Towards a contextualised approach to peacebuilding:

EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF RELIGION TO PEACEBUILDING IN LEBANON
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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INTRODUCTION

International ‘peacebuilding’ operations aim at preventing the recurrence of violence in countries that experienced civil conflicts (Paris, 2002). The word ‘peacebuilding’ sounds ambitious and appealing. Made of ‘peace’ i.e. the absence of armed conflict, and ‘building’ the concept of peacebuilding implies that peace can be developed according to a process. More than just ‘making peace’, ‘building peace’ means that peace is a long and complex process that goes further than reaching a settlement. This new dimension is interesting as one noticed that ‘making peace’ is usually not enough. Indeed, in many cases, peace agreements can be temporary and conflicts start again few days or few years after the signing of the agreement.

‘Peacebuilding’ is a “field of study, policy and practice” (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). These two last dimensions will be emphasised in this study. This means that, beyond a theory that analyses causes of war and peace, there exists a sort of ‘guideline’ or ‘methodology’ that could be used to build peace in a given environment. This sounds appealing as conflicts seem to be inherent in human societies. Indeed, in our contemporary societies, despite the accumulated knowledge and experiences of conflicts and their devastating consequences, wars still cause a lot of damages around the world. The idea that some tools would enable to build long-term peace and at the same time prevent new outbreaks of violence sounds both challenging and fascinating. ‘How can contemporary societies prevent the reproduction of deadly conflicts?’ is the underlying motivation of this study.

This question has motivated many intellectuals since the antiquity but experienced a growing interest recently in the 1960s within the academic field of ‘peace and conflict studies’. This social science “identifies and analyses violent and nonviolent behaviours as well as the structural mechanisms attending social conflicts with a view towards understanding those processes which lead to a more desirable human condition” (Dugan, 1989, p.74). It is not a closed realm and accepts contributions from many other fields of study such as economics, psychology, geography, political science, anthropology, history, gender studies, etc...

A concept largely developed within the field of peace and conflict studies is the one of ‘conflict resolution’. ‘Conflict resolution’ “implies that the deep-rooted causes of conflict are addressed and transformed. This implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p.29). The term is ambiguous because it refers at the same time to the process and the result. Moreover, it designates a “particular defined specialist field (‘conflict resolution journals’)” and an activity. The term started to be widely used in the 1970s and the 1980s (ibid.). Peacebuilding comes directly from
conflict resolution theories. The concept of ‘peacebuilding’ comes directly from conflict resolution theories.

‘Peacebuilding’ is a concept defined by its aim rather than by its content. To summarise, ‘peacebuilding’ designates “initiatives that are designed to prevent the eruption or return of armed conflict” (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). In 1992, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali used the concept of peacebuilding for the first time within the United Nations (UN) arena in his ‘Agenda for Peace’ and defined it as “a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation” (Boutros Ghali, 1992 in: Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009).

Since then, this definition has remained a standard for a range of actors involved in the field of peacebuilding and who agree on “the inherent ‘goodness’ of intervening in post-war societies to alleviate suffering” (Llamazares, 2005, p.20). These actors include: government development agencies, the military sector, the private sector, global financial institutions, international governmental organisations (IGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs), as well as academia and research organisations (ibid., p.22). Llamazares (2005) concludes of the existence of a ‘peacebuilding community’: “although methods and strategies may differ, actors that have traditionally held clashing agendas are now sharing a conceptual and operational language, and, at least rhetorically, adhering to similar principles and aims, forming the basis of a growing international post-war peacebuilding community” (p.22).

Despite the consensus about its necessity, peacebuilding remains largely criticized. Llamazares summarises four critics to peacebuilding strategies: “Too broad! Too dominant! Too un-reflexive! Too generic!” (p.22). Peacebuilding strategies as seen as ‘too broad’ because many different definitions of peacebuilding, more or less extensive, coexist and thus “it may appear more as a set of beliefs or injunctions rather than a coherent theory” (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). Moreover, strategies put in place by the peacebuilding community are ‘too dominant’ because they support an unique model, the Western model of liberal peace i.e. liberal democracy and market economy (Paris, 2002; Llamazares, 2005; Biersteker, 2007; Denskus, 2007; Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). As a consequence, peacebuilding strategies are also ‘too un-reflexive’ because peacebuilding actors, including scholars, question the core components of peacebuilding programmes (activities, actors, time, level of intervention, etc…) without questioning the values and assumptions underpinning the interventions (Llamzeres, 2005, p.21). This leads to a fourth critic...
this paper aims to address: peacebuilding strategies are ‘too generic’. Indeed, by supporting a unique model – the liberal peace model - peacebuilding policies and programmes tend to “attribute universality to culturally situated values and assumptions” (Llamazares, 2005, p. 21). This leads to the use of standardised managerial tools, implying that there would exist a ‘recipe’ to build peace. On the contrary, each country is different and has its own specificities that need to be taken into account to design efficient peacebuilding programmes. Biersteker (2007) states that “there is a danger that successes in one context will be picked up and imported wholesale into another without consideration of widely varying contextual, historical or situational differences between different conflict zones” (p.39). Therefore these generic strategies impact the effectiveness of peacebuilding programmes. Denskus (2007) explains that to build peace, there is a need for questioning the causes of violent conflicts in a politicised way and for “challenging Western understanding of economy, governance, and social aspirations of people” (p.656):

“Listening to people living in war and in peace, acknowledging their stories and those of the people who inhabit Aidland, and naming the uncertainties and failures that are part of these worlds, can help to bring a transformative element into a debate that is currently buried under the high pressure of supermodern aid management. Without these stories, and without more reflection on our own engagement and more qualitative insights into the social dynamics of war and peace, ‘peace-building’ will not even remain a buzzword. It will become another ‘airport’ on the global development travel routes – ‘This is the final call for the Aidlines flight from “gender” to “peacebuilding”, with a quick stop-over in “participation” (p. 661).

This study supports the idea that specificities of each country - culture, political and economic systems, regional context, history, etc... - have to be analysed to define the right methods and tools that will support peace in this given environment. Therefore, the aim of this research is to contribute to the definition of more adequate methods to build peace in a country i.e. methods that are specific to a country rather than a one-size-fits-all tool box.

To reach this goal, the theoretical framework of this paper will be based on the assumption that it is only by supporting a ‘bottom-up’ approach rather than a ‘top-down’ one that more concrete and effective results will be gained. Indeed, a bottom-up approach offers the guarantee to be specific and therefore adapted to each context. In this study, a bottom-up approach will be defined by two criteria: the type of actors who have to lead the peacebuilding process and the level at which they
should intervene. The first criterion implies to define the type of actors who could lead the peacebuilding process. While some authors emphasise the need for a strong third party role of the international community, others support local ownership to ensure a better sustainability. For instance, supporting the first thesis, Hampson (1996) argues that “the greater resources and staying power a third party could muster, the greater the chances of a peace agreement to deliver sustainable peace” (in: Llamazares, 2005, p.11). Advocating for the second position, Stiefel (1999) states that beyond participation, local ownership should imply to transfer control from donors to beneficiaries as it is more effective, more cost-effective and more sustainable (in: Llamazares, 2005, p.11). This ‘peacebuilding from below’ has however been criticised when it implies to support local power structures that are unjust. Still, this paper will focus on the role of these ‘insiders’ working in the field of peacebuilding i.e. “those vulnerable to conflict, because they are from the area and living there, are people who in some way must experience the conflict and live with its consequences personally” and not ‘outsiders’ who “choose to become involved in the conflict and have personally little to loose” (Aderson and Olson, 2003 in: Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). Even if this dichotomy does not totally reflect the distinction ‘local actors’/ ‘international actors’, the definition of ‘insiders’ still tells a lot about ‘local actors’. The leading role of this last category in the peacebuilding process will be emphasised in this study. The assumption underlying this choice is that these local actors are better skilled to design and implement relevant peacebuilding programmes rather than international actors, even if actions undertaken by both are necessary.

The second question implies to chose the level at which these local actors will intervene. Indeed, following Lederach’s (1997) multi-level approach, there are three levels at which actors can intervene (see Illustration 1: Lederach’s multi-level approach). The three approaches are complementary and their effectiveness depends on the context. Sometimes, in the same environment, the choice to prioritise one may be valid for few months and then, another one is necessary. This paper will focus only on local actors doing ‘level 3: grassroots leadership’ as it is considered as the core component of a bottom-up approach. It might not be the most effective level of intervention since projects at this level are usually small-scaled, but this research assumes that these leaders potentially have the most relevant qualitative approaches.
Illustration 1: Lederach’s multi-level approach

Types of Actors

Level 1: Top Leadership
- Military/political/religious leaders with high visibility

Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership
- Leaders respected in sectors
- Ethnic/religious leaders
- Academics/intellectuals
- Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership
- Local leaders
- Leaders of indigenous NGOs
- Community developers
- Local health officials
- Refugee camp leaders

Approaches to Building Peace

- Focus on high-level negotiations
- Emphasizes cease-fire
- Led by highly visible, single mediator

- Problem-solving workshops
- Training in conflict resolution
- Peace commissions
- Insider-party teams


In order to explore peacebuilding approaches implemented by local actors, at the grassroots level, Lebanon will be used as a case study. Lebanon has been the ground for many conflicts these last thirty-five years. It experienced a devastating civil war from 1975 to 1990. The country was still recovering when, in 2005, the prime minister Rafiq Hariri was murdered. This led to a major political crisis during which Syria was kicked out of the country. In July 2006, a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah broke out and lasted thirty-three days. Finally, in 2008, the two main Muslim communities in Lebanon – Sunni and Shiite – fought with each other after a governmental decision to dismantle Hezbollah’s private communication system. At the time of the research, summer 2010, tensions were very alive and there were persistent rumours about a possible new outbreak of violence. While writing this paper in January 2011, uncertainty remains. This succession of violent events makes it clear that Lebanon is not a country at peace and has not been at peace since 1975. Therefore, it becomes a relevant case study for research on peacebuilding. Indeed, efforts were done in the field of peacebuilding since and even before the end of the civil war in 1990, by both
Lebanese and international actors. However, as one noticed above, they remained unsuccessful and how to implement peace in Lebanon is still an ongoing challenge.

In order to detect contextualised tools to build peace in Lebanon, a focus will be done on religion\(^1\). In peace and conflict studies, religion has often been seen as generating conflicts. Therefore, little attention has been paid to its potential contributions to peace (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008, p.177). Indeed, all the solutions implemented by outsiders in post-conflict areas are mostly secular. However, during the last decade, scholars have produced studies about the relationships between religion, conflict and peace and support the potential capacity of religion and religious actors to contribute to the peace process (Bouta et al., 2005; Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008). The UN as well started programmes in this direction. In 2005 was founded the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’, a UN institution aiming “to improve understanding and cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures and religions, and to help counter the forces that fuel polarization and extremism” (United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, 2011). Its functions include to be “a bridge builder and convener, connecting people and organizations devoted to promoting trust and understanding between diverse communities, particularly – but not exclusively – between Muslim and Western societies” (ibid.).

This study will aim at exploring the potential contributions of religion to peacebuilding in Lebanon. Indeed, religious identities are still very strong among the Lebanese (Kraft et al., 2008, p.5). In countries where religion “plays a key role in the social life of the parties and in defining their identities (…) religious leaders and faith-based institutions may have a unique advantage in internal or ethnic conflicts” (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008, p.195). Therefore, religion will be used in this study as a path to build contextualised peacebuilding strategies for Lebanon.

The contribution of religion to peace can be studied under very different angles. Since this study aims at focusing on local leaders intervening at the grassroots level, contributions of faith-based actors to the peacebuilding process will be analysed. Faith-based actors “can be defined as organizations, institutions and individuals who are motivated and inspired by their spiritual and religious traditions, principles and values to undertake peace work” (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, 2008, p.185). This research will focus on faith-based organisations that are part of the

\(^{1}\) “Religion is often defined as a set of beliefs and practices. It is an important segment of a culture and influences and shapes one’s identity. However, it is important to mention that not all practices that are ‘justified’ by religion are actually related to religion. More often than not, these are actual socio-cultural traditions that are thought to have its origins in religion or are justified in the name of God. This is the thin and difficult line that defines where interpretation starts and ends” (Gunn, 2003).
Lebanese ‘civil society’. Indeed, civil society organisations (CSOs) are recognised to be a necessary actor to implement peacebuilding strategies (Pouligny, 2005, p.495-510). Faith-based organisations are more and more involved in peacebuilding activities (Bouta et al., 2005, p.1). However, it has not always been the case and contributions of faith-based organisations to peace have often been neglected in the past for the reasons mentioned above. First, because religion was not considered in a positive way in the field of peacebuilding. Second, because outsiders tended to define civil society using the Western criteria and many faith-based organisations do not fit these (Pouligny, 2005, p.498).

Faith-based organisations are well implanted in Lebanon (Abu-Assi, 2006, p.24). This study will therefore aim at exploring the potential contributions of local faith-based organisations to the peacebuilding process in Lebanon.

As mentioned above, peacebuilding is a broad concept that can include many activities depending on the chosen definition. Generally, peacebuilding will recover the following areas: “To provide security and public order; To establish the political and institutional framework of long-term peace; To generate justice and rule of law; To support the psycho-social recovery and the healing of the wounds of war; To establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace” (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). This paper will focus on the fourth category: psycho-social recovery and especially the process of ‘reconciliation’. ‘Reconciliation’ “is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future” (Bloomfield, 2003, p.12).

It was chosen since, while being in Lebanon, it appeared quickly that tensions between Lebanese are still very alive and that some actions need to be undertaken in order to favour a peaceful coexistence between the Lebanese. Since “lasting reconciliation must be home-grown” (Huyse, 2003, p.23), local faith-based organisations acting at the grassroots level have a potential role to play in the Lebanese reconciliation process.

To summarise, the main question of this study is: How do local faith-based organisations contribute to the reconciliation process in Lebanon? To answer this question, sub-questions have been designed:

- How do local faith-based organisations approach reconciliation in Lebanon theoretically and in practice?

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2 ‘Civil society’ refers to the “arena of voluntary – uncoerced – collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” (Pouligny, 2005, p.497). See more in Chapter III ‘Peacebuilding’ and civil society’.
• How do the religious orientations of local faith-based organisations influence their work on reconciliation?
• What are the main challenges to their work? How do local faith-based organisations evaluate their impact?

In order to answer these questions, the study will be divided into three parts. The first part - the conceptual framework - will describe theoretically the concepts that will be used in this paper: peacebuilding, religion, civil society and reconciliation. Only the dimensions useful for the research will be mentioned. This part will be closed by a methodology chapter. The second part will aim at applying the concepts mentioned above to the Lebanese context. This is a necessary step in order to get a global picture of the challenges faced by Lebanon to implement peace and in particular reconciliation. Finally, the last part consists in analysing critically the work of several local faith-based organisations working on reconciliation in Lebanon and drawing conclusions from it.
PART 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Chapter I: The concept of peacebuilding

1. History of the concept

The concept of peacebuilding first emerged in the field of peace and conflict studies with researchers such as Galtung and Lederach. Galtung\(^3\) (1976) introduced the concept of ‘positive peace’: “a structural transformation towards a socio-political and economic system capable of fostering justice and ensuring a self-sustained peace” (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). It is opposed to ‘negative peace’ that restricts peace to the absence of conflict. Galtung’s idea is that peace is a complex process that encompasses a range of dimensions and that cannot be only described by ‘the absence of conflict’. From that point, when analysing the potential roles of third-party actors in a post-war country, Galtung started to distinguish the concepts of ‘peacekeeping’, ‘peacemaking’ and ‘peacebuilding’. ‘Peacekeeping’ consists in preventing warring parties from attacking each other, often by sending UN peacekeepers on the ground. ‘Peacemaking’ implies forging a settlement between parties, which might be done through a peace agreement for instance. The process is usually owned by diplomats but more and more citizens are being involved. Galtung’s core idea is different but complementary to these two concepts. According to him, to reach sustainable peace the underlying causes of violence need to be addressed. For Pouligny\(^4\) and Hovanesian (2009), Galtung’s work introduced the main concepts to describe today’s notion of peacebuilding: “an endeavor aiming to create sustainable peace by addressing the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict and eliciting indigenous capacities for peaceful management and resolution of conflict”.

Lederach\(^5\) (1995), agreed with Galtung and introduced a new concept: ‘conflict transformation’. Transformation involves that “conflict can progress in either positive or destructive ways” (Gawerc, 2006, p.439). ‘Stopping’ a conflict might not be the solution if it is done at the expense of justice. Therefore, conflict transformation can be defined as “an ongoing process of change from negative to positive relations, behavior, attitudes and structures” (Pouligny and

\(^3\) Mathematician and sociologist, he is considered as the founder of peace and conflict studies.

\(^4\) Researcher expert in the field of peacebuilding. She was a senior consultant for the Peacebuilding Initiative, a project led by HPCR International, in partnership with the Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Program, Harvard University and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. This website is largely quoted in this paper and provides quality and exhaustive information about theoretical and practical questions related to the field of peacebuilding.

\(^5\) Practitioner and researcher in the field of peacebuilding, he has widely written on conflict resolution and mediation.
Hovanesian, 2009). It is related to peacebuilding since cultivating “an infrastructure of peacebuilding [means that] we are not merely interested in ‘ending’ something that is not desired. We are oriented toward the building of relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes, and structures” (Lederach, 1997 in: Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). Both concepts of peacebuilding and conflict transformation are linked to the idea of positive peace because they imply that “it is [direct, structural, and/or cultural] violence, not conflict that is seen as the antithesis of peace” (Miall et al., 1995 in: Gawerc, 2006, p.443). Work on the meanings of sustainable peace remained restricted to scholars interests for a long time. However, in 1989, as a new international context emerged, this work started to have concrete applications for governments and institutions in charge of peace and security issues, such as the UN.

After the fall of the USSR in 1989 and the end of the bipolar world, many scholars focused on the changing nature of conflicts. This context favoured the emergence of the idea that wars have a human cost and destructive consequences on states and societies and that something has to be done to avoid all these consequences: peacebuilding efforts. During this period, there was also a new debate about how to define 'human security'. Some argued that individuals should be protected from violent threats like genocide whereas others considered that threats such as hunger or natural disasters should also be included in the security agenda as they cause far more deaths than wars. (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). Therefore, in 1992, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali used the concept of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' in his ‘Agenda for Peace’ (see definition in the introduction). From then peacebuilding became a priority for the UN, leading to the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005.

2. Challenges of defining peacebuilding

The first critic addressed in the introduction was that peacebuilding involves so many dimensions that it is usually defined in a very broad way and this makes it difficult to use. “The term peacebuilding can be used to describe a varied set of activities or programmes, the manner that these programmes are implemented as well as their potential outcomes. It further encompasses efforts undertaken at different levels of the intervention and implemented by different actors” (Lewer, 1999 in: Llamazares, 2005, p.3). The challenge is that, if so many activities, levels and actors are assembled under a same umbrella term ‘peacebuilding’, it might become too broad to be meaningful. Llamazeres (2005) states there are six questions that will enable an academic or organisation to get a full definition of peacebuilding:

*What kind of peace should be built?* This refers to the debate about positive and negative
peace mentioned above. Supporters of negative peace claim for a realistic approach that just aims at ending violence in the short-term. Their opponents advocate for addressing the underlying causes of conflict in order to prevent new outbreaks of violence in the long-term i.e. positive peace. This question is closely related to the debate of peacebuilding as ‘stabilization’ or ‘transformation’. After 9/11, there was a focus on stability, meaning the need for a highly interventionist approach in order to stop violence. But the opponents stated that this confirms the statu quo and thus, does not build peace. They argued that peacebuilding activities should be an opportunity to change the underlying causes of the conflict. However theories of change still have to be examined more thoroughly to avoid general assumptions; for example that war destroys all the social fabric whereas, in reality, war transforms more than it destroys (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). The distinction between positive peace and negative peace also has implications on listing the issues to be addressed. Indeed a broad approach is difficult to implement as “there is no master variable for explaining either the outbreak of violence or the construction of a positive peace but a fairly large number of possible factors merely groupings of factors across categories such as greed and grievance, and catalytic events (...) [and] we have relatively little knowledge regarding what causes peace or what the paths to peace are” (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). Therefore, there is an attempt to narrow the concept of peacebuilding since the goal should not be “a synonym of all the positive things we would want to include in development in order to reduce any and all of a society's ills” (Lund, 2003 in: Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). Despite these critics, this study will adopt a definition of peace close to the one of positive peace. Indeed, even if this might be more difficult to implement, it is necessary to aim at building sustainable peace rather than just ending violence in the short-term. The case of Lebanon demonstrates that not addressing the underlying causes of violence leads to a precarious peace (see Chapter VI ‘Peacebuilding in Lebanon).

What sources of conflict should the intervention address? There is a consensus on the idea that peacebuilding implies to address the root causes of the conflict. Debates are about the dimension that should be addressed in priority. Some authors, such as Maynard (1999), emphasise the need to address insecurity issues “as it is vital that freedom of movement, absence of personal or group threats, and safe access to resources is achieved for all in the post-war setting to even hint a movement towards healing and reconciliation” (in: Llamzeres, 2005, p.7). Other scholars, like Pugh (1995, 2000), state that poverty is the main source of conflict and socio-economic vulnerability should be addressed in priority (in: Llamzeres, 2005, p.8). A third group of academics support the need for political and institutional reforms such as Kumar (1998) who argues that “post-conflict elections would restore the loss of legitimacy of political institutions and processes, thus institutionalising a conflict resolution mechanism into the body politic” (in: Llamzeres, 2005, p.9).
Finally, a last group of authors gives priority to the psycho-social dimension of conflict. Rothstein (1999) argues that “[…] since there is obviously an important psychological or emotional component of protracted conflicts, there is […] likely to be an equally important psychological or emotional component to their resolution” (in: Llamazeres, 2005, p.9). All the dimensions mentioned above are complementary: one will not work in isolation of the others. In this research, a focus will be done on the psycho-social dimension of conflict. Not because it is the most important dimension to build peace, but since it is an ideal dimension to assess the relevance of bottom-up approaches. Indeed, insiders are the better positioned to intervene in the cultural and spiritual spheres compared to outsiders (Cousins and Kumar, 2001 in: Cutter, 2005, p.781).

Who should guide the peacebuilding intervention? This question has already been mentioned in the introduction: should international players or at the contrary local actors lead the peacebuilding process? Again, a common action of actors altogether is necessary to obtain concrete results. However, in this paper, it is assumed that the latter ones should lead the process as they know better what they need.

What level of the intervention should drive the peacebuilding process? As presented in Lederach’s pyramid (1997, p.20) in the introduction, there are three levels of intervention. In this paper, a focus will be done on ‘level 3: grassroots leadership’.

What activities constitute peacebuilding? Peacebuilding activities aim at addressing the sources of conflict mentioned above: security, economy, politics and psycho-social recovery. Therefore, activities are part of processes. Pouligny and Hovanesian (2009) defines five processes:

- To provide security and public order;
- To establish the political and institutional framework of long-term peace;
- To generate justice and rule of law;
- To support the psycho-social recovery and the healing of the wounds of war;
- To establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace.

This approach has been chosen because this is at the same time comprehensive – all sources of conflict mentioned above are encompassed - and synthetic. Peacebuilding though should not be mixed up with 'development': it is a comprehensive political project that aims at avoiding the resurgence of violence (Tschirgi, 2004 in: Poulingy and Hovanesian, 2009). Activities are defined according to these processes and can be very diverse. For instance, Lund (2001) proposes a list of measures (in: Llamazares, 2005, p.16):

- Non-official Conflict Management Methods, supporting indigenous dispute resolution
mechanisms, peace commissions, non-official facilitation and problem-solving workshops;

• **Economic and Social Measures**, like humanitarian assistance, development assistance, economic reforms, inter-communal trade, private investment, agricultural programs, aid conditionality, economic sanctions,

• **Communications and Education Measures**, for example peace radio/TV, media professionalisation, journalist training, international broadcast, peace education, exchange visits, conflict resolution training;

• Etc.

This list consists in total of seven categories of measures. Here, only the most significant measures for this study were mentioned. This demonstrates that peacebuilding activities can be very diverse and complementary. In this study, the focus will be done on the process “to support the psychosocial recovery and the healing of the wounds of war” as reconciliation will be the main theme of this paper. Any kind of measure implemented by local leaders at the grassroots level to promote reconciliation will be analysed: from education measures to economic and social projects.

*When and for how long should peacebuilding happen?* As a consequence of the distinction between negative and positive peace, Last (2000) argues that “the setting must be ‘secured’ before any other peace-building activities take place, namely that the *hawks* must ‘boxed’ before the *doves* are ‘released’” (in: Llamazares, 2005, p.19). Moreover Lederach (1997) proposes “to construct a ‘working matrix for developing an infrastructure for peace-building’ that tackles first the crisis stage and issues for a period of 2-6 months; then the people and relationships for 1-2 years; then the institutions or sub-system for 5-10 years; and finally the vision of peace and desired future that all hope for and move towards and that will need work for generations” (in: Llamazares, p.19). In this paper, no focus will be done on the ‘when’ and the ‘how long’ as it is assumed that reconciliation is such a long and complex process as well as an intangible dimension of peacebuilding, that it is not advisable to try to set up any schedule.

3. **A recipe to build peace**

In the introduction, four critics to the peacebuilding concept were mentioned: “Too broad! Too dominant! Too un-reflexive! Too generic!” (Llamazeres, 2005, p.22). The first one was developed above, this paragraph will detail the remaining ones.
The only consensus about peacebuilding stems from its normative basis: it is a liberal project. “Peacebuilding is broadly constituted on the premise that democratic institutions and market mechanisms will ultimately provide the stable foundations for peace, both internally and externally” (Biersteker, 2007, p.39). Two conclusions could be drawn from that. First: peacebuilding is a Western project. Indeed, liberal peace, despite it is always presented in universal terms, remains embedded in particular Western historical and cultural contexts (Pouligny and Hovanesian, 2009). Paris (2002) states that peacebuilders support a particular vision of how states should be organised internally, based on models of liberal democracy and market-oriented economics. Paris concludes that peacebuilding missions can be compared to European colonial times and their ‘mission civilisatrice’: peacebuilders, when supporting a unique legitimate model of domestic governance, oblige war-shattered countries to comply with a ‘standard of civilisation’, necessary condition to be fully recognised and accepted by the international community (p.638). What is the legitimacy of this approach that aims at spreading a unique dominant peacebuilding model around the world and that can therefore be compared to ‘neo-colonialism’? If one put aside the ideological question, another issue relates to the effectiveness of such goals to promote peace. Indeed, scholars do not justify why democracy would be a necessary condition of peace.

Second: peacebuilding is a political project. Indeed, as managerial tools are used to run peacebuilding projects, it might make forget its highly political dimension: “by introducing managerial tools – such as the current focus on measuring the ‘effectiveness’ of peacebuilding (Anderson, 2004; Hoffman, 2004; Paffenholz and Reychler, 2007) – critical questions about the causes of violent conflict and the future outlook of societies emerging from conflict are depoliticised (cf. Ferguson 1994)” (Denskus, 2007, p.658). Peacebuilding is about peace and war, how people live together, what future they expect, how they deal with past: topics that are highly controversial, sensitive and political and deserve to be thoroughly analysed before starting any project. Because of these two factors – a Western project presented as a universal one and implemented by managerial tools with the risk of forgetting its political causes – peacebuilding is in fact a sort of ‘recipe’ to reach peace whereas each country requires its specific traits to be taken into account when designing a peacebuilding programme.

A surprising point is, as Llamzares (2005) states, that scholars working on peacebuilding are “too un-reflexive” (p.21). Indeed, few of them question this Western paradigm and alternatives to liberal peace are rare. Even scholars acknowledging it do not offer alternatives. For instance, Paris (2002) states: “I do not claim that this kind of globalisation is necessarily undesirable - indeed, I
have written elsewhere that peacebuilders should continue to promote the principles of liberal market democracy in war-shattered states” (p.638). As a result, Llamazeres just argues that peacebuilders should be clearer about it: “agencies engaged in post-war intervention must adhere to a four-dimension definition of peacebuilding encompassing: (1) An explicit and transparent aim to build positive peace” (p.30).

b) “Too generic!”: the need for contextualised tools

In order to implement relevant peacebuilding strategies, there is a need for developing tools specific to the selected post-war environment. A “comprehensive assessment of the context, conflict and peace dynamics, indigenous capacities and opportunities for peace should precede the design of peacebuilding programs” (Poulingy and Hovanesian, 2009). No analysis of the specific characteristics of a country could lead to activities irrelevant at best or harmful at worst. If one assumes that promoting democracy is the right priority to achieve peace, designing adequate and specific methods is required. For instance Paris (2005), supporter of liberal peace, states that trying to spread too quickly democracy and market economy might harm the country. Indeed, these two phenomena rely on the idea of competition: competition between political parties in democracy; competition between individuals and companies in market economy. However, promoting competition between people who just experienced war might be of danger: “political competition, even in the framework of a nascent democracy, can reinforce the very lines of division that defined the conflict. On the economic side, the marketisation programmes and the competition associated with increased privatisation can reinforce the differences and the gaps between the economic winners and losers in a society” (p.769).

As a remedy to avoid general assumptions and recipes to build peace, some indigenous authors started to advocate for their own visions and mechanisms of peacebuilding. For instance Murithi (2006), a South-African researcher, states that “[to build peace in an African context] what is required is to find a way to combine the best lessons that tradition has to offer with progressive modern norms and standards for the protection of human rights” (p.14). He describes traditional conflict resolution mechanisms used in Africa such as Gacaca in Rwanda, Ubuntu in East, Central and Southern Africa or Mato Oput in Uganda. These mechanisms can be more efficient than the imported ones as they are in line with local cultures. In the Middle East, Abu-Nimer (2000) criticises the Western assumption that Islamic religion and culture are not compatible with the principles of peacebuilding, conflict resolution, nonviolence and even democracy (p.217). Therefore, his work aims to “actively promote peacebuilding and nonviolent strategies and values
based on an indigenous Islamic religious context” (p.218). According to him, this is a necessary condition to implement efficient strategies in these contexts. This study agrees with this need for supporting local and indigenous methods and that is why it will focus on analysing contributions from local actors.

c) The role of outsiders

Even if this will not be treated in depth in this study, the above reflections raise the question of the involvement outsiders should have in the peacebuilding process. Dobins (2003) states that the support of the international community is essential: “what distinguishes German, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo on the one hand, from Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan on the other, are not their levels of economic development, Western culture, or national homogeneity. Rather, what distinguishes these two groups is the level of effort the international community has put into their democratic transformations” (in: Poulingy and Hovanesian, 2009). However, the nature of this intervention is discussed. Cousins and Kumar (2001) state that “the revitalisation of political institutions is one of the few areas where external actors can play a legitimate role, and that other areas of post-war recovery - such as the cultural or spiritual spheres - are internal processes where outsiders can have only limited impact and credibility” (in: Cutter, 2005, p.781). It means that the legitimate role of international actors lies in their capacity to help building the political institutions rather than encompassing the full array of activities that was mentioned above (security, economy and psychosocial recovery). As the main theme of this study is to work on reconciliation, the role of local actors will be analysed in priority. However, one of the sub-aims of this research will be to give some clues about how outsiders could improve their peacebuilding strategies by using the example of Lebanon.

In this chapter, the definition of peacebuilding adopted by this research has been detailed. The next step is to explore the relationships between religion and peacebuilding.
Chapter II: Peacebuilding and religion

1. Religion and conflict

In the field of peace and conflict studies, religion is frequently seen as a source of violence rather than a tool to promote peace. Indeed “secular, rational problem-solving approaches and methodological, epistemological perspectives developed by conflict resolution scholars viewed religion either as an instigator of conflict or ignore it altogether because religious issues involved in conflicts cannot be addressed from an empirical or positivist perspective” (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orenallana, 2009, p.177). However, scholars started to work on the relationships between religion and peace and this study aims at contributing to this movement.

Religious beliefs and practices can be the principal cause of conflict. However, often it is rather religion as a part of the identity of a group that leads to violence (Haynes, 2009, p.56). Indeed, “religion, unfortunately, is often the most visible difference between contesting groups and, as a result, frequently is blamed for conflicts” (Schneier, 2002 in: Pouligny and Katz, 2009). Religion can therefore be manipulated by the warring parties: “when conflicts are couched in religious terms, they become transformed in value conflicts. Unlike other issues, such as resource conflicts, which can be resolved by pragmatic and distributive means, value conflicts have a tendency to become mutually conclusive or zero-sum issues. They entail strong judgments of what is right and wrong, and parties believe that there cannot be a common ground to resolve their differences” (Reychler, 1997 in: Pouligny and Katz, 2009). Religion is used by warring parties since it is an easy way to rally people on their sides. In that process, religious actors can be part of the problem, for instance by establishing alliance with the war entrepreneurs, or part of the solution if they denounce this manipulation.

2. Religious teachings and peacebuilding

Religion can contribute to peacebuilding through its beliefs. Indeed, religious teachings have a great impact on people's thoughts and behaviours: “religion embraces a creed, a cult, a code of conduct, and a confessional community” (Appleby, 2000 in: Pouligny and Katz, 2009). The link between peace and religion is tight: “religion 'as a powerful constituent of cultural norms and values' is deeply implicated in individual and social conceptions of peace, because it addresses
some of the most profound existential issues of human life, such as freedom, inevitability, fear/security, right/wrong, sacred/profane” (Said and Funk, 2002 in: Bouta et al., 2005, p.11). This assumption might be valid for all religions (Gopin, 2000 in: Bouta et al., 2005, p.11). Some religious practitioners made a great contribution to peacebuilding theory such as the Quaker conciliator Adam Curle (1916-2006), who developed the concept of ‘peacebuilding from below’ at the peacemaking stage, and the Mennonite peacebuilder John Paul Lederach, who worked on the concept of ‘conflict transformation’ (see Chapter I ‘The concept of peacebuilding’), to cite only the most well-known. Religious ideas on peace and security have a great potential to have impact on the communities involved since for them they might make more sense than ‘universal guidelines’ from the UN (Bouta et al., 2005, p.11).

3. Religious actors and peacebuilding

Religion can contribute to peacebuilding through its actors. Indeed, religious individuals and organisations from different religions are increasingly involved in the field of peacebuilding (Bouta et al., 2005; Smock, 2006). This is not a new phenomenon. For instance, these actors have been involved in mediation at the peacemaking stage i.e. forging a settlement between parties. A famous example is the work carried out by the Community of Sant’Egidio to end the civil war in Mozambique in 1992. A study is now done on the activities carried out during the peacebuilding phase in order to prevent a new outbreak of violence and to build sustainable peace.

a) Local religious actors and their traditional functions in the society

Pouligny and Katz (2009) list three types of traditional religious actors one can find at the local level:

- **Religious authorities** who play the role of spiritual leaders and occupy a position of authority in a religious organization or community;
- **Traditional spiritual leaders** who do not belong to an organized religion but play a spiritual role, often more localized to a specific community; and
- **Members of religious communities** who have been influenced by a religious community and who are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or defend its values and precepts.

These traditional religious actors can play an important role in peacebuilding because of the social
functions they traditionally perform in their society such as ‘mobilisation’, ‘socialisation’, ‘integration’ and ‘substitution’ (Pouligny, 2006 in: Pouligny and Katz, 2009). Therefore through their function of ‘mobilisation’, they can contribute to shape people's views and values towards peace. Through their function of ‘socialisation’, they can educate and train people to adopt peaceful behaviours. Through their function of ‘integration’, they provide relief and development aid which is a great channel to contribute to peacebuilding. Finally, through their substitution function, religious actors become political actors and can advocate for political change towards peace.

Observers noticed that local religious actors usually survive better to war and state collapse compared to other institutions. For instance, if the governmental structures break down, religious actors and their institutions might be the last left organisations with credibility, trust and moral authority (Pouligny and Katz, 2009). They can contribute “to reweave a society and create the social structures that allow economic and political rebuilding to take place. Within these more local contexts, the faith beliefs and institutions of a community often take on an important role and can be positive factors in peacebuilding” (Moix, 2007 in: Pouligny and Katz, 2009).

b) Potential contributions of faith-based organisations to peacebuilding

Religious actors might influence peacebuilding as members of civil society. At the local level, one can find individual religious actors or faith-based organisations. Faith-based NGOs are “non-state actors that have a religious or faith core to their philosophy, membership, or programmatic approach, although they are not simply missionaries” (Diklitch and Price, 2004 in: Pouligny and Katz, 2009). At the international level, there are also faith-based organisations as well as interreligious and transnational movements.

The ways faith-based organisations undertake peacebuilding are very diverse. They can decide to act at the grassroots level or at the highest level, as both are necessary. They can have activities specifically dedicated to peacebuilding such as trainings concerning conflict transformation or peace education programs. They can also do it through development activities. Indeed, according to Smock (2006), “peace can be often promoted most efficiently by introducing peace-building components into more traditional relief and development activities” (p.4). This is acknowledged as an efficient manner to promote peace because the conflicting sides have to work together towards a concrete common goal: the improvement of their economical and social situation. Indeed some activities focusing only on theory without taking into account the concrete personal interests of people might be inefficient. Smock adds that secular peacebuilding projects can be very similar than the ones carried out by faith-based organisations, however, “the various
religious orientations of these faith-based organisations typically shape the peacebuilding they undertake” (p.2). For instance, these actors invoke religious texts for their activities. Further research needs to be done on how these religious orientations concretely shape their peacebuilding actions.

As a result, Bouta et al. in their comprehensive study (2005) report nine different ways in which faith-based (i.e. Christian, Muslim or multi-faith) organisations might have an impact on peacebuilding (p.35):

• Altering behaviours, attitudes, negative stereotypes and mine frames of Christian, Muslim and non-faith-based participants
• Healing of trauma and injuries as well as rehumanizing the 'other'
• Contributing to more effective dissemination of ideas such as democracy, human rights, justice development and peace-building
• Drafting committed people from a wide pool because of their wide presence in society and broad community base
• Challenging traditional structures, such as the perceived role of women in society
• Reaching out to governments, effecting policy changes, and reaching out to youth
• Mediating between conflicting parties
• Encouraging reconciliation, inter-faith dialogue, disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration
• Connecting – via international faith-based networks – like-minded faith-based communities in other countries, but also not like-minded faith-based actors for support, and in convening large meetings of them

This list is very interesting to show the wide range of activities that faith-based organisations can potentially implement. They have capacities and resources that make them great collaborators to promote peace, if they have the willingness to do so. Scholars acknowledge the strengths of these organisations (Bouta et al., 2005; Smock, 2006). One is that they might have a greater impact on the population: “faith-based NGOs do not do necessarily the job better than secular NGOs, but they can become connected with and inspire local religious communities, which in turn enhances their effectiveness” (Bolling in: Smock, 2006, p.2). Indeed, they can have more legitimacy than other organisations: “conflict fomented by a religious community can best be contested by a creative minority from the same faith community, which in some case can be faith-based NGOs” (Vendley in: Smock, 2006, p.2). Bouta and al. (2005) identify six strengths of faith-based peacebuilding (p.39):
• Strong faith-based motivation for peace-building
• Long term presence of local religious actors
• Long-term commitment of international faith-based actors
• Moral and spiritual authority
• Niche to mobilize (religious) communities for peace
• Faith-based peacebuilding can create a transcendental environment that encourages overcoming personal and religious differences

It shows that faith-based organisations have strengths that are complementary to the ones of secular organisations: their motivation is strong because based on faith or they own a moral and spiritual authority that might lack to other organisations. Of course, these strengths are potential: if a faith-based organisation decides to promote violence or intolerance, they will hinder rather than support the peacebuilding process.

The same comprehensive study acknowledges several weaknesses of peacebuilding activities carried out by faith-based NGOs. First, religious actors might be accused of proselytizing. For instance, a Christian organisation organising activities to reconcile Christians and Muslims, might be seen by the latter as trying to convince people that their religious orientation is the best. This highlights the fact that, in order to be better accepted by all stakeholders and especially the ones who do not belong to the same religious community, faith-based organisations could gain in some occasions by emphasising their neutrality. Another weakness described by Bouta et al. is the potential lack of professionalism of these organisations. Indeed “[some peace-building actors] seem to focus more on their faith-based motivation for peace-building, or on maintaining deep and long-term relationships with local counterparts, than on the fact that peacebuilding is a profession for which an organisation and its local counterparts require specific skills and experience” (p.41). One could question whether faith-based organisation should aim at being more professional or not. Indeed, peacebuilding is not their job, it is a consequence of their involvement to promote certain values. Moreover, it is usually on a voluntary basis.

Other debates related to the contribution of faith-based actors to peacebuilding processes include the link between them and the political sphere. Philipott (2007) argues that faith-based actors tend to be more effective if they stand aside from regimes (in: Pouligny and Katz, 2009).

Religion and especially faith-based organisations can potentially contribute greatly to peacebuilding processes. Before going into their role in the reconciliation process, the next chapter will analyse specifically the role of CSOs in the peacebuilding process.
Chapter III: Peacebuilding and civil society

1. Potential contributions of civil society organisations to peacebuilding

Civil society is a central concept in the peacebuilding theory because active CSOs are viewed as being an essential element to build democracy and good governance i.e. liberal peace. Pouligny (2005) states that “in war-torn societies, the creation and consolidation of NGOs is more specifically considered as part of the process of democratization” (p.496). Indeed, in our democracies, there are considered as a pillar of the society: they give extra opportunities to citizens to raise their voice outside of the electoral process. In post-conflict countries, “[CSOs] are often seen to carry the best hopes for a genuine democratic counterweight to the power-brokers, economic exploiters and warlords who tend to predominate in conflict-ridden weak or failed states, and may even capture the electoral processes” (Pouligny, 2005, p.496). They can contribute to rebuild trust between and within the communities, re-establish a state-society relationship and build a new social contract (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). CSOs also help to increase local participation and ownership, necessary conditions for sustainable peace.

CSOs are involved in all parts of the peacebuilding process (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). In addition to democracy, CSOs can support economic recovery through the development of economic opportunities such as micro-finance mechanisms. CSOs can be involved in the field of security and public order for example by their participation in the disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) programs. CSOs contribute to the field of justice and rule of law by providing legal assistance to facilitate access to justice. Finally, CSOs support psycho-social recovery in many ways: by providing psycho-social assistance, by supporting the reconciliation process, etc... Generally speaking, CSOs can make a contribution to peacebuilding processes by acting as intermediaries between outsiders and the communities or by providing alternative or complementary modes of governance when the state is not strong enough.

2. A contested definition

CSOs can have significant impacts on peacebuilding processes but defining them remains a difficult issue. Practitioners and academics working in the field of peacebuilding generally agree on two statements about the concept of civil society: “[civil society encompasses] the arena of
voluntary, uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” and “civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power” (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). In practice though, the term is not used in such various ways. And despite this general framework, there is no precise definition of civil society.

Following Pouligny and Martini (2009), a first element of debate in the field of peacebuilding is whether business and markets should be considered as part of civil society or not. A second element of discussion is about the link between civil society and government and politics: can civil society be politically neutral? To go beyond these considerations, some authors decided to approach civil society as “a space between societal sectors [i.e. political, economic and private spheres] (…) Thus, some actors do not belong just to one sector but operate in various spheres” (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006 in: Pouligny and Martini, 2009). For instance, people working for the government might also be involved in a community-based organisation. Politico-military actors might have their own humanitarian branches, etc… “This perspective helps us to apply a less rigid typology of what civil society is supposed to represent, and allows for the discovery and participation of those groups that may not correspond to a Western vision of civil society groups, such as more indigenous traditional forms of organization” (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). Indeed, the history of the notion, its cultural specificities and its evolution tend to be forgotten. Donors tend to seek organisations that are structured on the Western model in non-Western contexts without taking into account the local political structures or the traditional political systems. The issue is about the consequences that a chosen definition can lead to. The local forms of civil society, including informal networks and traditional forms of organisation, might be overlooked: “the risk is simply looking for forms that mirror what outsiders expect but that lack local cultural roots” (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). For example, if civil society is defined as politically neutral by donors, they might skip to support influential civil society groups (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). “The very West-oriented history of civil society and the lack of integration of other socio-political cultures explain why there is a persistent debate about the appropriateness of applying the notion of civil society to non-Western contexts” ((Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006 in: Pouligny and Martini, 2009). To make support more efficient, this study assumes that there is a need to broaden in practice the definition of civil society and to include more organisations.
3. Forms of civil society

There are various models aiming at classifying civil society actors. First, CSOs might be distinguished according to their geographical origin. ‘Insiders’ are local NGOs and community-based and grassroots organisations. To this group might be added, depending on the chosen definition, business associations, trade associations and professional associations, research and academic institutions as well as media and journalist associations, religious and faith-based communities and even traditional leaders. ‘Outsiders’ include international NGOs (INGOs), often Northern rather than international, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), donors, research and policy institutes and private foundations (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). Another sub-distinction among local actors is between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ organisations: some might aim at acting at the national level whether others focus on a community or a particular region.

What is the difference between NGOs and community-based and grassroots organisations? “The term 'non-governmental organisation' refers to a freely constituted group of persons or private collectivities for non-profit purposes” (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). In practice, the status of NGOs is self-attributed and acknowledged by donors if some prerequisites are fulfilled concerning their institutional form and professionalism among others criteria. They are professional-oriented and deliver services to 'beneficiaries'. They contrast with 'grassroots organisations', also named 'community-based organisations' which are “generally thought of as managed by members or directly on behalf of members of a community” (Pouligny and Martini, 2009). They might be overlooked by donors because of their lack of institutionalisation even if they represent the civil society better than NGOs: “NGOs are part of civil society only if they act together with citizen, corporate and autonomous institutions to engender the peaceful pursuit of a variety of societal interests, and do so in ways that help to counterbalance any particular partisan force that seeks to dominate” (Lund, Huvin and Cohen, 2006 in: Pouligny and Martini, 2009).

Actor-oriented models also define which groups form CSOs. For example, “civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups” (The London School of Economics and Political Science Centre for Civil Society in: Pouligny and Martini, 2009). On the other hand, function-oriented models stress the activities carried out by civil society. Therefore, the distinction between organisations is made according to their sectors of activity: human rights, education, humanitarian aid, etc...

These are attempts to theoretically put order into the field of civil society. Whatever criteria
are chosen to define, divide or distinguish civil society, the most important is to envisage the practical consequences this definition will have on the programmes implemented and their efficiency to contribute to peacebuilding. In this study, the focus will be done on insiders, with a focus on grassroots and community-based organisations. Using the *actor-oriented model*, faith-based organisations will be the main subjects of this research. Using the *fonction-oriented model*, organisations working on reconciliation will be studied.

4. Controversies about the involvement of civil society organisations in peacebuilding

CSOs are viewed as an important actor in a post-conflict situation as they are supposed to have been more resilient to violence than other structures. The idea is to “identify 'civil society' against a 'failed' state, to play NGOs, intellectuals, women, religious groups or 'elders' against 'warlords,' 'low politics' against 'high politics’” (Pouligny, 2005, p.496). Donors might see CSOs in a romanticized way whereas “during conflict and immediately after, civil society [organisations] tend to be organized along conflict lines, thus fostering clientelism, reinforcing societal cleavages and hindering democratization” (Harpviken and Kjellman, 2004 in: Pouligny and Martini, 2009). Even after a longer period, CSOs might have anti-social ends and can harm social cohesion rather than supporting it.

The relation between CSOs and the state is also controversial. Outsiders started working with CSOs because collaborating with the state was not an easy task: it is a long process and involves people who are not always committed to it. The 'bottom-up' approach is seen as an alternative to the costly and hard process of rebuilding state structures. However, an issue to address is the extent to which supporting CSOs undermines state structures. The aid given to CSOs is perceived by some governments as a means to privatize state structures, project issued from the liberal economic agenda of the donors. “NGOs increasingly look both like quasi-governmental institutions, because of the way they substitute state functions, and at the same time like a market, because of the way they compete with one another” (Kaldor, 2003 in: Pouligny and Martini, 2009). When supporting CSOs, one should ensure that in post-conflict contexts, their experiences will benefit to the society and to the state.

As a conclusion, one should keep a broad idea of what is part of civil society or not and then analyse case-by-case what/who contributes to the peacebuilding process and what/who hinders it. Outsiders should thus be modest and open to new schema in order to efficiently contribute to the peacebuilding process and avoid negative effects such as the ones due to competition for funding: “recipient NGOs may even tailor their programs and ideas to suit those of the donors rather than...
addressing real needs, thereby turning civil society organizations into 'creatures' of the donors” (Harpviken and Kjellman, 2004 in: Pouligny and Martini 2009).

CSOs have to be supported according to their contribution to the peacebuilding process and not to some pre-defined criteria about their characteristics. This research will focus on the neglected work of faith-based organisations on peacebuilding issues, especially reconciliation.
Chapter IV: The concept of reconciliation

1. Why reconciliation?

Within the peacebuilding field, ‘reconciliation’ is part of the psycho-social recovery. Reconciliation is a process that takes place after the end of the war, usually formalised by a peace agreement. It implies to transform negative relationships between the people who experienced war into positive ones. Indeed, as a consequence of the conflict, “relations [between former enemies] are based on antagonism, distrust, disrespect and, quite possibly, hurt and hatred” (Bloomfield, 2003, p.11). There is a consensus on the need to address these relationships as it is not likely that wounds resulting from the war will healed automatically as time passes. However, there are extensive debates about what to do, how to do it and who should do it.

2. Definitions and approaches

The main idea of reconciliation might be easily summarised: “on the whole, people would probably agree that reconciliation embodies some positive connotations about coming together and healing past conflicts” (Humber and Van Der Merwe, 1998). A more precise way to translate the concept might be the following (Bloomfield, 2003, p.12):

“[Reconciliation] means finding a way to live alongside former enemies - not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately. (...) Politics is a process to deal with the issues that have divided us in the past. Reconciliation is a parallel process that redesigns the relationship between us”.

Reconciliation is considered as a critical challenge for peacebuilding. It is part of the long-term solution to prevent people to return to violence by addressing the psycho-social grassroots causes of the conflict. Reconciliation is both a goal and a process: “it is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future” (Bloomfield, 2003, p.12).

In order to demonstrate the broad range of interpretations of the concept of reconciliation,
two works were selected. First, Philpott (2007) analyses the concept of reconciliation through the
notion of transitional justice. He defines transitional justice as the “sum total of activities through
which states and citizens redress past political injustices — deeds that are no longer occurring but
whose wounds may still be fresh, as if they had happened yesterday — in order to restore political
order in the present and for the future” (p.94). According to him, there are two ways of thinking
about ‘transitional justice’. One is the ‘liberal human rights paradigm’ adopted by the UN, human
rights activists, international lawyers and some NGOs, whereas the other approach is ‘the
reconciliation paradigm’ influenced by the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.
These two theories aim at rebuilding ‘right relationships’ but their approaches differ: “in the liberal
human rights paradigm, right relationship means that citizens come to respect and recognize one
another's human rights and deliberative capacities, [whereas religious concepts] may well endorse
these dimensions of right relationship, but they also envision a fuller restoration, involving
apology, forgiveness, empathetic acknowledgement of suffering and the transformation of enmity
between both groups and individuals” (p.97). These theories are rather complementary than
contradictory. Moreover, they do not symbolise a division between secularists and religious. For
instance, some academics support ‘reconciliation’ and ‘forgiveness’ with secular arguments. The
‘human rights paradigm’ is closely linked to the liberal peacebuilding agenda mentioned above.
Religious arguments come mainly from Christian traditions but Islam and Judaism have also
contributed.

In their work 'What is this thing called reconciliation?', Hamber and Van Der Merwe (1998)
analyse the situation of South Africa and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and list
no less than five conceptions of reconciliation within the South African context:

- **The non-racial ideology of reconciliation** defines reconciliation as dissolving the racial
  identities arising from the policies of the past. People with racist attitudes (particularly
  whites) (...) are urged to acknowledge their past so that they can become part of a new
  society;

- **the intercommunal understanding** approach sees the divisions of the past as
  fundamentally a consequence of the fact that South Africa is made up of separate
  communities with different cultures and histories. This approach highlights the need for
  improved communication and better understanding between groups, thus leading to greater
  co-operation and co-existence at the individual and political level;

- **the strongly religious ideology of reconciliation** emphasises the re-discovering of a new
  conscience of individuals and society through moral reflection, repentance, confession and
  rebirth;
– the human rights approach implies regulating social interactions through the rule of law and preventing certain forms of violations of right from happening again;
– the community building approach is generally concerned with individual relationships rather than with broad and abstract values of co-existence and national political tolerance and requires the clearing up of mistrust between previously conflicting parties and rebuilding personal bonds at the local level.

This analysis demonstrates the impossibility of a unique definition and approach of reconciliation. On the contrary, it shows the variety of approaches that can be implemented towards a same goal. This is useful since people who experienced war might be more sensitive to one approach or to another. It implies the existence of a great range of potential tools to create, in order to work on reconciliation in a given context.

3. Dimensions of the concept

Reconciliation, like peacebuilding, is a complex concept that encompasses many dimensions. This paragraph will introduce the main ones: the goal of reconciliation, its actors as well as its methods and tools.

\textit{a) Addressing the past to build the future}

Reconciliation implies to address the past as a way to start on new basis. This is a preliminary condition to start rebuilding society on right basis. Past and future are interconnected (Huyse, 2003, p.19):

“As a backward-looking operation, reconciliation brings about the personal healing of survivors, the reparation of past injustices, the building or rebuilding of non-violent relationships between individuals and communities, and the acceptance by the former parties to a conflict of a common vision and understanding of the past. In its forward-looking dimension, reconciliation means enabling victims and perpetrators to get on with life and, at the level of society, the establishment of a civilized political dialogue and an adequate sharing of power”.
b) Who is concerned?

Reconciliation is a broad process that implies the involvement of both individuals and their communities. Reconciliation takes place at the interpersonal level, between a perpetrator and his victim. However, reconciling groups and communities is also a necessity. Indeed, resentment is not only directed towards one or several individuals but generally against a community e.g. ‘the Palestinians’, ‘the Tutsi’, etc... “Even those who have suffered or benefited little from the past absorb the beliefs of their community and their culture” (Bloomfield, 2003, p.12).

c) Who should own the process?

As reconciliation is a comprehensive process involving all the members of a society, it has to be addressed by leaders as well as by people. A ‘top-down’ approach implies that an intervention at the national level is a preliminary condition before starting grassroots reconciliation. However, reconciliation at the top-level will never automatically engender rights relationships between community members. Thus there is the need for a ‘bottom-up’ approach focusing on improving interpersonal relationships between the members of a community. Both approaches are necessary to implement a comprehensive and sustainable reconciliation process.

Outsiders have to be very careful when designing their projects to contribute to the reconciliation process as it should be owned by the locals. Reconciliation is a profound process that implies changing in attitudes, feelings and behaviours and, as such, cannot be imposed: “lasting reconciliation must be home-grown” (Huyse, 2003, p.23).

d) Which method? One size does not fit all

As already mentioned in the previous chapters, reconciliation implies taking carefully into account the specific situation where it is needed. Then, adapted solutions have to be designed: there are no recipes for reconciliation. For instance, if a truth commission contributed to reconciliation in one country, it might be inadequate in another one. This has to be taken into account by outsiders if they want to be involved in the process. Therefore, “a starting point in addressing post-conflict reconciliation issues must be that no post-conflict situation [is] equal to another and that there [is] no one-size-fits-all solution. But the opposite [is] also true: it [is] not necessary to reinvent the wheel at every occasion, and there [are] a few standard parameters and model procedures that could usefully be defined and applied” (Pleuger, 2004 in: Pouligny, Katz, Martini and Lopez, 2009)
As conceptions of reconciliation differ, there is no consensus on where priority should be put. However there are some tools that are regularly mentioned:

- **Truth**
  Seeking for truth prevents denial of the events and gives an opportunity to people to tell their stories. However it is necessary to “take into consideration the society's ability to sustain the pressure and tension of exposing difficult truths without collapsing into renewed violence” (Brouneus, 2007, in: Pouligny, Katz, Martini and Lopez, 2009). It might happen that truth-seeking processes lead all parties to view themselves as victims and it thus hinders the reconciliation process (Barsalou, 2005 in: Pouligny, Katz, Martini and Lopez, 2009). Therefore, the link between truth and reconciliation is questioned.

- **Justice**
  Tina Rosenberg states that “if the victims in a society do not feel that their suffering has been acknowledged, then they (...) are not ready to put the past behind them. If they know that the horrible crimes carried out in secret will always remain buried (...) then they are not ready for reconciliation” (Rosenberg, 1996 in: Huyse, 2003, p.26). However, some others argue that retributive justice hinders reconciliation. That is why some states decided to vote amnesty laws as they consider that reconciliation can happen only if the successor elites do not try the officials of the previous regime.

- **Economic, social and political dimensions**
  Reconciliation is a comprehensive process as it entails all the dimensions of the society: “reconciliation - the healing of relationships - needs the underpinnings of economic justice, of political and social power-sharing, and so on” (Bloomfield, 2003, p.11). It appears here that all the dimensions of peacebuilding – political and institutional framework, security and public order, psycho-social recovery, justice and rule of law and economic recovery - are interconnected and that reconciliation, and thus peace, will not be reached if one dimension is missing. It is also worth to remember the following: “politics is a process to deal with the issues that have divided us in the past. Reconciliation is a parallel process that redesigns the relationship between us” (Bloomfield, 2003, p.12). Indeed, if the first process consisting in ‘dealing with the issues that have divided in the past’ is not on the right path, the second process of ‘redesigning relationships’ will surely be
• **Education and memory**

As reconciliation is a long-term process, long-term measures are necessary to consolidate what has been achieved through healing, truth and justice on short-run. As such education plays a great role: “education for reconciliation must be rooted in fundamental values such as respect and equality, be concerned with issues of pluralism, and address specific issues of culture, identity, class and gender” (Huyse, 2003, p.29). Memory is also of importance as it allows the acknowledgement of the pain of the victims, it obliges the offenders to recognize their faults and finally allows to teach the new generation the lessons learned. The philosopher George Santayana (1853-1952) stated that: “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (in: Huyse, 2003, p.30). However, too much memory might lead to counter-productive effects and give the impression that wounds will never be healed. Moreover, memory can also be manipulated, for instance by political leaders for their interests.

This list of tools demonstrates the complexity of the reconciliation process since many dimensions have to be addressed. But before designing these tools, there is a need to take a direction e.g. emphasis on truth or justice. Indeed, it is only by establishing a clear strategy beforehand that tools could be efficient. Otherwise, it might lead to contradictory approaches that will hinder the process. For instance, truth and justice cannot be emphasised at the same time. People will hide the truth if there is a risk to be sued but promise of amnesty to get the truth can lead to frustration and therefore impedes the reconciliation process. The defined strategy should be led by the national leaders taking into account demands from their population.

The leading question of this research is: ‘How do local faith-based organisations contribute to the reconciliation process in Lebanon?’ The underlying aim of this study is to contribute to the definition of more contextualised and adequate methods to build peace in a country. In this first part, the theoretical concepts on which this study is based have been progressively examined: peacebuilding, peacebuilding and religion, peacebuilding and civil society and finally reconciliation. The approach adopted for each of these themes has been clearly defined. The next chapter will present the methodology that was designed to answer the question.
Chapter V: Methodology of the study

1. Structure of the study

The literature review given in the previous chapters will serve as a theoretical basis to study the contribution of local faith-based organisations to the reconciliation process in Lebanon. In the second part of this study, these concepts will be applied to the Lebanese post-conflict situation. This will be done through a literature review and by interviews with key persons who have specific knowledge of the situation.

The final part of this study aims at analysing the specific contributions of local faith-based organisations to the reconciliation process in Lebanon. This will be done through interviews with key persons working in Lebanese faith-based organisations whose mission includes reconciliation. The findings will then be critically reviewed.

2. Selecting the organisations

Establishing a list of relevant organisations presented many challenges. Three criteria had to be specified: its identity as a CSO, its faith-based character and its work on reconciliation.

As already mentioned, this study aims to broaden the definition of CSOs. Choosing organisations with a explicit faith component already goes into that direction. However, for practical reasons, the chosen organisations will present minimum standards of institutionalisation, visibility and accessibility. This presents difficulties as far as Muslim faith-based organisations are concerned. Indeed there are differences in the ways Muslim and Western communities organise themselves: “Western societies are more individualistic, professional and bureaucratized. Many Islamic societies, on the other hand, are traditional societies, where kinship, tribalism and family ties are dominant” (Bouta et al., 2005, p.6). The social institutions of these communities differ and it is a challenge to find Muslim peacebuilding organisations in the Western sense. They seem to be less visible than the Christian or multi-faith organisations. That is why slightly different criteria have been used to identify Muslim organisations (see below). Another challenge was to chose organisations not related to the political sphere. As this will be described below, the tight relationships between political actors and religion hinders the reconciliation process in Lebanon. This study therefore tries to adopt a 'purely' religious approach i.e. with the least amount of tights
with the political sphere, even if this is rather difficult, especially where funding is concerned. The selected organisations are supposed to have minimal links with local official political authorities. However, one might argue that being funded by foreign institutions also implies some political aspects that need to be debated.

The second criterion is the faith-based character of the organisation. To define such organisations, the criteria elaborated by Bouta, Kadayfci-Orenallana and Abu-Nimer (2005) in their study ‘Faith-Based Peace-Building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors’ were used (p.5-9).

An organisation is labelled as Muslim if it:

✗ identifies itself as Muslim or Islamic, and/or
✗ operates in a community where Muslims form the majority, and/or
✗ is led by a Muslim Religious Actor, and/or
✗ includes Muslim religious leaders as equal partners, and/or
✗ uses Islamic values, teachings and practices to transform conflicts, and/or
✗ is led, or establishes by, Muslims inspired by Islamic values.

Christian or multi-faith organisations are categorised as such on the basis of:

✗ religious affiliation and resource base, and/or
✗ religious values that inspire their peace-building work, and/or
✗ use of religious resources in their peace-building work, and/or
✗ deliberate -and sometimes exclusive- cooperation with religious actors as counterparts, and/or
✗ the presence of religious clerics and/or laymen among their staff.

Finally, there was a need to specify the characteristics of an organisation working on reconciliation. Some organisations mention the concept in their mission statement. However, some others do not. One reason is that reconciliation is part of the specific vocabulary used by actors working in the field of peacebuilding. Organisations, especially local ones, might work on reconciliation without using this expression to name it. Therefore, this study will adopt a practical definition of reconciliation to identify organisations: working on reconciliation means trying to ‘improve relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese’. The limitation of this solution is that the expression might sound simplistic compared to definitions provided in the Chapter IV
‘Reconciliation’. However, this definition is more practical and less conceptual and therefore facilitates the explanation of the theme of the research to the interviewees.

3. Elaborating the questionnaire

The chosen method consists in interviewing key persons working in the selected organisations, especially people in charge of reconciliation programmes. As a basis for the interviews, a questionnaire was elaborated (see Annex 1) in order to gather data enabling to answer the main and sub-questions mentioned in the introduction.

In the questionnaire, questions were ‘open’ and aimed at gathering qualitative data. The sequence of questions was designed to start from the easiest questions e.g. what is your organisation doing to support reconciliation? (projects/programmes), to more complex issues e.g. relationships between reconciliation and the political system, need for reconciliation within a community.

4. Balancing the findings

Information provided by the interviewees have to be critically reviewed. Moreover, there is a need to assess the possible gaps between what these organisations say and what they actually do. To solve this issue, interviews with key persons adopting a different approach were conducted, mostly scholars, social workers and members of non faith-based organisations. Lebanese scholars, as they are not involved in the organisations, can stand back and offer a global perspective. Because of their direct work with people, social workers can give concrete inputs about how people interact in the every-day-life. It is assumed that, in Lebanon, they are less likely to have an agenda compared to other actors such as the political and religious ones. Finally, non faith-based organisations also offer another view on our matters, for instance because they usually work on ‘improving relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese’ but without mentioning the concept of reconciliation.
PART 2: BACKGROUND ON LEBANON
Chapter VI Peacebuilding in Lebanon

1. Background

This part will mention some important facts about Lebanon in order to better understand the purpose of this study. Some significant events of the Lebanese history, the presence of several religious communities in the country and the recent violent events Lebanon experienced will be introduced here.

Illustration 2: Map of Lebanon

a) History of Lebanon

Under the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was mainly populated with families from two confessions:
Christian Maronites and Druze (heterodox Muslims) and they were mainly living in the Mount Lebanon region. In the middle of the nineteenth century, conflict broke out between these two communities. After the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was placed under French mandate. In 1926, a new constitution initiated a parliamentary regime with a proportional sharing of the state along confessional lines: the president was Christian and the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim. This was supposed to be temporary until the strengthening of the Lebanese identity, which never happened. The Lebanese got their independence in 1943, symbolised by the signature of the National Pact where both Christian and Muslim communities agreed not to ask for foreign protection – from the East for Muslims and from the West for Christians (Berkeley Center, 2009, p.3).

b) The religious communities

Religious communities have a great importance in Lebanon. A first issue is about the words one should use. There are plenty of expressions to describe the use of religion in the Lebanese society. ‘Sect’, ‘confession’ or ‘religious community’ designate religiously separated groups. In Lebanon, it might refer to the Muslims or the Christians but also to sub-divisions within these groups such as the Druze, the Catholics, the Sunnis, the Shiites, etc... ‘Sectarianism’ is a “worldview that emphasizes the unique legitimacy of believers creed and practices and that heightens tension with the larger society by engaging in boundary-maintaining practices” (McGuire, 2008). ‘Confessionalism’ is related to political organisation. “In Lebanon, it is an official religious diverse scheme that distributes institutional power proportionally among various religious communities. The aim of this scheme is to secure balanced power sharing” (Al-Ariss, 2010, p.56).

There are eighteen communities recognised by the Lebanese government. The most important communities in terms of population are the following:

- Lebanese Sunni Muslims (approximately 28% of the total population)
- Lebanese Shiite Muslims (approximately 28% of the total population)
- Maronite Christian Church (approximately 25% of the total population)
- Druze (approximately 5% of the total population)

In total, Muslim communities represent almost 60% of the total population and Christian communities 40% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011).
c) Conflicts in modern Lebanon

Lebanon has experienced many conflicts during the past forty years. A major event was the civil war that lasted fifteen years (1975-1990). More than twenty years after its end, it remains difficult to map the ins and outs of the conflict: ‘who is fighting who?’ was, and is still, an not easy question (Abi-Ezzi, 2002, p.3):

“Many observers, analysts and commentators, as well as many Lebanese who lived through the war, would agree that what is commonly referred to as the Lebanese civil war was not one single conflict between two protagonists, but a series of wars that were fought in Lebanon by a host of different militias, both Lebanese, but also foreign, the PLO for example, who were supported by many different backers, national, regional and international at different times between 1975-90”.

The Taif agreement, ratified in 1990, put an end to the armed conflict. Between 144,000 and 167,000 people died whereas half a million Lebanese were displaced (out of a population estimated between three and three and a half million) (Abi-Ezzi, 2002, p.3). The Taif agreement is seen as the result of negotiations between the regional players rather than between the Lebanese (Messara, 2010).

After a period of relative stability, the assassination of prime minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and other high-profile assassinations opened a new era of disorders. In 2006, the thirty-three days war broke out in the South of Lebanon between Israel and the Hezbollah. Another violent event was the attack by the Lebanese government of the Palestinian camp of Nahr el Bared hosting political groups of Salafi in 2007. In 2008, the government tried to dismantle Hezbollah’s private communication system and it led to a civil conflict between the Sunni and the Shiite Muslim communities.

Even if this was the last major violent event in the country, tensions remain alive, especially between Sunnis and Shiites. Rumours are spreading that a conflict will break out soon if the Hezbollah is accused by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘Hariri Tribunal’) to be responsible for Hariri’s assassination.
2. The absence of peacebuilding process

The Taif Agreement was signed in 1989 by former members of the Lebanese 1972-1976 parliament. In this document were included, among other subjects: the demobilisation of militias, clauses about the Syrian presence and elements for political and administrative reforms. Twenty years after its ratification, “many of the reforms written in the document, including national objectives such as abolishing political sectarianism and passing election and administrative decentralization bills, have been continuously superseded by local and regional political interests” (Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies, 2008, p.1). The agreement just ended the Christian Maronite political dominance by giving more power to the other communities e.g. parity of parliamentary representation between Christians and Muslims.

This agreement marked the end of the peacemaking stage since a settlement was forged between the parties. However, to launch the peacebuilding phase, more is needed. Indeed, as stated in Chapter I ‘The concept of peacebuilding’, peacebuilding implies to deal with economy, security, politics and psycho-social recovery in the post-war context. These different building blocks in relation to Lebanon will be discussed in the next paragraphs.

3. Challenges to peace in Lebanon

Lebanon’s situation is influenced by internal and external pressures. “Understanding the Lebanese conundrum and assessing the sources of conflict thus requires analysis across these interconnected levels” (Kraft et al., 2008, p.15). In their comprehensive study ‘Walking the line, Strategic approaches to peacebuilding in Lebanon’, Kraft and his co-writers (2008) assume that all the post-war violence is due to structural challenges coming from the Lebanese state and society and not only because of specific and punctual reasons. The most structural challenges they mention are the following.

- **Sectarian identities**

Sects play a great role in the Lebanese society and this impacts the political orientations of the country. For instance, there are conflicting concepts of national identity. Christians tend to support the neutrality of Lebanon and its cosmopolitan character, therefore emphasising its non-Arab and non-Muslim components whereas Muslims stress the Arab/Islamic belonging. However, it is often a matter of manipulation by the political leaders. “Consequently, while sectarian sentiment can appear
dormant and subdued during times of relative stability and elite consensus, any serious political or inter-elite conflict will invariably be cast as a contest of power between sectarian communities and/or various sectarian factions, thus becoming infused with the full historical weight of conflict, violence and the resulting mutual fear perceptions” (Kraft et al., 2008, p. 5).

Moreover, sects are territorialised (see illustration 3). Religious communities used to live together in mixed areas before the civil war. When people started to be displaced, they chose to move to regions where people of their community already lived, for obvious safety reasons. Despite programmes supporting return of the displaced, the phenomenon remained unchanged. This had challenging consequences since the different communities live next to each other but not together. Therefore, people might never meet each other if they stay in the same place. When students go to the university, it is common that they meet and live with people from other communities for the first time in their life. Even in more mixed areas where the incomes are usually higher, people live together but do not really interact (Mouawad, 2010). In Lebanon and its capital, public places are rare: even if one may find people from different communities, in the end, all pieces of territory belong to a unique group. This phenomenon is called ‘the sectarian structuring of the public sphere’. For instance, Christian communities sometimes mark their territory with Bible extracts written on signs on the road (Noha, 2010). However, sectarian attitudes are not responsible for conflicts. “Rather, such sentiment is mobilised and refreshed by sectarian leaders according to political expediency and framed as defence against the purported ambitions of other communities, drawing on past atrocities and current demographic fears” (Kraft et al., 2008, p.6).
Politics: the consociational political system

The Lebanese political system is based on the fears that one sect will dominate the others. Thus a power-sharing system was specifically created to address this issue. The system is based on the repartition of the power among the different sects. For instance, it is written in the Constitution that the president is Christian, the prime minister Sunni and the head of the parliament Shiite. The same system applies to local elections. This system is called ‘consociational democracy’ as a consensus needs to be found by the different political parties to make any decision. It prevented the appearance of an authoritarian government that might be found in other Arab states. But it also led to paralysis and crisis: the required consensus makes it easy to sabotage the process (Kraft et al., 2008, p.17).

Political leaders just work to maximise the power of the sect they represent without
developing a global Lebanese political project: “the reality of contemporary Lebanese politics is the necessity of sectarian groups to hold government positions to mobilize resources for their communal constituencies” (Berkeley Center, 2009, p.5). It leads to a large system of clientelism: political leaders create networks of dependence, for instance by manipulating the public sector, and use them to get electoral support when needed. Therefore, the state has been used to support the interests of the different sects and no political project has ever been developed for Lebanon.

Those who try to cross the sectarian lines are regarded with hostility. The election reinforces the system: “in combination with the pervasive system of clientelism, gerrymandering, vote-buying, and the sectarian division of the public sphere, it rather tend to reproduce a political elite based on sectarian and parochial legitimacy” (Kraft et al., 2008, p.17). Participation of Lebanese people consists in “seasonal expressions of unconditional allegiance to unaccountable leaders who rarely bother to develop electoral platforms” (Kraft et al., 2008, p.18). The system is self-sustaining and thus no alternative mode of leadership and representation can emerge.

This leads the state to be unable to exercise its prerogatives. First, they are minimal and sectors such as education have been taken over by the sects and private companies. Second, when the state has prerogatives, it fails enforcing its laws and regulations. For instance, it does not own the monopoly of the use of force as some powerful armed non-state groups are present in the country e.g. Hezbollah factions.

Moreover, as the power is divided according to sectarian criteria, demography is a sensitive issue in Lebanon. The last census took place in 1932 and there is a consensus among leaders that no official census should take place today. It is estimated that the Christians/Muslims ration is 40:60. Within the Muslim part of the population, it seems that Shiites outnumber Sunnis and the phenomenon is growing. The explanations are that Shiites have a higher birth rate and that they are less likely to leave the country like Christians (Berkeley Center, 2009, p.8). “In short, no group is large enough to dominate the entire country, but trends show a slow dissipation of the Maronite population and the steady growth of the Shi’a population” (Berkeley Center, 2009, p.8). Moreover the presence of approximately 400 000 Palestinian refugees and 1 million of Syrian workers adds to the complexity of the situation.

- **Social and economic issues: an inequitable economic system**

There have been many tensions between communities due to the socio-economic frustration. From independence until the 1970s, there was a tenuous balance of power between Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. This sharing of power “was responsible for the dispensation of patronage and
resources to privileged groups for a half century” (Berkeley Center, 2009, p.5). The Shiite community used to be a minority, lagging far behind the three main communities, and has experienced economic deprivation for a long time. This led to the creation in 1975 of the Amal party supporting political and military aims and then the Hezbollah party. Hezbollah became a state in the state in South-Lebanon, providing its community with protection from Israel and with social services through hospitals and schools. There is a very large Christian Maronite diaspora (almost 10 million) of which a majority is located in the West. They are usually economically thriving and send money to Lebanon.

Today, Lebanon’s economy is led by several powerful actors. The ongoing economic stagnation enhances the power of clientelist support system. Therefore social and economic conflicts have a strong sectarian dimension and are instrumentalised by political leaders: “the most likely scenario appears to be mass mobilisation, ostensibly for the sake of social issues but charged with strong sectarian undertones, which, due to the territorialisation of sectarian identities, will solicit violent reactions from adjacent communities and ignite sectarian clashes, in particular between Sunnis and Shiites in the southern suburbs of Beirut” (Kraft et al., 2008, p.6).

- **International context: the involvement in major regional and international conflicts**

As the state is very weak, the Lebanese political scene is largely influenced by external actors. Because of its strategic geographical position, regional and international actors try to influence Lebanon according their interests by providing political, financial, military support that usually goes beyond the control of the state. Foreign countries provide Lebanese parties with political, economic or military support according to their interests. Political leaders use this support to maximise their personal influence while arguing that they represent the interests of their community. “Only with substantial outside support can Lebanese actors reasonably hope to tilt the internal balance of power by means of confrontation, while bargaining and compromise resume as soon as such support appears to be drying up” (Kraft et al., 2008, p.19).

Lebanon becomes the ground for proxy wars. There are many tensions between the religious communities in the Middle-East and they are reflected in Lebanon. Shiite Muslims are getting more and more power in the region and are perceived as a threat to the Sunni Muslim dominance in the region. They are supported by Iran which provides funds to the Lebanese Shiite community, Hezbollah for instance. Christians are a minority in the region and the number of Christians is decreasing in Lebanon. They are afraid to lose their power but they still have a large diaspora
located in the West supporting them on a financial level. Western states also have different political economic and security interests in the region.

Moreover Lebanon is located at the fault-line of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It leads to tensions indirectly (with the influx of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon since 1948) and directly by occupying regions of the South from 1982 until 2000 or through the 2006 war. Western states promote a peaceful resolution of the conflict while Syria and Iran defend a stronger position against Israel. All these stakeholders try to defend their position by trying to influence actors in Lebanon. They are closely interconnected. For instance, during summer 2010, an ongoing tension was about the possible accusation of the Hezbollah by Hariri Tribunal for murdering the former prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Hezbollah party, accuses this tribunal to be under the control of an American-Sionist conspiracy and threatened to attack Israel if they are effectively accused. But there is also an issue with the Sunni community as the tribunal cooperates with the Lebanese government led by Saad Hariri, the Sunni son of the victim. Therefore an accusation from Hariri Tribunal, if the prime minister does not deny it, will mean an accusation of the Shiite community by the Sunni community, which might sound like a declaration of war.

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Core Problems Leading to Conflict in Lebanon

*(Kraft et al., 2008, p.17)*

- Dysfunctional political system and lack of political participation
- Lack of a viable central government and state monopoly
- Sectarian-based patronage system and clientelism
- Oligopolistic economy
- Relative deprivation and uneven development
- Economic stagnation and demise of the middle class
- Private and public space and sphere structured along sectarian-based political identities
- Continuity of wartime elite and culture of impunity
- Large Palestinian refugee community
- Opposing foreign policy orientations
- Foreign intervention and proxy battle-ground
This table summarises all the unaddressed issues that prevent the emergence of sustainable peace in Lebanon. There are so many interrelated causes and so little willingness from the major stakeholders to change the situation that occurrence of a new conflict is highly probable. This study focuses on the role of faith-based organisation as actors of the peacebuilding process.
Chapter VIII: Faith-based organisations in Lebanon

1. The role of religion in the Lebanese society

Religion is a strong marker of identity in the Lebanese society. Sectarian identifications are used by Lebanese people to orient and interpret their behaviour in the private and in the public sphere (Kraft et al., 2008, p.20). “Communal identity was and is the bedrock of society, the basis not only for individual and collective identity but also for accessing patronage, work, and services” (Berkeley Center, 2009, p.3). Sectarian identity defines the place where to live, the schools, the jobs one can access, the media one watches, etc... The state is rather absent and there is no direct link between the state and the individual, everything goes through the communities (Khalaf, 2010). However, a strong feeling of belonging to one religious community is different than a strict observance of religious practices. Rather, there is a phenomenon of fanaticism in Lebanon (Mouawad, 2010; Daou, 2010; Noha, 2010). As religion is manipulated by leaders, people give more importance to symbols rather than to values (Daou, 2010; Tabbara, 2010). This leads to extreme positions against others who do not share the same religion.

2. The role of religion in Lebanese conflicts

Although the fighting groups often consisted of religious communities, these conflicts have never been about religion as such. Indeed “the [1975-1990] conflict was never about theology, but because of religion’s central role in marking identity in Lebanese society, religious symbols, identity, and leaders have impacted the course of the conflict” (Berkeley Center, 2009, p.3). Instead, the religious factor is a strong marker of identity that has been used to manipulate people. It helped to mobilise them by reinforcing identity differences among sects sharing the same language and basic culture. “Conflating foreign policy choices with sectarian identities for the purpose of political mobilisation, political patrons invest the struggle over such choices with the full weight of a history rife with violence and allow mobilisation to draw upon deep layers of emotion and vengeance” (Kraft et al., 2008, p. 5). Instead, the conflict was considered as political: “despite the fact that conflicts, persecutions and theological debates between Muslims and Christians have taken place throughout history, these wars were not engendered for religious reasons but by political motives” (Ghazzal, 1995 in: Khoury, 2005). Indeed, “the Muslim-Christian duality was only one ingredient

However, even if the conflict was not about religious issues, the importance of the religious factor in the Lebanese identity should be taken into account while working on reconciliation. “While some people believe that sectarianism was the main cause of the war and that the only way to solve the crisis is by promoting a country of law and institutions; other believe that it is necessary to take sectarianism into consideration in any attempted solution” (Frangieh, 2003 in: Khoury, 2005). This study is based on the latter approach.

3. Faith-based organisations in Lebanon

Abou Assi (2006) was charged to write an assessment of the Lebanese civil society. His study ‘An assessment of Lebanese civil society: Lebanese civil society, a long history of achievements facing decisive challenges ahead an uncertain future’ is comprehensive but advocates for a specific position: “it is hoped that civil society (…) will lead the country from a sectarian to a non-sectarian environment” (p.21). Abou Assi divides the history of the Lebanese civil society in five parts. Both non-confessional and confessional organisations have always existed in Lebanon. Indeed, in the Arabic language, there are two terms to describe civil society: al-mujtama al-alhi and al-mujtama al-madani. The first one (alhi) implies ‘kinship’ whereas the other (madani) “carries a willingness to move away from traditional structures and perceptions. Civil society in Lebanon is more of an ahli rather than of a madani nature” (Traboulsi, 2003 in: Barak, 2007, p.54). Non-confessional and confessional organisations number, nature and functions varied over time.

During the first phase (1900-1930), most CSOs were based on the religiously motivated aim of aiding the needy and the poor. 1940s and 1950s witnessed “the birth of sectarian associations: different religious groups responded to Lebanon’s independence and the ensuing mix of communities by establishing associations to socialize and control the members of their community” (p.23). During the third phase, before the war (1960-1975), non-sectarian organisations without confessional or political agendas came into existence such as unions or professional associations.

When the civil war broke out, CSOs were very active to compensate the lack of government. They provided social services as well as security in the presence of militia. Several trends characterised the period. Indeed, some non-confessional organisations were created in order to end the war and became well-known such as Offre-Joie or Mouvement Social (see Chapter IX ‘Findings’). However, this should not hide the fact that in general, this period witnessed “the decline of non-confessional associations and Lebanon’s split along confessional” (p.23). The fifth and current period presents the consequences of the war on the Lebanese civil society: “the
multiplication of confessional-based associations as the centrality of confessionalism became evident in the new political system” (p.24). On the other hand, environmental and human rights organisations were developed at the same time.

Faith-based organisations have played a great part in Lebanese history over time. However, supporting the reconciliation process is not one of their traditional field of intervention: “in the post-conflict era, most CSOs, including religious based CSOs, supposedly carry out activities regardless of race, colour, religion or political affiliation, but it is still feared that because many CSOs are based on communal or religious identity, civil society in the Lebanese context can reinforce societal fragmentation” (p.21).

This study will explore the qualitative contributions of the few faith-based organisations that are working on reconciliation. But first, where has the Lebanese reconciliation process stopped?
Chapter VIII: Reconciliation in Lebanon

The Taif Agreement signed in 1989 was entitled “the National Reconciliation Charter”. However, no comprehensive process has ever been implemented to reconcile Lebanese people after the civil war. Both government and CSOs share some of the responsibility (Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2008, p.2).

1. The governmental level

The governmental contribution to the process was limited to projects regarding the return of the displaced established in 1992. The Ministry of the Displaced cooperated with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to create the adequate conditions leading to the return of the displaced, with an emphasis on the rehabilitation of the infrastructures e.g. the houses of the returnees. This programme was not well perceived: it was considered as slow and partial (Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2008, p.2). Moreover, the authorities were unable to address the social issues of reintegration. The majority of the displaced did not wish to return. For instance, because they lived in a new permanent and fixed home since 1978 or 1982 or due to the difficult relationships between those who stayed and those who left a particular village. Therefore, the challenge of coexistence remained unaddressed by public actors.

An issue that can be raised is to decide whether the government has the legitimacy to work on reconciliation or not. Indeed, the amnesty law passed in 1990 enabled the former warlords to become the current politicians. Today, most of them became political leaders and therefore do not show a strong willingness to work on reconciliation. Indeed it would imply to look backward and one does not know the effects of such a process. Moreover, political leaders have an interest to keep tensions between communities alive as it is a way to justify their prerogatives: they are in charge of protecting their community against their supposed enemies.

2. The NGO sector

Abi-Ezzi (2002) was charged to evaluate the contribution of the Lebanese NGO sector to the national reconciliation process. She distinguished six areas of work for reconciliation within the sector: informal education, the memory of war, Muslim-Christian dialogue, development work,
teaching of conflict resolution techniques and the returning of the displaced (p.15).

According to her, their work consisted rather in “preventive conflict management” than in contribution to the reconciliation process (p.31). It means that they worked on preventing a new resort to force and did not put in place projects aiming at healing the wounds. However, psycho-social recovery is a condition for preventing a new outbreak of violence. Moreover, the lack of involvement of the government made their work inefficient: “in the absence of a national government-led agenda for reconciliation, the small-scale, often short-term, scattered, sporadic, but still valuable work of NGOs, practising various forms of preventive conflict management, is not consolidated” (Abi-Ezzi, 2002, p.31).

3. The result: a negative peace

Abi-Ezzi concludes her study on the reconciliation process in Lebanon by stating that, in 2002, Lebanese peace remained a negative peace:

“The violent conflict that characterised the civil war has now been replaced by less ‘visible’, more intangible dangers that can be mistaken for ‘peace’ by international aid agencies. (...) However, my research has shown in a very clear and unambiguous way, that tensions exist in Lebanon today between different religious communities and the economic recession is fanning the flames of discontent, deepening resentments and breeding intolerance” (Abi-Ezzi, 2002, p.32).

According to her, and despite her negative findings, efforts on three levels - the grass-roots level, the middle level (community leaders) and the official governmental level – could tackle the remaining challenges (Abi-Ezzi, 2002, p.32). There are several issues that would need to be addressed such as the fate of the disappeared, the memory of the civil war and the willed amnesia that prevails in Lebanon. Moreover, since new conflicts occurred since the end of the 1975-1990 civil conflict, it raised new questions such as ‘reconciliation processes’? Who needs to be reconciled? The Lebanese who experienced the civil war? Stakeholders of the 2006 war? Actors of the 2008 incidents? Etc... Problems piled up and are now inextricable.

A forum on the theme “What mix of NGO approaches, state policies and international assistance might help advance a breakthrough in national reconciliation efforts in Lebanon?” took place in 2002 and introduced new directions that could improve the work already done to contribute
to reconciliation (Abi-Ezzi, 2002, p.33):

- More comparative work might be helpful
- Building on the richness of NGO work in Lebanon
- Addressing (voluntary?) amnesia about the past – importance of memory
- The need for government action/leadership
- The need for coordination amongst NGOs
- The need for closer links between NGOs and the government
- The need to forge strategic alliances between political and private sectors
- The need for NGOs to define “reconciliation”
- The importance of memory
- To engage in a re-assessment of customary approaches to reconciliation – (the need for NGOs to assess their own work and learn from it)
- The need to assess relations between funders and NGOs
- NGOs acknowledge that conflict can be empowering or disempowering. How can it be empowering?
- The need to find new forms of power to address problems
- The need to work on a national reconciliation agenda
- Violence must be addressed
- Social and economic problems
- Structural challenges of national reconciliation have to be addressed
- Legislation and the judicial system’s role in aiding national reconciliation process
- South Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal

This list of directions advised in 2002 gives an overview of challenges that remain to improve the contributions of CSOs to the reconciliation process. Therefore, it gives an interesting introduction to the third part of this study. Indeed, the next part will answer the leading question of this research: ‘How do local Lebanese faith-based organisations contribute to the reconciliation process in Lebanon?’ Most of the issues mentioned by Abi-Ezzi in 2002 remain pertinent in 2010 and will be discussed in the next part. A first question that can be raised is: has the situation improved since 2002? Another relevant interrogation is: what is the role of faith-based organisations in that process? Are they a viable alternative to the existing mechanisms that showed their deficiencies?
PART 3: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
Chapter IX Findings

1. The selected organisations

In order to find organisations fitting the criteria, two main sources were used: network and the internet. The network consisted of scholar experts in the field of social sciences (Université Saint Joseph, American University of Beirut), mostly working in Beirut. Indeed, Lebanon is a small country (one fourth of the Dutch area) and most social, economic and intellectual activities are located in the capital. Collected information were correlated with resources on the internet. Indeed, Lebanese CSOs are numerous and widely use the internet as a means of publicity. Most organisations have a website but only a few update it regularly.

Eventually, it proved difficult to find organisations matching all criteria - CSO, local, faith-based, working on reconciliation. Local faith-based organisations are numerous in Beirut and in Lebanon so there were easy to find. However, selecting organisations working on reconciliation was an issue. As stated in Chapter VI ‘Peacebuilding in Lebanon’, peacebuilding issues have never been prioritised by government or CSOs. Moreover, current regional tensions between communities make it even more difficult to work on this question. Therefore, on the one hand, most of the organisations working on reconciliation tend to be international (secular/faith-based) NGOs because reconciliation in post-war countries is included in ‘outsiders’ agendas. On the other hand, local organisations working on ‘improving relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese’ tend to be secular. Indeed, these organisations perceive divisions of the Lebanese according to their confessions as a threat to peaceful coexistence in Lebanon. Thus, they prefer to mask this criterion and emphasise their citizen status through a secular approach. Some religiously active individuals and local groups of people might promote reconciliation but this is only in rare cases an institutionalised practice (Khalaf, 2010). As a result, these local faith-based organisations promoting reconciliation lack visibility because they are rare and not well-known. Another case is the one of a famous local faith-based organisation working on reconciliation but, since it is a marginal activity compared to its other activities, it was not easy to detect. One interviewee told me that all organisations claim they work towards peaceful coexistence between the Lebanese but few of them really try.

An additional point is that each of the criteria did not have one particular meaning but rather a range of interpretations. Sometimes, they were interpreted in a direction that would fit the study.
This choice was made because many organisations did not completely and perfectly match the four criteria. It was therefore agreed to accept the diversity of these organisations in order to get the most diverse sample of organisations and to draw the most complete and detailed picture. Eight faith-based organisations supporting the Lebanese reconciliation process were selected of which three are multi-religious. In addition, four non-sectarian organisations were chosen as their work was oriented toward ‘the improvement of relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese’.

Here is a short overview of all the organisations that were included in this study. Information provided in this paragraph concerns ‘formal’ data ones i.e. they come from sources produced by the organisations and they have not been critically reviewed. Nevertheless it is still an interesting overview since it presents the different goals defined by the organisations themselves. For more extensive formal information on each organisation, see Annex 2.

- **Single faith-based organisations**
  
  - **Al Makassed**
    
    *Al Makassed* is an ancient Sunni charity organisation that owns schools and university and provides social and health services.
  
  - **Imam Sadr Foundation**
    
    The *Imam Sadr Foundation* is a Shiite community-based organisation that seeks for social justice by offering health and education services as well as promoting dialogue and reconciliation.
  
  - **Institut de Rééducation Audio Phonétique (IRAP)**
    
    The *IRAP* is a Christian service organisation that started as a deaf school and then developed other programmes including community development projects mixed and disadvantaged regions.
  
  - **Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies**
    
    The *Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies* is a higher education institute which is part of the private, Lebanese, French-speaking university, Université Saint-Joseph and which focuses on religious studies.
  
  - **Opération 7ème Jour – Tarchiche**
    
    *Opération 7ème Jour – Tarchiche* is an initiative of Université Saint-Joseph launched in 2008 aiming at building reconciliation in the specific region of Tarchiche.

- **Multi-religious organisations**
  
  - **Adyan**
    
    *Adyan* is a recent multi-religious organisation which aims at spreading critical knowledge about religion and promoting dialogue and intercultural knowledge in Lebanon, especially among youth.
- Offre-Joie

*Offre-Joie* is a multi-religious organisation implementing youth projects in order to improve the life conditions in disadvantaged Lebanese areas.

- Initiative of Change

*Initiative of Change* aims at gathering people to work on justice, healing and human development with a method based on individual and personal change.

- Non-sectarian organisations

- Amel

*Amel* is a non-governmental organisation founded during the war which promotes the social, economic, cultural and civil rights of the underprivileged.

- Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya

*Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya* is a recent non-profit organisation supporting democracy and citizenship through projects with youth.

- Mouvement Social

*Mouvement Social* is a secular association that supports autonomy of the underprivileged through development projects and the involvement of the Lebanese youth for their society.

- Umam

*Umam* is a recently founded NGO that focuses on “creating a space for dialogue about the history of Lebanon and memory” without advocating for a specific position.

2. Criteria of selection

In this paragraph will be discussed how the various organisations match the selected criteria.

a) Civil society organisations

All the selected organisations are part of Lebanese ‘civil society’. However, they have different structures and functions. All of them are non-profit and non-governmental organisations. The *Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies* is the only organisation that is not a NGO since it is an educational institute.
b) Local organisations

It is not easy to specify what a ‘local organisation’ is. Does it mean a separate, independently functioning organisation or can it also be the Lebanese branch of a broader network? Does the organisation have to be founded exclusively by Lebanese resources or are foreign contributions to the budget accepted? In case an organisation is linked to a foreign institution, which level of subordination does the organisation have to respect?

Most of the selected organisations were founded and exist only in Lebanon. Initiative of Change is the only one that is part of a broader network (with its headquarters in Switzerland). However, according to one of its most active members, the organisation functions largely independent (Cheftari, 2010).

In Lebanon, there are no public resources to fund CSOs. Therefore, they have to find Lebanese individual or institutional private donors. Another option is to get funds from abroad. Many countries have interests in Lebanon for different reasons (see Chapter VI ‘Peacebuilding in Lebanon’). This impacts Lebanese civil society. Indeed all the selected organisations, without exception, receive funds from abroad. Obviously these funds are invested according to some official or unofficial agendas. As a result, funds, depending on the organisation, might come from regional governments (Syria, Iran), Western governments (United States Aid for International Development (USAID), the French embassy), international institutions (the UN, the European Commission), foundations (Anna Lindh Foundation, Sadafi Foundation), non-governmental organisations (Mercy Corps, Asmae), etc...

c) Faith-based organisations

Three categories of organisations were studied: single faith-based, multi-religious and non-sectarian organisations. Non-sectarian organisations are not necessarily secular ones. Indeed ‘secularism’ is a sensitive concept and many organisations do not use this adjective. The term is often misunderstood and implies for some people to be against religion. Therefore, using the term ‘non-sectarian’ is more accurate. Moreover, one should remain aware that there are many different ways of involving ‘religion’ within an organisation: there is no homogeneity in this field.

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6 Generally speaking, ‘secularism’ designates the phenomenon of separation between state and religion. However, this is highly debated concept since this separation can be conceived and implemented in very diverse ways: separation of the authorities, support of no religion or of all religions, etc…
- Single faith-based organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Makassed</td>
<td>Muslim Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Sadr Foundation</td>
<td>Muslim Shiite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAP</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opération 7ème Jour – Tarchiche</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for islamic-christian studies</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Multi-religious organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adyan</td>
<td>“[Belief] in the positive contribution of religions at both individual and social levels. Religious experience can in fact help individuals in opening up to others, and religions can also play a role in developing social relations between religious communities, which are greatly needed for harmony and brotherhood between humans, as well as for peace between nations” (Adyan, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offre-Joie</td>
<td>Organisation led by three values ‘Forgiveness, Respect and Love’ that are considered as spiritual rather than religious and as common to all religions (Khalaf, 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative of Change</td>
<td>“Initiative of Change has spiritual roots, but no religious affiliation. People who work with Initiative of Change come from a multiplicity of backgrounds and beliefs. Those with a faith are encouraged both to deepen their roots in that tradition, and to discover and respect the beliefs of others” (Initiative of Change, 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Non-sectarian organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umam</td>
<td>Dialogue and work on past and memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amel</td>
<td>Human rights, democracy, social justice and citizenship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya** | Human rights, democracy, social justice and citizenship
---|---
**Mouvement Social** | Human rights, democracy, social justice and citizenship

It is the only organisation that defines itself as ‘secular’ and not just ‘non-sectarian’ or ‘non-confessional’. Mouvement Social was created in 1961 by Father Grégoire Haddad, the former Greek-Catholic archbishop of Beirut. Known as the “Red Bishop”, he is famous in Lebanon for his fight against sectarianism and for secularism. He supports the idea of a state ruled by civil law and rights. It is an interesting case as his faith led him to promote secularism and to create an organisation based on this principle. (see Chapter X ‘Discussions’)

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**d) Work on reconciliation**

One of the selected organisations focuses exclusively on reconciliation: *Initiative of Change*. For the rest of the organisations, reconciliation is just one of their goals, because it is included in their mission statement or because they implement specific programmes on it. Some of the selected organisations do not mention reconciliation at all. They were chosen because they aim at implementing projects involving different religious communities and this might fit into the group of organisations working on ‘improving relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese’. It is assumed here that the first step towards reconciliation in Lebanon is to try gathering people from different communities under a common project, whatever its nature is. For instance, *IPRA* helps different communities living in the same area to provide for their basic needs but reconciliation is not a stated goal.

One can observe that the concept of reconciliation is almost never used by non-sectarian organisations (see graphic 1). This confirms the definition of reconciliation as a religious concept. The only non-sectarian organisation mentioning reconciliation is *U mam* but it is clearly stated that, before everything, they want to open a space for dialogue that ‘could’ lead to reconciliation. Among organisations that do not mention reconciliation, there is a difference between non-sectarian and faith-based ones. The faith-based ones (*Al Makassed, IPRA*), even if they do not mention the concept of reconciliation in their mission, still mention different religious communities having trouble to live together in their mission while non-sectarian organisations (*Mouvement Social, Amel, Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya*) refuse this approach and refer to ‘the Lebanese people’ as a whole.
Indeed, this is a strategic approach that refuses to see the Lebanese as several confessions coexisting but rather as one population. This is usually joined to an active work on citizenship.

Activities of these organisations focusing on reconciliation are very diverse (see table 1). They can be divided in two parts: there are organisations developing projects based on formal and informal education and organisations focusing on social and economic activities. The activities will be more thoroughly analysed in the next chapter.
Graphic 1: Repartition of the organisations according to their nature and to their area of actions

faith-based organisation

Imam Sadr Foundation

IPRA

Offre-Joie

Al Makassed

Initiative of Change

Adyan

Institute for Islamic-Christian studies

Opération 7ème Jour-Tarchiche

Mouvement social

Amel

UMAM

Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya

economic and social development

area of work

type of organisation

non-sectarian organisation

education

organisation mentioning reconciliation in its mission statement or in one of its programmes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities on reconciliation</th>
<th>Faith-based organisations</th>
<th>Non-sectarian organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institute for islamo-christian studies (USJ) single faith-based</strong></td>
<td>Université Saint-Joseph hosts the Institute for Islamo-Christian Studies. It aims at improving the relationships between Muslims and Christians through dialogue and trainings for example on interreligious conflict management.</td>
<td><strong>Nahwa Al-muwatiniya</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Makassed single faith-based</strong></td>
<td><em>Al Makassed</em> owns a university with an Institute of Islamic Studies. Within this institute, Christianity is taught by Christian believers. Moreover some punctual gatherings are organised with a Christian village.</td>
<td><strong>Umam</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adyan multi-religious</strong></td>
<td><em>Adyan</em> works on reconciliation through programmes of interreligious knowledge and discussions about memory in schools. They also produce films on reconciliation that they disseminate among the Lebanese.</td>
<td><strong>Umam</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiative of Change multi-religious</strong></td>
<td>Initiative of Change works on reconciliation by discussing with individuals and using their faith and thoughts to build internal peace.</td>
<td><strong>Umam</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities on reconciliation</td>
<td>Faith-based organisations</td>
<td>Non-sectarian organisations</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imam Sadr Foundation</strong> single faith-based</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Amel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Imam Sadr Foundation</em> works on reconciliation through academic institutions (conferences, workshops) and through development projects to improve the living conditions of the underprivileged.</td>
<td><em>Amel</em> implements a project with the <em>Institute for Islamo-Christian Studies</em> (USJ), ‘Ma Mnikhtelef’ (we don’t differ), that consists in building community-based dialogue and activities responding to social and economic needs. Activities implemented by youth will be paired with dialogue led by imams and priests.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IPRA</strong> single faith-based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>IPRA</em> implements social and economic development programmes in an underprivileged area where coexist two religious communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opération 7ème Jour- Tarchiche (USJ)</strong> single faith-based</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mouvement Social</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Opération 7ème Jour</em> is a recent programme developed after the 2006 war to promote the contribution of Université Saint-Joseph to the reconstruction efforts. Tarchiche is a project implemented by the “Ecole de formation sociale” and aims at organising social activities to reconcile the different communities living in this area.</td>
<td><em>Mouvement Social</em> implements social and economic development programmes for the underprivileged regardless of their community and the organisation promotes secularism as a political project to build a Lebanese nation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Offre-Joie</strong> multi-religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Offre-Joie</em> gathers youth from different communities to implement common projects. These activities can follow an incident due to tensions such as rebuilding a destroyed house.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

e) Other qualities

The criteria of selection were described above. There are other qualities that need to be taken into account to get a full picture of the selected organisations.

- Date of foundation

Some of the organisations are very ancient (Al-Makassed: 1878) whereas other are more recent (Nahwa al-Muwatiniya: 2005). Many of them were founded during or after a war, especially the civil war (1975-1990) (Amel: 1979, Offre-Joie: 1985, IRAP: 1986; Adyan: 2006; Opération 7ème Jour: 2006)

- Regions of work

Multi-religious organisations and non-sectarian organisations are mainly situated in the capital. They are usually small organisations without access to a large population. They implement some projects in the main cities or in remote areas. Single faith-based organisations have a broader territorial basis, but they are mostly situated in regions populated by the religious communities they work with and less often in mixed regions.

- Budget and staff

Information on budget and staff are important to better understand any organisation e.g. sources of funds contribute to understand better organisations agendas. Therefore this study aimed at providing some insights about this issue. However, transparency of organisations differed and it was not easy to collect and analyse data about the budgets of these organisations. All of them receive funds from abroad but sources depend on the type of organisation (Mouvement Social receives funds from the European Commission, Al-Makassed from Syria and Imam Sadr Foundation from UN institutions). They all work with both professional staff and volunteers.

- Belonging to political networks

Political affiliation is not easy aspect to detect if one is not familiar with Lebanese social structures. The aim of this paper was to study organisations without any political affiliation. However, in
reality, some of the organisations might receive funds from political parties. For instance, *Imam Sadr Foundation* might be linked to the Shiite secular party (Amal) as both of them were founded by Imam Al-Sadr.

- **Beneficiaries**

All the selected organisations deal directly with beneficiaries. Lobby activities to reach the government or other institutions were not taken into account.

**3. Limits of the results**

The process of selection of the organisations and the interviewees is always biased for several reasons. This is because an exhaustive assessment of all the organisations that could match the criteria would fall outside the scope of this study. Some organisations are more visible than others, for instance because they have a complete website, are located in the capital or are well-known among the expatriate community. These are privileged, because they are the most accessible. The same holds true for key informants. Thus some pertinent organisations and key informants might have been forgotten because they were less accessible.

The third part of this research is mainly based on interviews, a technique that implies some difficulties. The first difficulty was with informants who, for different reasons, were reluctant to answer the questions. One of the interviewees thought I wanted to put him and his organisation into a box ‘here is what Sunni Muslims think and do’. Another one told me ‘the great adventure’ of his organisation but avoided to reply to my questions. One of the possible explanations is that both of them mentioned the trend of media, researchers and other involved people to emphasise what engenders problems - such as trouble between the religious communities - rather than the positive and the progress. The fact that I am a young foreign female and an inexperienced researcher might have played a role. I was not always perceived as neutral in this country where many topics are sensitive, not to say taboo. Therefore, I felt that many interviewees were suspicious at the beginning of the discussion. In most cases, they eventually felt more relaxed as the interview moved on. My guess is that they noticed that I was not there to defend any position or to blame anyone. Generally speaking, people tell you what they want to tell you. One should keep in mind that the questions asked were really sensitive and sources of tensions at the moment of the research (summer 2010). Indeed there was a rumour that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in charge of prosecuting those responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 would accuse some
members of the Hezbullah party. This woke up tensions that were already pre-existing and that should be analysed in the broader complex Middle East regional context. Even if the choice of focusing on CSOs was based on the assumption that they would be more open to discussion, one should keep in mind the sensitiveness of these questions for any Lebanese person.

The second issue was about the meaning of the words. A research implies the use of concepts and when interviewing, it should be clear to the interviewer what meanings the interviewee attaches to concepts. At the beginning, the use of the concept of peace instead of the concept of reconciliation presented some difficulties. Indeed, one of the interviewees was in charge of trainings in islamic-christian dialogue and interreligious conflict management. She did not want to call her activity ‘peace education’, she just called it ‘dialogue training’. For her, the goal was not peace but ‘coexistence’. Why this refusal? According to her, peace is a concept that encompassed several ideologies. For instance, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “for Israelis, peace tends to be defined as personal and national security, and for Palestinians, peace tends to be defined as the right of sovereignty, freedom of movement and liberation” (Gawerc, 2006, p.461). Peace can also mean being in peace with oneself, etc... Calling her activity of dialogue between people from different religious communities ‘peace education’ for her would imply: people coming to the trainings are in conflict and they need peace. It would mean imposing her judgement and a type of truth. She refused this. It led her to not condemn people using the dialogue sessions to proselytise, which was just the opposite goal of these trainings. She did not want to use portmanteau words and also maybe aimed at avoiding unrealistic goals. During the session her colleague said that peace programmes after the war, for instance UN summer schools, “made one think that peace was possible”. Does this mean that, as they failed, they do not want anymore to give unrealistic hopes? Another interviewee said that if one talks about peace, it means naïve peace where ‘everyone loves each other’. Instead he wanted to use the word ‘citizenship’. At best confusion on words could lead to misunderstandings, at worst to open disagreements. It is therefore important to have clear definitions of concept and questions.

Third and finally, it was rather difficult to get an adequate understanding of the organisations instead of the personal thoughts of the interviewees. Indeed they are questioned on sensitive and complex topics that have no simple answer. If the organisation did not have an ‘official’ statement about a particular topic, the interviewees had to find ones in their own and personal resources. Therefore, it appeared several times, not to say always, that what the interviewees were saying reflected more their own points of view rather than the approach of the organisation. For instance, the head of communication of Imam Sadr Foundation was promoting the idea that the relationship between God and an individual is only personal and that the community should not be involved at
all. This sounds like an uncommon statement in Lebanon where the role of the religious communities is very strong, especially for an organisation claiming its religious affiliation. When asked about his personal background, he said he had been mainly educated in the United Arab Emirates and Europe. One could notice here that he was giving his own view rather than the organisation’s view.

Twelve local Lebanese CSOs were selected and seventeen persons gave their insights into the reconciliation process and the Lebanese situation in general. Approaches implemented by the organisations were introduced in this chapter. They will be analysed more thoroughly in the next chapter and, added to information provided by key informants, I will try to draw a picture of the reconciliation process in 2010 and the contributions of local faith-based organisations to this process.
Chapter X: Discussions

The last chapter aimed at describing the selected organisations and the limits of these findings. The aim of this chapter is to analyse and put into perspective all the collected information about the reconciliation process in Lebanon and how local faith-based organisations contribute to it. Indeed, the assumption of this paper was that, as religion takes an important place in people’s life, it could be an efficient basis to approach the reconciliation process. The selected method was to focus on faith-based organisations as it was supposed to be easier to collaborate with them. It was also focused on non-sectarian organisations in order to take into account the diversity of the activities including those organisations avoiding religion but ‘working on peaceful coexistence of the Lebanese’.

1. One need: to gather the communities

In order to implement a solution, one needs to clearly define the problem. On this step will depend the method. One of the common ideas of all projects is that the Lebanese need to meet each other. But here are two questions that need to be answered.

First, who needs to meet whom? The reconciliation of who with whom? In Lebanon, this an not easy question. There have been many conflicts and there are still many blurry lines of tensions so that ‘who was the enemy?’ and ‘who is the enemy?’ remain ambiguous questions with unclear answers. Indeed, during the civil war, the idea of a religious war between Muslims and Christians was widely spread and this was the product of a manipulation of the population by its leaders. Then followed many other conflicts with new lines of division. Is it a conflict between the different religious communities, e.g. Christian and Muslims? Within the same community, e.g. Sunni and Shiite? Between different political parties, e.g. between Christian parties (Le Courant Patriotique Libre versus les Forces Libanaises et les Phalanges Libanaises) or between mixed coalitions of political parties (8th of March and 14th of March)? Indeed, there are plenty of criteria to define the enemies and it is probably a mix of everything. However, the selected organisations seem to focus on the three main religious communities: Christian, Sunni and Shiite. Why is that?

It can be explained by the fact that belonging to a religious community is one of the major factors of identity in the Lebanese society (see Chapter VII ‘Faith-based organisations in Lebanon’).
Religious communities seem to be the potential actors of a very near new outbreak of violence. Therefore, organisations want to act at this level because it looks like one of the main sources of problems. Oppositely, one can also argue that this statement implies an agreement with political ideologies that aim at manipulating Lebanese people. For instance, maybe tensions are more economic than anything else. But as the Lebanese identify themselves according to their religious belonging rather than to a social class, organisations want to work on this level.

Second, what are the physical obstacles to less separation and more mixity in Lebanon? Communities do not live together anymore (see Chapter VI ‘Peacebuilding in Lebanon’). Organisations see in this phenomenon a reason for conflict as it is easier to judge, criticise and even dehumanise people when one does not meet them, talk to them, live with them. The other religious communities remain an image, not ‘concrete’, since there are no interactions. Therefore, organisations believe that encouraging meetings to get to know each other better will help release tensions. *Initiative of Change* is the only organisation that does not rely on this. Even if they might agree with this analysis, they do not try to gather people. They rely on the work on an individual basis. ‘Personal change’ is supposed to lead to a different behaviour, but *Initiative of Change* stops here. They do not try to influence what will happen next.

How efficient is the effort to gather communities? *Offre-Joie* and *Amel* manage to gather people from different communities, mostly youth. Indeed, they have been working on the ground for a long time and have a large network. For instance, when an incident between two communities occurs, *Offre-Joie* has the capacity to gather young people the day after to implement a concrete project linked to the event, e.g. reconstruction (Khalf, 2010). Organisations such as *Adyan, Nahwa Al-Mutuniya, Umam, Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies (USJ)* manage to mix people but mostly the ones who are already interested in these issues. They are city-based, small-scale and led by elite organisations and therefore fail to reach a large part of the Lebanese population. At the opposite, *Al Makassed university, IPRA, Imam Sadr Foundation* and *Opération 7ème Jour-Tarchiche (USJ)* are community-based and well-accepted on the ground. However, it was noticed that they usually work with only one community, the one they are belonging to. They do not manage to mix people because they are perceived as biased by members of other communities. For instance, *Imam Sadr Foundation* is a Shiite community-based organisation located mainly in the South, where the proportion of Shiite is the highest in Lebanon. As a consequence, they do not reach Christian or Sunni people. It is difficult among the organisations mentioned above to detect those that do not want to improve coexistence of the Lebanese (even if they state the contrary) and those that want so but face difficulties. Among them, it seems that *Imam Sadr Foundation* and *IPRA* are the only faith-
based organisations really willing to mix people but they acknowledge that there are other factors, usually political tensions, that prevent them from achieving this goal.

Why do most of these organisations not manage to achieve their first goal on the timeline: mixing Lebanese people? There are factors that organisations can work on and other factors that are too overwhelming to be addressed by the organisations.

2. The right method?

A social worker working on the project *Opération 7ème Jour-Tarchiche* said about its outputs: “we have the projects but we lack methods”. Indeed, this project presented many shortcomings. It took place in the region of Mount Lebanon during the first two weeks of August, near three villages of different sects. Fifteen first-year social work students were supposed to get to know the inhabitants by interviewing them and then organise social activities. At the end of the stay, an event was supposed to gather inhabitants from the three villages, symbol of constructive coexistence between the different communities, in an area where massacres took place during the civil war. However, the students were young, untrained and not willing to get involved (they came because it was mandatory). The project revealed many of the tensions in the area that were, again, not related to religion. For instance, some Christian children from one village did not want to play with Christian children from another village. Indeed, there were many conflicts between the few families living there about land and natural resources like water. The other communities were not enough involved in the project and during the final event mostly Christian inhabitants only came to see their relatives and friends performing on the stage and left right after.

*Amel* and *Offre-Joie* are the only organisations that really manage to gather people from different communities. This approach is insufficient, however, if the underlying problems are not addressed. Melhem Khalaf (2010), one of the founders of *Offre-Joie*, said about the creation of his organisation: “we were a bunch of students who wanted to do something against the war. What could we do? We knew how to do a holiday camp! So that is what we did”. A holiday camp was a good idea in 1985 but it seems that nowadays, Lebanon needs more than holiday camps. However, *Offre-Joie* has not changed its methods and it seems that the underlying causes of tensions that could potentially be addressed at this level are not. Therefore, it looks like an artificial and punctual reconciliation. It is the same with the project implemented by *Amel*, ‘Ma Mnikhtelef’ (We Don't Differ). A person in charge of the programme recognised that once activities are over, youth go home and hear all over again the same discourse i.e. ‘the other communities are our enemies’, ‘we

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7 Information about Mouvement Social were not sufficient to evaluate the mixity of the beneficiaries of their projects.
need to protect ourselves from them’, ‘we cannot live peacefully together’. Therefore, the activities
do not have long-term impact. There is a need for an in-depth and long-term approach but it appears
to be difficult to get beyond symbolic actions.

- Education Versus Development

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, one can divide the approaches in two parts: the ones
focusing on education and the ones focusing on economic and social development. Focusing on
education means promoting programmes that work on a theoretical level. They usually consist of
workshops, round tables, conferences, exhibitions, books, debates and films, that encourage
reflection and critical questions among the participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Method</th>
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| Adyan                                | - Work in schools on religious culture, interfaith relations and coexistence  
                                          - Dissemination of films about reconciliation                           |
| Initiative of Change                 | - Method based on discussions and exchanges                             |
| Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies (USJ) | - Training on Muslim-Christian dialogue                                       
                                          - Interreligious conflict management training                              |
| Al Makassed University                | - Teaching of religions by their believers                                 
                                          - Organisation of gatherings between students from different religious communities |
| UMAM                                 | - Organisation of events to open a space for debate about memory such as workshops or conferences |
| Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya                  | - Projects of awareness-raising about citizenship and democracy among the youth |

The main idea is to promote change by discussing and debating, by providing new ideas and
by encouraging self-reflection. According to this approach, people stay within their communities
and therefore stand on their (wrong) positions. Contradicting their beliefs and organising gatherings
with their ‘enemies’ will make them call what they think into question and lead to a better
understanding of each other, a necessary path towards reconciliation.

The main criticism formulated against this method is its lack of concrete aspects. At best,
people might agree theoretically that their prejudices were wrong. They might confirm that people
need to work together but still do nothing. Changing thoughts is a first step, changing behaviours is
another one. At worst, people might consider these gatherings as useless talks, for instance because
they are not sensitive to theoretical approaches. People might also agree with each other to be polite but without changing their minds. That is why the other approach focuses on promoting reconciliation through economic and social development projects.

This approach is based on the idea that people need to see the concrete benefits of reconciliation: social and economic benefits. The Lebanese will work together towards a common goal: the improvement of their living conditions.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Method</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offre-Joie</td>
<td>- Gatherings of children and youth from all regions and communities of Lebanon to implement common projects such as holiday camps or reconstruction of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Sadr Foundation</td>
<td>- Projects aiming at improving the well-being of all Lebanese, especially the underprivileged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAP</td>
<td>- Social services provided to mixed communities living in the same area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opération 7ème Jour-Tarchiche (USJ)</td>
<td>- Organisation of social activities gathering different religious communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement Social</td>
<td>- Projects aiming at improving the well-being of all Lebanese, especially the underprivileged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amel</td>
<td>- Projects aiming at improving the well-being of all Lebanese, especially the underprivileged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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This approach aims at being realistic: concrete actions are more efficient than words. But the issue is that it might be seen as a superficial approach as well. People can work together towards a common goal but if their disagreements (memory, politics, living conditions, etc...) are not addressed, it will end up in a superficial reconciliation that will not prevent a new outbreak of violence.

- **Interfaith dialogue**

Reconciliation is a goal for *Adyan* and *Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies (USJ)* whereas *Al Makassased University* just wants Muslim and Christian communities to get to know each other better. *Al Makassed University* only aims at providing a better balanced knowledge about religions to its students and therefore asks a Christian believer to teach his religion. It is also a priority for *Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies (USJ)* and *Adyan*, but they have supplementary activities consisting in interfaith dialogue. Interfaith dialogue means gatherings between persons with
different religious backgrounds and exchanging opinions on their beliefs, their values and their views on the world as well as on every day issues. The usual goal of these reunions is to get to know each other: “stereotypes which are learned through family and television and which pose the most obstacles to meeting and dialogue are eliminated” (Massouh, 2003 in: Khoury, 2005). Therefore, it fortifies coexistence and is also a means to prevent fundamentalism and extremism. On the one hand, advantages of this approach are obvious: it might contribute to get rid of prejudices and to find out spiritual and practical common grounds between the different communities.

“Differences between Christians and Muslims do not stem from disputes about religious doctrine but from long-standing disputes of history and power sharing, disputes that affect day-to-day political decision.” (Al-Sammak, 2002 in: Khoury, 2005). On the other hand, if conflicts in Lebanon are not religious ones, why would this interfaith dialogue be a solution? Is the problem really linked to the fact that Muslims believe in a unique God whereas Christian believe in the Trinity? Why acknowledge that tensions are linked to religion, since it is more than anything else a theory that politicians and other stakeholders want the Lebanese to believe in to manipulate them? “Maybe the conflict is political but when people kill, they do it on behalf of God” (Ayoub, 2010). Indeed, the brainwashing is so strong that discussing common grounds between Islam and Christianity might contribute to release some tensions. Moreover, designation as inter-religious dialogue might be seen as a way to emphasise differences whereas the goal is the opposite: “to realise that religions share the same essentials” (Khoury, 2005). All the more that it might exclude people who do not feel comfortable with discussing religion or who are not religious. For instance, what about tensions between the Shiite and Sunni communities? Could one imagine an inter-faith dialogue between them, whereas for some Muslims, it remains a taboo to acknowledge that there are two branches in Islam? In conclusion, as conflicts are not religious ones, interfaith dialogue should only be part of a broader strategy to address tensions. Lebanon needs space for dialogue but not only an interfaith one.

- **Space for debate about memory and past**

That is *Ummam’s* work: to open space for dialogue about past and memory. History is an issue in Lebanon, where the school history books finish in 1943. There is no common history in Lebanon, there are as many stories as communities. Each of them has its own version. As most of them present the other religious communities as the enemy, it nurtures tensions. For instance, it is common for a Christian to blame the Druze for what happened in 1860s. When a country where events dating a 150 years back are still so alive that they can structure the current debate, it means
that memory is an issue. There was a attempt to design an official common history book. It ended up to be a bland book as it mentioned only ‘positive’ aspects and avoided conflicting points (Messara, 2010). Many chapters focused on Israel as the common enemy and the division of the country between different communities was only mentioned during conflicts, disappearing with the peace coming. Adyan also focuses on this with youth projects. Their goal is not to rewrite the history. They do not aim at finding out truth or justice. They just want youth to balance their opinions, to understand that there are several versions of the Lebanese history and that they do not own the truth, (Tabbara, 2010). Umam also avoids advocating for a particular vision of history, they just try to create spaces for discussions (Souaid, 2010).

- Targeting the youth

Another base of their methodology is that organisations mainly target the youth. Indeed, as it is classic to state, youth are the future, they will be the adults of tomorrow and it is by working with them that one will manage to change the society. For sure, youth are the future of Lebanon but it is not that easy to work with them. According to a social worker who was in charge of UN peace summer camps, and confirmed by other interviewees, it is more difficult to work with youth now than in the 1990s, right after the war (Mouawad, 2010). She admitted that mixing youth from different communities is nowadays more difficult than before. One might try to explain this phenomenon by the withdrawal into one’s community which had grown since the end of the war. It means that communities emphasise their differences rather that their common grounds. Youth follow this cultural and social trend like any Lebanese and this is reinforced by two elements. First, youth do not have any experience of coexistence with other communities, at the difference of their parents. This coexistence dates from before the civil conflict, but these youth were born during the war. Second, youth have not been educated to think critically. They assume that what authorities - family, media, politicians and religious leaders – tell them is true and should not be called into question. Facing this, organisations try to promote a more critical way of thinking. This is one of the challenges Adyan gave priority to: “[we aim at initiating] them to an objective and critical approach of the relation between religion, society and politics within the Lebanese context” (Adyan, 2010). Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya also works towards this goal and its program ‘Daleel: Introduction to Active Citizenship’ which aims at “[nurturing] a sustainable attitude of critical thinking and free expression among students” (Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya, 2010).

However, working directly with youth might not be enough. As mentioned above concerning the project ‘Ma Mnikhtelef’ (We Don't Differ), Amel usually manages to organise
activities with youth from different communities and promote values of tolerance. However, when they go home, these youth hear again the intolerant and aggressive discourse usually found within the families. That is why Imam Al Sadr Foundation decided to work with families rather than to focus on youth. The solution has to be comprehensive and they know that if youth have to choose between a critical opinion and their family, they will choose the second option. They will not take the risk to disagree with the mainstream discourse.

A question that is worth mentioning here is the one of the school system. Indeed, Lebanese youth are influenced by three different sources: family, media and religious and political leaders. Schools do not play a great role in their education. It is a pity since school could be a major tool for reconciliation. First, it could be a space for mixing young Lebanese. Second, it could contribute to educate them to think critically. However, in Lebanon, schools are mostly private and confessional. It means that most of the Lebanese send their children to schools belonging to their sect. Therefore, schools that could be a major instrument for national integration, are “one of the main institutions that perpetuated Lebanon’s dual cultural heritage” (Jabra and Jabra, 1984 in: Barak, 2007, p.63).

Most schools do not mix children and the sectarian school system nurtures tensions. Indeed, only a few of them try to provide children alternative teachings. Those face two kinds of difficulties: the lack of methodology e.g. “some schools teach citizenship but do not train to citizenship” (Mouawad, 2010) and it thus remains an abstract concept. Moreover, even when schools try to support debates or promote new values, legitimacy of the institution is so weak that it is not likely that it will have any permanent impact. Children go home, discuss with their parents, watch the media and listen to their leaders. These actors support one mainstream discourse against which schools or CSOs have few capability to fight. The state tried to use the educational system to promote ‘national unity’ by providing history textbooks (see above). It was a failure as the state as well does not have enough legitimacy to be considered.

3. Critical thinking and individuality

The previous paragraph shows the inertia force of the system. This is partly due to the already mentioned lack of critical sense. This lack is especially obvious in the political realm. People do not balance their sources of information. They listen to their leaders and their media without questioning them. Therefore, they are easily manipulated by their leaders who play with their fears and tensions are nurtured. In Lebanon, political consciousness is either primary or based on fear (Mouawad, 2010). Everything is politicised but in the wrong sense: this is more about struggles for power rather than building a political project for the society. There is a need to develop and diffuse
political education among people.

This lack of critical sense is linked to the absence of acknowledgement of ‘individuality’ and the phenomenon of ‘unconscious imitation’. This absence of promotion of individuality implies for instance to have prejudices against one entire group. Indeed, groups are represented as uniform: ‘the Sunnis’, ‘the Muslims’, ‘the Christians’ etc... whereas no group is monolithic. When I mentioned to Assad Cheftari, Christian active member of Initiative of Change, that I could not understand how Christians could blame Druze for what happened in the 1860s, he replied: “I understand your reaction as an individual but as a community, it is more difficult”. The lack of acknowledgement of individuality leads Lebanese people to reproduce behaviours without questioning them. Some individuals manage to have critical and lucid opinions. However, from the thought to the actions, there is a gap difficult to bridge. Masses provide safety in a society where belonging to a group has such a great importance. It leads to a new question: what make people fight for their ideas against the system? According to Grégoire Haddad (2010), founder of Mouvement Social, people who do want to promote changes do not gather. Indeed, in Lebanon, getting involved into actions that go against the mainstream is hard and people might lack of motivation or find benefits too unlikely.

Then, how to manage the individual and collective parts of the reconciliation process? Ideally reconciliation should be a collective process as one community needs to reconcile with another one. However, since the context is not favourable (see below), one could imagine that CSOs should focus on individuals rather than groups. The documentary produced by Adyan ‘From war to reconciliation’ (2008) shows two former militia leaders telling their path from being a warlord to personal repentance, to public apology. It is enlightening to hear them describing their personal and individual way to deal with their past. Both found answers in faith. For now, since there is no collective process, could everyone go through the same kind of individual process? Can reconciliation at the individual level compensate for the lack of collective reconciliation? Would this be the beginning of a collective process? How do the individual and collective aspects of reconciliation interact with each other? Answering these questions impact on the methodology used by the organisation. Therefore, Initiative of Change adopted an approach at the individual level whereas most of the other organisations decided to work at the collective level. According to them, before changing relationships between human beings, you need to change the person from inside. Even in case of collective reconciliation process, an individual appropriation is needed. For instance, does someone who experienced the war have to go through the same process than someone who was born at the end?
4. Influence of religion

This study assumed that there were two ways in which the religious organisations could contribute to the reconciliation process: the use of religious beliefs and values to promote better understanding among people and the use of their legitimacy by religiously involved people to advocate for a reconciliation process. In the end, this appeared to be simplistic since too many issues are interconnected.

First the spiritual influence of faith-based organisations is difficult to evaluate because of its non measurable nature. Religious beliefs often led to the creation of an organisation but in different ways. Mouvement Social, IRAP and Imam Sadr Foundation were created by religiously involved people – one priest, two sisters, one imam – to improve the living conditions of the underprivileged. For instance, IRAP, a Christian organisation, started to help Muslims in 1986 with in mind “and if he was my brother?” (Slaiby, 2010). Mouvement Social was founded by Father Haddad (see Chapter IX ‘Findings’) and Imam Sadr Foundation started with the initiatives from the imam of the same name. These organisations focus on social and economic development projects to help the underprivileged. This implies that one has to work with all communities, since underprivileged people are everywhere. Adyan, Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies (USJ) and Offre-Joie were faith-based organisations created in order to improve coexistence between different religious communities. That is why, except Offre-Joie, most of them emphasise a theoretical approach.

One can state that the goals of all these organisations are both religious and political. The first category of organisations mentioned above, working on development, have political goals in the sense that they not only want to help the poor, they also want to empower them. They are not charity organisations that just aim at providing assistance. Their mission includes education, vocational training and citizenship so that the underprivileged can provide for their needs on their own and have the necessary means to raise their voice. Adyan, Institute for Islamic-Christian Studies (USJ) and Offre-Joie, organisations focusing on education, have political goals in the sense that they try to promote the idea of a multi-religious society in Lebanon. Even if their ideas are not very developed, this is a political project in a country where every community is afraid of being kicked out of the territory.

How do they use their religious values in their work? It is necessary not to deny the religious background of the people who are involved in the activities i.e. the ‘beneficiaries’ (Khalaf, 2010; Tabbara, 2010). Therefore, the organisations work with it. Offre-Joie and Adyan use their religious practices to gather people. Both of them organise once a year an event gathering religious leaders and believers from different communities where they choose one concept and write a common text.
Then, with *Adyan*, each community prays for this value and they gather to discuss it, whereas *Offre-Joie* proposes religious leaders to read the written text altogether. Organisations also try to disseminate their religious values among the beneficiaries of their programmes. They do it by stressing the core spiritual meanings of religious values and how these should impact behaviours. Indeed, many Lebanese affirm to be attached to their religious values but it ends up to be fanaticism (Mouawad, 2010; Daou, 2010; Noha, 2010). Religion is manipulated by religious and political leaders to justify actions that in fact are just motivated by their own interests. It is closely linked to the complex interconnection between religion and politics in Lebanon. Leaders play with the fears resented by the population, who eventually support their leaders. Therefore, organisations have a strong willingness to advocate for a new place for religion within the society, a place that does not imply fanaticism. That is also why organisations try to instil a critical sense in youth: to destroy the impact of these abuses. They try not to reinforce sectarianism and rather aim at giving an alternative role to religion in the education process (Tabbara, 2010). In front of the brainwashing of Lebanese youth, *Adyan* wonders if emphasising rationality would not be more efficient in some projects (ibid.).

Asked for their perception of non-sectarian organisations, faith-based organisations were not reluctant to collaborate with them. All of these organisations agree that cooperation with as many partners as possible, is the best. It is a too difficult fight to act lonely and diagnosis of these organisations have similarities e.g. necessity to be more critical of leaders’ sayings, necessity to find public places where the different sects could meet. Indeed, non-sectarian organisations witness the same phenomenon of brainwashing and manipulation. They just prefer to ignore the religious backgrounds of people and to emphasise their status of Lebanese citizen. According to them, involving religion in any way will reinforce rather than release tensions. On the solutions, they also have many common views. On the one hand, the selected faith-based organisations promote citizenship and human rights. Many of their members encourage the idea that religion should stand apart from the political life. They would like the system to be deconfessionalised. However, as this is still a sensitive topic in Lebanon, they do not claim it out loud. On the other hand, non-sectarian organisations are not against religion. They approve the idea that religious leaders and faith-based actors should promote reconciliation. They are just sceptical about the realism of this project. Indeed, today only few religiously involved people lobby for reconciliation. Most of them either support politicians or do not take position in the debate (Noha, 2010).

Evaluation of the work of these organisations turned out to be extremely complicated. Indeed there are many factors that small-scale CSOs cannot impact. Despite their willingness, the context has to be favourable to expect positive outputs. Therefore, organisations try to be realistic:
they set up long term objectives and expect to have an impact in twenty or fifty years, in one, two, three generations. They are not even sure to witness one day the impact of their work.

5. Obstacles and challenges

a) No evidence of reconciliation processes in 2010

Huyse describes what he sees as the three stages of a reconciliation process (Huyse, 2003). If a theoretical model cannot be considered as a truth, it still provides some clue to analyse a situation. Applying Huyse’s model to Lebanon shows with a great obviousness that reconciliation remains a huge challenge. The first stage of the reconciliation process consists in “replacing violence by non-violent coexistence”: “at the lowest level coexistence implies no more than a willingness not to kill one another - a case of walking by on the other side of the street” (Villa-Vicencio in Huyse, 2003, p.19). It implies to build new ways of communication between former enemies, victims and offenders. Here political and religious authorities as well as civil society have a great role to play, if the conflict did not destroy their legitimacy. Another condition to reach this stage is to provide a safe environment, where international and national actors have a responsibility. At this level, people are still enemies but they do not resort to force.

The second stage consists in “building confidence and trust”. People start to trust themselves and each other and see humanity in every person. Then people are able to distinguish degrees of guilt between the individuals within the community. Finally, the last stage is the one of empathy towards the former enemy. Through truth-telling process, victims and perpetrators start to share their responsibility and suffering. It might lead to the implementation of activities where the former lines of division are crossed like religion or generations. Huyse adds at this final stage that forgiveness and pardon might never happen. To accompany this process, there is a need to reduce socio-economic inequalities.

If one applies this theoretical model to the Lebanese situation, it becomes obvious that Lebanon has not reached the first stage and one could add that it is far from it. There are no effective ways of communication between those who were involved in the numerous conflicts in Lebanon, starting with the civil war. At this point, any external observer and some Lebanese people would argue that the legitimacies of religious and political leaders have been destroyed. For instance, because many of the current politicians used to be warlords. It might seem awkward to hear people responsible for massacres to talk about peace. The religious authorities also played an ambiguous role. Despite this, the majority of the Lebanese people still attach a great value to the
sayings and acts of their leaders. The safe environment required at this stage seems very precarious considering, for instance, the incidents that took place summer 2010, when the present study was conducted. Not only are people still enemies but they also seem ready to resort to force in the very near future. The second and third stages of this model seem far away.

b) How to achieve reconciliation in an unfavourable environment?

Work has been done on reconciliation before. But nowadays, it seems that reconciliation has to be stopped due to the very sensitive situation. Sister Noha, who organises gatherings and activities in Syria between Muslim and Christian youth, said she learned that when winds are contrary, it is better having a break and waiting for more favourable times (Noha, 2010). One can see here how precarious the work on reconciliation is. A new question that would be relevant is: what should be the strategies of the actors during unfavourable times? Should they opt for a wait-and-see approach? Should they continue to work on it? One difficult element for people working in this field is that their work can be deleted quickly at any time if one leader decides to wake up tensions. This leads to a sort of disenchantment among the old generation (Mouawad, 2010; Messara, 2010). How to build a long-term answer in an unstable context remains a challenge (Souaid, 2010). All the more so considering that some stakeholders are regional and international players and are even more difficult to reach than national players. There was a project of common history between Al Makassed University, Imam Sadr Foundation and Al Mabarrat (Shiite community-based organisation providing social services for children): what should have been achieved within a year was done in four years and has, due to the tensions between the different Muslim communities, been stopped for now. In the 1990s IRAP workers and volunteers stayed in their office because of the political tensions outside. A question raised by Umam’s director was: how to produce memory while the war is ongoing?

Lebanon is a country perpetually at war. In this situation, can a reconciliation process start before any real and effective peace agreement is established? This is not about a formal paper stating Lebanon is at peace but this is more an agreement between all the stakeholders that they resort to violence in Lebanon whatever the reason.

6. Political aspects of reconciliation

Beyond the current contextual obstacles to reconciliation, there is a need to solve a certain number of political issues in order to support the reconciliation process. Indeed, reconciliation is a highly
political question: “[if] we are to understand reconciliation as a political concept, then, we must consider not only how politics might be conciliatory but how reconciliation might be politicized” (Schnapp, 2005 in: Barak, 2007, p.51). Discussing politics implies to get rid of ‘sloganeering’ and get into the real debate. However, are the pre-conditions for such discussions there? Indeed, when trying to instil critical sense to youth, that is what organisations are doing: initiating the pre-conditions for political debates. But, as one noticed, there are many obstacles, the main one being fear. Indeed, Lebanese religious communities (and also within these communities) are afraid of being wiped out by another sect. Christians, who used to be the most privileged sect, are decreasing in number and therefore, fear to be kicked out of Lebanon by Muslims. Shiites used to be economically and politically disadvantaged compared to Sunnis. However, their growing population scare Sunnis who are afraid to loose influence. This rivalry is also related to ancestral regional disputes between these two groups. Fear paralyses Lebanese politics. Everyone is focused on his survival and therefore, it prevents the emergence of any constructive debate.

If one day these real or imagined fears disappear and the Lebanese manage to sit around the table, there are a list of political issues, not exhaustive, that would deserved to be discussed.

a) Which identity for Lebanon?

Working on reconciliation implies that people will want to live together again one day. Therefore one needs cement. This cement is called ‘identity’. This means that people share common values, a past and a future. But what is the Lebanese identity? What are their common values? What is their past? There is no common history and past is rarely debated. Is a common history book necessary or is it enough to have different versions coexisting? What is the Lebanese political project? There is a need for a common political project but for now, there are as many projects as communities: “Christians (…) emphasise a separate Lebanese identity centred on its non-Arab and non-Muslim components, Muslims tend to be oriented more towards the region and advocate an Arab/Islamic identity” (Kraft et al., 2008, p.16). Social and economic dimensions also have a place in the debate: according to the academic Messara (2010), the relevant question to think about is ‘how to transfer the socio-economic unity to the political sphere?’

b) Which state for Lebanon?

The identity question is closely related to the one of the state. Indeed, the state could be a structure that participates to guarantee the cohesion of the country. However, the Lebanese state is unstable
and not institutionalised (Harik, 1994 in: Barak, 2007, p.65). All the prerogatives that are traditionally performed by public institutions in Western states for instance, are in Lebanon supported by sectarian institutions e.g. schools, social service, justice for some issues. What sort of state do the Lebanese want? Do they want to build a strong one or are they satisfied with a one with little influence? In the latter case, is it an obstacle to peaceful coexistence in Lebanon? What other authorities of regulation should be set up to guarantee civil tranquillity?

Another issue concerning the state is: should the confessional system be perpetuated? Indeed, right now the democracy is between communities but not between individuals. Would it be better for Lebanon to become secular in its own way? Indeed, there are several ways of being secular. The term is often misinterpreted in Lebanon as ‘against religion’. It might be explained by the French heritage. France is a secular state and this led to a sort of global defiance against religion. However, this is only one interpretation. One research could be about: what would be a Lebanese secularism? Daou (2010) makes a distinction between a civil state and a secular state. A widespread position among the interviewees is that religion and politics should be separated and especially religious authorities from political authorities. Moreover, some of them support the idea of a civil law, not related to any sect, and that people could freely choose. “It is not clear in my mind whether the whole political system should be changed or just the politician cast. What is clear is that religion should be separated from politics” (Bassam, 2010).

c) Politicians in Lebanon

Politicians in Lebanon are an issue. There are gathered in confessional political parties and are very powerful (see Chapter VI ‘Peacebuilding in Lebanon’). There was a consensus among the interviewees that politicians constitute a large part of the problem. The problem is not the political system but the politicians (Tabara, 2010). They are the former warlords, responsible for massacres, who passed an amnesty which enabled them to stay in power. Therefore, they have little legitimacy left in the eyes of many Lebanese: “[w]hile war criminals were given titles, important political positions and privileges, the war disabled and those who went missing during the war were simply cast aside” (Barak, 2007, p.68). However, as one stated above, scared communities still support them since they are perceived as their unique protection against the ‘enemy’. In reality, these politicians protect more their personal interests rather than those of their communities. They use their sectarian affiliation to manipulate their people: “since 1943, Lebanese leaders have referred to ‘political sectarianism’ as an ill that needed to be abolished, while making the most out of its continued existence” (Barak, 2007, p.65). They are not willing to get involved in any reconciliation.
process. For instance, *Adyan* could not manage to initiate a working group on reconciliation involving political parties. Indeed, politicians have interests to leave past behind them and to present themselves as victims. This is problematic as reconciliation lacks a top-down support. Without this support, it becomes very difficult for CSOs to work on reconciliation and have a meaningful impact. Would the retirement of these former warlords contribute to clean the Lebanese political landscape?

d) The international and regional context

As already stated (Chapter VI ‘Peacebuilding in Lebanon’), Lebanon is involved in many regional and international issues that prevent it from being totally sovereign. Therefore, it becomes difficult not to say impossible that Lebanese could decide for themselves and by themselves, without any influence. Among other issues, coexistence of the three religious communities in the Middle East (Sunnis, Shiites and Christians), the international tensed context since 9/11 and the endless Israeli-Palestinian conflict led to a withdrawal into one’s community that had disastrous consequences in Lebanon. In that context, what would constitute the involvement of a government in a country that has not effective power? (Abi Ezzi, 2002, p.31)
CONCLUSION

The underlying motivation of this research was: ‘how can contemporary societies prevent the reproduction of deadly conflicts?’ Since the concept of peacebuilding - activities to prevent the recurrence of conflict - appeared to be a ‘recipe’ to build peace, this paper aimed to contribute to the definition of more adequate and contextualised methods to build peace. Therefore, a positive definition of peace was adopted and a study was done on local actors acting at the grassroots level. The selected actors were faith-based organisations since they have often been neglected in the past. An analysis of their work on reconciliation was done as it was considered to be a relevant sphere of intervention for local actors.

Lebanon was the selected case study. Indeed, the country has experienced many violent events and the peacebuilding process is still stammering. Sectarian belonging is an important factor of identity in the country and faith-based organisations are powerful. The reconciliation process though is hindered by political tensions in the entire region.

Twelve organisations were selected of which eight were faith-based. It was difficult to find local faith-based organisations working on reconciliation because they usually focus on provision of social services. The research question was: ‘how do local faith-based organisations contribute to the reconciliation process in Lebanon?’ The selected organisations implement different approaches, based on education or development, but always aiming to gather people. They also try to work on critical thinking as well as past and memory. Religious motives usually led to their creation and they use these motives and beliefs in their work.

However, the tense environment makes it difficult to evaluate the qualitative contribution of the selected faith-based organisations to the reconciliation process. Do they implement specific and relevant methods in the Lebanese context? So far, methods and tools implemented by these organisations seem to be relevant, the problem being the unfavourable context which makes it challenging for everyone to work on reconciliation. It is almost impossible to state whether they are better or worse than the ones implemented by international organisations because working on the Lebanese reconciliation process in 2010 goes against the grain (Tabbara, 2010).

In the end, this study, rather to reply to the question ‘which tools do faith-based organisations use to promote reconciliation?’, painted a picture of ‘what are these organisations trying to do to promote reconciliation (their visions, their methods, their obstacles)?’ Indeed, these faith-based actors are
dealing with political issues and the unfavourable context makes it very difficult for them to work on reconciliation. Even if, for now, conditions are not favourable enough, the potential of faith-based organisations to promote reconciliation remains:

“What seems surprising to me looking backward is that nobody, including the interviewees or the people from the faculties, told me, in a direct way, that my topic did not make sense considering the current situation. Why? Maybe they were not sure themselves whether it was relevant or not to work on it... As many questions do not have clear answers and therefore might accept many different answers, nobody will tell me that I am wrong. Maybe they also thought it was too late because I already chose my topic... The only thing some people were sure about was the necessity to secularise Lebanon and that religious organisations were not, today, the most adequate actor to work on reconciliation. Not because of their nature - the idea is that anyone wanting to go towards the right direction is welcome - but because the Lebanese religious actors are famous for contributing to the tensions rather than releasing them”.

To conclude, I assume that the underlying motive of this study - the definition of more adequate methods to build peace in a country - remains relevant. However, it seems that the selected case study – reconciliation in Lebanon - was not the most appropriate one. Indeed, it involves another difficult question, out of the scope of this study: ‘is it possible to work on peacebuilding, and in particular reconciliation, in an unfavourable environment?’ Indeed, in the case of Lebanon, there is almost a need to switch from peacebuilding to conflict prevention. At the moment of writing this conclusion (February 2011), Nagib Mikati has just been controversially designated as the new prime minister. The future of Lebanon is uncertain and a new conflict is highly possible. Therefore, I argue that studying peacebuilding measures, especially the ones dealing with reconciliation, implies to choose a country in a ‘post-conflict’ situation and not in a ‘new-conflict-about-to-start’ context. Lebanon is indeed in the latter situation. As Marie-Claude Souaid, working for UMAM, stated: Lebanon missed its chances to be in peace. It might have been possible during the first fifteen post-war years. But now, the situation is too complex. Therefore, the same research question should lead a new study based on a ‘real’ post-war situation, if it exists. Indeed, one could argue that the border between a ‘real’ post-war country and a ‘new-conflict-about-to-start’ situation is too blurry to be delimited, especially in the case of civil conflicts.
In addition, this study reasserts two assumptions about peacebuilding already mentioned in the introduction. First, actions need to be undertaken at all levels: insiders and outsiders, at the three different levels. In the case of reconciliation, if middle-range and top leaders are not involved, efforts of organisations will remain useless. Indeed, one noticed that the selected grassroots organisations alone cannot impact the society. Second, all dimensions of peacebuilding (security and public order; political and institutional framework; justice and rule of law; psycho-social recovery; socio-economic foundations) are interconnected and complementary. The peacebuilding process has few chances to be achieved if one is missing.

In particular, this research has showed the difficulty of controlling human expressions of violence and that, before everything, this is all about politics. There are voices that indeed do not believe in peacebuilding: the realists who see the field as ‘soft-headed’. There are also those who argue that “the field is misconceived as it is not situated within a larger analysis of the global forces of oppression and exploitation” (Gawerc, 2006, p.456). This last approach appears to be very relevant in the case of Lebanon: no solution can be implemented before political decisions are made. Indeed, the urgent priority for the Lebanese is to decide the kind of society and future they want to build, and if they want to build it together. This study gave a useful insight into the political dilemma of peacebuilding in the Lebanese case. In the same direction, more research should be done on the relationships between politics and peacebuilding. We go back to Denskus’ quote (2007):

“Listening to people living in war and in peace, acknowledging their stories and those of the people who inhabit Aidland, and naming the uncertainties and failures that are part of these worlds, can help to bring a transformative element into a debate that is currently buried under the high pressure of supermodern aid management. Without these stories, and without more reflection on our own engagement and more qualitative insights into the social dynamics of war and peace, ‘peace- building’ will not even remain a buzzword. It will become another ‘airport’ on the global development travel routes – ‘This is the final call for the Aidlines flight from “gender” to “peacebuilding”, with a quick stop-over in “participation” (p. 661)."


Abou Assi, Khaldoun. 2006. An assessment of Lebanese Civil Society: Lebanese Civil Society, a Long History of Achievements Facing Decisive Challenges Ahead an Uncertain Future. CIVICUS.


http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/63/79/lang,english/. [Last access 16 January 2011]
ANNEXES

Annex 1: Questionnaire

Background information (to be found in reports and on the websites)

➢ When was your organisation created?
➢ By whom?
➢ What is the mission of your organisation? Its values?
➢ In which context was it created?
➢ What are the specific goals and activities? Have they changed over time?
➢ Where do you work?
➢ Who are your 'beneficiaries'?
➢ How many staff? Paid or not? Which administrative structure?
➢ Where do the funds come from?

Intro: need to agree on a definition of reconciliation with the interviewee

“As a backward-looking operation, reconciliation brings about the personal healing of survivors, the reparation of past injustices, the building or rebuilding of non-violent relationships between individuals and communities, and the acceptance by the former parties to a conflict of a common vision and understanding of the past. In its forward-looking dimension, reconciliation means enabling victims and perpetrators to get on with life and, at the level of society, the establishment of a civilized political dialogue and an adequate sharing of power” (Huyse, 2003, p.19).

1st case: if the concept of reconciliation is mentioned in organisation's mission, I will ask them how they define it.

2nd case: if the organisation does not use the concept of reconciliation, I will replace it by the expression 'improving relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese'.
Questions

a) What is your organisation doing to support reconciliation/to improve relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese? (Projects/ Programmes)

b) Why do you work on reconciliation/on improving relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese?

c) Do religious values and principles influence your work on reconciliation/on the improvement of relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese? If yes, how?

d) How do you perceive the work on reconciliation of the secular organisations? Do you work with them?

e) How do you approach questions related to:

- **reconciliation of whom with whom?** How do you address resentment against the other communities? Within the same community?
- **past:** in your work, is what happened during wars mentioned? Do people express what they experienced during wars? How do you address the absence of common history? Do you think that the amnesty law was negative or positive for reconciliation?
- **political system:** do you think that political parties/political leaders/the political regime have a positive or negative influence on reconciliation in Lebanon?
- **economic and social:** do the economic and social situations of people add obstacles to reconciliation?
- **democracy, citizenship, human rights:** do you think that promoting these concepts can contribute to reconciliation?

f) What are your achievements? How would you evaluate the efficiency of your work?

g) What are the main difficulties and challenges you face when working on reconciliation/trying to improve relationships and cohabitation between the Lebanese?

h) What kind of support would you like to receive from outsiders especially international actors working in the field of peacebuilding?

*All these questions will not be automatically asked and not necessary in that order. It is a guideline. It will depend on the interview: whether the interlocutor is talkative or not for instance.*
**Annex 2: Selected Organisations**

Organisations are put in alphabetical order. Information were found in the official websites of the organisations: they are either integrally reproduced or reformulated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1. Adyan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Person met</td>
<td>Fadi Daou and Nayla Tabbara, founding members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Adyan official website <a href="http://www.adyanvillage.net/index.asp">http://www.adyanvillage.net/index.asp</a> [last access 19 January 2011]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full name</td>
<td>Lebanese foundation for interfaith studies and spiritual solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Non-governmental (NGO) and non-profit organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of creation/Founders</td>
<td>Adyan was created in 2006 by Christian and Muslim founding members: Fadi Daou (Professor in Fundamental Theology and Political Philosophy) Nayla Tabbara (Professor in Religious and Islamic Studies) Tony Sawma (Educational Leader and researcher in psycho-sociology) Mireille Matar (Teacher and Social worker) Samah Halwany (Researcher and Lecturer in Sociology of Conflicts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Multi-religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission/ Values</td>
<td>ADYAN works for the clarification of main religious and theological concepts, especially in the framework of pluralistic societies where different religious communities face common social and political challenges. The foundation also encourages the building and strengthening of solidarity and positive interaction among people belonging to different religious groups through dialogue and common commitment. ADYAN thus hopes to be a participant in the achievement and the anchoring of peace in Lebanon, the region and the world.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Examples of programs | - **Alwan**: School module about religious culture, interfaith relations and coexistence  
- **Awareness program**: spreading awareness within Lebanese society about inter-religious issues, dialogue and spiritual solidarity  
- **Spiritual Solidarity Day**: ceremony gathering social, educational, and religious leaders as well as groups and individuals from different communities to celebrate a common value and confirm adoption of it, through prayers, cultural activities and a written message subscribed to by all  
- **Sustainable Reconciliation**: production of films e.g. "From war to reconciliation", documentary on Lebanese witnesses (former militia leaders) to repentance, forgiveness and peace |
| Regions of work/Beneficiaries | - **Alwan**: students in high schools (schools, either private or governmental schools, and with a predominance of one religion in their population or with a religiously mixed population) |
- **Awareness**: all Lebanese population in schools, universities, NGOs, institutes, religious communities and parishes, political parties, or through media.
- **Spiritual Solidarity Day**: Lebanese social, educational and religious leaders as well as individuals from all communities.
- **Sustainable Reconciliation**: Lebanese and Arab population
- Work in Beirut and in the main cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds/ Partners</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anna Lindh Foundation; Feed the Minds; BANKMED; Al Waleed Bin Talal Foundation; Lebanese National Commission for UNESCO; Beirut Bank and Arab Countries (BBAC); For the Love of Tomorrow Films (London – UK), Safadi Foundation (Lebanon); The Arab regional office of UNESCO (Beirut – Lebanon); Initiatives of change; Imam Sadr Foundation; Forum for Development, Culture and Dialogue (Beirut – Lebanon); etc...</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Staff</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of creation/Founders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission/ Values</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Examples of programs** | - Medical activities  
- Democracy and human rights  
- Vocational training  
- Rural development  
- Child protection  
- Specific programs:  
  * Iraqi / Lebanese Children & Youth Empowerment through Non Formal Education and Psychosocial Activities  
  * Promotion of Women and Children’s Rights to Education, Leisure and Health  
  * ‘Ma Mnikhtelef” (We Don't Differ) |
| **Regions of work/Beneficiaries** | - 14 health centers located in the Bekaa region, South Lebanon and Beirut  
- The youth |
<p>| <strong>Funds/ Partners</strong> | Mercy Corps; GHR Foundation; ANERA; DRC; Medico International; IMC; Movimondo; Save the Children – Sweden; Al Walid Bin Talal Foundation; Médecins Sans Frontières; Médecins du Monde; Euromed; European Commission; ILO (International Labor Organization); UNDP (United Nations Development Program); UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency); UNICEF; WHO (World Health Organization); World Bank; UNFPA; Ministry of Social Affairs; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Youth and Ministry of Social Affairs (Lebanon); Ministry of Health (Lebanon); Ministry of Youth and Ministry of Social Affairs (Lebanon); Ministry of Youth and Ministry of Social Affairs (Lebanon); Ministry of Youth and Ministry of Social Affairs (Lebanon) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Paid staff and volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Sports; Arc en Ciel Association; Byblos Institute; Cooperation services of the French, Chinese, Italian, Qatar, Swiss, Dutch, Canadian, Iranian, and Japanese embassies; universities: LAU, Balamand university, Lebanese university, American University of Beirut and Université Saint-Joseph.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>3. Imam Sadr Foundation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Mohammad Bassam in charge of external communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source</strong></td>
<td>Imam Sadr Foundation official website <a href="http://www.imamsadrfoundation.org/enghome.aspx">http://www.imamsadrfoundation.org/enghome.aspx</a> [last access 19 January 2011]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature</strong></td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of creation/ and founders</strong></td>
<td>Starting in 1962 and in the years until 1978, Imam Sadr founded numerous centers and institutes and conducted many activities. It is difficult to state which ideas and activities should be considered the nucleus of what later became the Imam Sadr Foundation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation</strong></td>
<td>Shiite Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission/ Values</strong></td>
<td>The Imam Sadr Foundation is a community-based organisation that seeks to bring about social justice, change and equity by working closely with local communities in South Lebanon. Its activities focus on health, education and promoting a culture of dialogue and reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Examples of programs** | - Academic education  
- Vocational training programs  
- Health programs  
- Rural and social development  
- Income-generating programs  
- Centre for research and studies |
| **Regions of work/ Beneficiaries** | - Mainly in the South |
| **Funds/ Partners** | - Partners: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Norwegian Aid Committee (NORWAC), Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), World Health Organisation (WHO), World Bank, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Affairs, etc...  
- Funds: individual and diaspora contributions, ramadan iftars, income-generating activities, sponsorship, etc... |
<p>| <strong>Staff</strong>          | Paid staff and volunteers |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Name</strong></th>
<th>4. Initiative of Change Lebanon (Initiative et Changement)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Assaad Chaftari, founder of the Lebanese branch and former militia leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source</strong></td>
<td>Initiative of Change International official website <a href="http://www.iofc.org/home">http://www.iofc.org/home</a> <a href="http://www.iofc.org/history/Lebanon">http://www.iofc.org/history/Lebanon</a> [last access 19 January 2011]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature</strong></td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of creation/Founders</strong></td>
<td>- 1920s: creation of the international organisation, the Oxford group, by Franck Buchman, an American Lutheran minister of Swiss ancestry born in 1878 &lt;br&gt; - 1938: organisation renamed Moral Re-Armament &lt;br&gt; - 2001: new name, Initiative of Change &lt;br&gt; - 2000s creation of the Lebanese branch of Initiative of Change by Assaad Chaftari and Muhieddine Chehab, two former militiamen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation</strong></td>
<td>Multi-religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission/Values</strong></td>
<td>It has provided a rallying point for individuals and teams to work for justice, healing and human development, based on personal change starting in their own lives. It comprises people of diverse cultures, nations, beliefs and backgrounds who are committed to transforming society through change in individuals and relationships, starting in their own lives. Moments of personal transformation often mark a new direction in a person's life. And personal change can often lead to change in situations. &lt;br&gt; Four values are emphasized: &lt;br&gt; - <strong>Inner reflection</strong> – listening to, and tapping, the deep inner wisdom, the voice of conscience or, for some, the spirit of God &lt;br&gt; - <strong>Commitment to the highest values of humanity</strong> – a 'reality check' revealing the truth about ourselves and inspiring a humble search for deeper integrity, and greater passion &lt;br&gt; - <strong>Forgiveness</strong> – letting go of hate, resentment, and judgements of ourselves and those who have wronged us, a process that can unlock a view of our own and other's potential &lt;br&gt; - <strong>The big picture</strong> – daring to imagine a world where the needs of the whole human family are met, and to discover our unique part in bringing this vision into reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples of programs</strong></td>
<td>In Lebanon: &lt;br&gt;- Work in universities: clubs &lt;br&gt;- Workshops including film projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regions of work/Beneficiaries</strong></td>
<td>In Lebanon: &lt;br&gt;- Students &lt;br&gt;- Interested people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funds/Partners</strong></td>
<td>- Individual donations &lt;br&gt;- Part of the network of NGOs ‘Wahdatouna Khalasouna’, a collective of Lebanese individuals and NGOs cooperating for Peace and Hope between the Lebanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff</strong></td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>5. Institute for islamic-christian studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Rita Ayoub in charge of interreligious conflict management training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source</strong></td>
<td>Institute for islamic-christian studies official website <a href="http://www.ieic.usj.edu.lb/files/pres.htm">http://www.ieic.usj.edu.lb/files/pres.htm</a> [last access 19 January 2011]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature</strong></td>
<td>Private university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of creation/Founders</strong></td>
<td>The Institute for islamic-christian studies was created in 1977 by Université Saint-Joseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation</strong></td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Mission/ Values** | - Academic organisation that aims at improving knowledge of Islam and Christianism through dialogue, study and training.  
- To facilitate reconciliation. |
| **Examples of programs** | - Training in islamic-christian dialogue and interreligious conflict management  
- Masters in islamic-christian relations  
- Project with Amel ‘Ma Mnikhtelef’ (we don’t differ): community-based dialogue and joint activities that respond to economic and social needs of youth living in a region that experienced the civil war |
| **Regions of work/Beneficiaries** | - Students  
- Religious leaders  
- The youth  
- Interested people |
| **Funds/ Partners** | - Université Saint-Joseph  
- Partners for the project Ma Mnikhtelef (we don’t differ): Mercy Corps and Amel |
<p>| <strong>Staff</strong> | Paid staff |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>6. IRAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Josiane Slaiby (in charge of the community development project in Ain Biacout)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Source** | - No official website  
- Asmae official website  
- Blog of Hilda BARHOUM  
[last access 19 January 2011] |
| **Full name** | Institut de Rééducation Audio Phonétique (Institute of Audio Phonetic Re-education) |
| **Nature** | Institute |
| **Date of creation/Founders** | It was founded in 1960 by two Sisters: Janine Matta and Souad Ballita |
| **Affiliation** | Christian |
| **Mission/Values** | To provide education for deaf youth between 3 and 18 years old. |
| **Examples of programs** | - Programmes for the deaf  
- 1986: start of the community development project in Ain Biacout (not related to deaf) |
| **Regions of work/Beneficiaries** | - Deaf youth from all over Lebanon  
- Ain Biacout project: Christian and Shiite displaced communities living in Ain Biacout (suburb of Beirut) |
<p>| <strong>Funds/Partners</strong> | - The French NGO Asmae |
| <strong>Staff</strong> | Paid staff and volunteers |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Name</strong></th>
<th>7. Al-Makassed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Dr Issam Nachabe (in charge of the education department of Al-Makassed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source</strong></td>
<td>Al Makassed official website <a href="http://www.makassed.org.lb/home.html">http://www.makassed.org.lb/home.html</a> [last access 19 January 2011]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full name</strong></td>
<td>The Makassed Philanthropic Islamic Association of Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature</strong></td>
<td>Non-governmental non-profit association (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of creation/Founders</strong></td>
<td>Sheikh Abd-Alkader Kabbany was the initiator for its establishment in 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation</strong></td>
<td>Muslim Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission/Values</strong></td>
<td>Makassed is charitable humanitarian association that aims at developing the human being and enabling him to build a country and cope with modernization through knowledge and faith in accordance with the principles of Islam. Makassed is devoted to promote the development of Makassed society members based on high morals and ethics. Makassed association works within the concepts of the Islam religion, to promote social development, capacity building, and education for the future generations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Examples of programs** | - Education:  
  * Elementary schools, secondary schools  
  * Makassed University: Higher Institution of Islamic Studies, Higher Institutions of Nursing, etc...  
  - Health and social services: Makassed Hospital, etc... |
| **Regions of work/Beneficiaries** | - Universities and hospital in Beirut  
 - Elementary and secondary schools in Beirut and in rural areas (North, Bekaa, South and Mount Lebanon) |
<p>| <strong>Funds/Partners</strong> |  |
| <strong>Staff</strong> | Paid staff and volunteers |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>8. Mouvement Social (Social Movement)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Father Grégoire Haddad (founder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature</strong></td>
<td>Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of creation/Founders</strong></td>
<td>Founded by Father Grégoire Haddad in 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation</strong></td>
<td>Secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission/Values</strong></td>
<td>Mouvement Social is a non-confessional, non-partisan and non-charitable organisation. <strong>It aims to build a fair and humane society, to improve the citizenship and autonomy of the underprivileged through socio-economic development projects and to implicate Lebanese youths in the development and improvement of their society.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Examples of programs** | - 'Citizenship is my right'  
- Protecting Children from Conflict  
- Conflict Prevention and Peace Building  
- Vocational and social training for troubled youth  
- Around School: Education & Activities  
- Vocational and social training in the prison setting  
- Support for re-integration in society following completion of detention  
- Youth volunteerism and involvement in improving the society |
| **Regions of work/Beneficiaries** | - Mouvement Social has centres widely spread all over the Lebanese territory (Beirut, Nabatyeh, Akkar, Tripoli, Zahle, Saida)  
- Focus on the disadvantaged people and the youth |
<p>| <strong>Funds/Partners</strong> | Mouvement Social works hand in hand with other associations, municipalities and the private sector. |
| <strong>Staff</strong> | Paid staff and volunteers |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>9. Nahwa al-Muwatiniya (Towards citizenship)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Person met</td>
<td>Samer Abdallah (General coordinator of the organisation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Source | Nahwa al-Muwatiniya official website  
http://na-am.org/a/  
[last access 19 January 2011] |
| Nature | Non-profit organisation |
| Date of creation/ Founders | “Founded [in 2005] by individuals from all walks of life and from a mosaic of political, cultural, and religious backgrounds. [They] are members of civil society concerned with the state of affairs in Lebanon and beyond, and we seek to effect positive change through informed activism and engagement”. |
| Affiliation | Non-sectarian |
| Mission/ Values | [They] believe democracy begins with inclusive, educated, and engaged individual behavior which, when nurtured and multiplied, will lead to the improvement of civil society and the betterment of our national, regional, and global future.  
[They] seek a progressive, forward-looking democratic society based on social justice, knowledge, and an advanced economy simultaneously in harmony with the environment. We thus aim to alter the political culture in Lebanon-and the wider Arab world-towards a more participatory governance system where people exercise their rights and responsibilities. That is, towards greater citizenship. |
| Examples of programs | - Research: “Democratic Reform and Leadership Assessment Survey”  
- Education and awareness: course “Introduction to Active Citizenship”  
- Dialogue: activities to promote the Syrian-Lebanese dialogue  
- Advocacy and lobbying: project “Parliamentary Monitor”  
- Civic actions: “Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform” |
| Regions of work/ Beneficiaries | - Focus on the youth  
- Interested people |
<p>| Funds/ Partners | The World Bank, UNICEF, the British Council, UNDP, AMIDEAST and USAID |
| Staff | Paid staff (?) and volunteers |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Name</strong></th>
<th>10. Offre-Joie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Melhem Khalaf, founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature</strong></td>
<td>Association and non-profit organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of creation/Founders</strong></td>
<td>Founded in 1985 by a group of students including Melhem Khalaf.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Affiliation** | Multi-religious  
(despite the fact that Offre-Joie describes itself as non-religious, it is led by three values - love, respect and forgiveness- that have a strong religious connotation) |
| **Mission/Values** | Offre-Joie is a youth “NGO” which aims to gather the Lebanese people that have suffered from the war. It’s a way to say “NO” to the war.  
It aims at bringing back the Lebanese family together by implementing cohesion and deep fusion between the young people of different regions and religions to build a new Lebanon.  
Offre-Joie is animated by the young people and for the young people. We want to share and spread our vision with the youth:  
# To give them a stronger sense of citizenship and ownership over the future of Lebanon.  
# To build a spirit, a feeling of citizenship, and a message of hope.  
# To prove for them that we have the power to live together, rich in our differences  
Alongside its cultural and socially oriented projects, Offre-Joie is known to be the pioneer in all impartial patriotic protests and rallies. |
| **Examples of programs** | - Youth Movement: camps, trainings, seminars, community activities  
- Citizenship Action: rehabilitation of prisons, development projects in the unprivileged districts, rehabilitation of public schools in rural areas, reconstruction caused by war  
- Actions in emergencies |
| **Regions of work/Beneficiaries** | - Youth from all over Lebanon |
| **Funds/Partners** | - Offre-Joie France, a sister NGO  
- More than 37 private Lebanese enterprises supplying Offre-Joie with donations in kind  
- Private personal donations  
- Other associations |
<p>| <strong>Staff</strong> | Paid staff and volunteers |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>11. Opération 7ème Jour-Tarchiche</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Sister Noha, in charge of the project ‘Tarchiche’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Source** | - Opération 7ème Jour official website  
http://www.usj.edu.lb/7ejour/  
- Tarchiche Project webpage  
http://www.usj.edu.lb/7ejour/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=8&id_cell=11  
[last access 19 January 2011] |
<p>| <strong>Nature</strong> | University initiative |
| <strong>Date of creation/Founders</strong> | Opération 7ème Jour was launched by Université Saint-Joseph after the 2006 war. |
| <strong>Affiliation</strong> | Christian |
| <strong>Mission/Values</strong> | Opération 7ème Jour consists in several projects implemented by the relevant faculties and that aims at contributing to the reconstruction of the country after the 2006 war and to its development. For instance, the medical school is in charge of health and hygiene promotion programmes. |
| <strong>Examples of programs</strong> | The “école de formation sociale” is in charge of the project ‘Tarchiche’ since 2008: it aims at organising social activities to reconcile the different communities living in this area. |
| <strong>Regions of work/Beneficiaries</strong> | Families living in the three villages |
| <strong>Funds/Partners</strong> | Université Saint-Joseph |
| <strong>Staff</strong> | Paid staff, volunteers and students |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>12. UMAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Person met</strong></td>
<td>Marie-Claude Souaid, head of communication and research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Source** | Umam official website  
http://www.umam-dr.org/index.php?location=home  
[last access 19 January 2011] |
| **Full name** | Documentation and research centre |
| **Nature** | Non-profit civil company and non-governmental organisation (NGO) |
| **Date of creation/Founders** | Monica Borgmann, a German journalist and Lokman Slim, Lebanese columnist, editorialist, philologist and linguist, founded Umam in 2005. |
| **Affiliation** | Civil |
| **Mission/ Values** | UMAM D&R aims to initiate collective reflection on the many different types of violence that plagued Lebanon’s past, weighs heavily on its present, and has the potential to influence its future as well.  
In doing so, it also seeks to provide a platform that offers the public both access to, and the opportunity to exchange and debate memories. Importantly, this access spurs debate and reflection about these shared experiences through engagement in various activities intended if not to reconcile memories that often remain in conflict, then at least to neutralize them. Our organization believes that these resources are essential for building the future.  
In short, they represent the keys to historical and political self-analysis, understanding the formation of national and individual identity among Lebanese, acknowledgment and recognition of responsibility and blame, and potentially reconciliation. We believe that advocating Lebanon’s recollection of its violent past represents a critical, inescapable task in its national redemption and advancement in the new millennium. |
| **Examples of programs** | - Exhibition “Books from the battlefield”  
- Youth workshop “Our Sunday...back then”  
- Publications  
- Archive collection |
| **Regions of work/Beneficiaries** | - The youth  
- Interested people |
| **Funds/ Partners** | Arab Human Rights Fund; Canadian International Development Agency; Goethe Institute; United States Institute for Peace; Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation; International Center for Transitionnal Justice; etc... |
| **Staff** | Paid staff and volunteers |