THESIS TITLE: “Greek Aid: Inside and outside the borders: an overview of external humanitarian/developmental policy and internal policy towards refugees and asylum seekers of Greece.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION

GREEK EXTERNAL AID POLICIES
a. Historical overview of Greek policy on humanitarian sector  
b. Beginning of Humanitarian Action  
c. The role of NGOs and other civil society organisations for international development cooperation in Greece  
d. Volunteering in Greece  
e. Developmental Diplomacy as a part of foreign policy  
f. Greek Bilateral Policy for International Cooperation for Development  
g. Geopolitical Priorities  
h. The establishment of Hellenic Aid of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
i. The “tied aid” phenomenon

EVALUATION OF GREEK AID
a. Internal Evaluation  
b. Peer Review by DAC  
c. Humanitarian Response Index for Greece  
   i. Asylum requests  
   ii. Unaccompanied minors  
   iii. Greek detention centres  
b. The European Regulation- Dublin II  
c. Greece- Turkey borders: case study Iraq  
d. Recommendations by Human Rights’ actors  
e. Corruption  
f. Linking Refugees to External Aid

Final Conclusion

Literature

Annex I

Annex II
ABSTRACT

This paper intends to explore Greek Aid in two terms: humanitarian and developmental aid which forms part of external aid and aid for refugees and asylum seekers entering the borders and residing in Greece. These two different types of policies, the first external while the second one internal, coincide at one principle point, the protection of human rights in terms of covering basic needs of vulnerable populations. At the same time, international community sees a link between refugee flows and development, conflicts and poverty, aid and human rights protection. This paper will try to explore Greek Aid and discover under a human rights’ approach if these two policies are indeed connected and to what extent.

KEY WORDS: Greek aid, humanitarian, development, refugees, asylum seekers, Greece
INTRODUCTION

Greece became a bilateral donor in 1996 and joined the Development Assistance Committee of OECD in December 1999. It has made an important progress in its development cooperation system over the last 13 years and humanitarian aid has increased. As compared to other DAC members, Greece is a relatively small donor facing some large challenges in terms of moving its policies a step forward, by strengthening its aid delivery system and adapting to new aid instruments.

Greece’s security and welfare is closely linked to the stability and economic prosperity in developing and transition countries in the Balkans, the Black Sea area and the Eastern Mediterranean. As a developed and stable country in these complicated multicultural regions, Greece responds to development challenges in its neighbourhood. Greece also has a significant comparative advantage in these regions, due to shared history and cultural interaction, good political and trade linkages and its own recent development experience. That is the reason why its main geopolitical goals are focused on this specific region. Other regions of interest will be mentioned in this paper as the subject of aid will be analysed.

Through development diplomacy, Greece is taking the initiative and is acting towards the Millennium Development Goals based on DAC, EU and national policies’ priorities. In this framework, Greece is providing to development and humanitarian activities with 0,17% of its Gross National Income, towards the least developed countries of world according to DAC’s ranking list. At the same time, Greece’s aim was to raise its official aid as it is set by the EU up to 0,56% of the GNI until 2010 and at 0,7% until 2015.

The funding is distributed in three ways:
- Bilateraly (Government to Government)
- Multilateraly (through I.O or Programs)
- Through civil society, with projects implemented by Greek NGOs.

Responsible for the Coordination of the development and humanitarian aid that Greece provides, in a bilateral and multilateral level, is the DG of International Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Hellenic Aid.

It is obvious that from 0,17% to 0,56% there is still a long way to go. Greece, even though it is a member of EU and OECD is still one of the smallest donors, not only with regards to the quantity of money but also to the quality.

The period that this paper will examine is 1999-2009- a decade of Greek external humanitarian aid due to the fact that in 2010 public funds have been cut off as the financial crisis exploded.\(^1\) The Greek financial crisis will not be examined, however, issues of maladministration in the sector of external aid will show the reader how the bureaucratic system worked so far.

Greece has been described as the last country- donor in the ranking of the main 23 western countries- donors that form part of DAC. This last position is in terms of: a. responding to humanitarian needs, b. integrating relief and development, c. working with humanitarian partners, d. implementing international guiding principles and e. promoting learning and accountability as mentioned in the Humanitarian Response Index.

\(^1\) However, 2010 was a milestone year for Greece as the financial crisis stroke the country and led to a series of (un)expected events. European Union leaders have agreed to use funds from both European countries inside the euro zone and the International Monetary Fund to help financially-crippled Greece while saving the European currency. In order to receive this international loan, Greece was obliged to implement austerity measures so that the deficit is reduced. These austerity measures included the exclusion of humanitarian /developmental aid funding from the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at least for 2010-2011. At the moment that this paper is being written, Hellenic Aid has announced that no call for proposals will be held until further notice. It is obvious that when a country is struggling with its own debts, there is no justification for spending money abroad.
Greece has also signed the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and thus is one of the 35 countries that are working towards the achievement of efficient humanitarian assistance. The rising question is: has Greece been an effective and efficient donor? While trying to explain how efficient and effective donor Greece is it is worth comparing the solidarity Greece- as an official donor- shows to countries through its development and humanitarian aid with the practices witnessed inside the Greek borders with regards to refugees and asylum seekers.

In order to explain the above, one should consider the humanitarian situation existing in Greece in the entry points for refugees and asylum seekers. As Greece is one of the borders of the European Union (together with Cyprus, Malta, Italy, Spain), is seen as a gate to a better future and as a haven of hope or even survival of many vulnerable populations coming from countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

In 2008 more than 150,000 illegal immigrants arrived in Greece creating a humanitarian chaos at the borderguard stations and immigration detention centers.

The policies of various Greek Governments followed during the past few years, have created different reactions by the other European Countries and especially Human Rights' Organizations, claiming that refugees' rights have not been protected in Greece. The European Court of Human Rights has issued decisions against Greece in cases of refugees’ rights violations.

The question that easily comes to mind is: **Why a country that has the intention to become a competitive aid donor is facing a great difficulty to protect the basic human rights of refugees and asylum seekers inside its borders?** While trying to answer this question one should keep in mind that the addressed populations usually coincide. This means that the recipient countries of Greek aid are usually the same countries from which refugees and asylum seekers come from, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine etc.
In humanitarian and development aid literature worldwide, there has been an effort to link these two policies – humanitarian aid and internal refugee policies in developed countries- in order to reduce the illegal migration to the countries of the West. This paper will try to explore up to what extent these policies are combined in Greece. This aspect will be researched and developed in this paper to see if there is any link between the aid policies and the issue of illegal immigration as it is declared by Hellenic Aid- the official government institution dealing with external aid.

In these terms, this paper will be focusing on the following issues:

- the inherent amalgamation of Greece’s external humanitarian and development aid (external aid)
- the technical aspects of Greece’s humanitarian and development policy (GHD, DAC criteria)
- the human rights’ regime in Greece itself in terms of refugees and asylum seekers policies

By reading this paper, the reader will be able to investigate the existing tensions in Greece’s policy on a human rights’ based approach to external humanitarian/developmental policy and its internal policy towards refugees and asylum seekers. This will lead to the answer of the following research question.

**Research question**

*What has been the development of Greece’s humanitarian and developmental policy since the year 1999 and what is the extent to which its internal policy towards refugees and asylum seekers are at odds with the guiding principles of Greece’s external policy?*

**Subquestions :**

1. How has the external Greek aid policy developed over the past ten years?
2. Which are the main deficiencies of Greek aid and which are the reasons that cause them?

3. What is the role of NGOs and other actors in Greek aid?

4. How efficient and effective donor is Greece?

5. Is Greece diverging from or complying with the international standards of humanitarian aid such a GHD?

6. What is the extent to which the principles of Greece’s external aid policy are violated in its internal policy towards refugees and asylum seekers?

Framework

First of all, a historical overview of Greek humanitarian aid will be made. The criteria used to evaluate the performance of every donor will be elaborated explicitly.

Secondly, there will be a description of Greece’s humanitarian policy and its evolution throughout the last 10-12 years. This policy will be linked to the general geopolitical characteristics of Greece with reference to its priorities and especially the countries of origin for many refugees and asylum seekers.

Finally, the situation for refugees and asylum seekers in Greece will be described. As soon as the reader will be able to fully understand how such populations are treated in Greece, the international legal framework will be mentioned. The most important part of the paper will be the combination and interaction of these two different policies together with a conclusion.

It should be noted that the description of Greece as a donor will cover the decade from 1999-2009. After the economic crisis that stroke Greece in 2009-2010, the data provided are subject to many changes.
Moreover, the military action of Greece in Humanitarian Interventions will no be analysed even if sometimes when calculating the funding of Humanitarian Aid, such interventions are included. However, they do not form part of the Official Aid.

Methodology

The research will be based on primary sources, such as official government documents, reports from external actors such as DARA Initiative and most importantly the reports of DAC. Reports of Human Rights’ NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch will also be studied.

The methodology followed will be based on an analysis made on the internal policies of Greece against the international norms regarding refugees and asylum seekers (International Refugee Law) as well as international norms that Greece pays respect with regards to its external policy on humanitarian and development aid. Such norms that will be studied are human right norms on which humanitarianism and cooperation for development are based as well as more specific initiatives followed by international aid donors such as Good Humanitarian Donorship. Based on this international normative framework, the Greek political reality will be analysed to see how it

CHAPTER I

Greek external aid policies

The following chapter will explore Greek aid starting from the first years of its appearance till 2009. The questions that we will try to answer are the following:

7. How has the external Greek aid policy developed over the past ten years?
8. Which are the main deficiencies of Greek aid and which are the reasons that cause them?
9. What is the role of NGOs and other actors in Greek aid?
The reader will be able to understand the basic strategies of Greek Aid based on a thematic approach and explore the difficulties faced by all actors caused by the Greek political reality.

a. Historical overview of Greek policy on humanitarian sector

It’s been a few years that Greece is considered a donor country, as every developed country of the West, by funding humanitarian and development aid to other countries. The integration of Greece to the Development Assistance Committee- DAC of OECD in 1999 was the official international recognition of this fact.

Greece, however, did not start providing development aid in 1999. When integrated in the European Community in 1981, Greece accepted the European Status Quo and was "forced" to provide financial Aid to the European Development Fund, which focused on development project in African countries, the Caribbean and Pacific. But even before 1981, Greece contributed to international organization with developmental goals (such as the World Bank) and provided a small amount of bilateral aid (especially to Cyprus). However, until 1995, Greece has been characterized by DAC as a country that received aid and not as a donor.\(^2\)

The history of Greek Official Development Aid is actually starting in 1996, when the country is officially expressing its willingness to join DAC. Since 1996 until today, the Greek Development and Humanitarian Aid follows a complicated route of multiple changes and redefinition of itself that offer at any researcher a wide variety of questions that need an answer.

During the period of the integration of Greece in the European community, the country appeared to receive some assistance, despite the fact that at the same time it financed small scale technical assistance projects and provided scholarships to the nationals of the developing countries.) At the same period both the public and the private sector as well as the civil society - still at a

\(^2\) Huliaras, Asteris “The 7 paradoxes of Greek Aid”, Agora without frontiers, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, pg 91
primary level- seemed to fall behind in matters of awareness, alertness, preparation and participation in the actions of the worldwide humanitarian and developmental future.

In Greece, the requirements, which were going to lead to the non-marginalization of the country and would provide the motivation to participate in efforts of the International Community to deal with crises and destructions caused by humans or natural phenomena, to fight poverty and to improve the financial and social situation of the populations of the least developed countries (LDCs) of the world, have not been created yet.

The integration of Greece in the European Community was without any doubt the first significant step to get out of the post-war lethargy that has been in for the last decades. Indeed, Greece from the first time of its integration and then, has been suddenly called to pay a great amount of money to the European Development Fund (EDF) according to the Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement every year, in spite of the fact that it was difficult to realize the cosmogenesis that happened worldwide in the field of international development cooperation.\(^3\)

At this point, we should mention that Greece was the only member country which was not a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) until 1996, while Portugal has already been integrated since 1991.

However, there is something special about the history of official Greek aid before 1995. Until then, the massive percentage of Greek aid was multilateral (70-80%), unlike other international donors, whose multilateral aid was 50% of the total aid. In 1996, almost at the same time when Greece expressed the willingness to join DAC, it presented a 5year programme of development aid (1997-2001), which mentioned the increase of bilateral aid from 0.02% to 0,1% of the GDP, at the end of the 5 year plan. The total aid that Greece promised was almost close to the average funding

of other DAC members (which means 0.25% of their GDP), with an equivalent presence in multilateral and bilateral aid. It is unclear if this percentage was the result of the limits DAC has posed to Greece while negotiating its entrance, or on the contrary, it was a pre-decided goal of the Greek Government due to the dramatic march of events in the Balkans, combined with some other priorities of the Greek foreign policy of that time (such as the candidacy of Greece as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council).  

b. **Beginning of Humanitarian Action**

The main reasons of the resuscitation from the long lethargy and the negotiation with DAC in 1996 concerning the 1st five year period Programme of Bilateral Official Development Cooperation 1997-2001 are the following:

- The need to participate in the human and development initiatives which occurred during the 90s in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Turkey and in other countries.
- The great improvement of the vigilance rate of the institutions of the Greek civil society and especially the developing non-governmental organisations, as a result of the direct or indirect involvement in actions or programmes of humanitarian and development cooperation and assistance to the countries mentioned above and other countries as well.
- The significant increase of the country's participations in international conferences, Council meetings on Head of State, Government or Minister level, organised by the United Nations and the European Union, with regards to problems caused by the relations between the North and the South, the development of the countries of Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and Asia.

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*Huliaras, Asteris “The 7 paradoxes of Greek Aid”, Agora without frontiers, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, pg 91*
The active participation of Greece in regional initiatives, such as the Black Sea Initiative, the Adriatic Initiative, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea Cooperation to name but a few.

The role the country can play, taking into account the benefits raised in order to promote our – from the participation of the Greek military forces to international peace missions, under international command, to those countries which face crises (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan lately).

The achievement of significant financial targets concerning the implementation of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the participation of the country in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the previous completion of the EU internal market have created a very positive atmosphere so as to succeed the improvement of the national economy and to increase the extraversion rate of the private initiative in the Balkans and the Former Soviet Union.5

c. The role of NGOs and other civil society organisations for international development cooperation in Greece

The introduction of a Declaration of Council of Ministers for Development and the European Commission, dated back to 2000, reports that “…the issue of Development is nowadays more important than ever in South Africa and southern Asia. Over 40% of the population of these countries live under the level of poverty. 800 million people worldwide, including 200 million children suffer from malnutrition. Only the 36% of children who live in the 48 LDCs are subscribed to schools…”6

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Taking into account this disappointing situation, the determinative target of the EU Development Policy is the poverty eradication and the formation of an effective strategy concerning the LDCs. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Planning (PRSP), which the UN and EU institutions follow, requires the participation of the developing non-governmental organisations in order to achieve cooperation. The role the non-governmental organisations and other institutions play, concerning civil society diplomacy, has been improved and has exceeded their traditional actions so nowadays it covers the field of *preventive diplomacy*. A special edition of the British Department for International Development mentions that “civil society is not the only suitable mechanism which provides assistance to the services and the governments of donor countries. It should be considered as an authentic expression of local needs and action of the LDCs.”

The globalisation of economies constantly reinforces the development of the three following issues:

a) Public Sector Projects

b) Private Initiatives

c) Civil Society Institutions Actions, in which the non-governmental organizations represent a crucial part.

Concerning the role of the non-governmental organizations of North and South, the EU Commissioner B. Ryeland mentions that “…in fact they are responsible for the participatory development, which should be close to people and satisfy their basic needs…and in particular, they should help the poor populations, those who are excluded and neglected or have no contact with the international development policy and the international cooperation…”. However, the significant increase concerning the importance and the role of the non-governmental organizations as well as

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8 DFID/ Development Information. Civil Society and National Policy. Glasgow Workshop, May 2000, pg. 1
the other institutions of the civil society (youth associations, religious associations, women’s organizations, Human Rights Field Operations, environmental organizations, local authorities, agricultural associations, development networks, e.t.c.) is not independent from the increase in the significance of the democracy programmes and the decentralized co-operation as well as the fight against poverty in LDCs, sectors in which the results are really effective because of the experience, the direct co-operation with the locals and the flexibility they showed.

According to the national tactic, about a quarter of the whole international assistance in every field derives from the non-governmental organizations and other relevant institutions or development networks. Norway, in particular, one of the most important international donors and DAC members, offers about a quarter of its resources from the annual budget to the international development cooperation, in programmes the non-governmental organizations organize (most of which are Norwegian), as Anne Kristin Sydnes\(^\text{11}\), Minister of International Development Co-operation and second in hierarchy after the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned in a recent talk in the Storting. We should mention that Anne Kristin Sydnes is the Head of all the International Development Co-operation services of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In her talk, the Minister claims that “… nowadays we demand from everyone we work together to show great effectiveness, more development for every single krone we invest, less bureaucracy and higher quality…”. She goes on saying that “… the patterns of the aids we cannot return, should be set up in such a coordinated way that they can rationally use the benefits and the workforce of each non-governmental organization so as to achieve our development targets… in order to ensure the predictability and to offer to the non-governmental organizations the freedom of action they need, we intend to restrict the traditional way of funding they used to have so as to distribute the funding

\(^{11}\text{Statement to the Storting by the Minister of International Development Co-operation Mrs. Anne Kristin Sydnes on “The challenge of Poverty reduction”, April 2001, page 1}
to those measures that support the civil society…”\textsuperscript{12} “…while our determinative goal is a more targeted, concentrated and effective development co-operation”\textsuperscript{13}

Following the basic aims of the Nordic School- which may have enough similarities with a small country like Greece and become an example of cost- effectiveness-, it would be wise to refer to the crucial conclusions of a recent survey conducted by the Danish Ministry of foreign Affairs in order to examine the operational frame of co-operation with the non-governmental organizations. “…the evaluation showed four basic benefits and five weaknesses concerning the non-governmental organizations and their programmes. The benefits are the following:

➢ The role of most of the non-governmental organizations focuses on the fight against poverty.
➢ The non-governmental organizations keep a close contact with local partners
➢ Their aim is to ensure the follow-up of their actions and they use good mechanisms in order to achieve it.
➢ They can satisfy the needs of the poor.

The weaknesses are the following:

➢ The non-governmental organizations still work in an isolated way and they cannot connect the long-term with the short-term results.
➢ Their action has to do more with the implementation of a goal rather than its facilitation.
➢ They focus on the provision of services.
➢ They do not have enough information concerning the socio-economic sector.
➢ They cannot estimate the long-term effects…”\textsuperscript{14}

At this point we should mention that the non-governmental organizations, regardless the operational benefits and drawbacks they have, appear to be reliable interlocutors and partners not

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., page 8
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., page 9
\textsuperscript{14} DFID/ Development Information, \textit{op. cit.}, page 2
only with the governments and the international organizations concerning their effort to fight poverty and develop the LDCs, but also with the World Bank, which funds humanitarian tasks as well as programmes that have to do with disaster relief and crisis prevention. More specifically, the World Bank installed an NGO unit before 1999, “…which considers that the international development is an enterprise among governments, donors, private sector and the civil society that work together in order to achieve sustainable social and financial benefits for the poorer…” At the same time, the World Bank Post Conflict Fund “…which funds with amounts of money from a few thousand to a few million dollars in order to support programmes which study the conflicts, the relations with poverty and how they can intensify the sustainable development and break the circle of violence”.

In Greece, the first NGOs appeared in the late 80s. In 1985, a National Platform for NGOs has been created. This means that it was 14 years prior to the creation of Hellenic Aid- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department for International Cooperation for Development. One of the first NGOs were the World Young Women’s Christian Association (World YWCA) and the Greek Committee for International Democratic Solidarity.

A milestone year for Greek NGOs was 1999, when the Kosovo Crisis stroke. It was the same year Hellenic Aid was established together with various NGOs that initially became active. During the 90s some of the biggest worldwide organisations like Medecins sans Frontieres (1990), Medecins du Monde (1990), ActionAid Hellas (1998) were created. This kind of NGOs always kept their links with their “parent” organisations as well as the same motivation. They usually participate in annual meetings, common trainings, capacity building operations, and most definitely they share the same framework of operation.

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16 Ibid, page 34
17 Ibid, page 35
While in the rest of the EU states the majority of humanitarian/developmental NGOs were driven by religious motives and were closely linked to the church, the Greek reality has been different. Apart from the above mentioned NGOs that were linked to some of the largest international organisations, there have also been some Greek NGOs driven by a left ideology of solidarity for peoples around the world that facing a conflict in the region like Lebanon, Palestine, Colombia etc. Last but not least, there are some NGOs that are more professional and are mostly project oriented.

By 2007, the Greek Platform for developmental NGOs had 22 members only, including all the big organisations but leaving aside smaller ones who for various reasons such as the annual subscription preferred not to join.

However, it should be mentioned that the operational capacity of these NGOs is limited. To prove this, we could use as indicators their low annual budget as well as the number of implemented projects per year. What is really important to mention is that only few of these organisations have access to EU funding within the last three years. It is also interesting that Greek Organisations lack permanent staff members. Most of them do not have more than 3-4 people working permanently and only few of them have around 10. What matters the most, though, is that Greek NGOs have problems connecting to the Greek society. As we will see in the following chapter, even though Greeks have demonstrated humanitarian feelings by donating to enormous crises, mostly natural disasters such the earthquake in Turkey in 1999, the tsunami in Asia in 2004 and the earthquake in Haiti in early 2010, they seem not to have an education over issues like development. There are very few NGOs that are supported by members, mainly because there is a misconception about them, that they all belong in a corrupted system. The only ones that have an annual support by individual funding are the ones that

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18 DG ECHO has signed the FPA agreement only with two Greek NGOs and the past few years there has been only one project implemented by Medecins du Monde- Greece in Algeria.
belong to a larger family such as MSF, ActionAid and MDM. However this funding is not sufficient for the implementation of large-scale projects and, in a way, leads all NGOs to a situation of dependency by funding of Hellenic Aid. As we mentioned earlier there are only few NGOs working with EU funding, so the majority of the implemented projects are based on Hellenic Aid funding.

Even though we are focusing on Greek Aid until 2009 we should mention that when the financial crisis stroke in 2009, Hellenic Aid’s funding was cut. This has left all NGOs with financial problems, not been able to finish off projects they had already started. Not to mention, the economic situation of staff members that we forced not only lose their jobs but also change career perspectives as their expertise was not needed anymore.20

d. Volunteering in Greece

Until the end of the previous decade, the biggest part of the Greek civil society has not appeared to have any direct or indirect involvement –due to the lack of basic information- with the problem of the North-South relations, the need to fight poverty systematically in LDCs, the need to cooperate with the local social partners and the basic aspects as well as the resultants regarding the problem of the development of the poorer countries of the world. Moreover, another basic factor which seems to have significantly contributed to this direction, may be the fact that Greece, until the beginning of the 80s, was the recipient of assistance along with the fact that the Greek educational system and the media were not familiar with the dynamics of the North-South co-operation. At the same time, the rest of the developed world has already been active for some decades in the field.

Another significant aspect, which still remains the most important weakness for not having a strong volunteering movement in the civil society of the country, is the lack of development education of the young people. In the Scandinavian and other donor countries is a crucial part of the secondary

20 Ibid, pg.4
education and represents the base of their civil society and the starting point of the creation of the volunteering movement with a stable perspective.

It becomes clear that, apart from the available financial sources, the participation rate of a donor country concerning the international efforts to fight poverty depends on the alerting rate and the participation rate of the civil society in relation with the international developmental diplomacy.  

In order to achieve a dynamic strategy on this field, there should be significant information and a dynamic civil society together with other institutions. The gradual but constant increase of the alerting rate in the Greek civil society seems to be present. The tragic events in the Balkans, the earthquakes in Turkey and the situation in Palestinian territories which are under occupation and in Afghanistan- with the contribution of the media- seem to sensitize the Greek society. They increase their intention to help and activate the social institutions, which in the past appeared to be inactive towards the international situation. However, despite the indisputable fact that the Greek civil society could not take advantage of the situation at the same rate, even if its involvement in the Balkan events was immediate, things seem to have changed after the creation of new NGOs and the implementation of important development projects by international organizations in the area.

Nowadays, in the first top five development NGOs since the 90s on international range, a significant number of development NGOs has been added, which can organize projects in developing or in transition countries and complete them successfully.

We should notice that the NGOs which specialize in projects of immediate humanitarian cooperation, construction of the basic social infrastructure and protection of the environment, show great strength.

Consequently, the Greek NGOs seem to have overcome some of their weaknesses and restrictions of the “Balkan Syndrome” caused and, in their attempt to broaden their horizons, they

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aim to organize and carry out projects in the Middle East, the south-eastern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, inter alia, something that offers new perspectives and opens up new horizons in the Greek developmental diplomacy as well as the economic and commercial diplomacy that follow, both of which can take full advantage of the various benefits the first undoubtedly has created. Of course, the international initiatives and actions of the Greek NGOs, the university institutions, the religious and cultural organizations and the development networks, whose work has created a favorable climate for the development of the humanitarian assistance to the developing countries - something that happens for the first time in Greece - played a significant part in the overturning of the situation.

The volunteer movement is irreversible; there is a need, however, to reinforce the information rate of the Greek society and the young volunteers in particular, in order to increase the international development co-operation institutions and to become activated concerning projects for poverty reduction combined with the improvement of their experience and their professional skills. It should be mentioned that in the Special NGO Registration of the International Development Cooperation Department, 180 NGOs are subscribed, most of which are in Athens and Thessaloniki. Moreover, more than 45 of the NGOs have been financed by the International Development Cooperation Department (Hellenic Aid) during the period of 2000-2002, after the application, the evaluation and the approval of their programmes conducted in developing and under transition countries and especially in the Balkans.

Finally, two basic observations should be made concerning the issue of the financial support to the NGOs. The first observation has to do with the need to adopt tax motives by the Greek government for the significant support and the increase of the number of the NGOs which are active in the developing countries. The important decrease or, more preferably, the total elimination of the tax the NGOs –especially for those that are registered in the Special NGO Registration the International Development Cooperation Department-have to pay referring to the goods and the services as well as the private donations, will definitely contribute to the multiplication of the
development projects and the international promotion of our country. This technique in conjunction with the financial management control has been adopted by a great number of international donors. The second observation refers to the need to raise the private funding to the Greek NGOs. It is known that in Spain “more than 250 million Euros, coming from private funding, were given to the civil society organizations- especially the NGOs- in order to achieve initiatives and co-operations in the developing countries in 2000…” Moreover, “… according to the Monterrey results and taking into account the importance of the private funding in the international development co-operation, it becomes clear that the tax relief toward co-operating actions is a positive measure for the increase of the total amount of development”, while the same text, coming from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mentions that “every tax relief which a non-profit organization benefits from as well as every tax whose basic target is the promotion of to the developing countries, is actually a public issue so it should be included in ODA”.

e. Developmental Diplomacy as a part of foreign policy

The actions of the urgent humanitarian and development co-operation, which is internationally known as developmental diplomacy, are one of the most crucial components of the foreign policy of every contemporary state along with the traditional as well as the financial and commercial diplomacy.

If in the three types of diplomacy mentioned above, we include the peace missions, under international command, conducted by the armed forces of the donor countries (in conflicts or natural disasters), then we can understand the role that humanitarian actions and the international

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development co-operation projects have played with regards to the foreign policy of all the donor countries.

The operational framework is clearly presented in the following chart, which shows how the sectors and the institutions interact\textsuperscript{23}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Short-term actions of development support</th>
<th>Medium-term Development Programmes</th>
<th>Long-term Development Programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government entities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government entities (NGOs, development networks, e.t.c.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutions of initiative</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

One could also claim that the developmental diplomacy is more likely to lead –at least in a short term basis– to obvious results than any other diplomatic or non-diplomatic interventions and contributes to the comprehension and the co-operation between the donors and developing countries that receive the support. Moreover, it creates significant co-operations which can have better and long-term perspectives among the populations while in some cases it can cause various effects that can expand the co-operation to other bilateral commercial, financial, technological and cultural sectors, with positive results. So, the developmental diplomacy is nowadays a basic tool and a mechanism of the foreign policy of the donor countries- especially those which are DAC members-

and it is a part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, since 1990s, it has been proved that the organized implementation of the development co-operation strategy in a state of war country can play a crucial role to the conflict prevention$^{24}$ concerning the preventive diplomacy and the restoration of peace and stability in the area. It has become clear that “…the economic growth does not ensure the reduction of poverty but it is a significant element for the sustainable reduction of poverty in a long-term basis…the policies should go beyond the financial issue, to focus on the needs of the poor, to ensure the least social standards and the access of everyone to the social services…”$^{25}$.

According to DAC, “Greece considers that the issue of developmental support is a crucial part of the international financial relations of the country as well as an important tool of its foreign policy… Greece also estimates that it has significant benefits concerning the development of the neighboring countries, because of their shared history, the intercultural actions, the great amount of mutual understanding, the effective commercial and political relations as well as the recent experience Greece had…”$^{26}$.

### f. Greek Bilateral Policy for International Cooperation for Development

The participation of Greece as a full DAC member in December 1999, is one of the most important stations of the difficult route the country had to go through in order to be considered as one of the donor countries and a reliable international partners, in spite of the fact that the goal of 0.2% of the GNP the country had to give as a support to the developing countries was achieved in 2001.

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25IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank Group, 2000: A better world for all- Progress towards the international development goals, p. 21-22

Despite the inherent functional and structural problems the Greek public sector faces, which is considered to be able to cope effectively with the problems raised by the developmental process of the developing or under transition countries, the country has started the efforts in order to become a full DAC member.

In 1996, negotiations start in Paris in order for the 1st Five- Year Programme of Bilateral Official Development Cooperation was signed, which will allow the country to become a full member of it.

The basic goal of this Programme was to reestablish the balance between the strong multilateral pillar of the support (about 0,1% of GNP) and the really weak pillar of bilateral government assistance (about0,01% of GNP) which the country offers to the developing or under transition countries in total this period. Later, however, it became clear that this operation was not easy at all, due to the financial difficulties and the requirements needed to achieve the Maastricht convergence criteria. The second goal of the Programme was to set up the basic structure of a strategic plan for the Bilateral Official Development Cooperation during the period 1997-2001- something that happens for the first time in Greece- and to establish those processes that will allow the development of a regular inter-ministerial coordination and a more effective implementation of the actions and the programmes organized by government entities or other institutions to the developing countries concerning the developmental diplomacy of the country. However, from the first three years of its implementation, the Programme shows its operational functional weaknesses, the most important of which are the following:

- The administrative system of training, coordination, supervision and implementation of the programme –in contrast with the equivalent administrative mechanisms of the DAC member-countries and of other states- is really fragmented (except for the Ministry of National Economy which controls the coordination through the Ministerial Monitoring Committee, there co-exist eight ministries and four public institutions)
➢ The official bilateral development support of the 13 public institutions mentioned above, does not concentrate, as expected, from the need to achieve the results and as the international trend demands- in some developing countries as well as some priority institutions, so as to achieve the maximum of the results.

➢ A great part of the programmes under implementation cannot be considered that they contribute immediately to the fight of poverty\textsuperscript{27} and the development of entitlements for the broadening of co-operation in the area, due to the lack of sources, the big number of applications for funding, and the lack of a long-term developmental strategy.

➢ A big amount of the projects under implementation concentrate in the Balkans for objective or other reasons, while other developing countries, which face important problems with poverty, such as Middle East, do not take advantage of the bilateral assistant the country offers.

➢ If we liked to draw the most significant operational weaknesses of the Programme, we would probably reach to the following “inverted pyramid”

g. Geopolitical Priorities

It is worth mentioning the almost absolute priority that was given to a specific geopolitical zone, Europe (firstly the Balkans and secondly the Black Sea). It is clear that all countries have geopolitical priorities. Japan to East Asia, UK and France to their ex-colonies in Africa and the Caribbean and USA giving most of the amount of aid to two countries: Egypt and Israel. No one can deny that the Balkans are very important for Greece’s foreign policy and security. However, most of the donor countries are giving a great amount of their Aid to the strategically unimportant Less Developed Countries of Africa and Asia. Besides, the first priority according to DAC should be the fight against poverty. In Greece's case, this “ethical” dimension of aid is totally absent. Sub-saharan Africa, for instance, whose 70% of the population is under the level of poverty (income <2$ daily), was almost neglected until very recently. In 2001, Greece provided 81% of its aid to countries of medium income and only 2.2% to LCDs. This has created issues with DAC, because they do not accept such funding to countries like Bulgaria and Rumania as development aid.
This geopolitical priority shows a narrow perception of the greek foreign aid. However, we should admit that the Balkans is a region that most staff members are familiar with as they travel frequently and have a good understanding of the current situation. Familiarity should not be the only reason when choosing the geopolitical priorities for aid. It is difficult for any researcher that studies how these geopolitical priorities are being chosen not to be suspicious when the law for the bilateral aid (2996/2002) has chosen from the whole continent of Africa only 2 countries, Mauritius and Seychelles, as they are the most appealing destinations.

### h. The establishment of Hellenic Aid of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, based on the Law of 2731/99 and the Ministerial Decree 224/2000, established the Hellenic Aid which functions as a specialized institution of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for the promotion, the resonance and the supervision of actions and projects to the developing countries, conducted by the NGOs and other institutions of the civil society.

The establishment of the Hellenic Aid was based on the aspiration to restore a direct and functional contact with the international development. Also the current administrative policy on the field of international development co-operation and the need of the developmental diplomacy of the country were taken into account. The establishment of Hellenic Aid can be considered by some academics as a success not only because it allowed the ministry of Foreign Affairs to react in time and effectively- despite its limited sources- in a period characterized by a great number of humanitarian crises, especially in the Balkans, but also because the country appeared to have a specialized national developmental institution for a first time. This institution sets the role of Greece as a reliable international partner and assistant of the countries which face armed conflicts or crises.

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28 Huliaras, Asteris “The 7 paradoxes of Greek Aid”, Agora without frontiers, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, pg 91
With the establishment of the Hellenic Aid, Greece has a national developmental institution similar to the Swiss Aid, the Danish Aid, the Aus Aid and others, which empowers all the institutions of the Greek civil society activating in developing and under transition countries—especially the NGOs— and can immediately intervene in the context of the actions and projects of the developmental and preventive diplomacy. From the first results concerning the work of the Hellenic Aid until now, it has been proved that both its constitution and work were imposed and necessary for the promotion of Greek national interests.

Furthermore, after its establishment and its function in an early stage in 1999, Hellenic Aid tried to adopt innovative measures and international practices\(^{29}\) like those used by other DAC member states, concerning the drawing up and the application of sustainable projects by the NGOs. It also tried to inspire and contribute to the improvement of the effectiveness, the experience and the ability of the NGOs, especially the new ones, in order for them to implement actions and programmes to the developing countries.

Until 1999, despite its low funding, Greek Aid’s management has been divided between 13 different public institutions (9 Ministries and 4 other public organisations), under the direction of the Ministry of Finance\(^{30}\).

These institutions were:

1. Ministry of Defence
2. Ministry of Finance
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4. Ministry of Interiors, Public Administration
5. Ministry of Environment
6. Ministry of National Education

\(^{29}\)The edition of *the Specific Guide of the NGOs and other Civil Society Constitutions* (February 2001) is one of them
7. Ministry of Agriculture
8. Ministry of Health
9. Ministry of Commercial Maritime
10. Greek Organisation for External Trade
11. Greek Organisation for Tourism
12. Greek Organisation for Manufacturing SMEs and Handicraft
13. Employment Organisation (OAED)

This has been considered a paradox as it is internationally accepted that the largest the number of included institutions the higher the managerial costs and thus the lower the effectiveness. However, this division is reasonable because even before 1996 all these 13 institutions were involved in the process of aid programmes. The main reason for this division as well as the proliferation of funds is the bureaucratic competitiveness of two basic institutions: the Directorate General for International Economic Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the newly created DG for International Cooperation for Development (Hellenic AID). This bureaucratic competitiveness between the two ministries – that started almost 2 decades ago- was very intense and in a way not fair. The MFA with hundreds of staff members with the mandate for the Greek Foreign Policy was regarded by the Ministry of Finance as a "threat" not only because it was administratively independent but also because it had the responsibility to promote the “financial diplomacy” of the country. That is why this division was totally intentional; so that the MFA would not eventually absorb all the funds for the Greek Aid, the Ministry of Finance preferred to divide this amount to various other institutions and keep for itself the role of the Coordinator. (planning, follow up and representation).  

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31 Huliaras, Asteris “The 7 paradoxes of Greek Aid”, Agora without frontiers, Vol. 9, No. 2 , 2003, pg 91
Nowadays, and especially after the constitution of a new position of the State- Secretary for the External Economic and Commercial Relations for a first time in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is an innovative measure following the Scandinavian standards, as well as the transmission of all the responsibilities and sources of the bilateral official development co-operation of the country from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a new period has started, characterized by the approach of the greek administrative mechanism towards the successful international practices which follow the dominant international development process and the DAC recommendations. Based on these trends and taking into consideration that the developmental strategy which will be followed during the implementation of the 2nd Five-Year Programme of Bilateral Official Development Co-operation 2002-2006 will achieve more effectiveness and will be oriented to the goal of fighting poverty, it is likely to invert the situation and from the weaknesses of the “inverted pyramid” to successfully go to the “normal pyramid”, according to the following image:

![Diagram](image-url)
At an international level, there are two types of management of humanitarian/development aid for donors. The first one is based on independent Ministries for Development Aid (Australia, Germany, UK, USA, Canada and Sweden) and the other one is based on the incorporations of Development Aid Policies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Belgium, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland). Greece apparently preferred the second type.\(^\text{32}\)

**i. The “tied aid” phenomenon**

Greek Aid can be characterized for its close interrelation with the policy of external trade of the country. This is not an original for Greece, as "tied aid" is frequently used by other donors that force the countries that receive aid to buy their products and services.\(^\text{33}\) A part of aid always has some reciprocal benefits. However, for the majority of donor-countries, the management of development aid is clearly distinguished from the economic and trade diplomacy. In Greece, on the contrary, the DG that was responsible for aid was the same one that managed the trade diplomacy of the country. This has led to a draft plan that was institutionalised a few years later for the reconstruction of the Balkans with a budget of 550 million dollars that initially was considered as additional funding for aid and finally was a part of the already established budget for Greek Aid. This plan was rather oriented towards the support of Greek companies in the region than a development aid programme. Besides, 20% of its funding was a direct donation of Greek Companies and could not be in any case considered as development aid. Even the rest of the 80% was directly related to trade interests. This means that HIPERB seemed to disconnect aid for

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\(^{33}\) Huliaras Asteris, "The Tied Aid Paradox", Agora without Frontiers, Vol.6, no.3, 2001, pg. 263-274
poverty reduction and characterize it as an “instrument” for Greek investments in the Balkans, which actually resulted in unemployment increases in Greece.\textsuperscript{34}  

There have been some declarations from the Greek government that this kind of activities in the Balkans apart from reducing poverty, they indeed help to minimize migration flows to Greece. But is there any evidence that there is actually a link between this developmental policies and migration flows to Greece?

In 2008, the official annual report of Hellenic Aid mentioned the links between development and migration.

“According to Hellenic Aid, Greece is trying to move towards scaling up its official development assistance (ODA) while respecting its international commitments. Additionally, Greece is trying to improve the effectiveness of the aid it provides, by launching three new development strategies, which concern:

a) Including the concept of Climate Change into development aid,

b) Exploiting the possibilities and challenges that arise from Development Assistance, when combined with Migration, and

c) Promoting the notion of “Aid for Trade”.

More specifically, the first strategy mainly involves the financing of climate change adaptation projects, in LDCs as well as in Small Island States, given that the needs for climate change adaptation of these areas are barely covered by the international community. This innovative initiative provides a 4-year financing package of a total of 20 million euros, to be accorded to African Union, to CARICOM and to Small Island States, through the legal framework elaborated by relevant MoUs.

\textsuperscript{34} Huliaras, Asteris “The 7 paradoxes of Greek Aid”, Agora without frontiers, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, pg 91
The second strategy covers Migration, in a multidimensional way, using a variety of measures. These include not only launching information and support activities for the refugees, but also, using immigrants in Greece as bridges of cooperation with their countries of origin, and, at a subsequent level, as a way for additional development support for these countries. This comprehensive approach is going to be brought out during the Greek Presidency of the forthcoming Global Forum on Migration and Development, scheduled for 2009.

As for the third strategy, it is based on encouraging international trade and, consequently, extrovert economic activity of the host countries. This is the latest trend in the Hellenic development assistance policy and is thoroughly considered, henceforth, as a significant criterion of eligibility, when it comes to evaluating project proposals of development nature.

In addition to the above initiatives, Greece intends to ameliorate the quality of its development assistance.

- Encourages co-funding of the projects with other donors: local partners, international organizations but also the private sector, through Corporate Social Responsibility.

Greece, when working towards upgrading its development assistance, has two challenges to consider: keep this task as unaffected as possible by the current unfavorable economic conditions and, at the same time, reach a significant quantity and quality improvement of the aid provided to the developing world, through proper monitoring, but also with the necessary contribution of the Civil Society and other state authorities.”

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**Sub-Conclusion**

Bureaucratic interests have influenced not only the decision-making process but also the implementation of decisions for foreign aid. And furthermore, bureaucratic competitiveness has played an important role in the management of aid. Without having any evidence and judging by

35SkylakakisTheodoros, Annual Hellenic Aid Report, 2006,pg. 6
the overall governance in Greece, and as prof. Huliaras also mentions, there is a speculation that NGOs, companies and consultants involved in Greek aid may have been chosen based on a micro-political bases and not based on objective criteria.

What has been also very clear throughout this research is the secrecy with regards to the management of the aid. This secrecy is confirmed through direct personal experience of the Pr. Huliaras, as some staff members of the Ministry of Finance that was responsible at that has declared that “it is an official policy of the Ministry not to reveal information and data”, as well as through other researchers' or new staff members (trainees of the National School of Public Administration) that faced the same problems while trying to be informed. Another proof of this secrecy is that any publicity is avoided, since there are not many references in the Daily press with regards to Greek Aid (there are about 2-3 articles in the past 5-6 years in the mostly read Greek newspapers). 36 It is, however, easier to prove that such a secrecy exists than actually understand the reasons why it exists (...).

However, while reading the first chapter it is easy to understand how Greek Aid has developed through the years, which are its deficiencies, its priorities and which are the characteristics of the actors involved in the whole process. As we move forward to our research, we will be able to explore the quality of Greek Aid as it is evaluated internally and externally.

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36 Eurobarometer, 1993
CHAPTER II

EVALUATION OF GREEK AID

In order to understand the quality of Greek Aid, we need to see how it is evaluated based on criteria like Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles (see. Annex I) by internal or external evaluations as well as basic humanitarian principles, human rights, transparency criteria etc.

This chapter has the intention to discover all these through the eyes of DAC as well the Humanitarian Response Index- an external evaluation made each year by DARA Initiative. All these will help us answer the sub-questions:

- How efficient and effective donor is Greece ?
- Is Greece diverging from or complying with the international standards of humanitarian aid such a GHD?

a. Internal Evaluation

The evaluation of bilateral aid has a long tradition in other donor countries and begins back in the 50s, even before the evaluation of projects implemented in a national level. In Greece however, such an evaluation has never really taken place. During the period 1996-2001 500 million dollars have been spent for which there has been no clear image on what has been achieved and what kind of mistakes could have been avoided.

The lack of evaluation has a bureaucratic explanation, since the maladministration of the projects could put in jeopardy the professional status of the managers. Despite the pressures DAC has put on the Greek government regarding the importance of evaluation, there has been resistance on the matter as some managers implied that there’s an internal evaluation taking place while others
admitted that due to “lack of sufficient staff members and adequate know-how\textsuperscript{37}” such an evaluation procedure could not be possible. However, evaluation has been incorporated in the Greek legislation in the law N.2731/99 article 20.

The Ministry of Finance, at the end, decided to get an external evaluation by an independent consultancy company. This evaluation though didn’t refer to any project in particular but focused on the general role of the Ministry concerning aid and was actually mild while criticising the whole decision making process. The final evaluation was left unfinished and many staff members that still work for Hellenic Aid are not aware of its existence\textsuperscript{38}

At the same time there has been some evaluation of projects funded by MFA and implemented by Greek NGOs during 2000-2002. These evaluations have been characterised though by a competitive attitude between the two Ministries (Finance/Foreign Affairs) and could be judged as insufficient: they were either superficial or only financial evaluations.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{b. Peer Review by DAC.}

According to the current practice, DAC obliges all its member countries to be subjected to the processes of the Peer Review every three years. This process is based on the fact that the assessed country sends regularly detailed statistical or not notifications in Paris. At the end of the third year, DAC officials visit the competent national services of the assessed country as well as they make a field visit in a developing country, which the assessed country has chosen.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{38} Huliaras, Asteris “The 7 paradoxes of Greek Aid”, Agora without frontiers, Vol. 9, No. 2 , 2003, pg 95

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, pg.96

\textsuperscript{40} Filippaios, Georgios, “ Greek Policies on International Cooperation for Development and the role of NGOs”, Ed.Papazisis, Editors: Huliaras Asteris, Sklias Pantelis “Civil Society’s Diplomacy”, Athens, 2002
In March 2001 a special meeting was conducted, where the representatives of the 23 DAC member countries submitted questions to the representatives of Greece and the text of the first Final Peer Review, which was drafted by its Secretariat, was completed. It should be mentioned that in the text of the Review of the Development Co-operation Policies and Programmes of Greece\textsuperscript{41} DAC recognizes that “…Greece has started well, constructing its assistance programme…” during the period 1997-2001, it refers to a number of achievements carried out by the Ministries of National Economy and Finance, while it points out that the field visit in Albania “…showed the intention of Greece to play a specific role, supporting the development of Albania…”\textsuperscript{42}.

The text of DAC also mentions that the time of the first Review of Greece is very important because “…it happens at the same time with the changes of the ministerial responsibilities concerning the development co-operation presented on 23\textsuperscript{rd} October 2001, while it takes place during the preparations of the new five-year programme 2002-2006…”\textsuperscript{43} and concludes, after a number of significant observations and comments concerning the weaknesses and the malfunctions of the Greek policy, the administrative mechanism, the implementation of the programme, etc., with the necessary results every country has to take seriously into account, adopting the necessary improvements and adaptations in the near future.

More specifically, DAC demanded from Greece:

A. Definition of the goals and the objective aims of the assistance programme, including the main contribution of the sustainable reduction of poverty in the regional security and welfare as well as the development of the assessment framework for the decision making and the apportionment of appropriations.


\textsuperscript{42}Ibid, page 3

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid, page 2
B. Promotion and expansion of the long-term developmental activities, now that the urgent situation in the neighbouring countries have been reduced, as well as the continuous increase of the amount of the official developmental assistance on relation to the GNP.

C. Activation in order for the new policy of poverty reduction, gender equality and protection of the environment to become more operational and conduction of a review concerning the environmental consequences in order to find out which actions are going to get a funding through HIPERB.

D. Taking advantage of the opportunity of the current transmission of responsibilities, in order to ensure that the organizational structure will promote the effective and efficient attainment of the goals and the objective aims of the developmental co-operation.

E. Establishment of a team, which would include experts on developmental assistance, in order to administer and implement the assistance programme during their stay in the main accepted countries.

F. Adoption of a more completed and programming approach of the planning of the country and its budget, which will be based on high levels consultation regarding issues of developmental co-operation.

G. Conduction of a review concerning higher education scholarship programmes and increasing support of actions on the field of the basic social services.

H. Aspiration of a more strategic and completed approach of the multilateral aid and promotion of the binding of the bilateral and multilateral aid.

I. Reporting of statistical data by the CRS system of DAC.

J. Immediate need to put into practice the monitoring and evaluating system.

K. High level commitment that the consistency of the policies for poverty reduction becomes a governmental objective aim and adjustment of the current structures for the promotion of a more systematic dealing with the issues concerning the consistency of policies.
L. Increase of the attempts to inform both the politicians and the public opinion, regarding the achievements as well as the developmental impact of the programmes which have received funding by the Greek assistance programmes.\textsuperscript{44}

c. Following Peer Reviews

The above chart, taken by DAC’s Peer Review in 2004, shows the exact amounts of money spent by the Greek government for Official Development Aid. We can easily understand that there is a link with countries that are the main “providers” of refugees and asylum seekers as for example Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. We can also see that there is a geopolitical priority set for the Balkans and especially Albania, one of the countries from which Greece receives the majority of its migration flows. However, more importance is being put on the Balkans than countries with larger humanitarian problems such as the countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa.

\textsuperscript{44}DAC:DCD/AR(2002)2/09/PART1, \textit{Ibid.}, Paragraph 23, p. 8
Then, we should note the following information: there has been an obvious attempt to hide the fact that the funding is a part of the national budget. It is worth mentioning that after 1996, various governmental institutions involved in the management of national funding for bilateral aid, have tried to establish the Greek Aid into the political arena. This has led to the following: officially and unofficially, the national funding for development aid are being called "DAC funding" or just "DAC money", creating a misunderstanding as far as the origin of this money is concerned. As DAC mentions at its 2002 report\textsuperscript{45}: “Many people and organizations in Greece- including NGOs, consultants, university professors and journalists- do not understand DAC’s role and are referred to the official development aid programme as “DAC programme” and to the available funding as for development activities as ‘DAC money”, Efforts should be made in order to inform people and organisations that receive funding - as well as the MPs, the Media and the general public that these activities are based on the taxes the Greek people is paying...:

However, this misunderstanding is not a result of a rather random misconception, as DAC seems to believe. Even well informed staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not seem at that time to make an effort in order to avoid these terms. This leads to the conclusion that it was not a misunderstanding and that they have changed the proper name of these funds in purpose, in order to avoid showing their origin. These funds were a part of the national budget and thus they were vulnerable to any political exploitation by the Opposition such as "money are being spent abroad when the pensions are very low and the people are hungry etc". Furthermore, the Ministry wanted to focus on the fact that Greece had “international obligations" derived from the promise they made to DAC (that were not binding) for a gradual increase of the bilateral aid\textsuperscript{46}.


\textsuperscript{46} Huliaras, Asteris “The 7 paradoxes of Greek Aid”, Agora without frontiers, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, pg 101
d. Humanitarian Response Index for Greece

The system of calculating Greek Aid remained all this years (1997-2002) problematic. It is true that efforts have been made to systematically record the funds for aid by the Ministry of National Economy, but it is doubted if these data, provided to the Ministry by the managing institutions, have been accurate or complete. Furthermore, even today, Greece does not provide detailed data to the Creditor Reporting System of DAC. Besides that, there are serious doubts if all the public institutions dealing with aid have monitored and recorded their financial data.\textsuperscript{47}

Generally, these phenomena led some times to the underestimation of Greek aid while some other, fewer times, to its overestimation. Certainly, this is not something new for Greece and it clearly reflects the serious deficiencies of Greek public administration, which is totally unaware even for the specific number of its employees. Furthermore, aid funding, as it was reported for the period of 1996-2002, is still not specified with regards to their content. It is often almost impossible for someone to have a clear image of the managerial costs, the financial participation of each institution as well as the number of staff employees, as most institutions do not have detailed files of their actions. It is interesting to study the example of the peace corps of the Greek Army in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kossovo, FYROM, Albania). In total, based on published data, the cost of such missions is almost 50\% of the whole bilateral aid. The ex Ministry of Finance claims that these costs include humanitarian aid, medical aid, buildings’ and roads’ reconstruction etc. However, the salaries of the military that work abroad are included in the general costs of humanitarian aid (with a difference between "external" and "internal" salaries) but without knowing the exact percentage of the total cost.

In 2001, the Greek Aid has been reduced to 0,17\% of the GDP because the public services “forgot” to calculate the aid that was provided by local authorities and other public institutions apart

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid, pg 102
from the official Ministries. This omission was due to a non-important, in the first place, administrative change: the movement of a qualified employee to another department of the Ministry. Next year, this employee has been moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was responsible for the data recording, so what has been forgotten the previous year, has been added again, resulting to a major growth of the Greek Aid up to 0,22% of the GDP.\footnote{Huliaras, Asteris “The 7 paradoxes of Greek Aid”, Agora without frontiers. Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, pg 91}

Based on the annual Humanitarian Response Index, an evaluation of the 23 donors worldwide, Greece received an overall ranking of 22nd in 2010 HRI. (one position up than 2009). It showed slight improvement in its ranking for Pillar 4 (Protection and International Law), moving from 22nd to 19th. Its next best ranking by pillar was for Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) at 21st followed by a ranking of 22nd in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Performance in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability) remained at the bottom of the donor list (23rd). Greece’s ranking for generosity and burden sharing was 17th among the donor group. By indicator, Greece ranked well for non-discrimination in humanitarian action (5th), along with the indicators for support unaffected by other crises (4th), and for assistance free of conditionality that compromises humanitarian action (7th). It ranked 9th among the donors with regards to maintaining independence from non-humanitarian objectives, for equitable distribution of funding to different crisis countries, and equitable distribution of funding in accordance to the needs in the crisis, but its rankings were consistently low across nearly all other indicators in the HRI. For example, it ranked 22nd for needs assessments, needs-based response and funding based on needs assessments, three critical indicators to ensure that assistance is in accordance to needs. Greece performed well below the overall donor average in all of the crises studied this year.
HRI 2009 scores by pillar

Table 1

Pillar 1  Responding to needs
Pillar 2  Prevention, risk reduction and recovery
Pillar 3  Working with humanitarian partners
Pillar 4  Protection and International Law
Pillar 5  Learning and accountability
The above table shows that there are some points of Greek Official Aid worth mentioning as quite strong. For example, in terms of non-discrimination Greece is ranked as number 5 of all DAC members. However, we can also see its last position in the ranking for conducting evaluations, as we mentioned previously. Obviously, accountability and evaluations are not the best part of Greek Aid.
Table 4 is showing the ten main strengths of Greek Aid. What is worth mentioning is its equitable distribution of funding to different crisis countries and to complex emergencies, always in line with the needs of the vulnerable populations. Respecting humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, non-discrimination, independence from non-humanitarian objectives, has always been in accordance with Greek External Aid.
Table 5 shows a specific preference for food project and a slighter one for health projects. These two fields can been characterised as priorities by most of the donors, while for Greece are not only priorities but they tend to monopolize the interest of Greek decision makers.

Table 6

* Dac Peer Review 2004

This table shows a general average on a scale to 10 comparing to the average of other DAC donors.
Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<th>Areas for improvement</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
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<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
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<td>4.73</td>
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<td>-100%</td>
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<td>4.12</td>
<td>-94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-90%</td>
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One of the most important table shows the efficiency of Greek Aid in terms of its strengths as we already mentioned in previous table but also its areas of improvement. It is important to see that at some indicators Greece is 100% below average especially when it comes to accountability initiatives and evaluation.

Sub- Conclusion

It has not always been easy to evaluate Greek Official Aid as most of the times evaluators had to overcome many obstacles and face large bureaucratic fences. However, through the gathered material, it is not difficult to understand that Greece, comparing to other donor countries, has a long way to go until it is considered as a competitive donor.

Although Greece’s deficiencies were many, we shouldn’t underestimate the initiatives taken, especially for emergency crisis, especially complex ones, and for its timely funding, when the effectiveness and efficiency reached their top. The weakness of Greek Aid is definitely the issues of accountability and evaluation where no research succeeded in gathering any information.
The answer to the question if Greece is respecting GHD has not been easy to find as some GHD principles have been promptly followed while others, as we mentioned, were totally, intentionally or not, forgotten.

We shouldn’t forget to mention though Greece’s high performance on respecting humanitarian principles. The next chapter will help us discover if these principles are also being respected inside the borders, when the above mention vulnerable population of countries in conflict or touched by a natural disaster are trying to cross the borders in search for a better life.

CHAPTER III

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN GREECE

The countries of the west, and especially the European Union member states, are seen as havens of hope and even survival by poor and vulnerable populations of many Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries. Armed conflicts, lack of good governance and economic instability in the developing world have a big impact on desperate families and individuals to take the decision to seek a new and better life. The resulting problem of illegal immigration has become an increasing concern for the chosen havens in the European Union. The most popular of those are the countries of the Mediterranean Sea such as Spain, Italy, Malta and probably most of all Greece which, as a border region of Europe, has experienced during the past two decades a surge of illegal immigration, from both land and sea.

This chapter will explore the situation of Greece as a destination for refugees and asylum seekers and will try to answer the following question in relation to the previous chapters:

-What is the extent to which the principles of Greece’s external aid policy are violated in its internal policy towards refugees and asylum seekers?
a. Greek foreign policy for refugees and asylum seekers

With some 150,000 illegal immigrants arriving in Greece in 2008 (and the number is getting higher every year), as the main transit country for Asian and African immigrants, the economic, social and humanitarian problems of this massive influx are obvious. There has been a sharp increase in the number of illegal immigrants entering Greece in the past few years. Those registered at the borders in 2007, totalling 112,364, were up by 17% over the previous year, and there has been a similar increase in 2008. Arrests of traffickers in illegal immigration increased in that period by more than 40%.

The government claims that model reception centres, complying with UN specifications, have been established in numerous regions of the country, with many more under construction. The truth though is far more different. These receptions centres are of the lowest possible quality, overcrowded, with hygiene issues and resemble more to a refugee camp in a conflict region than a centre that hosts immigrants and asylum seekers in European grounds.

Among these illegal immigrants, as already mentioned, there’s a vast majority of asylum seekers. Due to the overload of the people arriving in Greek islands and the mainland, the Greek Government is incapable of treating the large amount of asylum requests, and this will be the main issue that this chapter will deal with. Research has been made in order to explore the policies that are being implemented when treating a request for asylum, the situation in which an asylum seeker is facing when entering the country of Greece as well as how all these are connected to the European and International Legislation.
Greece has signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties that secure the Rights of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, in order to secure the right of each foreign immigrant, at any point of entry, to apply for asylum orally or in writing, citing fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social status or political beliefs. But the reality is slightly different.

The Greek government claims that even after the rejection of an asylum request, foreign applicants are not sent back to a country where their life and liberty may be threatened. These claims continue with misleading arguments by an ex- Minister of Interiors protesting that “the long-term immigration policy of Greece, as defined by key legislation in 2005, provides for the "rational planning" of the entry of immigrants based on their special skills and taking account of the country's social and economic life. The law also provides for the safe working conditions of foreigners who come to Greece and take up employment. In addition to many other safeguards, it facilitates family reunions and sets rules for the protection of human trafficking victims and of unaccompanied minors”.

Greece sees the solution on this problem in the joint action of the members of the European Union for the protection of the EU's borders. However, the last few months of 2009, the policies of the conservative government have become much stricter than they used to be, with mass extradictions of illegal immigrants, which is the “official” name for every person entering the country without having the necessary documents, even if they are refugees, asylum seekers or economic immigrants.

The Greek Government is treating the issue of illegal immigration by paying attention to the following issues: immigrants and possible asylum seekers to be treated only on a case-by-case

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basis, under national law, on humanitarian or economic grounds; this is how the Greek government claims to be implementing its foreign policy with regards to refugees and asylum seekers as a part of a larger group of illegal immigrants, which also includes economic immigrants.

One of the priority issues, set in the foreign policy of Greece is the enforcement of Frontex, an agency that is supposed to control all external borders of EU, including the Eastern Mediterranean part that concerns Greece the most.

Greek foreign policy is trying to push for the enforcement of humanitarian and development efforts. All Greek administrations until today, believed that there’s a need for projects that raise the living standards in the countries of origin, as well as for efforts to resolve the existing conflicts. Connecting the immigration policy with international cooperation for development policy is one of the issues that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been trying to deal with. “Europe as a whole has much to gain by a co-ordinated effort to resolve a problem of immense economic, social, and humanitarian proportion”, claims the ex- Minister of Interior, Pavlopoulos. However, no research has been focused on this connection of international cooperation for development and refugee policies, thus it is very difficult to draw any results.

It is firmly supported that the EU in general should sign readmission agreements with countries of origin or transit giving each EU member-state the legal authority to send back to their countries of origin illegal immigrants with full respect for their rights and international law.

Greece, being close to Turkey, Middle East and Africa, is on the European Union frontline. Its geographical and thus geopolitical position makes Greece vulnerable to waves of migrants from all kind of different crisis zones. That is why closer co-operation with the EU to protect the union's external borders is essential. But this co-operation based on high standards and mutual respect has
not been enough. It appears that other EU member states are all too willing to look the other way as

_Greece performs their dirty work of keeping migrants out._

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i. Asylum requests

Approving the requests for asylum is quite rare in Greece. The first nine months of 2008 the rate was 0.03%, according to the Ministry of Interior.

The Greek authorities try to prevent asylum seekers from entering the EU at the Greek border. Some still succeed in entering but regulations are unofficially blocking their access to asylum procedures. Those who manage to lodge asylum claims are almost always denied. In 2007, out of 25,111 asylum claims, Greece granted refugee status to eight persons after the first interview, an approval rate of 0.04 percent; the approval rate at the appeals stage was 2 percent.

It is worth mentioning that the origin of asylum seekers, or as they are called illegal immigrants, are either from Iraq, Kurdistan, Palestine, Somalia, Afganistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Most of these regions are in an unstable, unsecure situation being involved in a long-term conflict, and not only a bad economic situation as most of the Greek society believes51. Greece systematically rounds up and detains Iraqi asylum seekers and other migrants in dirty, overcrowded conditions and forcibly and secretly expels them to Turkey.52

Greece also fails to provide refugee protection within its own territory. If we take Iraqis as an example, of nearly 2,000 Iraqi asylum claims decided in Greece in 2006, none were granted on Refugee Convention grounds or protected because of risk of harm from armed conflict and

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generalized violence in Iraq. This is not the case only for Iraqis. In spite of the extremely low approval rates, the number of Iraqis lodging asylum claims in Greece increased from 1,415 in 2006 to about 5,500 in 2007.

A story similar to many others that proves the above situation is the following:

“The police arrested me in Thessaloniki and put me in jail for 25 days. The guards did not speak to me. If I tried to speak to them, they just shook their heads. I had no asylum interview when I was arrested, detained, or released. I told them I was an Iraqi. I gave them my real name. They only asked me if I wanted to stay in detention or leave. They told me that if I asked for asylum and a red card that I would need to spend more time in jail beyond 25 days, but if I didn’t want asylum and a red card I could leave detention after 25 days. So, I refused the red card and after 25 days they released me. I got a white paper telling me I needed to leave the country in 30 days. I wanted to go to another country to seek asylum, but a friend told me that because they took my fingerprints, they would send me back to Athens. I have now been here a month without papers. Now I am in a hole. I can’t go out. I can’t stay. Every day I think I made a mistake to leave my country. I want to go back, but how can I? I would be killed if I go back. But they treat you like a dog here. I have nothing. No rights. No friends.

—An Iraqi Kurd from Kirkuk, who made five attempts to cross from Turkey to Greece, was beaten and summarily expelled from Greece to Turkey and beaten and detained in Turkey before going back to Greece.54

If we analyse the case of Iraq, for example, there is a serious possible harm coming from the spread violence. This means that Iraqis are in fear of persecution and consequently in need of international protection. This protection, ideally, is provided to them by third states, according to the Refugee Convention where the definition of the refugee is the following:

A **refugee** is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of that country, under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

ii. Unaccompanied minors

As it is recommended by UNHCR, child Refugees status should be determined as following:

- **Examination of asylum claims lodged by separated children in priority**, completion of the procedure before minors depart from the reception centres.
- Recognition of the refugee status to all minors who fulfil the criteria of the 1951 Refugee Convention, in accordance with procedures that reflect all relevant guidelines issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as concerns unaccompanied children.
- Granting of humanitarian status to all minors who do not fulfil the criteria of the 1951 Convention, but who, because of their status as unaccompanied and the inability for them to be reunited in safety and dignity with their families, are in need of international protection.

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accordance with the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the General Comment of the Committee on the Rights of the Child No. 6 (2005)\textsuperscript{55}.

However, the reality is different from the international obligations of Greece.

Children are being interviewed in ways that make them be scared and without being given a meaningful opportunity to tell their real stories. Interpretation is always an issue as it is not possible to have interpreters in the language of origin of the people arriving, and most of the times English interpreters are being used even if the people actually speak English slightly\textsuperscript{56}.

Stories like the following are an example of what human rights' organization face every time they communicate with such vulnerable population. "When they sighted the Turkish shore, Daoud, an Afghan boy said, "The police put us back on our rubber boat. We had a small engine, but the police took the engine and the two oars. The police made a hole in the boat. When we were at sea before we were caught the boat was okay, but when we were put back in the water it was punctured. We tried to paddle with our hands ... The wind was head on and nobody had life vests."\textsuperscript{57}

Children are facing in Europe similar horrors as they were facing at home. Instead of providing them with shelter, Greece and consequently Europe is making it even more difficult for them.

The Government of Greece accepts the fact that they form part of the developed world and they are signatory member to all the International Treaties and Conventions for Refugees, asylum seekers and children. All the European Union member states share the responsibility to protect children and especially the unaccompanied ones. But when it comes to the crimes that are committed against them by Greek officials, it is quite obvious that the common policy for asylum is

\textsuperscript{55} UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘‘Proposals of the United High Commissioner for Refugees concerning the protection of separated children seeking asylum in Greece’’, 18 June 2008, UNHCR, Pg3

\textsuperscript{56} Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Greece does EU's migration dirty work’’, 25 January 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/498178ab1f.html

\textsuperscript{57} Idem.
failing. The international standards set are not respected and the European Union is incapable of doing anything to prevent it\textsuperscript{58}.

Human Rights’ Organizations report that the Greek Coast Guard officials push migrants out of Greek territorial waters. Sometimes they even puncture their boats or disable their vessels. For those managing to gain a foothold in Greece, the authorities block access to asylum procedures and deny nearly all asylum claims, as we already argued by providing the percentage of asylum requests’ acceptance\textsuperscript{59}.

Turkish border authorities are also responsible for abuses to migrants trying to enter their territory and they have similar policies implemented towards them, including detaining the migrants in inhuman and degrading conditions. When the illegal immigrants, caught in the act of entering Greece and Greek authorities push them back to Turkey they have no meaningful opportunity to seek asylum and are often detained indefinitely, as it will be mentioned later on\textsuperscript{60}.

Asylum-seekers are being held in conditions of arbitrary detention while the examination of their claim is pending. They are often interviewed about their claim in the absence of an interpreter and lawyer. Lawyers report that in practice, individuals can expect to have their claim rejected at first instance. The percentage of rejection is almost 99.8\%. \textit{Greek authorities should immediately take concrete measures to improve the conditions for asylum-seekers including by resolving the legal limbo in which they are left – without documents and without access to any social services in practice}. It is of high concern the well-being of an estimated 2,500 people, including unaccompanied children as young as nine years old evicted from their makeshift homes in the port area of Patras, due to complaints of the local population of Patras. Most of the evicted people come from Afghanistan. \textit{Greece does not return people to Afghanistan and yet does not process their}

\textsuperscript{58}Idem.  
\textsuperscript{60}Idem.
asylum application in a prompt, fair way, leaving them in limbo without legal status and therefore without rights.

iii. Greek detention centres

As stated by UNHCR representation in Greece, the existing detention centres not only are insufficient in terms of the number of people they can host, but they lack the basic necessities such as medical treatment for the residents of the centres, hygiene etc.

“They often lack the most basic entitlements, such as interpreters and legal aid, to ensure that their claims receive adequate scrutiny from the asylum authorities.”

For example, the centre of Pagani in Lesvos has a capacity of 250 persons, while there are more than 900 residing there, including more than 250 unaccompanied minors. In Greece, there are 11 centres with a capacity in total for 891 persons, based on UNHCR’s calculations. It is obvious that the total number of asylum seekers entering is very high, leading to being very overcrowded with problems in terms of health and hygiene. (see Pictures in Annex II).

Greece is also in direct violation of the European Convention for Human Rights when the conditions of detention are inhuman and degrading. These conditions of detention for migrants in Greece are not considered as systematically inhuman and degrading, however it is not uncommon. The risk of such treatment is particularly real at the airport and at the borders in Evros and in Aegean Sea island where people are entering either by entering for the first time through Turkey or by being returned from other EU member and other neighbouring states under the Dublin system.

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The willingness of the Greek state to follow its obligations means little if this is not evidenced through the conduct of police and other officials.  

b. The European Regulation- Dublin II

In 2003, all EU states have agreed on a common European Asylum System known as Dublin II where it has been decided that every asylum request will be examined by the first country the asylum seekers will enter, and only this country will be responsible for determining the status of the person in request for asylum. Fingerprints are being taken so as to identify each person that tries to launch two or more different asylum claims in different countries. These fingerprints are being collected by Eurodac and are being used be all police forces of the EU.

This European regulation was based on a false assumption that all EU member states have the same standards and procedures for refugees and asylum seekers. What the creators have not thought of was the incredible burden that would face the states that form the borders of EU. It is worth mentioning however that the border states agreed and accepted this new regulation, without having any reservations for the possible outcome of it.

As Dublin II requests, each person trying to claim asylum in the second or third country that he entered, is being redirected to the first country he entered, which is most of the times a Mediterranean country and more specifically Greece. This leads to the fact that the Greek authorities, as well as Italy, Spain and Malta, try to prevent asylum seekers from entering the EU at

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63 Idem.
the Greek border, and if they do succeed in entering, try to block their access to asylum procedures.  

All EU Member States should make use of Article 3.2 of the Dublin II Regulation allowing Member States to examine an asylum application "even if such examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in this Regulation."

The Dublin II Regulation provides criteria to decide in which country applications by asylum-seekers should be considered, and allows them to be returned to the state where they first entered or that is responsible for their entry into the territory of European Union (EU) member states, Norway and Iceland.

"The Dublin system traps asylum seekers in a revolving door. They can't move onward because the Dublin II regulation normally requires asylum seekers to lodge their claims for protection in the first EU country in which they set foot, and they also can't move back home because of fear of war and persecution. They are almost never provided asylum in Greece.", says Human Rights’ Watch representative.

The Dublin II Regulation was adopted on 18 February 2003 by the European Council. It covers EU member states and Iceland and Norway.

Due to the existing situation, the European Commission initiated a procedure against Greece for infringing the Dublin II Regulation. This happens apparently due to lack of legal guarantees as asylum claims are not actually being examined in substance after transfer. The Commission decided to officially lodge a complaint to the European Court of Justice. Article 16 of the Dublin regulation

includes an obligation for EU Member States to complete a substantive examination of the asylum claim after taking back an asylum-seeker from another member state. In a judgment of 19 April 2007, the European Court of Justice equally found that Greece has also failed to implement Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers. This directive establishes a number of minimum standards with regard to reception conditions for asylum-seekers during examination of their asylum application. The directive requires member states to ensure a standard of living adequate for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence.  

UNHCR Greece has also been critical towards Greek asylum and detention policies and recommended that other European states not return asylum seekers to Greece. UNHCR said that asylum seekers in Greece “often lack the most basic entitlements, such as interpreters and legal aid, to ensure that their claims receive adequate scrutiny from the asylum authorities.”

On 7 February 2008 the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board suspended all returns to Greece under the convention, "on the basis of the latest information about the possible violations of the rights of asylum seekers in Greece, and on the basis of the need for more information about the conditions of the asylum seekers in this country". The UNHCR announced its recommendation even before Norway announcing that it was suspending all transfers of asylum seekers to Greece under the terms of the Dublin II regulation. On March 10, 2008 a Swedish court ruled against the return of a disabled Iraqi asylum seeker to Greece under the terms of the Dublin II regulation. Also, in early 2008, the European Commission initiated an infringement procedure against Greece for preventing access to asylum procedures for persons returned under the Dublin regulation. The

66 idem.
Commission will consider whether those returned to Greece are able to gain access to asylum procedures.\textsuperscript{68}

The European Commission has proposed some amendments to the Dublin II regulation and the Reception Conditions Directive. Concerning these amendments, Greece and other Mediterranean EU member states are having second thoughts on how to deal with the fact of the disproportionate burden that Dublin II has created for member states on the external borders of the EU. Some member states are questioning the harmonization of their standards and procedures for establishing asylum claims and their standards for the reception of asylum seekers, the integration of refugees, and the return of rejected asylum seekers. Greece’s treatment of asylum seekers brings into question whether, in fact, such harmonization exists and whether an asylum seeker in Greece has the same opportunity to find protection as in other EU states.\textsuperscript{69}

The European Commission underlined the seriousness of the issue when it recognised the immigration problem and the need for its comprehensive management. Its document on a “Global Approach to Migration” was followed by the European Council's approval of the “European Pact on Immigration and Asylum” for a common immigration and asylum policy in order to combat illegal immigration. The pact proposed the organisation of legal immigration and policies for integration, according to the needs and reception capacity of each country, together with more effective border controls.

c. Turkey- Greece borders / Case study: Iraq

Iraqis are the biggest nationality group seeking for asylum within the borders of the Europe Union. Obviously, Greece is their favourite entry point. However, Greece is not a country that


\textsuperscript{69} Idem
actually wants this role; neither the Iraqis want to stay there as the living conditions for asylum seekers are not good. They usually prefer to seek asylum in other countries. However, Iraqi asylum seekers find themselves stuck in Greece. Firstly, the Dublin II regulation does not let them move onward, as it is required to the asylum seekers to lodge their claims for protection of the first EU country, where they arrive, and of course they cannot return back to their home countries due to the fear of persecution and war.

Usually they are trying to enter EU through Turkey's coast with destination the Greek islands or by crossing the river Evros, which is the natural geographical border between Greece and Turkey. The Greek Police and the Coast Guard are not managing to prevent irregular entry. In 2007, the Greek police recorded 112,369 arrests for illegal entry or presence. But Human Rights NGOs, such as Human rights Watch and Amnesty International, believe that there are much more cases that are not recorded at all!

The police in Evros borders arrests illegal immigrants or possible asylum seekers on Greek territory and put them in detention for days, without registering them. The common procedure is as follows: the police gathers a big amount of illegal immigrants and takes them back to the border at night where they actually force them secretly to return to Turkey.

The Turkish General staff has announced almost 12,000 third-country national having been expelled by Greece and forced to return to Turkey between 2002 and 2007. Of course this number refers only to those that have been actually arrested by the Turkish police. The actual number may be a lot higher.

Some times it is even worse, when the Greek Police and the Coast Guard are actually forcing migrants to stay in their boats and push them to return to the Turkish coast. Border- enforcement officials usually do not make any effort to communicate with these vulnerable people, even to see if
their in need of international protection. In many cases, beating or any other kind of mistreatment is reported.

Abusive treatment of migrants by Turkish border authorities is also reported very frequently by Human Rights Organization, in the border region with Greece, where inhuman and degrading conditions of detention in direct violation of Turkey’s obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) are described by the detainees.

The situation in Turkey is even worse. If one is detained by the Turkish authorities, there is no meaningful opportunity to seek asylum or other forms of protection in Turkey. Usually they are detained indefinitely until family or friends are able to provide them return tickets. Turkey, which has placed a limitation on the Refugee Convention that only recognizes Europeans as refugees, continues to put Iraqis apprehended at the Greek border on buses and return them to Iraq without giving them any meaningful opportunity to seek protection before being returned.

Greece is violating the **principle of non-refoulement** by returning to Turkey any migrants who may be subjected to onward return to their respective countries, but also by returning any migrants to Turkey because they face a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment there. The situation is similar to Italy returning refugees to Libya and it is a direct consequence of the Dublin II Regulation.

The conditions that NGOs found at the Tuncacenter in Edirne, Turkey, show that migrants returned from Greece are systematically and consistently subjected to inhuman and degrading conditions. By returning migrants to such conditions, Greece is violating its international obligations and specifically its obligations under the ECHR\(^{70}\).

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In legal terms, Greece is the one that does not follow its international obligations as a member of the Refugee Convention, since Turkey has set a limitation only to recognize Europeans as refugees. Greece, on the other hand, is a full member of the Convention, but at the same time is incapable of respecting it. The most important aspect of this Convention, the principle of non-refoulement is being violated in the majority of the cases. Not mentioning the lack of protection of the basic human rights for medical treatment, good living conditions and not suffering from abuses by the frontier police.

Although some EU states are beginning to have reservations about sending asylum seekers back to Greece, the EU is also not in accordance with its obligations and responsibilities to protect refugees fleeing their home countries. The burden has been carried by a few states that guard the borders of EU. Those states, as already mentioned, however, have limited capacity to deal not only with the amount of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants. The EU lacks a common asylum policy for people seeking asylum inside the EU, but an external refugee policy as well that would provide support for refugees outside the EU through resettlement and other burden-sharing measures in the region of displacement that could reduce the need of Iraqis to seek asylum outside their region.

d. Recommendations by Human Rights’ actors

NGOs and UNHCR have made recommendations to the governments of Greece and Turkey in order to protect the basic human rights of asylum seekers, including rights like avoiding inhuman and degrading conditions of detention. The most essential of all though is the right to be granted to seek asylum and not to be expelled immediately without having the opportunity to be familiar with the asylum procedure. This becomes even more difficult for the position of Greece when such actions are considered as refoulement, subjecting the returnee to persecution, torture, or other
serious harm. Another recommendation made is that EU states should consider their own non-refoulement obligations and suspend transfers of asylum seekers back to Greece and instead they should examine their claims themselves. Only when Greece manages to meet international standards in terms of detention conditions, police conduct, access to asylum and other forms of international protection, and the practice of forcibly returning asylum seekers who face persecution, torture, or inhuman and degrading treatment in Turkey or their countries of origin, then they should choose to resume such transfers back to Greece.  

The detention of refugees and migrants has also been confirmed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CPT) published on 8 February. The report of CPT is quite similar to other reports issued by UNHCR and NGOs that have been witnessing the situation for the last years. CPT has noted the “persistent failure by the Greek authorities to tackle the structural deficiencies in... the establishments holding foreign nationals”. It found that the conditions in border guard stations were “in general, unacceptable even for short periods.” For example, “the cells at Isaakio and Neo Himoni had poor access to natural light and ventilation, and the detainees were provided with dirty blankets and slept on filthy mattresses on the floor. The toilet facilities were dirty and, in some cases, out of order. At Neo Himoni, two of the three cells were permanently flooded due to a plumbing defect, yet detained persons were still held in these cells during times of overcrowding and forced to sleep on damp mattresses. Moreover detainees were still offered no outdoor exercise and the hygiene products provided were totally insufficient.”

The Greek government should act immediately to stop the practice of holding people, in particular immigration detainees, for prolonged periods in ordinary law enforcement detention.

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facilities; and accommodate them in centres specifically designed for such use.\textsuperscript{72} It should be noted that the majority of those people are facing the risk of serious harm from generalised violence and widespread targeted persecution such as Iraqis and Afghans. That is why when they are being returned to Turkey they lack meaningful opportunities to seek asylum and it is a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, the cornerstone of refugee rights law, international human rights’ law (Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment or Treatment), together with article 3 of ECHR.\textsuperscript{73}

An Iraqi Kurd from Kirkuk who was among the scores interviewed by Human Rights Watch, made five attempts to cross from Turkey to Greece and was beaten and summarily expelled from Greece. He was also beaten and detained by the Turkish authorities. After the Greek authorities finally registered him, they used detention to deter him from seeking asylum. "They told me that if I asked for asylum and a red card that I would need to spend more time in jail beyond 25 days, but if I didn’t want asylum and a red card I could leave detention after 25 days. So, I refused the red card and after 25 days they released me. I got a white paper telling me I needed to leave the country in 30 days.

A 34-year-old Iraqi Turkoman from Kirkuk who said that he made 10 attempts to cross into Greece before succeeding provides another typical example. "One time I crossed the river into Greece and arrived in Komotini," he said. "They put us in jail for five days and then took us to the river and pushed us back. We were 60 persons. They put us in a small river boat with a motor in groups of 10. They did it in the middle of the night. It was raining hard, and the Greek police started beating


\textsuperscript{73}Human Rights Watch, “\textit{Stuck in a Revolving Door: Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the Greece/Turkey Entrance to the European Union\textquotedblright}, 26 November 2008, 1-56432-411-7, available at: \url{http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/492e6c622.html}
us to make us move more quickly. I saw one man who tried to refuse to go on the boat, and they beat him and threw him in the river. They beat us with police clubs to get us to go on the boat.”

Humanitarian actors that are fully concerned about them are forcing the authorities for a big change by recommending actions that seem more than logical to a democratic nation’s mind:

Such recommendations are the following, as presented by UNHCR:

UNHCR and NGOs formed the following recommendations to the Greek government and the European Union, including:

- EU states should suspend transfers of asylum seekers back to Greece under the Dublin II regulation and instead should examine their claims themselves;
- The Greek government should make a public commitment to ensure that migrants apprehended in Greek territory or at the border - whether on land or at sea - are treated in a humane and dignified manner, are given the opportunity to seek asylum if they choose, and are not subjected to forced return to Turkey; and
- Greece should immediately stop the routine and systematic police practice of gathering migrants in police stations in the Evros region, trucking them to the Evros River, and sending them across the border secretly in small boats.\(^7\)

\(\text{e. Greek Press Review}\)

The following lines are being written based on articles of Greek newspapers and not literature as the issue is currently a “hot” issue. Apart from what already has been described in this chapter, new perspectives have been given to the refugee and asylum seekers situation in Greece during the last few months. The constant demonstrations against the situation of illegal immigrants, as well as a high percentage of an extreme right party for the European Parliament, has urged the government

to take measures on the issue after postponing it for years. Not only in Greece, but in the whole of Europe, there has been observed an increase of extreme right parties’ percentages, as they are the ones that address the matter of illegal immigration in a strict way. The threat of extreme right has in a way pushed the Greek government to focus on the issue lately.

These measures, as they will be described further on, do not address the issue in terms of humanitarian solidarity towards this vulnerable population as it was expected by all humanitarian actors in Greece and worldwide that are concerned by this situation, but in terms of easing the public opinion who is fed up with the situation of illegal immigration, due to the high rates of criminality in some regions. All these have made it clearer that measures should be taken in order to soften the public opinion.

The first policy adapted by the government, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is to address the issue to the European Union as well as the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Greek MFA believes that since the capacities of Greece are very limited in terms of hosting this huge amount of people arriving everyday in Greek territory, the issue should be handled by Europe as a whole.

Indeed, the real intention of migrants, as it is already explicitly described throughout this paper, is to move on from Greece to other European countries such as Sweden where the asylum application are accepted in a percentage of 73%. Consequently, this is not a matter that Greece should deal on its own, but in good cooperation with rest of the European Member States, since it is a matter that concerns all.

As already mentioned, the refugees and asylum seekers in Greece are kept in detention centres or the so called welcoming centres- or camp settlements. The number of these centres is more than inefficient, when only an amount of 871 persons can be hosted, where there are more than 148.000 people having arrived in 2008.
After the European elections of 2009, the government of C. Karamanlis, has been determined to take some measures. One week later the opening of 2 refugee camps was announced, one in Ritsona and one in Western Attica. Most of the humanitarian actors and other political parties called them new "concentration camps" as the living conditions will not be decent, like in all the other small refugee camps that already exist. The number of people that can be potentially hosted in these centres has not been announced yet, but it is quite certain that they will not have a capacity of more than a couple of hundreds of people.

Another measure, taken by government immediately, was the deporting of around 150 Pakistanis, with charter flights. The Minister of Interior, in charge of this matter, mentioned that none of this Pakistanis has applied for asylum. The conditions under which these people were arrested and forced to this airplane remain unknown, but if we take into consideration how the police in other regions such as in Evros is refusing the provision of interpreters or even the possibility to apply for asylum, then it is obvious that these people did not have the time or the knowledge to apply for asylum. This measure has been implemented many times until the end of 2009.

At the same time, in the centre of Athens, police missions of wide range are taking place in order to arrest all the illegal immigrants and "clean" the city from the misery, diseases, criminality and poverty that surrounds them. The local population has demanded the government to take such actions, since they believe that the high rate of criminality and the feeling of insecurity are caused by the presence of the illegal immigrants.

Another reason for these immediate and strict measures taken by the government is that it is summer season and thus a touristic period. The local population who is involved with tourism has raised the issue of low touristic performance, especially in regions where hotels have sunk due to the illegal migration that has turned those regions, like islands in the Aegean Sea. A special fairy line is being planned to be used only for the transportation of illegal immigrants arriving in the
islands of the North and South Aegean, in cooperation of the Ministry of Interior as well as the Ministry of Mercantile Marine.

According to some newspapers, boats will be sailing every two days from islands such as Kos, Mitilini, Leros and other small ones with at least 500 migrants. These boats will be costing almost 30,000 euros per day and police will accompany them. Medical teams will be examining the migrants in containers that will be located in the ports.

All these measures, officially presented by the Greek mass media are an expression of the violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Greece is officially and not secretly at all abusing the human rights of these people that have no access to legal aid and thus justice.

However, the most important measure taken by the new government of PASOK (Socialist Party) which has not yet been implemented, is the establishment of a new Office specialised in Asylum Procedures. Until now the police have been responsible for the whole procedure lacking any education on human rights’ protection, while in no other country of the EU police has such a mandate.

f. Corruption

Since the subject has raised media attention, new data on illegal migration have been given to the public. Most of Greek TV channels are referring to a large system of illegal trafficking of population from various crisis zones of the neighbouring regions. This illegal trafficking includes also Greek nationals that get involved in various ways. Apart from the fact that migrants pay huge amounts of money to get imported in Greece- or Europe in general-they also pay large amounts of money to public servants that exploit their vulnerability and ask for 100s of euros in order to provide them with the pink card- card of temporary residence. They also have to pay lawyers that say that will be working in favour of the asylum applications. Most of the times, these lawyers tend
to disappear, letting their clients down. It seems like the whole situation in Greece has become a large business that one is difficult to give any solutions. The Greek government The system in Greece is corrupted in such degree as Pakistan and Nigeria, based on reports by Transparency International.

g. **Linking refugee to external aid**

While describing the situation concerning refugees and asylum seekers in Greece and after having also studied the external aid policies of Greece we have come to the point to discover which are the links between these two policies.

In international literature, conflict and human rights’ abuses are associated with poor governance and possible migration flows. Academics admit that countries in conflict are always the ones that face great economic problems. That is why it is not always easy to distinguish an economic immigrant from a refugee/asylum seeker. It is also possible that what in the beginning might start as a refugee movement, it might also evolve into economic migration.

The countries that are responsible for sending away masses of refugees and asylum seekers due to conflict and in fear of persecution are the same countries that ask for external aid from the international community. Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Palestine are only a few places in the world where there is need for aid. Humanitarian aid has a direct link to refugees and asylum seekers reaching the borders of the European Union.

We should keep in mind that the European Union is one of the largest humanitarian donors worldwide and at the same time the first destination for asylum seekers. Greece, being a part of it and also an external border, could not avoid being active in both fields. The problem is that Greece does not have the capacity to accommodate all these refugees.
In order to avoid more refugees coming to its borders, the Greek government (no matter which political party has the majority) has adopted for some years the strategy to address these countries with development activities like income generating activities and not only humanitarian aid\textsuperscript{75}. Linking relief to development strategies could be the ideal way to address migration.

That is the first link between aid and refugees and Greece is trying to implement such policies in order to face all the difficulties as well as public opinion that is devastated by immigrants’ criminality due to the degrading conditions that they live in. The second link has to do with these conditions that we just mentioned.

Human rights are meant to bind to humanitarianism. The right to life for example is of major importance to both senses. It is not important only to stay alive but to achieve happiness and liberty at the same moment. Protecting human rights means protecting the right to health, the right to education, the right to shelter and the right to dignity.\textsuperscript{76} When a country strives to protect human rights in far away regions and manages to provide the population with food, water and shelter, it is suppose to do the same when it comes within its borders. Unfortunately, as we saw during this chapter, in Greece this is not possible. Refugees and asylum seekers, but also economic migrants, are living in degrading conditions, have no access to medical health and have no shelter provided by the state.

These are the two links between refugees and external aid. This paper did not conclude if the projects that actually address migration flows are effective as the number of refugees is getting higher and higher. However, it was easier to see the level of respecting human rights’ internally and externally.

\textsuperscript{75}Hellenic AID, “Priority Countries and Sectors for the Allocation of the Hellenic Humanitarian and Development Aid”, 2007
Sub-Conclusion

If we compare the results of the media research with the results of reports of UNHCR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, it seems like all pieces come together and show some light to this issue that makes the country that invented democracy and fundamental freedoms look like an under developed country that cannot even respect the basic human rights.

The chapter managed to describe up to what extent is Greece following its international obligations towards the persons that are in need of international protection. The results were more than disappointing. The living conditions of these people that find themselves in a very vulnerable situation are more than inhumane and degrading (see. pictures in Annex I). Greece fails to protect even the most basic human rights as it is the medical treatment, hygiene etc. Most of all, it has been proven with arguments that Greece is failing to provide access to asylum procedures and forcibly returns asylum seekers to countries like Turkey where possibilities to grant asylum are almost zero.

The reasons for Greece’s actions are first of all the Dublin II regulation that forces all people in need for international protection that first entered Greece to request asylum only in Greece and not be able to move in an other European country in order to request asylum there. This has resulted in Greece being a guardian of the European borders and carrying all the burden of the high numbers of migrants wanting to seek for a new home inside the European Union. But most of all, it should be noted and fully understand that there is a whole system exploiting these people by letting them live illegally and consequently work illegally as cheap workforce needed for jobs of low income and low social status.

This chapter has also answered the question with regards to the links of refugees and asylum seekers with external aid under a human rights’ spectrum. It is everyone’s hope that things are changing as Greece is facing a new era of financial crisis trying to survive and change into a more developed and independent country of the European Union.
This paper intended to discover Greek humanitarian and development aid just before the financial crisis. For a decade Greece made significant efforts to become a competitive international donor as its fellow EU and DAC member countries. By establishing Hellenic Aid, a specialised agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece aspired to face all the difficulties of the international relief business and evolve into a very effective humanitarian donor. Maybe the efforts have not been sufficient. Maybe the bureaucratic system did not let Greek Aid bloom as it was supposed. One thing has been made clear through this paper: Greek Aid cannot move forward if there’s no evaluation initiatives in order to assess the completed projects, to draw some conclusions from lessons-learned. However, Greek has been an effective donor in terms of timely funding of emergencies and complex crisis.

But when it comes to the protection of refugees rights and covering the needs of vulnerable populations that enter the Greek borders, Greece has not been effective at all. Maybe the amount of refugees and asylum seekers entering the borders is massive and the capacities of Greece are limited comparing to other EU countries. That is why a better and more efficient European framework is needed.

Greek government has mentioned that migration flows can become less if external aid is focused on countries that are responsible for these flows. However, except from the fact that countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan have been a priority, we couldn’t find any other information towards that strategy against migration.
For a country in the edge of a financial crisis, with high rates of corruption, an enormous bureaucracy and limited capacities, we should admit that it has not been easy to build an international donor profile or to accommodate all refugees and asylum seekers. The future is vague for the moment as all public funding for external aid has been cut and the focus is turned on the migration problem. Let’s just hope that as soon as the crisis is over the situation with refugees can only become better and funding for external aid can start again, so that Greece can be considered as a developed country that fully respects human rights.

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The 23 Principles and Good Practice defined by the group provide both a framework to guide official humanitarian aid and a mechanism for encouraging greater donor accountability. These were drawn up to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of donor action, as well as their accountability to beneficiaries, implementing organisations and domestic constituencies, with regard to the funding, co-ordination, follow-up and evaluation of such actions.

Objectives and Definition of Humanitarian Action

1. The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.

2. Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; impartiality, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; neutrality, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and independence, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

3. Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

General Principles

4. Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.

5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.

6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.

7. Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.

8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.

9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and
return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.

10. Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

**Good Practices in Donor Financing, Management and Accountability**

**(a) Funding**

11. Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.

12. Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations.

13. While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.

14. Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

**(b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation**

15. Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.

16. Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.

17. Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.

18. Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.

19. Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.

(c) Learning and accountability

21. Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.

22. Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.

23. Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.

ANNEX II

PICTURES FROM PAGANI DETENTION CENTRE IN LESVOS ISLAND