Dying Together, Living Apart: “Cultural Peacebuilding” as a Catalyst for Peaceful Change

How the Problematic Nature of Intractable Conflicts, caused by a high Prevalence of “Conflict Culture”, can be addressed by a “Cultural Peacebuilding” Strategy

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Preface

Writing this master thesis was mostly a part-time endeavour. Even though the scope and depth of the topic required my full attention and time, the fact that I started my internship within the first month of starting my thesis, meant that I had to do my research and writing in the evenings and weekends. Dividing my time and attention was not always easy, and I would lie if I said that I always enjoyed sitting behind my laptop while my friends were having a good time in Geneva. However, the subject never stopped interesting me, and whenever I would sit down to write about or research the issue of peacebuilding, I forgot about everything else that was happening around me.

Even though I have remained passionate about this paper until the end, I do not think there would have been an end if it had not been for my colleagues and supervisors during my internship, as well as the friends that I made here in Geneva. Not only did they provide me with the necessary time to make sufficient progress, they also supported me, cheered me on, and showed sincere interest in what I was doing. I thank them for that. Heartfelt thanks to my family as well, whose faith in me has kept me going. Especially my father left more footprints on the pages of this paper then he will ever know. Moreover, my gratitude goes out to David, whose endless knowledge helped me improve my work. Last but not least, I have to thank my boyfriend, who had to share me with books, articles and desktop computers even during the short amount of time that we had together this previous year. Yet, he never complained, and stood by me every step of the way.
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<td>ASEAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISEPO</td>
<td>Canada International Scientific Exchange Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles (of Interim Self-Government Arrangements of the PA, which marked the beginning of the Oslo process)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GCMHP</td>
<td>Gaza Community Health Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IPCRI</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OPT</td>
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<td>P2P</td>
<td>People-to-People (phrase for activities that bring people in direct contact with each other)</td>
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<td>PIJ</td>
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<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIME</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute of the Middle East</td>
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<td>SFP</td>
<td>School for Peace (an initiative of the Neve Shalom/Wahat-al-Salam (Oasis of Peace) community)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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Introduction

Our world today is scarred by countless types of conflict. More then ever before, images of urban violence, national struggles, international confrontations and fierce ethnic wars enter our living rooms and leave lasting impressions. The most persistent, ongoing and violent conflicts today are so-called intractable conflicts. These types of conflict are often about deep-rooted issues, such as identity and human needs, and they are characterized by extreme levels of violence and destruction. Most of all, however, intractable conflicts have sunken into a state of self-perpetuating, in which violence from one side generates even more violence from the opposite party (www.beyondintractability.org, “Characteristics”). This cycle has proven very difficult to break. Even though the amount of policy aimed at building peace in all types of conflict has increased significantly in the past decades, most intractable conflicts, as the name implies, have defied any form of resolution (www.beyondintractability.org, “What Are Intractable Conflicts?”; Crocker et al. 4). Why these conflicts are nearly impossible to solve is not well understood. In this paper, I will argue that the human, or more specifically, cultural component of these conflicts has not been addressed adequately. In order to forge these intractable conflicts into peaceful and sustainable situations, peacebuilding needs to incorporate grassroots to top-level initiatives in order to change peoples’ perspective on themselves, others, and the conflict. This approach lies at the heart of a new peacebuilding strategy that will be presented and explained in this paper.

By taking a human-centred, culture-sensitive approach, this paper aims to crystallize the effect that people and their opinions, sentiments and perspectives have on a conflict situation, as well as vice versa. The concept conflict culture will be introduced in order to explain the inevitable connection between culture and conflict. The concept of conflict culture lies at the heart of a new peacebuilding strategy, named cultural peacebuilding. This approach aims to address the problematic nature of intractable conflicts by bringing grassroots, mid-level and top-level initiatives together and to create a broad support for the peacebuilding process.
The Problematic Nature of Intractable Conflicts
The term *intractable conflict* is widely used, but slightly understood. The term *intractable* refers mostly to persistence of a conflict, and its longevity and resistance to resolution. It has also been interpreted as being irresolvable, but this is naturally a problematic view when discussing the possibility of peacebuilding (Crocker et al. 5). The occurrence of intractable conflicts is growing, and currently, more than 25 percent of all conflicts have lasted at least one generation (25 years) (Dynamics of Conflict (by ICC), “Intractable Conflict”). Examples include Sri-Lanka, Israel and the Palestinian, Kashmir, Somalia, the Congo and many others (Crocker et al. 4; www.beyondintractability.org, “What are Intractable Conflicts?”). These types of conflict are of international concern, as their effects include harmful, cross-regional practices such as drugs smuggling, illegal weapon proliferation, human trafficking, money laundering and terrorism (Crocker et al. 4). However, the effect that an intractable conflict has on the populations involved is most severe.

In an intractable conflict, societies become trapped in a vicious cycle of violence (Bar-Tal, “Collective Memory” 88). Because they persist for a long time and often last at least a generation, perceptions of violence, the *self* and the *other* become embedded in society by the institutionalisation of the conflict through social, political and cultural channels (Bar-Tal, “Collective Memory” 90). These cultural channels include ideologies, legends, myths, ceremonies, rituals and religious beliefs (Aronoff xvii). The reason why societies adapt to conflict in such manner is rather logical. As conflict emerges and violence occurs more often, affecting all members of society, people need to be able to understand these events. Rationalisations might include the dehumanization of the enemy and the glorification of one's own goals or cause. Connected to these rationalisations are ideologies and symbols that degrade the opponent and celebrated the lives lost for the greater good. These ideologies and symbols become integrated into rituals, ceremonies and a sense of identity. The longer a conflict lasts, the more embedded these cultural aspects become and the harder they are to change. After several decades, parties might not even be fighting for a particular cause anymore; they are only fighting each other out of principle.
This cultural manifestation of the conflict within a society’s culture as described above is not unknown. A number of scholars, including Daniel Bar-Tal and Schmidt and Schröder have recognised the profound effects that conflict has on culture, as well as vice versa. However, as will be explained in the following chapter, the terminology used by these scholars is both proliferated and vague. In order to underline the cultural dimension of conflict, the concept of conflict culture will be used in this paper.

Current peacebuilding approaches and initiatives have failed to solve some of the most relentless intractable conflicts of our time, such as the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, or opposing groups in Kashmir and Somalia. In my view, this is partly due to the fact that most peacebuilding strategies focus mainly on institutional peacebuilding and fail to take into account the conflict culture that is embedded in many of these conflicted societies. As Galtung explained, positive peace can only be achieved by addressing direct, structural and cultural violence (Ramsbotham 41), which forms an inherent part of a conflict culture. However, while peace enforcement has focused on stopping direct violence, peace-making aims to bring conflicting parties towards a peace agreement and peacebuilding is mainly concerned with structural peacebuilding by strengthening institutions, the cultural aspect of peacebuilding has remained unexplored.

Research Question and Conceptual Framework:
In the last decade, peacebuilding has become a matter of great international interest. Since the publication of “An Agenda for Peace” in 1992, written by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the term peacebuilding has taken up its rightful place in the Peace and Conflict Studies dictionary. In the years that followed the publication of An Agenda for Peace, the notion of peacebuilding was operationalised in several UN resolutions and today it forms an essential part of international as well as national response to violent conflict. Even though peacebuilding initiatives have proved extremely beneficial in many post-conflict societies, they have failed to transform many of the intractable conflicts that we know today.

Peacebuilding in generally known to constitute of several important strategies, namely, (1) re-integrating former combatants into civilian society, (2)
security sector reform, (3) strengthening the rule of law, (4) improving respect of human right, (5) providing technical assistance for democratic development and (6) promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques (Ramsbotham et al. 575). Although these aspects seem to cover all the aspects needed for the reconstruction of a peaceful society, I argue that they fail to achieve real success in intractable conflicts because they inadequately address underlying cultural issues that make these types of conflicts especially problematic. Additionally, they are build on the premise that peacebuilding starts in a post-conflict setting, I will argue, however, that peacebuilding needs to commence in a far earlier stage in order to pave the way for a sustainable, widely supported peace situation.

As mentioned above, intractable conflicts, because of their multi-generational and extreme violent nature, inevitably affect people a their society to their core. The change in culture that often takes place, referred to in this paper as a conflict culture, influences the way people perceive themselves, their opponent, the use of violence and the conflict as a whole. Because the conflict itself becomes embedded in people's identity, solving it becomes increasingly problematic. Therefore, in order to move beyond people's strong identification with their struggle, the dehumanization of the opponent, a polarized perception of the situation and the normalisation of violence, the underlying conflict culture needs to be addressed. However, the process of changing a conflict culture cannot take place in a vacuum. Firstly, the success of the endeavour depends on institutional support. Secondly, people's sentiments and perceptions, although they lie at the core, are not the only components of a society, and changes on institutional and political level are needed as well. Hence, a peacebuilding approach is needed that incorporates all these different aspects. The strategy that I have coined cultural peacebuilding, will therefore build on existing peacebuilding approaches whilst addressing underlying cultures of violence within conflicting societies in order to build a sustainable peace. This strategy will be presented by answering the following question:

What is “cultural peacebuilding” and how can it contribute to the peaceful transformation of intractable conflicts?
In order to answer this question, we first have to assess the concept that lies at the heart of the cultural peacebuilding strategy, namely, the notion of conflict culture and its significance in intractable conflicts. This assessment leads to the following sub-question:

1. What is a “conflict culture” and how does it relate to intractable conflicts?

This question forms the conceptual foundation of my research, and will be answered in chapter 1. As mentioned above, the idea of a conflict culture is not a new one, although the term is. By drawing from existing theories, the concept of conflict culture will more accurately underline the significant relation between conflict and culture.

After laying the foundation, I will present the cultural peacebuilding approach. In chapter 2, the following question will be answered:

1. In its aim to address the problematic nature of intractable conflict, how does “cultural peacebuilding” intend to change the underlying “conflict culture”?

This question will be answered by providing a thorough explanation of the way in which cultural peacebuilding addresses the specific nature of intractable conflicts and by describing the different strategic steps in great detail.

In order to move beyond a purely analytical exercise it is also important to consider the practical implementation of the cultural peacebuilding strategy. Therefore, the following question is asked:

1. How can the “cultural peacebuilding” strategy be applied in the field?

As the cultural peacebuilding approach is based on current successes as well as failures, chapter 3 will be used to give an in-depth analysis of a case study and to compare those peacebuilding initiatives as conducted in the field with the cultural peacebuilding strategy as introduced in the chapter 2. This case
study will be the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is probably the most persistent and culturally entrenched conflict of our time. By applying the theoretical model on an actual situation, this chapter aims to operationalize the cultural peacebuilding approach on the one hand, and highlight the crevices in current peacebuilding efforts on the other hand.

Finally, the research question will be answered in the concluding chapter. Moreover, I will assess the added value of the cultural peacebuilding approach and share my views on the phenomenon in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.

Methodology
Although, in many ways, this study would benefit from a field-based, qualitative research approach, a variety of constraints do not permit such a methodological method at this point in time. Therefore, the research questions mentioned above will be answered by conducting a literature-based study, which will draw from a variety of sources.

In order to explain the phenomenon of intractable conflicts and clarify the concepts of a conflict culture and, by extension, cultural peacebuilding, anthropological as well as psychological literature has been thoroughly examined. To connect these findings to the concept of peacebuilding, I have drawn from the rich field of Peace and Conflict studies, in addition to official UN sources, such as the reports mentioned above as well as Security Counsel Resolutions. For the assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian case-study, I have used academic analytical studies as well as grey sources.
1. Cultural Change in Intractable Conflicts

Within conflict and peace studies, the relationship between culture and conflict has been examined by a number of scholars. In general, one can distinguish two approaches. Firstly, culture, or rather, cultural differences have been characterised as a source of conflict. This line of thinking links to the idea that certain cultures are more prone to violent conflicts than others, as well as the notion that certain irreconcilable differences between cultures can lead to tensions and, in certain cases, conflict between them. One could describe this type of conflict as a *culture conflict*. Contrastingly, the second approach focuses more on the effect that conflict has on culture and the way in which *conflict cultures* are created through the existence of multi-generational and intractable conflicts. Naturally, both approaches are connected in theory as well as practice, and *cultures of violence* are often believed to be the source of ongoing or returning conflicts within societies as well.

Even though cultural characteristics and variations in conflict situations have been addressed in peace and conflict studies, the concept of culture per se has yet to be thoroughly examined (Marsella 652). However, current trends in conflict resolution approaches have recognised the importance of grass root and civil society involvement. As culture lies at the very foundation of every society, I believe that a deepened understanding of the role of culture in conflict is essential for a successful peacebuilding approach.

To understand the way in which conflict and culture influence each other, a theoretical understanding of the concept of culture is needed. Therefore, the concept of culture will be explained in the paragraph below. Subsequently, the relation between culture and conflict will be treated, after which the phenomenon of the intractable conflict in particular will be examined, with special regard for the socio-psychological effects that such a conflict has on the people involved. To make this more tangible, I will introduce the example of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To conclude, the different aspects will be combined to form a comprehensive definition of a *conflict culture*. 
1.1 The Why and How of Culture

Culture is a widely used yet contested concept. Although culture has been defined in many different ways and for many different purposes, anthropologists have reached a certain consensus about the most important characteristics of culture. Firstly, culture is something distinctly human. No other beings have such complex and diverse structures of behaviour and meaning as people do. Moreover, culture is all-encompassing, as it affects all aspects of life and, often, specific cultural features are expressed most clearly in the everyday behaviour of people. Culture, however, is not static, and because all features, such as customs, institutions and beliefs, are connected through integrated, patterned systems, a change in one of these features leads to a change in the entire culture (Kottak 35-38, 41).

In essence, culture is shared. Even though individuals might have their own modes of behaviour and systems of meaning, it only becomes a culture when a group shares them and members of the group pass their culture through to their progeny. In this way, culture forms a collective meaning system, which is expressed through symbols and myths that convey the goals and values deemed important by society (Aronoff xiii). Because of its shared nature, culture is often embedded in a community’s norms, values, institutions, and acceptable practices. In this sense, culture provides people with a tool to understand their surroundings and to allocate appropriate action (Ross, 184). It is essentially this function, the provision of meaning, which explains the existence of culture.

From a psychological perspective, culture meets particular human needs. The famous American professor in psychology, Abraham Maslow, was one of the first scholars to describe these needs though a psychological prism, which formed the basis of a new approach in psychology, namely humanistic psychology. In Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the third most important desire of humans, after physiological needs and the necessity of security, is to feel loved and to belong (Maslow 20-21). The need to belong to a group is strongly connected with the phenomenon of a shared and collective culture that determines inter-group behaviour as well as group boundaries. Additionally, human beings have a cognitive need to understand their environment as well as their place in it. According to Maslow, the satisfaction of this basic need is a
necessary prerequisite for people’s self-actualisation. In order to make sense of the world, people usually conform to the dominant worldviews and modes of identification within their society during their childhood. This process of enculturation is therefore an important aspect of all human cultures (20-21). The relationship between the human need for meaning, the cognitive structures described above and the resulting worldviews, which form the core of culture, can be seen in figure 1.

The relationship between psychological development and culture does not end there. Although the influence of culture on our psyche is well documented, it has also been recognised that human psychological development in general contributes to the formation and continuation of a shared culture. The so-called object-relations theory, an important psychodynamic theory within psychoanalytic psychology, explains how people develop mentally by interacting with their environment. This theory aims to explain our thoughts and feelings about other people, or, in psychoanalytical discourse, objects, and the way in which they mediate our interpersonal functioning (Westen 430). According to this theory, children use a number of psychodynamic mechanisms during early childhood to establish the process known as concept formation, an active process that is central to the ego functions of memory, symbolization, judgment, abstraction, comprehension, and insight (Meloy 36). One of these is the attachment mechanism, through which a child emotionally connects with the people close to it, and fails to do so with others (Westen, 431). Another mechanism is identification, which does not only include the emotionally and mental bond a child experiences with another person, but also the actions this bond entails. Moreover, the process of externalization, of projection, moves a child to attribute those images, feelings and impulses that cannot be integrated with the self-image, to the external world (Ross 57-58). Finally, societal organisations, such as the family, school, political parties greatly influence the child’s development as well (Raviv et al. 7). Logically, people in similar circumstances attach, identify and externalise in a similar matter. These processes therefore contribute to the formation of collective identities, which is an important aspect of culture. All in all, culture and socio-psychological development are closely related to each other.
1.2 Hand in Glove: Culture and Conflict

As mentioned above, culture is adaptive. Because one of the most important functions of culture is to explain people's surrounding world, a change in this world means that societies will adapt. Obviously, conflict has a dramatic effect on people's worlds, and therefore, the culture that signifies a society in its "normal" state transforms accordingly. In other words, cultures change when they become less effective in coping with existential and social problems that might arise due to a conflict situation (Aronoff xv). Similarly, as cognitive structures evolve and transform as a result of interaction with the environment, psychosocial development also depends on socio-cultural factors (Raviv et al. 6).

Actually, one might say that culture in a conflict situation plays an even more pronounced role than in a peaceful setting. This has to do with certain manifestations of culture that relate to certain characteristics of conflict societies. Firstly, culture is essential in the development of in-group and out-group identities. Naturally, polarization between the in- and out-group, or allies and enemies, becomes particularly salient during a conflict, and therefore this aspect of a society's culture deepens. Secondly, the so-called collective myth, in which symbols, stories, icons and metaphors form a shared narrative about a people's identity, is often emphasised and politicised. As these myths legitimize ideals, values and moral codes, they strengthen the sense of belonging as well as the validity of the cause (Oberschall 21). These manifestations of culture, which will be examined in more detail in the following paragraph, play an important part in legitimizing violence.

The legitimization of violence through culture is a recognised phenomenon that many significant scholars within peace and conflict studies have written about. Galtung introduced the concept of cultural violence, which is very useful when examining the relationship between culture and conflict. Galtung defines cultural violence as "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (...) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence" (Galtung, "Cultural Violence" 291). Schematically, therefore, the concept of cultural violence connects to the
concepts of structural and direct violence in Galtung’s famous violence triangle as can be seen in figure 2. All three factors play an equally important role in conflict situations. They do, however, differ in their relation to time. Direct violence is an event, structural violence is a process, and cultural violence is an invariant, as cultures in general are slow to transform (Galtung, “Cultural Violence” 294). Additionally, the relation between the different corners of the triangle is by no means linear, nor singular. Although cultural violence is often used to justify and legitimise other forms of violence, it is not a prerequisite. Structural and direct violence can take place without any clear evidence of cultural violence within a society at first, and, by extension, they can actually be the driving forces behind the institutionalisation of the latter concept (Galtung, “Cultural Violence” 295).

The concept of cultural violence is a very useful one, and its introduction by Galtung has rightly stressed the complexity of the relation between culture and violence. Naturally, this relation becomes even more salient in conflict situations. However, cultural violence, as introduced by Galtung, has a very broad appliance that exceeds the scope of conflict per se. Galtung underlines that, even in seemingly peaceful societies for instance, groups are subject to structural and direct violence, such as discrimination and linguistic marginalisation, which is condoned or even fuelled by cultural violence (Galtung, “Cultural Violence” 292-295). Although this theory sheds some important light on the issue of domination and marginalisation in human society, it does not entirely capture the complex influence that conflict has on culture, and vice versa. This paper will examine this particular relation more deeply, looking at how conflicts, and especially intractable conflicts, affect people’s lives and what the cultural consequences of these effects are.

1.3 Characteristics of Intractable Conflicts as Catalysts for Cultural Change
Conflict is of course a general term and many of the ideas generated here can be applied to a wide variety of conflict situations, from interpersonal conflict to war. However, one essential overarching characteristic of conflict is violence. Violence can be both physical (direct) and structural, and in both forms they
are closely related to cultural change. As mentioned by Schmidt and Schröder, "violence produces unique experiences that are culturally mediated and stored in a society’s collective memory. Their representation forms an important resource for the perception and legitimization of future violence" (Schmidt and Schröder 8). It is exactly this legitimization of violence that becomes a powerful catalyst in conflict situations and creates the danger of intractability. In this sense, violence, and its effects on the human psyche, can be seen as the seedbed for intractability. Once a conflict has become intractable, the socio-psychological effects and subsequent socio-cultural changes become more substantial and varied. This will be explained below.

According to Bar-Tal ("Collective Memory"; "Sociopsychological Foundations"; Rouhana and Bar-Tal), intractable conflicts have certain recognisable and unique characteristics that facilitate their problematic nature. As can be seen in figure 3, these characteristics are longevity, violence, involvement and beliefs. In my view, all of the characteristics have particular socio-psychological consequences, which contribute in turn to the creation of a culture of violence. In order to understand this latter concept thoroughly, I will address each of these characteristics in more detail below.

LONGEVITY

One of the most significant aspects of intractable conflicts, which is of overarching importance, is the longevity or protracted nature of the conflict. In essence, a protracted conflict is a conflict which lasts more than one generation, meaning that at least one age group has grown up knowing nothing but the conflict situation (Bar-Tal, "Sociopsychological Foundations"
 Naturally, the psychological as well as cultural consequences of such a long lasting conflict are significant. Firstly, the fact that at least one generation has grown up within the intractable conflict means that their psychological development has been deeply affected by this conflicted environment. As mentioned before, the object-relations theory explains how we attach ourselves to people in our direct environment and how we identify ourselves according to the dominant modes of identification in our surroundings. Naturally, when a child grows up in a society where different groups interact sparingly, and when they do, this interaction is often perceived negatively, this has a direct effect on the bonds a child forms and the formation of its own identity. Hence, strong concepts of the self and the other are formed, forming an impenetrable wall between one’s own society and that of the enemy. Additionally, past events are interpreted and re-interpreted in order to explain current events, shaping a collective memory that influences a society’s beliefs. Moreover, the longevity of the conflict means that societal adaptation to the conflict situation remains valid for a prolonged period and becomes embedded in a society’s culture. Subsequently, this culture is passed through to the next generation by socialisation processes and becomes even more deeply embedded. The significance of these processes will become clear in the following chapters.

VIOLENCE
As mentioned before, violence has a profound influence on people’s lives and is therefore psychologically and culturally mediated. Although the effects, as will be explained, are divers and multifaceted, one has to distinguish two forms of violence. Firstly, the experience of violence, committed by the opponent, has to be integrated into the worldviews of its victims and witnesses. Secondly, the act of violence, as committed against the opponent, has to be mediated as well. Both these facets of violence are socially connected, which explains why, in an intractable conflict, societies become trapped in a vicious cycle of violence (Bar-Tal, “Collective Memory” 88).

There are several components that explain the significant meaning of violence. Firstly, the preservation and sanctity of life is perhaps one of the strongest universal aspects of human culture. Similarly, forcefully taking a life is considered a violation of a shared moral code. Perhaps, this is due to the
undeniable irreversibility of the fact. Furthermore, the loss of life is always connected with strong emotional involvement. This involvement, as well as the sense of sanctity, also explains the desire of vengeance that is often connected with violence (figure 4). Moreover, humans feel an intense need for rationalisation of violence, the people that commit it as well as the people who are victimised by it. The way in which this rationalisation takes shape and form within society will be explored in the following paragraphs.

Psychologists have recognised that violence has profound effects on the individual. Especially during childhood, experiences of violence can affect and even hamper psychological development. Naturally, this is also the case during intractable conflicts. As mentioned above, in an intractable conflict, at least one generation grows up with the conflict situations as its direct point of reference. According to Punamäki, this can cause a variety of psychological disturbances, but more importantly, becomes a part of children’s inner-life. As parents are not always able to protect their children in a conflict situation, the trust-based parent-child relationship can be harmed. Moreover, violence becomes an important part of the child fantasy life, generating feelings of anxiety as well as aggression. Additionally, according to the learning theory, children develop a so-called *double morality*, according to which war and violence in itself are bad, but the national cause and retribution are not (Punamäki 46). Finally, children’s need to explain their surroundings means that the violence becomes incorporated into their worldviews, shaping their beliefs about morality, justice, identity and appropriate action. Rationalisations might include the dehumanization of the enemy and the all-encompassing importance of one’s own national cause.

Within an intractable conflict, whole generations grow up within very similar circumstances, experiencing threat, stress, pain, grief, hardship and trauma. Hence, many of the psychological effects of violence are felt and mediated collectively. In response to war-related violence, emotions of fear, hatred and anger are felt by at least a significant part of society’s member (Bar-Tal et al., “Collective Emotions” 446-450). As these negative emotions develop out of negative experiences, they in turn foster negative beliefs and actions.
As society tries to make sense of the violent experiences, psychological coping mechanisms similar to those of the individual get activated. These mechanisms include societal beliefs about the self, the other and the conflict as a whole, such as the dehumanization of the opponent and delegitimization of their cause. These beliefs are based on a collective memory of the past, by which the present is explained in a collective narrative or myth. Similar beliefs, such as the justness of one’s own goal and a collective feeling of victimization tend to mediate acts of violence committed against the opponent. What these beliefs entail and how they are incorporated into the conflict culture will be examined the sub-paragraph about beliefs (page 18).

IN VolVEMENT
There is a particular aspect of an intractable conflict that facilitates the characteristics explained above. However, it does not only facilitate, it is also facilitated. As explained above, certain societal beliefs do not only explain and condone the violence and losses experienced by a society’s members, but also motivate ongoing involvement. Hence, the relationship between violence, involvement and beliefs is a cyclic one, which in turn contributes to the longevity of intractable conflicts. This cycle, as can be seen in figure 5, is similar to Galtung’s violence triangle in many ways (Galtung, “Cultural Violence” 294). Violence, as a characteristic, is similar to Galtung’s concept of direct violence, in the sense that it is an event (or a multitude of events). This event is facilitated by people’s involvement, both, as will be explained below, as a physical investment and as a mental preoccupation. Involvement can therefore be viewed as a process, similarly to structural violence. The beliefs that form one of the most distinct characteristics of intractable conflicts are the foundation for both the events and the process. This echoes the concept of cultural violence as introduced by Galtung. However, he typified this concept as an invariant, whilst I believe that this wrongly implies a sense of permanence or inalterability. A foundation, be it the basis on which all else is built, can be changed if the
circumstances permit it. The longevity of the conflict, as described in the sub-
paragraph *Longevity* (page 13), relates to the situation in which this cycle of 
events, processes and foundations functions. As it is both a cause and a result 
of the intractability of the conflict, the duration is a key component of the 
problematic nature of the conflict, and should therefore be taken into account 
in the process of resolution.

Involvement is a key aspect of an intractable conflict. Two particular aspects characterise people’s 
involvement in this type of conflict (figure 6). Firstly, due to the highly violent nature of intractable conflicts, 
as well as the longevity, people make a tremendous material as well as psychological investment (Bar-Tal, 
“Sociopsychological Foundations” 1432). Emotionally, this investment is characterised by the so-called 
“multiplier effect”, which explains how individual wrongs can get multiplied 
into a collective grievance (Oberschall 29). The fact that people are willing to 
invest is partially explained by the societal beliefs put forward in the previous 
paragraph, but in turn it also explains why it is so important for people to understand why they have to invest and lose as much as they do. In addition, 
one once people have invested in something, they often find it difficult to let go. Therefore, people participating in an intractable conflict are often not willing to contribute to its resolution.

A second characteristic is the centrality of the conflict, which means the conflict plays a central role in the lives of every single member of society. Although the amount of involvement (and investment) differs from person to person, generally speaking everyone is affected in one way or another. This involvement is closely related to the loss of life, as many people in an intractable conflict have either lost a loved one or know someone who has. As a consequence, the conflict influences personal as well as collective decisions that people make. Moreover, because the conflict is such a central feature of everyone’s life, it also plays an important role in the public agenda (Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations” 1433). Additionally, it explains why it affects the socio-psychological development of so many children in a similar way, why societies that are involved in an intractable conflict often experience
clear collective emotions, and why societal beliefs are shaped by the conflict to such an extent. All in all, the centrality of the conflict contributes to its continuation and vice versa.

**BELIEFS**
Beliefs play a significant role in everyone’s life, no matter what the circumstances are. However, in a conflict situation, a variety of beliefs specific to the context of the conflict emerges and other beliefs, especially those concerning ideas about identity, become more salient. In intractable conflicts, certain specific perceptions contribute to the severity and longevity of the conflict and constitute its problematic nature. The most significant of these perceptions are the notion of *irreconcilability*, a view of *totality* and the concept of a *zero-sum* situation (figure 7). The idea of irreconcilability stems from the view held by most members of both societies, that there is no feasible solution for the conflict. Because of this belief, people prepare themselves for an ongoing conflict. The fact that people do not see a solution is connected to the notion of *totality*, meaning that the participating parties perceive the conflict as being about existential and basic goals, values and needs that are of all-encompassing importance to their lives. Because the cause for which people are fighting is essential, concessions are impossible. Consequently, the conflict becomes characterised by its zero-sum nature, in which each party only focuses on their own needs and views a loss on the opposite side as a gain and vice versa (Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations” 1432-1433).

Besides these three particular perceptions about the conflict, people develop a number of particular societal beliefs in order to cope to with the stressful situation and explain and make sense of their situation, or, in other words, to satisfy their basic needs for understanding, control, safety and identity (Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations” 1434). According to Bar-Tal, “societal beliefs are cognitions shared by society members on topics and issues that are
of special concern for the society, and which contribute to the sense of uniqueness of the society's members" (Societal Beliefs 25). They often concern the structures, processes and characteristics that are important to societal life, and are organised in thematic clusters. Moreover, societal beliefs are often part of the public agenda and, consequently, are an important influence on decisions made by political and religious leaders (Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations” 1435). In an intractable conflict, certain societal beliefs become especially important. One of these is the belief in the justness of one's own goal, which explains the sacrifices made by members of society and motivates ongoing involvement. Another is the delegitimization of the opponent. This process, in which dehumanization, negative trait characterisation, out-casting, political labelling and negative group comparison strip the enemy of its legitimacy (Rouhana and Bar-Tal 765), plays an important part in explaining the existence of the conflict, its continuation, the experienced violence and losses as well as the participation in the violence by one's own society (Oren and Bar-Tal 113-114). Similarly, a positive self-image, through which traits as bravery, heroism, martyrdom and endurance are attributed to members of one's own society, and victimization, according to which one's own society is the victim of the brutality and injustice of the enemy, elevate one's own society and its goals above the opponent's (Rouhana and Bar-Tal 765-766). Moreover, beliefs about patriotism and unity become increasingly salient (Bar-Tal, “Societal Beliefs” 29).

Because they persist for such a long time and often last at least a generation, beliefs about the conflict, violence and the Self and the Other become embedded in society by the institutionalisation of the conflict through social, political and cultural channels (Bar-Tal, “Collective Memory” 90). These cultural channels include ideologies, legends, myths, ceremonies, rituals and religious beliefs (Aronoff xvii). Examples of institutionalisation of beliefs concerning the justness of one's own goals and the delegitimization of the opponent include polarised political discourse and dichotomising (school) literature. Institutionalisation of a positive self-image and victimisation can include a polarised discourse as well, but also the use of historical or religious narratives, national and religious ceremonies and memorials for the fallen (Bar-Tal, “Collective Memory” 90-91). These forms of institutionalisation will become more clear when exemplified by a current intractable conflict.
Due to the process of social learning or enculturation, as well as the limited space for socio-cultural exploration, children pick up on and absorb these societal beliefs (Punamäki 46; Raviv et al. 129, 137). Consequently, within a generation, they become embedded in the national psyche. In this sense, as can be seen in figure 8, they contribute to the formation of a collective memory that explains the societal beliefs, a collective emotional orientation that fuels the societal beliefs, and an ethos of conflict, which internalises the ideas and emotions connected to the conflict and make it into a distinct ideology (Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations” 1435).

Cognitively, this ethos of conflict has an important effect on the evolvement of an intractable conflict, as it forms a distinct prism through which new information and experiences are interpreted. Through selectivity and selective attention focusing, interpretation and evaluation of information that is consistent with the dominant beliefs and selective memorisation, the internalization of the conflict is a perpetual process (Bar-Tal et al., “Ethos of Conflict” 96-97). Hence, the transformation of such a conflict cannot succeed if these aspects are not addressed.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Seen through this perspective, I will briefly examine the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an example, in order to understand the creation and application of these societal beliefs and their effects. On both sides, tendencies to dehumanize the enemy, glorify the group’s own objective and survival, associate with one’s own group as being the victim, employ a fundamentalist religious language and celebrate those that have fallen for the cause, are evident. Palestinians have portrayed the Israelis as colonialists, Jewish evil and even Nazis, not only in the political discourse, but in literature, art and (school) textbooks as well. Similarly, Israelis use terms such as terrorist, Arab
fundamentalist and Nazis, referring strongly to the possible threat to the survival of the Jews and invoking images of a Holocaust type threat posed by the Palestinian aggressor, a phenomenon that has only recently emerged (Oren and Bar-Tal 113-115; Atran 494-499). Additionally, both groups portray themselves as victims of the conflict towards the outside world, with Palestinians emphasising the illegal occupation of their territory as well as the ongoing human rights abuses and Israel stressing the unlawful and terrorist nature of the Palestinian resistance (Bar-Tal, “Collective Memory” 94; Atran 497). To complicate things even further, powerful groups in both societies have provided the conflict with a religious connotation. The Palestinian resistance is closely associated with the notion of Jihad or the Islamic Holy War, and Hamas makes ample use of a violent religious language. The right wing parties in Israel, which remain ever popular, stress the religious importance of the biblical land of Israel and by doing so, turn the conflict into a matter of religious survival (Atran 499-506). Furthermore, both Israeli’s and Palestinians glorify the people that have died for the cause. Israel commemorates its fallen soldiers in public services and through heritage sites. In Palestinian society, the concept of martyrdom is very popular, and those men and women that have died in their efforts to attack the state of Israel and its inhabitants are honoured both publicly and privately (Bar-Tal, “Collective Memory” 95-96). All these cultural characteristics are natural adaptations to life in a conflict situation. Furthermore, they also shape people’s perceptions about what is right and wrong, as well as who is bad and good. Violent behaviour, while usually constrained by societal rules, becomes normal. Israeli soldiers are not questioned when they shoot unarmed children and Palestinian suicide bombers are celebrated when they succeed in blowing up a bus full of Israeli citizens. Not only the infliction of harm onto the enemy becomes a natural response, the experience of violence itself becomes normalised and embedded in a society’s culture as well. Peteet (31, 38-41) describes how young men in the West Bank consider a beating or detention by Israeli soldiers an important rite of passage, which gives them power and prestige once returned to their own community. This phenomenon also effects other cultural characteristics, as older men, who were traditionally the authority figures in Palestinian society, are loosing their position to younger men that are active in the Palestinian resistance. Cleary, the effect of violent conflict on a society’s culture is substantial and should not remain unexamined.
1.4 A Conflict Culture

In the previous paragraphs, I have explained the existence of culture in general, and the relationship it has with conflict in particular. Subsequently, I have examined the particular characteristics of intractable conflicts in much detail, as well as the way in which society and its members are affected by these characteristics. Through these examinations I have tried to describe the way in a conflict culture is created in times of intractable conflict. In figure 9, one can see how the different characteristics of an intractable conflict and its subsequent effects come together into a phenomenon that I have named a conflict culture.

In words, the experience of an intractable conflict calls for different cognitive structures and, by consequence, worldviews, which meet the human need for
meaning. Though the particular characteristics of an intractable conflict, specific socio-psychological effects become evident. These effects include the formation of a collective memory about the conflict, a collective emotional repertoire that includes feelings of hate, fear, anger and a desire for vengeance, personal and collective emotional and psychological involvement and a variety of personal and collective beliefs about the conflict, the *self* and the *other*. These aspects form a specific worldview in which the conflict is completely encapsulated. This worldview, together with its establishment within institutions and symbols, forms a specific condition that I have given a generic term, namely a *conflict culture*. Although this *conflict culture* enables a society to adapt to the conflict conditions, it also prolongs and maintains the conflict because it shapes the way that new experiences are interpreted and decisions are made (Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations” 1446).

As was mentioned before, a culture is something that is shared and transmitted by a process that is aptly named enculturation. Although culture is adaptive, in the sense that it changes according to alterations in a society’s circumstances, it is also rather rigid. By this I mean that it does not change overnight, nor by changing the thoughts and actions of one single member of society. Here we are again reminded of the concept of *cultural violence* as introduced by Galtung (“Cultural Violence” 294), which is characterised as being an *invariant*, or, in other words, the stable or unchanging factor. Although this characterisation signals an important attribute of culture, namely that it is a foundation for processes and events, I do not agree with the notion of inadaptability. Even though changing a foundation might be a long and demanding endeavour, it can be done. Even Galtung unwittingly admitted this when he suggested that the relation between *invariant, process* and *event* was not linear, but each of the facets could be a starting point for the creation of the other aspects, and thus, processes and events were able to change a culture as well (Galtung, “Cultural Violence” 295).
In order to change a culture, one of two things needs to happen. There either needs to be a change in the society’s circumstances that triggers a cultural transformation, or people have to re-consider their own worldviews collectively and change their behaviour accordingly. The first approach could be seen as a change in events, where the second possibility relates to the processes that are taking place in a society. Using Galtung’s violence triangle as a model, figure 10 shows the interrelated nature of these aspects and they manner in which they can affect or change each other. The fact that both of these processes are very difficult to initiate explains why intractable conflicts have proven so very hard to solve. Although history has proven time and time again that intractable conflicts are extremely difficult to solve, I believe it is not impossible. By involving all levels of society in a systematic way in order to change both the event and the process, the conflict culture that forms the foundation of intractable conflicts can be transformed. This process of cultural peacebuilding, as will be explained in much detail in the following chapter, is multi-dimensional, process-oriented, personal yet collective, and most of all, lengthy.
2. How to Transform a Conflict Culture: Cultural Peacebuilding

As explained above, intractable conflicts are highly complex and multi-faceted situations. They are naturally prone to continuation because of the prevalence of a conflict culture. People tend to perceive the world in accordance to their worldview, systematically accepting and disregarding information in order to retain their acquired logic. In a conflict culture, new information is collected, experiences are interpreted and decisions are made within the framework of the conflict. By consequence, alternative information and approaches are excluded, thus continuing the conflict. An inherent effect of this kind of process is the continuation of violence. As violence towards the opponent is justified by the societal beliefs inherent to the conflict culture, violent acts are carried out without restraint. Consequently, this violence serves as a justification for the opponent to use violence as well, thus creating the well-known vicious cycle of violence (Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations” 1446-1447). Similarly, the delegitimization of the enemy hinders any understanding about the opponent’s needs and wishes, therefore greatly hampering any form of negotiation between the conflict parties (Oren and Bar-Tal 123-124). Moreover, the so-called mobilization paradox explains how effective mobilization strategies, as often used by political leaders, to exaggerate grievances, play on fears, emphasise stereotypes and sharpen identities, have a very detrimental effect on efforts to build peace (Oberschall 31).

Understandably, these problematic features that characterise an intractable conflict are very difficult to address. Especially traditional peacebuilding strategies, which have focussed on the post-conflict reconstruction of societal infrastructure and structural rebuilding of institutions, do not acknowledge the fact that, in order to come to a sustainable peace, a seedbed for peace needs to be build first. As the metaphor implies, this seedbed needs to be developed on grassroots level, by changing the above mentioned conflict culture. By peacebuilding during, and not only after a conflict, the probability of a strong peace agreement does not only increase, but public support, which guarantees a sustainable peace in the end, is created as well. This is closer to
Galtung’s idea of peacebuilding as a strategy to offer alternatives and remove the causes of war (de la Rey and McKay 141-143).

Other approaches, which focus on the intervention during a conflict situation, are also not adequately equipped to deal with the problematic nature of intractable conflicts and the way in which a conflict is embedded in society. Peace interventions or peacekeeping operations, designed to stop direct violence, do not address any actual causes of the conflict, nor the societal beliefs that fuel its continuation (Oberschall 81-86). Conflict resolution strategies, which include problem solving workshops, negotiations and third party intervention through mediation and arbitration, are based on the premises that the parties are willing to come together. In intractable conflicts, however, this is often not the case. Moreover, conflict resolution strategies usually deal with a limited group of people, leaving out the wider public that is so important to the sustainability of peace. Additionally, negotiations are often about the issues that explain the conflict, while peace building should include not only the tangible issues, but all of the dominant sentiments, beliefs and ideas that explain the continuation of the conflict as well.

Although I agree that, in order to build peace, tangible sources of dispute have to be adequately negotiated and human needs that fuel the conflict have to be satisfactorily addressed, I also believe that this can not be done when parties are unwilling to negotiate, unable to see the other party’s needs and incapable of living in peace. In other words, before one can think of building peace, a seedbed needs to be created at grassroots level in which a sustainable peace can grow. Therefore, I have created a coherent, comprehensible and practical approach called cultural peacebuilding, which will address the socio-psychological effects of intractable conflicts and their institutionalisation by involving the parties at top-level, middle range and grassroots in specific ways, in order to create a situation in which a positive peace can be obtained.

2.1 Conceptual Borderline
The field of peacebuilding is not new, nor is the topic of intractable conflicts unexplored. Consequently, countless concepts and phrases are connected to the notion of building peace in a conflict or post-conflict society, preparing a society for peace, creating a culture adapted to a peaceful situation, solving a conflict, stopping the violence, bringing conflicting parties together, and so
forth. However, I have not used any of these concepts or terms because I believe they do not entail what is meant by the concept of *cultural peacebuilding*. To substantiate this conceptual borderline I will explain why I have not used some of the terms that might seem similar or at least connected to the concept of *cultural peacebuilding*.

*Culture of Peace*

Firstly, although *cultural peacebuilding* might be thought of as a process that tries to build a culture of peace, I do not use the term *culture of peace* as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1999 (A/RES/53/243). This concept entails 7 core elements, which include social justice, human rights, non-violence, inclusiveness, civil society, peace education and sustainability. Although I find these notions both important and inspiring, I also believe that they are too grand as well as too vague to be useful for the *cultural peacebuilding* approach. Moreover, they bypass the societal aspects that influence the prolongation of an intractable conflict. The goal of *cultural peacebuilding* is simply to accomplish a sustainable peace situation, without having the aspiration of building the *perfect* society. Although this might sound a lot less ambitious, it is by no means less difficult to obtain than a culture of peace as defined by the UN (Christie et al. 351-352).

*Conflict Resolution*

In essence, the goal of the peacebuilding approach set out in this paper is to resolve the conflict in the long run. However, we do not use the already existing term *conflict resolution*. Firstly, as mentioned above, because conflict resolution entails a variety of techniques to solve the overall conflict issues (Chirstie et al. 193), while *cultural peacebuilding* does not only deal with the issues that lie at the roots of the conflict on a political level, but also tries to overcome the *conflict culture* that lies at the heart of it. Secondly, conflict resolution often deals with specific and limited groups of people, while the *cultural peacebuilding* approach tries to include all facets of society. Moreover, *cultural peacebuilding* is about more than just solving the conflict. It is about bringing people together so they will be able to live together in peace instead of either dying together, or living apart.

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1 For a copy of the resolution, see Annex 1.
Reconciliation

Although cultural peacebuilding is partially about bringing people together, it is not the same as reconciliation. Reconciliation is an important aspect of cultural peacebuilding, but a general willingness to acknowledge the opponent needs to be present first. Moreover, reconciliation is often a very personal endeavour, while cultural peacebuilding is concerned with society at large.

Peacebuilding

Last but not least, the term peacebuilding in itself has not been used for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it is closely associated with a post-conflict situation, whilst cultural peacebuilding is not. Additionally, peacebuilding in general entails far more than just cultural peacebuilding. It is therefore important to stress that cultural peacebuilding is but an aspect of peacebuilding as a whole.

2.2 In an Almost Perfect World

In a perfect world, there would be no intractable conflicts. In an almost perfect world, the conflict situation would go through certain changes in order to facilitate the process of cultural peacebuilding. These changes would include a decline or total termination of violence, a strong leadership committed to non-violence, the possibility (geographically and politically) for members of the different sides to interact, a minimum adherence to human rights and the willingness, both on a leadership and grassroots level, to work towards a more peaceful situation. However, the reality is that many of these circumstances are often not attainable in an intractable conflict, especially not at once. Therefore, the approach set forward in the paragraph below is supposed to be able to withstand the conflict situation to a certain extent. Certain peacebuilding processes are viable even when there is violence, a lack of institutional infrastructure and a lack of political will and public support. Other processes, however, need better circumstances in order to be successful. Because of this divide in timing, the cultural peacebuilding approach is broken up into different four phases. Each subsequent phase is more complex, and therefore requires more stability and support, or, in other words, more inclination towards peace. However, as each phase is designed to break down the conflict culture and increase tolerance, openness, curiosity and inclination towards peace, the changes required for cultural peacebuilding to be successful are expected to increase while the process is on its way.
2.3 The Cultural Peacebuilding Approach

In the previous paragraphs, the complex nature of intractable conflicts has been described. Subsequently, the failure of traditional approaches to solve these types of conflicts has been examined. Firstly, current approaches are focused predominantly on post-conflict situations. Secondly, a disproportionate amount of attention is paid to top-level and institutional processes. When grassroots are involved, as in reconciliation programmes, it is done very haphazardly, and grassroots incorporation is not mainstreamed into the wider peacebuilding effort. By providing inadequate attention to perceptions and sentiments at grassroots level, the problem of conflict culture is mainly ignored. The inability to address the underlying conflict culture that fuels and sustains the conflict has surfaced as an imminent weakness of current strategies. The premise of the cultural peacebuilding strategy below, which aims to overcome this inability, is the idea that peace cannot be build without a proper seedbed. As the name implies, this seedbed needs to be present at grassroots level. In order to create a seedbed, the conflict culture, which underlies the persistence of intractable conflicts, needs to be altered. To do this, however, a focus on grassroots alone is not enough, as private initiatives need to facilitated by institutional provisions, and political agreements need to be made as well. The aim should be to restructure formal and informal organizations, intercultural and inter-religious relations and economic systems in order to bring about social change (Glasl 8) Therefore, the cultural peacebuilding approach incorporates activities on different levels in order to form a seedbed for peace, plants the seeds, cultivate the peace process, and pick the fruit of a sustainable, peaceful society.

Four Phases, Three Levels

As mentioned above, the peacebuilding approach explained below is divided into different phases that mark the start of a variety of societal changes. Moreover, as a conflict culture is something that effects society as whole, but is none the less influenced differently by different levels of the same society, I have decided to divide the cultural peacebuilding approach into different levels of action. For this, Lederach's model for intervention has proven useful (Lederach 390). As can be seen in figure 11, this model includes three levels of leadership, which all have their own specific peacebuilding approach. In the cultural peacebuilding approach, an adaptation of this model will be used.
Firstly, besides focussing on the leadership of the different levels, cultural peacebuilding will focus on each level of society as a whole. Therefore, top will refer to political and military power holders and institutions as well as important religious figures, middle range will refer to important public organisations, NGOs, INGOs and civil society leaders, and grassroots will refer to all other members of society at large, including those organised in unions, civil organisations or local NGOs. Secondly, and consequently, the specific approaches or strategies will be different as well. However, the basic idea of a three-level approach to peacebuilding will be the basis of the peacebuilding design.

Processes of Change

By aiming to transform a conflict culture in order to work towards a sustainable peace, the cultural peacebuilding approach is essentially striving for social change. As mentioned previously, social change can only come about through a transformation of formal and informal structures, intercultural and inter-religious relations and economic systems (Glasl 8). In order to work towards these transformations, a multitude of processes have to be deployed, which identify the problems, design a vision for a peaceful future, create awareness, transform social and psychological tendencies and implement and manage the changes. To guide the cultural peacebuilding approach, I have therefore drawn for the basic processes of organisation development as put forward by Glasl (8).

Organisation development is a planned and systematic approach that aims to enable organisational performance by involving its people. The concept, which emerged in the fifties, is based on the work of American psychologists and
behaviourists such as Abraham Maslow and Kurt Lewin, and was revolutionary in its idea to improve organisational effectiveness by addressing work culture (www.cipd.org, “Organisation development”). Although traditionally a business strategy, organisation development has been linked to conflict resolution by scholars such as Friedrich Glasl and Rudi Balreich (Glasl and Balreich 1-82). The multifaceted approach contained in the organisation development processes is very suitable for the multi-dimensional cultural peacebuilding approach, that aims to involve the different stakeholders, in different ways, at different times. The division and aim of the processes, as put forward by Glasl, is as follows:

- "Diagnostic processes: these raise awareness of the problems and their background, how they have arisen and intensified, and resources and strengths which still exist. This forms the basis for consensus about the need for change;
- Future design processes: i.e. developing visions, overall concepts, future scenarios and alternative models, thus focusing people’s energy towards a desirable future which makes the peacebuilding worthwhile;
- Psycho-social processes: these are about changing roles, relationships and attitudes (...);
- Learning processes: these support all the other processes by spreading new knowledge (...) and providing training in new skills;
- Information processes: these help to raise awareness among the broader public about what is planned and what has been achieved so far.
- Implementation processes: these are not only about putting the negotiated solutions and changes into practice, but also about reinforcing previous goals, targets and plans;
- Change management processes: these are necessary in order to professionally plan the processes, (...) providing personnel and material resources, harmonizing and coordinating them” (Glasl, 8).

These processes can be linked to the characteristics of intractable conflicts as put forward in paragraph 1.3 as well. The diagnostic processes as well as the future design processes, for instance, can be seen as a direct effort to break through the longevity of the conflict. The implementation process is partially about stopping the violence, but also about redressing the effects of the violence and preventing future outburst. The learning processes as well as the
implementation also change people’s involvement. The psycho-social and the information processes, on the other hand, will have a tremendous impact on people’s beliefs. By addressing the different characteristics of the intractable conflict that lie at the heart the prevailing conflict culture, and moving beyond them, these processes strive towards the transformation of a society’s culture.

Based on the different phases, levels and processes described above, I have created the following table, which is the framework for the cultural peacebuilding strategy. In this table, different activities will be placed according to appropriate level and phase, as well as the appropriate process of change. Below, I will describe the prescribed cultural peacebuilding activities per phase in more detail.

Table 1 - The Framework for the Cultural Peacebuilding Strategy

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<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
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<td>No Inclination towards Peace</td>
<td>Little Inclination towards Peace</td>
<td>Considerable Inclination towards Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
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<td>Implementation</td>
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<td>Change Management</td>
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### PHASE 1 – No Inclination towards Peace

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<td>Change Management</td>
<td>Public Motivation of Peacebuilding</td>
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**Level 1 – Top**
The first phase of the *cultural peacebuilding* approach can begin whenever the government decides that it is time to end the conflict and build a peaceful society. This might be an independent political decision, brought about by democratic processes or popular pressure, but it might also come about through third party intervention. Perhaps it seems contradictory that a cultural transformation, as I have characterised the process of *cultural peacebuilding*, begins with the political elite, and not civil society. Although it is true that cultural change can only commence and succeed when society as a whole changes (Afkhami et al. 4, 28), I believe that every grassroots initiative,
no matter how appropriate, sensible or inspiring, will have no chance of contributing to a societal transformation if it is not supported by the political and military power holders, or the top level. Therefore, the beginning of the process of cultural peacebuilding makes use of the so-called trickle-down effect, whereby decisions and initiatives at the top affect the middle range and grassroots. However, it is likely that peacebuilding initiatives are already existent on grassroots level and a popular need for peace might very well have been the driving force behind the political change to begin with. It is therefore very important to strengthen grassroots initiatives and draw from them as a source of inspiration. Additionally, as will be explained below, certain important initiatives can be adapted to make a contribution to cultural peacebuilding, such as indirect peace education programmes, even in hostile circumstances.

The process at top level will be a diagnostic one, in which the parties analyse the effects and causes of the conflict, including at the grassroots level. During this process, an understanding of the underlying conflict culture should emerge. After a decision has been made at the top level to break the longevity of the conflict and work towards peace, this decision needs to be implemented. Hence, the military has to refrain from further aggressive acts against the opponent. Moreover, a shift in the political discourse is needed, as conflict narratives and mobilization techniques need to make place for the public denunciation of violence. These form the basis of a future design. The change in political discourse includes the abstinence from polarizing language, public delegitimization of the enemy in official sources, including speeches and (school) literature, and imagery of victim hood and irreconcilability, in order to change the dominant societal beliefs. In other words, the information process needs to be adapted. Moreover, the political, military and religious elite will have to motivate peacebuilding initiatives in the other levels by, for instance, public campaigns and financial incentives, in order to manage future change in all levels of society.

**Level 2 - Middle Range**

In the middle range, similarly, businesses, organisations and civil society leaders need to motivate their employees, members or followers to actively analyse the conflict, and to diagnose the underlying issues. The next step will be to start thinking about peace and the process of building it, in order to come
to a future design. This might be done by organising support groups and handing out information. Moreover, organisations need to publicly denounce the use of violence and remove any negative, polarizing elements from their public discourse. Additionally, organisations and civil society leaders can use their influence to motivate members of society to actively participate in peacebuilding activities as well.

**Level 3 - Grassroots**

At grassroots level, as part of the implementation process, it is important that existing peacebuilding initiatives are continued, as they maintain an infrastructure of constructive dialogue, provide a support system for those members of the community that still believe in peace, undermine the power of the extremist and limit escalations of violence (Moaz 571-572). Although acts of violence cannot be expected to cease immediately, family support and control are two important features that have the effect of moderating aggression and violent behaviour of individuals (Barber 219; Lynch and Cichetti 521). Similarly, communication with other members of the “in-group” as well as communication with members of the opposing society, if possible, can facilitate a change in the societal beliefs (Kuriansky 82-85). Open and accessible Internet connections can facilitate this communication, which is vital to the psycho-social processes. These processes will often start at the individual level before tickling down into the collective consciousness. In my opinion, one of the most important initiatives at this stage is indirect peace education. Peace education in general recognises the limitations of teaching society as a whole about the importance of peace (Bar-Tal and Rosen 560). This learning process therefore tries to change attitudes, increase tolerance, reduce prejudice, weaken stereotypes and redefine conceptions of self and other by teaching school-aged children new ways to think about the conflict and possible peace. It is said that peace education in intractable conflicts, because of its focus on the collective experience of the conflict, its attempt to break through the collective memory or narrative of a society and to address the dominant collective or societal beliefs can greatly contribute to cultural transformation that is needed to solve the conflict (Kupermintz and Salomon 29). Peace education programs range from particular school-based curricula to weekend encounters, joint summer camps and workshops (Salomon 3). Generally, they also enjoy wide financial and political support. Although peace education has proven to have a positive effect on intractable conflicts
(Salomon 11), the complexity of an intractable conflict situation also means that there is a very limited seedbed for grand initiatives such as peace education. At the beginning of the peace building process, the progress towards peace is limited, support, both popular and governmental is unsubstantial and people are not ready for reconciliation. Moreover, societies in conflict often do not have a well-functioning Ministry of Education, nor a well-defined educational policy or a clear educational authority. Because of these deficits, a full-scale peace education program is difficult to create at this point in the process. However, an adapted program with a limited scope can be initiated. This program, which Bar-Tal and Rosen have named indirect peace education, consists of lessons in reflective thinking, tolerance, ethno-empathy, human rights and conflict resolution (Bar-Tal and Rosen 563-564). Although this approach might mean that children focus on other intractable conflicts than their own, it does provide them with important cognitive tools for peace building and is therefore of unsurpassable importance for further progress.

**PHASE 2 – Little Inclination towards Peace**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagram</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top</td>
<td>Middle Range</td>
<td>Grassroots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diagnostic</strong></td>
<td>Economic Interaction &amp; Interactive Problem Solving Workshops</td>
<td>Direct Peace Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future Design</strong></td>
<td>Start Negotiations: Dispute Level &amp; Super Ordinate Goals</td>
<td>Continue to Denounce Violence &amp; Strengthen and Draw from Existing Peace Initiatives</td>
<td>Openness to Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psycho-Social</strong></td>
<td>Control and Offer Socio-Psychological Support</td>
<td>Social Control and Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Learning</strong></td>
<td>Promotion of Peace through Media and Official Institutions</td>
<td>Inter-Cultural and Inter-Religious Dialogue</td>
<td>Direct Peace Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Promotion of Peace through Media and Official Institutions</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Sign a Cease-fire Agreement and Re-assign Military Personnel</td>
<td>Create Shared Institutions &amp; Strengthen and Draw from Existing Peace Initiatives</td>
<td>Openness to Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change Management</strong></td>
<td>Sponsoring Peacebuilding Activities and Health Sector and Educational Reform</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
There is no time frame for the different phases, nor a clear marker that signals the right time to move from one set of activities to another, because peacebuilding by its very nature is unpredictable. However, one could conclude that a society is prepared for more explicit peacebuilding activities once peace has taken up permanent residence on the political agenda and features in every day conversation as well. These phenomena signal a growing inclination towards peace, which is needed for increased participation in the cultural peacebuilding approach.

*Level 1 – Top*

Once the idea of peace has been introduced to society and the government has demonstrated its willingness to commit to the cause, it is time for top-level negotiations. Because feelings of negativity and mistrust are likely to still be prominent on both sides, the negotiation procedures could benefit from following a particular format. In this phase, negotiations can therefore take place on a dispute level. At this level, instead of focusing on dispositional and structural factors, it is crucial to identify the actual interests and interpretations of the dispute. This narrow focus avoids the risk of the discussion becoming to unsubstantial and reductionistic and tempers the emotions of the negotiating parties (Ross 197-198). It also facilitates the process of identifying super ordinate goals, or goals that move beyond the dispute and are of interest to both parties, in order to bring the parties closer together and facilitate the future design process (Rouhana and Bar-Tal 767). Moreover, equal representation and equal positional power should be guaranteed. When one party has significantly more leverage then the other, external mediators, preferably from a multitude of national and academic backgrounds, should attempt to balance the process (Kupermintz and Salomon 297). Additionally, in order to guarantee a non-violent continuation, it is also important that the parties sign a cease-fire agreement. This is in fact an important part of the preliminary *implementation* of the peace process. Internally, measures to reduce the use of violence also need to be taken. These do not only include the control of violent acts, but also the prevention of feelings of aggression. Moreover, the psychological effects of violence also need to be addressed. As the psychological needs of society members are often neglected during a conflict, a large-scale reform of the health sector, as part of
the change management process, is required. According to the WHO, therapeutic programmes for victims of violence as well as perpetrators are essential for curtailing violent behaviour within a society (Holsopple et al. 47-48). Additionally, other health organisations, institutions and the public media can be used for public education and awareness campaigns about the detrimental effects of violence and possible preventative and curative measures. Similarly, these channels can be used to promote peace in general by providing the public with relevant information. Peace promoting programmes for children and families, as well as short public service announcements can help to increase inclination towards peace (Holsopple et al. 74-77). Moreover, on management level, a reform of the ministry of education is also needed to facilitate the introduction of direct peacebuilding. Finally, the top level should sponsor the implementation of peacebuilding activities on other levels and re-assign military staff to activities that contribute to the institutionalisation of peace.

**Level 2 - Middle Range**

For businesses, non-governmental organisations and civil society leaders this is a good moment to increase their interaction with similar entities on the opposite side. Businesses can consider increasing their economic cooperation with businesses of the conflicting society. Non-governmental organisations and civil society leaders might organise and participate in interactive problem solving workshops. In these workshops, high-ranking members of society meet on a regular basis and work together at solving practical problems, related as well as unrelated to the conflict. This form of interaction in a constructive environment has proven to have a positive effect on the beliefs of the parties about the opponent and facilitate a break away from past cycles of behaviour (Rouhana and Bar-Tal 768-769; Ross 197) and can be seen as part of the diagnostic process. In order to address the presence of violence, businesses, organisations and civil society leaders are expected to continue the denunciation of violence as part of their future design. Additionally, community control needs to increase, as well as the possibility of and access to socio-psychological support. For a more structural change in societal beliefs, the middle range actors should facilitate inter-cultural and/or inter-religious dialogue. This approach nurtures tolerance and understanding, and the religious narrative can pave the way for reconciliation and healing (Brenes
and Welles 105; Holsopple et al. 60-64) and can be seen as a psycho-social as well as a learning process. Institutional cooperation could have a similar effect. It is therefore recommended that more shared institutions such as sport clubs, and professional associations, are created, so to bring opposing groups together during a growing number of activities (Oberschall 233-234). Moreover, in light of the implementation process, existing peacebuilding initiatives should be examined and strengthened. Research has shown, for instance, that women in conflict situations are often active at a grassroots level for a variety of causes, such as demilitarization, gender equality and security. These examples could prove useful if organisations aim to design their own peacebuilding approach. Additionally, strengthening these initiatives is essential if a cultural transformation is to be successful (de la Rey and McKay 144).

**Level 3 - Grassroots**

Besides a general openness to change and cooperation as well as growing intensity in social control and support concerning violent behaviour, in phase 2 direct peace education can also commence. Direct peace education addresses the issues at hand in a very direct manner, challenging children to re-think the societal beliefs and collective memories that they have been raised with.

Because, during the process of indirect peacebuilding, children have already been taught to think reflectively, be tolerant and feel empathy towards other groups and to contemplate the concepts as well as examples of conflict and peace, they are groomed for a more in-depth approach. In the direct peace education programs, which is a diagnostic as well as a learning process, children are taught about the essence of conflict in general, as well their own conflict, the reasons for its occurrence, the different categories, their results, the way in which conflict resolution addresses them and the process of peacebuilding. Consequently, they should be taught about the peace building process that is ongoing in their own society as well, why it has been initiated and how they can contribute to it. Subsequently, they have to contemplate the presentation of the rival. For this purpose, themes such as legitimization, equalization, differentiation and personalisation are addressed, and by introducing testimonies of children from the opposite group, children are thought to identify themselves and others differently. With this new insight, the history of the conflict is examined in an unbiased way. By critically
studying their society’s collective memory, children are motivated to change the common narrative. Finally, children are asked to formulate their goals concerning the new affects and emotions they expect from the peacebuilding process. By visualizing the end result, they are believed to become more dedicated to them (Bar-Tal and Rosen 567-569).

**PHASE 3 – Considerable Inclination towards Peace**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 3 Considerable Inclination to Peace</th>
<th>Level 1 Top</th>
<th>Level 2 Middle Range</th>
<th>Level 3 Grassroots</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diagnostic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Start Reconciliation: Acknowledgment &amp; Public Sharing</td>
<td>Openness to Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Future Design</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Start Reconciliation</td>
<td>Denunciation of Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psycho-Social</strong></td>
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<td>Collective Self-Healing</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Learning</strong></td>
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<td>Inter-Cultural and Inter-Religious Cooperation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Peace Central on the Public Agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Control on Violence and Institutional Reform / International Cooperation</td>
<td>Peacebuilding through Shared Institutions</td>
<td>Involvement in Peace-building Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Change Management</strong></td>
<td>Institutionalisation of Peace</td>
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When the activities initiated in phase 1 and 2 are ongoing or have been completed, one should expect to see the beginning of substantial societal change. Firstly, as violence is no longer implemented or condoned by the top level, incidences of violence should have become rare. Moreover, members of all societal levels should be actively involved in peacebuilding activities, which are advertised by the media and other social and cultural institutions.
Additionally, efforts made by civil organisations and leaders to increase interaction between people from opposing sides, together with direct peace education programs, have started to undermine the delegitimizing and victimizing tendencies as well as other dominant societal beliefs about the conflict, the self and the opponent.

**Level 1 – Top**
As the inclination towards peace within the conflicted society is becoming more substantial, the top level can move their negotiations towards a new approach. Although external mediators can remain useful, at this point in the process the opposing parties should be able to conduct negotiations on their own accord. Probably, the opposing parties have gathered more insight into each other’s points of view and are familiar with the process of working together. By this point, they can be expected to trust each other more and come to practical and sustainable solutions to the conflict, in order to create a *future design*. Conflict resolution strategies such as active listening, brainstorming and creative thinking might prove useful (Christie et al. 193-202). Specific conflict resolution approaches that are aimed at overcoming differences and creating a *positive peace*, such as Johan Galtung’s TRANSCEND approach, might be deemed appropriate at this point as well (Christie et al. 210-221). Generally speaking, this means that this phase of the negotiations will benefit from cognitive reorganisations by both parties in order to incorporate psycho-cultural dispositions and interpretations into the peace process. The method of joint problem solving, aided by external experts, can greatly contribute to this process (Ross 197-200). Besides involvement in negotiations, the top level must remain active in the *implementation process* by continuing to control acts of violence and make institutional reforms. The aim of this is to institutionalise peace, or, in other words, to incorporate peaceful cooperation with the opposing party as well as the dedication to the internal peacebuilding process into public institutions. Consequently, the government should be open to international cooperation and peace should remain high on the public agenda and funds have to be allocated accordingly.

**Level 2 – Middle Range**
In phase 3, the middle range level has a very important part to play. Especially non-governmental organisations and civil organisations and leaders are vital,
as they can initiate the process of reconciliation. At this point, scholars have argued that it is too early to form truth and reconciliation commissions and the like, as the psychological wounds inflicted during the conflict are still raw (Bar-Tal, “Collective Emotions” 449). However, certain preliminary steps can be taken to start off the reconciliation process. Firstly, through interaction with members of the society with which one is in the conflict, one can begin by personally acknowledging the other party’s experiences. This process is mostly concerned with subjective truths or accounts and can depend on methods of storytelling and dialogue. It is therefore a special type of diagnostic process. Another useful method to initiate the reconciliation process is public sharing, by which members of society share their experiences in spoken or written form with other members of their society. By introducing personal narratives into the collective arena, the power of the collective narrative might be weakened. Moreover, these accounts can also be shared with the opposing group, thus facilitating the psycho-social process of acknowledgement and understanding. Within this private context, the announcement of apologies can be a very powerful catalyst for change as well (Christie et al. 254-260). Besides starting the reconciliation process, the middle level should continue community control against violence, as well as the allotment of socio-psychological support. Inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue might be stretched to include inter-cultural and inter-religious cooperation, by which different organisations or religious groups join forces in the peacebuilding process. This is an important part of the learning process, but it facilitates psycho-social change as well. Moreover, shared institutions that were created during phase 2 can now be used for peacebuilding activities. Examples might include fieldtrips by mixed sport-clubs to each other’s communities, conflict resolution workshops for shared businesses, or other forms of implementation (Oberschall 235-237).

Level 3 – Grassroots

At grassroots level, this is a time of expression and openness. Through regular interaction, people should feel more inclined to reconciliation. Direct peace education programs should continue, so to raise a new generation to think critically about their own societal beliefs and narratives and to have an open mind towards other groups. Social control and support should be motivated, but a collective denunciation of violence at this point can be expected as well.
Besides being widely active in the peacebuilding process, however, members of society should also be concerned about working through their own conflict-related experiences and psychosocial issues. Therefore, a process of collective self-healing should also be initiated. During this process, society at large aims to reduce pain, grief and suffering by “participating in social and political activities, taking control over one’s own life and destiny, establishing a network of psychological services, commemorative projects or ritualistic acts (Nets and Bar-Tal, qtd. in Bar-Tal et al., “Collective Emotions” 456).

PHASE 4 – Complete Openness to Peace

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 4: Complete Openness to Peace</th>
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<th>Level 2 (Middle Range)</th>
<th>Level 3 (Grassroots)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Diagnostic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psycho-Social</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change Management</td>
<td>Facilitate Official Reconciliation</td>
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After all the different phases are successfully completed, we reach phase 4. This phase can be seen as the last phase before we can speak of an actual peaceful society. As mentioned previously, there is no time line for this approach, so phase 4 could commence after months of peacebuilding, but possibly also after a decade. Even though, in many ways, phase 4 is mostly comprised of the continuation of the activities from previous phases, it is also the time in which peace is expected to become embedded in society. Even though the activities that take place at the top level might get a lot of (media) attention, the emphasis in the cultural peacebuilding approach is on the grassroots level at this point. Here we can see people actually living peace, becoming used to it as they had previously become used to the conflict.
Level 1 - Top
As said above, this phase of the peacebuilding process is one in which the respective political leaders are in the limelight. After what might be years of negotiations, we can expect that a peace agreement will be signed at this point. Naturally, the peacebuilding process does not end here as peace agreements can be broken (and have been in the past) and the peace agreement might set a certain time line that affects the duration of this last phase. However, this agreement does mark an important milestone, especially if it was born out of fruitful and equal negotiations, which cultural peacebuilding aims to achieve. After signing a peace agreement, which should spell out the future design of the affected societies, the government might consider creating a truth and reconciliation commission. However, this decision should be made with careful consideration of the sentiments in society as a whole. An official apology towards the previously opposing party might be appropriate at this stage as well, in order to facilitate the psycho-social processes at other levels. Moreover, the top level should implement the peace processes by being dedicated to peaceful international interaction, non-violence and open border policy to facilitate economic cooperation and interaction. Even if the conflict has taken place within the limits of one state, this approach will decrease the changes of relapse and facilitate the institutionalisation of cooperation and tolerance. To conclude, the top level should be committed to a peace-centred media policy and political discourse as part of the information process.

Level 2 - Middle Range
If the top level has provided for it, the middle range can become involved in more official models of reconciliation, characterised by commissions, public trials and reparations (Bar-Tal et al. 456). Furthermore, in continuing the implementation process, peace and non-violence should be institutionalised in organisational policy and cooperation through shared institutions should continue and increase.

Level 3 - Grassroots
The implementation and continuation of peace is on the shoulders of society as a whole. Therefore, activities at grassroots level remain important. Peace education should stay a part of the school system in order for the learning process to continue. The start of reconciliation, the formation of a new
collective memory, legitimization of the opposing party, peace and conflict awareness and a general dedication to non-violence and peace are signs of a successful psycho-social process. This situation is created though real-life, day-to-day interaction.

2.4 The Cultural Peacebuilding Strategy

All these activities come together in the table 2. The different shades of grey indicate the area on which the emphasis should be most in each phase. During the first phase, diagnosis, design, implementation and management at top level are of great importance. However, this does not take away from the essential role of grassroots activities, and all existing initiatives should be cherished and supported. Once the peacebuilding process has been facilitated, all levels of society should become active in diagnostic, future design, learning and implementation processes. At top level, information processes should commence, and the societal change has to be managed. Simultaneously, important psycho-social processes can take place at middle range and grassroots level. After the first phases have been concluded, the attention can be shifted away from the top level. Although the political and military processes might still be in the limelight, the members of society should carry the peace process at this point. At this stage, the conflict culture should start to transform. As people increase their knowledge about and interaction with the opponent, previous worldviews will cease to make sense. Driven by a need for meaning, people’s cognitive structures are expected to adapt, thus transforming the dominant worldviews. Although, by itself, this might be an individual process, a broad (institutional) support will facilitate a change in culture. Looking back at the relationship of change between event, process and foundation, as put forward in chapter 1 (figure 10), the dualistic nature of the cultural peacebuilding approach becomes evident. Cultural peacebuilding, is not only concerned with changing the event by ending the hostilities, as peacemaking is, or with changing the process on an institutional level, as traditional peacebuilding is, but with changing both. By doing so, it is much better equipped to change the foundation of the intractable conflict, namely, the conflict culture.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Inclination towards Peace</td>
<td>Little Inclination towards Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diagnostic</strong>&lt;br&gt;Third Party Intervention/Political Decision</td>
<td>Economic Interaction &amp; Interactive Problem Solving Workshops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future Design</strong>&lt;br&gt;Public Denunciation of Violence</td>
<td>Start (Balanced) Negotiations: Dispute Level &amp; Super Ordinate Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psycho-Social</strong></td>
<td>Control and Offer Socio-Psychological Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Learning</strong>&lt;br&gt;Remove Negative Elements From Political Discourse</td>
<td>Promotion of Peace through Media and Official Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong>&lt;br&gt;Remove Negative Elements from Public Discourse</td>
<td>Inter-Cultural and Inter-Religious Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Ceasing Military Violence</td>
<td>Promotion of Peace through Media and Official Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change Management</strong>&lt;br&gt;Public Motivation of Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Sign a Cease-fire Agreement and Re-assign Military Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Level 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>Middle Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivate People to Think about the Conflict</td>
<td>Denounce Violence and Motivate People to Think about Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Peace Education</td>
<td>Continue Existing Peacebuilding Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Peace Education</td>
<td>Openness to Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Control and Support</td>
<td>Direct Peace Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to Cooperation</td>
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<td>Phase 3</td>
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3. Cultural Peacebuilding in the Field

The cultural peacebuilding strategy as put forward in the previous chapter is based on a purely analytical exercise. In order to operationalise the approach, this chapter will examine a real-life case study in order to assess, on the one hand, what kind of peacebuilding initiatives are currently being undertaken and how they might be inadequate, and, on the other hand, how the cultural peacebuilding strategy can address the inadequacies in a practical and feasible manner. As a case study, I have chosen Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as this conflict is one of the most persistent intractable conflicts of our time. The examination of this conflict will provide the reader with case specific knowledge of the types of peacebuilding projects that can be initiated in an intractable conflict situation. Although, by looking at one specific case, the described initiatives might not be universally applicable, I believe that it does provide a comprehensive and complete example.

3.1 The Conflict
Before looking into the peacebuilding activities that have recently been initiated in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how they might have failed to address the problematic nature of the situation, it is important to understand the background of the conflict itself. Therefore, the main issues as well as the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its recent developments will be described below.

THE ISSUE
At first sight, the conflict between the Israeli’s and Palestinians is about territory. Simply said, the Palestinians claim that the Israeli’s unrightfully took their territory. The consequential occupation of the Palestinian territories should therefore end and a sovereign Palestinian state should be created. The constitutional design and borders of this state, as well as its relationship with Israel, however, are highly contested (Oberschall 129). To understand the salience of this issue, one has to surpass the purely nationalistic ideal of sovereignty and examine the emotional ties of both peoples to the land. The historical significance, for both Jews and Muslims, of the territory that is now known as Israel, is rooted in ancient times. Although the Jewish narrative of the “Holy Land” is best known, many Palestinians feel
a similar connection to the place in which they live. These emotional factors greatly complicate the conflict (Selby 66; Star 38-42). The violence and oppression that have exponentially increased through the decades have become an additional point of concern. All in all, there are many issues to be addressed, not even to speak of the underlying conflict culture that has emerged and complicates conflict resolution processes even further.

THE HISTORY
The conflict as we know it today essentially started after World War II, when the migration of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust to the historic Promised Land of Israel was stimulated by the international community. Even though the British Mandate over the Palestinian territories had expired in 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution 181 (the Partition Plan), which divided the land into two territories, namely an Arab and a Jewish state. However, Israel’s neighboring countries, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq, did not agree with the creation of this new nation and declared a war on Israel that same year. Israel won the war and was able to expand its territory. Within this new situation, the West Bank, as well as a part of Jerusalem, were ruled by Jordan. The Gaza strip stayed under Egyptian control, until July 1956, when Israel attacked Egypt and occupied the Sinai peninsula. Although Israel released the Sinai the next year, due to international pressure, it once again captured the territory ten years later, during the Six Days War of 1967. Within this important struggle, Israel captured the Hills of Golan, the Gaza strip, the West Bank and the eastern part of Jerusalem as well, marking most of its territory that is still known today. In 1973, Syria and Egypt attacked Israel in order to recapture parts of the territory, which enabled Syria to reclaim a part of the Golan Heights. In 1978, Israel signed over the Sinai to Egypt as part of the Camp David Agreements. In 1982, Israel captured southern Lebanon, which caused strong international tensions. During this period, Palestinian resistance to the occupation increased, and in 1987, the first Intifadah started, marking a violent period of the conflict. In 1993, the Oslo Accords, officially known as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supported the instatement of a Palestinian Authority, giving way for a short period of relative peace (see paragraph 3.2). In 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and

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2 For a map of the contested territories over the years, see Annex 2.
the head of the Palestinian Authority, Arafat, ratified the Oslo II Agreement in which four major changes were recognized (Selby 99):

- Firstly, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is officially recognized and given (some) administrative, legislative and territorial powers;
- Secondly, the PA is given policing and security powers over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), mainly the West Bank;
- Thirdly, economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians will be restructured, and
- Fourthly, Israel will be allowed to continue colonization of the West Bank.

Although the Agreement was considered a breakthrough, dissatisfaction with the Agreements on both sides led to tensions, and when Rabin was murdered at the end of 1995, the Israeli government adopted a less lenient stance towards the Palestinians. As the violence increased on both sides once again, peace talks were initiated between Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Arafat in July 1999, and new agreements was made about the status of Gaza and the West Bank. A subsequent summit in July 2000 ended unsatisfactory, as parties could not reach consensus about the division of Jerusalem. When Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon provoked Palestinian sentiments by visiting the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on the 28th of September 2000, the second Intifadah broke out.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The conflict between the Israeli’s and the Palestinians is characterised by the Uppsala conflict database as an intrastate conflict with minor intensity. The last 2 years, the parties involved have been the Israeli government, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. In the years prior, Fatah has also been an involved actor (www.pcr.uu.se, “Conflict Summary”). This change is significant, because it signals the fact that the Hamas movement succeeded in ousting the ruling Fatah-party from power and established a new Palestinian National Authority (PNA) government over which it held control in the January 2006 elections. Hamas’ unwillingness to recognise Israel and respect previously signed agreements with Israel led to financial and diplomatic blockade of the Gaza Strip by Western countries, which aggravated the crisis in the Gaza Strip. Hostilities between militants and the Israeli army as well as Israeli targeted killings and other attacks have subsequently increased
Moreover, the humanitarian crisis of the Palestinians worsened as Hamas and Fatah fought for power within the territories, cumulating in a divide between a Fatah controlled West Bank and a Hamas controlled Gaza strip. While Hamas refused to interact peacefully with the Israeli's, Fatah's Abbas entered into negotiations with Israel on several occasions. The year 2007 was also characterised by a reignited clash between Israel and Hezbollah and retributive violence between the Israeli army and Hamas, Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

In 2008, negotiations between Abbas and Israeli officials continued, but did not come to a final agreement before the proposed deadline (the end of the year). Simultaneously, violence between Gaza and Israel continued, as well as the Israeli blockade. In June, a six-month ceasefire was reached by means of Egyptian mediation. Unfortunately, attacks reignited as soon as the truce ended at the end of 2008. Before the start of 2009, Israel launched a massive air assault on Hamas targets, killing as much as 395 Palestinians (www.pcr.uu.se, “Countries”).

In 2009, violence between the Israeli government and Hamas, as well as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad continued, with the beginning of the year characterised by the prolongation of air assault on Hamas targets. In total, this operation claimed around 1038 Palestinian casualties. After this period, a number of countries became active in peace efforts. Especially Egypt initiated a number of peace talks, and Germany also participated. As a result, Israel announced a ceasefire on the 18th of January, which Hamas endorsed the week after. Efforts to continue the ceasefire, initiated by Egypt, continued the following months, coupled with attempts to bring Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority to the table. Most negotiations, including those related to the release of prisoners, have had little success. Subsequently, the European Union has recently become involved in the peace efforts (www.pcr.uu.se, “Conflict Information”).

3.2 Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Since the start of the conflict, countless stakeholders have tried to bring peace to the region. Especially after the nineties, middle range and grassroots peacebuilding initiatives have been numerous and widespread. However,
despite of all these efforts, the conflict between the Israeli’s and Palestinians persists. It is exactly this resistance to reconciliation that defines an intractable conflict, and the aim of the cultural peacebuilding approach put forward in chapter 2 is to break through this resistance. In order to understand in what way peacebuilding efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have, and more importantly, have not been able to address the underlying conflict culture, these peacebuilding initiatives will be analysed. By examining these initiatives per level, I will be able to compare current activities to the approach put forward in chapter 2. When discrepancies become apparent I will operationalise the peacebuilding approach by explaining in what way cultural peacebuilding can be used to adequately address the problematic nature of intractable conflicts.

LEVEL 1 - Peacebuilding as a Political Process
Since the nineteen seventies, there have been several diplomatic attempts to build peace between the Israeli’s and Palestinians. After the 1973 war, for instance, Israel, motivated by political pressure for the United States became involved in a peace settlement with Egypt and other Arab states. This resulted in the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1977. However, due to national and international political changes, the Accords were never implemented (Oberschall, 139-140). Moreover, the political discourse by Israeli as well as Palestinian authorities, the first saying that any effort towards a Palestinian State would be met by an iron fist, and the other speaking of a “Zionist invasion”, were unconstructive (Atran 485). The following years were marked by two important occurrences. Firstly, the first Intifadah, or public uprising, started in 1987. Secondly, the Palestine National Council voted to recognise the state of Israel and all relevant UN resolutions. These events paved the way for the possibility of a two-state solution and, consequently, the future Oslo Accords (Oberschall, 141). As the Oslo Accords mark the only substantial peace process that has taken place since the start of the conflict, I will analyse this particular process and compare it to the cultural peacebuilding strategy.

The Political Process
The Oslo peace process that started in the 1990s was based on UN resolution 242, which said that all occupied territory form the 1967 was would be returned to the Palestinians and Israel and its Arab neighbour states would
sign a peace treaty and normalize relations. Consequently, a Palestinian state would be formed. The parties concerned came together for the first time in Madrid on October 30, 1991. Open negotiations, however, were blocked by internal unrest and it was the secret face-to-face peace talks, initiated by Norwegian non-governmental organisation, which brought the parties together. Consequently, in 1993, after the negotiating parties, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), had officially recognised each other's authority, the Oslo process officially started. This was marked by the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), which set out a plan of action for the exchange of territory and control, followed by “final status” negotiations on the core issues at a later time. In the Oslo A agreement, Israel recognised the Palestinian right to self-determination and statehood. This was followed by a set of practical and specific agreements and protocols, and the Oslo B agreement mapped the way to Palestinian independence and democratic statehood, dividing the territories in different areas of control. Unfortunately, the whole process was problematic from the beginning, as the parties did not agree on major issues such as the habitation of Israeli settlers, the return of Palestinian refugees, demilitarization and the status of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, high-end political negotiations continued, and public confidence remained (Oberschall 147). When the Camp David peace talks about the remaining issues started in the summer of 2000, the world was looking on expectantly. Arafat and new Prime Minister Barak still disagreed on all major issues, but political pressure for all parties, including President Clinton, who facilitated the talks, pushed in onwards. In the end, however, no agreement was reached and the peace process failed. What actually went wrong remains contested, but it is agreed that a lack of trust between negotiating parties as well as the people they represented, the asymmetry of power between Israel and the Palestinians and a lack of impartial mediation by the Unites States, made the peace process very weak (Oberschall 153-154; Habib 1109). The start of the second Intifadah at the end of 2000 and the following Israeli response ended the official peace process for good.

Political Discourse
Some researchers have argued that the willingness of the parties to move towards a peace process in the early nineties was caused by a shift in culture,
especially on the Israeli side. According to Robert Freedman, during the late eighties and early nineties, young Israeli Labour leaders, students and intellectuals, together with traditionally marginalised groups such as Israeli Arabs and haradim\(^3\), slowly chiselled away at the dominant Zionist discourse, which demonized the Palestinian opposition. The initial success of the peace initiative contributed even more to a less generalised, more open perception of the “other” by both parties. However, the continuation of violence by Palestinian armed (terrorist) groups withheld the Israeli public to fully commit itself to peace (Freedman 21-22). Unfortunately, the 1992 change in government from Labour to Likud also meant a change in political discourse. From a “land for peace” approach, the government moved towards a self-centred, security-motivated attitude (Freedman 35-36). The election of Likud Prime Minister Netanyahu, who obstructed the peace process by relaxing control over settlers, exasperated the situation even further. In his political discourse, Netanyahu alienated Arafat and the PLO, by stating that they were not able to protect the Israeli people and therefore should not be trusted (Freedman 44; Oberschall 141-146). On the Palestinian side, things were not much different. Opposition groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), rejected the peace process from the start (Oberschall 141-146). While the process continued, public discontentment grew as Arafat failed to include any other public representatives in the peace process and the humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate (Habib 1110) Even prominent figures such as PLO minister Farouk Kaddoumi and famous intellectuals like Professor Edward Said, started to speak out against the autocratic nature of Arafat’s rule (Shlaim 249). By exposing the weaknesses of the Olso process, Hamas politically challenged the creation of the Oslo Accords. The violent attacks against Israeli citizens, and the Israeli retaliations that followed, were meant to create public disillusionment about the peace process (Freeman 42-43).

**Violence**

Under Israeli pressure, the Palestinian Authority instigated a crackdown on terrorist activities. Moreover, all armed militia’s had to be declared illegal and disarmed, and the Israeli government insisted that the PA would mobilize

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3 Haradim are followers of the Haradi or Chareidi Judaism, which is the most conservative form of Orthodox Judaism.
NGOs to organise a public campaign against violence. Until these requirements were met, Israel refused to redeploy their troops from Hebron (Freedam 37, 39). Despite the efforts of the PA to satisfy the Israeli demand for security, Prime Minister Peres ordered a total external and partial internal closure of the West Bank and Gaza as part of the Israeli antiterrorism measures (Freeman 39-40). Besides this form of structural violence, the Israeli military was a strong presence in much of the OPT during the nineties, and cases of citizens being shot on the streets were frequent (Rigby 350; Usher 15). Moreover, violent attacks on Palestinian civilians by Israeli citizens were frequent and unhindered by the Israeli authorities (Rigby 351). Additionally, despite the stringent antiterrorism measures taken by the Israeli government as well as the PA, the violent attacks by Hamas and PIJ against Israeli citizens continued unabated, and countless suicide attacks increasingly paralysed the Israeli public with fear. The Israeli retaliation measures, which became more intense after every attack, had devastating consequences for the people in Gaza and the West Bank, especially economically (Freedman 43). As incidents of spoiler violence from Palestinians as well as Israelis increased, the peace agreement became more fragile.

International Involvement
Besides the fact that the Oslo process as a whole was based on, and fuelled by international involvement, to which namely Norway and the United States were party, the peace process had other consequences for international political cooperation as well. During the peace process, Israel participated in more substantive international dialogue. At the height of the Oslo process, in 1995, Israel maintained diplomatic relations with 142 countries, which included neighbouring states such as Egypt and Jordan, but also other Arab nations, including Tunisia and Qatar (Freedman 22). The fact that many of these states, which previously had not recognised Israel as a rightful state, were open to international cooperation was directly related to the fact that, by publicly recognizing Israel, the PA, lead by the PLO, marked a historical change in the attitude of Arab states towards diplomacy with non-like-minded nations (Shlaim 248).
Polls taken on both the Israeli and Palestinian side at the beginning of the Oslo process suggest that it enjoyed substantial support. In 1993, 65% of Israeli citizens were in favour of a settlement (Shlaim 249), while in Gaza, notoriously the most rejectionist part of the OPT, 66% supported the peace process (Usher 15). The question is to what extent the public discourse contributed to this support, and how it changed towards the end of the process in 2000. On the Israeli side, the rhetoric used by Peres when he was Prime Minster painted a pleasant picture of the future, in which Israeli’s could live peacefully and without fear. Netanyahu, on the other hand, who became head of state in 1996, focussed primarily on the threat of terrorist attacks, reviving the latest exploding bus and rejecting any Palestinian claims to peace as long as insecurity in Israel continued (Freedam 44). The media also played a distinctive role in the years of the Oslo process. According to Shinar, modern media can play a decisive part in conflict situations, as a participant at large, as well as a catalyst or even a “diplomatic broker” (5). Besides the exchange of information that takes place between journalists, policy makers and field staff, the ability of the media to provide topics and sources for discussion, and in some cases, even initiate international dialogue, should not be underestimated (Shinar 5). Surprisingly, even though war and violence usually have a higher “news value” than peace, the media adopted a “reconciliation model” inspired coverage of the peace process during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Perhaps, after decades of violence, a focus on negotiation, cooperation and peace was more news worthy then the violence that continued in the background. As the Oslo process developed during the mid-nineties, media coverage of the signatory occasions, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Arafat, Peres and Rabin, an interview with Arafat on Israeli television (Kuriansky 7) and other, local as well as international occasions of reconciliation created a climate of positivism and hope. The acts of violence that continued on both sides were treated as exceptions rather then the rule (Shinar 7-8). Although the media campaign that motivated the public to “give peace a change” might not have been the result of journalistic interest alone, it did influence the development of the peace process. Shinar argues that this positive influence might not have had the desired effects, as is created false hopes about the significance of the peace process, which, in reality, was not much more then the creation of a (bad) contract. When the peace process failed in 2000, the
severe disappointment resulted in a shift of focus, after which the media concentrated exclusively on the escalating violence instead of the underlying cultural dimensions of the conflict (Shinar 9).

Peacebuilding Compared
When we compare the Oslo peace process to the cultural peacebuilding strategy as put forward in chapter 2, it becomes clear that the peace process did not live up to all the prerequisites that I have determined for a successful peacebuilding approach. In table 3, the steps that have been taken are coloured green, while the activities that were only partially implemented are yellow. Minor efforts have been characterised as orange, whilst the activities that were clearly not incorporated are the red.

The initiation of the peace process in 1991, although facilitate by international mediation, was based on a political decision by both parties. Although these parties, namely the PA and the Israeli government, denounced the use of violence, other powerful political forces, such as Likud and Hamas, retained a violent rhetoric. This was mirrored in the political discourse, which became more negative over time. After the initiation of the peace process, negotiations between the parties commenced, although the process has been characterised as highly unbalanced. At this time, the media was very active in promoting the peace process. Under Israeli pressure, the PA made efforts to control the violence against Israeli’s, but the military presence in the OPT continued. As they OPT were suffering economically under Israeli control, there was little institutional capacity for peacebuilding. Peace did remain central on the
public agenda, but when further negotiations failed and no final agreement was signed, the entire process came to a halt. No further attempts for official reconciliation were made, and the political as well as public discourse became centred around the escalating violence once again.

LEVEL 2 – The Middle Range Reaction

The peace process that led up to the Oslo Accords is probably one of the most documented peace processes of our time. The process that simultaneously took place on the middle range level has received far less attention. What is clear about the 1991 to 2000 period is the lack of mobility between the Israeli and Palestinian communities. Due to the stringent antiterrorism measures described in the previous sub-paragraph, little exchange and cooperation was possible. Consequently, most of the peacebuilding activities during the Oslo process took place at the highest level (Salinas and Rabi 25). However, on both sides, organisations and community leaders initiated peacebuilding projects in their respective communities, and in some instances they were even able to cooperate.

Businesses
Research has show that Israeli businesses were not active in peacebuilding initiatives during the Oslo process. According to this same research, this lack of action was due to a variety of factors. Firstly, Israeli businesses were afraid of the consequences of voicing an opinion that was not in line with the political discourse, seeing the central role that the government played in the private sector. The same was true for the possible reaction of the public, which might have harmed their position on the market. Moreover, the Israeli business sector lacks a decisive actor that took the lead in a peacebuilding effort (Barsella 37). On the Palestinian side, there are no clear examples of corporate peacebuilding either. Considering the dire economic circumstances in the OPT during the nineties, a lack of business activity in general is not surprising.

Organisational Cooperation
In the non-profit sector, there were a few initiatives that aimed at bringing Palestinians and Israeli’s together. Through the Canada International Scientific Exchange Program (CISEPO), for instance, Israeli, Jordanian and
Palestinian health care professionals have been working together since 1994. Besides improving cross-border cooperation, the project aimed, and aims to this day, to obtain project-specific outcomes that contribute to health improvement (Skinner et al. 1). In the mental health sector, an important partnership between Palestinian psychologists, social workers and psychiatrists working for the Gaza Community Health Program (GCMHP) and their Israeli colleagues, most of whom worked for the Tel Aviv University, has lasted throughout the peace process and its aftermath. Although the goal of the cooperation was mostly the strengthening of the Palestinian mental health sector, through equal cooperation, the project has strengthened bonds between people as well (Kuriansky 308-311). Other initiatives in the health sector, such as the joint research project with the Al Quds’ School of Public Health, initiated by Ronny Shtarkshall, were not implemented due to lack of (donor) funding (Kuriansky 35). However, in the area of social work, the Al-Quds University Schools of Social Work, in cooperation with the Hebrew University and the Jerusalem Foundation, set up a program in 1990 to bring Palestinians and Jews together through the basic tool of social work, dialogue (Salinas and Rabi 29; www.peacengo.org). Aimed at a different group of stakeholders, Friends of the Earth Middle East, which was founded in 1994, brought together Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli environmental NGOs in order to work together at the protection of their natural heritage as a prerequisite for peace (Salians and Rabi 29). The Peres Center, founded by Shimon Peres in 1997, and the 1992 initiative of a Palestinian Anglican minister, the Sabeel Center, worked alongside the Oslo process to advance peace by strengthening social-economic development and improving political and social consciousness (Salinas and Rabi 29-30).

**Policy Work**

In Israel, the peace movements during the Oslo process were mainly active on policy level, where they tried to motivate the government to seek peace with the Palestinians and further the negotiations. The first mass peace movement, Peace Now, was founded in 1978 by a number of Israeli reserve officers and soldiers. Even though they pressed the government to participate in negotiations and come to a mutual compromise, the Peace Now movement was never been openly critical towards the government (Salinas and Rabi 30).

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4 The Al-Quds University is located in East Jerusalem.
Currently, Peace Now advocates for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (www.peacenow.org). Another peacebuilding organisation that focuses mostly on influencing Israeli policy was Gosh Shalom. It was founded in 1993 to “influence Israeli public opinion and lead it toward peace and conciliation with the Palestinian people” (Salinas and Rabi 30).

People to People Programs
In the spirit of reconciliation that followed the signing of the 1995 Interim Agreement, donors became increasingly interested in funding so-called people-to-people activities (Kuriansky 69). The Norwegian Applied Social Research Center (Fafo) funded as much as 151 of these projects throughout the nineties, including cultural, education, environmental and media projects. The PA, as well as the Egyptian and Jordanian governments, have generally been in favour of these efforts for individual cooperation (Kuriansky 70). A well-documented example of a non-governmental organisation that initiated people-to-people activities during the Oslo process is the Israeli-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI). The organisation, which was launched in 1988 (www.ipcri.org), aimed to transform the cultural and ideological bases of the conflict by offering a intellectual platform on which all parties to the conflict can exchange ideas (Salinas and Rabi 31; www.ipcri.org). In 1998, at the height of the Oslo process, IPCRI conducted a series of reconciliation-aimed dialogue workshops, in which 15- and 16-year old youth from Palestinian and Israeli schools shared their personal views on the conflict. Subsequent research showed that these workshops had very positive effects on the perceptions that both groups had of each other (Moaz 566-567).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a variety of important peacebuilding initiatives emerged. In 1999, the year in which the tensions grew that accumulated in the failure of the peace process, both the Peace Research Institute of the Middle East (PRIME) and MIFTAH5 were founded, which are now one of the most significant organisations that work in the conflict (Salinas and Rabi 29, 31). These organisations signalled an upward trend, as there seemed to be growing interests in grassroots peacebuilding,

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5 A Palestinian initiative for the promotion of global dialogue and democracy.
especially so-called people to people (P2P) activities⁶, after the violence intensified during the second Intifadah (Kuriansky 49). Although important, I will not take these initiatives into account here, as they fall outside the period of the Oslo process. An overview of these activities can be found in Annex 3.

**Peacebuilding Compared**

When comparing the peacebuilding activities that took place during the Oslo process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (table 4), there are some positive signs, even though the amount of initiatives might not have been sufficient. For instance, peace movements, such as Peace Now, aimed at changing the public opinion about the conflict as the possibility of peace. Similarly, a variety of organisations actively engaged in cross-cultural cooperation, and there was even a mushrooming of shared institutions. Efforts to increase inter-cultural dialogue and to move towards reconciliation were especially valuable. However, one has to wonder if the time was right for reconciliation, considering both the continued violence as well as the lack of institutional support.

**LEVEL 3 – Where the Grass Grows**

The limited mobility that hindered peacebuilding in the middle range level greatly affected peacebuilding on the grassroots level as well. Moreover, historically, the Arab region does not have a highly active grassroots peace movement. On the Israeli side, peace movements do exist, but the politically complex and violent circumstances of the nineties

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⁶ As will be put forward in paragraph 3.3, a more detailed description of current peacebuilding activities can be found in Annex 3.
kept them from flourishing (Salinas and Rabi 28). Nonetheless, as the peace process developed in the nineties, more grassroots initiatives emerged. Some of these were facilitated by international support, as the projects described above, but others emerged from within Israeli and Palestinian society. These initiatives differ in their character and intent.

Activism

Although it is not often thought of as a constructive process, activism is actually an import pillar of peacebuilding. Not only has activism contributed to factual changes in policy, for example in the United States during the Vietnam war, it also plays an essential part in the process of societal change, as it raises awareness about a specific issue, and motivates people to critically assess their own perceptions. During the Oslo peace process in Israel and the OPT, a variety of activist groups were active, especially on the Israeli side. Two of the most well known of these groups are Women in Black and Yesh Gvul (Salinas and Rabi 29). Women in Black is a grassroots organisation that emerged in January 1988, shortly after the first Intifadah broke out. A group of Palestinian and Israeli women, dressed in black, decided to protest the occupation by standing on a busy intersection in Israel for hours, holding signs with slogans rejecting the situation in the OPT. The initiative was inspired by other “women in black”, such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina. In the 90s, the group grew into an international organisation, which organised vigils for a variety of causes all around the world (www.womeninblack.org.uk, “A Short History”). Yesh Gvul was a resistance movement that supported so-called “refuseniks”, or soldiers that refused to serve in the Israeli army. The organisation emerged in 1982, in reaction to the invasion of Lebanon by Israel. The organisation aimed to support soldiers in their choice not to serve in the army, and protect them from prosecution whenever possible (www.yeshgvul.org, “About”; Salinas and Rabi 29).

Dialogue, Exchange and Cooperation

As explained in chapter 2, an important cornerstone of peacebuilding is dialogue, exchange and cooperation between opposing groups. By bringing people into contact with each other, perceptions and beliefs about this “other” tend to change, thus paving the way towards a cultural change. Although, as mentioned in a previous sub-paragraph, the interest in so-called people-to-
people activities has grown exponentially since the second Intifadah, some significant initiatives were already being taken during, and even prior to the Oslo process. The famous Neve Shalom/Wahat-al-Salam, or Oasis of Peace, for instance, was founded by fryer Brunno Hussar in 1970. He believed that people who live together learn how to live in peace together, and to prove this he started a Palestinian-Jewish community. The mixed community of Palestinian and Israeli families started small, but in 2009 fifty families, half of them Jewish, half of them Palestinian, were living together in a corporative mini-society. Since its founding, more peacebuilding initiatives have blossomed out of the Oasis of Peace, such as the School for Peace, the Jewish-Arab Center for Peace, One Voice and the People’s Voice Initiative, which aim at “amplifying a moderate voice” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Salinas and Rabi 32; www.nswas.nl). Other individuals have initiated smaller, but not less ambitious, peacebuilding projects during the Oslo process. Leah Green, for instance, started conducting Compassionate Listening trainings in 1990. In these trainings, participants were taught to listen to people from both sides of the conflict respectfully, and to recognise everyone’s humanity. By providing as many people as possible with these skills, Green aimed, on the one hand, to offer people a practical tool for conflict resolution, and, on the other hand, to build a solid and wide constituency for peace (Kuriansky 105-106). In the Living Room Dialogue, a group of about thirty Israeli’s and thirty Palestinians shared their stories with each other during the Oslo period, while enjoying each other’s cuisine. In 1992, Lionel and Elizabeth Traubman, who worked together with Palestinians and Israeli Jews on a framework for a possible peace process, initiated these dialogues in different cities in the United States. The core group of sixty Palestinians and Jew had met more than 170 times by the year 2007, and they have inspired people around the world to start similar dialogues (Kuriansky 119-121).

Peace Education

As mentioned in chapter 2, peace education forms an essential part of the cultural peacebuilding approach. Research has shown that, even though peace education alone cannot solve a conflict, and in some instances, a prior establishment of an interpersonal relationship between member of conflicting societies might be necessary, these types of programs can contribute significantly to a society’s openness to peace (Kupermintz and Salomon 300).
This is by no means a new idea. During the Oslo process, several peacebuilding programs were initiated, and some of these still exist to this day. The Hand in Hand program, for instance, was revolutionary and experimental when Lee Gordon and Amin Khalaf founded it in 1997. They set out to bring Israeli and Palestinian children together in an egalitarian, bilingual and multicultural educational setting, and by 2005 the project was implemented in three public schools with a sum of 665 students (Kuriansky 261-262). As mentioned previously, the Neve Shalom/Walat-al-Salam community also hosts a School for Peace (SFP). This school has been bringing together Jews and Arabs in dialogue workshops since the eighties. SFP has been using the human relation and contact theory approach since 1979, and it therefore focuses on individual perceptions. As the founders assume that the conflict is based on conflicting identities, they believe that exploring and reflecting on these identities can pave the way towards a changed perception of the issues at hand (Kuriansky 277-280). Unfortunately, educational programs were more difficult to organise in the OPT, especially in Gaza, since the years of curfews and other Israeli restrictions, together with a rigid approach to education by Palestinian teachers and schools, hindered any new initiatives during the years of the Oslo process (Rigby 359-365).

*Peacebuilding Compared*

When we compare the grassroots peacebuilding initiatives that were taken during the Oslo peace process in table 5, there are some promising signs. For instance, different direct peace education programs were set up to bring Palestinians and Israeli’s together and teach them about the conflict, each other, and the
prospect of peace. However positive, there are two weaknesses to these programs. Firstly, they were too few, especially in the OPT, which limited their possible impact on society. This is related to the second weakness, which is the directness of the approach. Although these programs might have worked on a small scale, within sheltered communities, it cannot be expected that a community as a whole is open to a critical examination of their own history upon starting a peace process. As explained in chapter 2, indirect peace education is therefore a preferred first step. Considering the other grassroots initiatives, one has to admire the inventiveness, passion and resilience of the people that created them, as well as the courage and openness of the people that participated in them. However, reaching a couple of thousand people, if that, is not enough to build peace. Even though, during the Oslo process, there might have been some interaction, some legitimization, and some openness to reconciliation and cooperation, neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian society as a whole shared in these developments. Without the possibility of regular interaction and the continuing violence, no inclination towards peace was acquired and no collective healing process could initiate. Considering these circumstances, in addition to the flaws of the Oslo Accords themselves, it is hardly surprising that the peace process failed and accumulated in the second Intifadah.

3.3 Current Developments: Continuity or Change?

Since the Oslo process and its regrettable failure, time has not stood still. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has known more and less violent episodes during the past decade, but unfortunately it remains unsolved. Although steps towards a settlement have once again been taken, one has to critically assess their merit, considering the flaws of the previous peace process. Below, I will briefly describe the recent developments, and, taking into account the comparison made above, explain in what way the cultural peacebuilding strategy as put forward in chapter 2 could contribute to a more fruitful outcome.

MAKING HISTORY

In 2002, a so-called Quartet of support was initiated during a diplomatic meeting in Madrid. This Quartet was made up of the highest diplomatic representatives of the United States of America, the United Nations, the
Russian Federation and the European Union, and had the role of leading and supporting the Middle East peace process. Their main aim was to bring about a two state solution as soon as possible, by following three strategies. Firstly, security had to be restored. Secondly, the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians had to be addressed, and strong, democratic and market-oriented institutions rebuilt. Thirdly, the Quartet would initiate viable negotiations work towards a sustainable settlement of the conflict (Powell, 452). The roadmap based on these strategies paved the way towards a peaceful settlement within three years (Sura, 12). Unfortunately, however, the Quartet has not been successful in this aim. On the second of September this year, renewed peace talks between the United States’ Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, Israeli Prime Minster Netanyahu and Palestinian President Abbas have been initiated. Considering the new negotiations, special US envoy George Mitchell, as well as High Representative of the European Union, Catherine Ashton, have expressed their confidence that there will be a solid peace agreement based on a two state solution within a year (Black; Ashton). Although this second peace process is still in its infancy, it already shows distinctive similarities with the Oslo process. The problematic political situation in the OPT and the polarised political discourse between the two authorities, as well as the continuation of violent attacks by Hamas, PIJ and other groups, the unabated Jewish settlements, and Israel’s stringent attitude towards the Gaza strip, do not predict a successful outcome. At grassroots and middle range level, developments have been more promising. As mentioned previously, the second Intifadah in 2000 motivated an increased interest in peace related initiatives, especially so-called P2P projects\(^7\). Even though this increase, together with improved professionalism, scope and access, are positive development, some crevices remain. The business community, for instance, remains passive in the peace process. The implementation of indirect peace education, in order to groom an important part of society for more intense, confrontational direct peace education, has yet to become a reality. More generally, grassroots and middle range peacebuilding activities remain primarily in the hands of NGOs and individuals, and they are not integrated into the top-level peace process. Especially this lack of coherence, which also constitutes a lack of (institutional) support, is one of the most prominent weaknesses of the peacebuilding process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By

\(^7\) A detailed description of a selection of these initiatives in can be found in Annex 3.
implementing certain aspects of the *cultural peacebuilding* strategy, this process could be improved.

**CHANGING HISTORY**

The *cultural peacebuilding* strategy as put forward in chapter 2 is divided into four phases. By taking peacebuilding one step at a time, and adapting the approach and activities to the susceptibility of a society as a collective entity, and, by default, the openness of individual members, cultural change can be established. A sudden manifestation of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives is likely to evoke rejection by the majority of people, while an unstructured, *ad hoc* approach to peacebuilding is unlikely to contribute to any lasting results if it cannot be sustained (Salomon, 12). Therefore, the overall peace process would benefit from an integrated, structured approach, in which a variety of stakeholders from top, middle range and grassroots level developed a strategic plan *together*. An important part of such a plan should be a system of monitoring of the peacebuilding process, based on frequent dialogue between different stakeholders (Mitchell 82). More specifically, the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might benefit from the implementation of a variety of activities from the *cultural peacebuilding* strategy, which, as explained in paragraph 3.2, have not been implemented during the previous peace process.

*Top Level*

In a free, democratic society, as Israel is, and the OPT are striving to be, people can express themselves openly. When members of society, whether they are public representatives or not, have certain views about the opposite party in a conflict, or about a possible peace process, they should be able to convey these publicly. However, when a government decides to participate in a peace process, it is essential that members of this government refrain from polarizing or hateful speech that might endanger the (fragile) relation between negotiating parties. Therefore, it would be advisable that, within a democratic system, a decision to participate in the peace process is put through parliament. By doing so, the largest possible political support can be guaranteed. Although the situation is difficult in the OPT, seeing the division of power between the West Bank and Gaza, a parliamentary approach should be used by Israel at a minimum, and preferably in the West Bank as well.
When opposing parties commence their negotiations, equality between them is essential (Kupermintz and Salomon 297). As the distribution of power between Israel and the Palestinians will not be equal until the territory is controlled equally by both parties, and they have equal access to rights and duties, a safeguard needs to be put in place in order to secure equality during political negotiations. Mediating parties can play an important role in this. During the Oslo process, there was a neutral mediating party (Norway), and a mediator that was known for its pro-Israeli stance (the United States). In future peace negotiations, this situation should be avoided. It would therefore be preferable that two mediating parties participate during the (hopefully) upcoming peace process, which are trusted by both parties. Egypt would be a possible candidate for one of these positions, but individuals instead of country representatives could also fulfil these functions. During the peace process, interaction between representatives of both parties, as well as (economic) cooperation between the governments, should be maximised in order to increase institutional support for the process.

When negotiations commence, parties should refrain from any type of violence. In the case of violent spoilers, which, in the Israeli-Palestinian situation is not unlikely, retaliation measures should not be an option. When security concerns cannot be addressed by non-violent means, harm against civilians should be prevented at all time. Within their own society, top-level representatives should ensure maximum interaction with the public, through media as well as shared institutions. By doing so, the top level will be able to motivate public participation in the peacebuilding process (Shinar 5). Moreover, the government should make efforts to facilitate peacebuilding initiatives through institutional and financial support. By retaining an interactive dialogue with all levels of society, the top level will be more able to respond to the peacebuilding dynamics of society. Consequently, official reconciliation will be able to take place whenever it is most appropriate.

**Middle Range**

Activities on the middle range level will benefit greatly from greater interaction with the top level and the grassroots level as well. For businesses, political support is likely to serve as an important catalyst for pro-active
participation in the peacebuilding process (Barsella 37). Even though, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, economic cooperation might not be easily achieved considering the imbalance in economical development, international donors and NGOs might be able to play an important facilitating role. If cooperative projects and creating an interactive infrastructure are sponsored, not in the least by support for technological developments, corporations and other organisations are likely to work together more.

Seeing the important role of religion in both the Israeli and Palestinian society, the medium of inter-religious dialogue should be explored more widely. Studies have shown that inter-faith interaction, which works on the moral basis of compassion and tolerance, can have very positive effects on conflict dynamics, even in religiously motivated conflicts (Kuriansky 17; Abu-Nimer 685). Inter-religious interaction can also play a role in reconciliation processes. In order for these processes to be reactive to public dynamics, as well as effective and efficient, I believe that society as a whole can benefit from a “reconciliation plan”. By interacting, organisations, profit as well as non-profit, and community leaders from both societies should try to work out a plan for reconciliation together. This interactive planning would be most appropriate in the second phase, or perhaps at the start of the third phase. By making a plan, with goals, parameters and standards, the process is most likely to be suited to the level of inclination that people feel towards peace as well.

Grassroots

It is surprising how resilient people have been in light of the longevity and severity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even in the most challenging times, individuals have tried to keep the peace process going by taking all kinds of peacebuilding initiatives (Moaz 571). As can be read in Annex 3, the amount of grassroots initiatives has only increased since the second Intifadah. As far as input and intention is concerned, the grassroots movement has been incredibly promising. However, in certain areas, peacebuilding on grassroots level could improve even more.

Firstly, as put forward in chapter 2, indirect peace education is the most appropriate first step in cultivating a seedbed for peace (Bar-Tal and Rosen 563-564). If indirect peace education could be implemented on a wide scale, I
believe society would benefit greatly. Secondly, as interaction is at the heart of grassroots peacebuilding, people should strive to interact with members of the opposite party as much as possible. Naturally, the inclination towards interaction will be small when the peacebuilding process is in its infancy, but this should improve as the peace process develops. Even when face-to-face interaction is problematic due top-level restrictions, as has been the case in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, interaction through interactive media, such as the Internet, can be a fruitful alternative. Thirdly, more attention should be paid to collective self-healing. During this process, as explained in chapter 2, people should be “participating in social and political activities, taking control over one’s own life and destiny, establishing a network of psychological services, commemorative projects or ritualistic acts” (Nets and Bar-Tal, qtd. in Bar-Tal et al., “Collective Emotions” 456). Although the Israeli society has more institutional capacities for this type of process, socio-psychological development is not a widely used concept in Palestinian society. Therefore, in the OPT, little attention is paid to the psychological wounds that the conflict has caused and the way in which these wounds can be healed. In order to come to a stage of collective healing, I believe that especially the Palestinian society would benefit from a mainstreaming of mental health care and a more prominent place of socio-psychological and emotional issues on the public agenda.

What now?
The previous sub-paragraphs have described possible alternatives for future action in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in very generic terms. I am aware of the fact that the activities proposed in the cultural peacebuilding strategy, although they intend to include all facets of society and all aspects of the peace process are quite vague. This vagueness is intended to contribute to their applicability to a variety of conflicts, and the way in which I have compared them to the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was meant to operationalise the approach a bit more. However, one has to be an expert in the dynamics of a specific conflict in order to make any concrete suggestions about the way in which different stakeholders can contribute to the peacebuilding exercise. Therefore, I believe that the people involved in the field, on top, middle range as well as grassroots level, are the only ones that can truly operationalise the cultural peacebuilding strategy.
Conclusion

This paper started with the question: what is cultural peacebuilding and how can it contribute to the peaceful transformation of intractable conflicts? In the pages above, I have tried to answer this question by bringing together theory and practice. Below, I will conclude this paper by discussing the findings put forward, and the answers they provide. Moreover, I will critically reflect on these answers and the information on which they are based. This reflection will lead to a number of recommendations for future action and research.

Discussion

Within peace and conflict studies, theory and practice remain separated more often than not. Even though peace and conflict theories are based on the analyses of real-life conflict situations and aimed at establishing tangible peace, they are often not applied to the situations that they are designed to address. Therefore, theories such as the game theory, the theory on conflict escalation and de-escalation, and even Galtung’s conflict triangle (Ramsbotham 9-17) remain abstract concepts that have very little to do with the reality of the field. This paper has tried to move beyond a purely analytical exercise by looking at the applicability of a model as well as the conceptual content. By doing so, the following questions have been answered.

What is a “conflict culture” and how does it relate to intractable conflicts?

As put forward in chapter 1, conflict culture is a collective, shared perception of the world in which a conflict has taken center stage. By viewing the world through the lens of a conflict, people tend to dehumanize their opponent, legitimize the use of violence and centralize their own cause. Subsequently, these tendencies become embedded in institutions and practices over time. People’s involvement in the conflict is greatly facilitated by this shared ethos. Naturally, a conflict culture does not appear out of thin air. It is an adaptation to circumstances that motivates people to re-asses their perceptions of their surroundings. The individual human need to make sense of the world forces people to adopt appropriate cognitive structures. Subsequently, the need to feel connected to others moves people to share these structures with fellow members of society. Although individual adaptation to change is quite rapid,
cultural change takes more time. Culture does not become truly embedded unless it is shared via enculturation, through which a culture is passed on from one generation to the next. Therefore, in order for a conflict culture to emerge, a conflict needs to be long lasting. Here we come to the relation between conflict culture and intractable conflicts. The four characteristics of an intractable conflict, namely its duration of at least one generation (longevity), the high levels of violence and destruction, the public involvement in the conflict, and the beliefs that fuel this involvement, make it the most fertile ground for the formation of a conflict culture. The relation, however, does not end there. An intractable conflict does not only feed the existence of a conflict culture, this conflict culture feeds into the intractability of the conflict as well. By shaping the way in which experiences are interpreted and decisions are being made, people's conflict-centered worldviews contribute to their resistance to resolution, and consequently make the conflict very difficult to solve. In essence, the conflict culture becomes the foundation on which the conflict is built. Hence, in order to address the problematic nature of intractable conflicts, the underlying conflict culture needs to be changed.

In chapter 2, the cultural peacebuilding approach has been introduced and explained. By doing so, the following question has been answered:

In its aim to address the problematic nature of intractable conflict, how does “cultural peacebuilding” intend to change the underlying “conflict culture”?

The cultural peacebuilding approach is based on two assertions. Firstly, culture is shared by people. Therefore, in order to change a culture, one needs to involve the people that share it. Secondly, culture is a human adaptation to certain circumstances. Consequently, in order to change the culture, one needs to change the circumstances. Although, arguably, cultural change can be obtained by addressing either of these two aspects, the cultural peacebuilding approach strives for the maximum effect by addressing the event, or, in other words, the circumstances, as well as the process, which is created by the people. However, addressing both of these aspects requires different types of action by different stakeholders. Changing the event, which most importantly means stopping the violence and other conflict related conditions, often requires action from the (political) leaders. The top-level can
also play an important role in changing the process, by de-motivating involvement in the conflict, and motivating and facilitating involvement in peacebuilding. However, only people themselves can achieve a culture change. Organisations, corporations and civil society leaders can be important catalysts by involving people in this change and bringing members of opposite societies together. In a sense, they fulfil an exemplary function. On grassroots level, the actual process takes place. A change in this process cannot be achieved by one person alone, but it does start with one person. Grassroots initiatives that aim to change people’s involvement in the conflict into involvement in peacebuilding have the capacity to affect society as a whole, because they grow from within. Nurturing and stimulating these initiatives is therefore essential for achieving cultural transformation. The cultural peacebuilding strategy aims to involve the different levels of actors by using a tripartite approach that sets out certain plans and activities for top-level, middle range and grassroots actors. These three levels are highly interconnected, with the top-level supporting the other levels, the middle range creating a bridge between the elite and the grassroots level, and facilitating change in the latter, and the grassroots level empowering the two higher levels. In order to work towards a culture change most effectively, this interconnectedness is utilized by streamlining the activities at all levels.

When discussing a strategy that works towards cultural transformation, one must not forget the aspect of timing. As mentioned previously, a conflict culture is not formed over night. Even though people adapt to new circumstances very quickly, a conflict only becomes embedded in a culture when it is passed to the next generation through enculturation. Consequently, changing this slowly formed culture takes time as well. The cultural peacebuilding approach is based on the premise that peacebuilding is a long-term endeavour. Therefore, the strategy sets out a gradual plan that might take decades to complete. Within this gradual plan, however, the cumulative nature of change is taken into account. Although a society and its members might be dismissive of peace to begin with, this can be expected to change after certain peacebuilding activities have been taking place for a period of time. As the inclination towards peace increases, different, more pro-active and engaging activities can be developed. These activities, which might have been rejected at the beginning of the peacebuilding process, form another step of the
ladder towards peace. This gradual nature of peacebuilding is incorporated into the cultural peacebuilding strategy by including four different phases, which entail different levels of inclination towards peace.

After having broken down the cultural peacebuilding strategy, I have tried to show how cultural peacebuilding can be achieved in real-life by answering the following question:

How can the “cultural peacebuilding” strategy be applied in the field?

By focussing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a prime example of an intractable conflict, I have illustrated the way that peacebuilding is attempted on the three different levels. The case study has exemplified the crevices in the current peacebuilding approach, which range from a lack of political will, a continuation of violence and conflict-centred discourse, unequal negotiations, a lack of corporate involvement and a general absence of cooperation between the different levels. By applying the cultural peacebuilding strategy to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, several recommendations for action have been made. These suggestions included increased cooperation between the different levels in order to create and implement a coherent peacebuilding plan, a more positive and coherent political discourse, equal negotiations, non-violence, corporate involvement, indirect peace education, increased interaction between members of the different societies and a mainstreaming of psychosocial care. However, these recommendations remain general, as the cultural peacebuilding strategy can only be effectively operationalised by the actors themselves. I will reflect on this aspect of the approach as put forward in this paper more extensively on page 79.

So, the question remains:

What is “cultural peacebuilding” and how can it contribute to the peaceful transformation of intractable conflicts?

In a nutshell, cultural peacebuilding is an approach that aims to bring about cultural transformation in order to build a sustainable peace. Cultural transformation is especially important when trying to solve intractable
conflicts, as these types of conflicts, due to their highly violent and destructive nature, their longevity, the physical and emotional involvement of the people in them, and the beliefs that these people hold, have resulted in the origination of a conflict culture. By setting out a plan of action for all levels of society that takes the gradual and lengthy nature of the process into account, the cultural peacebuilding strategy intends to transform the conflict culture into a culture that is compatible with the formation of a strong and sustainable peace.

Reflection
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the activities set out in the cultural peacebuilding strategy are kept indistinct in order to make them applicable to a variety of different conflicts. However, due to its character, the cultural peacebuilding strategy is not appropriate for all long-lasting conflicts per se. This divergence relates to the differences levels of public involvement in conflicts. The term intractable conflict is used widely for conflicts that last more than one generation. However, the fact that these conflicts last for a long time does not necessarily mean that there are subject to a conflict culture. To clarify this distinction, intractable conflicts are defined restrictively in this paper. The inclusion of involvement and beliefs stipulate that only conflicts with wide public participation are prone to the conception of a conflict culture. The cultural peacebuilding strategy, which aims at transforming this culture, is therefore not applicable to conflicts in which only limited segments of society or specific armed groups are active, without the support of society as a whole or any other form of wider public involvement.

Even when a conflict fits the definition of an intractable conflict as put forward in this paper, the cultural peacebuilding strategy does not necessarily fit the situation right away. Each conflict context is unique, and a variety of properties and circumstances define they way in which peacebuilding is best approached. For instance, the political make-up of a society defines the scope of action of the top-level. The security situation, but also the geographical circumstances, determines the amount of possible interaction between conflicting parties. The institutional development of a society confines the scope for middle range and grassroots action, and the diversity and quantity of stakeholders involved defines the possibilities for appropriate action. Therefore, I want to underline that the strategy proposed in this paper is only
a framework, which is not automatically suitable for every intractable conflict situation. Thorough field research is needed in each individual conflict situation in order to assess the most suitable use of the cultural peacebuilding strategy. Essential for this type of research is the inclusion of the views and needs of all stakeholders. In a sense, this should form the basis of the first step in the cultural peacebuilding strategy, in the form of the creation of a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy by members of all three levels together. In Annex 4, I have included this initial step in the cultural peacebuilding strategy. Possibly, when approaching the cultural peacebuilding strategy in such an ad hoc manner, it can also be applied to smaller, internal conflicts, such as clashes between urban gangs, regional tensions between social groups that have to share limited resources, such as host communities and refugee populations, or one-issue conflicts between different societal groups, such as the conflict about abortion in the United States.

Cultural peacebuilding should also not be viewed in a vacuum. It is conflict resolution strategy that is based on the idea that peace needs to be build in people’s minds before it can become a reality. Therefore, it is a first step in the gradual transformation of a conflict situation into a peaceful, well-functioning society. Other steps include more traditional post-conflict peacebuilding strategies such as the re-integration of soldiers, the resettlement of refugees, institutional recovery and democratization. The cultural peacebuilding strategy is by no means meant to replace these invaluable activities.

Recommendations
In my view, this paper should be viewed as a starting point, not as an end result. The cultural peacebuilding approach as presented on the previous pages brings an important aspect of intractable conflicts to light, which apparently is often forgotten. In order to address this aspect, namely the conflict culture, a more human centred approach to peacebuilding is needed. This human-centred approach has resulted in the cultural peacebuilding strategy. Although this strategy constitutes an important theoretical framework for future peacebuilding efforts, I believe that it merits additional field research. This field research will not only be an important source of information for a conflict specific cultural peacebuilding approach, but it could also strengthen the general cultural peacebuilding strategy as a framework for
peacebuilding in a variety of conflicts. Therefore, as a follow-up to this paper, I would recommend a thorough field-centred study about the possibilities of cultural peacebuilding.

Finally, I would like to make an overall recommendation about peacebuilding in general, and peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. As might have become evident from my approach to peacebuilding, the cultural peacebuilding strategy aims to bring about a sustainable situation in which people can live together in peace. However, when you interpret peace as a state of not harming or even not wanting to harm each other, cultural peacebuilding is not the only way to obtain it. This sort of peace, which Galtung named direct peace (Galtung, “Cultural Violence” 291), can probably be reached with a far less comprehensive and complex strategy. However, in a situation of direct peace, people are often not willing nor able to live side by side and share their lives together. Even though this might sound like an unfavourable situation, it is the achieved result of many recent peacebuilding efforts. Although I am not an expert, it seems that the situation in Northern Ireland is an excellent example of this. After decades of being trapped in an intractable conflict, the situation in Northern Ireland has been characterised as peaceful since 2002. However, segregation between Irish Catholics and Protestants remains embedded in society and inter-group relations leave much to be desired (Tam et al. 304). This type of peace is far less stable and therefore more susceptible to a relapse into violent conflict. Additionally, the situation is extremely difficult from a personal point of view as well, as people have to live in close proximity to those they feel very negatively about. In order to avoid this type of situation, the cultural peacebuilding strategy aims at changing people’s perception of each other in such a way that they will be able to live their lives together, instead of solely dying together.

The peace process that has been initiated once more in the case of Israel and the Palestinians works toward the well-known two-state solution, in which the territories will be divided in accordance to the 1967 borders. Although I understand the dire situation of the Israeli’s and Palestinians, their yearning for peace, and their pessimism about the prospect of truly friendly relations, I feel that a two-state agreement would not be the best solution to the conflict. As Habib puts it, a two-state solution (...) entails “strategic fragmentation,”
“convergence,” “separation walls,” “security fences,” and the like” (1116). I believe that this should not be the peace that people are striving for. Perhaps Galtung’s “peace package”, as put forwards as part of his TRANSCEND strategy, is a better solution. This set of substantial and detailed measures includes the following: “(1) Palestine is recognized as a state following UN Security Council Resolutions 194, 242, 338, with June 4 1967 borders with small land exchanges; (2) East Jerusalem becomes the capital of Palestine; (3) a Middle East Community with Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria as full members, with water, arms, trade regimes based on multilateral consensus, and an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East with a broader base; (4) the Community is supported by the EU, Nordic Community and ASEAN financially and for institution-building expertise; (4) Egypt and Jordan lease additional land to Palestine; (6) Israel and Palestine become federations with 2 Israeli cantons in Palestine and 2 Palestinian cantons in Israel; (7) the two neighbor capitals become a city confederation, also host to major regional, UN and ecumenical institutions; (8) the right of return also to Israel is accepted in principle, numbers to be negotiated within the canton formula; (9) Israel and Palestine have joint and equitable economic ventures, joint peace education and joint border patrolling; (10) massive stationing of UN monitoring forces; and (11) sooner or later a Truth and Reconciliation process” (Galtung, “TRANSCEND” 87).

This type of “binational” state is based on the premise of cooperation and cohabitation, which lies at the heart of a positive, sustainable peace. However, in order to live together and work together, people must first learn to look at each with a perception of peace, instead or a view defined by the conflict. In order to bring about such as change, I sincerely hope that people involved in the peace process will be inspired by the cultural peacebuilding strategy.
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Annex 1

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RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/53/L.79)]

53/243. Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace

A

DECLARATION ON A CULTURE OF PEACE

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Charter of the United Nations, including the purposes and principles embodied therein,

Recalling also the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which states that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”,

99-77443
Recalling further the Universal Declaration of Human Rights\(^1\) and other relevant international instruments of the United Nations system,

Recognizing that peace not only is the absence of conflict, but also requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation,

Recognizing also that the end of the cold war has widened possibilities for strengthening a culture of peace,

Expressing deep concern about the persistence and proliferation of violence and conflict in various parts of the world,

Recognizing the need to eliminate all forms of discrimination and intolerance, including those based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status,

Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997, by which it proclaimed the year 2000 as the “International Year for the Culture of Peace”, and its resolution 53/25 of 10 November 1998, by which it proclaimed the period 2001–2010 as the “International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World”,

Recognizing the important role that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization continues to play in the promotion of a culture of peace,

Solemnly proclaims the present Declaration on a Culture of Peace to the end that Governments, international organizations and civil society may be guided in their activity by its provisions to promote and strengthen a culture of peace in the new millennium:

**Article 1**

A culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life based on:

(a) Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation;

(b) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

(c) Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(d) Commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts;

(e) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations;

(f) Respect for and promotion of the right to development;

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\(^1\) Resolution 217 A (III).
(g) Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men;

(h) Respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information;

(i) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations;

and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace.

Article 2

Progress in the fuller development of a culture of peace comes about through values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life conducive to the promotion of peace among individuals, groups and nations.

Article 3

The fuller development of a culture of peace is integrally linked to:

(a) Promoting peaceful settlement of conflicts, mutual respect and understanding and international cooperation;

(b) Complying with international obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

(c) Promoting democracy, development and universal respect for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(d) Enabling people at all levels to develop skills of dialogue, negotiation, consensus-building and peaceful resolution of differences;

(e) Strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring full participation in the development process;

(f) Eradicating poverty and illiteracy and reducing inequalities within and among nations;

(g) Promoting sustainable economic and social development;

(h) Eliminating all forms of discrimination against women through their empowerment and equal representation at all levels of decision-making;

(i) Ensuring respect for and promotion and protection of the rights of children;

(j) Ensuring free flow of information at all levels and enhancing access thereto;

(k) Increasing transparency and accountability in governance;

(l) Eliminating all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;

/...
Advancing understanding, tolerance and solidarity among all civilizations, peoples and cultures, including towards ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities;

Realizing fully the right of all peoples, including those living under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, to self-determination enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and embodied in the International Covenants on Human Rights, as well as in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

**Article 4**

Education at all levels is one of the principal means to build a culture of peace. In this context, human rights education is of particular importance.

**Article 5**

Governments have an essential role in promoting and strengthening a culture of peace.

**Article 6**

Civil society needs to be fully engaged in fuller development of a culture of peace.

**Article 7**

The educative and informative role of the media contributes to the promotion of a culture of peace.

**Article 8**

A key role in the promotion of a culture of peace belongs to parents, teachers, politicians, journalists, religious bodies and groups, intellectuals, those engaged in scientific, philosophical and creative and artistic activities, health and humanitarian workers, social workers, managers at various levels as well as to non-governmental organizations.

**Article 9**

The United Nations should continue to play a critical role in the promotion and strengthening of a culture of peace worldwide.

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2 Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
B

PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON A CULTURE OF PEACE

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on a Culture of Peace adopted on 13 September 1999,

Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997, by which it proclaimed the year 2000 as the “International Year for the Culture of Peace”, and its resolution 53/25 of 10 November 1998, by which it proclaimed the period 2001–2010 as the “International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World”;

Adopts the following Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace:

A. Aims, strategies and main actors

1. The Programme of Action should serve as the basis for the International Year for the Culture of Peace and the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World.

2. Member States are encouraged to take actions for promoting a culture of peace at the national level as well as at the regional and international levels.

3. Civil society should be involved at the local, regional and national levels to widen the scope of activities on a culture of peace.

4. The United Nations system should strengthen its ongoing efforts to promote a culture of peace.

5. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization should continue to play its important role in and make major contributions to the promotion of a culture of peace.

6. Partnerships between and among the various actors as set out in the Declaration should be encouraged and strengthened for a global movement for a culture of peace.

7. A culture of peace could be promoted through sharing of information among actors on their initiatives in this regard.

8. Effective implementation of the Programme of Action requires mobilization of resources, including financial resources, by interested Governments, organizations and individuals.

B. Strengthening actions at the national, regional and international levels by all relevant actors

9. Actions to foster a culture of peace through education:
(a) Reinvigorate national efforts and international cooperation to promote the goals of education for all with a view to achieving human, social and economic development and for promoting a culture of peace;

(b) Ensure that children, from an early age, benefit from education on the values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life to enable them to resolve any dispute peacefully and in a spirit of respect for human dignity and of tolerance and non-discrimination;

(c) Involve children in activities designed to instill in them the values and goals of a culture of peace;

(d) Ensure equality of access to education for women, especially girls;

(e) Encourage revision of educational curricula, including textbooks, bearing in mind the 1995 Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy\(^3\) for which technical cooperation should be provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization upon request;

(f) Encourage and strengthen efforts by actors as identified in the Declaration, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, aimed at developing values and skills conducive to a culture of peace, including education and training in promoting dialogue and consensus-building;

(g) Strengthen the ongoing efforts of the relevant entities of the United Nations system aimed at training and education, where appropriate, in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management, peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as in post-conflict peace-building;

(h) Expand initiatives to promote a culture of peace undertaken by institutions of higher education in various parts of the world, including the United Nations University, the University for Peace and the project for twinning universities and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Chairs Programme.

10. Actions to promote sustainable economic and social development:

(a) Undertake comprehensive actions on the basis of appropriate strategies and agreed targets to eradicate poverty through national and international efforts, including through international cooperation;

(b) Strengthen the national capacity for implementation of policies and programmes designed to reduce economic and social inequalities within nations through, \textit{inter alia}, international cooperation;

(c) Promote effective and equitable development-oriented and durable solutions to the external debt and debt-servicing problems of developing countries through, \textit{inter alia}, debt relief;

(d) Reinforce actions at all levels to implement national strategies for sustainable food security, including the development of actions to mobilize and optimize the allocation and utilization of resources from all sources, including through international cooperation, such as resources coming from debt relief;

(e) Undertake further efforts to ensure that the development process is participatory and that development projects involve the full participation of all;

(f) Include a gender perspective and empowerment of women and girls as an integral part of the development process;

(g) Include in development strategies special measures focusing on needs of women and children as well as groups with special needs;

(h) Strengthen, through development assistance in post-conflict situations, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconciliation processes involving all engaged in conflicts;

(i) Incorporate capacity-building in development strategies and projects to ensure environmental sustainability, including preservation and regeneration of the natural resource base;

(j) Remove obstacles to the realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, in particular of peoples living under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, which adversely affect their social and economic development.

11. Actions to promote respect for all human rights:

(a) Full implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action;\footnote{A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.}

(b) Encouragement of development of national plans of action for the promotion and protection of all human rights;

(c) Strengthening of national institutions and capacities in the field of human rights, including through national human rights institutions;
Realization and implementation of the right to development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to Development5 and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action;

Achievement of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995–2004);6

Dissemination and promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at all levels;

Further support to the activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the fulfilment of her or his mandate as established in General Assembly resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993, as well as the responsibilities set by subsequent resolutions and decisions.

Actions to ensure equality between women and men:

Integration of a gender perspective into the implementation of all relevant international instruments;

Further implementation of international instruments that promote equality between women and men;

Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women,7 with adequate resources and political will, and through, inter alia, the elaboration, implementation and follow-up of the national plans of action;

Promotion of equality between women and men in economic, social and political decision-making;

Further strengthening of efforts by the relevant entities of the United Nations system for the elimination of all forms of discrimination and violence against women;

Provision of support and assistance to women who have become victims of any forms of violence, including in the home, workplace and during armed conflicts.

Actions to foster democratic participation:

Reinforcement of the full range of actions to promote democratic principles and practices;

Special emphasis on democratic principles and practices at all levels of formal, informal and non-formal education;

5 Resolution 41/128, annex.
7 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annex II.
(c) Establishment and strengthening of national institutions and processes that promote and sustain democracy through, *inter alia*, training and capacity-building of public officials;

(d) Strengthening of democratic participation through, *inter alia*, the provision of electoral assistance upon the request of States concerned and based on relevant United Nations guidelines;

(e) Combating of terrorism, organized crime, corruption as well as production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs and money laundering, as they undermine democracies and impede the fuller development of a culture of peace.

14. Actions to advance understanding, tolerance and solidarity:

(a) Implement the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance and the Follow-up Plan of Action for the United Nations Year for Tolerance\(^8\) (1995);

(b) Support activities in the context of the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations in the year 2001;

(c) Study further the local or indigenous practices and traditions of dispute settlement and promotion of tolerance with the objective of learning from them;

(d) Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance and solidarity throughout society, in particular with vulnerable groups;

(e) Further support the attainment of the goals of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People;

(f) Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with refugees and displaced persons, bearing in mind the objective of facilitating their voluntary return and social integration;

(g) Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with migrants;

(h) Promote increased understanding, tolerance and cooperation among all peoples through, *inter alia*, appropriate use of new technologies and dissemination of information;

(i) Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance, solidarity and cooperation among peoples and within and among nations.

15. Actions to support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge:

(a) Support the important role of the media in the promotion of a culture of peace;

(b) Ensure freedom of the press and freedom of information and communication;

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\(^8\) A/51/201, appendix I.
(c) Make effective use of the media for advocacy and dissemination of information on a culture of peace involving, as appropriate, the United Nations and relevant regional, national and local mechanisms;

(d) Promote mass communication that enables communities to express their needs and participate in decision-making;

(e) Take measures to address the issue of violence in the media, including new communication technologies, *inter alia*, the Internet;

(f) Increase efforts to promote the sharing of information on new information technologies, including the Internet.

16. Actions to promote international peace and security:

(a) Promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, taking into account the priorities established by the United Nations in the field of disarmament;

(b) Draw, where appropriate, on lessons conducive to a culture of peace learned from “military conversion” efforts as evidenced in some countries of the world;

(c) Emphasize the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in all parts of the world;

(d) Encourage confidence-building measures and efforts for negotiating peaceful settlements;

(e) Take measures to eliminate illicit production and traffic of small arms and light weapons;

(f) Support initiatives, at the national, regional and international levels, to address concrete problems arising from post-conflict situations, such as demobilization, reintegration of former combatants into society, as well as refugees and displaced persons, weapon collection programmes, exchange of information and confidence-building;

(g) Discourage the adoption of and refrain from any unilateral measure, not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, that impedes the full achievement of economic and social development by the population of the affected countries, in particular women and children, that hinders their well-being, that creates obstacles to the full enjoyment of their human rights, including the right of everyone to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being and their right to food, medical care and the necessary social services, while reaffirming that food and medicine must not be used as a tool for political pressure;

(h) Refrain from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion, not in accordance with international law and the Charter, aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State;

(i) Recommend proper consideration for the issue of the humanitarian impact of sanctions, in particular on women and children, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian effects of sanctions;
(j) Promote greater involvement of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts and, in particular, in activities promoting a culture of peace in post-conflict situations;

(k) Promote initiatives in conflict situations such as days of tranquillity to carry out immunization and medicine distribution campaigns, corridors of peace to ensure delivery of humanitarian supplies and sanctuaries of peace to respect the central role of health and medical institutions such as hospitals and clinics;

(l) Encourage training in techniques for the understanding, prevention and resolution of conflict for the concerned staff of the United Nations, relevant regional organizations and Member States, upon request, where appropriate.

107th plenary meeting
13 September 1999
Annex 2

1. Maps of Israel from Biblical times until the 1967 (Six Day) War
2. Maps of Israel from 1946 until 2000
ISRAEL in Biblical Times

David's Kingdom (c.970 B.C.)
Solomon's Kingdom (c.930 B.C.)

The Hasmonaean Kingdom (under the Maccabees, 167-142 B.C.)

PALESTINE
U.N. Partition Plan (1947)
- Jewish state
- Arab state

ISRAEL (1949-1967)

ISRAEL and Occupied Territory (since June 10, 1967)

The Parliament of Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its national capital in 1950. The US Government has not recognized this proclamation and its embassy remains in Tel Aviv-Yafo.
Annex 3

Current Peacebuilding Efforts

Even though one might expect the opposite, the period of escalating violence that started on the 28th of September 2000, saw an upward trend in peacebuilding. From the onset of the second Intifadah, there seemed to be growing interests in grassroots initiatives, especially so-called people to people (P2) activities (Kuriansky 49). Even though the creation and implementation of peacebuilding programs became increasingly difficult when the violence ignited and blockades became stricter, people became more and more involved in the important work of peacebuilding (Moaz 567; Kuriansky 228). Currently, there are more then 200 groups active in peacebuilding activities (Kuriansky 15). Consequently, the number of grassroots and middle range peacebuilding activities is endless, and the selection made in this Annex should therefore be seen as just that, a mere selection.

Before we look at these peacebuilding activities, it is important to underline that I will not be looking at forms of activism. Activism during the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, even if it was often non-violent and directed at building peace, was always an expression of resistance and non-conformity. Forms of activism include demonstrations, political rallies, activist publications, stone-throwing, sabotage, non-cooperation, boycotts and silent vigils, but also the creation of private and secret institutions, such as schools, after the official ones had been shut down by the Israeli’s during the late 80s and early 90s (Habib 1104-1106; Rigby 353-356). These forms of public resistance have been, as mentioned in the paper, of tremendous importance, not in the least for the strength and coherence of the Palestinian society, and deserve adequate attention, but will not be discussed further in this paper.

The different grassroots and middle range peacebuilding activities can be divided into three types, namely, people to people activities, peace education and promotion, awareness raising and advocacy. The first category, people to people activities, can itself be divided into two different approaches, namely the approach of interactive dialogue and productive or creative cooperation. Before exemplifying each of these categories of activities with practical examples, the reasoning behind them is briefly explained.
PEOPLE TO PEOPLE ACTIVITIES

When the peace talks leading up to the Oslo accords started in 1993, they paved the way for new civil society peacebuilding initiatives. In the following decades, countless programs, workshops and plans were initiated, which were often some form of “people to people” (P2P) activities. These activities, also described as “encounters” or “dialogue”, bring together a wide array of individuals (often in peer-based groups) from both communities, in formal and informal settings, and attempt, either through direct dialogue or participatory projects, to change the perception of the “other” (Plonksi 400). This approach is based on the psychological premise, the “contact hypotheses”, which predicts that personal and emotionally intimate encounters increase understanding between people by clarifying similarities and providing insight into each other’s and one’s own societal context and identity, (Kuriansky 82-85). This increased understanding of and identification with the opposite party is of significant importance for the transformation of a conflict, as has become clear from chapter 1. As positive effects are widely documented, P2P activities remain popular and numerous. They can vary greatly in number of participant, length and intended target groups. Examples are therefore both divers and inspiring. Activities based in interactive dialogue bring people together for the sake of sharing their narratives and increasing understanding. Productive or creative cooperation, has, besides increasing understanding and identification, a more practical aim as well. It is based on the idea that, order to build a shared and sustainable society, cooperation is essential. Many Israelis and Palestinians long for a shared society, and feel that there is a lot to learn from each other. Consequently, these people initiate cooperative plans, such as joint research project, musical and theoretical productions and corporate workshops.

Interactive Dialogue

Projects and programs aimed at interactive dialogues have many shapes and sizes. Small initiatives bring together only a handful participants at a time, such as the Everest Peace Project, that brings together Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis in extreme surroundings and circumstances in order for them to rely on each other and bond (Kuriansky 227), or the Living Room Dialogues, that bring together small groups from both sides to eat, drink and talk together during a festive occasion (Kuriansky 121-125). A, Arab initiative
to visit the Auschwitz death camps together with a group of Israeli-Jews in 2003 can also be seen as such a small but powerful initiative (Salomon 10). Examples of larger projects, often based on peer-group participation, are sports camps and matches organised by, amongst others, PeacePlayers International and the Peres Centre for Peace, that bring together Arab-Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish children and adolescents to play sports together (Kuriansky 229). A Dutch initiative, a sail camp called “Samen in Zee”, that took place in 2004 and 2005, is another such project. Better known are the intensive encounter groups, retreats, and contact programs in which Israeli, Palestinian and sometimes Jordanian students live and study together (Plonski 399), initiated by successful organisations such as the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) (Kupermintz and Salomon 295; Kuriansky 566), Seeds for Peace, Building Bridges for Peace, Kids4Peace and Peace it Together (Kuriansky 232). These projects often take place outside of Israel or the OPT, for the purpose of both neutrality and safety, such as the three week camp in Canada and the US in 2003, which offered a safe opportunity for interactive dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli students (Plonksi 400). Besides students, teachers are also involved in contact programs, such as workshops in which Israeli and Palestinian teachers can exchange perspectives on the curricula they teach, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and life in general (Kupermintz and Salomon 297).

As it is increasingly difficult to bring Israelis and Palestinians physically together due to increased restrictions on mobility and violent occurrences, several organisations have turned to technology to help them with their peacebuilding efforts. ICPRI, for instance, makes ample use of computer-mediated dialogues (Moaz 568), and the Parents-Circle Families Program, which brings together Israelis and Palestinians that have lost loved ones, uses a free chat-line and phone system in their “Hello Peace” project to facilitate dialogue between people from opposite sides of the conflict. They have also set up an interactive website (Kuriansky 100-101). Another Internet based project, Soliya, brings together students from colleges in the United States and the Arab world to talk about global issues and cultural differences in order to shed light on the relationship between the United States and the Arab World (Kuriansky 162).
As said by de la Rey and McKay (144), women also play an important part in peacebuilding, as they are often more supportive of reconciliation processes than men. International organisations, such as UNIFEM, have been a driving force behind the integration of women’s initiatives in the peacebuilding efforts, but grassroots organisations are active as well. The Bat Shalom/Jerusalem Link, for instance, organises joint activities with Israeli and Palestinian women that live in Jerusalem and the West Bank. These activities included dialogues, trainings workshops and political activism (Kuriansky 233-234; Moaz, 569). Other important female powered initiatives include the Coalition of Women for Peace and MIFTAH (Plonski 404).

Religious initiatives have also played a major role in peacebuilding during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Organisations such as the Interfaith Encounter Association (IEO) and Friends of Interfaith Encounter bring people together in inter-religious dialogue. The strength of this approach lies in its highly on-political nature, its ability to mobilize a large amount of people and the message of love, tolerance and reconciliation that lies at the heart of religion (Kuriansky 17, 132).

**Productive and Creative Cooperation**

Besides programs that focus on interactive dialogues, P2P peacebuilding activities focus on productive cooperation as well. Examples are shared research projects between Israeli and Palestinian students and scholars, of which as much as 217 were counted in the year 2000 (Kuriansky 71). One of the organisations that facilitates such projects is the New Initiative for Middle East Peace (NIMEP), which was set up by students, for students, and engages in productive dialogue, academic research and hands-on exploration of the region (Kuriansky 158). As with the encounters focussed on dialogue, projects that aim for productive cooperation make use of technological advances. Middle East Education through Technology (MEET), for instance, provides academic education for Palestinian and Israeli youth (Kuriansky 232). The computer game “Peacemaker” is also an example of the way in which technological advancements can be utilised for peacebuilding efforts.

Some organisations have set up cooperative projects within the service providing sector as well, such as the Gaza Community Mental Health Program.
(GCMHP), in which mental health professionals from Gaza and Israel have worked together for 14 years to provide and strengthen mental health care training (Kuraiansky 308). Unfortunately, the creation of joint programs does not always illicit sufficient donor support, and projects that aim for collaboration by students, scholars and young professionals have often failed (Kuraiansky 35). Support for educational projects has proven easier to come by, and programs in which teams of Israeli and Palestinian schoolteachers work together to design study programs are numerous (Kupermintz and Salomon 299). The Peace Research Institute in the Middle East, for instance, conducts joint research projects as well as project to create new history textbooks. IPCRI does joint research projects, joint evaluations of peacebuilding activities and of textbooks as well (Moaz 568).

On a more creative level much cooperation has place as well, such as in arts programmes and musical performances (Plonksi 400). Examples range from shared art exhibits to cooperative filmmaking projects organised by Creative Arts Network in Canada and a photography project in Givat Haviva. A stand-up comedy show, StandUp for Peace, in which an Jewish and Palestinian comedian work together, is another example (Kuraiansky 235-237). An organisation that uses theatre as a means to promote coexistence, educate on democratic values and encourage understanding and mutual respect is Peace Child Israel (PCI), which often uses performing arts it as an intricate part of their encounter programs (Kuraiansky 192).

PEACE EDUCATION
As explained in chapter 2, peace education in general recognises the limitations of teaching society as a whole about the importance of peace (Bar-Tal and Rosen 560). It therefore tries to change attitudes, increase tolerance, reduce prejudice, weaken stereotypes and redefine conceptions of self and other by teaching school-aged children new ways to think about the conflict and possible peace. Probably one of the most well-known and affective projects was set up by profesor Sami Adwan and social psychologist Dan Bar-On, who founded the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME). They developed unique educational programs and booklets for Palestinian and Israeli youth to understand their own narratives and thus redefine their perception of the conflict (Kuraiansky 231, 245-251). Another well known
organisation, IPCRI, has a Peace Education Department (PED), which trains teachers to implement peace education programs (Kuriansky 268). They also conducted a yearlong education program in 2005, in which 300 Israeli and Palestinian youth participated (Kupermintz and Salomon 298). Hand in Hand, from the Center of Jewish-Arab Education in Israel, has the goal of providing egalitarian, bilingual and multicultural education for Jewish and Arab children. They founded three public schools in Jerusalem, Galilee and Wadi Ara, which 665 students had attended in the year 2005 (Kuriansky 261-262).

Another well-know school for peace is the one in the Neveh Shalom/Wahat el Salam (“Oasis of Peace”), where Jewish and Arab people live cooperatively together. The school conducts dialogue workshops to bring the opposite groups closer together (Moaz 569). A peace education project has also been conducted by the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Kuriansky 39) and the Middle East Children Association (MECA) conducts dialogue and training workshops for teachers and moderators, and promotes peace education as well (Moaz 568).

These are only a fraction of all peace education projects and initiatives that have taken place the last few years. Unfortunately, however, as can be deducted from the examples above, these initiatives are all private. Peace education has not been mainstreamed into the public education of either Israel or the Occupied Palestinian territories. On the contrary, many Israeli and Palestinian textbooks still contain derogative descriptions about the “enemy” as well as falsified information about the conflict itself. Moreover, education in the occupied territories, especially in the Gaza, has been badly hindered by the Israeli blockade, the curfews and the lack of overall safety. In previous decades, the majority of the schools in the Palestinian territories were actually under Israeli control and thus subject to regular closings. This has impeded the development of the Palestinian educational system immensely, even though underground schools continued to provide an educational opportunity for Palestinian youngsters (Rigby 352-353).

**PROMOTION, AWARENESS RAISING AND ADVOCACY**

Essential to peacebuilding is the promotion and advocacy of peace and peacebuilding, as well as raising awareness about the possibility of building a peaceful society. Although other initiatives, such as people to people activities
and peace education, contribute to this as well, wider, more organised initiatives are often needed. Within the Israeli-Palestinian context, much has been done in this regard. The organisation Crossing Borders, for instance, produces a newspaper with Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli youth (Moaz 568). Similarly, “Windows”, a Hebrew-Arabic magazine, published the stories of people from both sides through writing, art and photography (Kuriansky 164).

The Parents-Circle Families Program, mentioned above, uses the media to promote their projects, such as the “Hello Peace” initiative, as well as peace, reconciliation and tolerance in general. They also conduct seminars and lectures at high schools to increase awareness and make use of a live broadcast during the radio program “Voice of Peace”. The “Good News Broadcast” by Paul Sladkus, uses the radio as a forum to raise awareness about peacebuilding programs and projects that are initiated throughout Israel and the Palestinian territories. Nowadays, personal blogs can serve this purpose as well. Films, such as the documentary “Men on the Edge: Fishermen’s Diary”, have also played an important role in spreading a positive message of peace. The extremely popular soap opera “Friends for Palestine” has had a similar effect, as well as the radio soap “Al-Dar Dar Abuna” (“Home is our Home”). Moreover, demonstrations, such as the Children March for Peace that took place in Caesarea in 2005, can play an important part in raising awareness and increasing support (Kuriansky 100-103, 239, 223, 327-328).

On a less publicised scale, organisations have been active to raise awareness and funds and increase cooperation. The Clinton Global Initiative (CGI), for instance, has promoted peacebuilding projects and facilitated partnerships between stakeholders (Kuriansky 240). Alliance of Middle East Peace brings together organisations that are working for coexistence and cross-cultural dialogue, and raises awareness and financial support (Kuriansky 15-16). A Different Future (ADF) was founded to amplify the voice of moderate Israelis and Palestinians and provides forums for these voices, such as free publicity services, high profile meetings and seminars and international working groups, which make use of video conferencing (Kuriansky 337-339).
As becomes clear from the paragraphs above, there is not only an impressive number of peacebuilding activities being initiated in the field, their diversity and quality are inspiring as well. These peacebuilding activities deserve the time and space to be discussed in detail, as they are often inventive and very powerful. Moreover, the psychological processes that facilitate these peacebuilding programs, as well as the emotional, cultural, mental, situational, geographical, financial and practical issues that hinder them, are not only interesting to examine, but also crucial if we are to learn from our wins and our losses. Unfortunately, however, this paper does not provide the right stage for such a discussion. There are many interesting books written on the subject, such as the book Beyond Bullets and Bombs, edited by Judy Kuriansky, and I greatly encourage anyone that is interested in the topic to read them.

Does it work?
After examining the process of peacebuilding in the field, one question naturally comes to mind, namely: do these initiatives actually work? Many studies have been done in this regard, and the common perspective is that peacebuilding activities, such as peace education, inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue and peacebuilding workshops do not only create bonds that move beyond the conflict, but play a very important part in the road towards lasting peace (Salomon 15; Kuriansky 20, 38, 46, 194, 197). However, the importance of continuance and wide participation is also stressed. Personal bonds can be a very strong catalyst for peaceful change, but studies have proven that, once a participant in an encounter program returns to its community without continuing the encounter in some shape or form, the bond diminishes over time (Salomon 12). This reiterates the power of the community in shaping the worldview of its members, and underlines the influence that a conflict culture has on a society. Because of this reason, many peacebuilding activities have not been successful in the past (Kuriansky 75-76, 231). In this regard, the importance of governmental and institutional support cannot be underestimated. Hence, peacebuilding activities can be most effective when supported by a top-down peace process that facilitates grassroots initiatives and provides financial as well legislative support.

However, when there is no official, high-level peace process going on, are these initiatives still useful? According to practitioners as well as scholars, they are,
as they maintains an infrastructure of constructive dialogue, provide a support system for those members of the community that still believe in peace, undermine the power of the extremist and limits escalations of violence (Moaz 571-572). It must be said, though, that the success of these initiatives is dependent on the level of equality and symmetry between Israeli’s and Palestinians within the initiating organisations. As Moaz put forward, it is often those peacebuilding organisations in which both parties participate and are represented equally and that initiate programs in different parts of the region, which survive even the harshest circumstances. The use of language, as either English or Hebrew and Arabic, is important in this respect as well (Moaz 569-571).
Annex 4

The Final Cultural Peacebuilding Strategy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diagnostic</td>
<td>Future Design</td>
<td>Psycho-Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third Party Intervention/Political Decision</td>
<td>Public Denunciation of Violence</td>
<td>Family Control and Support / Interaction with Members of Opposite Society</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Motivate People to Think about the Conflict</td>
<td>Denounce Violence and Motivate People to Think about Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Diagnostic</td>
<td>Future Design</td>
<td>Psycho-Social</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Start (Balanced) Negotiations: Dispute Level &amp; Super Ordinate Goals</td>
<td>Continue to Denounce Violence &amp; Strengthen and Draw from Existing Peace Initiatives</td>
<td>Control and Offer Socio-Psychological Support</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Interaction &amp; Interactive Problem Solving Workshops</td>
<td>Openness to Change</td>
<td>Social Control and Support</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Learning</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of Peace through Media and Official Institutions</td>
<td>Promotion of Peace through Media and Official Institutions</td>
<td>Sponsoring Peacebuilding Activities and Health Sector and Educational Reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Direct Peace Education</td>
<td>Openness to Change</td>
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<td>Information</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Change Management</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote Inter-Cultural and Inter-Religious Dialogue</td>
<td>Sign a Cease-fire Agreement and Re-assign Military Personnel</td>
<td>Sponsoring Peacebuilding Activities and Health Sector and Educational Reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Direct Peace Education</td>
<td>Openness to Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Considerable Inclination to Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Diagnostic</strong></td>
<td>Start Reconciliation: Acknowledgment &amp; Public Sharing</td>
<td>Openness to Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Future Design</strong></td>
<td>Continue Negotiations: Joint Problem Solving and Cognitive Recognition / Institutionalisation of Peace</td>
<td>Start Reconciliation</td>
<td>Denunciation of Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psycho-Social</strong></td>
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<td>Collective Self-Healing</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Learning</strong></td>
<td>Start Reconciliation: Interaction &amp; Apologies / Social Control and Socio-Psychological Support / Inter-Cultural and Inter-Religious Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Peace Central on the Public Agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Control on Violence and Institutional Reform / International Cooperation</td>
<td>Peacebuilding through Shared Institutions</td>
<td>Involvement in Peace-building Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Change Management</strong></td>
<td>Institutionalisation of Peace</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 4</th>
<th>Complete Openness to Peace</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diagnostic</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Future Design</strong></td>
<td>Sign Peace Agreement / Policy of Non-Violence &amp; Open Borders</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psycho-Social</strong></td>
<td>Cooperation through Shared Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Learning</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Peace-Centred Media and Political Discourse</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Peaceful (International) Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change Management</strong></td>
<td>Facilitate Official Reconciliation</td>
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