Organizational Learning in Humanitarian Action -
The Example of the INGO World Vision International from 1998 until 2008

A Study on the Evolution of Humanitarian Response Policies as a Result of the Application of Organizational Learning Practices

Master Thesis for the Erasmus Mundus Master of Arts in Humanitarian Action (NOHA)
University of Groningen, The Netherlands

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is written towards the completion of my Masters in Humanitarian Action (NOHA) at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

This study focuses on organizational learning within humanitarian action organizations. The INGO World Vision International was analyzed as the case study. It is elaborated whether and how evaluative documents have influenced policy documents. The study is part of a broader PhD research of C. Afek-Eitam of the University of Groningen on organizational learning in the humanitarian sector. Two other Master students, Geert de Jonge and Peter Kamphof, did a similar research as this at the same time for the INGOs Care International and Save the Children UK, which leads to a possibility to compare the three researches on organizational learning within different INGOs and thereby broader conclusions can be drawn. The literature research for this study was conducted in Groningen/ the Netherlands in the beginning of 2010, as well as in Louvain-la-Neuve/ Belgium. During March 2010, I visited the Liaison Office of World Vision International for one week in order to gather first hand information and key documents. During the study, a number of people working for World Vision International around the world were consulted. The results of this research should raise awareness on the topic of organizational learning within the humanitarian sector. It should also help to improve the organizational learning mechanisms within World Vision International.

I speak out my acknowledgements for a number of people who have helped me to get my thesis to this result. First of all I thank my supervisor C. Afek-Eitam, PhD-Researcher from the University of Groningen, with all my heart for her incredible support since January 2010. Your manner of supervision is in my view all a student can wish for. I feel extremely lucky that I was able to work with you, being demanding on the one hand and personal on the other hand. Your guidance and ideas pushed us researchers and I learned a lot from you. Secondly I thank Geert de Jonge and Peter Kamphof for being part of the research-team. This was a unique opportunity and even though we all had many things happening at the same time, our discussions were very valuable for me. I also thank the INGO World Vision International for being so open and let me do the case study about them. Special thanks go to the team from the Geneva Liaison office, specifically Kevin, for providing us with the necessary information to conduct the research and to get us in touch with the right people. Further I thank everyone whom we interviewed during the study for taking time and giving us detailed answers. It is extremely valuable to be able to get insight in such a big and significant INGO. Without their help the study would not have been what it is. In the end I thank my family and friends who supported me throughout 2010 and gave valuable input for this thesis.
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>Cat</td>
<td>Category</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>Emergency Capacity Building Project</td>
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<td>Eval</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>HEA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Emergency Affairs</td>
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<td>H-LEARN</td>
<td>Humanitarian Learning and Evaluation Review Network</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>LE</td>
<td>Learning Event</td>
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<td>LL</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>LLE</td>
<td>Lessons Learned Event</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>National Office</td>
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<td>OL</td>
<td>Organizational Learning</td>
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<td>OLM</td>
<td>Organizational Learning Mechanism</td>
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<td>RO</td>
<td>Regional Office</td>
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<td>RTE</td>
<td>Real Time Evaluation</td>
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<td>RTL</td>
<td>Real Time Learning</td>
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<td>SM</td>
<td>Senior Management</td>
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<td>Senior Management Team</td>
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<td>Support Office</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WVI</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
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LIST OF TERMINOLOGIES

Accountability:
Accountability is taking responsibility for both learning and implementing lessons learned, implying that power is used responsibly (Lipshitz et al 2002: 86, HAP 2007:7). Humanitarian accountability involves taking account of, and accounting to disaster survivors (HAP 2007: 7). NGOs have multiple accountabilities, being downwards towards their partners, beneficiaries, staff and supporters as well as upwards towards trustees, donors and host governments (Hulme & Edwards 1995: 967).

Disaster:
A disaster occurs when the impact of a hazard on a section of society causes widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope (Twigg 2004: 13, ISDR Secretariat 2004).

Evaluation:
Evaluation is the analysis of the outputs and impact of the project during its lifetime, when it finishes and- ideally- some time after it has finished; feeding the findings of the evaluation into future projects and into general policy and programming guidelines (Twigg 2004: 7). In short, through evaluation, the value of an object can be systematically assessed (Trochim 2006).

Humanitarian Action (HA):
HA is distinct from development work and the term refers to outside assistance for communities suffering from urgent crises such as natural disasters, conflicts, droughts or famines (Oliver 2008:26).

Relief/ Response:
The provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after a disaster to meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people affected. It can be of an immediate, short-term, or protracted duration (ISDR Secretariat 2004).

International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO):
Non-governmental organizations are usually voluntary and open associations of individuals outside of the formal state apparatus that are neither for profit not engage in political activities as their primary objective (Iriye, 1999:422). An INGO is a cross-national organization in which membership is made up of non-state actors (Taylor and Curtis 2008:420).
Lessons Learned:
Though this term seems at times synonymous with ‘recommendations’, for the purposes of this paper it will refer to those items identified through an evaluation that point to room for improvement and that bear consideration in planning for future emergencies (Oliver 2008:26-27).

Natural, rapid-onset disaster:
These are triggered by natural hazards such as earthquakes, cyclones, floods, landslides, volcanic eruptions and certain types of disease epidemics. They occur suddenly, often with very little warning (Twigg 2004:17).

Organizational Change:
Organizational changes are adjustments at all levels of an organization. It is important to differentiate between change and learning as a response based on understanding the relationship of that response to environmental events and/ or past actions. Making organizational changes or adjustments does not and should not automatically assume the existence of learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 803).

Organizational Learning (OL):
Even though different approaches and concepts exist on organizational learning, it is agreed that a. learning improves the future performance of an organization (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 803) and b. that organizational learning takes place in the individual, group and organizational level (Crossan et al 1999), in various depth (single/ double/ triple or low/ high level or non-cognitive/ cognitive) (Ebrahim 2003, Argyris and Schön 1978, Fiol and Lyles 1985, Altman and Iles 1992) and forms (explicit/ implicit) (Crossan et al 1999). Organizational learning is the development of knowledge from past actions, and then using that knowledge in order to cause behavioral change (Fiol and Lyles 1985:811, Ebrahim 2003: 107).

Organizational Learning Mechanisms (OLMs):
OLMs are observable organizational subsystems in which organization members interact for the purpose of learning (Lipshitz 2002:82).
SUMMARY

This study deals with organizational learning in humanitarian action. The case study is the international non-governmental organization (INGO) World Vision International (WVI). WVI is an organization that is based on Christian values and is working in relief, development and advocacy in order to assist vulnerable people impartially. This research focuses on WVI’s relief line of ministry which is called Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs (HEA). The research is based within the theoretical framework of social constructivism, which says that all social structures are constructed by humans and have a ‘meaning’ attached. Structuration theory states that all social entities, including organizations, are based within a system of rules and laws within which they can act and in turn change these systems as well. The concepts on organizational learning, accountability and policy-making are central to the research. Organizational learning is the development of knowledge from past actions, and then using that knowledge in order to cause behavioral change (Fiol and Lyles 1985:811, Ebrahim 2003: 107). Even though different approaches and concepts exist on organizational learning, it is agreed that a. learning improves the future performance of an organization (Fiol and Lyles 1985:803) and b. that organizational learning takes place in the individual, group and organizational level (Crossan et al 1999), in various depth (single/ double/ triple or low/ high level or non-cognitive/ cognitive) (Ebrahim 2003, Argyris and Schön 1978, Fiol and Lyles 1985, Altman and Iles 1992) and forms (explicit/ implicit) (Crossan et al 1999).

The central question that is analyzed is concerned with whether evaluative activities of WVI influenced its humanitarian policies (standards) from 1998 until 2008.

Consequently to the theories, a qualitative methodological approach is followed, examining the case study of WVI in depths. The data that is used for this research consists of evaluative documents (consolidated evaluative activities called trends analyses) and policy documents by WVI (standards) as well as interviews with senior staff that was involved in organizational learning processes in WVI. The documents and the transcribed interviews are analyzed via thematic coding. The standards are coded according to key recommendations that were derived from the evaluative documents. This step shows whether the recommendations in WVI were transferred into strategic planning. The interviews were encoded with codes that were derived from the conceptual framework (Lipshitz et al 2002 and Crossan et al 1999). Additionally, internal and external contextual uncontrolled elements of possible influence are included into the analysis.

The outcomes of the analysis of the research are that WVI is highly engaged in creating and using organizational learning mechanisms to improve its humanitarian policy standards. The main mechanism that has been established for the facilitation of organizational learning is the Humanitarian Learning and Evaluation Review Network (H-Learn). The study pointed out that some influence of the trends analyses on the standards is visible. The standards improved drastically over the years and
especially the standards of 2008 show clear progress and integration of the former named recommendations and lessons learned. Nevertheless, the translation from evaluative activities into policies does not occur as successful as it could be. In the analysis of the interviews, it appeared that many facilitators for learning are well established, being the commitment to learning, proximity to the mission, environmental influence as well as efforts to create accountability. The leadership seems committed to a degree that they are willing to act when they are confronted with concrete recommendations stating changes that have to be made. One facilitating factor of organizational learning that is lacking is the structural facet (Lipshitz 2002). Even though WVI established a wide understanding of learning and introduced the H-Learn system, there is no formal link that transfers the recommendations from the evaluative activities into the policy-making cycle. It showed that in the past, individual influential persons had introduced recommendations for change on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, the organization WVI is spread over the whole world which causes that too many systems for knowledge management with too little communication exists in order to be able to achieve successful learning including recommendations from all parts of the organization. If WVI keeps putting effort into improving its organizational learning mechanisms and changes some major issues, it will get closer to its objective of becoming a learning organization, which is an organization where people individually and collectively continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together (Senge et al 1990:3).

Recommendations for WVI:

- WVI should rethink its system for learning mechanisms. Firstly, a formal mechanism has to be introduced which concretely facilitates the translation from recommendations into standards. This mechanism could be formally integrated into H-Learn and should involve the senior management, which is central in WVI’s policy-making.

- It is problematic that WVI has too many different systems in place. Nobody in the organization has the overview about the different mechanisms, tools and knowledge management systems that exist in offices all over the partnership. There should be one central generally accessible point for knowledge management.

- It is crucial to have clear terms of references in place including the responsibilities of who does what in the learning cycle in order to facilitate organizational learning.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The humanitarian sector has changed enormously during the last decades (Stoddard 2003:25). The number of natural and man-made disasters has increased and with it has the number of actors, the scope of their humanitarian response as well as the intensity of response (Clarke and Ramalingam 2008:25). Along with a debate on aid effectiveness, the interest and heightened demand for accountability and organizational learning of organizations delivering humanitarian assistance has grown (Carlsson and Wohlgemuth 2000:7). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) delivering humanitarian assistance need to demonstrate results to the public and to their donors as humanitarian action is widely criticized for not being improving their performance from one response to the next (Marriage 2006:209). One way to increase the effectiveness of the work is by applying what is learned from earlier lessons (Carlsson and Wohlgemuth 2000:17). Organizations delivering humanitarian assistance have both individually and collectively considered how they can learn from experience and apply this to improving performance (Harvey 2010:13, Brabant 2001:183). Joint efforts have been undertaken in the last decade aiming to improve the accountability, performance, professionalism and capacity of the humanitarian community (Brabant 2001:183). Lipshitz et al stated that organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs) are subsystems in which members of an organization interact for the purpose of learning (2992:86). An example for OLMs is evaluative activities, which can be systematically used to improve learning. A statement by Oliver states that organizations are not learning: ‘Though evaluation for accountability seems fairly straightforward, determining just how the evaluation influences the organization and beyond is not’ (Oliver 2008:viii). This statement shows that there is a difference between being accountable through evaluative activities and actually learning from them in order to improve the work. It is important to discover whether these accusations are true or whether organizations actually do learn from the evaluative activities they conduct. Carlsson and Wohlgemuth state that while there is a significant body of research on general organizational learning, there is a lack of empirical studies in development co-operation or humanitarian assistance (Carlsson and Wohlgemuth 2000:7). In the for-profit sector, organizations have to learn and change in order to adapt to new situations, demands, laws and strategies because otherwise they cannot survive the competition, while in the humanitarian sector this need for learning in order to survive can be questioned (Brabant 2001:190). This research looks at organizational learning through documented organizational learning within the emergency response sector of World Vision International. The influence and relationship between its organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs) and policy changes are analyzed.

World Vision International (WVI) is a Christian relief, development and advocacy organization which works for and with children, families and communities in order to overcome poverty and injustice (WVI 2010). The organization was founded in 1947 by the Reverend Bob Pierce and has nowadays programs implemented in about 100 countries around the world (WVI 2007d).
WVI has institutionalized knowledge management and learning with the goal of understanding how the organization can improve its performance through a strategy of gathering and analyzing information to create knowledge and learning that can be applied to its work (WVI 2004). The approach was developed in the global humanitarian part of World Vision, called the Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs (HEA) Line of Ministry. This is due to the strong collaborative relationship it has with other agencies, especially through the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). ALNAP has led a substantial amount of research and exploration of these concepts. Corresponding with this coordinated effort, WVI’s HEA affairs office has developed a strategy for its own organizational learning, known as the World Vision Humanitarian Learning, Evaluation, Analysis, and Research Network (H-Learn).

In order to improve the effectiveness of the knowledge management and organizational learning, it is useful to analyze the extent to which and how they have improved the performance of the organization in achieving its humanitarian response goals. This study attempts to address this by reviewing what changes in the policy of WVI’s emergency response system have occurred over the last 10 years and what effect the purposeful learning system of H-Learn has had on this evolution.

This research is coordinated by a PhD research project, conducted by Chamutal Afek-Eitam at the University of Groningen, which studies post response evaluative practices in INGOs as organizational learning mechanisms. As part of this wider research, the author of this dissertation is one of three Master students from the NOHA Masters in Humanitarian Action from the University of Groningen in the Netherlands who examine the relationship and evident influences of OLMs on strategic planning and policy. Each of the students examines a different INGO. The three INGO case studies are: World Vision International, Save the Children UK, and CARE International. The choice of organizations is due to the fact that all of these INGOs are major actors in the humanitarian field (see chapter 3 for selection criteria) and represent three different traditions from which these humanitarian INGOs have evolved, being Religious, Dunanist and Wilsonian (Stoddard, 2003:27). The overall goal is to be able to compare and exchange the knowledge gathered on the three INGOs as a representative current organizational learning state in the sector. Additionally, this united effort will allow drawing conclusions over the outcomes of the three different studies regarding the historical evolution of organizational learning in the humanitarian sector from 1998 until 2008.

The research has a high degree of scientific, societal and personal relevance. The scientific relevance is that the research about World Vision International is, together with two similar researches, part of a larger PhD project. The societal relevance is that the research project was requested by the INGO World Vision International, which means that it refers to a need in the field and in the society and that the organization will most probably use the outcomes of this research. The research will be a useful contribution to general knowledge and specifically for the humanitarian arena. The research has a high degree of personal relevance because it includes the opportunity to get to know important and current issues of the field of humanitarian action in much detail. It is necessary
to understand the management procedures and structures of one big and important actor in the humanitarian field, the organization World Vision International. This relates to my interests as I would strive to work in the area of management in humanitarian action after finishing the NOHA Master’s. I have prior knowledge about implementation of policies into the practice in the development sector, now it is interesting to analyze in how far the practice, in form of evaluative activities and documented learning, has in turn influence on the broader policy-making of an organization. The problem which is addressed in this research is that humanitarian NGOs are being criticized for not being effective enough and not improving their approach when needed.

**Research Question and Sub-Questions**

The research question is:

*To which extent were the changes in humanitarian emergency policies between 1998 and 2008 a result of applying post-response evaluative activities in World Vision International and which factors have facilitated or hindered this influence?*

The sub questions which can be derived from this research question are the following:

1. *How have WVI’s emergency response policy and standards evolved between 1998 and 2008?*
2. *How have WVI’s organizational learning mechanisms evolved during 1998 and 2008?*
3. *To which extent have the mechanisms of organizational learning practically been applied and effectively influenced the humanitarian response policy and standards between 1998 and 2008?*

This research is a case study in which it is reviewed which changes have occurred in an INGO between the years of 1998-2008 and relate the application of organizational learning mechanisms to it. The methods used are a document- and literature review as well as an analysis of interviews. The INGO dealt with in this study is World Vision International.

The first sub question looks at what changes occurred in the humanitarian and emergency policy of World Vision International between the years 1998 and 2008. When reviewing the changes in policy, one has to remember that with the concept of policy, many different documents can be meant, as official policies, sub policies, standard operational procedures, relief standards etc. For this study, the most dynamic official document type which represents the actual official organizational standpoint is used. In World Vision, these are the so-called ‘standards’. My justification to look at the change in WVI ‘standards’ follows recommendations made by WVI HQ management describing official policies as rarely changing and highlighting that the so called WVI Standards are the most dynamic document which is reviewed regularly and there for best to identify changes. Because the standards are part of
WVI’s policies, I will use the word ‘standards’ in the following when referring to the part of policy in WVI that is analyzed in this study.

The second sub question is points out the mechanisms which are developed by WVI for organizational learning and the process of how the learning is supposed to feed into the organization. One important part of the learning process in WVI is H-Learn, which is explained in detail later on. WVI produced a number of different types of post response evaluative documents being lessons learned on learning events, consolidated learning and three-year trend analyses. This study chiefly looked at the ‘trend analyses’, which combine the consolidated lessons of a number of years.

The third sub question is meant to unfold whether and to which extent the organizational learning from WVI’s humanitarian and emergency responses in practice had influence on the emergency response standards. This includes the extent to which the changes in WVI’s humanitarian standards do reflect documented learning from evaluations, showing whether evaluations are used.

The fourth sub question deals with factors and facilitators that influenced the organizational learning and will answer why and how WVI learns. Generally, the study is able to how effective the organizational learning system H-Learn was in changing WVI’s humanitarian standards.

The output of the study will be a report presenting the findings of the research with respect to the research questions and providing a history of WVI’s humanitarian line of ministry over the past ten years, showing the changes in policy that have occurred and whether the changes have occurred due to organizational learning. Generally, the research aims at finding out whether the evaluations from the bottom in the field influence the policies at the top. By this it can be seen whether the organizational changes are influenced by the bottom. In the end, a conclusion can be drawn about the extent to which the changes in WVI’s emergency response policy were influenced by applying organizational learning.

**Previous Relevant Empirical Studies**

One PhD study which is of interest for this research was conducted by Lakshmi Karan and published in April 2009. The title is ‘Evaluation use in non-governmental organizations – unlocking the ‘do-learn-plan’ continuum’ (Karan 2009). The dissertation explores factors which influence the use of evaluations and the challenges which NGOs face when adapting learning practices and systems that enable use of evaluations. It is relevant because a utility model was developed that identifies key factors which influence use and the practical steps which NGOs can take to implement it. The model is comparable to the model presented by Lipshitz (2002), which will be explained later on. The similarities lay in the arrangement in a way that both models describe main factors/facets that are comprised of sub-themes which in combination lead to increased utilization/facilitation in learning. The author recommends that future researchers could test his model through in-depth case studies among diverse NGOs. He asks if the eight essential factors in the model were triggered would there

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be increased utilization? The research is comparable to this question because the model by Lipshitz is taken and it is explained which factors facilitated or impeded organizational learning. Yet unlike the above studies this research asks this question with regards to INGOs delivering humanitarian assistance.

Another relevant previous research was done by Monica LaBelle Oliver and published in August 2008 (Oliver, 2008). The title is ‘Evaluation of emergency response: Humanitarian aid agencies and evaluation influence’. The thesis is dealing with evaluation influence by looking at the organization CARE International in depth and concludes that evaluation does influence in useful ways. Oliver defines that evaluation influence is ‘taking the notion of evaluation use a few steps further by offering more complex, subtle, and sometimes unintentional ways that an evaluation might positively better a situation. Her findings show that the consequence of evaluations goes beyond use to encompass influence, which includes both direct, intended evaluation results and indirect as well as unintended effects. She concludes by recommending that comparing two or more NGOs would improve the identification of commonalities in evaluation use and show where the trends of the influence of evaluations lie. The following research project aims to do exactly this with three organizations as WVI, Save the Children UK and CARE International are analyzed and can be compared in how they translate their evaluative activities into policies. Furthermore, unlike Oliver broader focus on general influence of evaluations on the INGO this study examines a more specific influence type focusing especially on evaluations as an OLM. These two PhD researches address the need for the current study. They elaborate on problems in organizational learning and their findings can be used for this research.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION
This chapter embraces the theoretical framework for the research, the conceptual background to the study, as well as a literature review. The main conceptual subjects elaborated deal with organizational learning, accountability and policy-making. As the concepts of organizational learning and accountability in humanitarian NGOs are often interlinked, confused or used as synonyms, as will be explained later on, it is important to distinguish their roles clearly. For an INGO in the humanitarian action sector, both concepts are of vast importance, but both need separate attention.

When applying the concepts to an organization as World Vision International (WVI), it is important to distinguish between what the organization says it is doing and what it does in reality. Argyris and Schön developed a theoretical foundation for this phenomenon, they have coined the terms for what an organizations says it does as ‘espoused theory’, and while what organizations actually do in reality they called ‘theory-in-use’ (Argyris and Schön 1974: 30). This applies to WVI’s system of organizational learning, to the way WVI deals with accountability as well as how policies are made.

The research is placed within a theoretical framework of constructivism, which is firstly explained in order to understand the approach and logic taken in this research. I will then narrow down and connect this to the approaches of Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978), and March (1991), which provide the specific theoretical foundations to the topic of organizational learning. Afterwards, the concepts of organizational learning, accountability and policy-making are elaborated in more detail. The third part of this chapter is a literature review which provides a background on the sector of humanitarian action, on evaluative activities and on the INGO World Vision International, its structure and approach to organizational learning and accountability.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Theory enables the researcher to ground his or her research in an epistemological framework that provides a paradigm to analyze and understand the question from a specific viewpoint. For this research, constructivism as a broad learning theory acts as the theoretical paradigm. Within social theory, constructivists emphasize the social construction of reality (Jackson 2006:164). The social world exists through consciousness, thoughts and ideas of people who are involved in it and create it; it does not exist independently. Generally speaking, the social reality is not part of nature (reality), which is guided by natural laws (Jackson 2006:164), instead it is constructed, hence constructivism. The social reality rather consists of undefined material entities, which people interpret (Jackson 2006: 65). Vico, Immanuel Kant and Max Weber can be seen as forerunners of constructivism. Vico stated that the natural world is made by God, but the historical world is made by Man, meaning that people create and therefore influence it (Jackson 2006:164). Kant argued that knowledge which we obtain about the world is always subjective since it is filtered through human consciousness. Weber
emphasized that the social world (the world of human interaction) is different from the natural world of physical phenomena since humans rely on ‘understanding’ of each other’s actions and on assigning ‘meaning’ to them (Jackson 2006:164).

Organizational theories explain how organizations are structured and developed in a society. The following table shows an overview about two of such theories, being structuration theory and institutionalization theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Connection to the Research</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structuration</td>
<td>Structuration claims that all human action is conducted in the context of a pre-existing social structure that is governed by a set of norms, rules and/or laws. This means that human action is predetermined based on the varying contextual rules in which they live. However, the structure and rules are not permanent and external, but can be modified by human action. This means that humans are influenced and guided by social structures, but can in turn and with their own resources influence the structures themselves as well (also called ‘duality of the structure’).</td>
<td>Structuration theory encompasses that change of the guiding rules/ the guiding system is possible. For an organization, this would mean that its resources and knowledge are both the base for the organization to search for new capabilities, and at the same time sets limitations to the organization’s scope. For this research, the theory implies that the analyzed INGO World Vision International at the same time faces limitations as well as possibilities to learn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization</td>
<td>Institutionalization as a social theory claims that a concept, behavior or social role is embedded within an authoritative organization, social system or the society as a whole. It suggests that individuals or organizations are guided by inflexible systems of social or legal controls.</td>
<td>Institutionalization theory claims that actors are constrained by a structure, or social boundaries, which does not facilitate change. The decision-making of an organization is influenced and restricted by existing institutions and frameworks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Barley and Tolbert (1997:21) state that structuration theory and institutional theory are comparable because both theories affirm that action is guided by institutions or social rules. While structuration theory describes how institutions are created and changed through action, this is widely disregarded by institutionalization. For the current study it is important to assume that, in line with structuration theory, organizations are able to learn and shape the guiding institutions and frameworks themselves and are not restricted and undermined by social structure, as institutionalization suggests.
Structuration theory could embed the theory created by Schön and Senge. They developed the concept of the loss of the stable state, which holds that our society and all of its institutions are in continuous processes of transformation. According to these scholars, people must learn to understand, guide, influence and manage these continuous processes of transformation for themselves as well as for the institutions. In other words, people have to become skilled at learning. People must not only become able to transform institutions in response to changing situations and requirements; they must invent and develop institutions which are ‘learning systems’, systems capable of bringing about their own continuing transformation (Schön 1973:28, 57). From the structuration point of view this would mean that people have to overcome the restrictions of social rules and institutions and instead create and shape their social world through learning.

This way of thinking by Schön is also in lines with constructivism. What is happening in the ‘material’ world of an organization is not naturally given. It is made by people, especially those who participate in the organization since they create the way the organization works and give meaning to it. The meaning and actions of an organization are not static, but are constantly refined by internal and external interactions. The transformations which happen in our perception can be consciously influenced and therefore lead to change. This leads to the concept of learning. Learning has to be done in all entities of society since the society (which is constructed by humans) is constantly changing. Classical organizational theory explains how this transformation and process within social entities is done in organizations. Important academics for classic organizational theory have been March (1991) as well as Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978). They established the basics of organizational theory and organizational learning, which they see as a key process of change within organizations. In the following, the conceptual framework of organizational learning with its attributes is elaborated upon:

2. ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

2.1. What is Organizational Learning?
The interest in organizational learning (OL) has grown enormously over the past years. A number of academic publications tried to grasp and explain the concept, however no single theory or model of organizational learning is widely accepted and the literature uses many different terminologies and interpretations to approach organizational learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 803; Crossan et al 1999: 522). It is recognized that most concepts of organizational learning have complementary and universal characteristics, which enables the use of different models and theories of organizational learning and the combination of different aspects and ideas. This is shown by Fiol and Lyles and Crossan et al, who summarized different theories on organizational learning and organizational change (Fiol and Lyles 1985; Crossan et al 1999). Even though different approaches and concepts exist on organizational learning, it is agreed that a. learning improves the future performance of an organization (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 803) and b. that organizational learning takes place on the individual, group and
organizational levels (Crossan et al 1999) in various depths (single/ double/ triple or high/low level) (Ebrahim 2003, Argyris and Schön 1978, Fiol and Lyles 1985, Altman and Iles 1992) and forms (explicit/ implicit) (Crossan et al 1999). Fiol and Lyles conclude that ‘organizational learning is the development of insights, knowledge, and associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions and future actions’ (Fiol and Lyles 1985:811). Examining non-governmental organizations, Ebrahim derives his theory from March (1991) and Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978). He states that organizational learning is a key process of change in NGOs (Ebrahim 2003:107). According to Ebrahim, learning involves the generation of knowledge by processing information or events and then using that knowledge in order to cause behavioral change (Ebrahim 2003:107). This means that in order to learn, the knowledge has to be used to influence organizational practices or procedures. In short, as Levitt and March defined in 1988, ‘organizations learn by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior’ (Ebrahim 2003: 107). This means that learning involves generating knowledge by processing information or events, and then using that knowledge to cause behavioural change (Ebrahim 2003: 107), which can, as stated before, be done at different levels, in various depths and forms. The majority of the theories on organizational learning are directed at profit-making business organizations. For organizations delivering humanitarian assistance, motivations and implications of organizational learning are different, which will be explained later on. For this thesis, different major concepts of organizational learning are combined.

In the humanitarian context, one can distinguish between organizational learning and institutional learning. Organizational learning takes place within an organization while institutional learning is about the ‘quality of interactions between organizations that relate to each other in a given context’, which is generally a system-wide approach between and across agencies, referring to learning in the international humanitarian system (Brabant 2001: 183).

According to Senge et al (1990:3), ‘learning organizations are organizations where people individually and collectively continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together’. Being a learning organization is an ideal which can be strived at, that is however very difficult to be reached in its full state, as it does not only include individuals, but rather facilitates learning and transforms itself at all levels of the organization (Pedler et al 1991:1). The approach to learning organizations can be different, for example as a ‘top-down’ approach, being initiated and developed by senior management (Hughes and Tight 1998: 183), or rather ‘bottom-up’ or democratic such as laid out at by Watkins and Marsick (1992; 1993). Organizational Change does not necessarily imply organizational learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 803). When analyzing organizational learning, one has to be careful not to take change automatically as an indicator for organizational learning since change in behavior can occur without any cognitive association development, and it does not automatically imply learning while cognitional change can happen without behavioral change as well. Quite some literature exists which describes
internal and external factors that can trigger change (Brabant 2001: 191, Lipshitz 2002, Ebrahim 1999, Clarke and Ramalingam 2008). The triggers are mostly called external and internal factors and have been explained in more detail in Lipshitz multifaceted model. Thus, organizational change does not imply organizational learning, neither does it imply that the organization is a learning organization. In order to measure whether an adjustment in an organization are changes due to organizational learning, an in-depth look at the functioning of the organization is needed (Brabant 2001:184).

2.2. The Motivations, Purposes and the Goals for Organizational Learning

The motivations for profit-making companies to learn are to increase profits, growth and market share (Stoddard 2003: 34). A company maintains its competitive advantage and long-term survival by adapting to its environment; this adaptation is applied through organizational learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 804). In contrast to this, humanitarian NGOs tend to be lead by different motivations than for-profit businesses. While on the one hand, NGOs are regulated and have legal obligations as charities in their own countries, Stoddard claims that an NGO worker must take into account the needs and interests of the beneficiaries, the desires of the donors as well as the interest of the organization to survive and grow (Stoddard 2003: 34). These motivations often clash with each other, and require prioritization. Because NGOs are likely to have different motivations than profit-making companies, it is more difficult to interpret and analyze decisions that are taken; this special situation is elaborated later on.

Within an NGO, there are different purposes of organizational learning relating to different levels of action (Brabant 2001:185). These purposes are participative learning in the field, project- or program based learning, policy-based learning and advocacy or policy-influencing learning. A fifth purpose of learning is accountability. Out of these purposes, policy-based learning is probably the most difficult (Brabant 2001). Policy-based learning refers to policy formulation, which requires generalization and transferring experiences from one context to the other, bearing risks that meaningful differences are neglected. In reality, policy may be more influenced by values, power and influence and a prevailing doctrine rather than by systematic analysis (Brabant 2001:185).

2.3. Depths of Organizational Learning

Fiol and Lyles compared different literatures about organizational learning and found that many scholars draw on different depths of learning (lower-level, which is adjusting the behavior within an organizational structure (due to repetitive behavior) and higher-level learning, which is adjusting overall norms and rules (cognitive process at higher management level) (Fiol and Lyles 1985:808). Fiol and Lyles showed that different authors used this dimension to describe basic features of organizational learning, only that the authors named the concepts differently (1985: 808). Argyris and Schön (1978) developed the notion of single-loop learning (changes in an organization’s practices and strategies) and double-loop learning (changes in values or ‘governing variables’, which underlie the practices and strategies) (Ebrahim 2003: 109). These levels refer to different depths of learning.
Single-loop learning is a corrective action, attempting to solve problems without substantial alteration in the existing framework, while double-loop learning is change due to fundamental transformation, questioning the underlying assumptions and beliefs and changing them if required. The authors Altman and Iles name another level resulting in triple-loop learning, referring to Swieringa and Wierdsma (1992). In this theory, single-loop learning exists when it is questioned how things are done. Double-loop learning is when it is questioned why things are done while triple-loop learning refers to questioning the essential principle, mission and vision (Altman and Iles 1998: 47).

2.4. Levels of Learning

Among different literatures, views on different levels of learning, being individual, group and organizational learning, and about the influence they have on each other, are discussed. According to Crossan et al, organizational learning and its implementation can take place at three different levels: at the individual, group and organizational level (Crossan et al 1999: 524), while Fiol and Lyles name that learning can take place at the individual or organizational level (1984: 804). They say that even though individual learning is important, systems are required to transmit learning to others and to achieve memories, cognitive systems and organizational learning. By this, an organizational understanding and interpretation of the organization’s environment and the building of strategies can be done (Fiol and Lyles 1984: 804). This shows that individual learning is necessary but not sufficient for organizational learning, since individual learning does not imply that the organization learns as well, while organizational structures in turn can promote or hinder individual learning. It can be concluded that individual and organizational learning mutually reinforce each other. In the humanitarian sector, often it is a problem that monitoring, evaluation, as well as impact assessment result only in single-loop learning at the individual or group level (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 808). The double-loop learning at organizational level often is initiated from the board, senior management or sometimes staff initiatives that have the power to change policies radically (Fiol and Lyles 1985: 808).

2.5. The Process of Learning

The literature about organizational learning widely agrees that organizational learning is a dynamic process. Ebrahim developed a model of a basic organizational learning cycle and added to it the influences of the environment of the organization, which he called the ‘Stimulus-Response Model of Learning’ (Ebrahim 2003: 116). The learning process within an organization takes place in a learning cycle of four steps (Ebrahim 2003: 110). This basic cycle of learning is influenced by the environment, as for example government policies, conditions by funders, industrial development, physical factors and so on (Ebrahim 2003: 114). The external factors stimulate change and response in an organization, while the also organization in turn changes the environment to a certain degree. Thus, Ebrahim’s learning model explains how organizations gather experience and knowledge as they respond to stimuli from encountered situations in the environment (Ebrahim 2003: 114).
Another theory of an organizational learning process is explained by Crossan et al (1999). They describe organizational learning as a multilevel dynamic process which is introduced by individual learning, continuing to group learning and resulting into organizational learning (Crossan et al 1999: 524). Referring to March (1991), they state that organizational learning derives from managing exploitation (what has already been learned) and exploration (new learning) (Crossan et al 1999: 522). This is done by feed-forward and feedback processes between the different levels of learning. Ebrahim also referred to March and describes that learning can be done by doing, by exploring or by imitating. Learning by doing is in this case the exploitation, a repetitive trail-and-error process within a routine that is possibly improved (Ebrahim 2003:108). Exploring can be defined as searching for new ideas and procedures without being able to see the full consequences of the decision (Ebrahim, 2003:108) while March defines it as taking risks, experiment and innovating (1991: 71). Imitating in the end is taking over the routines or strategies of other organizations (Ebrahim 2003:108). The model which Crossan et al created is called the ‘4Is’ model, it describes organizational learning as strategic renewal through four processes at the three different levels (individual, group and organizational level), which involve the creation and application of knowledge. These four processes are Intuiting, Interpreting, Integrating and Institutionalizing, which all begin with the letter ‘I’ and are the cause of the name ‘4Is model’ (Crossan et al 1999:524).

According to Crossan et al, the process of learning begins at the individual level with intuition, where individuals deal with understandings based on their experience and capacity (Crossan et al 1999:525). These understandings are then interpreted and communicated to the group. The process of interpretation is set up by the individuals sharing their ideas with others in the group and transforming them from being implicit to making them explicit (Crossan et al 1999:525). By this they can be integrated into the cognitive maps of the group. Interpretation takes place on the individual and the group level. In the end, the group level is doing the integration process by achieving a rational, collective action which transfers the learning to the organizational level. The integration takes place at the group and the organizational level. At the organizational level, the knowledge is integrated and the final process of institutionalizing can take place through systems, routines and structures, which make the learning available to all members of the organization (Crossan et al 1999:525). In summary, the model by Ebrahim includes a process of learning in addition to different depths of learning (single-loop and double-loop). However, it does not distinguish between the different levels of learning (individual, group or organizational level). The model by Crossan et al includes a process of learning...
as well as different levels of learning (individual, group and organizational level). It does however not include different depths of learning as single- or double-loop.

### 2.6. Facilitators and Barriers to Organizational Learning

According to Fiol and Lyles, four contextual factors determine the probability that learning will occur. These factors are culture, strategy, structure and environments (Fiol and Lyles 1985:804). Ebrahim later renamed these as ‘governing factors’, which constrain or enable learning at every stage of the learning cycle. Ebrahim defined them as cognitive capacities, relationships of power as well as perceptual frames (Ebrahim 2003:110). Supporting the above, Lipshitz et al agree that there are different sets of factors that improve the likelihood of learning. Lipshitz et al have developed a detailed multifacet model of organizational learning which includes a number of relevant facets that determine the quality of organizational learning (Lipshitz 2002:78). The model adds to the former explained concepts in a way that it builds a framework of conditions which facilitate learning. It is called ‘Lipshitz’ Multifacet Model of Organizational Learning’. The model describes the dynamics under which organizations are likely to learn. The better these facets are fulfilled, the higher the likelihood of learning will be. The five facets that Lipshitz et al developed are structural, cultural, psychological, policy, and contextual facets, which are each set together by a number of positive conditions. The figure of the multifacet model is shown on the left.

Learning in organizations can be distinguished into learning in and learning by an organization (Lipshitz et al 2002:78). Lipshitz et al argue that individuals learn in an organization and a variety of organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs), which are represented in the structural facet, are required for translating and disseminating the information to achieve learning by an organization (Lipshitz et al 2002:78). This assumption of learning in and by an organization equals to the different levels of learning. The other four facets (cultural, psychological, policy and contextual) influence the structural facet.
Lipshitz et al describe that productive learning includes the three steps of being conscious and systematic, yielding valid information and in the end conducting actions that produce new perceptions, goals or behaviors (Lipshitz et al 2002:82). The concept of productive learning does not imply that an organization either learns perfectly or not at all, instead it allows for explaining the extent and quality of learning according to different degrees of number and effectiveness to which the facets are fulfilled in a given part of an organization, taking into consideration horizontal and vertical links among organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs) (Lipshitz et al 2002:79).

The structural facet explains that through the set-up of OLMs, individuals can act and reflect on behalf of the organization. OLMs are subsystems, in which members of the organization act for the purpose of learning (Lipshitz et al 2002:82). The quality of the OLMs determines, together with the other facets, the productivity of learning. Through the OLMs productive learning can take place not only in the organization, but at all levels of learning and by the organization.

The cultural facet is set together by the five norms transparency, integrity, issue orientation, inquiry and accountability, which are likely to produce valid information and cause a commitment to corrective action (Lipshitz et al 2002:85). These norms determine the productivity of learning. Transparency is to expose thoughts and actions to others in order to receive feedback. Integrity is to collect and provide information regardless of the implications. Issue orientation is to focus on the relevance of information to the issues no matter what the social rank of the recipient or the source is. Inquiry means to persist in investigation until a full understanding is achieved, implying questioning the status quo. Finally, accountability is to define or assume responsibility for both learning and implementing lessons learned (Lipshitz et al 2002:86). All these cultural norms imply a willingness of incurring costs in order to achieve productive learning.

The next facet is the psychological facet, which is set together by psychological safety and organizational commitment (Lipshitz et al 2002:87). These two psychological states are difficult to maintain. Psychological safety is a state in which people feel safe to make errors and honestly discuss what they think and how they feel. Without psychological safety, people do not take risks, a requirement for learning. Organizational commitment is the extent to which organizational members identify with an organization’s goals and values and do not differentiate between its own and the organization’s interests (Lipshitz et al 2002:87). With regards to the cultural facet, psychological safety determines transparency, integrity and issue orientation, while organizational commitment determines inquiry and accountability (Lipshitz et al 2002:87).

The policy facet is about the formal and informal steps taken by the management to promote organizational learning within issues as policies, rules, budgets, procedures and so on. Especially important are the commitment to learning, the tolerance for error and the commitment to workforce (Lipshitz et al 2002:88). These issues are strategic decisions expressed in rhetoric and action (as training and reward systems etc). An example showing commitment to learning by the organization is by the organization spending resources in terms of time, effort and money for OL practices. Tolerance
for error has to be expressed in a way that learning is not punished but instead valued as opportunity for learning. Commitment to the workforce is making policy in a way that ensures employment and de-emphasizes status differences (Lipshitz et al 2002:89). These three issues determine the psychological facet of the organization.

The fifth facet is the contextual facet, which is either indirect or not under the control of the management of an organization. The five components of the contextual facet determine the likelihood that organizational learning evolves and that organizational learning is productive in the organizations and/or the subsystems (Lipshitz et al 2002:90). The five components are error criticality, environmental uncertainty, task structure, proximity to the mission and committed leadership (Lipshitz 2002:81). Error criticality refers to a situation when errors that are made have a serious effect on the organization or on its costs. If an error encompasses the risk of producing high costs, learning is more likely to take place in order to prevent the error from occurring. Environmental uncertainty refers to change and intensity of competition in the environment, which can require change and learning (Lipshitz et al 2002:91). The task structure influences achieving valid information and people’s motivation to cooperate with colleagues in learning. Proximity to the organization’s mission or specialization increases learning within a certain task system (Lipshitz et al 2002:91). Lastly, committed leadership and support are essential for the successful change of programs in general (Lipshitz et al 2002:92). Managers should make organizational learning a central element in the organization, install and institutionalize OLMs, install the values of a learning culture and create conditions for psychological safety and organizational commitment.

In summary, Lipshitz et al developed a model which takes into account the different nature of individual and organizational learning by pointing out that, besides collection, analysis, storage and use of information, organizational learning requires OLMs (Lipshitz et al 2002:93). OLMs facilitate learning by organizations. The five facets which are named are not necessary conditions for learning, but they describe an ideal in which each positive link increases the likelihood of organizational learning. Different organizations learn in different ways with different conditions being fulfilled (Lipshitz et al 2002:93). The multifaceted model does not differentiate between single- and double loop learning, as Argyris and Schön proposed, but it expands by emphasizing the structural, cultural and contextual conditions for the facilitation of productive learning. Through the multifaceted model, the likelihood of the success of productive learning can be estimated, while there is no single best set of arrangements for learning. An organization cannot be called either as learning or not learning, it will mostly be something in between, loosely linked process with a variety of OLMs. The conditions elaborated by Lipshitz et al may be necessary for the facilitation of learning, however, they are insufficient in determining whether learning will take place since other factors may avert learning. The multifaceted model allows to determine the extent and quality if organizational learning by assessing the number, variety and effectiveness of organizational learning mechanisms and identifying their horizontal and vertical links throughout the organization (Lipshitz et al 2002:94).
2.8. Organizational Learning Mechanisms (OLMs)

As Lipshitz et al identified in their research, a variety of OLMs are required for translating what individuals learn in an organization into information that organizations can use and disseminate to achieve organizational learning (Lipshitz et al 2002:78). Different examples of OLMs can be found in section 6 under evaluative activities.

Information management and documentation about lessons learned should be handled in a centralized system in order to facilitate a process of learning from these documentations (Brabant 2001:194). Reporting guidelines help organizations to make reports more useful tools of information gathering. It can be problematic when learning and accountability are confused and not the facilitation of learning is seen as central goal of knowledge management, but rather it is accountability. When it comes to learning, information overflow is counterproductive for effective learning. Information should be synthesized, selected and prioritized (Brabant 2001:194). This shows a need for organizational mechanisms to manage recommendations and to monitor that important ones are followed-up. Learning on the one hand requires documentation and synthesis, but also dissemination on the other hand. For this it is important that the management does not avoid sensitive or confrontational themes (Brabant 2001:195). A crucial type of OLMs is handover mechanisms, which are important to preserve institutional memory and learning (Brabant 2001:197).

2.9. Summary: The Key Relevant Contextual Concepts

Summarizing these different models, it becomes visible that one can generally distinguish between levels and depths of learning and the conditions, which facilitate change induced by learning. The following table gives an overview about the analyzed concepts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept of OL</th>
<th>Content of the Concept</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depths of Learning</td>
<td>Lower-level (single-loop/ non-cognitive) versus higher-level (double-loop/ triple-loop/ cognitive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Implementation</td>
<td>Individual, group and organizational levels of implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Crossan et al 1999, March 1991)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of Learning</td>
<td>Implicit versus explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Crossan et al 1999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Process of Learning</td>
<td>(Raw Data ➔) Information Acquisition (Intuiting) ➔ Knowledge Generation (Interpreting) ➔ Action/ Practice (Integrating) ➔ Knowledge Routinization (Institutionalization) ➔ Change/ Improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ebrahim 2003, Crossan et al 1999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitators of Learning</td>
<td>The more the five facets (structural, cultural,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Lipshitz et al 2002) \[\text{psychological, policy, and contextual} \] are fulfilled, the higher is the likelihood of organizational learning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Learning Mechanisms (OLMs)</th>
<th>OLMs are observable organizational subsystems that should facilitate translation and dissemination of information by properly reviewing and acting upon it for achieving organizational learning.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Lipshitz et al 2002)</td>
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2.10. The Chosen Framework for the Research

Generally, all named core concepts will be applied to WVI in order to receive a complete picture of the organizational learning activities within WVI. For the present research, the depths of learning (single- and double-loop, Ebrahim) and the levels of implementation (individual, group and organizational, Lipshitz) are used. In addition, the model of Crossan et al about the facilitators of change will be central for the analysis. The model will help to explain why something has or has not been learned by the organization.

3. ACCOUNTABILITY

3.1. What is Accountability?

Lipshitz states that accountability is to define or assume responsibility for both learning and implementing lessons learned (Lipshitz et al 2002: 86). A difference between the way accountability is seen in humanitarian action and in other parts of life becomes clear. While Lipshitz defines accountability of having a responsibility towards learning, the humanitarian stakeholders focus much on the beneficiaries and the responsible use of power: According to the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), accountability is the means by which power is used responsibly. Humanitarian accountability involves taking account of, and accounting to disaster survivors (HAP 2007: 7). This implies that survivors of emergencies can participate in decisions that affect them, influence the decision-making process and complain when a decision is made poorly or has unexpected and unwelcome consequences. The Global Accountability Project (GAP), defines accountability as ‘the process through which an organization makes a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of its stakeholders in its decision-making processes and activities, and delivers against its commitment’ (Blagescu et al 2005: 20). The core principles of accountability are transparency, participation, evaluation and complaint and response (Blagescu et al 2005: 23-24).

In the Good Enough Guide by the Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB), accountability is all about how an organization balances the needs of different groups in its decision-making and activities, while focusing on involving the stakeholders in planning, implementing and judging the emergency response (ECB 2007: 4). Generally, accountability can be broken down to the following points:
• Being transparent and communicating effectively with different stakeholders
• Knowing what impact the actions have (M&E, impact assessment and learning)
• Does an organization do what it says it does? (Compliance)

Accountability should always be mutual rights and responsibilities between stakeholders in which dialogue and communication is crucial for understanding each other. The key components in an organization for accountability are accountability capabilities (as mechanisms and policies), practices (activities between organization and stakeholders) and culture (attitudes and values of staff). Only when these components are fulfilled, accountability can exist in an NGO (Blagescu et al 2005: 27).

3.2. Accountability to Whom?

An NGO in the humanitarian sector is not only obliged to make profit for itself as it is the case for for-profit companies. Instead it has to serve and satisfy a large number of different stakeholders. The GAP defines the stakeholders as ‘individuals and groups that can affect or are affected by an organization’s policies and/or actions’ (Blagescu et al 2005: 20). For INGOs, the internal stakeholders are national members, employees and the trustees. External stakeholders are funders, supporters, beneficiaries, other affected groups or individuals, partners, governments and peer INGOs (Blagescu et al 2005: 21). Since an NGO can’t be accountable to all these different stakeholders, a prioritization has to be done, bearing in mind mission and values and the issues on which they engage stakeholders as well as the stakeholder groups which they engage (Blagescu et al 2005: 21).

Interdependence between NGOs and funders exists since the NGOs depend on the funders ‘economic capital’ in exchange for ‘symbolic’ capital in form of information and reputation for the funders (Ebrahim, 2003: 144). Funders demand standardized reporting formats, easy measurable inputs and outputs and centralizing information generation in order to be able to control the information. There are firstly information systems set up by the funders which make the funds flow and are necessary for the accountability in order to show how the funds are spend and as justification towards the government, and there are secondly internal information systems set up by the organizations. ‘Upward’ accountability means that actors are accountable towards the next higher level. The information flows up the chain from the field to the organization, funders and evaluation commissions. ‘Downward’ accountability is the evaluation by the beneficiaries over the higher level, so the organization. However, the downward accountability is mostly very informal. There is no downward accountability on the higher levels. Accountability and information systems influence organizational learning. Upward accountability mechanisms enable learning by using information that is gathered in the field (Ebrahim, 2003: 146). An organization needs to be careful to not only be accountable towards the ‘uppers’, but also the ‘lowers’, for which their work is initially done. Also Hulme and Edwards state that NGOs have multiple accountabilities, being downwards towards their partners, beneficiaries, staff and supporters and upwards to trustees, donors and host governments (Hulme and Edwards 1995: 967). The primary accountability of NGOs is often towards governments and institutional donors, since these are the ones having financial power over them. NGOs also have
contractual obligations to spend the designated money for certain purposes. Besides the accountability upwards towards funders, NGOs also have accountability downwards to their beneficiaries, inwards to the organizational values and mission, members and staff and horizontally to their peers (Blagescu et al 2005: 16 and 17).

In the humanitarian field, accountability is especially important since the survivors have acute needs, they face a lack of choice and competition, a lack of voice since old structures of participation are destroyed, the decisions done in that field can decide over life and death. Beneficiaries generally lack the power to make demands, which often results to the accountability to them as being quite weak. NGOs have a moral obligation to be accountable to the beneficiaries, which usually roots in their mandate and the quality is different from one to the next organization (Blagescu et al 2005: 17).

A humanitarian NGO needs to respond to the challenge of accountability. NGOs do this in two ways: firstly by organizational initiatives and secondly by creating sector initiatives (Blagescu et al 2005: 63). There are various sector initiatives, which will be discussed in the following section. An organization also has organizational initiatives, which are partly cutting with the sector initiatives, as some codes of conducts which the NGO adheres to.

3.3. The Relevance of Accountability for this Research and the Distinction from OL

It is important to analyze the concept of accountability for this research since it is often confused with organizational learning. Ebrahim states that NGOs use accountability measures instead of learning, which is not a positive development as ‘accountability as short-term and rule-following behavior rather than as a means to longer-term social change’ is counterproductive for organizations (Ebrahim 2003a:56). What many actors confuse about the two concepts accountability and learning is that accountability is often performed as compliance with certain rules. The important point is to get accountability to a point where it is not only compliance with rules set by donors and the sector, but where it is about learning in a proactive rather than reactive way. Organizations show that they comply with the rules and call it learning, however, the evaluations and lessons learned are barely translated into learning and change (Ebrahim 2003b:818). Learning should be a part of accountability, often it is said to be the same as accountability. Accountability is important, but it is only effective when it leads to learning/ change and action (Ebrahim 2003a).

4. POLICY MAKING

4.1. The Policy Cycle

In order to be able to understand the way a policy is, or should be created or changed in WVI, it is important to understand how theory explains the making of policies. According to Colebatch, a policy is ‘a course of action taken by an institution in order to achieve certain results’ (Colebatch 2002). The policy process is a sequence of stages in the realization of this goal. These actions are often
represented as a cycle including similar stages as the one which is subsequently presented. The following figure presents one of the many theories on policy-making cycles to get an introduction and understanding in policy-making. This policy-making cycle is presented by Colebatch (2002):

In the figure, the six stages of the policy cycle are visible. When a problem is recognized by policy-makers, or people who have influence on the policy-makers they decide to bring it on the table to take action and through this, the agenda setting is done. Authorized leaders determine the objectives they wish to achieve in the decision-making stage. A course of action is taken by choosing the means. In this decision, a range of options is weighed against the relative costs and benefits of each. The preferred alternative that is chosen is formulated in the policy. The next step is the implementation of the policy. Different actors have to carry out the courses of action that have been chosen and create the output and outcome. After the policy has been implemented, the evaluation and feedback of the results is made. The outcome of the implementation should now be evaluated. If it is necessary, which is often the case, the policy is amended in the light of the evaluation and the process of the policy cycle starts again (Colebatch 2002).

4.2. Discussion

The policy cycle is comparable to the learning cycle created by Ebrahim (2003). This is logical since the organizational learning should step in between the evaluation and feedback and the agenda setting. Ideally, OLMs exist in an organization which set those points which have to be improved, changed therefore ‘learned’ on the agenda in order to make policies that facilitate learning:
It is important to unfold the policy-making process within WVI in order to see how policies are supposed to be created (espoused theory) and how they are made in reality (theory-in-use). The point where to step in is to examine whether policy-making is influenced by the organizational learning mechanisms. Organizational learning has to be regarded as being part of the policy cycle and not as being a learning cycle in itself that stands apart from the actual policy-making process. The figure shows that those being in charge of the policy-making within an organization, mostly the senior management, should be involved with the learning and see it as a part of the policy-making process.

What is important to remember is that, as mentioned before, policy-making requires generalization (Brabant 2001: 187). In generalizations, important differences might get lost. Therefore, policy-makers should look for unusual experiences and select cases to reflect variety instead of averages. Further they should build policies upon longer-term experiences in wider geographical areas to develop a bigger picture. If generalizations are made too quickly, wrong lessons can be learned or lessons from one context are applied to a different, not fitting the context (Brabant 2001: 187). Also, policy and planning should carefully consider the conditions that will affect its implementation and should preferably enhance those with an expected favourable influence.

5. BACKGROUND OF THE SECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ACTION

5.1. Development of Humanitarian Action

A crucial point for humanitarian action took place in 1859, when Henri Dunant assisted the wounded Austrian and French soldiers in the Italian battle of Solferino (Weiss and Collins 2000:13). From saving the wounded soldiers from the battlefield, the idea of modern humanitarianism was established. Following this event, in 1864, Henri Dunant founded the Red Cross in Geneva (Weiss and Collins 2000:13). The Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies developed seven basic humanitarian principles2 (IFRC 2008). According to the United Nations, ‘humanitarianism is a universal concept that applies to all people at all times. It is rooted in the objectives of humanity (saving lives), impartiality (non-discrimination and needs-based assistance) as well as neutrality (not taking sides)’ (United Nations 2009). In 1949, the Geneva Conventions were signed. These lay out the basic rules of behavior during times of war as to protect people who are not taking part in the hostilities (civilians, health workers and aid workers) and those who are no longer participating in the hostilities, such as wounded, sick and shipwrecked soldiers, as well as prisoners of war (ICRC 2010). Over the years, with the occurrence of irregular and extreme events, new laws, conventions and institutions were established around humanitarian action (Weiss and Collins 2000:14). The body of law relating to humanitarian activities is called ‘International Humanitarian Law’ (IHL), of which the Geneva Conventions are an important part (ICRC 2004). IHL is significant as it applies during times of armed

2 See annex 4 for details of the humanitarian principles
conflicts (which is why it is also called the ‘law of war’), while human rights law is largely suspended during times of conflict (it also called the ‘law of peace’) (Reindorp 2002:31).

With the end of the Cold War, humanitarianism was increasingly placed on the security agenda (Reindorp 2002:29). The UN took over a bigger role through the Agenda for Peace initiated in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the UN’s Millennium Assembly in 2000 led by Annan (Reindorp 2002:29). Since the 1990s, humanitarian action continued to evolve as the nature of conflict shifted towards internal conflicts and transnational threats such as terrorism, especially after 9/11 (Reindorp 2002:30-31). This raised a few questions. Firstly, humanitarianism is being politicized and militarized, which blurs the lines and causes the diminution of humanitarian space. Secondly, the sovereignty of states is questioned through the responsibility to protect, raising dilemmas about responsibilities and rights (Reindorp 2002:31). Even though these issues mostly relate to man-made disasters, natural disasters also require the involvement of political actors. However, governments often fail to protect their citizens in matters where no international law exists. For example, there is currently no assistance and protection rule for internally displaced people (Reindorp 2002:36).

5.2. Categories of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are usually voluntary and open associations of individuals outside of the formal state apparatus that are neither for profit nor engage in political activities as their primary objective (Iriye, 1999:422). Non-governmental on the one hand does not imply not-for-profit, however the common NGO is at the same time a non-profit organization (NPO), as Iriye described (1999:422). The term INGO refers to a cross-national NGO (Taylor and Curtis 2008:420). Stoddard describes how humanitarian NGOs can be divided into many different classifications and typologies (Stoddard 2003:25-28). In her article, she names three different main traditions from which humanitarian NGOs have evolved (Stoddard 2003:27). These three traditions are faith-based organizations, Dunantist organizations and Wilsonian organizations. Faith-based organizations act in harmony with Christian principles. World Vision International is an example for this tradition. Dunantist organizations act according to the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence from state interests, as for example Save the Children. The third tradition is Wilsonian organizations, which are named after the ideas of the former American President Woodrow Wilson and which aim to spread U.S. values and influence through the principles of cooperation and multilateralism. The INGO CARE International is an example for this type of tradition (Stoddard 2003:27).

5.3. Categories of Disasters

According to Twigg (2004:13) and the ISDR Secretariat (2004), a disaster is the realization of a risk that happens from the combination of a hazard, vulnerability and insufficient capacity to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk. A disaster happens when the impact of a hazard on a
section of society causes human, material, economic or environmental losses that overwhelm the society’s ability to cope with it using its own resources (Twigg 2004:13, ISDR Secretariat 2004).

Generally, three widely accepted types of disasters can be distinguished, being natural disasters, violent conflicts (man-made disasters) and other crises, as complex emergencies (Twigg 2004:17). Natural, rapid-onset disasters are triggered by natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, cyclones, landslides, avalanches, volcanic eruptions and certain types of disease epidemics. They occur suddenly, often with very little warning (Twigg 2004: 17). Natural disasters can also be slow-onset referring mostly to food shortage or famine, where the crisis builds up over several weeks or months (Twigg 2004:17). Armed conflicts, which are man-made disasters, can take place internationally between states (international armed conflicts), within the territory of a state (non international armed conflict) or in asymmetric wars (Steward 2003:313). However, a disaster cannot always be categorized clearly since many disasters are a combination of different types of emergencies at the same time. In such a situation, emergencies are called complex emergencies. This happens for example when a natural disaster is protracted by political instability and violence (Twigg 2004: 17, Weiss and Collins 2000:34).

In this study about organizational learning in World Vision International, we are looking at the response to natural rapid-onset disasters, specifically to earthquakes, floods and storms. The motivation for this is that the study has limitations in time and one category of disasters had to be chosen since every category has to be approached in different ways and can therefore not be easily compared, as the strategy of response to (long-term) conflicts need to cover different aspects and fight different problems than a slow-onset drought or a rapid-onset natural disaster.

5.4. Initiatives for Accountability and Learning in Humanitarian Action

Because of the challenges for humanitarianism, which were elaborated earlier, humanitarian action more than ever needs to be accountable, transparent, predictable and coordinated (United Nations 2009). Since 1995, international NGOs and other humanitarian agencies have initiated a number of inter-agency projects on quality and/ or accountability in humanitarian action. This was done to pool knowledge and resources as well as to agree upon common standards and tools (The Sphere Project 2009). Of the initiatives, the most important ones relating to the subject of this research - organizational learning and accountability - are the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP).

The initiatives focus on specific topics. Most of them have introduced their own tools for tackling their area of interest in form of principles, standards, management frameworks, lessons learned, training materials and guides for the field (The Sphere Project 2009). Generally, the initiatives show a common direction in improving quality and accountability. When resources which are

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3 An overview of initiatives for accountability and learning can be found in annex 7.
generally agreed upon already exist, it saves time for organizations who want to adapt new standards in a certain field. Thus, the advantage of such initiatives is that they create a point of reference for resources and frameworks in addition to the advantages that standardization of assistance among the sector offers (The Sphere Project 2009).

6. **EVALUATIVE ACTIVITIES**

   Trochim states that through evaluation, the value of an object can be systematically assessed (2006). It is the analysis of the outputs and the impact of the project during its lifetime, at its finishing point and - ideally- some time after it has finished; hence feeding the findings of the evaluation into future projects and into general policy and programming guidelines (Twigg 2004: 7). Different types of evaluations exist, depending on the purpose of the evaluation (Brabant 2001:195). The most common types of evaluations for NGOs are formative-, process-, summative-, as well as outcome evaluations. ‘Formative evaluations’ start early in a project and are ongoing, evaluating the progress and nature of implementation. They can identify gaps and improvements and therefore strengthen the project that is being evaluated, as for example needs assessments. ‘Process evaluations’ monitor activities to make sure that a project is implemented correctly and completed on time. ‘Summative evaluations’ assess the projects’ overall effectiveness and achievement of what it was designed to do as for example outcome- or impact evaluations as well as meta-analyses that integrate outcome estimates from multiple studies. They are often completed when a project is over and help stakeholders to decide about future projects. ‘Outcome evaluations’ assess the extent to which a project achieved its intended effects and which impacts it had (Trochim 2006, Zarinpoush 6-7).

   Evaluative activities in organizations can be conducted in different formats. They can be project evaluations and strategic evaluations, either of selected programs or for cross-cutting themes. Evaluative activities can also be ex-post evaluations, audits, mid-term reviews and real time evaluations. It is important to recognize different evaluative activities and tools for information gatherings exist (Zarinpoush 2006:29, 31). The information can be gathered from sources such as reports, databases, records, meeting minutes etc. or being generated at focus groups (discussion rounds) at different levels with all different stakeholders, as well as interviews, surveys etc. (Zarinpoush 2006:29, 31). As explained before, organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs) are observable organizational subsystems in which organization members interact for the purpose of learning (Lipshitz 2002: 82). In order to analyze how an organization approaches learning, their evaluative activities and established OLMs need to be elaborated and analyzed. In this research, the focus lies on evaluative activity syntheses documents, which are initially derived from learning events in World Vision International This will be detailed later on.
6.1. Different Types of Use of Evaluative Activities in Humanitarian Action

In the 1980s, evaluations of humanitarian action were still rare, while nowadays they have become one of the most visible features of learning and accountability (Sandison 2005:90). Even though evaluations of all forms become more and more common, it is a question whether and how they are effectively used (Sandison 2005:90). As stated by Carlsson (2000:122), evaluations are used in many different ways for many purposes, which can be far from learning. Patton (1997) is an initiator of the concept of utilization-focused evaluation. He describes three primary uses or purposes of evaluation findings (Patton 1997: 76). This is firstly in order to judge the value of a program (in form of accountability to stakeholders or to inform funding decisions). Secondly, evaluations can be used to improve a program (learning) and thirdly, knowledge can be generated through evaluations.

Carlsson developed a number of categories of the use of evaluations. The first and second purposes of evaluations by Patton (1997:76), the judging and learning are, according to Carlsson’s system, of instrumental use. Instrumental use happens when findings are fed back into the planning and implementation of the operations and lead to direct changes in policy, funding or operations (Carlsson 2000:122). This would refer to the concept of single-loop learning. Evaluations can also be of conceptual use, referring to the case where evaluation findings trickle down into an organization and develop into new ideas, concepts and new ways of structuring the operations over time. Single evaluations often do not lead to direct changes in underlying ideas, but rather a number of evaluations add up to cumulative knowledge and the conceptual use. This use refers to double-loop learning. Evaluations also can legitimize decisions and positions that have already been taken on other grounds in order to justify actions taken. In this case, not the result but the fact that an evaluation has been conducted, counts. Another type of use for evaluations is the ritual use, in which an evaluation is seen as a formal or symbolic act which shows desired qualities on behalf of institutional obligations (Carlsson 2000:122, Sandison 2005:97). In order to be accountable, it is not enough to simply identify performance issues. It also involves the commitment of responding to findings of evaluations. In ritual evaluation, an account has been made (through transparency), but no action follows from it (Sandison 2005:96). Another case is when evaluations are not used at all, when potential users do not find anything interesting in an evaluation to develop into their action or they are not aware of the results (which can refer to a dissemination problem) (Carlsson 2000: 122). Non-use can have rational, unintended or practical reasons due to unexpected events (Sandison 2005:97). Evaluations can also have a learning use for individuals since the participation in the evaluation can change the behavior of individuals (Sandison 2005:96). The user’s participation in turn can also strengthen the organizational learning culture. Another type of use is misuse when findings are intentionally misrepresented or suppressed, for example due to political reasons or personal advantage or rejecting findings because they do not correspond with the beliefs of stakeholders or decisions that have been taken (Sandison 2005:96-97).

Learning is not limited to a particular use, however, it is most likely to occur through either instrumental or conceptual use (or the individual learning use). Carlsson criticizes that evaluations are
rather donor-centric, without value for local stakeholders, and are rarely used for instrumental purposes, since they form a part of an already on-going process of organizational encounter (Carlsson 2000: 129). The use of evaluations for learning purposes can be improved. This has been discussed by Patton in 1997. In his article on utilization-focused evaluation, he elaborates that evaluations should be judged by their actual utility (Patton 1997:20). According to him, the use of evaluations does not lie in a complex methodology and a sophisticated finding for the decision-making, but rather in a comprehensive approach that is focused from the starting point onwards on all stakeholders. This means that the design of the whole process of evaluation and the empowerment of the users affect its use, not only the output (Patton 1997:20).

Instrumental use refers to single-loop learning while conceptual use of evaluations refers to double-loop learning. According to Sandison (2005:93), the conceptual use of evaluations is associated with organizations and policy-making rather than with individuals and specific projects. In this thesis, I am analyzing evaluative activities, primarily syntheses of evaluations, and whether they lead to a change in policy documents by using the Lipshitz model (2002), a comprehensive approach at facilitators of change. Following the former explanations, this would mean that I am looking at the conceptual use of evaluations, or double-loop learning. As Sandison states, evaluation syntheses are best used for conceptual use (Sandison 2005:93). Lessons learned and repetition of key findings drawn from evaluations generates new, strong information for an organization since it recognizes recurring issues. This is why I chose to focus on the use of evaluations to see whether evaluative activities have lead to change in policy documents, referring to double-loop learning. The fact that a comprehensive approach is necessary for the use of evaluations and change reinforces the use of the chosen model by Lipshitz, since it includes all different facets which are necessary for change. The model is comprehensive and practical since it looks from different points of view, not only a process or system, but at all facilitators of change.

7. THE INGO WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL

World Vision International (WVI) is a Christian humanitarian organization that is working for the well-being of poor and vulnerable people, especially children, in nearly 100 nations (WVI 2007a). WVI works in the three areas of sustainable development, disaster relief and advocacy (WVI 2007a). When responding to humanitarian emergencies through disaster relief, WVI seeks to protect vulnerable people, provide emergency relief such as food, water, shelter, medicine and clothing, and to build preparedness for future disasters (WVI 2007a). The assistance is community-based and available to all those in need, regardless of race, gender, ethnic background or religious belief (WVI 2007a). World Vision International works with communities, churches, governments and other aid agencies to deliver services. The motivation of WVI is to follow the example of the Christ to love one another, especially children and the poor, while WVI respects other faiths and believes (WVI 2007a).
7.1. Organizational Structure of World Vision International

World Vision International is a partnership of interdependent national offices (WVI 2010c). The mission statement and shared core values 4 bind the partnership (WVI 2010a). By signing the Covenant of Partnership, each partner agrees to common policies and standards (WVI 2010c). The International Board oversees the international President, approves strategic plans and budgets, and determines international policy (WVI 2010c). For the offices which have full membership in the partnership, national boards have responsibility for governance (WVI 2007a). A principle of subsidiarity applies since operational decisions are made at the local or national level when possible and national directors approve more than 90 percent of all projects within previously approved budgets (WVI 2007a).

Previously, the partnership contained two types of national offices being support offices and field offices. Support offices as Canada, USA, UK, Germany and Australia primarily raised funds and provided other ministry support. Field offices mostly implemented emergency relief and community development programming (WVI 2007a). The distinctions between the two kinds of offices have blurred over the last decade, as both types of entities can raise funds and implement programs. Nowadays, all country offices are called ‘national offices’, while some of them are independent.

WVI has a partnership office based in Monrovia, California, USA for functions as international finance, communications, human resources, IT and a number of strategic planning roles, which is however not seen as headquarters (WVI 2007a). The secretariat of WVI is spread over the whole world. It is registered in California and momentarily more dominantly present in London. In addition, the partnership is supported by two other types of offices. The regional offices coordinate actions across continents or regions of the world. National offices report to the regional offices, which in turn report to the Head of Operations for the globe (WVI 2007a). The second type of workplace is the international liaison offices, which are placed in areas of international decision-making in order to consult, advise and to advocate on an international level. Liaison offices are for example situated in Geneva (for policy issues) and New York (WVI 2007a). World Vision International works in three lines of ministries, being the Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs (HEA), the Transformational Development (TD) and Policy and Advocacy (P&A). In annex 3, an organigram of World Vision International can be found. A majority of WVI's funding resources is generated by private donors; from individuals, corporations and foundations. Funds from child sponsorship account for about a half of WVI's cash income. The remaining funds are derived from governments and multilateral agencies (WVI 2010c).

In an emergency, the Global Rapid Response Team (GRRT) is World Vision's first response mechanism to major disasters. The GRRT is on permanent standby and is deployable within 72 hours of a disaster designation. It can assess the situation, develop a response structure, initiate funding and

4 See annex 5
material resource streams, and manage the process for proceeding with a response. It operates in the first 90 days and is then replaced with a permanent full-time response team (WVI 2007a).

7.2. Organizational Learning in World Vision International

World Vision International consists of three main ministries, as was explained before. The HEA ministry has developed a so-called 'Quality Assurance Framework' in 2004 (WVI 2004). This framework consists of four parallel systems which collectively compose a framework of quality assurance for WVI’s humanitarian programming (WVI 2004). These four systems are DME (Design, Monitoring & Evaluation), H-Account (Accountability), H-Cap (Capacity Building) and H-Learn (Humanitarian Learning, Evaluation, Analysis and Review Network) (WVI 2004). The Quality Assurance framework was modeled by WVI as shown annex 6. H-Learn is the mechanism used for organizational learning, and therefore the relevant system for this study, which will be explained in more detail in the following.

World Vision International’s System of H-Learn

The term H-Learn stands for Humanitarian Learning, Evaluation, Analysis and Review Network. It is a learning platform that was designed in order to create and institutionalize WVI’s knowledge for improving humanitarian action by applying lessons learned to practice (WVI 2004). A key role of H-Learn is to ensure that learning processes and recommendations from evaluative- and learning activities are incorporated into WVI’s core decision-making, strategies, policies and standards, and that better practices are being applied (WVI 2004). Within the framework of H-Learn, a set of tools was developed to generate documented learning, which can then be reviewed, analyzed, and guide the organizational change necessary to apply the lessons (WVI 2006). The creation of H-Learn showed a commitment from the senior management to knowledge-management and learning. After two years, the H-Learn approach was adopted across the whole organization through the creation of a Global Knowledge Management office.

Evaluative Activities

One of the key evaluative activities supported by H-Learn are ‘learning events’ that are held before (pre-response learning event), during (real-time learning event) and after emergency responses (post-response learning event) with participants from all levels of the partnership, including expert- and practice group learning events (WVI 2006). A learning event is a meeting to capture and share lessons, recommendations and better practices, which are documented in reports. These reports containing lessons are consolidated each year and every three years. The accumulation of documents is analyzed for trends, grouped according to sectors and themes, and compared to the previous tri-annual trends analysis. The concerned thematic areas can include the executive/leadership and strategic lessons, operational lessons, technical lessons, disaster management lessons and quality assurance
lessons. WVI's key evaluative activities, as the reports from the learning events, evaluations, consolidated learning and trends analyses from 1998 until 2008 can be seen on the timeline 1.

Accountability in World Vision International

World Vision International states that it is accountable to those whom it serves, the beneficiaries, to donors, and to staff (WVI 2007b). It states that it takes measures of accountability in form of financial accountability through internal and external audits, program achievements as well as through indicators concerning child health, education, participation, hope, household resilience, community relationships, and social sustainability. WVI also produces annual report (WVI 2007b).

WVI is a signatory to numerous initiatives that set standards of governance, management, and accountability. Among the most important ones for learning and accountability are the membership in the steering committee of the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) and in ALNAP6. WVI's memberships for other initiatives can be examined in annex 2 and on the timeline in annex 8.

Policy Making in World Vision International

The Global Relief Forum is the highest level group for WVI's ministry of HEA (WVI 2007a). It is comprised of all major WVI emergency response and mitigation stakeholders. Launched in 1999, the forum's purpose is to ensure participation by WVI's stakeholders around the globe in developing humanitarian strategy, planning, and interventions. Decisions from the forum, which are based on consensus, are sent back to each constituency group (national offices, regional offices, partnership offices, the strategic working group and/or the international board) in the form of recommendations. These may then transform the recommendations into appropriate policies, standards and guidelines.

WVI states that learning emerges as a key process for organizational development and growth (WVI 2004). The model on the left shows how WVI draws its cycle of learning with the help of H-Learn. When analyzing WVI's learning mechanisms it is important to review how the organization sees its learning process in order to be able to judge what goes wrong in the process or the logic (if anything). WVI models its process of learning as a cycle.

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5 See annex 8
6 In annex 7, an overview of learning- and accountability initiatives is provided.
with different steps that are repeating themselves. Spelled out, the learning cycle in WVI can be explained in the following way:

Step 1: Raw Data e.g. output from learning events and activities. This step describes how raw data is captured from research (see step 7), as well as from evaluative activities as learning events and evaluations.

Step 2: Information e.g. consolidated learning, real time learning. The raw data from step one is distilled and information is produced in form of reports etc.

Step 3: Knowledge e.g. input into tools and technical standards. The information that was generated in step 2 is validated and knowledge is created through knowledge management and systems as for example the 'cracking-the-nut', where main recommendations are consolidated and realized.

Step 4: Learning e.g. subject matter/ expert group learning & better practice. In step 4, WVI conducts 'learning', which is described as sharing and adopting the knowledge from step 3 depending on the subject matter for example through expert groups and facilitating better practice.

Step 5: Practice e.g. operational frameworks for various response contexts. In step 5, the 'learning' is transferred and adapted into practice by the creation of operational frameworks for different response contexts.

Step 6: Change, Improvement, Quality e.g. Scorecard Report and Evaluation of organizational strategies against learning. Through applying the elaborated steps, change, improvement and quality can be achieved. This can be measured through scorecard reports and evaluations in which organizational strategies are weighed against learning.

Step 7: Research e.g. Impact assessments and beneficiary perception/ views of humanitarian assistance. The step that closes the cycle is that after step 5, research is conducted on various themes, to create and discover which in turn produces raw data and lets the cycle start all over.

WVI's learning mechanisms have developed a great deal in the past ten years. Since 2000, the learning events have been institutionalized. In 2004, the system of H-Learn has been introduced. The lessons learned reports, which have been of very different quality before 2000, have changed towards the same format in order to be better comparable and focus more on what is really important.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the theoretical and the conceptual framework were laid out and a review of the key literatures for the research was given. It became visible that a number of different literatures exist around organizational learning and that most authors use different terminology for similar concepts. A general agreement exists that organizational learning can take place on different levels, being individual, group and organizational level. Change- and learning can happen through different types of learning, being through simple improvements and adaptations due to needs (single-loop learning/ low level learning/ non cognitive learning), or through deeper reflection and a conscious change in values.
and systems (double-loop learning/ higher level learning/ cognitive learning). In this chapter, also accountability and its distinction from organizational learning have been explained and the broad concept of policy-making has been introduced in order to get an understanding about how policies are created and changed generally. In the analysis of this study, these main concepts will be applied to the organization World Vision International in order to understand how the organization’s system of policy-making, learning and accountability is set-up. The model of Lipshitz (2002) is one of the central models to explain how and why or why not the policies/ standards in the emergency sector of WVI have changed due to learning activities. This chapter also provided a background to humanitarian assistance, to different evaluative activities and to the subject of the case study, the INGO World Vision International.

By building upon the theoretical framework of constructivism and the organizational theories of structuralism and institutionalization, and by exploring more specifically the practical models on OL, the research explores the OL practices and OLMs in the INGO World Vision International. While according to constructivism, reality is independent of human thought, meaning and knowledge is always a human construction, which is relative to the subjective view of people. Constructivists use qualitative research as methodology including in-depths studies of one case or phenomenon, which is explained from a subjective point of view. In this research, the constructivist line is followed and therefore, a qualitative approach to the case study of World Vision International is chosen. Quantitative research is not in lines with the principles of constructivism since it looks for universal realities and single truths, which are rejected by constructivists. The methodology of this qualitative approach is explained in the following chapter. The methodological tool would fit an analysis for a topic as the current one.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

1. RESEARCH STRATEGY

The research strategy that is used is a case study of the organization World Vision International in the time frame of ten years from 1998 until 2008. The practice of organizational learning in this particular humanitarian action organization is examined. A case-oriented analysis is a study that aims to understand a particular case or several cases by looking closely at the details of each (Babbie, 2007:379). This facilitates that the organizational learning practices of WVI are examined in detail and helps to get an insight of the influence of the organizational learning practices on the strategic planning of the INGO. Together with the research conducted by the two other NOHA Master’s students about the INGOs Save the Children and CARE International, a cross-case analysis can be made afterwards. The analysis of the three organizations extends this research and enables a comparison of the approach on organizational learning in each of them, which takes this research to a higher and wider ranging level.

In line with the theory under which this research is conducted, Social constructivism, the study takes a qualitative approach as research methodology. Constructivism says that norms and social life are constructed by humans and they can be adjusted over time (Jackson 2006: 164). Constructivists typically use qualitative research by conducting in-depths studies to explain issues. In contrast to that, for example positivism looks for a universal truth, and does this by using quantitative research (Jackson 2006). A qualitative study is a non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships (Babbie 2007: 378). In a qualitative study, data collection, analysis and theory are intertwined. The validity of a qualitative study, meaning whether it is measured what was intended to measure, is commonly high. However, the reliability, whether the same data would be collected every time in repeated studies, is generally lower.

2. VARIABLES AND CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP

In the research question, the application of organizational learning of World Vision is the independent variable, while the change in the policy approach is the dependent variable. This means that in the research the causal relationship between the application of organizational learning and policy change in the context of the INGO World Vision is explored, which can be visualized:

Independent Variable  →  Dependent Variable
Application of OL  Causes  Policy Change in WVI
3. SELECTION OF THE INGO

World Vision International was chosen as a case study due to three reasons. First of all, it is one of the major INGOs in the field international humanitarian action, having one of the biggest budget turnovers, which makes it interesting to examine how they perform in organizational learning (Stoddard 2003). Secondly, as said before, the research is conducted in a research project with two other INGOs which have a central role in international humanitarian action, CARE International Save the Children UK. Each of the three organizations represent three different types of traditions from which these humanitarian INGOs have evolved, being Religious, Dunantist and Wilsonian (Stoddard 2003). World Vision International as a Christian organization is a faith-based or religious organization while CARE is Wilsonian and Save the Children is Dunantist. All three types of NGOs are chosen in order to have representatives from all traditions for increasing variety and through this the reliability of the outcomes of the research project. A third reason for researching World Vision International is that the organization agreed to and asked for an in-depth examination of their organizational learning activities.

4. DATA COLLECTION AND SELECTION METHODS

The qualitative data which is used for the research is a combination of primary and secondary data as well as formal sources. In addition to using existing primary and secondary literature, full contacts with the INGO World Vision International have been established with access to documentation as well as to personnel, which is a source of primary data. The different documents received through World Vision International are the documents concerning organizational learning, all reports about evaluative activities as well as policy and strategy documents from the past years since 1998, as well as relevant documents from before. Most documents were provided in an electronic format and either collected by contacting different members of WVI or downloaded from World Vision International’s HEA database. Chosen documents were analyzed and interviews with different staff members of the organization were held. These different kinds of documents are analyzed in this study in order to answer the research question. The analysis of this collected data creates empirical evidence on which the research can draw its conclusions. In the following, the collection and selection methods as well as the content of the different sets of data (documents and interviews) are laid out. The data analysis methods are explained later on.

Data Sources Are:

1. Written documents
   a. Documented evaluative reports of emergency unit
   b. Policy/strategic planning reports of emergency unit
2. Emergency unit organizational timeline 1998-2008 - created with the INGO

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7 Timeline 1 in annex 8
5. DOCUMENT COLLECTION AND SELECTION

In March 2010, there has been a one-week research at the Liaison Office of World Vision International in Geneva/ Switzerland. During this week, many documents concerning the study from WVI have been collected mainly in electronic form from the database, but also in paper copies where no electronic version was available. WVI provided full access to all available documents by giving access to the database. At the Liaison office, next to Kevin Savage, different people were consulted about the importance of documents and the next steps for the research.

5.1. Evaluative Policy and Strategy Documents

The documents concerning and around organizational learning include evaluative policy and strategy documents about accountability, M&E and learning, being mainly documents on H-Learn. They set out the evaluative activity planning, strategy and policies within the HEA sector of WVI.

5.2. Evaluative Activity Documents

The evaluative activity reports contain learning event reports, evaluations, consolidated learning and trend analyses. In total, 36 evaluative activities, being reports from learning events and internal and external evaluations, were found for the years 1998 till 2008. Three consolidated learning reports (containing synthesized lessons learned) and three so-called trend analysis, covering periods of three years, were found. The trend analysis reports have a central role in the analysis of this research. They are used to be able to analyze the link between evaluative activities and the strategic emergency planning as they each summarize the recommendations and lessons learned of three years. As the first trend analysis covers the period from 2001 until 2004, two lessons learned reports from before were included into the study.

5.3. Internal Strategic Organizational Documents

The third set of documents by WVI are emergency strategic planning or policy documents, which include overall policies on emergencies, standards for emergency responses, strategic intents and procedures of the humanitarian line of ministry as well as annual reports. For this study, mainly the so-called ‘standards’ are used because they are the most dynamic policy documents representing the organization’s official standpoint and describe the major changes in the humanitarian response planning. Another cause of the selection of the standards as policy documents is that these documents
were systematic and were able to be found, unlike other documents which were high in number, but scattered and random. Also, other documents were claimed to be less important than the standards.

5.4. Key Internal and External Events

Also documents on key internal events were gathered within the databases of WVI. Another set of documents concerning external key events in the field of humanitarian action, as initiatives within the sector, was used which was selected on basis of relevance and usage for the humanitarian field.

5.5. Existing Literature Review

A detailed literature review was conducted for chapter 2, the theoretical framework for the study, being concerned with organizational learning, accountability and policy-making. Lipshitz multifacet model has a central role in the research. It is used to explain why the evaluative activities have or have not influenced the strategic planning of WVI. Additionally, a background study on humanitarian assistance and WVI was conducted. The literature used included relevant articles, books and documents.

5.6. Semi-Structured Interview Selection and Conduction

The Selection of Key Interviewees

Mainly in March and April 2010, semi-structured interviews were held with a number of interviewees. The selection of interviewees has been done in cooperation with Kevin Savage, the responsible person for organizational learning at the Liaison Office in Geneva, who proposed a number of relevant people. The interviewees were staff of World Vision International, all of them had relevant long-term experience in the HEA, Humanitarian Emergency Affairs sector of WVI. These key interviewees were able to provide relevant information for doing an analysis on the links between evaluative activities and strategic emergency planning. For the interviews, a prepared interview protocol with questions has been used flexibly. In total, six of the interviews appeared to have sufficient and relevant content which can be used for the study. These interviews gave a deeper insight into the organization and the motivations and reasons behind policy-making, strategic planning and how these are influenced by evaluative activities. The interviews provided data from the personal point of view of the interviewees, which is relevant for describing the organizational learning developments within WVI because it can unfold incentives for organizational learning, as well as reasoning of policy makers and a deeper insight about problems faced within organizational learning. The interviews which have been conducted have been recorded on tape. Afterwards they have been transcribed, in order to be able to analyze the interviews. The analysis method which has been used for the transcribed interviews is explained in the next section.
5.7. Data Analysis Methods: Inductive Thematic Coding

According to Baxter and Babbie, data analysis generally ‘brings logical and observational aspects together in the search for patterns what is observed’ (Baxter & Babbie 2004: 9). The data analysis of this qualitative research looks for patterns in the influence of evaluative activities on strategic planning. For the qualitative data processing of the interviews and the standards documents as well as the evaluative documents, I use the methodological approach of thematic encoding with the computer program Atlas.ti for a qualitative data analysis. For this research, the open coding was used, which is the initial classification and labeling of concepts in qualitative data analysis. The codes are decided upon through the researcher’s examination and questioning of data according to specific themes (Babbie 2007:385). The codes that have been chosen for the document analysis can be found in the analysis part in chapter 4 in section 1. These codes have been selected during the examination of evaluative documents (trend analyses) and reflect reoccurring or important lessons learned/recommendations which are analyzed in this study with regard to influence on strategic documents/standards. Codes that were chosen in order to analyze the interviews can be seen in chapter 4 in section 3. The thematic codes that were used for the analysis of the interviews are based on the organizational learning concepts that were elaborated in chapter 2.

5.8. Steps of Data Analysis

As explained in the theory chapter, this research is done in the wake of the theory of constructivism, which methodologically leads to a qualitative data analysis, in-depths study on case to case basis. I analyze whether evaluative activities have influence on the strategic planning of an organization. It is examined what the organization is doing in reality and what individuals and the collective say that it is doing. Through analyzing these two issues, I will have more certain evidence when I get the same outcome for both questions. The following part explains which steps are taken in the process of the qualitative analysis of this research in chapter 5, in order to receive an answer on the research question. It is explained how I analyze the available data in different steps in order to receive a scientific answer to my research question.

Stage 1 – Content Analysis of Evaluative and Strategic Documents

For visualizing the analysis, a timeline of the WVI HEA ministry stating all documents and internal/external events from 1998 until 2008 was developed\(^8\). The documents which were actually used for the analysis are recorded in the second timeline\(^9\). The first stage of analysis is a content analysis of the evaluative documents (trend analyses) and the strategic planning documents (standards). First, the evaluative documents are reviewed and key recommendations (repeated and/or emphasized ones) are selected and used as codes. Secondly, the strategic documents are analyzed and coded regarding the existence or non-existence of the key recommendations from the trend analyses.

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\(^8\) Timeline 1 in annex 8
\(^9\) Timeline 2 in annex 9
Thirdly, any connections between key recommendations and existence of these themes in the strategic reports are highlighted in a new timeline, which is only stating the concerned documents\textsuperscript{10}. No interpretation is done at this stage.

Stage 2 – Content Analysis of other Influence

The external and internal events on the timeline are examined for any possible influences on the existence or lack of existence of the selected key recommendations in the organization’s strategy documents. No interpretation is done at this stage. The goal of the first and second stage is to analyze the data regarding what the organization is doing in reality, whether the key recommendations are really transferred into the standards or not, and how other internal or external events have influenced the strategic documents.

Stage 3 – Thematic Coding of Interviews

In the third stage, codes of key elements to be explored in the interviews are created. The codes are derived from the concepts that were identified in the theoretical part. The codes are derived from Lipshitz’ Multifacet Model of Organizational Learning and the 4Is model and can be seen in chapter 4.3. The next step is to code the interviews according to the selected codes in order to explain why evaluative activities in World Vision International do or do not influence the strategic planning. In the end, the results are compiled in the table in annex 12 according to the selected themes. No interpretation is done at this stage. The goal of the third stage is to get a bigger picture of organizational learning in World Vision International by analyzing how individuals think about it and to explain what might influence the process. At this stage, it can be seen what the organization (or individuals in the organization) think it is doing. This part is explanatory (five facets) and explains which factors had influence on whether the evaluative activities resulted into strategic change (while the first two stages were rather descriptive, analyzing whether there was an influence of trend analyses on the standards).

Stage 4 – Final Analysis of Combined Findings

In stage four of the analysis, both analysis results are examined and interpreted individually. First, the new timeline 3 created in stage one and two, which shows the actual relationships between evaluative activities and strategic planning and internal and external events and strategic planning, is interpreted. Secondly, the thematic coding of the interviews of stage three, which presents the individuals perspective on evaluative practices, organizational learning, and strategic planning within the INGO, is examined.

\textsuperscript{10} Timeline 3 in annex 10
Stage 5 – Discussion

In the last stage of this research analysis I look at both interpretations and analyze what the data says with regards to the sub-research questions. I answer how my outcomes comply with the theory and how they fit to what other literatures or researches say about these issues. In the end, I give recommendations, based on the data findings, as well as additional literatures and personal observations. I also name implications for further research.
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

To recall, the question which is analyzed in this research is whether the evaluative activities, meaning the consolidated reports on lessons learned and recommendation (called trends analyses in WVI) have influenced the policies (standards). This is an analysis of whether a bottom up approach took place from 1998 until 2008. It is not discussed whether the standards in turn had an effect on the implementation of activities, which would constitute a top-down approach. In the following, the different steps of analysis, as elaborated in the methodology chapter, are conducted. While in the first steps, the outputs are only named, but not analyzed, the analysis of the combined findings as well as the discussion takes place towards the end of this chapter. The timeframe which was chosen in this study is from 1998 until 2008 since this period is short enough to be researched within the framework of this thesis, but long enough to discover changes in WVI’s approach since it covers a number of important events as disasters or changes in the international humanitarian sector.

1. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF EVALUATIVE AND STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

As described in the methodology part, the first stage is a content analysis of the trends analyses and the standards. WVI developed different categories of emergency and level of responses which are laid out in the Standards Handbook 2008. The levels of response is divided into five levels, from 0 (no response), via P (response through the partners) to 1 (response by the national office), 2 (response by the region) and 3 (response by the partnership). The categories of emergency reach from I to III, depending on the severity and impact of the emergency. Different criteria developed by WVI determine the category of emergency. The same kind of category of emergency can have different levels of response, depending on the capacities of the involved offices. I am analyzing Category II and Category III standards as these are the ones mostly requiring an international response. As for this study, reports on consolidated learning have been used (see chapter 3 on methodology). While timeline 1 in annex 8 shows all policy documents, evaluative policies, internal and external key events as well as evaluative activities, the evaluative and strategic/policy documents which were used for the research are the following and can be seen on timeline number 2 in annex 9:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Documents</th>
<th>Strategic/ Policy Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Columbia Earthquake 1999 Lessons Learned (Published 2000)</td>
<td>Standards 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Year Trends Analysis 2001-2004</td>
<td>CAT II Standards April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Year Trends Analysis 2004-2007 (Paper 1 and 2)</td>
<td>CAT III Standards April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Year Trends Analysis: Key Lessons and Trends</td>
<td>CAT III Standards October 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The trend analyses summarize the lessons learned of each three years. They are consolidated learning documents. Since the first trends analysis that was available covering emergencies of 2000, I used two evaluative documents from before that, being Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and the Columbia Earthquake of 1999. The evaluative documents were reviewed and key recommendations (repeated and/ or emphasized ones) were selected and coded according to their themes. The following table shows which evaluative codes have been used in the analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes: Recommendation in Trends Analysis</th>
<th>Codewords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Networking and Collaboration between NGOs, Governments and UN | Network  
Collaboration  
Coordination |
| 2. Program development and implementation  
a) Need for vulnerability/ risk assessment  
b) Impact/ qualitative monitoring | Vulnerability  
Risk  
Assessment  
Impact  
Monitoring |
| 3. HR and Staffing  
• Support (physical, emotional)  
• Recruitment second-wave staff takes too long  
• Proper HR policies needed for specific needs (per diem, salaries/overtime etc)  
• HR staff needs to be first line response team members and be on the ground the first few days  
• ToRs for HR (Job descriptions are needed)  
• Additional training/capacity building in HEA for NO staff is needed | Human Resources  
Staff  
Recruitment  
HR Policy  
ToR |
| 4. Communications  
WV Communication teams (National and Regional offices) must move fast to capitalize on world media attention and fundraising | Communication  
Media  
Funding  
Donor |

The strategic documents were analyzed and coded regarding the existence or non-existence of the key recommendations from the evaluative documents. The output of the coding can be seen in annex 11, a table in which the chronologic development of recommendations/ lessons learned (left column) and the development of the according standards (right column) can be found. After the coding has been done and been accordingly filled into the table, I looked at which lessons learned and recommendations might have had an influence on the standards. This was visualized by marking with arrows in the table in annex 11. The generalized output of this description was marked in timeline 3 in annex 10, which shows which evaluative activities have influenced which standards. Generally speaking, the changes in standards have often occurred after the latest trends analysis which was available, which means that there was a connection and influence of the evaluative activities on the standards visible.
2. Analysis of Other Influence

The goal of the first and second stage is to analyze the data regarding what the organization is doing in reality, whether the key recommendations are really transferred into the strategic planning or not, and whether other internal or external events have influenced the standards. The external and internal events on the timeline were examined for any possible influences on the existence or lack of existence of the selected key recommendations in the organization’s strategy documents.

Concerning external events, it is obvious that they had an influence on the organizational learning and accountability mechanisms which were developed within WVI. As many external initiatives promote and ask for accountability and standards, these are taken over by WVI as well. Even though no direct influence on one specific standard can be observed, the environment clearly pushed for improved and extended standards, for professionalism and accountability.

3. Thematic Coding of Interviews

In the third stage, codes of key elements to be explored in the interviews were created, which were derived from the models identified in the theoretical part. The codes were obtained from Lipshitz’ Multifacet Model of Organizational Learning (2002) and the 4Is model by Crossan (1999) are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Code words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lipshitz</td>
<td>Organizational Learning themes for coding based on the Multifacet Model of Organizational Learning (Lipshitz et al 2002) - Why do NGOs learn?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural facet</td>
<td>Organizational Learning Mechanisms (OLMs)</td>
<td>Mechanism for learning, evaluation, implementation, lessons learned, assessment, learning event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological facet</td>
<td>Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>No distinction between personal values and WVI values, identification with goals, commitment to WVI, organizational commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Facet</td>
<td>Commitment to Learning</td>
<td>Training, education, commitment to learning/committed to learning, strategy on learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Facet</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Accountability, responsibility for learning, lessons learned, follow up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual Facet</td>
<td>Proximity to Mission/Environmental Uncertainty</td>
<td>Competition, external influence, environmental uncertainty, reach goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4Is Model (Crossan et al 1999) - How do NGOs learn?

| Levels of | Individual, Group and Organizational level |
Sets of themes form and create the different facets in Lipshitz’ model, but not every ‘theme’ needs to be completely fulfilled for learning to happen. Lipshitz et al (2002) solely stated that the more the facets are fulfilled, the higher the likelihood will be that learning occurs. For this study, choices had to be made, which is why only one theme for every facet has been chosen. The overall picture which we derive can be expected to be an indication for how learning is done and what facilitates learning in WVI. The choices are related to the other concepts and theories as well.

The next step was to code the interviews according to the selected codes in order to explain why evaluative activities in World Vision International do or do not influence the strategic planning. One general code on organizational learning in WVI has been added to the coding. In the end, the results are compiled according to the selected code themes. The output of the coding can be seen in the table in annex 12. The goal of the third stage was to receive a broader picture of organizational learning in World Vision International by analyzing how individuals think about it and to explain what might influence the process. At this stage, it could be seen what the organization (or individuals in the organization) think it is doing.

4. FINAL ANALYSIS OF COMBINED FINDINGS

In stage four of the analysis, the results of the output are examined and interpreted individually. First, the new timeline created in stage one and two, which shows the actual relationships between trends analyses and standards as well as internal and external events and standards, is interpreted. Secondly, the thematic coding of the interviews of stage three, which presents the individuals’ perspective on evaluative practices, organizational learning, and strategic planning within the INGO, is examined. Over time, standards were developed according to the three different categories of disasters (and levels of response). This means that there are different standards applicable for each category. As mentioned before, I was looking at category II and III emergencies and their standards.

4.1. Networking and Collaboration

One of the chosen lessons learned from the trends analyses was networking and collaboration, which occurred as recommendation in all trends analyses. As explained, the thematic coding was applied to the different trends analyses and the standards, meaning that all relevant text pieces in the trends analyses and standards from 1998 until 2008 were coded in order to be able to compare the
development of trends and standards over time. These coded parts of the trends analyses and standards can be found in the output of the analysis in annex 11. It got visible that the standards in 1997 did not state networking and collaboration in the standards; they were only named very shortly, general and vague in a section describing monitoring. The lessons learned of 1998 and 1999 mentioned that cooperative efforts and enhanced coordination is needed. In reply to this recommendation, the standards of 2000 are more specific than the 1997 standards, but very much focused on networking with donors and partners instead of truly cooperating. In the standards 2002 was added that the networking with donors should be ongoing all the time, not only during emergencies. In 2002, coordination was mentioned for the first time. At this stage, the standards are also focused on WVI giving input to the humanitarian sector by doing coordination and not only keeping relationships through networking for the own good. It is stated that WVI should ‘participate regularly on NGO/donor heads of the agency coordinating committee’. Active networking with local and regional donors also is still mentioned. In the most recent standards of 2008, it is mentioned that networking and information sharing should take place with local and regional donor representatives, UN, other INGOs and so on. At this point it can be seen that the lessons learned from the trends analyses are taken over, as this standard is exactly formulated as it was in the trends analysis. In the standards 2008, it is also mentioned that WVI should coordinate with local national emergency networks (e.g. OCHA, National Emergency Committee) and share information with them. Here, collaboration becomes clearly visible in the standards. WVI should also support national offices (NO) in communications, advocacy and networking. Generally, the development of the standard relating to networking and collaboration shows that WVI developed its standards clearly. The standard changed from WVI being a rather self-focused organization to being a team player who is collaborating with all different actors towards coordination and collaboration. Even if this was a recommendation in all trend analyses, it can be hoped that at some point in future, WVI will perform better in this issue of networking and collaboration so that the recommendation does not have to repeat over and over. The standards changed over time, which hopefully will trickle back to practice at some point.

4.2. Communications

The next thematic code that was analyzed is communications. In the 1997 standards, it was only broadly mentioned that after a disaster, there should be daily communications going on until the disaster subsides. In the following evaluative activities of 1998, international communications were included into the recommendations while the 1999 recommendations asked for a communications system in place, for fundraising strategies as well as for clearly defined communication channels and roles. The standards of 2000 were much more detailed than the standards of 1997 and they included most of the recommendations that were given in 1998 and 1999. They described the communications structure at the time of an emergency within WVI and they take into account the international media. Response stage standard 1 takes media releases into account within the first 24 hours. Response stage standard 3 demands a 7-day operational plan within 48 hours which includes alerting the media.
Within the first 72 hours, private and public funding projections should be known as well. The terms of reference for the initial preparedness plan and the full preparedness plan include an in-depth communications coverage. The category III standards of April 2002 suggest preparedness in international communications at preparedness stage, relations with the local media at boiling stage and communications at response stage; however relations with international media are not mentioned in these standards anymore. The category III standards of October 2002 are very similar to the ones of category III of April 2002 and do not show any changes in communications with the international media. The trends analysis 2001-2004 mentions for the first time that world media attention and fund raising must be addressed quickly. In addition, it is named that it is unclear who should receive what in terms of communication and what the expectations of the partnership from the national office are. The category III standards of 2005 seem to respond on these clear messages from the trends-analysis. While the standards named in the years before are still included in the 2005 standards, the description of responsibilities in communications is much more detailed than it was in the standards before. Boiling stage standard 13 says that the regional communications are supposed to be in consultation with international communications. It is much more described who has what tasks and what is expected from the national offices (response stage standard 1). A new feature is that a ‘staging room’ is supposed to be set up within 48 hours (response standard 5), from which out experienced staff can monitor the emergency developments. Still within 72 hours, funding projections have to be organized. In summary, even though more standards address communications and the inclusion of communications in the relief preparedness plan, the standards of 2005 do not address international media coverage yet, while it is stronger on the task and duty description of individuals and national offices. The trends analysis 2004-2007 repeats the recommendation that communication teams must move fast to capitalize world media attention and fund raising, as is the 9-year analysis of trends of 2009. The standards handbook 2008 shows a clear improvement in this topic of communication. The six essential steps for the first 24 hours of an effective emergency response within WVI includes the points of communications (even though being more informal) and funding through activating contact with donors. At the preparedness stage, a number of different communications-instruments for media have to be in place. Level 3 response stage standard 5 says that emergency communications engage with local, regional and international media, which is a big change as it was not as clearly stated before. Within a week’s time, communications materials have to be developed for media and marketing (level 3 response stage standard 27).

Generally, for the topic of communications with international media and funding, WVI shows the biggest change in the standards handbook 2008, which completely fulfills the recommendation and lessons learned set out for many years by the evaluative activities. Before, these changes have been more vague and smaller. The standards handbook 2008 distinguishes the communications-situation for all different levels of response and categories of disasters, taking into account the evaluative activities which have been conducted the years before. It is not possible to determine exactly which evaluative
activities have influenced which standards as the recommendations were repeated several times in the last 10 years and the standards developed slowly. It appears that recommendations have raised awareness over the years until 2008, when the new standards handbook finally took over the recommendation.

4.3. Program Development and Implementation

For program development and implementation, two sub-codes were derived from the evaluative activities, being a) ‘the need for a full vulnerability/risk assessment and baseline to be done before a response starts’ and b) ‘impact/qualitative monitoring is lacking’. This theme shows a special development over time. In the 1997 manual, assessments and monitoring have been part of the standards. While the 1997 manual is rather weak in terms of some of the other standards, it shows some basic standards in the field of assessments and monitoring. The standards of 1997 say that an assessment team is dispatched to the disaster site within 24 hours and only after the return from the assessment site, the relief proposal is designed. Effective monitoring must be in place and through continuous record keeping and reporting, monitoring is done. While in the 1998 lessons learned document on Hurricane Mitch, neither assessments nor monitoring have been named, the 1999 lessons learned on the Columbia Earthquake earmarks that constant monitoring has to be done by WVI. It also stated that quality assessments require coordination and that early and rapid field assessments with a participatory approach are important for project design, which is flexible for adaptation after new assessments. Surprisingly, in the standards of 2000, neither assessments nor monitoring have been mentioned, meaning that standards that have been included in 1997 were taken out of the programming. The category II standards of April 2002 state that assessments are done at the response stage while goods and services are already deployed and distribution is under way. During the boiling stage, the developments have to be monitored. In the standards of category III of April 2002, neither assessments nor monitoring has been mentioned, only the capacity assessment and advocacy assessment, which are related to internal organizational assessments and not to assessments of the emergency situation itself. In the category III standards of October 2002, it is mentioned who should monitor the standards of the operational response (response standard 15), which however does not relate to impact of the action. The trends analysis 2001-2004 for the first time states that there is a need for a full vulnerability/risk assessment before a response starts, which has to be followed up by a comprehensive monitoring system. The category III standards of 2005 state that there should be a senior response coordinator present who has the correct assessment, design and response skills. In addition, a staging room has to follow emergency development, which however does not relate to impact monitoring. The trends analysis of 2004-2007 is more defined on this topic and states that next to a full vulnerability/risk assessment and baseline needs to be done before the start of the response and that impact/qualitative monitoring is necessary. It also states that national offices need training in conducting assessments. The 9-year trends analysis states the same on the need for vulnerability/risk assessments before the response stars and impact monitoring as the trends analysis the year before. As
the standards handbook 2008 was still in work in 2009 and early 2010, the lessons learned from the trends analysis 2000-2009 might still have influenced the standards from 2008. In fact, the standards of 2008 show a real improvement in comparison to the ones of the years before. In the six steps essential for an emergency response, conducting an initial assessment is named as third step after leadership and personnel. This requires a rapid assessment and document findings, with an initial rapid assessment within the first 24 hours and a detailed sectoral assessment within 72 hours. Also, the 2008 standards have included assessment tools from the ongoing activities and preparedness stages on. The Pre-Crisis Review Team is supposed to engage in a monitoring system for emerging crisis. Concerning port-response monitoring, the Executive Support Team (EST) is supposed to monitor at both field and head office levels, establishment and implementation of activities, and assisting in aligning these with the response strategy. It is clearly visible that the standards have changed in the area of assessments before a response is done. A monitoring on quality and impact of the action is not as developed yet and should still receive more priority in future. However, as the need for assessments already came up in 1999 evaluative activities, and the monitoring only in the trends analysis of 2001-2004, it is understandable that the assessment standards are more developed than the monitoring ones. There is a realistic possibility that impact monitoring will have more weight in the following standards.

It gets clear that evaluative lessons and recommendations have to be mentioned for long enough to get translated into more radical standards. Often, the changes in standards are not drastic, but rather adaptive and it is not exactly clear, which evaluative activity finally caused a change of a standard. It looks like the organization ‘gets used’ to the recommendation and there is in fact a trend towards realizing that the recommendation should be translated into standards. This happens through a mix of being on the agenda for a long time and through other influences that are not necessarily caused by the evaluative activities. This shows that not necessarily OLMs do cause a change in standards, but rather a slow trend which develops towards the change. Generally said, in the point of program development and implementation, no big changes have occurred in the standards until 2008. The recommendations from the evaluations were repeated throughout all the years, however, only the standards of 2008 showed a real improvement in picking up the lessons learned and recommendations.

4.4. Human Resources and Staffing

Human resources and staffing was another significant recommendation throughout the analyzed trends analyses. Starting with the 1997 manual, there was a whole section on staffing (section 2.4). It is stated that trained and experienced professionals should be hired for relief response and that staff should continuously be trained. The lessons learned 1998 suggest support measures and compensation of staff to insure a positive morale. The lessons learned of 1999 give the recommendation that a clear definition and responsibilities assigned to national office personnel is necessary, before and during the emergency. Also, training of staff is essential. The standards of 2000 say that staff roles need to be defined, including ToRs, taking into account the lessons learned of 1999. The standards of April 2002
for category II and category III do not state a need for defined responsibilities; instead only for an HR plan and recruitment necessities and that the response staff needs to be in place within 72 hours or about reacting to the capacity assessment. The category II standards of April 2002 include stress management and trauma counseling, which was addressed in the 1998 recommendations. The category III standards of October 2002 additionally clearly state that all staff roles need to be defined (boiling stage standard 6) and that a staging room has to be staffed with experienced and knowledgeable staff (response stage standard 2). The trends analysis of 2001-2004 showed that the recruitment of second wave staff takes too long, and that the high turnover rate is negative. Furthermore, clear job descriptions are needed for every position in the response, standard job descriptions clearly helped. Also, capacity building of staff needs to be done before and emergency instead of during an emergency. The category III standards of 2005 include that occupational stress management issues are supposed to be defined. It reinforces that staff roles are defined including job descriptions and requisitions. The Full Relief and Preparedness Plan should include security guidelines for staff including critical incident stress response. These standards include more than before the well-being of relief staff. The trends analysis of 2004-2007 is more detailed on recommendations for staff. It mentions that staff requires spiritual, emotional and physical support during a relief response. Furthermore, HR policies should meet the specific needs of staff. The recruitment of full time second wave staff takes too long and HR staff needs to be seen as first line response team members. It is still written that clear job descriptions are needed. The 9-year trends analysis names the same recommendations in addition to a need for capacity building in HEA for national office staff. The standards handbook 2008 is very detailed on the description of human resources and staff. The standards in 2008 try to bring clarity into the confusion of responsibilities during a response in times of declaring the category of emergency and the type of response. Within 72 hours, a response staffing plan is to be developed by the regional office. The ongoing activities ask for continuous training, as it was recommended before in the evaluative activities. A security planning must be existent as well. Job description must be prepared in the preparedness stage and reviewed at the response stage. A very important improvement, asked for in the evaluative activities, is the staff care plan that has to be developed in the preparedness phase (standard 16). This plan includes spiritual well-being and psychosocial care. The response stage standards also include measures around the staff’s well-being (standard 2). A designated senior executive is supposed to visit the emergency site within a week and give support to the staff. Within the six steps within the first 24 hours, the first step is leadership, in which an interim response leader is to be appointed and the safety of the WVI staff should be secured. The second of the six steps is the personnel, including activation of a response team and definition of roles. Additionally, in the standards 2008, the terms of references are defined for different roles and jobs, including a description of who needs to care for staff. This recommendation showed a clear improvement in the 2008 standards as well and reinforces what was concluded before. In summary,
this theme improved continuously over the years. Mostly, recommendations from the evaluative activities were taken up in the next issued standards.

Taking into account this analysis of the four themes and the timeline 3 in annex 10, which shows the connections and influence of the trends analyses on the standards, it can be concluded that on the one hand, the trends analyses to a certain extent had an effect on the standards document that was issued next. On the other hand it got also clear that some recommendations have been stated in the trends analyses for years and only were included in the standards after a long time. This shows that sometimes, recommendations need to raise awareness before actually a change will happen and before those responsible for policy-making translate the recommendations into standards. Finally, it is obvious that the standards documents improved enormously between 1998 and 2008. The standard handbook of 2008 is very comprehensive including new standards that have been earmarked as recommendations since the 1997. As the standards handbook is very complete concerning the analyzed coded themes, one can hope that the standards will be realized soon and do not have to be stated in form of a recommendation in the following evaluative activity documents.

4.5. Analysis of Interviews

After the interviews have been coded according to the themes that have been derived from the concepts on organizational learning, the coded text parts can be analyzed. This part of the analysis allows for a conclusion about how learning in WVI is done and what facilitates and influences it. The table in annex 12 shows the coded quotes sorted according to the themes.

Concerning the theme of depth of learning, meaning single-loop (low level/ non cognitive) or double-loop (high level/ cognitive) (Ebrahim 2003, Argyris and Schön 1978, Fiol and Lyles 1985), the analysis of the interviews shows that both, single- and double loop learning have been referred to by the interviewees. Single-loop learning is facilitated in WVI, for example through the learning events (LEs) that take place regularly. Quote 5 states that for those people who participate in the learning events, it is definitely a learning activity since the staff is carrying the knowledge that is gained at the LEs into the next response, referring to a change in practices and improvement in performance. Little changes can be learned directly at the LEs while bigger changes need some time (611). The lessons that are discussed at the LEs could be disseminated organization wide at program level, which however only happens under certain circumstances when the leadership is active to do so (7). Quote 7 states that that if evaluations are done properly, the community and the national office will take over the recommendations. However, in order to have systems changed, leadership has to initiate or facilitate the change, which proved to be difficult as the high-level leadership is ‘far from practice’, an unfortunate fact, as ‘system changes are needed probably more than anything else’ (7). Bigger system

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11 (6) refers to annex 12 quote 6, this quoting system is used in the following
changes, which can fall under the category of double-loop learning, have been observed through experiencing radical and big lessons. Quote 4 gives the example that after the tsunami happened, a clear change in systems and structures happened because major lessons were learned. The question remains whether these changes in systems have been a real change in value or ‘governing variable’, as it is the case in double-loop learning, or whether it was only a change in the practice and strategy at a higher level. However, in order to reach double-loop learning, the leadership of WVI needs to get involved, be committed and be as close as possible to practice as possible in order to initiate big cognitive double-loop changes on the basis of recommendations. In quote 53, it is mentioned that very targeted recommendations based on clear and simple facts (single-loop) are easier to change and realize by the senior leadership than the bigger structural ones (double-loop). In addition, even though the leadership would be motivated to take up recommendations and initiate change, a mechanism for communicating these recommendations systematically is lacking (53). This analysis shows that WVI learns mostly at the depths of single-loop learning via a change in practices through adjustments and in many cases lacks the transfer of learned lessons to the higher management level, which is needed to cause organizational learning and change in governing values (double-loop learning).

The different levels of learning have been introduced in the 4Is model by Lipshitz (2002). The quote 8, 14 and 15 state that learning in WVI is individualized as experiences are not very well documented (10). However, it is also argued that mistakes are often not repeated by people who have not personally gone through the response. This enables the assumption that the information that individuals intuitively have is made explicit and via interpretation with others transferred towards the group level learning. This is confirmed by quote 16 with the example that individuals meet and talk at the LEs. However, even though LEs are indeed good for individual, and probably group learning, they clearly lack maximizing effectiveness at the organizational level (17). In order to achieve organizational learning, WVI has developed several OLMs and tools to facilitate learning. However, these tools are not used properly and therefore they are probably not the right means for facilitating learning. Quote 11 affirms that staff would not go back and read information transferred by others, but rather learn it on his own, as reading long reports it is too complicated and too time-consuming. This is also a reason for why it is also recommended by the interviewees that the same people should work in new responses as they have learned individually from their former experiences (quote 12, 13 and 15). The analysis of the levels of learning shows that learning often takes place at the individual level, and sometimes at the group level while learning at the organizational level is more complicated and does often not take place as intense as it should.

The analysis turns now towards Lipshitz’ multifaceted model of organizational learning (Lipshitz et al 2002). Of each of the five facets,12 one facilitator of learning was chosen as a code. Concerning the contextual facet, two topics have been shortly analyzed. The proximity to mission is rather fulfilled as the work of WVI gets more and more professional in the areas of the classic mandate

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of WVI (quote 18, 21, 20). The proximity to the mission is getting more intense as people are more motivated when WVI is actually reaching what it strives to reach. In quote 53, the interviewee states that the goal of WVI is to work for the people they serve and does the very best for the mission it has. Quote 19 refers to the environmental uncertainty, which is also a part of the contextual facet. It is made clear that WVI was pushed a lot by external factors regarding standards, principles (neutrality) and improvement in effectiveness, which is environmental influence of a positive use. Deriving from these points, it can be concluded that the contextual facet is broadly fulfilled.

For the cultural facet, the accountability within WVI is analyzed. From the interviews it gets clear that accountability came more and more to the foreground in the last decade (22, 23, 27 and 28). A special tool for accountability, LEAP, has been developed and WVI was pushed and supported in this field by the different humanitarian accountability standards, as for example the Sphere Project and the Red Cross Code of Conduct (23). Evaluative activities in WVI are done for the reason of assessing and proving accountability towards donors (24, 25). However, these evaluations are often not used afterwards, neither by the involved people nor by others in the organization. Quote 26 states that accountability and learning are both important for WVI, however it is questioned whether both can be achieved. WVI’s goal is to work for the people they serve (the beneficiaries) and does the very best for the mission it has (53), which is part of humanitarian accountability. On a small scale regular basis, WVI is involved in accountability, as for example that tools are translated into local languages for training (64). As WVI constantly strives to be accountable towards staff, donors and beneficiaries, this part of the cultural facet is broadly fulfilled as well, even though the distinction between OL and accountability and the use of evaluations in order to become more accountable could be improved.

Concerning the psychological facet, especially the organizational commitment, the interviews showed that WVI is working on creating organizational commitment and integration of staff. The staff members trust each other and teambuilding exercises are conducted regularly (38). Especially the staff of the Global Rapid Response Team (GRRT) is supported well and gains psychological strengths through organizational commitment of its members (quote 39). The GRRT is taken as example for whole WVI in order to further improve organizational commitment of its members. An interviewee speaks about the fact that an evaluation has been traumatic for the organization as it had shown negative results of the work that has been done (quote 40). If actions like this do demoralize the work of an organization, it can be assumed that organizational commitment is rather high and people do not differentiate between their own and the organization’s interest.

In the policy facet, it is looked at commitment to learning. The interviews showed that the commitment to learning in WVI developed enormously over the last decade. The organization learned from a learned lesson that changed the work in a national office in a positive way (29). However, the commitment to learning decreased after a negative outcome of an evaluation, which caused that evaluations with too negative and drastic outcomes were avoided (40), which in fact is negative for the commitment to learning and means that it is avoided to discover the truth about the performance as
there is the fear of failure. Instead, support by the organization would be needed in order to facilitate evaluative activities and learning (32). On the other hand, the interviewees say that they see learning being applied constantly (31). The organization itself is theoretically committed to learning (33, 34), but it needs backbone to be consistent and even face failure and rather see failure as an opportunity instead of a disappointment. An interviewee says that the organizational culture for learning can sometimes be vague as people are normally first hesitant but are on a good way towards creating a real organizational culture for learning (36). This has been seen at the arising community practice which shows that staff is willing to participate in learning once they experienced it and know what it constitutes (36). It is however the case that the learning only proceeds slowly and the senior leadership is rather hesitant to be involved in learning too much, which some staff members do not understand or value (35). It is stated that for the senior management, evaluation and learning are no priorities so that evaluative activities are driven by external conditions since the demand from within WVI is not high enough (33). Other interviewees say that the leadership would probably be more motivated to take up recommendations and initiate change if a mechanism for systematically communicating these recommendations was present (53). Some individuals are very committed to learning and tried to introduce mechanisms for it, as for example an evaluation policy. However, until now, evaluative activities have been used for accountability purposes rather than actually using the outcomes for learning, which leads to the fact that mistakes and patterns are often repeated in different responses. The commitment to learning is motivated by the very mission of WVI, which is to serve the beneficiaries and do the best to be as efficient and effective as possible (53). Generally speaking, the commitment to learning in WVI depends from person to person. An increased commitment can be seen at hand of the developments that tried to facilitate learning in the past years. However, it is not possible to achieve learning when only single persons are committed. Full learning would have be broadly supported by all staff members of WVI and should be facilitated by a motivated the senior management team, whose commitment is by now questionable (probably not because it neglects learning on purpose but because the communication mechanisms are not sufficiently in place).

As the interviews were conducted with a view to understanding and analyzing the way that WVI is learning, a lot of information concerning the structural facet, being organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs), was obtained. Coming to the history of OLMs within WVI, from 2002 onwards, a working group was set together which hold loose ‘lessons learned events (LLE)’ and consolidated best practices (49). From the different LLE reports and the few evaluations that have been conducted, a trend analysis was be created, which was rather difficult as the outputs from different evaluative activities were not comparable (49). As a result of this analysis, the humanitarian learning unit, including H-Learn, was established in 2004 (49). From this point on, the methodology around evaluative activities improved, learning was more and more institutionalized and a database for knowledge management was set up (49). The database is called worldvisioncentral and is supposed to contain all internal knowledge and information (50, 51). Next to worldvisioncentral database, also the
Relief Forum database exists (56), which shows that data is still spread over different knowledge management systems. It is agreed that it is important to understand the difference between information and knowledge management (53) as having a database storing information not the same as managing and using the knowledge. Still, there is no systematic way for capturing all different evaluations yet, as WVI is a ‘complicated partnership’ (60). Especially when support- or funding offices conduct evaluations, these are normally captured at one place (60, 62). Some documents are in the database while some have not even been recorded (60). The ‘lessons learned workshops’ were recalled to ‘learning events’ in order to show that at these workshops, the learning is not finalized, but still in progress requiring follow up action (49). Until 2007, the learning unit improved and WVI moved more towards its goal to become a ‘learning organization’ (49). Since knowledge management in the HEA ministry was successful, it was transferred to a level covering whole WVI, including a much bigger scope covering research, evaluations etc (49).

The official learning mechanisms which WVI uses are learning events (LEs) or, very seldom, evaluations. Evaluations never have been a common practice in WVI and they have mostly only been done on request of donors (51). Round tables, in which learning events are reflected by the senior management, initiate discussions on learning as well, and are an unofficial mechanism (55). The outcomes of these can be found in meeting minutes and if a ‘very important issue’ is brought up, ‘some member’ would take action upon it. The interviewees generally agree that recommendations and lessons learned were not very well documented, even though a number of different mechanisms and tools have been established (41). One interviewee sees evaluation as a key to learning, and states that evaluation is useless if it is not utilized (52). This leads to the fact that in addition to conducting evaluative activities, it is crucial to move further with the utilization of learning through effective mechanisms. The interviewees also believe that recommendations and learning do sometimes go from the individual to the organizational level, even though on a small scale (41, 42), depending highly on the skills and motivation of the individual person experiencing the lesson (43). There are some examples which show that WVI has learned, as the learning events were institutionalization as well. However, at the same time it is said that the feedback into the system early in the process is crucial and needs to be improved (46, 48). One clear failure of the mechanisms is that during a response, nobody has time to read old lessons learned (44, 45). This statement shows that the system of learning is not working as it should be since learning should be an ongoing process and not take place when the lessons actually have to be applied. Generally, there is a clear lack of urgency for conducting evaluative activities and feeding the outcomes back into the system (46). It is stated that until now there has been no incentive or punishment which could enforce learning (47).

Every three years since 2001, trends-analyses have been conducted, which contain consolidated lessons, recommendations and trends from learning event reports and evaluations. One interviewee stated that at one point, when she was responsible for learning in WVI, she brought the recommendations that derived from the trends-analyses up in front of the senior management team
(SMT), of which she was a part as well. This was crucial as the SMT took up some of the recommendations (53). She also established a system called ‘cracking-the-nuts’, in which the five top lessons were taken, analyzed and it was seriously discussed how to improve the situation (53). These measures were driven by a single person who was in a position to take about changes as she was part of the SMT. Some of those learning’s actually were improved enormously as a direct outcome of this mechanism (53). Within the humanitarian group, change came along due to this sort of advocacy mechanism. When the person pushing for the ‘cracking-the-nuts’ left the position, it was not possible to maintain the system. She said that there were ways it could have worked beyond having a strong hold to the SMT, as WVI is not hierarchical and everybody can involve with everybody, but however, the ‘cracking-the-nuts’ system stopped after she left. Another way of learning was to point out institutional issues annually, which was a slower and less cause-and-effect discussion, but was however including engagement and interest by senior leadership. One interviewee says that the senior leadership in fact is interested in producing learning and change, however, the right communication with them has to be assured (53). Quote 54 states that there is no formal process of how to integrate the H-Learn into standards, which is a central point to a failure in achieving organizational learning. One of the interviewees stated that the lack of communication on the evaluative material due to the lack of systems, even within HEA, is the cause for the lack in learning. It is not sure who does what, which causes that mistakes are repeated over and over. Even if different systems have been tried, it is necessary that everybody knows who does what, and that these negotiations don’t stay within a small group (61). Quote 55 agrees that learning events should be followed up by a formal procedure to learn from them as soon as possible. Furthermore, learning should be integrated directly into quality programming and operations (53). In WVI, people write handover notes as part of their performance, so that following people for the position can take over their work (55). However, the interviews also state that WVI is based very much on relationships and that it is questionable how somebody can do a job when they are new and don’t know anyone (56). Another crucial statement is that the knowledge which WVI has gained in the last few years is not reflected in the standards or policy (55).

Through the ECB project (emergency capacity building project), WVI works together with other agencies in doing joint evaluation, joint decisions and the production of a good enough guide, which was a push towards major changes (64). A standards-tool working-group has been proposed which should be set up with people from all regions and meet on a regular basis. Recommendations for improving learning are to use older experienced people as a resource and coach, who but should be available for giving advice (65). In addition, the big reports on recommendations and lessons learned should be integrated into action cards, a 10-page book or check list. These should address all necessary basic issues including issues as communications and security for facilitating an organized, standardized and clear response. The view to the future is that, as there has been lots of development of mechanisms in the last three years, it will develop further (59). For the OLMs of the structural facet, it can be concluded that efforts and improvements for improving OL and OLMs are being made within
WVI. However, in order to use evaluative activities and the system of H-Learn effectively, a mechanism is needed to bring the recommendations into the policy cycle in order to integrate them into policy documents as the standards.

5. DISCUSSION

In the last stage of this research analysis I analyze what the data states with regards to the research question. I answer how my outcomes comply with the theory.

The Sub-Questions

1. How have WVI’s emergency response policy and standards evolved between 1998 and 2008?

The development of the policy sector on emergency relief within WVI can be seen in timeline 1 in the shapes of ‘Emergency Strategic Planning or Policy Document’\(^\text{13}\). WVI’s emergency response policy is a document which is not changed very often. In fact, there has been the Relief Operations Manual in 1997, and the Ministry Policy in Emergency Relief 2002 replacing it. A new policy on relief is being developed in 2010. The more lively documents at a policy level are the sub-ordinate standards. As seen in the timeline, the 1997 Manual included standards, in 2000, standards have been published, as well as in April 2002, where the level response has been categorized (standards were published on the category II and category III). In October 2002, a revised version of the category III has been released. The same applies to the category III standards published in 2005. The latest standards are the standards 2008 handbook, which was still in the phase of finalization in the beginning of 2010. Another form of strategic planning is the ‘preferred futures’ which were created for 1999-2004, the ‘Strategic Directions 2003-2005’ and the Strategic Intents 2005-2010 and Strategic Intent 2010-2015. These describe the strategic lines WVI planned to take. As the standards show the best, which changes occurred on the strategic and policy level, and whether lessons learned have been integrated, these were used and analyzed in this research. Generally said, it is clearly visible that the quality of standards has improved throughout the ten researched years. While the standards have been very general and vague in the beginning, they are much more detailed towards 2008. The fact that WVI introduced different levels of gravity of disasters and different category of response differentiates the measures which have to be taken and help to improve the understanding of the situation for the involved people. The policy documents are developed by a team in WVI that includes the senior management opinion and involves different stakeholders within WVI in the process of policy making. However, one clear and applicable procedure of how policies are made and changed is lacking.

2. How have WVI’s organizational learning mechanisms evolved during 1998 and 2008?

\(^{13}\) Annex 8
The most important organizational learning mechanism that has been developed in WVI has been H-Learn, which has been introduced in 2004 as part of the mechanisms for quality assurance in WVI. H-Learn is supposed to facilitate learning within WVI. Before H-Learn was introduced, no emphasis has been put on learning in WVI. Approaches to learning activities have been on a very ad hoc basis. As of the introduction of H-Learn in the framework of quality assurance, attention has been given to learning and to standardizing learning activities. Evaluative activities which WVI conducted can be seen in the timeline 14. The practices followed by WVI are mostly learning events that take place during or after emergency responses. The learning events were renamed from ‘lessons learned events’ as the former title would imply that lessons have already been learned. In a learning event, involved staff of an emergency response comes together and reflects on the response. The output is an evaluative document stating the lessons learned and recommendations from the learning event. Another form of evaluative activities within WVI is evaluations, which are however not conducted very often for a number of different reasons. First of all, negative output from an evaluation has demotivated the staff in the past. Secondly, evaluations are often only conducted for the reason that donors ask for them. Thirdly, evaluations are expensive and have not brought the favorable output before. WVI has participated in a number of joint evaluations together with other humanitarian NGOs. Every couple of years since 2000, WVI conducted and conducts so-called trends-analyses that cover a period of three years and combine all lessons learned and recommendations from learning events and evaluations. The first one has been from 2000-2004, the second one from 2004-2007 and the most recent one compares the ones from 2000 onwards with the last period 2007-2009. In some years, consolidated learning have been done, which include the evaluative activities for a year. For the analysis in this research, the trends analyses have been used, as they combine the findings of the evaluative activities effectively. For the period before 2000, where the trends analyses have not been done yet, the document on the learning event from hurricane Mitch (1998) and the learning event from the Columbia earthquake (2000) have been used. When looking at the evaluative activities over the years, a clear improvement and standardization is visible. While the document from the Honduras hurricane 1999 exists of only loose statements by involved staff, the Colombia earthquake document concludes on different sectors. The trends analyses also reach from basic listings of lessons learned in the beginning to comparison with former outcomes in 2009.

3. To which extent have the mechanisms of organizational learning practically been applied and effectively influenced the humanitarian response policy and standards between 1998 and 2008?

This sub question refers to the level of influence of the evaluative activities on the standards. Change into the favorable direction was and still is happening within WVI. The question needs to be addressed whether the evaluative activities in fact cause this change. The answer is that the influence

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of the evaluative activities on change in standards is present, smaller direct connections can be seen from one trend analysis to the next issued standard. However, integrating the recommendations fully often takes time. This means that the analysis of the different standards showed that direct changes from one evaluative activity to the next standards did appear, but in a rather restricted way. Full changes often were adapted after several years and probably due to different sources of awareness-making from outside or inside the organization and not directly cause by one evaluative activity. When a recommendation becomes a commonly known problem in an organization, it is likely to be changed at some point, disregarding what the evaluative activities say, even though the evaluative activities can help raising awareness. Still, some standards took over the exact wording from the evaluative activities. Here it can be assumed that the changes in the standards occurred due to the mentioning in the evaluative activities. Over the years, a clear improvement in the quality standards is visible and the standards handbook of 2008 is a very comprehensive document that integrated most recommendations from the former trends analyses.

4. What factors facilitated the (lack of) influence of evaluative post-response practices in WVI’s humanitarian and emergency response strategies between 1998 and 2008?

In order not only to answer whether the evaluative activities have influenced the policies in WVI, but in order to go deeper and explain to a certain extent how this was influenced, the current question was asked. Having analyzed the interviews conducted with WVI staff according to the model by Lipshitz et al (2002), it can be generally said that several factors influence the learning in WVI while others are weaker and explain why the learning from evaluative activities is not as effective as it probably could be. The organizational learning mechanisms (structural facet) are crucial for learning. This is a factor which is difficult in WVI as the system for organizational learning is not thought-through in a straight forward way. Even though the learning mechanism H-Learn exists, there is something lacking in the mechanism. Through H-Learn, learning should be facilitated by gathering information and transferring it through policy changes into organizational learning. The problem is that it is assumed through H-Learn that once the information is gathered, it is automatically transferred into policy changes, which is not the case. For this, a mechanism has to be developed and installed so that the tasks to do integrate recommendations from evaluative activities are given to a staff position. The integration of recommendations should be standardized and formalized. A possibility would be to have someone acquiring and consolidating the crucial lessons learned and recommendations, as it is already done in the 9-year trends analysis in 2009, and then install a formal mechanism that transfers this knowledge to the awareness and tasks of the senior management who decide about policy changes. Concerning the cultural facet, where accountability was analyzed, it is clear that accountability is integrated well into WVI. WVI took over a lot from the sectoral accountability initiatives and focuses on accountability towards beneficiaries and donors. Lipshitz defined accountability as responsibility for learning and implementing lessons learned, while humanitarian
accountability initiatives integrated the factor of taking into account the beneficiaries. WVI feels responsible for this, and works on improving the system. The psychological facet including organizational commitment is fulfilled largely as well. The members generally identify with WVI’s goals and are committed to the organization’s interests. Within the framework of the policy facet it was looked at commitment to learning. As an organization, WVI clearly wants to learn which is visible through learning events and the installation of systems for learning. However, the commitment should be intensified, even if it means that negative outcomes of learning have to be accepted. Commitment to learning should exist apart from only expecting positive messages, and it should be shown in real learning regardless of the outcome, but instead using the outcome to improve. For the contextual facet, environmental uncertainty as well as committed leadership has been looked at throughout the analysis. The environmental uncertainty has a big influence on the policy developments within WVI. Through external developments, as discussions and initiatives, the internal awareness for certain issues changes and adapts. Leadership is a crucial point as the senior management in WVI is responsible for initiating and changing policies. When the person responsible for learning in WVI was at the same time part of the leadership, quite some influence was practiced and recommendations were taken up and followed through by the person on personal initiative. After the person left the position, it appears that the leadership is not highly committed anymore to take up recommendations and integrate them into policies. This may also be due to the lack of a system and not only due to the commitment to learning.

In summary, most sub-themes of the facets are fulfilled in WVI or are being improved. The only facet that still needs clear improvement is the structural facet. While WVI on the one hand works hard on improving its organizational learning mechanisms and has established extensive measures in the past years, this facet still needs a clear formal mechanism that transfers evaluative activities into a change in standards and in the end into effective policy change.

Links with the Theories

The section on the policy cycle in Chapter 2.3 introduced that organisational learning mechanisms are needed to translate evaluation and feedback to the agenda setting. In WVI, this step is basically missing. The senior management holds meetings in which is decided over policies. However, only known subjects or problems will be addressed and be put on the agenda. The consolidation of evaluative activities can be as organized as possible, but as long as those who are responsible for policy-making are not aware of the recommended issues, they will not be integrated into policies.

From the analysis, it got visible that double-loop changes do often not result from single recommendations or lessons learned, but are an outcome of longer-term developments and ideas. It cannot be factually determined which evaluative activities have changed the standards. There are always more reasons and influences for change than a single evaluative activity. However, it became visible that the evaluative activities to a certain degree are reflected in the standards. Even though the organization WVI generally grew much stronger and more professional in conducting and presenting
evaluative activities as well as in the quality and quantity of standards, and even if the evaluative activities can not be the single reason for change, they definitely have a big influence and are part of a bigger process of organizational learning. In WVI, many systems are a place, but a single, simple general standardized mechanism is missing. However, it is clear that organizational learning is happening, probably not as fast and efficient as it could be done, but nevertheless it takes place.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This thesis was looking at the extent to which evaluative activities (‘trends analyses’) have influenced strategic emergency response policy (‘standards’) in the INGO World Vision International and explains the facilitators for this. Within the theoretical framework of constructivism, different concepts about organizational learning have been elaborated. The most important concepts appeared to be different depths (single-loop and double-loop by Ebrahim 2003) and levels of learning (individual, group or organizational level by Crossan et al 1999). The facilitators of change in organizations, developed by Lipshitz et al (2002), were used to find out how learning is done in WVI. Through a qualitative research approach, evaluative documents and policy documents have been analyzed and interviews with WVI staff were examined according to the organizational learning concepts.

In the evaluative activities, many recommendations are repeated over and over again throughout the years, which show that on the ground, those issues have not improved very much. This was however not what was looked at in this research as the question was whether evaluative activities are translated into policies. Recalling the research question which needs to be answered: To which extent were the changes in humanitarian emergency policies between 1998 and 2008 a result of applying post-response evaluative activities in World Vision International and which factors have facilitated or hindered this influence?

This question can be answered with the analysis that was conducted before and through the sub-questions that were elaborated. Through the creation of the mechanism H-Learn and through having institutionalized post-response learning events, it was shown that WVI takes learning seriously. The process of being actively involved in learning is given in WVI, which is a valuable precondition for learning. Still, work needs to be done in this regard as the process is still not formalized, but instead random and too weak to be effective. Since the documentation of learning is poor, much depends on the memory of individuals. During the regular learning events, the individual staff members do learn individually, this learning now needs to be brought up to the group- and organizational level. The influence of evaluative activities and organizational learning mechanisms on the policy change of World Vision International is present to a certain degree. Some of WV’s policy changes were achieved by the means of documented organizational learning (learning events/ consolidated learning); however, these are the result of advocacy by specific individuals and not by certain organizational learning systems or organizational culture in place. The research shows that organizational learning in the past depended on single persons who pushed personally for lessons learned to be taken into consideration at the policy-making level. Organizational learning is therefore to be seen as a coincidence, influenced predominantly by the opinion and status of an individual and not because information it is put into an organizational learning cycle. Until now it is down to individuals/personnel to drive the senior management through kind of advocacy roles in order to create awareness about the learned events. This task should be up to a system in the organization that enables learning
and puts the recommendations into policies and practice. Sometimes in WVI, learning worked because individuals drove it, but for the case when people leave, there needs to be a system. Even though the direct influence of evaluative activities on policy change cannot be proved, WVI is involved in a positive process of learning. Change, improvement, standardization and learning take place, and it is expected to improve in future. It is crucial for WVI that the necessary awareness and attention is already present and is continuously on a way to improve. But it is also important that the whole way of learning is thought-through, that responsibilities are laid out and that a mechanism facilitates the feedback from the ground up to the policy level and back to dissemination on the ground.

This means that organizational learning influences policy-making only in some cases and in such cases the learning process seems to take place only at the decision-making layers. This type of limited organizational learning depends on single powerful initiatives and not integrated with a knowledge management system which feeds the knowledge from bottom to top and vice versa within the organization. Not only is the learning limited but if the individual leaves (as WVI experienced), even the limited organizational learning processes diminishes.

In order to institutionalize learning, a transferable mechanism has to be established through which the information and knowledge derived from evaluative activities is transferred into the organization so that systematic learning can be achieved. The system has to be created in a way that even if the responsible person leaves the position, learning goes on in the same way. This means that learning should not depend on a single person’s efforts, but on a coherent system that transfers the information into knowledge, which in turn should lead to a change in policies/standards and then back into adapted actions on the ground. The policy making at WVI is directed by the senior management. They are supposed to translate knowledge into changes in policy and standards.

Another point of concern is that the database is too complex. WVI has a high number of systems in place and no person has the overview about every mechanism. As example, there are two different databases (worldvisioncentral and the Relief Forum data base), on which different information is saved. There are various toolkits available at different places and nobody in the organization knows in detail what is available and where to find what. The national offices all have their own databases and save their evaluative activities individually, which leads to the fact that much information from the ground never arrives at the higher levels of the organization and therefore can’t be included in learning from the beginning on. The system for quality assurance in WVI has four different pillars with each different set ups, documents and tools, while they should be interlinked and work together since it is not possible to detach evaluation, learning and accountability from each other. Different learning reports and formats have been used and been saved either in country offices or in offices around the world, partly in paper version and partly in electronic version. This means that from these documented learning’s, no organizational learning can happen. However, this information flow and communication process is supposed to be improved recently. At the level of WVI, H-Learn is in place, which should facilitate learning and the storage of knowledge. One can recognize that systems in place are not the
only solution, but rather the documented lessons and evaluations must be synthesized, prioritized, transferred into standards and disseminated again. Concerning WVI’s cycle of learning, it is important to recognize that the whole cycle that is modeled constitutes learning, so the activity which is called ‘learning’ in fact stops the cycle, as nobody knows how to conduct the concrete step of learning. The system or learning culture which has to be introduced has to be a tool which connects the results from H-Learn to the policy-making level. It has to be clarified how policies are made, how the translation of H-Learn to the policy-making works, who is responsible for the realization of H-Learn and how the information is going up to the policy-makers and down again to the field staff. This tool should be integrated into the policy-cycle of the organization at the point of agenda setting. Still, not only systems are the solutions. It is important not only to introduce yet another system, but to increase communications and clarity about tasks and responsibilities. The leadership which is responsible for policy-making needs to be involved and they should actively be committed to have recommendations and lessons learned on their agenda.

Concluding, a clear effort for establishing organizational learning in WVI is visible, this only needs to be adjusted in some parts in order to work properly and lead to effective organizational learning and towards its goal to become a learning organization, which is an organization where people individually and collectively continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together (Senge et al 1990:3).

Recommendations for WVI:
• WVI should rethink its system for learning mechanisms. Firstly, a formal mechanism has to be introduced which concretely facilitates the translation from recommendations into standards. This mechanism could be formally integrated into H-Learn and should involve the senior management, which is central in WVI’s policy-making.
• It is problematic that WVI has too many different systems in place. Nobody in the organization has the overview about the different mechanisms, tools and knowledge management systems that exist in offices all over the partnership. There should be one central generally accessible point for knowledge management.
• It is crucial to have clear terms of references in place including the responsibilities of who does what in the learning cycle in order to facilitate organizational learning.

Recommendations for Future Research
During the research, a couple of issues for further research came up. First of all, in this thesis it was dealt with how recommendations do feed into policies and standards. This is only a first step in the cycle of effective learning. It is crucial to research how policies and standards are disseminated back to the ground so that change will happen not only at the policy-level but as well be converted back to the whole organization in order to achieve true organizational learning. Another topic that
popped up during the research and which is important for organizational learning is staff management. Drop-out of staff means losing organizational knowledge and organizational memory. Therefore, it would be very positive to keep experienced staff in order to increase organizational learning and response. Research could be conducted about how to manage staff in the most effective way in times of emergency as well as in times of preparing for emergencies.
REFERENCE LIST:


--- History. 2007d.


--- LEAP (Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning). 2nd ed. 2007b.

--- Rapid Induction Package. 2007c.


APPENDICES

Annex 1) Stimulus-Response Model of Learning
Annex 2) History of World Vision International
Annex 3) Organigram of World Vision International
Annex 4) The Humanitarian Principles
Annex 6) Model of Quality Assurance in WVI
Annex 7) Overview of Accountability Initiatives
Annex 8) Timeline of WVI
Annex 9) Timeline 2 – The Documents Used for the Analysis
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ANNEX 1) STIMULUS-RESPONSE MODEL OF LEARNING

The process within an organization, so within the basic learning cycle, happens in four basic steps which can be seen in the model (Ebrahim 2003: 110): (1) acquiring information about the organization and its environment; (2) generating knowledge, either by analyzing and interpreting information or by reflecting on action; (3) acting, either by applying knowledge to organizational activity, or by experimenting with new ideas; and (4) encoding knowledge and experience into routines or memories. Knowledge and action can reinforce each other. Knowledge can inform and guide action while knowledge is generated by reflecting on action. In the model, knowledge is constantly modified, based on new information and feedback, and as a result, routines are constantly refined (Ebrahim 2003: 110). In the center of the figure, there are the governing factors which constrain or enable learning. These factors impact every stage of the learning cycle. They are cognitive capacities, relationships of power as well as perceptual frames (Ebrahim 2003: 110). To this basic cycle of learning within organizations, the environment outside the organization can be added, which results into the ‘Stimulus-Response Model of Learning’ (also SR learning model), to be seen in the figure.

ANNEX 2) HISTORY OF WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL

The American evangelist Reverend Bob Pierce founded World Vision in 1950, when he travelled to the war-torn Korea and saw numerous children in desperate need for help (WVI 2007d). In 1953, he established a program of child sponsorship to assist children orphaned by the Korean War. In
the beginning, funds were forwarded to orphanages and institutions which cared for children. World Vision expanded to other Asian countries, to Latin America and Africa (WVI 2007d).

In the 1970s, World Vision became officially an international organization with offices in 40 countries. A development ministry, large-scale relief division and more effective fundraising were developed. In order to address root causes of poverty, the community development model to childcare was established. World Vision, in partnership with communities, developed projects to meet people’s needs while adhering to accountability. Recognizing the international scope of both operations and fundraising, World Vision International was established in 1978 as a partnership of interdependent national offices. Large-scale relief efforts for earthquake victims in Central America, cyclone survivors in India, and refugees in the South China Sea were conducted. World Vision improved its abilities to respond quickly and efficiently to large-scale crises including to famine in the African Sahel, Operation Baby-Lift (at the communist takeover of Cambodia and Vietnam), and Operation Sea sweep (rescuing refugees who fled Vietnam by boat). World Vision responded to the drought and food crises in Ethiopia and eight other African nations in the mid-1980s with the largest relief response in the organization’s history (WVI 2010b). World Vision facilitated flying in a BBC film crew to gain the world’s attention to the famine; the media coverage resulted in an immense flow in funds. In 1985 only the Ethiopia budget increased from US$5 million to more than US$70 million. With the collapse of communism in the 1990s, World Vision began operations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the 1990s, World Vision was responding to needs in Rwanda, China, Bangladesh, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Central America among other countries. In these years, WV began formal relations with the United Nations, as UNICEF and the World Health Organization as well as with other international institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Trade Organization. A liaison office was opened in Geneva to be in contact with the UN institutions. In 2000, an office was opened in New York to share programmatic experience for better policy choices and day-to-day relations with the global institutions. From the 1990s onwards, World Vision increased worldwide public policy networks to advocate against child labour, sexual exploitation of children and child trafficking. Also international debt- and landmine issues were addressed. World Vision worked with a number of global NGO coalitions and platforms, to address child exploitation and became the first NGO member of the World Bank advisory panel on child labour (WVI 2007d).

Since 2000, World Vision has worked on integrating its various actions of relief, development, advocacy, peace-building, humanitarian protection, child protection, and HIV/AIDS (through the 2000 announced Hope Initiative) responses. Humanitarian activities, including disaster mitigation work, are currently done in about 63 countries. World Vision also builds relationships with governments, businesses and other NGOs, and is working on NGO accountability and transparency. World Vision is a signatory to numerous codes of conduct, which set standards of governance, management, and accountability for non-government development organizations, for example the
Sphere Project, People in Aid, ALNAP, the Convention on Rights of the Child, the Geneva Conventions, the Code of Conduct and the Inter Action Field Protocol. It is also on the steering committee of the Geneva-based Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP). WVI also is signatory to the Code of Conduct of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Non-Government Organizations in Disaster Relief, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Sphere Humanitarian Charter for Non-Government Organizations. World Vision is a member of national and international NGO bodies such as the Australian Council for International Development, the Disaster Emergencies Committee (UK), the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (US), InterAction (US), and the Association of German Development Non-Governmental Organizations (VENRO). More than 2 million children benefit directly from World Vision's sponsorship while its relief and development work enhances the lives of nearly 100 million people (WVI 2007d).

ANNEX 3) ORGANIGRAM OF WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL

ANNEX 4) THE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES
The humanitarian principles are seven principles according to which many organizations act. They were established by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Some humanitarian actors criticize some of the principles, but generally they are key concepts within the sector of humanitarian action.
The seven principles are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity as well as universality.

The principle of **humanity** is the guiding principle. It means to alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life, health and to ensure respect for the human being. Humanity promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples (IFRC 2005: 101).

**Impartiality** means that the assistance is dealt out based on needs of the victims, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and is non-discriminative as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions, to relieve the suffering of individuals (IFRC 2005).

**Neutrality** means that no political side is favored in hostilities or and that NGOs do not engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature, which is seen as a precondition for access to all victims of a conflict (IFRC 2005).

The principle of **independence** includes that organizations delivering humanitarian assistance are independent, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, they must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the humanitarian principles (IFRC 2005:101).

Voluntary service means that the relief movement is not prompted in any manner by desire for gain. Unity implies that only one society of an organization (mostly referred to RCRC Societies) can be in any one country, which must be open to all and carry out its humanitarian work in its territory. The last principle, universality, refers to all societies in the RCRC movement having the same status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other worldwide (IFRC 2005:101).

ANNEX 5) WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL: VISION, MISSION AND CORE VALUES

**Vision**
World Vision’s relief, development and justice work is based on a vision of a world committed to the well-being of children. World Vision strives to build thriving communities where peace and justice will prevail and all can enjoy security, opportunity and happiness. On 1 October 2003, we proclaimed this statement of our vision: Our vision for every child, life in all its fullness. Our prayer for every heart, the will to make it so (WVI 2007).

**Mission**
Our Mission Statement and Objectives: World Vision is an international partnership of Christians whose mission is to follow our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ in working with the poor and oppressed to promote human transformation, seek justice, and bear witness to the good news of the Kingdom of God. We pursue this mission through integrated, holistic commitment to:
Transformational Development that is community-based and sustainable, focused especially on the needs of children;

Emergency Relief that assists people afflicted by conflict or natural disasters;

Promotion of Justice that seeks to change unjust structures affecting the poor among whom we work;

Partnerships with Churches to contribute to spiritual and social transformation;

Public Awareness that leads to informed understanding, giving, involvement, and prayer;

Witness to Jesus Christ by life, deed, word, and sign that encourages people to respond to the Gospel (WVI 2007).

WVI’s Core Values
1. We are Christian. In the abundance of God’s love, we find our call to serve others.
2. We are committed to the poor. We are called to relieve their need and suffering, engaging a relationship between the poor and the affluent.
3. We value people. We regard all people as created and loved by God, each with a unique claim to dignity, respect and intrinsic worth.
4. We are stewards. We are faithful to the purpose for which we receive resources and manage them in a manner that brings maximum benefit to the poor.
5. We are partners. As members of the World Vision Partnership, we accept the obligations of joint participation, shared goals, and mutual accountability.
6. We are responsive. We are responsive to life-threatening emergencies as well as to complex socio-economic situations requiring long-term development (WVI 2010a).

ANNEX 6) MODEL OF QUALITY ASSURANCE IN WVI

(WVI 2006)
### Annex 7) Overview of Accountability Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Good Enough Guide (by ECB)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies by ECB (See ECB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The ECB is an inter-agency project of six big humanitarian NGOs. Its most important resource is the Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies: the Good Enough Guide (2007). The ECB wants to improve speed, quality and effectiveness in humanitarian emergencies concerning staff, impact measurement and accountability as well as disaster risk reduction. It does not look at developing standards but rather how to put them into practice. The ECB tools were developed in assistance with HAP, People in Aid and Sphere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synergie Qualité (by Coordination SUD)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Synergie Qualité is a project coordinated by the NGO umbrella group Coordination SUD. Its resource is the Guide Synergie Qualité (2005) which helps NGOs to implement their own quality approach. It includes a multidimensional approach with ethical principles, organizational factors, technical know-how and relationships inside and outside the NGO. The Synergie Qualité incorporates the COMPAS Rose criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>HAP is a membership organization of national and international NGOs and donor agencies. It wants to establish a system of accountability towards the survivors of disasters by a global quality assurance system based upon HAP’s Principles of Accountability. HAP can investigate complaints of non-compliance made against member agencies. It publishes annual Humanitarian Accountability Reports and established the HAP Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management Standard in 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative was launched in June 2003 at an international meeting with representatives of donor governments, UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and other organizations involved in humanitarian action. Government and DG ECHO representatives at the meeting endorsed Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship which set out commonly agreed objectives for, and a definition of, humanitarian action, as well as a set of guiding principles and good practice examples of official donorship (ODI 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The INEE network aims to ensure that safe, relevant and high quality education is available to the whole population during and after emergencies. The INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction are companion standards to and complement the Sphere Project. INEE has standards on four aspects of education and focuses on participation and analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality COMPAS (by Groupe URD)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The COMPAS Rose is a comprehensive framework of 12 quality criteria for use in project management and evaluation, the four main criteria focus on the affected population and include needs, achievement of objectives, risk reduction and positive effects in short- and long-term. The eight additional criteria focus on agency and project structures and processes. The COMPAS Rose focuses on mandate and policy realization through project processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sphere Project</td>
<td>1997/2000</td>
<td>The Sphere project is an open access resource for organizations delivering humanitarian assistance and individuals. It was set up by humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent Societies. The produced resource is the Sphere Handbook, the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (2004), including rights of people affected by emergencies and minimum standards for use in four sectors of humanitarian action as water, sanitation, food, shelter and health. These standards address the technical aspects and core management in all kinds of humanitarian projects, which are taken over by many agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>System-wide network with 61 full member organizations and individuals. Established after the multi-agency evaluation of Rwandan genocide to improve humanitarian performance through a system-wide composition which provides a platform for collective learning, innovation and change, providing an evaluative reports data base. Three key areas: research and development, fora for shared learning and</td>
</tr>
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improvement and providing a knowledge library based on evaluative reports. Longer-term research: Annual Review of Humanitarian Action (RHA) based on evaluation and in order to improve the quality and utilizations of evaluations. Shorter-term research: promote RTL, RTEs and AARs and lessons learned papers on different emergencies

| Groupe URD  | 1997 | See Quality COMPAS |
| People in Aid  | 1995 | Global membership network of more than 140 NGOs Resource: People In Aid Code of Good Practice, which contains principles concerning staff and learning according to which the members can be audited and certified (general idea: people who work for an agency are central to the achievement of an agency’s mission and aims and agencies are accountable towards their staff) |
| Coordination SUD (Solidarité, Urgence, Développement)  |  | See Synergie Qualité |
ANNEX 8) TIMELINE OF WVI

ANNEX 9) TIMELINE 2 – THE DOCUMENTS USED FOR THE ANALYSIS

ANNEX 10) TIMELINE 3 - THE INFLUENCE OF EVALUATIVE ACTIVITIES ON STRATEGIC PLANNING


Legend:
- Emergency/Strategic Planning Policy Document
- Evaluative-Policy/Strategic Document
- Internal/External Aid Events
- Evaluative Activity Report

Clear influence
Vague influence
## Annex 11) Output Analysis

### Networking and Collaboration
- Coordination and collaboration between NGOs, Governments, and UN before and during response is vital to its success.
- It is imperative to have good relationships with major donors at SO and NO levels before and during the response (becoming problematic).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Activity</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Strategic Policy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997 Manual</td>
<td>Section 2.8 – Monitoring An effective monitoring system requires: Close networking with other responding agencies. (Networking and collaboration is not mentioned in the direct response standards)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1998 Lessons Learned Hurricane Mitch Honduras Cat III Emergency
- Develop a cooperative effort with other NGOs, churches and organizations to mobilize response.

#### 1999 Lessons Learned Columbia Earthquake Cat II Emergency
- Interaction with other NGOs and governmental agencies at the National and Regional levels facilitated and enhanced coordination during relief operations.

#### 1998 Lessons Learned Hurricane Mitch Honduras Cat III Emergency
- Develop a cooperative effort with other NGOs, churches and organizations to mobilize response.

#### 1999 Lessons Learned Columbia Earthquake Cat II Emergency
- Interaction with other NGOs and governmental agencies at the National and Regional levels facilitated and enhanced coordination during relief operations.

#### Standards 2000
- Early Preparedness Stage Standard 5: Begin active networking with local and regional donor representatives.
- Early Preparedness Stage: Begin identifying possible staff, possible church partners, and other local stakeholders capable of acting as partners.

#### April 2002 Cat II Standards
- Cat II Early Warning and Preparedness Stage: Begin active networking with local and regional donor representatives.

#### April 2002 Cat III Standards
- Cat III Early Warning and Preparedness Stage: Begin active networking with local and regional donor representatives.

#### October 2002 Cat III
- Basic Expectation: Maintenance of an ongoing relationships and networking with local aid missions and donors is essential.

#### Early Preparedness Standard 6: Active networking with local and regional donor representatives, Participate regularly on NGO/Donor heads of agency coordinating committee.

#### Trends Analysis 2001-2004
- Networking and Collaboration: Coordination with external stakeholders is vital to success.
- Relationships with donors at National Office and Funding Office level must be built well in advance of the emergency.

#### Trends Analysis 2004-2007
- Networking and Collaboration: Coordination and collaboration between NGOs, Governments, and UN before and during response is vital to its success.
- It is imperative to have good relationships with major donors at SO and NO levels before and during the response.

#### 9 Year Analysis- Key Lessons and Trends 2000-2009
- Lesson 1 and 34: Networking and Collaboration: Coordination and collaboration between NGOs, Governments, and UN before and during response is vital to its success.
- It is imperative to have good relationships with major donors at SO and NO levels before and during the response (becoming problematic).

#### Standards Handbook 2008
- Level 3 Response Standards Ongoing activities Standard 9: Active and regular networking with churches, local and regional governments, donors, UN and other NGO representatives is ongoing (participate regularly in NGO/ donor coordination committees, share preparedness plans with stakeholders and identify issues of concern for advocacy with relevant authorities and other NGOs).
- Level 3 Preparedness stage Standard 17: NEW: Step up networking & information sharing with local and regional donor representatives, UN, other INGOs, etc. (participate regularly in NGO/ donor coordination committees, share and discuss preparedness plans with donors and other stakeholders, share situation updates with SOs, donors, governments and other NGOs).
- Level 2 Response Standards Ongoing Activities Standard 9: Active and regular networking with local and regional governments, donors, UN and other NGO representatives is ongoing
- Level 2 Preparedness Stage Standard 19: Step up networking & information sharing with local and regional donor representatives, UN, other INGOs, etc.
sharing with local and regional donor representatives, UN, INGOs, etc.

Essential Six Steps for WV National Office Leadership during the first 24 hours 1. Leadership: Coordinate with local national emergency networks (e.g. OCHA, National Emergency Committee) & share information

Pre-Crisis Review Team ToRs- Supports NO leadership in development and implementation of communications, advocacy and networking

Executive Support Team- ToRs: Supports relief program and NO leadership to develop and implement strategies for communications, advocacy and networking

Executive Support Team- ToRs: Networking & agency representation

Communications

WV communication teams (National & Regional Offices) must move fast to capitalize on world media attention and fund raising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Activity</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Strategic Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997 Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td>Section 2.12 – Timeline for Key Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>When working at a world class disaster, daily communications on the situation and WV operations should be distributed to the WV Partnership until the disaster subsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 Lessons Learned Hurricane Mitch Honduras Cat III Emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Boiling Stage Standard 10: Communications staff in position. World Vision signage and media instruments in place.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SO indicate communications staff available for immediate field placement along with available technology and equipment.</td>
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<td>Responsible; Regional Communications in consultation with International communications.</td>
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<td>Resources: VP Communications, SO/Regional Secondments, ERDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 Lessons Learned Columbia Earthquake Cat II Emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Response Stage Standard 1 (within 24 hours): Daily operational briefings, communications reports emailed from region within 24 hours, and continuously for 2 weeks or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SOs monitor communications reports for possible media releases, advocacy and operational issues.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Responsible; National &amp; Regional Communications Staff, RRT Communications Staff, SOs</td>
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<td>Resources: International Communications, RRT Communications Staff, SOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Response Stage Standard 2 (within 48 hours to 72 hours); Rapid Response Team and Communications on site within 24 to 48 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standards 2000

(items apply to rapid onset emergency)

Early Warning Preparedness Stage Standard 3: Initiate continuing communication with support offices, internal communications and Advocacy
- Develop ongoing communications materials on the situation. Request assistance from SO’s International Communications and Advocacy as required.
- Responsible: National Director in consultation with RVP, Regional Relief Manager for multi-country CATEGORY III in conjunction with National Directors
- Resources: Support Offices, International Communications, Advocacy

Boiling Stage Standard 10: Communications staff in position. World Vision signage and media instruments in place.
- SO indicate communications staff available for immediate field placement along with available technology and equipment.
- Responsible; Regional Communications in consultation with International communications.
- Resources: VP Communications, SO/Regional Secondments, ERDM

Response Stage Standard 1 (within 24 hours): Daily operational briefings, communications reports emailed from region within 24 hours, and continuously for 2 weeks or more
- SOs monitor communications reports for possible media releases, advocacy and operational issues.
- Responsible; National & Regional Communications Staff, RRT Communications Staff, SOs
- Resources: International Communications, RRT Communications Staff, SOs

Response Stage Standard 2 (within 48 hours to 72 hours): Rapid Response Team and Communications on site within 24 to 48 hours
Response Stage Standard 3 (within 48 hours): 7 day Operational Plan in place and posted on CATEGORY III Response web site within 48 hours. Plans must reflect the following standards: Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct - Humanitarian Charter & Sphere Standards - People in Aid Code
- SOs indicate the level of their engagement for this particular crisis to the SRA
- SOs use the 7-Day Operational Plan to update potential donors, activate marketing plan, and alert media.
- Responsible: Regional Relief Manager, SOs
- Resources: Rapid Response Team (RRT), NO/SO/RO/PO rosters

Response Stage Standard 8 (within 72 hours): Conference call with senior partnership leadership within 72 hours.
- The RVP will convene a teleconference with the listed parties to inform them on the current situation including: security, proposed planning of WV engagement scenarios, discuss initial communications and marking needs, HRT needs and other urgent immediate needs or issues needing attention. Identify selected WV executive who will make a visit to the emergency site in the first week.

Response Stage Standard 8 (within 72 hours): Private and public funding projections, including dollar handles, within 72 hours.
- SO indicate initial private and public funding availability projects
- Responsibility: National, Regional & Partnership Communications Staff, National & Regional Directors, VPs & Senior Leadership
- Resources: SO Marketing commitment projections

Terms of Reference for Initial Preparedness Plan and Full Preparedness Plan
Communications plan, In-depth communications coverage (develop with VP Communications), Hosting journalists

April 2002 Cat II Standards

Medium Scale Category II Relief Preparedness and Response Standards
Preparedness Stage: Initiate continuing communication with support offices, international communications and Advocacy

Boiling Stage: Regional Communications staff including NO, local media point person on alert / on call for immediate deployment

Response Stage 24 hours: Daily operational briefings, communications reports emailed from region within 24 hours, and continuously each day for 2 weeks or more

Response Stage: Private and public funding projections, including dollar handles, within 1st week

April 2002 Cat III Standards

Large Scale Category III Relief Preparedness and Response Standards
Preparedness Stage: Initiate continuing communication with support offices, international communications and Advocacy

Boiling Stage: Communications staff in position including NO to point person to relate to local media. World Vision signage and media instruments in place.

Response Stage: Daily operational briefings, communications reports emailed from region within 24-hours, and continuously for 2 weeks or more

Large Scale Category III Relief Preparedness and Response Standards
Response Stage: Global Rapid Response Team and Communications on site within 24 to 48 hours

October 2002 Cat III

Large Scale Category III Relief Preparedness and Response Standards
Early Warning Preparedness Stage Standard 4: Communications with SOs, ICM
- Ensure direct contact between NO and SOs/ICM
- ND to monitor; Sitreps produced by NO Communications Department, NO point person for local media networking and liaison
- Resources: Support Offices, International Communications

Large Scale Category III Relief Preparedness and Response Standards
Early Warning Preparedness Stage Standard 6: Active networking with local and regional donor representatives.
- Participate regularly on NGO/Donor heads of agency coordinating committee.
- NO represented at sector meetings, NO represented at government meetings
- Field and Regional Offices, Local and regional aid agencies, GRRRT & SRCs

Large Scale Category III Relief Preparedness and Response Standards
Boiling Stage Standard 9: Communications staff in position including NO point person to relate to local media.
- RRT communications staff in place, Appoint NO local media person.

Large Scale Category III Relief Preparedness and Response Standards
Boiling Stage Standard 10: Grants and interagency liaison person on-site to support interagency coordination
- Designate SRA or other to assure coordination with donors and other NGOs. Liaison takes place, SOs are kept informed

Large Scale Category III Relief Preparedness and Response Standards
Boiling Stage Standard 13: Draft funding proposals
- Ensure effective inter-office communications, Approve all proposals.

Response Stage Standard 1 (within 24 hours): Daily briefings: first reports emailed from region within 24-hours, and then for daily 2 weeks or more
- Ensure communications staff has necessary resources.
- Continuity of daily update briefings on the emergency situation and WV operations.
- International Communications: RRT/NO Communications Staff

Response Stage Standard 6 (48-72 hours): Private and public funding projections, including dollar handles, available within 72 hours.
- Proactively call SO CEOs to solicit commitments
- Communications staff obtains initial funding projections, Operations staff provide dollar handles to marketing
Trends Analysis 2001-2004

- WV communication teams (National & Regional Offices) must move fast to capitalize on world media attention and fund raising.
- Lesson 50: In an emergency, it is unclear who should receive what in terms of communications, and what the expectations are of the Partnership from the NO.

Cat III 2005 Standards

Large Scale Category III Relief Preparedness and Response Standards

Early Warning Preparedness Stage Standard 4: “R/S” Initiate continuing communication with support offices, international communications and Advocacy
- Develop ongoing communications materials on the situation. Request assistance from SO’s International Communications and Advocacy as required. Identify a NO point person for local media networking and liaison.

Boiling Stage Standard 13: “R/S” Communications staff in position including NO point person to relate to local media. World Vision signage and media instruments in place.
- Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing
- Regional Communications in dialog with International Communications puts in place needed RRT communications staff in the early emergency stages to maintain the story, a NO media point person for local media networking and liaison is functioning. All WV logo banners, flags, stickers, t-shirts, hats and WV logo materials are in place and back-up stocks are maintained at the Regional and HEA/ERDM levels, The CAT III Data Base is planned for implementation once operations begin.
- Regional Communications in consultation with International communications

Response Stage Standard T (within 24 hours): “R/S” Daily operational briefings, communications reports emailed from region within 24-hours, and continuously for 2 weeks or more Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing Program Management Security IT
- National and Regional Communications staff with the support of International Communications sent out daily update briefings on the Emergency situation and WV operations response detail. What WV is doing where? These updates are sent to the Partnership daily until the emergency situation normalizes (up to 2 weeks and more depending on the situation). The CAT III Database is mobilized for Partnership wide communications and programming information, A NO media point person for local media is proactively engaging, networking and liaising with the local media.
- “R/S” Rapid Response Team and Communications on site within 24 to 48 hours
- Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing Program Management Security Human Resources Supply Chain Management IT
- An SRC and RRT members including appropriate sectoral and support skills are on site being mobilized by the Regional Relief Director. Communications & ERDM VPs
- Administrative Set-up If SRC is not available, the appropriate RRT will be mobilized by the Regional Relief Director

Response Stage Standard 4: “R/S” 7-day Operational Plan in place and posted on Category III Response web site within 48 hours. Plans must reflect the following standards: Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct, Humanitarian Charter & Sphere Standards, In conflict situations applying the Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) framework, People in Aid Code, HAP Principles, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing Program Management Security Finance IT
- This plan will include what emergency response activities at what locations will take place during the first week. Actively follow-up with the SO International Program Offices to measure levels of engagement. For effective Operational Plan development, ensure that inter-office communications in the NO is taking place, especially between programming and finance.

Response Stage Standard 5 (within 48 hours): “R/S” “Staging Room” mobilized within 48 hours. This will ensure appropriate Partnership wide communications.
- Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing Security IT
- A “Staging Room” will be set up by the Regional Relief Director or National Director and staffed with experienced and knowledgeable staff with the support of the HEA/ERDM and SO assistance, This staging room will monitor the emergency developments and operational detail, act as a communications linkage point for Partnership operational inquiries and assist the appropriate operations planning measures from a perspective outside of immediate operations. Human Resource “Staging Room” will be set up to come along side RRT-HR manager. This may or may not be at the same site as the Relief “Staging Room.”

Response Stage Standard 10 (within 72 hours): “R/S” Private and public funding projections, including dollar handles, within 72 hours. Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing Security IT
- National, Regional and International Communications staff will inquire with SO International Programs and marketing leadership to obtain initial funding projections for the emergency response, This requires an active, aggressive role by National and Regional leaders making contact with SO CEO’s regarding commitments, For effective Operational Plan development ensure that inter-office communications in the NO is taking place, especially between programming and finance.

Standard 17 (within 3 weeks): “R/S” 90-day Operational Plan in place and posted on Category III Response Web site within 3 weeks. Plans must reflect the following standards: Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct, Humanitarian Charter & Sphere Standards, In conflict situations applying the Local Capacities for Peace.
The SRC or the Regional Relief Director (if there is no appointed SRC) and the RRT will put together a 90-day operational plan on the CATEGORY III Response website within three weeks. This plan will include what emergency response activities at what locations will take place during the first 90-days. Ensure that Communications Policy/Advocacy and security components are part of the plan. As required request Communications, Policy/Advocacy and Security for review advice and assistance. Access design support for this plan from SOs as needed. Actively follow-up with the SO International Program Offices to measure levels of commitment. For effective Operational Plan development ensure that inter-office communications in the NO is taking place, especially between programming and finance.

Full Relief Preparedness Plan: Terms of Reference
- Communications plan
- In-depth communications coverage (develop with VP Communications)

Standards Handbook 2008

Management Notes
Standard 11: Six essential steps are given for the first 24 hours of an effective Emergency Response within the World Vision Partnership
1. Leadership: Activate the NO DMRR.C
2. Personnel: Activate the National Rapid Response Team (NRRT)
3. Assessment: Conduct Initial Assessment
4. Communication: Alert the Partnership through the Regional HEA office
5. Response: Respond Immediately to Affected WV ADPs
6. Funding: Activate Contact with WV Donors

Level 3 Response Time Line
Within 1 Week at National Response Office:
- Visitors' plan is published
- 10-day operational plan
- Communications materials developed for media and marketing

Level 3 Response Standards
2) Preparedness Stage
Standard 12: Communications and Advocacy (CAPA) are engaged
- Agree on advocacy and communications strategy
- Develop communications and advocacy materials, NEW: including context-appropriate messaging regarding WV's Christian identity
- Nominate NO point person for media enquiries and spokesperson for interviews
- Signage and media instruments are in place
- NEW: Consider inter-agency advocacy and media responses

Level 3 Response Standards
3) Response Stage
Standard 27 (within 24 hours): A Share Crisis Alert is sent out within 12 hours of emergency impact. First situation report is posted on wvrelief.org and additional updates are posted in line with necessity and supply of information; frequency determined by Level 3 Coordinating Team
- NEW: A Share Crisis Alert will be sent out to relevant distribution lists within 12 hours of a rapid onset high profile emergency
- NEW: Communications nearest the point of impact of a rapid-onset crisis contacts Regional Communications staff or GRRRT Communications immediately and the alert will be sent out to appropriate distribution lists
- NEW: In the event of a high profile Cat 2 or Cat 3 emergency a sub-page of wvrelief.org is launched simultaneously and information posted there
- NEW: Emergency communications point person's proactively engage with local, regional and international media
- In conjunction with partners, Nat'l and Reg'l Communications staff, with the support of Int'l Communications, updates and posts a briefing on the emergency situation and WV's response
- The update includes details of operational response from WV and partners; these updates are posted on wvrelief.org daily until the emergency situation normalizes
- Obtain details, location and activities of other active NGOs, UN and Gov't bodies
- The Level 3 Response Database is mobilized for Partnership-wide communications and programming Information
- Emergency communications point person's proactively engage with the local, regional and international media

Level 3 Response Standards
3) Response Stage
Standard 27 (within 1 week): NEW: Communications materials developed for media and marketing
- Communications resources gathered for media relations and marketing appeals need to be sourced and posted on wvrelief.org
- Communications resources to include stories, photos and video (where possible) of case studies demonstrating need and initial World Vision response
- Media spokespeople trained and available for interviews where appropriate
- Case studies and stories 1) to demonstrate WV’s ongoing response and 2) to be used for accountability, advocacy and education

Level 2 Response Standards

2) Preparedness Stage

Standard 13: Communications and Advocacy are engaged
- Agree on Communications Strategy
- Agree on Advocacy strategy
- Communications and advocacy, each will develop materials, NEW: including context-appropriate messaging regarding WV’s Christian identity
- Nominate NO point person for media enquiries and spokesperson for interviews
- Signage and media instruments are in place
- NEW: Consider inter-agency advocacy and media responses

Level 2 Response Standards

3) Response Stage

Standard 3 (within 24 hours): NEW: A Share Crisis Alert is sent out within 12 hours of emergency impact. First situation report is posted on wvrelief.org and additional updates are posted in line with necessity and supply of information. Frequency of updates determined by Level 2 Response Coordinating Team
- Share Crisis Alert sent out to relevant distribution lists within 12 hours of a rapid-onset high profile emergency
- Communications nearest the point of impact of a rapid-onset crisis contacts Regional Communications staff or GRRT Communications immediately and the alert will be sent out to appropriate distribution lists
- In the event of a high pro?ie Cat 2 or Cat 3 emergency, a sub-page of wvrelief.org is launched simultaneously and information posted there
- In conjunction with partners, Nat’l and Reg’l Communications staff, with the support of Int’l Communications, update and post a brief on the emergency situation and WV’s response
- The update includes details of the operational response from WV and partners; these updates are posted on wvrelief.org daily until the emergency situation normalizes
- Obtain details, location and activities of other active NGOs, UN and Gov’t bodies
- The Level 2 Response Database is mobilized for Partnership-wide communications and programming
- Emergency communications point person/s proactively engage with the local, regional and international media

Essential SIX STEPS for WV National Office Leadership During The First 24 Hours

(under the declaration of an emergency and level of response) for an Effective Emergency Response

4. COMMUNICATION: Alert the Partnership through the Regional HEA office
- Contact the Regional HEA director or his/her designate informing them of the situation as known
- Initiate the Declarative Consultative Group (DCG) process
- Prepare a sitrep and facilitate uploading on http://www.wvrelief.org
- Share photos and stories of human interest with the Partnership

Essential SIX STEPS for WV National Office Leadership During The First 24 Hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 2 Response Standards</th>
<th>3) Response Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard 21: NEW: Communications materials developed for media and marketing</td>
<td></td>
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<td>- Communications resources gathered for media relations and marketing appeals need to be sourced and posted on wvrelief.org</td>
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<td>- Communications resources to include stories, photos and video (where possible) of case studies demonstrating need and initial World Vision response</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Initial Q&amp;As and media messaging guidelines need to be developed and updated daily in the initial stages and through the life cycle of the response</td>
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<td>- Media spokespeople trained and available for interviews where appropriate</td>
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<td>- Case studies and stories 1) to demonstrate WV’s ongoing response and 2) to be used for accountability, advocacy and education</td>
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Essential SIX STEPS for WV National Office Leadership During The First 24 Hours

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment to recommend advocacy messages,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard 22: Initial advocacy is completed. NEW: Ongoing advocacy monitoring plan is in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assessment to recommend advocacy messages, which are communications and advocacy measures, which are appropriate in order not to put WV operations and staff into risk, NEW: while still expressing commitment to justice and identifying WV as a Christian humanitarian organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assessment to recommend advocacy messages, messages and communications at national, regional and international levels</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Advocacy and media strategy developed with agreed public messages and spokespeople in place</td>
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Essential SIX STEPS for WV National Office Leadership During The First 24 Hours

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<tr>
<td>Codes: [Eval: Communications]</td>
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</table>
It is important for Program Managers to be flexible enough to continuously adapt emerging needs as indicated through on-going assessments.

Neither assessments nor monitoring relating to the named evaluative recommendations have not been named in this strategic report (only capacity assessment and advocacy assessment).

In this report, it is mentioned who has to monitor which standard.

Response stage Standard 15: - Schedule weekly conference calls for as long as needed with major stakeholders to monitor situation and operational response.

CROSS REFERENCE. In Boiling Stage Item #13 & In Response Stage Item #8 Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing

Neither assessments nor monitoring relating to the named evaluative recommendations have been named in this evaluative report (only capacity assessment and advocacy assessment).

Boiling Stage: Write preliminary drafts of funding proposals for most likely scenario within 30 days. (Monitor and tailor according to new developments)

Senior Response Coordinator is on site along with the RRT with the correct assessment, design and response skills.

Response Stage Standard 5: “R/S” “Staging Room” mobilized within 48 hours. This will insure appropriate Partnership wide communications. Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing. It will be set up by the Regional Relief Director or National Director and staffed with experienced and knowledgeable staff with the support of the HEA/ERDM and SO assistance. This staging room will monitor the emergency developments and operational detail, act as a communications linkage point for Partnership operational inquiries and assist the appropriate operations planning measures from a perspective outside of immediate operations.

“R/S” Weekly Conference Call with Category III Partnership Coordinating Team as long as needed. CROSS REFERENCE. In Boiling Stage Item #13 & In Response Stage Item #8 Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing

- There is a need for a full vulnerability/risk assessment and baseline to be done before a response starts
- Impact/qualitative monitoring is lacking

Program Development and Implementation
- There is a need for a full vulnerability/risk assessment and baseline to be done before a response starts

<table>
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<td>1998 Lessons Learned Hurricane Mitch Honduras Cat III Emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999 Lessons Learned Columbia Earthquake Cat II Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for the National and Regional Offices to continually monitor sociopolitical, economic, physical, environmental and other factors that could increase the risk and/or the vulnerability in a given site. The quality of assessments requires coordination between the Program Officer(s) and data gatherers, and the ability to incorporate the information into a format required by donors. Early and rapid field assessments using a participatory approach assisted World Vision to identify appropriate relief supplies and GIK, and design food and emergency kit distribution measures. It is important for Program Managers to be flexible enough to continuously adapt emerging needs as indicated through on-going assessments.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trends Analysis 2001-2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesson 27: There is a need for a full vulnerability/risk assessment and baseline to be done before a response starts. This then needs to be followed up with a comprehensive ERDM monitoring system</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trends Analysis 2004-2007</th>
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<td>- There is a need for a full vulnerability/risk assessment and baseline to be done before a response</td>
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<td>Section 2.2. Rapid Response: Initial assessments should begin within 24 hours after the disaster hits</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.11. Other Standards: More specific standards are detailed in other sections of this manual, as Standards for assessment and design of projects</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.12. Timelines for Key Standards: Assessment team dispatched to disaster site within 24 hours. Relief proposal designed and submitted for approval and funding within 24-hours after return from assessment site.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.6. Monitoring: Effective project monitoring systems must be in place to provide the information needed for appropriate project revisions. An effective monitoring system requires: willingness and commitment, a good understanding of social, cultural, political, economic and ethnic factors, well-maintained records, regular feedback from beneficiaries and other community contacts, close networking with other responding agencies. WV currently implements thorough management monitoring systems for the purposes of ongoing project revision, auditing and reporting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section 2.9. Record Keeping and Reporting: Weekly and monthly operations reports are essential to inform management and donors, monitor program accomplishments and identify needs and challenges for the future</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response Stage: Goods and services are deployed and distribution is under way with new assessments in progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boiling Stage: Write preliminary drafts of funding proposals for most likely scenario within 30 days. (Monitor and tailor according to new developments)</td>
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<td>Senior Response Coordinator is on site along with the RRT with the correct assessment, design and response skills.</td>
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| “R/S” Weekly Conference Call with Category III Partnership Coordinating Team as long as needed. CROSS REFERENCE. In Boiling Stage Item #8 Operational Imperatives Communications and Marketing |

6. FUNDING: Activate Contact with WV Donors
- Contact WV Support Office HEA/Communications personnel
- Contact with potential donors (e.g. UN, ECHO, Embassies, Government Aid agencies)

van der Ende 95
starts. - Impact/qualitative monitoring is lacking. It is vital for National Offices to have training in conducting assessments, and also to have Partnership-wide assessment tools. Poor assessments = poor programming = poor funding = poor response (training cared for through LEAP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9 Year Analysis - Key Lessons and Trends 2000-2009</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson 3 and 11: Program Development &amp; Implementation:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- There is a need for a full vulnerability/risk assessment and baseline to be done before a response starts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Impact/qualitative monitoring is lacking.</td>
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Security IT, Schedule weekly conference calls for as long as needed with major stakeholders to monitor situation and operational response. As needed to resolve outstanding issues make individual calls to assure operations mobilization is moving smoothly ahead.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>- Six Steps essential for Emergency Response, number 3: <strong>ASSESSMENT:</strong> Conduct Initial Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Carry out a rapid assessment of the situation and document findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gather Information about the impact of the emergency on WV staff members/families as well as sponsored children/families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Review context analysis relative to the NDPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Within 24 hours: Initial Rapid Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Within 72 hours: Detailed sectoral assessment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Level 3 Response Standards**

**Ongoing Activities Standard 3:** An NO Disaster Preparedness Plan (NDPP) exists and is updated annually
- Ensure consistency between risks identified in the Risk and Capacity Assessment Tool and agreed risk scenarios used in NDPP
- NO or RO to mobilize a design team to develop a preparedness plan addressing all emergency and risk reduction dimensions to be included in the NDPP
- For effective DPP development, ensure that inter-department communications in NO are effective, especially between programming and finance, supply chain, security and HR, and that these are aligned with plans at the regional level lines of business and technical communities of practice
- Assumptions for NDPP:
  - Reflection of communities' engagement through CDPP process
  - Recognition of local disaster management structures and plans
  - NEW: Recognition of outside stakeholders’ (gov’t, INGOS, UN) preparedness plans
  - NEW: National situation report on children incorporated into the NDPP
  - ND/Ops Director (normally delegated to National HEA Coordinator/H-DMRR,C), RHEAD for Crisis Country Clusters and countries with no WV presence
- Risk and Capacity Assessment Tool
- NDPP Template
- NO Scorecard

**Ongoing Activities Standard 11:** **NEW:** Situation updates are prepared and shared regularly
- NO/RO to provide a monthly update (as part of ND/RHEAD monthly HEA Update) on the country/region and potential issues that may develop into a disaster + NOs likely response and need for additional capacity
- Risk and Capacity Assessment tools

**Preparedness Stage Standard 14:** Rapid and sectoral assessment tools are available and contextualized; boilerplate funding proposals for the most likely scenario are written

**Response Stage Standard 4:** **NEW:** Initial rapid assessment is launched
- Rapid damage and needs assessments are launched
- Ensure coordination with stakeholders

**Response Stage Standard 12:** **NEW:** Detailed sectoral assessments are launched
- Based on rapid damage and needs assessments, detailed sectoral assessments are launched
- Coordination with other players on the ground is required (UN, Government, INGOS and Local NGOs) in line with the current humanitarian reform of Cluster Approach

**Response Stage Standard 18:** 7-day Operational Plan is in place and posted on Level 3 Response Database
- The response team will develop a 7-day operational plan based on rapid needs assessments; this plan will describe the emergency situation and response activities for the first week, and is actively followed up with SO IPGs to ensure engagement

**Level 2 Response Standards**

**Ongoing Activities Standard 3:** An NO Disaster Preparedness Plan (NDPP) exists and is updated annually
- Ensure consistency between risks identified in the Risk and Capacity Assessment Tool and agreed risk scenarios used in NDPP
- NO or RO to mobilize a design team to develop a preparedness plan addressing all emergency and risk reduction dimensions to be included in the NDPP
- For effective DPP development ensure that inter-department communications in NO are effective, especially between programming and finance, supply chain, security and HR, and that these are in line with plans for regional level lines of business and technical communities of practice
- Assumptions for NDPP:
  - Reflection of Communities’ engagement through CDPP process
  - Recognition of local disaster management structures and plans
  - NEW: Recognition of outside stakeholders’ (Gov’t, INGOS, UN) preparedness
plans
- NEW: National situational report on children incorporated into the NDPP
- Risk and Capacity Assessment Tool, NDPP Template, NO Scorecard

Ongoing Activities Standard 11: Situation updates are prepared and shared regularly
- NO/RO to provide a monthly update (as part of ND/RHEAD monthly HEA Update) on the country/region and potential issues that may develop into a disaster + NOs likely response and need for additional capacity
- ND, National HEA Leader, National Communications Leader
- Risk and Capacity Assessment tool, FEWSNET, Relief Web, Newsvision, wvrelief.org

Preparedness Standard 15: Rapid and sectoral assessment tools are available and contextualized; boilerplate funding proposals for most likely scenario are written

Response Stage Standard 15 within 24 Hours: Initial Rapid Assessment is launched

Response Stage Preparedness Standard 13 within 72 hours: Detailed sectoral assessments are launched

Response Stage Standard 19: RM to develop a 7-day operational plan based on rapid needs assessments; the plan is to describe the emergency situation and response activities for the first week, and is actively followed up with SO IPGs to ensure engagement

Spheres of Potential PCRT (Pre-Crisis Review Team) Engagement & Review
- Strategic: Linkages with IWG initiatives – joint assessments, evaluations, training
- Operational: Vulnerability and capacity assessment, including action plan to address identified gap
- Monitoring system for emerging crisis and key trigger point
- Level 3 implementation monitoring tool
- Pre-positioning plan for relief items & equipment (including GIK)
- Initial assessments if not previously done by NO

Outputs
- Updated DPP
- Vulnerability & capacity analysis, including action plan to address capacity gaps
- Assessment & monitoring processes initiated
- Contingency plan to lessen negative impacts of emergency, and the WV response, on the NO and its normal programming
- Strategy to enhance/manage links with the wider WV partnership and external identities
- Action Plan for NO to implement specific preparedness initiatives and capacity enhancements

PCRT: As a consequence of early warning indicators (from the CEWG, NO & RO observations, UN & governmental monitoring initiatives, media reports, etc.), a Pre-Crisis Review Team (PCRT) will deploy before a disaster occurs to provide strategic guidance, support and coaching. This will be with senior members of National Office(s) (ND, SMT & Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Committee members), their national Board(s), and their relevant RO, and will enable them to identify and implement preparedness and monitoring measures that will strengthen future implementation of the WV emergency response commensurate with the humanitarian needs, Partnership and international policies, protocols and standards, and Partnership expectations. The intent of this is not to place additional pressure on the National Office leadership but to guide, coach and come alongside the NO team while opportunities for preparedness exist.

Level 3 and 2 Ongoing Activities Standard 1: NEW: A National Office Humanitarian Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Committee (H-DMRR.C) exists
- NO to form an H-DMRR
- H-DMRR.C to meet regularly to discuss DMRRSP and monitor progress

Level 3 and 2 Ongoing Activities Standard 12: NEW: NO identifies disaster prone project areas and regions where the national government frequently declares national emergencies
- NO analysis and on-going monitoring. What are the root causes? What are potential and likely outcomes?
- NO Early Warning mechanism established
- NO Communications contingency plan developed with SOs
- NO participation in regular coordinating meetings established at the local and national level to monitor preparedness and coordinate responses

Executive Support Team (EST): Monitors at both field and head office levels, establishment and implementation activities, and assists in aligning these with the response strategy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Resources and Staffing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Support (physical, emotional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Recruitment second-wave staff takes too long</td>
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<td>- Proper HR policies needed for specific needs (per diem, salaries, overtime etc)</td>
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<td>- HR staff needs to be first line response team members and be on the ground the first few days</td>
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<tr>
<td>- ToRs for HR/ Clear job descriptions are needed</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Activity</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Strategic Policy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1997 Manual</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Section 2.3 Relief and Preparedness Response</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>- Qualified staff should be available and stockpiles of emergency relief supplies should be in place as appropriate in disaster-prone countries with WV offices.</td>
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<td>- Regional and international rosters of skilled mobile relief staff will be maintained to ensure qualified staff are available for quick assignment to crisis locations.</td>
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<td>Section 2.4 Staffing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Hires trained and experienced professionals in relief response:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Identifies and provides appropriate training opportunities for WV relief professionals to build on their experience and upgrade their skills;</td>
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<td>- Engages highly-qualified, technical consultants if needed to provide short-term assistance.</td>
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<td>- WV prefers to hire qualified relief practitioners in the country of operations. If adequate staff are not available locally, qualified staff will be recruited regionally and globally.</td>
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1998 Lessons Learned Hurricane Mitch Honduras Cat III Emergency

- Staff Support
  - Staff well being and morale during the exhaustive work of emergency response will be monitored. Appropriate support measures and compensation for staff will be used to insure positive morale.

1999 Lessons Learned Columbia Earthquake Cat II Emergency

- A clear definition of roles and responsibilities assigned to National Office personnel, as well as personnel in the field, is essential for effective decision-making, leadership and management of relief activities.
- It may be necessary to compile a pool of previously identified national personnel (internal and external) in various fields of emergency relief and disaster mitigation, with appropriate operations and management expertise (including translators). Having available a list of job descriptions is useful for proceeding to rapid recruitment in an efficient manner.
- Once the emergency hits, and WV decides to be operational, there should be a moment set aside to assign specific roles and responsibilities for teams based on the previously defined National Emergency Plan.
- Training in emergency response and disaster mitigation for national staff – including ADP - staff is essential.

Standards 2000

- **Boiling Stage Standard 7:** All regional and national office line staff on-site. SO indicate the staff they are seconding and period of the secondment.
- **Boiling Stage Standard 8:** Senior partnership recruiter of the CATEGORY III is designated. Recruiting for needed technical staff triggered. All staff roles defined, ToR prepared, job descriptions defined, employment terms and duration requisitions defined. Occupational Stress Management (OSM) issues are defined.
- **ToR Initial Preparedness Plan:** Security guidelines for staff including critical incident stress response implementation & protection guidelines

Preparedness stage: Begin identifying possible staff, possible church partners, and other local stakeholders capable of acting as partners.

April 2002 Cat II Standards

- **Early Warning and Preparedness Stage:** Create and circulate Initial Disaster Preparedness Plan within 30 days

This IDPP includes a full HR plan with deployment of specialized relief staff management structure along with plans for logistics, finance, administration and security

- Begin identifying possible staff, possible church partners, and other local stakeholders capable of acting as partners.

- **Boiling Stage:** The Results of the capacity assessment will be acted upon and appropriate capacity building or staff employment will take place

- Senior regional recruiter designated. Recruiting for needed technical staff (including stress management and trauma counseling)
- Regional Communications staff including NO, local media point person on alert / on call for immediate deployment

- Needed supplies, services and essential staff identified from the Global
Prepositioning Unit (GPU), GIK departments of Support Offices, the RRT HR manager, the RRM and Support Offices
Response stage Within 72 hours: Fast track relief response structure is being put in place and response staff on site within 24 to 48 hours

April 2002 Cat III Standards

Early Warning and Preparedness Stage: Create and circulate Initial Disaster Preparedness Plan within 30 days
- Begin identifying possible staff, possible church partners, and other local stakeholders capable of acting as partners.

Boiling Stage: The Results of the capacity assessment will be acted upon and appropriate capacity building or staff employment will take place.
- All regional and national office line staff on-site.
- Preliminary screening of local staff initiated.

October 2002 Cat III

Early Warning and Preparedness Stage Standard 7: Begin identifying possible staff & partners.
Boiling Stage Standard 4: For multi-country CATEGORY IIIs, a regional response strategy is developed. Appoint NO staff (ERDM or Operations director) to regional design team
Boiling Stage Standard 5: Capacity building or staff employment are based on results of capacity assessment
  • Boiling Stage Standard 6: Senior partnership recruiter of the CATEGORY III is designated. All staff roles clearly defined
  • ToR/JDs prepared
  • Recruiting technical staff triggered. Resources: Rosters of potential and past staff.
  • Boiling Stage Standard 8: All regional and national office line staff on-site.
    Mobilize all staff
    Suspend leaves, vacations etc.
  • Boiling Stage Standard 11: Preliminary screening of local staff initiated.
    Identification and recruitment of local and international staff.

Response Stage Standard 2 within 48/72 hours: Staging Room staffed with experienced, knowledgeable staff.

Trends Analysis 2001-2004

- Recruitment of fulltime/second wave staff, takes too long, resulting in a rapid, continuous turnover of response staff and a loss of credibility with external stakeholders
- An experienced and qualified international staff member should be designated for NGO/UN co-ordination from the start of the response
- There is a need for more rapidly deployable technical staff
- Clear job descriptions are needed for every position in the response. The standard job descriptions have helped this process
- Capacity building of local staff must be done before the emergency, not during

Cat III 2005 Standards

Preparedness Stage Standard 7: “R/S” Begin identifying possible staff, possible church partners, and other local stakeholders capable of acting as partners.

Boiling Stage Standard 4: “R/S” The Results of the capacity assessment will be acted upon and appropriate capacity building or staff employment will take place

Operational Imperatives

Comms and Marketing
Security
NO/RO develop training plans and employ staff to fill skills gaps which can not be filled locally

Boiling Stage Standard 10: “R/S” Senior partnership recruiter of the CATEGORY III is designated. Recruiting for needed technical staff triggered. All staff roles defined, ToR prepared, job descriptions defined, employment terms and duration requisitions defined. Occupational Stress Management (OSM) issues are defined.

Staff Care for difficult field locations is addressed

Operational Imperatives

Comms and Marketing
Security

Human Resources

- The RRT HR Dir mobilizes recruiting for all needed emergency leadership & tech staff. In collaboration with the SRC and tech sectors, all staff roles are designed, a reporting structure is developed, TOEs are defined, job descriptions and requisitions are developed and approved by the SRC and Reg’l HR leadership.
- The required recruiting materials are passed to reg’l and int’l recruiters for rapid recruitment.
- Int’l and reg’l recruiters refer to existing internal and external database of potential emergency response candidates.
Appropriate equipment and supplies procured and deployed for staff assigned to difficult field positions.

- Rosters of potential and past staff.
- Regional HR
- Global HR
- SO/National/Regional/PO Secondments
- RRT (Regional & Global)
- OSM HR Resource Person

Operational Imperatives for staffing

Response Stage Standard 5: "R/S" “Staging Room” mobilized within 48 hours.
This will insure appropriate Partnership wide communications.

Operational Imperatives

Comms and Marketing

Security, IT

- A “Staging Room” will be set up by the Reg’l Relief Dir or Nat’l Dir and staffed with experienced and knowledgeable staff with the support of the HEA/ERDM and SO assistance.
- This staging room will monitor the emergency developments and operational detail, act as a communications linkage point for P’ship operational inquiries and assist the appropriate operations planning measures from a perspective outside of immediate operations.

Human Resource “Staging Room” will be set up to come along side RRT-HR manager. This may or may not be at the same site as the Relief “Staging Room.”

Full Relief Preparedness Plan: Terms of Reference: Security guidelines for staff including critical incident stress response implementation & protection guidelines

Complete human resource plan, with names of people who have agreed to come, have been formally released to come and are ready to come.

Trends Analysis 2004-2007

- There is a continuing need to build up emergency response surge capacity.
- Staff requires spiritual, emotional, and physical support during a relief response. (There is a need for better orientation of new arriving staff e.g., cultural, socio-political, religious, security, etc)
- There is a need to have proper HR policies in place that meet the specific needs of relief staff (e.g. R&R, per diem, salaries/overtime, etc).
- Recruitment for full time/second wave staff takes too long.
- HR staff needs to be seen as first line response team members and be on the ground during the first few days.
- Clear job descriptions are needed for every position in the response.
- Large-scale emergency responses require good technical support personnel from the Partnership to assist in the response.

9 Year Analysis- Key Lessons and Trends 2000-2009

- (5)/ (56) Support (physical, emotional)
- (6)/(57) Recruitment second-wave staff takes too long
- (63) Proper HR policies needed for specific needs (per diem, salaries/overtime etc)
- (58) HR staff needs to be first line response team members and be on the ground the first few days
- (4)/ (59) ToRs for HR (Job descriptions are needed)
- (5)/ (25) Additional training/capacity building in HEA for NO staff is needed

Standards Handbook 2008

Due to the number of possible combinations of emergency category and response level, and the implications of the level of response (such as on EPRF allocations, deployment of staff, marketing effort) there often exists some ambiguity and confusion surrounding the following: who is responsible for initiating the declaration process; how the decision is made and communicated; to what extent consultation is required in the process; and what happens if there are differences among stakeholders about the nature of the emergency and, more importantly, the scale of WV’s response.

The Emergency Declaration Process and Declaration Consultative Group (DCG) is the key mechanism for evaluating at an executive partnership-level both the emergency and response criteria described in the ‘Criteria for Declaration of Emergencies’, and for advising executive leadership on options for making an emergency declaration.

Within 72 hours: Response staffing plan is developed by RO

Level 3 Ongoing activities Standard 5. NEW: A security and Evacuation Plan is developed and reviewed at least once every year

NEW: Security training to be conducted at least for key new staff members in NO

Ongoing activities under Standard 10: Develop list of partner resources such as warehousing, volunteers, staffing, and protocols

Ongoing activities Standard 13: NEW: NO staff competent in applying humanitarian standards NO to provide training to H-DMRR members’ NRRT/essential staff and potential partners in Red Cross CoC/Sphere/LCP/PIA/Accountability/Principles of Partnership (see Appendix 3 in this Handbook), Humanitarian Charter, CoC re sexual exploitation, and others

Preparedness Stage Standard 3: Capacity building, training, and hiring and orientation take place to fill any gaps highlighted by the capacity assessment

NEW: All hired staff must maintain values and behaviour shaped by their Christian faith; approvals must be sought to recruit senior management of faiths other than Christianity

- Develop training plans and employ staff to fill skills gaps
• Begin the identification and recruitment of local staff
• Job descriptions and requisitions are prepared and approved
• Orientation plans and toolkits are in place
• NEW: All JDs, candidate profiles and recruitment processes reflect and follow the core capabilities related to demonstrating Christ-centered life and work
• NEW: All recruitment must comply with policies on Christian Commitment in HEA and witness of Jesus Christ

Standard 16: Staff care plan is in place
R&R provisions are reviewed and implemented
• Briefing and debriefing protocols are present
• Stress mgmt plan in place
• Security protocols in place
• NEW: Plan includes strategies to support staff spiritual well-being and provide psycho-social care
• NEW: Staff spiritual care/psycho-social specialist on site
• Program Manager
• HR Specialists
• TORs
• HEA HR
• GC Director for Staff Care (P&C)
• CC Coordinators

Preparedness Standard 18: NEW: Review security and evacuation plan
• Update security and evacuation plans relative to the situation and updated NDPP
• Ensure required security assets are in place
• Ensure staff are trained and aware of security/evacuation procedures

Response stage Standard 2 (after six steps plan) within 24 hours: NEW:
Intercessory prayer mobilized
Mobilize prayer for affected children, families and communities, as well as response staff, local partners and donors
Response Standard 21 (within 72 hours):
Response staffing plans developed
• Develop short- and long-term plans that consider all available sources of response staff (NO, RO, RRRT, GRRRT, PO secondees, GRR, new hires, etc.)
• Rapid induction package is available
• Staff care plan is updated according to changing situation

Response Standard 22: Senior partnership recruiter is designated and recruitment triggered
• Staff roles are defined, a reporting structure is developed, TORs and JDs are defined, job requisitions are developed and approved by the RM and NO/RO
• The required recruiting materials are made available to recruiters
• Cultural and religious context profiles and appropriate behaviour guidelines available to all staff

Response Standard 24 (within one week): RVP site visit takes place
RVP will arrange with NO and RHEAD a visit to the emergency site within one week for the purpose of: staff support, internal communications, awareness of the situation on the ground

Response Standard 25 (within one week):
One designated senior WV executive, representing the wider Partnership, visits the site
• This person will be nominated on the Executive Team Conf Call
• The purposes for the visit are: collecting communications and marketing resources, awareness of the situation on the ground, staff support, positioning the designated WV executive as a spokesperson
• NEW: Briefing of spokesperson and management of media relations for executive representative as appropriate

Level 2 Ongoing Standard 5: NEW: A security and Evacuation Plan is developed and reviewed at least once every year
NEW: Security training to be conducted at least for key new staff members in NO

Ongoing activities under Standard 10:
Develop list of partner resources such as warehousing, volunteers, staffing, and protocols

Ongoing activities Standard 13: NEW: NO staff competent in applying humanitarian standards NO to provide training to H-DMRR, C members/ NRRT/ essential staff and potential partners in Red Cross CoC/ Sphere/ LCP/ PIA/ Accountability/ Principles of Partnership (see Appendix 3 in this Handbook), Humanitarian Charter, CoC re sexual exploitation, and others

Preparedness Stage Standard 4:
Capacity building, training, and hiring and orientation take place to fill any gaps highlighted by the capacity assessment
NEW: All hired staff must maintain values and behaviour shaped by their Christian faith; approvals must be sought to recruit senior management of faiths other than Christianity
• Develop training plans and employ staff to fill skills gaps
• Begin the identification and recruitment of local staff
• Job descriptions and requisitions are prepared and approved
• Orientation plans and toolkits are in place
• NEW: All JDs, candidate profiles and recruitment processes reflect and follow the core capabilities related to demonstrating Christ-centered life and work
• NEW: All recruitment must comply with policies on Christian Commitment in HEA and witness of Jesus Christ

Preparedness Standard 16: Staff care plan is in place
R&R provisions are reviewed and implemented
• Briefing and debriefing protocols are present
• Stress mgmt plan in place
• Security protocols in place
• NEW: Plan includes strategies to support staff spiritual well-being and provide psycho-social care
• NEW: Staff spiritual care/psycho-social specialist on site

Preparedness Standard 20: NEW: Review security and evacuation plan
• Update security and evacuation plans relative to the situation and updated NDPP
• Ensure required security assets are in place
• Ensure staff are trained and aware of security/evacuation procedures

Response stage Standard 1 (after six steps plan) first 24 hours: NEW: Intercessory prayer mobilized
Intercede prayer for affected children, families and communities, as well as response staff, local partners and donors

Response Standard 23 (within 72 hours): A Detailed Response staffing plan is developed • Develop short- and long-term plans that consider all available sources of response staff (NO, RO, RRRT, GRRT, GRR, PO secondees, new hires, etc.)
• Rapid induction package is available
• Staff care plan is updated according to changing situation

Response Standard 24 within 72 hours: Regional recruiter is designated and recruitment triggered
• Staff roles are defined, a reporting structure is developed, TORs and JDs are defined, job requisitions are developed and approved by the RM and NO/RO
• The required recruiting materials are made available to recruiters
• NEW: Cultural and religious context profiles and appropriate behaviour guidelines are available to all staff
• Designated recruiter
• International staffing specialists

Response Standard 26 (within one week): RVP/Sub-Regional Director/R-HEAD visits takes place
• RVP/Sub-Regional Director/R-HEAD will arrange with NO a visit to the emergency site within one week for the purpose of: staff support, internal communications, awareness of the situation on the ground
• NEW: Briefing of spokesperson and management of media relations for executive representative as appropriate

ANNEX 12) OUTPUT THEMATIC CODING OF INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Output</th>
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</table>
| 1    | **C**: Do you think the learning has to do with individuals or with the organization itself? I will rephrase my question: If for example you would go to a new office or somebody would go... are your experiences documented on an organizational level or are they more on an individual level?
I: Sadly this is not terribly well documented. It is sub-wide. If I would move to a new office, I would take the tools that we developed with me. So to that level it was organizational! So we did write it down. We wrote down work plans, timelines etc. Anyway, I'm getting off topic there. So it wasn't just individual And the stuff I learned, anybody that was working on the team would probably also learn and take along. So we did learn individually, but we also learned organizationally. |
| 2    | **C**: So if I understand you, you say that the learning can only happen if you actually individually or personally people need to go through the learning process?
I: No, I wouldn't go so strong as that. What I am saying is that you are not repeating the mistakes or greater... if one of the people went through it gravendi(?)! It is certainly documented and there is brilliant people in the world who say: Ah yes, that is life, let us not let do that. |
| 3    | **M**: But would you say that WV has a special position in that place, are they more neutral or do they take sides for the victim?
I: I would say, we try not to take sides. I give you a great example. I work in Lebanon. WV came here in 1975 essentially to support the Christians communities during the war. We learned a lot since then. We don't do that now. We work in communities, we work in... |
I have a major question which is: Do you remember any big changes in the humanitarian sector of WV in the last ten years?

I: Yes, I do.

M: And how can you see that?

I: I should know that. I try to think of something at the top of my head. (24:30)

M: Or do you have an example of a big event which happened and which lead to a change in policy?

I: Yes, that's what I am trying to think of. And off the top of my head I can't think of it. In my current job, I am not in relief, I am more a national director in relief and development advocacy, and administration, so what is going through my mind is about finances, which I spend my time with. Let me keep thinking maybe I come up with an answer. I know it has occurred, I just can't tell you off the top of my head what it is. (25:20)

M: Okay, no problem.

I: I have seen system changes. Policy might be the wrong word. But I have seen we change the way we do things. Structures.

M: After you saw it wasn't good as it was in place.

I: Yes, probably a big one I am noticing is compared from the tsunami to more present day relief responses. The tsunami we sort of role banned on those existing offices. There is a much more intentional effort to integrate today the existing ongoing programming. We have learned of the tsunami that an 800 kg gorilla comes in on the four national offices. Does it make sense? I don't know if people understand what I say.

M: Yes, but for those people who took part in the event it definitely a learning activity.

I: Right, and that's what I said to her is that's where we get to the individual thing. Where if you now have the experience of the response and the experience of the lessons learned, for sure you gonna carry that knowledge into the next one. Which is again an argument for making sure you retain your staff.

M: So there could have been some learning here, not only affected here. Like in 2001 we learned some lessons, but they were only realized in 2005 for example.

I: Yes some things might happen, maybe more little things that might happen immediately, there are perhaps others that needs time. Especially when you talk about concept, you know, different ways of doing things. That perhaps happens at a later stage.

M: Do you think that the learning processes of WV actually are reflected in the policy changes?

I: I should know that. I try to think of something at the top of my head. (38:36) I think in some cases it maybe is transmitted and shared. Well if you do evaluations properly, you know that, you should have everybody being engaged. With national staff are actually doing, you are more of a facilitator. With national staff, with community leaders. I remember doing one of our development programs in Kenya and it was great because we had the school teachers, the women, actually everybody doing interviews and you know we spent a week actually showing people tools and they were really excited about doing it themselves and actually they would come back with their findings at the end of the day and we would say okay so that is what you found, so what are your suggestions that need to be done? And it came out those were really good recommendations. So if that is done properly, then the community is gonna make the changes, the national office is gonna make the changes, but at the program level, for organizational change, we have to deal with the leadership who are often removed from the practice. And it is those systems which need to be changed probably more than anything else.

C: So if I understand you, you say that the learning can only happen if you actually individually or personally people need to go through the learning process?

I: No, I wouldn't go so strong as that. What I am saying is that you are not repeating the mistakes or greater... if one of the people went through it graven(?) It is certainly documented and there is brilliant people in the world who say: Ah yes, that is life, let us not let do that.

M: Or do you have an example of a big event which happened and which lead to a change in policy?

I: I was the regional response director for the Sri Lanka response, I wouldn't go back and read what happened in Ethiopia or wherever, India or Pakistan. I didn't go read what was available to me, I just learned it on my own. And I bet they did the same in Myanmar and they are doing the same in Haiti today.

C: So you think that the learning has to do with individuals or with the organization itself? I will rephrase your question: If for example you would go to a new office or somebody would go... are your experiences documented on an organizational level or are they more on an individual level?

I: Sadly this is not terribly well documented. It is sub-wide. If I would move to a new office, I would take the tools that we developed with me. So to that level it was organizational. So we did write it down. We wrote down work plans, timelines etc. Anyway, I'm getting off topic there. So it wasn't just individual. And the stuff I learned, anybody that was working on the team would probably also learn and take along. So we did learn individually, but we also learned organizationally.

M: Do you think the learning has to do with individuals or with the organization itself? I will rephrase your question: If for example you would go to a new office or somebody would go... are your experiences documented on an organizational level or are they more on an individual level?

I: Yes, but for those people who took part in the event it definitely a learning activity.

M: The real secret is to make sure you get some of the same people, you know what I'm saying?

I: Right, so the guy who is now running the Haiti response, it would have been really good if he were. I mean maybe he is, I don't know who was running in, I wasn't following it. It would have been good if he would have been in some of the previous responses. That he already have learned a couple of things, and imagine that person has.

M: Through humanitarian action. If you look at the response in Bosnia. Am I responding only helping the Bosnians or am I also helping to my mind is local capacities for peace. That's what we are doing, we are getting connections and divisions.

I: Yes, we got a hell of a lot of resources, professional, I mean we are learning from where we went.

M: Through humanitarian action. If you look at the response in Bosnia. Am I responding only helping the Bosnians or am I also helping the Croats and the Serbs? You know what I mean? So am I being, what's the word I want there?

M: Neutral or impartial?

I: Neutral, that's the word I wanted, its late afternoon.

C: So there could have been some learning here, not only affected here. Like in 2001 we learned some lessons, but they were only realized in 2005 for example.

I: Right, so the guy who is now running the Haiti response, it would have been really good if he were, I mean maybe he is, I don't know who was running in, I wasn't following it. It would have been good if he would have been in some of the previous responses. That he already have learned a couple of things, and imagine that person has.

M: Yes, but for those people who took part in the event it definitely a learning activity.

I: Right, and that's what I said to her is that's where we get to the individual thing. Where if you now have the experience of the response and the experience of the lessons learned, for sure you gonna carry that knowledge into the next one. Which is again an argument for making sure you retain your staff.

M: And when I talk about it, that's where I see those pieces in sort of becoming individual ways of working. When I see them talking about things, that is where there learning is coming out. I guess that is the point that I was trying to make. I see the individuals talking about learning events. But actually the participation in the learning events.

M: You know, people do learning events, they go them, they participate, it is really good for the people who are there, the question only is how do we maximize the effectiveness of it at the organizational level?

C: It's a classic problem. Theory of use and theory of what we say. In organizations that is often the case. So what we want to do and what we do. What I am trying to track down is how do the findings of the evaluations or the learning events in this case, because we are looking at the learning events that were done- do you see them linking to the level of organizational learning. I mean not necessarily to individual learning. If they do at all, the learning events?

M: I think we can use the 80-20 rule here. Probably 80% of what came out has been used at the individual level, but 20% also has been used at the organizational level. I don't wanna disregard that but I think that most learning is individualized.

C: Through humanitarian action. If you look at the response in Bosnia. Am I responding only helping the Bosnians or am I also helping the Croats and the Serbs? You know what I mean? So am I being, what's the word I want there?

M: Neutral or impartial?

I: Neutral, that's the word I wanted, its late afternoon.

C: So if I understand you, you say that the learning can only happen if you actually individually or personally people need to go through the learning process?

I: Yes, maybe a big one I am noticing is compared from the tsunami to more present day relief responses. The tsunami we sort of role banned on those existing offices. There is a much more intentional effort to integrate today the existing ongoing programming. We have learned of the tsunami that an 800 kg gorilla comes in on the four national offices. Does it make sense? I don't know if people understand what I say.

M: Do you think that the learning processes of WV actually are reflected in the policy changes?

I: I should know that. I try to think of something at the top of my head. (38:36) I think in some cases it maybe is transmitted and shared. Well if you do evaluations properly, you know that, you should have everybody being engaged. With national staff are actually doing, you are more of a facilitator. With national staff, with community leaders. I remember doing one of our development programs in Kenya and it was great because we had the school teachers, the women, actually everybody doing interviews and you know we spent a week actually showing people tools and they were really excited about doing it themselves and actually they would come back with their findings at the end of the day and we would say okay so that is what you found, so what are your suggestions that need to be done? And it came out those were really good recommendations. So if that is done properly, then the community is gonna make the changes, the national office is gonna make the changes, but at the program level, for organizational change, we have to deal with the leadership who are often removed from the practice. And it is those systems which need to be changed probably more than anything else.
improvements. I mean I am not a WatSan specialist, but I am sure we have learned better ways of drilling wells and better ways of supplying water than we did ten years ago.

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I: It is the project management cycle, we have standardized it.

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Lipshitz: Cultural Facet: Accountability (Lipshitz et al 2002)

M: Yes but do you remember specific events which changed the organization or the humanitarian policy of the organization?

I: Well, the first one I would totally say would be the one I told you about humanitarian accountability. I mean we are members of Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, so that one is the original, the Red Cross Code of Conduct, Sphere, another one I know we got better at WV, we call it LEAP.

So a lot of times, we generated evaluations for external demands and they haven’t really helped that response per se at the end of the response, so what people get out of those is, yes some accountability around what we do, whether we do what we said, but no opportunity to make different decisions about what is happening and so that person goes into the next response.

C: So you answered quite a few of the questions I was learning to. Because one of the questions is, are evaluations more for accountability reports or in WV are they targeting towards learning, or if it is balanced, so you talked about that now and mentioning a problem that we see in many organizations that evaluations are from external requests and mainly for accountability purposes.

I: Let me clarify. That’s not in the documentation about what we want to do, but that’s in the practice on the ground. So if you look at our overarching framework it says that evaluations are supposed to be used for learning, it just hasn’t been used for that. We say we wanna do that.

C: It’s a classic problem. The theory of use and theory of what we say. In organizations that is often the case. So what we want to do and what we do.

I: I am just looking up here. I was just thinking about your accountability question that you asked earlier, so I am looking for a definition with LEAP, to be able to tell you what it says about that. It says that one of the promotions out of seven, one is to promote accountability and learning. So it is clearly stated in there that we want to achieve both of the things. Whether we can is another question, but it is definitely in there.

I: Yes, actually what we are focusing upon more, what we have done is actually focusing now more on accountability within LEAP, to be able to tell you what it says about that. It says that one of the promotions out of seven, one is to promote accountability and learning. So it is clearly stated in there that we want to achieve both of the things. Whether we can is another question, but it is definitely in there.

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C: There have been a lot of movements and dynamics towards the better in the emergency sector in WV, do you think that the, is there a link with the development part of WV?

I: Yes, we are getting there, we got some very good sector expertise now, for example education, health, we are also integrating out accountability framework with the development side. Sometimes it takes a while, it doesn’t happen over night.

Lipshitz: Policy Facet: Commitment to Learning (Lipshitz et al 2002)

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I: Well, accountability kind of focus and kicked off kind of before the tsunami. We worked together with HAP then and we set up an accountability unit in Sri Lanka and I think that was kind of the critical starting point for us. Now we have an accountability associate director and an accountability officer who is based in Africa and puts frameworks to be used in an emergency. For example, I am talking about XX now. In the Haiti response, if you look at the HAP website, we got the Red Cross Code of Conduct translated into Creole in the first few days. And that was a textual ToRs of anybody who is action. And we got an accountability poll person, we do have an accountability framework using the four pillars, the complaints mechanisms and so on. And which is evolving our development partners within the organization so we make sure it is an integrated framework used in development work as well.

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C: There have been some evaluations in earlier years, in 89, I spoke with Mark Jens last night and he told me about an evaluation that was very traumatic for the organization.

I: Which one was it?

C: In Mozambique I think. And one of the reasons why you don’t do evaluations is because it was very traumatic, it showed very big failures and it has demoralized the staff. The flipside of an evaluation. Because that is true, it’s the flipside of an evaluation. You have internal evaluations, joined, single, so many different types.

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I: Yes. And think that the organization, this organization certainly learned from it. Our office, I know this team. That the different people here operate. I see learning applied every week.

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So enabling someone to make that change, even if they know what it is, requires a lot of engagement from the organization to say yes, this is what we need to do.

33

I: The idea is we need to be more consistent in what we do

C: Why?

I: We need to do more evaluations because we don’t have a strong background in that. But a lot of those decisions haven’t been made yet. So part of what Kevin and I have worked on loosely in the last year is to promote the idea of an evaluation policy. We have guidelines we have standards about evaluations more broadly about when evaluation have to be done but the I think that hasn’t really been taken up well within HEA, again for a number of reasons.

C: What are the most important causes for this that you see?

I: If I think if we look at the demand part, there is a gap there, people who are responsible to make decisions in responses are not really demanding evaluations to be done. And there is probably several reasons for that. Because it’s not really on their priority, there is no budgeting for, then it does happen. It tends to happen when there is an external drive that brings that issue forward. So if we have a grant that has a specific requirement for evaluation, we do them. So we are still driven a bit by these external conditions. Self in WV the demand for evaluations is not high. And I think that comes from the value that people have seen or not seen in the past. So a lot of times, we generated evaluations for external demands and they haven’t really helped that response per se at the end of the response, so what people get out of those is, yes some accountability around what we did, whether we do what we said, but no opportunity to make different decisions about what is happening and so that person goes into the next response. So it is kind of a loop that is happening there, we do them when its required, but the people who would be the ones to demand it in the next evaluation didn’t have a lot of value from the evaluations personally when they go into the next response it follows the same pattern.

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I am just looking up here. I was just thinking about your accountability question that you asked earlier, so I am looking for a definition within LEAP, to be able to tell you what it says about that. It says that one of the promotions out of seven, one is to promote accountability and learning. So it is clearly stated in there that we want to achieve both of the things. Whether we can is another question, but it is definitely in there.

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So you know, I do think it frustrates now, when I am told we have to push things forward and so on. The senior leadership have not changed. I am just about leader leadership and that person who changed from the senior leadership and that team always has been very open and very engaged and very keen on doing this. So it’s just about them ensuring that the communication about that. I don’t think there has been any change in the humanitarian unit about their commitment to change. Now, I was well known in WV, I had a field reputation, I was on the senior leadership team, some things were easier for me, but I don’t think that here have been new barriers come up. And even within now going global, the global environment has not being used to this kind of thinking. I really don’t think there have been many barriers, I mean the main barriers is what is the priority? I haven’t seen these big barriers.

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And one thing we have set up in WV is what is called community practice. So that we can keep all knowledge in one area. Before that
C: And if you look at the organizational culture for learning? I: Well, sometimes you hear that a prophet is not perceived well in his own town. Always, people do not necessarily from something that is being done by its own people, but you know there is an extra type there you would like to talk about. Who has eaten my cheese or something. You know what I mean sometimes a view from the outside is preferred rather than insight. But I think it does not only happen with WV. I think it happens at quite a few places. But we are getting better.

Lipshitz: Psychological Facet: Organizational Commitment (Lipshitz et al 2002)

I: There was a way to overcome this, which is a high level of support for senior managers. So yes the SOP would always be informed about what a particular person is facing on the ground and this person will get support from the SOP. C: What I feel is that the strength of the GRRRT is the positive. I: Yes, you are protected a lot, I mean Ian. Maybe there are even things that you don’t know. That there are often criticisms about what you are doing.

Lipshitz: Psychological Facet: Organizational Commitment (Lipshitz et al 2002)

I: That learning is only as good as the people who learned it. Okay, that was probably documented, but truly bad. So, I think the human is the most big important part. C: So if I understand you, say that the learning can only happen if you actually individually or personally need to go through the learning process? I: No, I would not go so strong as that. What I am saying is that you are not repeating the mistakes or greater… if one of the people went through it gravend(?). It is certainly documented and there is brilliant people in the world who say: Ah yes, that is life, let us not let do the same message repeated. Because if we keep seeing the same message from learning event to learning event it means that we are not

I: Okay, in the middle of the tsunami, who has got time to sit down and read the lessons learned paper to avoid that mistake?

C: And you think that the learning events actually are connected to change in policies and can you remember perhaps some events that you have experienced or not? I: Right, and that’s what I said to her is that we get to the individual thing. Where if you now have the experience of the failures and it has demoralized. The flipside of an evaluation. Because that is true, it’s the flipside of an evaluation. You have internal evaluations, joined, single, so many different types.

Lipshitz: Psychological Facet: Organizational Commitment (Lipshitz et al 2002)

M: But this is also leading to the question whether these events then influence the broader policy of the organization, but you already tried to answer this. I: I do think they do, I couldn’t point to a policy right at the top of my mind, but I do know that they send relatively senior people there. So it was learn individually, but we also learned organizationally. M: Yes, and think that the organization, this organization certainly learned from it. Our office, I know this team. That the different people here operate. I see learning applied every week.

I: Yes, I basically would say the same thing. There is some that’s learned. But the problem is, who is gonna read that lessons learned document when you are right in the middle of: Oh my gosh, I have got to get 50,000 tents or whatever. So you are not dealing with reading all. You are swamped by emails, phone calls etc. It is certainly documented and there is brilliant people in the world who say: Oh yes, that is life, let us not let do that.

C: Can you think of any organizational learning that has happened over the years, not necessarily those that have evolved or been pressured from the outside but from internal findings, from response experience, that then trickle back to OL and then leading to a change in policy or strategies? I: I would say just from the fact that we continue to do learning events and that they have become so much part of what we do, that shows that there is a value of doing them. Otherwise we would have stopped doing them. C: Yes, they become institutionalized really. I: The organization has learned I guess that doing learning events is a good thing and so we continue to do that. So there is organizational change around that. Have we maximized our use of that? No, but that is not the question. We have changed our practice around doing learning events. We do them pretty consistently. Could it be better? Of course, but that is one place where I have seen for example organizational change. Answering that question. This will come out of what you are looking at. So many times we see the same message repeated. Because if we keep seeing the same message from learning event to learning event it means that we are not really learning the things. We need to continue feedback around we need to do it earlier in the process. And we are starting, Right? Starting to do that. But what it means is within emergency, the organizations says that sometimes there is a lack of urgency, but I would say that we also have a lack of urgency responding to what comes out at lessons learned. So eventually we get to somebody when we do them, so we do them. But there is no urgency, so we don’t do them, we do them. And do you think that the learning events actually are connected to change in policies and can you remember perhaps some events
I: And pretty soon after I joined there was a working group together which has a very long same, something like best practices and learning in relief or something. I can’t remember exactly. BPSS - Best Practices and Relief Standards. I think that was probably it. It was called. And I remember for some reason I got to be on that group, and I remember the first meeting. There was at that stage that group focused on putting together some standards for the humanitarian group. So we didn’t have standards about how we respond to different sizes of emergencies. So I think the feeling was, there must be some good practice out there. If we could learn practice together to develop good standards? So for a couple of years we developed all of these standards and everything else which you know certainly pulled together people’s own personal best practice and examples of what worked and didn’t work. It wasn’t a systematic use of the organization of the learning process. Because what was the OL at that stage? And at the same time we sort of bumped along and did a few learning events. There weren’t really any lessons learned work shops or implementation guides. (08:17)

C: But sorry, would you be able to give some examples of that? So you are saying that you can see changes from learning so maybe you can name some learning techniques which you find successful apart from the learning events and some examples of how that changed policies and responses?

I: I have tons and tons of examples and I can send you some paperwork if you are interested. But in brief, we did a number of different things. Every three years we did trans-analyses. And that included evaluations. So what we did at that trend analysis is we
went both to the senior leadership within the humanitarian unit and the important thing is I was part of the team. I see that very critical, I think if you are not on the team, it’s harder. Once a year we had the so-called ‘cracking the nuts’. We took the five top learnings, negative learnings usually and actually sitting for two days and thinking what can we really do about them? (19:34)

And just at the top of my head, there are some very clear significant direct results. For example, from the early trends analysis what came out is, we needed our third wave to include HR and IT people. Was never the case. That then was put into our operational comparative that these are the key areas in which we need third wave staff as HR and IT. So that was a clear result for that. We had a lot of issues coming up about leadership, national offices. And their attitude to be able to grasp the ideas. And so then we also that we set up the executive response team. The pre-response team and then the collective response team which was a group of three or four high level very experienced WV people, who could go in either pre-response , for example in the slow-onset when we know it’s gonna hit, or in the very very early days to basically fit with the humanitarian leads so you tell my people to guide them through the process of what was expected of them in the partnership. That was a direct result of the cracking the nut, one of the top five learning’s. (21:00)

Another one of the top five learning’s was about capacity building and how do we capacity building. We already got some nice examples of capacity building that are more depths about what allowed us to really go into it without, who should we be focusing on? There has been an over-emphasis on our GRRT, who at any one time was never more than the second term people. It was never more than 10% of the people who went into the response of an emergency. And the findings from the learning events coupled with overall effectiveness within the regions really enable people to say, yes they are an important element, but they are only one important element. And we put so much time into training supporting coaching the people from the GRRT and yet they are only 10%, maximum 20% of the people who response. So what are we supposed to do with the other 80%? And you don’t think of all those of dialogues. And sometimes there was a direct cause and effect. The trends analysis said that we need more IT people and we go and change the operational imperatives for IT people going the third way, other times it opened up a much broader conversation which then lead to changes.

Then in addition to that there was in every learning event and then equally in the trends analysis, what we typically found was that 20% of what happened in that emergency was totally contextual to that particular emergency. And therefore to be dealt with by the national office. Or you just shook your shoulders and said okay that weren’t necessary, but won’t happen again out of context. (22:57)

And about another 25% or something was totally within the control of the humanitarian unit. But the majority of what we were finding, 50-60%, were organizational institutional issues. So what are our expectations of our national directors, how are business systems running, how do we the finances? How are the senior management and to senior leadership through what was called the operational working group and the strategy working group. And so I presented on an annual basis to those groups to flag the institutional issues. And that was certainly slower and less direct cause and effect discussion. But there was most definitely engagement on both levels and definitely both levels are engaged. But we want to know decisions of the trends analysis, see how we are doing, it lead to increased funding to the humanitarian group, it lead to changes in the way that we look at our support services as finance and HR and things. So it is slightly harder for me to say that what I presented on a Monday and then in the humanitarian group was changed. Within ten days to say that, so it’s a direct result of room and said, okay let’s develop this and do this, we made it happen ourselves. But there were very clear examples of where institutional changes happened because of what we have driven announdedly humanitarian learning areas. (24:49)

C: It is great to hear this. The cracking the nut activity had to do a lot with the position and the capacity to do that. And now things have changed quite a bit in the structure.

I: Yes and that is when I left, this was one of my big concerns. I thought this is not good. But at the same time, it... how do I put this? There hasn’t been a push to leadership.

You know, WV is not a hierarchical organization. You can go to whoever whenever. Not like in the UN where you cant talk to anyone. And I have been encouraging. It was much easier when I was sitting. I do not accept that not sitting on the SNT is a fundamental issue. I do believe there are other ways to...

C: And what do you think on an organizational level and on an individual level. While in corporate it would be money of course. What do you think of that, since you are in ALNAP as well.

I: I think the main incentive is to go back to the job. I think this is why we are in this industry, to do the very very best for the people we serve. And you know, everyone I come across just wants to do what they do, be more effective, have more impact and to be more efficient I mean there is cost driver. And therefore people are very open to learning. And the people at ALNAP. I think the issue when people have clear learning and clear possibilities to change, I think the issue is often coming with other agencies which have just come up with taking the evaluation route. Sometimes it is very difficult to come up with clear facts for change. Because evaluations are much more qualitative than everything than everything. So the barriers which I have of seen, which I haven’t mentioned, is saying you are working in WV, but when you come in with a very abstract you know we need more capacity of people need to know more, that is a huge barrier. The leadership is saying yes, tell us something we don’t know. And it is about to split things down to fact-based problems, as to say, 80% of our staff is working in our national offices, we are not targeting out national offices, therefore we need something specifically for the national staff. Then I see people say: Okay, that makes sense, let’s do it! So being very very targeted. The second thing which I certainly found is, we needed our third wave to include HR and IT people. Was never the case. That then was put into our operational comparative that we have through a very big change process during the last two years, so I think the main barrier was just that people had too much to do. It is like you said another initiative, another new thing and so then again it’s about working through it how do we do things that it takes time to do another new thing and interesting, the GRRT pushed back the learning thing, by you know we have other things to do, we need to train our staff on this this and this. (30:00) And it’s difficult. And then eventually they came a couple of years later and said, we actually don’t know about this this and this and we need training and help. And we said: Okay, it took you two years to come around with that, but it’s better than me standing there screaming and shouting.

So you know, I do think it frustrates now, when I am told we have to push things forward and so on. The senior leadership have not changed. I am just about the only person who changed from the senior leadership and that team always has been very open and very engaged and very keen on doing this. So it’s just about them ensuring that the communication about that, I don’t think there has been any change in the humanitarian unit about their commitment to change. Now, I was well known in WV, I had a field reputation, I was in the senior leadership team, some things were easier for me, but I don’t think that here have been new barriers come up. And even within now going global, the global environment has not being used to this kind of thinking. I really don’t think there have been many barriers. I mean the main barriers is what is the priority? I haven’t seen these big barriers. And one thing we have set up in WV is what is called community practice. So that we can keep all knowledge in one area. Before that we had a billion different working groups and advisory groups. We have over 5000 people involved in community practice now. 75% of which come from the national offices. And that has taken every major change in management process on my behalf. It hasn’t taken, I mean it has been hard work, but it hasn’t been illluminated and it hasn’t been difficult. People said, wow this actually woks. You mean you can actually go to somebody who can help me in that area? Oh I like that, where can I find that? So again, it’s been driven by the individuals and again I am constantly taken back about how far these things have rolled out and people say: oh we are now. It’s been taking up a live on its own, because people value it. So it is about hitting the right spot about what people value.

C: Do you think you would be able to do that in any organization?

I think no. I mean, I would say that nothing is impossible. One thing that drove me mad in WV in all those years is that people say no we can’t do that, it’s too political To a certain extend I put my head down and just kept running. But at the same time, really in 10 years in WV, I really honestly only hit one or two things that I would classify as too political and you know and I thought: Wow how do I ever get there? That’s why I wonder when people say, something is too political and we can’t move forward and I just say you haven’t fought, you just have to take a different approach and it works and there has also been a significant change in the senior leadership at the global level, not the humanitarian unit and that made a difference as well as the leadership coming from around, but they know what they are doing. Is this a good idea or a bad idea? Bad idea, I tell you about it. So then recently I have been asked by Children’s Fund International, CRF, ActionAid and Oxfam I have engaged with have four agencies on knowledge management
strategies. The first thing I found is that most of them are confusing about what is information and what is knowledge management. Once we have talked to the senior leadership on these issues there's tempt to be clarity and most of the staff come back and say thank you that was very useful, we have not been about to brake that barrier. (34:40) The interesting thing is that the senior staff who were not in those meetings are still pushing back and say why can't we use a database. It seems to be very much a dialogue based discussion. So once you brake those barriers, the next barrier is about where knowledge management or learning, however you wanna call it, is located. Is it located in IT or HR, then you might give up there and then. It has to be linked directly to programming, quality ministry, whatever you wanna call it. Operation, the people who do the work. If it comes in IT or HR, then it just turns into training function or information management. So again, if you can brake that and integrate it into operations, programming, whatever you wanna call it, that's another key element. So the agencies that have been able to achieve that, the wider understanding of learning and moving it to the appropriate place, has managed to make some headway. So could I go and do that in many organizations? Probably not the UN, but most of their agencies or in NGOs, I don't see why not. And again, with the ECB agencies, could we work with the WV focal points and the ECB agencies… and many of them have been locked with looking at the evaluation side, once you are able to move out of that into the broader learning side leads to better results. I don't think WV is particularly different in any way either that we have an easier work environment than other group. I mean in many ways its harder because we have an exalted networks and nobody has control about anybody, so it's a lot about of persuasion and pertruding as everything else. I do know my friends at Oxfam many times who are supposedly having people under their control and then are tearing a hair out because it turns out that they don't really have that. And many of us blame it on their internal culture, but in fact I think it's not that different. We are humanitarians instead of the set up of our organization.

M: But can you explain how the process should work, how the H-Learn should be translated into standards?
I: I was talking to Rahel because I was thinking about that. About how can we formalize the process.
C: Is there a formal process?
I: There is no formal process.
C: So generally what happens?
M: We understood that before Elenor was talking to the Senior Management Team and the SMT was then saying that research should be done about this topic and if there was a need for this specific learning to be implemented or to be officialized in a policy, they would then do this.
I: Yes, that's correct. But as you can see, she would go to the SMT.
C: Exactly.
I: And it would take some time
C: And they discussed it in the forums as well.
I: Yes in the relief forums, so she could take it to the SMT or the relief forums and that happens first and so we have identified these and then you know, that was the practice there.
C: But that's not a feasible method
I: We still use that, I think now we went even one step further by creating like this. We need to think about how we can make these immediate. Because if something comes out of a learning event, it is something that distracts. So we find these ways.
C: But do they trickle down to something which is then analyzed to take action on and to be reflected? Something like a channel that can take the information, this is very utopian, very ideal, but the learning events is on the ground level and then we have different levels, group levels and organizational levels. So my question is that point where the database, not yet, but there is a point where H-Learn or knowledge management or somewhere where the lessons go into then for you to look at the database and say right, so there are these standards and they need to be reflected by this evidence.

I: I wouldn’t look only at the lessons. Meeting minutes is very important too because some of the things they will discuss it at the leadership meetings.

C: Where do they go then?
I: The minutes?
C: The minutes, how do they go to all these meetings.
I: They are in the database and I have asked access.
C: You have access. But you need to combine them.
I: Well if there are big things coming out, there will be action on it.
M: By whom?
I: Some member
M: And they make the agenda-setting in the SMT then?
I: Sorry?
M: How is it transferred to the SMT or to the policy change? If there is an outcome at a learning event, how is it reflected in the policies afterwards?
I: There is a learning event, there is a report, there is the SOT, they are meeting next week and there had been previously a couple of weeks ago a round table. So the outcomes of the round table they will discuss in the SOT.
C: So the learning events also themselves?
I: Yes and that is why it is very important.
C: So we should get these minutes.
I: The quarterly and annual reports. Yes, so it is not just the learning events. The learning events brings more one aspect. Well it also brings other things you know, it can bring other things, but maybe the full report more in terms of organizational I don’t know. One example, H-Learn is a system functioning and an extension. (25:46) C: Relatively.
I: Yes. And it is an extension to the original, it is even more. And what I came up with is what is missing here is an accountability function. This is something missing and this will perhaps later on be discussed at the SOP. And they would decide who creates this function.
C: And who do you think from the learning events.
I: But this is also not a formal process, like a process map. From here we go there and there.
C: If the whole team here would change now.
I: Sorry?
C: If the whole team would change now, would they create their own system? Or would they use the system in the same way or would they create their own?
I: That would be different.
C: Yes I am looking for the paths.
I: You mean if there would be coming other people if they would sort of keep continuation to the work?
C: Yes so the standards are the same way that they would see there is H-Learn and there is earning events and that is where we learn from.
I: Maybe because one of the things we formalized was the handover notes for one person replacing the other. But of course you can always have someone who is doing it differently. There is another thing I think I have been doing that for tree-four years that I have been replaced. Your handover notes actually is part of your performance. How they work and if they have done it in time and that sort of things.
C: Okay, that’s important.
So from what we see now, there are four-five different learning mechanisms? One official, the learning events. That is an official learning mechanism. And then the round table meetings.
I: Wouldn’t that be official too?
C: Well depends, they look at different things but if they try to solve political issues, financial issues. It does reflect as learning event, but the question is how is that connected. Learning starts off at the ground and then goes up to the group level and then goes up to the organizational level. Or if it is different learning, and the sources are on the spot and not on an organizational level. Yes I think it might be sort of this thing, because it is a way more transparent. It will become quite different if there is actually a formalized way. Sometimes one event tackles also other issues.
C: So that prevents repetition.
I: Exactly.

56 I: WV is very much based on relationships. Sometimes I wonder for certain kinds of jobs you know how can you do it when you are brandnew. And I think that is one of the things your research is about.

57 I: You have access to all the databases? The Relief forum database is very important. Where the key things out of responses comes up.
C: No we don’t have access to that
M: We have a relief form part in this database, but it is not that one
I: You find annual reports, quarterly reports, minutes, you find everything there.

58 C: So we know how we are doing on these different lessons that we are learning or not learning. And so that was the problems of the responses that were going on every year and all the wider emergency group would be together and go through these and would say well we add on this, we add on that. Then we always had a set of lessons that we thought were never learned. And these are what we call ‘the hard nuts to crack’.

59 They were very much limited in scope, but I think over the last three years they have really blossomed more in the learning events and there is a lot more formation, I think it’s even going to evolve further.

60 We didn’t have any systematic way and we still don’t actually, because WV is quite a complicated partnership, we don’t have a systematic way of capturing all the different evaluations, program evaluations and I suppose with Kevin is geeking up some heavy reports. You know, some things are in the database, some things are missing, some things don’t even get recorded. Particularly you know if you might have someone from a support office or funding office that goes out and does an evaluation. (15:27) They keep hold of that and it is not fed into any kind of comprehensive system.
C: How do you see these two, the H-LEARN and the DM&E systems and then you have also an accountability system. How do you see them all working together? If they do.
I: No they haven’t, they are beginning to a lot more, for example DM&E and accountability are doing a learning XX together. That means typically concentration on assessments. So there is a lot more kind of collaboration going on there.

61 I: Well basically communications of the material, the lack of systems if you like so. And even within our own HEA group. We weren’t
M: I have a major question which is: Do you remember any big changes in the humanitarian sector of WV in the last ten years?
I: Oh yes, we got a hell of a lot more professional I mean we are learning from where we go. The one that pops in my mind is humanitarian accountability. Within the last ten years we have recognized the focus is the beneficiary, not the donor. The other one is, we have become more technically competent. We know what works and what does not work.
M: That’s good to hear.
I: Well I mean the whole industry, not just WV, in the last 20 years got remarkable better. And so I think we have learned. What comes to my mind is local capacities for peace. That’s what we are doing, we are getting connections and divisions.
M: You mean through humanitarian action or as another part?
I: Through humanitarian action. If you look at the response in Bosnia. Am I responding only helping the Bosnians or am I also helping the Croats and the Serbs? You know what I mean? So am I being, what’s the word I want there?
M: Neutral or impartial?
I: Neutral, that’s the word I wanted, its late afternoon. (21:52)
M: But would you say that WV has a special position in that place, are they more neutral or do they take sides for the victim?
I: I would say, we try not to take sides. I give you a great example. I work in Lebanon. WV came here in 1975 essentially to support the Christians communities during the war. We learned a lot since then. We don’t do that now. We work in communities, we are working with Jews, Christians, all sides.
M: Yes, which is more neutral and more impartial, that’s true.
I: Right, but are we perfectly neutral? Probably not.
M: No, probably not, but I guess that’s not important, but its always about what you want to achieve, the ultimate goal.
I: Yes and that is two places what is at top of my mind we improved in the last ten years. And then of course there is the technical improvements. I mean I am not a Water specialist, but I am sure we have learned better ways of drilling wells and better ways of supplying water than we did ten years ago.

M: Yes but do you remember specific events which changed the organization or the humanitarian policy of the organization?
I: Well, the first one I would totally say would be the one I told you about humanitarian accountability. I mean we are members of Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, so that one is the original, the Red Cross Code of Conduct, Sphere, another one I know we got better at WV, we call it LEAP.
M: Yes, I heard about it.
I: It is the project management cycle, we have standardized it.
M: And you also introduced H-LEARN.
I: Yes, absolutely right, that’s another one.
M: Do you think that the learning processes of WV actually are reflected in the policy changes?
I: Yes I do.
M: And how can you see that?
I: Okay and just to start off, how does that the n correspond with… Because we know that WV International are not doing evaluations.

C: Okay, no problem.

I: I have seen system changes. Policy might be the wrong word. But I have seen we change the way we do things. Structures.

C: And is that strategy organization wide or is it specifically for Zambia?

I: Yes, it's completely directed towards emergency responses. That is institutionalized into our practice and I think evaluations less so. I think that there is a lot of reasons why we see evaluations in some responses and not in others. I think it's pretty inconsistent, our level of evaluations. It has much more been straight forward for us to do learning events than doing evaluations.

C: Okay I don't think I have seen that document yet. We are trying to collect, to put together all the documents that exist and we are in the process of doing that here in Geneva. So they should have that document here, this M&E strategy?

I: It's just in the process of being published. So I think if you ask Rahel, she has some copy of that. And then probably, hopefully in the next weeks, there will be the published copy.
I: think if we look at the demand part, there is a gap there, people who are responsible to make decisions in responses are not really demanding evaluations to be done. And there is probably several reasons for that. Because it’s not really on their priority, there is no budgeting for, then it does happen. It tends to happen when there is an external drive that brings that issue forward. So if we have a grant that has a specific mandate, then we are still driven by those external conditions. Self in WV the demand for evaluations is not high. And I think that comes from the value that people have seen or not seen in the past. So a lot of times, we generated evaluations for external demands and they haven’t really helped that response per se at the end of the response, so what people get of that is around what we did, whether we actually showed accountability and put no opportunity to make different decisions about what is happening and so that person goes into the next response. So it is kind of a loop that is happening there, we do them when its required, but the people who would be the ones to demand it in the next evaluation didn’t have a lot of value from the evaluation personally when they go into the next response it follows the same pattern.

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C: It’s a classic problem. Theory of use and theory of what we say. In organizations that is often the case. So what we want to do and what we do. What I am trying to track down is how do the findings of the evaluations or the learning events in this case, because we are looking at the learning events that were done- do you see them linking to the level of organizational learning, I mean not necessarily to individual learning? If they do, if they do all the learning events? I: I think we can use the 80-20 rule here. Probably 80% of what came out has been used at the individual level, but 20% also has been used at the organizational level. I don’t wanna disregard that but I think that most learning is individualized.

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C: Can you think of any organizational learning that has happened over the years, not necessarily those that have evolved or been pressured from the outside but more from internal findings, from response experience, that then trickle back to OL and then leading to a change in policy or strategies? I: I would say just from the fact that we continue to do learning events and that they have become so much part of what we do, that shows that there is a value of doing them. Otherwise we would have stopped doing them. C: Yes, they become institutionalized really. I: The organization has learned I guess that doing learning events is a good thing and so we continue to do that. So there is organizational change around that. Have we maximized our use of that? No, but that is not the question. We have changed our practice around doing learning events. We do them pretty consistently. Could it be better? Of course, but that is one place where I have seen for example organizational change. Answering that question. This will come out of what you are looking at. So many times we see the same message repeated. Because if we keep seeing the same message from learning event to learning event it means that we are not really implementing the thing that we learn. And so we need to do the feedback around. And we need to do it earlier in the process. And we are starting, Right? Starting to do that. But what it means is within emergency, the organizations says that sometimes there is a lack of urgency, but I would say that we also have a lack of urgency responding to what comes out at lessons learned. So eventually we get to some of them, but there is no urgency in them, what can I see to take the problems and react quickly, there may be exceptions to that. But I am just saying to what from I have seen.

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Maybe that also making that change in a response is a difficult thing. Maybe it comes back to some kind of thing that is happening in a non-response time. So for example how are we encouraging people who will be a response manager to really understand not just our lessons learned but also something good practice, how are we trying to support that in a non emergency context? Because at the time when they go in, you are not trying and learn how to do that. You have a sense of what is that and that looks different.

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C: That’s good, so OL theory claims that OL is fundamental requirement for an organization to survive. So the theory claims if an organization doesn’t learn, it will die. What do you think, is this true for humanitarian organizations or are they unique and it is not true? I: I think it is true, actually. I think that the less we learn the less relevant we become over time until we actually die. And so that becomes important because we can go through along way while becoming less relevant until we are actually expiring. Maybe that is part of the problem around the urgency. If you knew tomorrow, if you did interact, if you didn’t make the change, if you knew your organization would die, for sure, you would want to do that. But if you didn’t have that change tomorrow or next year, because it is only becoming a little less effective, then the level of urgency is much lower. (30:24)

C: Yes, absolutely. So it is directly linked to the incentives and the need to learn. I: Yes.

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What major changes do you remember in the strategic policy in the humanitarian sector of WV in the last 10 years? Like very broad changes which actually affected or should have affected the ground. I: Right. That is a tough question because I think my experience mostly is as an implementer and sometimes there is policy happening you don’t even know what they are because you don’t even know the policy in the beforehand anyway.

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changes and operational approaches to humanitarian response. I: I think there is a lot more intentional communication with community members. So about their needs and their concerns. That comes from a number of different place at the same time. There has certainly been a much stronger accountability function. This is also part of our DM&E policy referring to the high level, I think there were people who were reading that and trying to implement that on the ground. So those two things that are kind of happening at the same time.

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I: Do you mean whether the policies are enforced on the ground? M: Yes I: I am not sure that… I think there are some policies that have just become part of our standards and operational procedures and part of our behavior and part of what we do. Those ones are the ones that really work. And we don’t even think about them so much as policies anymore. But there are areas where there are policies that are more non-living. They are less relevant but those, it doesn’t really happen even if people are aware of it. Do you know what I mean? So I think there is actually a lot of policy things that is happening on the ground but people might not even be aware of them as policies. M: Yes, so people are unsure that those are changes. You already said that you participated in several learning events. And do you think that the learning events, you already said that they change for 80% individuals, do you think these learning events change the humanitarian work on the ground? I: Let me just correct something that you said. I personally never have been at a learning event. Although I helped facilitate a sort of a learning event. But in terms of going through a learning event, I haven’t really done that. But what I have seen is how they have, you know what I have seen is from them not happening to them happening after every response. Does that make sense? So that is what I have observed. And when I talk to people about it, that’s where I see those pieces in sort of becoming individual ways of working. When I see them talking about things, that is where there learning is coming out. I guess that is the point that I was trying to make. I see the same message repeated. Because if we keep seeing the same message from learning event to learning event it means that we are not really implementing the thing that we learn. And so we need to do the feedback around. And we need to do it earlier in the process. And we are starting, Right? Starting to do that. But what it means is within emergency, the organizations says that sometimes there is a lack of urgency, but I would say that we also have a lack of urgency responding to what comes out at lessons learned. So eventually we get to some of them, but there is no urgency in them, what can I see to take the problems and react quickly, there may be exceptions to that. But I am just saying to what from I have seen.

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You know, people do learning events, they go them, they participate, it is really good for the people who are there, the question only is how do we maximize the effectiveness of it at the organizational level? M: I actually don’t think that the learning events actually are connected to change in policies and can you remember perhaps some events where that happened or some number of events in the past? I: I don’t think that I can answer that specifically. I think there are people who could answer that better. Because I think it has happened and I can’t give you examples of that now, that is why I am hesitant right now. I can say yes, but I can’t tell you specifics, but I know that it has had. M: Yes, but do you know who is responsible for doing that, for realizing what has been learned at learning events? I: Within the structure of what has happened previously there was the cracking the nuts system where H-LEARN would sum a bunch of trends and picked out what was the senior leadership. And then the senior leadership would take action on it on a specific few items. So that is how it is supposed to work. I really think there has been some successes, but there is room for more of
81 I: Yes, I joined WV in 2000 as a humanitarian coordinator for the African Region. And at that stage there was no formal position anywhere in WV for learning or anything like that. But there were two things that were ongoing. One was a process which was called lessons-learned workshops, which was done pretty much as a sort of ad hoc. There would be a documentation of pieces about Rwanda. So I think throughout 2000 there were be like three or four done, but it was pretty ad hoc based on big responses.

82 C: And pretty soon after I joined there was a working group together which has a very long term, something like best practices and learning in relief or something. I can’t really remember exactly, BPRS - Best Practices and Relif Standards, I think that was probably what it was called. And I remember for some reason I got to be on that group, and I remember the first meeting. There was at that stage that group focused on putting together some standards for the humanitarian group. So we did not have standards about how we respond to different sizes of emergencies. It must be some good practices. I think the feeling was, there now do we bring that good practice together to develop good standards? So for a couple of years we developed all of these standards and everything else which you know certainly pulled together people’s own personal best practice and examples and what worked and didn’t work. It wasn’t a systematic operation of the standards, just like OIL at that stage? And so for the standards, it was sort of bumped along and did a few learning events. There weren’t really any lessons learned workshops or implementation guides. (08:17)

C: And this is when? Sorry?

I: This is between 2002 and 2003. So as part of this working group which had sort of bumped along, I sort of had raised a number of issues that we weren’t really putting together, it was more reactive to each learning event rather than anything else. So I tempted a trend analysis across the different workshops we have done, evaluations, so the things that contributed towards learning.

And to be honest, it was a bit of a nightmare, because every report was different. There was no standard format, it was like applying across the different workshops. Some reports were two pages long, some were hundred pages long. And out of that comes a number of suggestions. We need to standardize it, we need to have standard templates, we need to actually say what are we trying to learn etc.

But what it did do is that it brought together some very clear trends. So the first time, this is 2003 beginning of 2004, we were actually able to say, across the responses we have looked at, we are systematically failing in x, y, or systematically sharing practices in a, b, and c. As sort of results, it was decided that we needed humanitarian learning unit and I then it was about me to come in and sort out. What did I find when I came in, well not a lot. There wasn’t really anything there. So I was working on this part time for about a year on beforehand. I came in with a blank sheet of paper and the first thing I really focused on was: What do we mean by learning, I mean we were doing these lessons learned events which was basically just some data and a bit of validation and that’s it, and of course that is only the start of the learning cycle. So we really had to look at the academic side of better practices and we moved into an understanding about the process that translates information to data and information to learning and learning to knowledge. So what people have done in the past, maybe the first of three or four steps. And one of the things we did was turning it a lessons workshops to learning event, which was an important step since our leadership thought it is called lessons learned, so we have learned something, but in fact most of the times it is lessons not unlearned. So that was kind of a key moment when people realized that what we did was only a tool, one single thing you do in a wider process. And so from there over the next few years a couple of things rolled out. So first when we did learning events, even if we didn’t standardize and sort out when we did, we did learning events. And after about three years I covered both roles. But we didn’t have any additional resources. So our focus then was to work actually at the global level about what the overall DM&E standards should be and that was documented in LEAD, and how to make sure that the tools are appropriate for humanitarian focus.

83 C: I just now have been looking at the humanitarian database that was launched not long ago and I understand that you are working on a global database that holds all the knowledge.

I: We got worlddivisioncentral which is our portal which holds all the knowledge. Basically all of our internal knowledge and information has been moved to that database, the one web-based system, our humanitarian is one of the first ones which moved across.

C: No it’s been wonderful to look at this database. I have been gathering data on WV, evaluations and learning events for the last two years, just now I have seen the database for the first time. I mean it is nice to see all the same reports. I mean I had the reports already, but it was nice to see them online in one place, one location.

I: Yes, it’s gonna make a big difference to have everything, because before we had everything on various places, now we have it on one system, which is gonna make a very big difference.

C: So, what I wanted to know, I one of my struggles was to get evaluation reports for the humanitarian units, post response evaluation reports. And there seems to be a gap between the Global reports, and the unit evaluation reports. And the unit level, all the lessons learned events, but not the evaluation reports. And I wanted to ask you, how do you see it interacting later on, so maybe one question, one level within the humanitarian unit, how does knowledge management, evaluation and learning, the learning events interact between them and the global level, I mean where you are now. So whatever angle you would like to take on that.

I: Okay, there is a very simple explanation reports and that is maybe one thing that you can’t do with a global WV has never been very strong in doing what I call classic evaluation. We did evaluations when they were required by our grant donors, but most of that done by our funding office, for example WV UK owns the sort of committee for doing evaluations next to everything else. We don’t have a great big body of evaluations. So when I have become the humanitarian role, the learning role, we said that what we need is a DM&E or monitoring and evaluation role to go with it because we need to do that with it. We didn’t have the funding to do it. So four three years I covered both roles. But we didn’t have any additional resources. So our focus then was to work actually at the global level about what the overall DM&E standards should be and that was documented in LEAD, and how to make sure that the tools are appropriate for humanitarian focus.

84 So I chaired ALNAP for three years and I was a full member for about six years. And one thing that came out very clearly from the work there is that my colleagues in many other agencies who would do evaluations and were evaluation directors found it extremely frustrating that they did all these evaluations and they felt there was no utilization of them and very little change process came out of the evaluations. And in fact one of the phenomenal moments in ALNAP was the utilization study done on the RHA about three years ago. Because one of my frustrations when I went into ALNAP is the feeling was that to evaluate is everything. Evaluation as a key learning is very important key to learning, but it’s only one. (17:15) And after we had the utilization study that was done, there was one of these ‘aha’ moments that people realized that evaluations are just one part of them. So would I like to adapt to more evaluation? Absolutely. But at the same time we made a very conscious decision in WV that while they are important, they are only one part of what we need to do and that is why we sort of didn’t stop everything to make the evaluation a big agenda. And I think that’s right because if look at my colleague agencies, without saying we have got it all right, but we have been able to move further with the utilization of learning and change within organizations with a mix of learning events, reviews and evaluations etc. than those agencies who have just used evaluations.

85 C: But sorry, would you be able to give some examples of that? So you are saying that you can see changes from learning so maybe you can name some learning techniques which you find successful apart from the learning events and some examples of how that changed policies and responses?

I: I have got tons and tons of examples and I can send you some paperwork if you are interested. But in brief, we did a number of different things. Every three years there were included evaluations. And that was a five top learnings, negative learnings usually and thinking what can we really learn from this. And just at the top of my head, there some very clear significant direct results. For example in the early trends analysis what came out is, we needed our third wave to include HR and IT people. Was never the case. That then was put into our operational comparative that
these are the key areas in which we need third wave staff as HR and IT. So that was a clear result for that. We had a lot of issues coming up about leadership in national offices. And their attitud e to be able to grasp the issue and to respond. And as a direct result of that we set up the executive response team. The pre-response team and then the collective response team which was a group of three of four high level very experienced WV people who could go in at the very beginning, it’s gonna hit, or in the very very early days to basically fit with the national director, the national board, you know any of the very senior people to guide them through the process of what was expected of them in the partnership. That was a direct result of the cracking the nut, one of the top five learning’s. (21:00)

Another one of the top five learning’s was around capacity building and how do we do capacity building. We already got some nice examples of capacity building. But it allowed us to really go into more depths about what is working, what isn’t working, who should we be building on? There has been an over-emphasis on our GRRT, the second term people. It was never more than 10% of the people who went into the response of an emergency. And the findings from the learning events coupled with overall effectiveness within the regions really enable people to say, yes they are an important element, but they are only one important element. And we put so much time into training supporting coaching the people from the GRRT and yet they are only 10, maybe 20% of the people that we expected to do with the team. So what are we supporting and how do we think of these kinds of dialogues. And sometimes there was a direct cause and effect. The trends analysis said that we need more IT people and we go and change the operational imperatives for IT people going the third way, other times it opened up a much broader conversation which then lead to changes.

Then in addition to that there was in every learning event and then equally in the trends analysis, what we typically found was that 20% of what happened in that emergency was totally contextual to that particular emergency. And therefore has to be dealt with by the national office. Or you just shook your shoulders and said okay that wasn’t necessary, but wouldn’t happen again out of context. (22:57)

And people in WV will have clear learning and clear possibilities to change. I think the issue is often coming with other agencies of which we have just come up with taking the evaulation route. Sometimes it is very difficult to come up with clear facts for change. Because evaluations are much more qualitative than everything else. So the barriers which I have seen, which I haven’t seen to be honest as much in WV, when you come in with a very strong argument you know we need more capacity of working people need to know more, that’s a huge amount. And the presented on an annual basis to those groups to tag the institutional issues. And that was certainly slower and less direct cause and effect discussion. But there was most definitely engagement on both levels and definitely both senior leadership would come back and say we want annual reports of the trends analysis, see how we are doing, it lead to increased funding to the humanitarian group. It lead to changes in the way that we look at the finance and HR and things for the next year. This was in the form which was presented on a Monday and on the Tuesday was change. Within the humanitarian group it was in fact quite easy to say that, we sat in a room and said, okay let’s develop this and do this, we made it happen ourselves. But there were very clear examples of where institutional changes happened because of what we have driven announcedly humanitarian learning areas. (24:49)

G: It is great to hear this. The cracking the nut activity had to do a lot with the position and the capacity to do that. And now things have changed quite a bit in the structure.

I: Yes and that is when I left, this was one of my big concerns. I thought this is not good. But at the same time, it... how do I put this? There hasn’t been a push to leadership. You know, WV is not a hierarchical organization. You can go to whoever whenever. Not like in the UN where you cant talk to anyone. And I have been encouraging. It was much easier when I was sitting, I do not accept that not sitting on the SNT is a fundamental issue. I do believe there are other ways to.

C: And what do you think on an organizational level and on an individual level. While in corporate it would be money of course. What do you think of that, since you are in ALNAP as well.

I: I think the main incentive is to go back to the job. I think this is why we are in this industry, to do the very very best for the people we serve. And you know, everyone I come across just wants to do what they do, be more effective, have more impact and to be more efficient. I mean there is a cost driver. And therefore people are very open to learning. And the people at ALNAP. I think the issue when people have clear learning and clear possibilities to change. I think the issue is often coming with other agencies of which we have just come up with taking the evaluation route. Sometimes it is very difficult to come up with clear facts for change. Because evaluations are much more qualitative than everything else. So the barriers which I have seen, which I haven’t seen to be honest as much in WV, when you come in with a very strong argument you know we need more capacity of working people need to know more, that’s a huge amount. And the presented on an annual basis to those groups to tag the institutional issues. And that was certainly slower and less direct cause and effect discussion. But there was most definitely engagement on both levels and definitely both senior leadership would come back and say we want annual reports of the trends analysis, see how we are doing, it lead to increased funding to the humanitarian group. It lead to changes in the way that we look at the finance and HR and things for the next year. This was in the form which was presented on a Monday and on the Tuesday was change. Within the humanitarian group it was in fact quite easy to say that, we sat in a room and said, okay let’s develop this and do this, we made it happen ourselves. But there were very clear examples of where institutional changes happened because of what we have driven announcedly humanitarian learning areas. (24:49)

C: Do you think you would be able to do that in any organization?

I: I think no. I mean, I would say that nothing is impossible. One thing that drove me mad in WV in all those years is that people say no we can’t do that, it’s too political To a certain extent I put my head down and just kept running. But at the same time, really in 10 years in WV, I really honestly only hit one or two things that I would classify as too political and you know I thought: Wow how do I ever get there? That’s why I wonder, something is too political and we can’t say anything. I mean we have just have to take a different approach and it works and there has also been a significant change in the senior leadership at the global level, not the humanitarian but the global level and that made a difference as well cause these are not people who just go around, but they know what they are doing. Is this a good idea or a bad idea? Bad idea, I tell you what thou it. So then recently I have been asked by Children’s Fund International, CRF, ActionAid and Oxfam I have engaged with hose four agencies on knowledge management strategies. The first thing I found is that most of them are confusing about what is information and what is knowledge management. Once we have talked to the senior leadership in these issues there’s a need to be clarity and most of the staff come back and say thank you that was very useful, we have not been about to break this barrier. (24:42) The interesting thing is that the senior staff that when we were in those meetings are still pushing back and say why can’t we use a database. It seems to be very much a dialogue based discussion. So once you break those barriers, the next barrier is about where knowledge management or learning, however you wanna call it, is
located. If it located in IT or HR, then you might give up there and then. It has to be linked directly to programming, quality ministry, whatever you wanna call it. Operation, the people who do the work. If it comes in IT or HR function, then it just turns into training function or information management. So again, if you can brake that and integrate it into operations, programming, whatever you wanna call it, that’s another key element. So the agencies that have been able to achieve that, the wider understanding of learning and moving it to the appropriate trace, has managed to make some headway. So could I go and do that in many organizations? Probably not the UN, but most of their agencies or in NGOs, I don’t see why not. And again, with the ECB agencies, could we work with the WV focal points and the ECB agencies… and many of them have been locked with looking at the evaluation side, once you are able to move out of that into the broader learning side leads to better results. I don’t think WV is particularly different in any way either that we have an easier work environment than other group, I mean in many ways its harder because we have an exaltered networks and nobody has control about anybody, so it’s a lot about of persuasion and persuading as everything else. I do know my friends at Oxfam many times who are supposedly having people under their control and then are tearing a hair out because it turns out that they don’t really have that. And many of us blame it on their internal culture, but in fact I think it’s not that different. We are humanitarians instead of the set up of our organization.

And these standards are out of learning. So it would be interesting whether it was really ad hoc or it was really out of this specific learning. I think, I have been in this area for two years. I can’t say whether before it was very deliberate or not, I know it has happened, but I don’t know in the last couple of years, this is important for the purpose of your research, it has been very deliberate. If something comes up from the learning events, we need to do A,B,C for the standards. Or a tool, one of the learning events might say, which is one of the things that has been coming up right now, that even above the standards, that’s the reason why we are going to do it. They think better in rapid onset than in slow onset. But even in rapid onset, it just doesn’t fit the way that things have changed. (is meant that some toll fit better to rapid onset and not to slow onset, which is why it had to be changed?)