LRRD Implementation Possibilities and Struggles for Aid Agencies in Post-tsunami Aceh, Indonesia.

By: Anne Faber
S1559583
NOHA, Network of Humanitarian Action
31-12-2011.
Supervisor: B.L. Aardema
Table of contents

Acronyms 4
Acknowledgements 5
Introduction 6
  0.1 Outline 8
Chapter 1: the LRRD concept 11
  1.1 Introduction 11
  1.2.1 LRRD, the theory 11
  1.2.2 the phases of LRRD 15
  1.3.1 LRRD implementation in Aceh, the phases 19
  1.3.2 LRRD implementation in Aceh, conceptual issues 22
  1.4 Conclusion 24
Chapter 2: Financial aspects 26
  2.1 Introduction 26
  2.2 Donor policies and restrictions 26
  2.3 Allocation of Funds and possible gains of LRRD 28
  2.4 Amount of aid and its consequences for LRRD 30
  2.5 Conclusion 31
Chapter 3: Coordination 33
  3.1 Introduction 33
  3.2 Internal matters 33
  3.3 The importance of coordination and its shape 35
  3.4 Coordination difficulties 37
  3.5 Conclusion 40
Chapter 4: Cooperating partners 42
  4.1 Introduction 42
  4.2 Incentives to cooperate 42
  4.3 Cooperation and humanitarian principles 44
  4.4 Government cooperation 46
  4.5 Conclusion 48
**Chapter 5: Beneficiaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Introduction</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1 Identifying Beneficiaries</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2. Expectations</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Participation</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Conclusion</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

**Suggestions for further research and limitations**

**Bibliography**
Acronyms

**BRA**  Aceh Reintegration Agency  
(Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh)

**BRR**  Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency.  
(Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi)

**EC**  European Commission

**EU**  European Union

**DRR**  Disaster Risk Reduction

**GAM**  Free Aceh Movement  
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)

**GoI**  Government of Indonesia

**ICRC**  International Committee of the Red Cross

**IOM**  International Organization of Migration

**LoGA**  Law on Governing Aceh

**LRRD**  Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

**MDF**  Multi-Donor Fund

**MoU**  Memorandum of understanding

**MSF**  Médécins Sans Frontières

**NGO**  Non Governmental Organization

**RRD**  Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

**UN**  United Nations

**UNORC**  United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator
Acknowledgements

It is my pleasure to thank those who made this thesis possible. My first and foremost thanks will go out to my supervisor from the University of Groningen, B.L. Aardema. His positive attitude and effort to keep in contact with me, even while being on the other side of the world, stimulated the writing process to a great extent. Without his guidance and constructive criticism this thesis would have never gotten to what it is now. I would also like to thank the staff members of the NOHA-program at the University of Groningen and the University of Gadjah Mada in supporting me in my academic processes. Amongst who Eric Hiariej from the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta in assisting me in the early processes of my thesis.

Special thanks go out to Delsy Ronnie, for helping me find the internship with GIZ in Banda Aceh and my internship supervisor Luc de Meester for giving me the opportunity to visit other organizations present in the area and conduct interviews for this thesis. Furthermore, I would like to express immense gratitude to Mirisa Hasfaria for providing me with a wonderful place to stay in Aceh and bringing me in contact with very interesting people. Additional thanks go out to my friends, family and fellow NOHA students supporting me along the way. Of whom I would like to mention two people in particular: My mother, Lies Koster, for her unconditional love and endless encouragements and my brother, Wiebe Faber, for his patience and support at the final and most stressful phases of writing. Lastly, as there are certainly people I have failed to mention here, I would like to thank all those who supported me in any respect during my studies.
Introduction.

The importance of effective and successful humanitarian operations is stretched, especially in these past decades where emergencies have grown in number and intensity (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1). For this reason, more and more emphasis has been put on the significance of relief as compared to rehabilitation and development. Government and aid budgets have become proportionately higher for humanitarian than for development aid, which up till 1980s dominated the overall aid budget (Duffield 5). Consequently, many NGOs have the tendency to specialize in humanitarian action in order for them to be able to give more clarity on their actions and therefore attract more donors. Furthermore, for NGOs solely focusing on relief it is easier to address the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence (Council 1).

Even if this emphasis would encourage the effectiveness of humanitarian action, emergency response does not end as soon as relief efforts are over. In most cases, humanitarian assistance is followed up by organizations trying to rebuild and further develop the affected area. Hence, relief and development organizations are active in similar regions providing two forms of aid, which are often highly separated. A division not always meeting the needs on the ground as real life situations are hardly ever clear cut relief or development situations. There often exists a “grey zone” or “gap” between humanitarian action and development in which lines between the two forms of aid are blurry (COM “LRRD an Assessment” 3). It can be noted that especially for beneficiaries of aid little meaning is given to this division in their day-to-day struggle to survive and build livelihoods (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 4). Therefore, an exclusive focus on humanitarian needs will fail to meet the overall needs of disaster and conflict affected people, especially in the long run. The trend of focusing more and more on humanitarian assistance could therefore undermine development and enlarge the already existing gap between the two forms of aid.

In this light we can see coordination as a key word in overcoming this gap. One of the main thoughts addressing this issue is the idea of ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development’ (LRRD). The idea originated in the 80s and its basic thought is rather
simple, it aims to link the three previous mentioned concepts to overcome the gap between humanitarian action and development (Goyder et al 15). This in a desire to come to a sustainable situation where relief supports development and development prevents the situation from falling back into another emergency phase. It sounds rather logical and advantageous but it is not always easy to implement in reality. There are numerable transitions to be made to achieve an effective linkage due to the differences in characteristics between relief and development. Furthermore, the several stakeholders involved in the linkage discussion; donors, aid agencies, cooperating partners and beneficiaries all influence LRRD in their own way (Goyder et al 56).

As a response to the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 the concept of LRRD was implemented by several agencies amongst which the European Commission (EC) (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 8). Aceh, a province in the northern tip of the Indonesian island Sumatra, was largely affected. Over 150.000 people were killed by the tsunami and many more were affected, disrupting the entire social and economic system in the province (Masyrafah and McKeon 1). Besides this natural disaster, civil unrest in the region had been going on for 30 years prior to the tsunami and had its own destructive effects on the region (Herlinger 11). The mixture of conflict and natural disaster complicated the situation in which lines between relief and development were already blurry. Unique about this situation was the amount of aid given and number of organizations present in the region, both record high. The possibilities for LRRD are therefore interesting to analyze in such a complex situation where resources were largely available.

The analysis of linking relief, rehabilitation and development will be from an organizational point of view. This in order to discover the applicability of LRRD within the given aid system and whether it is a useful concept in overcoming the gap between relief and development. The overall question of this paper will therefore be: Which possibilities and struggles did aid organizations face for LRRD implementation in post-tsunami Aceh? As relief influences many sectors of society, main focus will be put on livelihoods and capacity building to avoid overgeneralization of the LRRD concept. Since most NGOs in Aceh were active in these sectors achievements and difficulties in implementing LRRD are most likely to be found here.
0.1 outline.

To answer the main question of this paper focus will be put on the actors aid organizations interact with when moving from relief to rehabilitation and development. After explaining the concept and showing how relief, rehabilitation and development took shape in post-tsunami Aceh these actors will be discussed in separate chapters. The most important stakeholders in the aid sector are the donors, the aid organizations themselves and the beneficiaries of aid (Goyder et al 56). When it comes to aid organizations it is not only important how they organize themselves but also whom they cooperate with. Therefore this paper will be divided in five chapters starting with an analysis of the LRRD concept and from there discussing the influences of donor agencies, aid organizations, beneficiaries and cooperating partners on the implementation of LRRD in post-tsunami Aceh. The methodology of this paper rests mostly on literature reviews, both primary and secondary. Additionally, research was done by, holding semi-structured interviews with people working or who used to work for aid-organizations in post-tsunami Aceh.

As mentioned, the first chapter will explain the concept of LRRD, which will be used as a theoretical framework. The question in this chapter will be: What can be understood by the LRRD concept and in which way did it take shape in post-tsunami Aceh? An analysis of LRRD will be given discussing the concept, its benefits and the conceptual difficulties aid organization face for implementation. The phases within LRRD and how these took shape in post-tsunami Aceh will get special attention. Hereafter the influence of donors on LRRD implementation will be addressed. Over and over again, aid agencies let themselves be guided by donor regulations in order to receive more funding. Relevant is therefore the question: To what extent did donors influence the LRRD implementation of aid organizations operating in post-tsunami Aceh? Special emphasis will be put on the consequences of the extreme amount of donor money made available for Aceh on linking relief, rehabilitation and development. Furthermore, attention will be given to the role of the media, as receiving media attention and fund raising are often interrelated.
After discussing the influence of donors on LRRD implementation it is good to reflect on aid organizations’ own relation towards the linkage issue. When implementing LRRD organizations face several internal difficulties, which will be analyzed in chapter three. Central question in this chapter will therefore be: To what extent did aid agencies influence their own capacity in implementing LRRD in post-tsunami Aceh? An aid organization does not stand alone in its LRRD implementation but has to coordinate with other aid agencies to make LRRD effective. For that reason, apart from organizations internal matters special emphasis will be put on the coordination between the different aid agencies in post-tsunami Aceh.

Not only do aid-organizations coordinate with one another during LRRD implementation they also cooperate with other agencies, not necessary aid agencies. Chapter four will therefore address their cooperating partners questioning: To what extent did cooperating partners influence LRRD implementation of aid-organizations operating in post-tsunami Aceh? During LRRD a transition has to be made from cooperation with international agencies, NGOs, local contractors and civil society during relief to cooperation with local communities during rehabilitation and an eventual shifting towards strong government involvement in the development phase (Steets 10; White and Cliffe 316). The role of national authorities will get a central role in this chapter as one of the main argument given by critics of the linking concept is that cooperation with the government could undermine the basic humanitarian principles relief leans on (White and Cliffe 320).

At this point, one of the most important actors in the LRRD discussion needs to receive attention, the beneficiaries of aid. When moving from relief to rehabilitation and development a shift has to be made in the specific target group. While relief and rehabilitation focus more on individuals, development targets communities or the society as a whole (Steets 10). Furthermore the involvement of these individuals or groups is an important issue for LRRD. Will this be on a basis of ‘free aid’ where aid is just handed out to the beneficiaries often seen with relief efforts, or in a more participatory one know in the development sector. Chapter five will therefore answer: To what extent has LRRD implementation been in influenced by the beneficiaries of aid and their participation in post-tsunami Aceh?
This paper aims to show the benefits of LRRD and the problems still encountered in the concept. The case study will give better insight to the applicability of LRRD in reality and the remaining organizational constraints for implementation. For this paper, it is therefore not the overall goal to thoroughly analyze the effectiveness of LRRD in Aceh but focus more on organizational constrains regarding LRRD of aid agencies operating in Aceh. This case will, therefore, be used as a tool to get insight from the field for eventually researching the possibilities for organizations to better implement LRRD.
Chapter 1: The LRRD concept

1.1 introduction

The idea to link relief, rehabilitation and development emerged in the 80s and 90s when a realization came that the old division between relief and development simply did not meet the needs on the ground (DG Development 2). The African food crisis in the 80s was one of the main triggers for the development of the concept (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 2). LRRD emerged therefore naturally, to address needs in the field and no longer ignore the influence humanitarian assistance and development have on each other. It can be a useful and sometimes an even a necessary concept in overcoming this previous mentioned gap and consequently in addressing crisis situations in an effective and sustainable manner. However, LRRD is by no means an unconventional concept. Many years have passed since the idea came into being and even though plenty of opportunities arise to develop the concept, progress has been slow. It is therefore not mainstreamed in the sense that it is applied in all disaster situations. To explain what can be understood by the LRRD concept and in which way did it take shape in post-tsunami Aceh the concept will be further elaborated in this chapter. The idea of LRRD, its benefits and the reasons for its slow progression will be discussed including the phases of LRRD and shape it took in Aceh, followed by a discussion on possible restrictions and critiques.

1.2.1 LRRD, the theory

Humanitarian assistance and development are both forms of aid that are fundamentally different. Humanitarian assistance or relief is meant to save lives and reduce the suffering of victims, whereas development is there to support the social, economic and political development of countries (Green and Ahmed 189). Although they are very different, both forms of aid can have a strong influence on one another. Relief organizations are often followed up by rehabilitation and development agencies, which means that for a period of time they are working in the same field. Additionally, development can have impact on relief as in unstable areas there is a potential for new
crisis to break out. This influence does however, not take away the occurrence of a gap or ‘grey zone’ during the transition from humanitarian action to development and vice versa. Thus, LRRD originated to ease this grey transition zone and by these means overcome the gap between relief and development.

The basic idea of LRRD is simple:

Emergencies are costly in terms of human life and resources. They are disruptive of development. They demand a long period of rehabilitation. And they have spawned bureaucratic structures, lines of communication and organizational cultures that duplicate development institutions and sometimes cut across them. By the same token, development policy and administration are often insensitive to the risk of drought and other shocks, and to the importance of protecting vulnerable households against risk. If relief and development can be 'linked', these deficiencies can be overcome. Better 'development' can reduce the need for emergency relief; better 'relief' can contribute to development; and better 'rehabilitation' can ease the transition between the two. (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1)

There are certain transitions to be made when moving from relief to development that can be found in the characteristics of both humanitarian action and development aid. Looking at these characteristics will give an insight in the difficulties and challenges LRRD encounters. Humanitarian assistance addresses the immediate needs of individuals affected by crises and is given mainly through nongovernmental and international organizations (Eur-Lex 153). It is set up to save lives and alleviate suffering of victims in situations of natural disasters or conflict and rests on the principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and independence (Steets 10). The help provided is often nationally coordinated and on basis of free help meaning help without participation by the community. It seeks for short-term possibilities of alternative measures, immediate effectiveness and has no or little contact with political power. Humanitarian assistance therefore typically supplies material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes in their response to a humanitarian crisis (AusAID 1).
Timing is essential for LRRD, it is therefore important for relief agencies to think about when to act, where to act and for how long. Aid organizations have different instruments through which they operate to reach their goals; these instruments need to be applied at the right moment (DG Development 4). Relief, aiming to save lives and alleviate suffering should respond quickly to disasters and try to reach all people in need. By acting fast more people can be rescued, protected and provided with the necessary health supplies, food, water and shelter (Steets 10). This quick response must however not be mistaken by acting too hasty. Without well-organized aid programs future development could eventually be disrupted (Maresko 94). Ideally, relief should be brief and must try getting things back to normal as soon as possible. The shorter this phase lasts the lower the chances for a disruptive effect on future development. However, it is not always possible to make relief short and swift as the nature of the disaster plays an important role. The length of time for relief should be based on ‘the risk of a recurrence of the original trigger moment/ hazard and the ability of the affected communities to respond to it’ (Goyder et al 17). This is more difficult in conflict and complex emergencies as situations are less predictable, causing humanitarian assistance to sometimes last for years.

The characteristics of humanitarian action seem to stand contrary to those of development, which is there to support autonomous development policies and strategies. It aims to improve the economic and social conditions of a society outside times of crisis and builds on principles of sustainability, national ownership, alignment of country strategies and systems as well as mutual accountability (Steets 10). The aid provided mainly happens under co-operation programs agreed with the partner country and is therefore strongly interwoven with political power. Stakeholders involved negotiate in this long-term process of development and are subject to political constraints. Development aid is given to support the social, economic and political development of countries and is therefore addressed to communities or the society as a whole. Development should therefore aim at moving towards ‘peace, justice, social equity, and an absence of, or at least a declining trend in, ignorance, disease, and poverty.’ (White and Cliffe 322) It is spread over a longer period of time to achieve a more cost effective and local relevant response (Ramalingam and Barnett 7).
When moving from relief to development several shifts have to be made: from fast acting short-term vision to medium or long-term strategies; from free delivery to cost recovery; from humanitarian to development principles; from independent work to cooperative action; from a sector approach to a multi-sector approach; from individual relationships to one based on communities; from one single distribution logic to a participatory one; from a “universal” needs definition to a more contextual and specific definition (Steets 10,11). This is therefore a very critical phase in a country in order to make development plans work after relief work has finished. Without a good link it will be more difficult to effectively organize development and cause stability and peace in the long run.

Rehabilitation stands in the middle of these transitions, the nature of rehabilitation is a mixture of relief and development and can therefore be seen as a bridge between the two. Although rehabilitation often gets less attention in the LRRD concept, its role is nevertheless of great importance. It aims to ensure the livelihood of the victims and help restore social, economic and institutional stability (Green and Ahmed 189). Rehabilitation could build on achievements of humanitarian assistance and reduce potential negative effects relief could have on development (EC, “on LRRD” 9). It can be used to restructure and improve facilities and services destroyed by emergencies and make them in a way that they can withstand a potential future emergency (White and Cliffe 316). Rehabilitation in this model can ease the transition between humanitarian assistance and development. This transition can be seen in the several phases LRRD encounters in its aim to link relief, rehabilitation and development.

It is often difficult to make a clear distinction between relief and development, but it is even harder to make this distinction with rehabilitation. Rehabilitation often starts as soon as the immediate cause of the disaster has passed and has the goal of restoring the region or country to its previous state or even better than its pre-disaster status like in Aceh. Although the way rehabilitation is implemented is country and situation specific there are certain standards pointed out by the EC which rehabilitation should live up to. EC states that “rehabilitation should be of a transitional nature, and in principle of limited duration, although specific situations may require interventions of longer term; rehabilitation should not simply aim for a return to the previous situation but should
prepare, not necessarily in a linear way for the resumption of sustainable development in a better way than before and taking account of the lessons learned from the crisis.” (COM “on LRRD” 9).

A critical note is placed by Anderson and Woodrow who point out the linkage issue should be put in a broader perspective. They see that the transition from relief to development can be eased when relief work is held to development standards, meaning that ‘every disaster response should be based in an appreciation of local capacities and should be designed to support and increase these’ (Anderson and Woodrow 96). By doing this, vulnerabilities of people will be reduced and long-term sustainable development can be achieved. Furthermore, development programs should be aware of the changes of a possible new disaster, anticipate on this and be designed to prevent or mitigate such disasters (Anderson and Woodrow 96). In this way humanitarian action will be linked to development and vice versa. Development should therefore eventually reduce the need for emergency relief through disaster preparedness, preventing and resolving conflicts and assuring a return to structural stability (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 5; EC, “on LRRD” 9). With this in the back of our minds, it is helpful to first focus on the transition phases that stand central in LRRD-thinking, whereafter this broader context of the concept can be fully understood.

1.2.2 the phases of LRRD

![Fig. 1. The LRRD Continuum](image)

When the initial idea emerged to link relief and development one spoke of a ‘continuum’ to address the several stages of LRRD (White and Cliffe 315). This continuum was based on a situation of a natural disaster, for instance an earthquake, tsunami or flood. A linear transition was assumed from the onset, or trigger moment, of a
crisis, in which the relief phase starts followed by the phases of rehabilitation and development (Smillie XIII). In this model rehabilitation stands in between relief and development and can therefore be seen as the binding, or linking factor. The European Commission sees the role of relief within this continuum as a provider of urgent short-term humanitarian assistance to save and preserve lives of people facing serious difficulties resulting the disaster (COM “on LRRD” ii, iii). Rehabilitation programs will provide a link by progressively taking over relief work to stabilize the economic and social situation and facilitate the transition towards a medium and long-term development strategy (COM “on LRRD” ii, iii). The LRRD continuum is set out in fig 1. but became outdated soon after it emerged for its over simplistic way of looking at emergency situations. The continuum was based solely on natural disaster situations and even in that regard it is too simplistic. Crisis situations, especially complex emergencies, are not as linear as the continuum implies and the chronic nature of many disaster situations is overlooked, the three phases of LRRD may overlap, fall back or coexist (White and Cliffe 318).

These days, the term LRRD contiguum (fig 2.) is a more generally way over approaching the phases of the emergency response. It takes into account the non-linear nature of emergency situations and stresses out that in these situations assistance in relief, rehabilitation and development are often given at the same time. During these overlapping phases, denoted by the arrows in fig. 2 the lines between relief, rehabilitation and development are most blurry. However, the contiguum model is still not a satisfying tool that can be easily applied to all disaster situations. Disasters are often divided into natural disasters, armed conflict and structural disasters, the LRRD concept should take the nature of a disaster into account (Eur-Lex 153). It is possible to apply LRRD in all cases, however, in some situations it is very difficult and might be even troublesome. It is most important to use different ways for implementation to address each type of disaster in its own unique manner.
The nature of each disaster determines the complexity in implementation of LRRD. For natural disasters LRRD is relatively easy, coordination and transition happen in a predictable manner and occur in a non-hostile environment (COM “LRRD: an Assessment” 5). Collaboration with government is therefore easier and it is easier to take potential negative effects on future development programs in account. For conflict situations and structural disasters it is more difficult to link relief and development. These crises are often long lasting and transition periods are not as clear, may take long and could easily fall back into the relief phase. This makes it difficult to decide for organizations when the relief phase should end and development should start. An additional challenge is that the borders between these various kinds of crisis are sometimes blurry and can overlap. This means an approach to a certain crisis can never be the same, each situation is unique and therefore the way relief, rehabilitation and development are linked is also unique for the circumstance. This makes LRRD a difficult and challenging aim to achieve for every crisis situation.

With this in mind Hugh Goyder et al came up with a more appropriate way to look at the LRRD model shown in fig. 3 (58). It takes into account that in emergency situations there are often subsequent critical moments that will influence the transition between the different phases (Goyder et al 58). These critical moments have not been integrated in the contiguum model. Furthermore, the contiguum model fails to see the
possibility of development falling back into rehabilitation or even relief work. There are often certain criteria or indicators for the relief phase to end, however in practice there are often ‘triggers’ for agencies to make the shift (Goyder et al 58). These triggers are critical moments for organizations to decide whether to continue with relief or shift to rehabilitation and development. This trigger could be because relief work has ended but for instance also for the simple reason that organizations run out of funding. In some cases development assistance was already provided before the onset of the crisis. In this scenario one must think how and when it is possible to restart previous development efforts.

What can further be seen in fig. 3 is that rehabilitation and development start at almost the same time as relief. This to indicate how reconstruction and development needs have to already be considered from the outset in the best possible way for that time being. These needs should be coordinated from the earliest possible stage to effectively link relief, rehabilitation and development. Looking at it from this perspective the objective of humanitarian assistance can go further than not undermining development by contributing to development.
1.3.1 LRRD implementation in Aceh, the phases

In order to implement LRRD there needs to be a certain type of clarity about long term plans. Setting out future objectives and knowing the parameters within which aid organizations should work will help a smoother transition from one phase to the other (Goyder et al 7). A very important question arises whether it is possible to define these objectives already during the relief phase. Is there time to think about long term development when lives are at stake? Short-term perspectives can sometimes stand contrary to those of long term. The European Commission (EC) states that ‘in such situations, the long-term perspective must come second to saving life’ however, they also state that it is ‘nevertheless extremely important to keep sight of the longer-term view.’ (COM “on LRRD” 1) Therefore, relief organizations have to make difficult decisions by continuously consider whether short-term humanitarian needs should prevail over long term solutions. In the first few days after a disaster it is near to impossible to start doing this, but what could be seen was that after the tsunami relief organizations arriving in Aceh could start thinking about long term perspectives within a time span of approximately six weeks (Borgese).

To be able to shift away from humanitarian action there needs to be at least a minimum level of security in the affected area (COM “on LRRD” 9). At this stage, when security issues are in order, relief organizations are left with an important responsibility, namely the planning of exit strategies. Organizations should think whether to continue their practices into the rehabilitation and development phase or leave in a way that profits these two phases the most. In some cases, relief organizations that did move into the rehabilitation phase in Aceh lacked the capacity to do so. Therefore it is important for relief agencies to realize when to ‘get out of the way’ when skills of endurance are necessary which cannot be provided by that particular organization (Telford and Cosgrave 16).

As far as the phases can be divided in post-tsunami Aceh, the relief phase has mostly been observed as very successful. Local and international responses to the tsunami were immense and able to handle quickly. Before the tsunami the area was quite isolated and rather reluctant to accept foreigners, but this changed after the tsunami.
Humanitarian actors were able to clear dead bodies and rubble caused by the tsunami much quicker than expected. Furthermore good medical support, shelter and food provided to victims avoided hunger and contagious diseases (Zeccola 316; Doocy et al 289). An element supporting the effectiveness of the relief phase was the unexpected stop of hostilities in Aceh within eight months after the tsunami (Billon and Waizenegger 411). The Helsinki peace agreements signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on August 15 2005 laid down a road for peace in Aceh and stimulated effective humanitarian assistance (Zeccola 316). As a result in May 2005, six months after the tsunami, the Indonesian President Yudhoyono officially declared the relief phase to be over paving a way for rehabilitation and development (Masyrafah and McKeon 7). Generally people felt like this was a fair time to declare this phase to be over (Rinanda). At this time, many people lived in temporary houses and started thinking about moving somewhere permanent.

Due to the magnitude of the disaster the rehabilitation of Aceh took many years and was therefore strongly interlinked with development. After the end relief phase had been declared the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) established a ‘Master Plan’ (Rencana Induk) for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh (Masyrafah and McKeon 24) This plan, led by the BRR was laid out not only to build back Aceh but to ‘build back better’ within a timeframe of four years. Although this should have been enough time for reconstruction, building processes went slow (Afifuddin). One of the critiques the GoI is that they could have set up the BRR earlier. Furthermore, rehabilitation has the potential to build and rebuild facilities and services in such a way it can withstand a potential future emergency. However, when rehabilitating Aceh it might seem obviously that not everything can be made tsunami-proof (Ventura ; White and Cliffe 316)

Additionally, the consequences for LRRD due to the division in conflict and tsunami victims became more prominent during the rehabilitation and development phase in Aceh. Although the LRRD phases of both disasters in Aceh overlapped greatly they were not completely similar. Overall, the tsunami recovery went quicker than the recovery of the conflict (Sofyan). The fast onset of the natural disaster created victims with relatively short-lived needs (Goyder et al 8) while the conflict left combatants and
villagers traumatized due to years of violence and abuse (World Bank 1, 2). This does not mean the tsunami did not traumatize people as the contrary is true, but to get a 30-year lasting conflict truly out of the hearts and minds of people needs more time and could sometimes take generations (Ventura). This is one of the main reasons development activities at this moment are mostly focused on the peace process. The conflict was a struggle of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) against the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to gain independence over the region. Therefore with conflict recovery ex-GAM members had to be re-integrated into society and new laws were made to meet the Acehnese in their wish for more autonomy. Although reintegration of ex-GAM members went rather quickly the development of new Laws on Governing Aceh (LoGA) is a slow and continuing process.

It is difficult to analyze the Development phase in Aceh as it is still ongoing and difficult to say where it exactly began. Activities of aid organizations in Aceh are now more concentrated on the peace process and strengthening local government capacity. Most development organization plan to stay until August 2012 whereafter the government should take over the responsibility for further development. The government established a disaster management agency making people better prepared for future disasters. From another perspective, international organizations entering Aceh brought certain principles with them which made important contributions to gender equality, freedom of press and human rights (Idria).

Still, some areas need further attention, especially transportation, electricity and managing water supply systems remain problematic (Mardhatillah). Furthermore, during reconstruction the quality of buildings and infrastructure could not always be guaranteed (Telford and Cosgrave 16; Ventura). This poor quality of some of the reconstruction work during the rehabilitation phase is likely to be felt in the following years. More generally, development in Aceh has to deal with enhancing local preparedness and reducing structural vulnerabilities mainly through better education (Telford and Cosgrave 17). Economically there is still a lot to improve, the poverty rate of 19.6% is much higher than the already high Indonesian average of 12.5% (Mardhatillah). But one of the main problems at the moment remains the capacity of the local government. Aceh received a high level of autonomy but needs to streamline its practices. The region remains
legislatively weak due to the low capacity of law making (Sofyan). Capacity of civil servants is still weak and Aceh knows one of the highest rates of corruption in Indonesia (Mardhatillah). Although, Aceh is granted a substantial amount of autonomy the political situation remains unstable. Nevertheless, the chances of a return to conflict are very small, although old sentiments have not died out yet a fall back into a similar conflict is unlikely.

1.3.2 LRRD implementation in Aceh, conceptual issues

Overall, the idea of LRRD is still a work in progress as it remains a rather vague and therefore heavily discussed concept. Although more and more people see the importance of an effective linkage between these phases, critics claim that relief and development are technically and politically too distinct for this to happen (White and Cliffe 323). The concept of LRRD is rather basic which allows many organizations to integrate it in their practices, however, this simplicity makes it also likely for LRRD to raise more questions than it answers regarding the role of different actors in the process (Goyder et al 8). Philip White and Lionel Cliffe point out that the linking debate is often stuck at the level of generalities, rather than discussing the how agencies should or should not implement it (White and Cliffe 315). The opinions about how LRRD should take shape in within emergency situations differ highly. Although Goyder et al point out a more appropriate model how LRRD could be applied in reality, the LRRD contiguum is still widely used under donors and aid agencies including the European Union. It is therefore difficult to come to a coherent model to link relief, rehabilitation and development.

One of the issues we run into when implementing LRRD is therefore of a conceptual manner. The definitions of relief, rehabilitation and development are not identical to all actors in the field, which creates a lack of clarity for the exact meaning of these terms (White and Cliffe 314). For instance, the recovery is sometimes used to address the grey area between relief and development (Steets 10). Therefore the terms rehabilitation and recovery are often used interchangeably. As organizations each hold their own set of principles and organizational cultures they tend to give different names to their activities to best fit their practices and place within this aid sector (Buchanan-Smith
and Fabbri 11). Argued could be that NGOs often do not fall neatly under the categories of relief, rehabilitation or development. Just as the division of phases is not as clear-cut neither are the activities of NGOs. Therefore an own terminology by organizations is understandable, let alone to make them stand out from all the others agencies working in the same field. However, this extending puddle of terminology can lead to confusion and blur the linkage discussion.

This reflects in the awareness of the LRRD concept by aid organizations in post-tsunami Aceh. Many of them are unfamiliar with the exact term but have an overall idea about underlying thought to linking humanitarian aid with development (Masyrafah and McKeon 10). Many organization have integrated the linkage issue in their activities but under a different name. Early recovery is for instance one term widely used under aid organization and highly overlaps with the thought of LRRD. It addresses the recovery process in which early recovery starts in the humanitarian setting and is ‘guided by development principles that seek to build on humanitarian programs and catalyze sustainable development opportunities.’ (Early Recovery in the 2011 CAP 1). Just as early recovery terms like ‘development-relief’ (Maresko 117), ‘developmental relief’ or ‘linking disaster to development’ are used by organizations (Fakhrrrazi) to address the linking discussion. Although this might seem confusing and could complicate the implementation of LRRD, it is often a different name given to more or less the same thing. The exact focus of the linkage discussion might differ and the way the phases after a disaster are analyzed might be different, but the idea that humanitarian action should lay the foundations towards development is integrated in all these thoughts.

Although the idea might be simple, the goal that LRRD aims to achieve is quite hard. Even when the concept is implemented by organizations it depends on the capacity and dedication of their employees to have its desired effects (Goyder et al 15). Successful LRRD implementation becomes more difficult as the nature of the emergency becomes more complex. The link between relief, rehabilitation and development cannot be seen independently from the pre- and post-crisis phases (DG Development 2) Furthermore, a crisis is not always a single peak, it may stabilize, tone down and rise again over a given period of time it is therefore difficult and even troublesome to decide when relief phase should end and rehabilitation and development begin. LRRD therefore needs to be
adjusted according to each specific crisis situation, making it even harder to implement. Additionally, Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell argue that even though LRRD is important ‘the first priority in discussing relief-development linkages must be to assure basic relief, so that human life is protected. This must take precedence over any sophisticated attempt to use relief for development purposes; and also over development expenditures, even those designed to reduce vulnerability.’(10) In this way they are stepping away from LRRD completely when emergencies get too severe.

When LRRD is however done in an effective and efficient manner, not only by focusing on the grey transition area but taking the idea to the broad scope of all recovery effort this should have its positive effects. There are many benefits to an effective linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development that will be further discussed in the following chapters. An effective link should ease the transition between the three phases. Aid organizations face, however, several problems when implementing the LRRD concept making it a difficult task to implement the concept in practice (COM “on LRRD” ii). The following chapters will therefore discuss these problems more specifically. Each chapter explaining the influence on LRRD implementation of these most important stakeholders involved in the linkage discussion.

1.4 Conclusion

Conceptualization of LRRD remains a difficult task and it is tempting to get stuck in generalities. Due to the different nature of humanitarian action and development several shifts have to be made to overcome these differences. Rehabilitation could provide a link within the transition phases, as its characteristics lie in between those of relief and development. When LRRD is put in a broad perspective it will not only address a smoother transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, it also focuses on the capacity of development to prevent future crisis. Timing is essential when moving from one phase to another. However, transitions are very situation dependent making it difficult to determine when to move from one phase to the other. Ideally, relief should be short and swift to have a minimal destructive effect on future development, however, not all situations allow for this to happen. Although generally, LRRD has been observed to be rather successful in Aceh, mostly since the relief phase had very positive effects for
rehabilitation. Some difficulties occurred during rehabilitation, which took longer than planned. Furthermore, LRRD does not stand alone in the linking debate. For better implementation there needs to be a more coherent and clear model. In this way it is easier to integrate the concept within organizational structures and make employees aware of the advantages LRRD can have. For a more effective LRRD implementation it is therefore of great concern to keep the linkage discussion going and try to establish to a more comprehensive model for LRRD better applicable in real life situations.
Chapter 2: Donors

2.1 Introduction

The strict division of humanitarian- and development aid lies deeply within the funding structures for these forms of aid. This chapter will therefore explore the influences donors have on aid organizations in their ability to link relief, rehabilitation and development. Although the division in aid sectors could be seen as the most prominent constrained for LRRD, there are other financial restrictions put on NGOs that could influence a successful transition. Therefore a deeper analysis will be made on donor policies and restriction, where after allocations of these funds will be explained and possible benefits LRRD can have for donors. Since the amount of funding for Aceh was exceptional, special attention will be given to the influence this had on LRRD. When discussing donors, these could be of all sorts, ranging from private to official donors. This chapter will mostly deal with the official donors within aid administration departments or intergovernmental institution, as these have highest influence on aid agencies. To what extent did donors influence the LRRD implementation of aid organizations operating in post-tsunami Aceh?

2.2 Donor policies and restrictions

Aid organizations rely to a great extent on large official donor agencies for the funding of their projects. These agencies are known to have their own set of standards and regulations in which they allocate their funds. Donor policies can be strict plus different criteria and procedures can be applied for the sustainability, funding and implementation arrangements (COM “on LRRD” iv). These policies are set out for the obvious reason of making sure received funding is used correctly. It is a method for donors to monitor and influence aid agencies in order to safeguard the quality of their performance. However, financing procedures are often complex and can complicate and delay project implementation (DG Development 2). There is no coherent set of standards amongst donor agencies, therefore one might ask whether these regulations indeed stimulate the quality of aid. Especially when realizing that in many cases the scope for
organization to link relief, rehabilitation and development is limited due to these regulations.

The institutional division between humanitarian aid and development aid exists within most donor organizations (COM “on LRRD” iv). This strict division complicates a successful implementation of LRRD since it limits the flexibility and scope of aid organizations. Aid money for relief and development is provided from different sources and is subject to different procedures (COM “on LRRD” 25). Telford finds these emergency funds often unnecessarily restricted, especially those funds for humanitarian organizations (12). Furthermore, donors have the tendency to focus more on funding emergency needs than those for rehabilitation and development. Within this strong separation the access to relief aid is relatively easy while access to development aid is not. Furthermore, taking LRRD into consideration, the funding for rehabilitation which should ease the transition between the two is often hardest of all to access (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 11). This could also be seen in Aceh, although some favored recovery and reconstruction, agencies working on relief were strongly funded receiving almost half of the total aid budget for the region (Telford and Cosgrave 5).

In Aceh, a further division was made amongst donors by separating funds into tsunami- and conflict programs. The EU insisted on this separate funding to enable a smoother recovery operation in Aceh (Senanayake 9). Due to this division organizations where bound to stick with one category in order to receive funding, or divide their actions into several projects, in which each project should address either conflict or tsunami victims (Sofyan). For organizations, this separation was sometimes impossible to make as after experiencing thirty years of separatist conflict, many people were affected by both the tsunami and the conflict. In some occasions funding was therefore observed as too separated, causing overlap in programs. Another imbalance occurred, the funding for tsunami-affected people was at least ten times higher than that for conflict victims (Sofyan). This is understandable, since the devastation of the tsunami made a greater impact on the region. However, the imbalance in funding could as well have been a result of the media interest in the region mainly covering the tsunami. This could have made organizations claim and donors provide more aid money in areas of higher media coverage.
But conditions made by donors go beyond this division in type of aid and victims addressed. An additional constraint for NGOs is the timeframe in which they should spend the obtained funds. Most of the relief funds in Aceh had to be spent within the first six months after the tsunami, putting a high pressure on organizations to respond quickly. Sometimes, this time pressures compromised the making of a good assessment of the situation before implementing projects. Telford and Cosgrave found that after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami assessments of situations were often slow, overlapping, poorly shared and imprecise (4). For instance when the IOM was working on housing projects, donors pressured for projects to start even before they were able to assess what needed to be done in the region (Rinanda).

Furthermore, the pressure to spend the money in time made some organizations rush their projects. This while a longer endurance of the project might have been better for future development (Goyder et al 8). In 2009, right before many international organizations left Aceh, projects had to be rushed and funding had to be spent before the given deadline. To avoid hasty work, aid organizations could ask for more time to be able to finish their projects accordingly. Sofyan acknowledges that in many cases aid-organizations working in post-tsunami Aceh had asked for longer than the original timeframe given for their project. Especially the time it would take to finish rehabilitation efforts was underestimated in Aceh. Four years turned out to be too short to distribute all the promised houses, leaving some areas unfinished long after BRR stopped their activities (Goyder et al. 7). Although donor organizations are often flexible in giving this extension, it could mean that occasionally organizations have to pay back part of their received funding. Just like international organizations, the time for donors in which they stay in a country or region is often limited. When aid organizations are dependent on these donors for their funding, extension to projects can simply not be granted when it goes beyond the stay of this donor.

2.3 Allocation of Funds and possible gains of LRRD

For LRRD the allocation of funds is very important, the share of aid given to relief work and that given to development has to be in balance for an effective linkage. This is however problematic as strategic priorities of donors do not necessarily overlap
with relative levels of need (Harmer and Macrae 5) Donors are often far away from the actual disaster, making it more difficult to allocate funds according to needs. However, just like in the case of Aceh more and more international donors establish offices at field level. In this way allocation decisions can be make at the country level, and support can be better distributed according to the needs on the ground (Steets 4).

Critique on donor policies in the early stage of relief in Aceh claim that their allocations of funds were not needs based (COM “on LRRD” iv). However, a number of constraints existed for donor agencies to respond to the needs of the tsunami and war affected people in Aceh. Telford sees these constraints in the often slow, overlapping, poorly shared and imprecise assessments made and further states that ‘financial tracking was incapable of presenting a comprehensive, accurate and up to date picture of funding at any stage’ (Telford and Cosgrave 4). Donors were therefore put in the difficult position to make adequate funding decisions and often fell in the trap to be led by the media and political pressures. These pressures resulted in a uneven amount of funding towards humanitarian organizations compared to agencies working on rehabilitation and development. Furthermore, funds were not always provided according to the capacity and quality of NGOs. Donors often favored organizations of the same national origin instead of comparing effectiveness and efficiency of the different agencies and their programs (Telford and Cosgrave 5).

In order to fund projects more according to the needs of the Acehnese during the rehabilitation and recovery phase, the government requested the World Bank to establish a multi-donor trust fund (MDF) coordinating the allocation of funding in Aceh (Masyrafah and McKeon 29). About 75 percent of the funding went through the government in order to increase the sustainability of these funds (Masyrafah and McKeon 29). The MDF managed about 10 percent of the funding, but influences over 80 percent of the total funding due to the coordination efforts they managed (Sofyan). NGOs at this stage had to work in accordance with the Government to receive funding from the Worldbank and MDF (Sofyan). Close coordination with the Government was therefore a must for NGOs working in Aceh during the rehabilitation phase. This had the advantage of minimizing transparent administration costs and furthermore providing a coherent framework in which agencies were able to ensure that their financial contributions were
meeting the needs of the Government’s reconstruction agenda (Masyrafah and McKeon 29).

Surprisingly, the benefits LRRD can have for donors is little explored, this while potentially great sums of donor money can be saved when linkage has been made effectively. Often LRRD is just seen as a good idea with no opportunity costs for donors. However by increasing the flexibility of donor money successful LRRD is stimulated and can have possible trade-offs. Large amounts of money can be saved on for instance staff time and administrative costs as projects run smoothly from one phase to the other (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 13). When relief is done in accordance to development standards, and therefore, not undermining long-term sustainable development, a great amount of time would be saved as well as funding. Depending on the definition of donor funds for relief, LRRD and its benefits will become more important the narrower donors define these funds (Goyder et al 17).

2.4 Amount of aid and its consequences for LRRD

One of the most outstanding elements in the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is the extreme amount of donor money given to the region. The devastating tsunami received loads of public and media attention, causing generous amounts of funding. The money provided by private sources was huge and provided with the additionally large official aid response an overall budget that exceeded the estimated losses and damages by at least one-third (Telford and Cosgrave 5). An estimated of USD7.7 billion was made available for Aceh from all possible sectors (Masyrafah and McKeon 5). At a certain point organizations even put a halt on further aid floating into the region when they realized enough resources where obtained to perform their activities. A situation unique compared to most emergency responses in which NGOs often have trouble finding enough funding to support their projects. This meant an international emergency response which, maybe for the first time in history, could operate almost free from financial constraints (Telford and Cosgrave 1).

The benefit of donor sources coming from individuals and corporate- or other private entities, is that these are fast and flexible leaving organizations in Aceh with an unusual level of independence (Telford and Cosgrave 4). The large amount of donor
money gave many organizations a greater freedom to plan and set out their response strategy. While it is normally the stagnating and declining aid budgets causing a decrease in the incentive to work on LRRD, in this instance the freedom and flexibility, mostly due to this private funding, made it easier to shift funds according to needs in the field and address the linkage issue (Goyder et al 7). It further gave the incentive to organizations to not only build back Aceh, but to ‘Build Back Better’ a term generally used during the rehabilitation of Aceh (Steinberg and Smidt 185). Moreover, it provided a chance for many organization to prove themselves and show their capacities to the public.

Flexibility in aid made it possible for some organization to shift their budget from relief and use it on rehabilitation and development. In some cases, this had a very positive effect on LRRD as organizations with prior knowledge in the region could now further build on their achievement made during the relief phase. However, some organizations started to work on areas in which they had no prior knowledge. For instance, organizations focusing on water supply suddenly were helping with building houses while they had no competence to do so (Sofyan).

A further downside of the extreme amount of money pumped into humanitarian projects in the region can be seen in pressures on organizations. Although it created a great amount of freedom for organization and an increased ability to implement LRRD, it also established high expectation for organizations to do well (Goyder et al 7). Not all organizations had the capacity to absorb these high amounts of funding and for those who could suddenly had a budget many times higher than their normal spendings. Not all organization were capable to deal with this increase, as they had no prior experience in handling these great sums of money. Pressure for organizations to perform rose quickly as donor expectations and media coverage were high. This made organizations start to become highly competitive instead of work together (“Growth of Aid and the Decline of Humanitarianism” 253).

2.5 Conclusion

It seems that donors had quite a substantial influence on the ability of aid agencies to implement LRRD in post-tsunami Aceh. The present donor structures have a rather
negative effect on LRRD by reducing the capacities of organizations to implement the concept. The numerous regulations, separate funding and time constraints can be seen as the main restrictions in doing so. Furthermore, Incentives of aid organizations to implement LRRD often decline in their struggle to gain the appropriate amount of funding. The situation in post-tsunami Aceh was, however, unlike many other emergency responses due to the extreme amount of funding made available for aid organizations. Since a relatively high amount of this funding came from private donors the flexibility of aid organizations to implement LRRD strategies increased. On the other hand, the separation into conflict and tsunami programs decreased this flexibility again. Additionally, while internally flexibility was enlarged my the substantially high amount of funding, incentives to cooperate with other organizations was no longer necessary to reach own organizational goals. This endangered an effective linkage again, as cooperation is an important element in the LRRD concept, which will be later, explained in chapter four. For better LRRD implementation, rules and regulations should be reconsidered. The extent to which it is necessary for donors to control the practices of aid organizations with these regulations or whether they could be adjusted to give organizations more freedom in their practices and therefore enlarge their ability to implement LRRD needs to be rethought. Moreover, LRRD could have a positive effect on donors by saving time and making aid more cost-effective, something which up till now has been insufficiently researched.
Chapter 3: Aid organizations

3.1 Introduction

An effective implementation of LRRD by aid organizations depends not only on the applicability of the concept and external influences, but also on the way aid organizations integrate the concept into their own organizational structures. As relief, rehabilitation and development are fundamentally different; aid organizations often focus on different aspects within the LRRD framework. For that reason, each organization will need to find its own way to shape LRRD into their practices. Implementation of LRRD is more than a statement made by an organization, the way their staff deals with the linkage issue will eventually influence LRRD implementation to a great extent (COM “on LRRD” 5). Furthermore, coordination can be considered as one of the key elements enabling LRRD to take shape. It not only avoids double work but can also smoothen transition between the different phases of LRRD. In this way rehabilitation can build further on achievements made by humanitarian agencies and minimize possible negative effects for development. During the phases of LRRD a shift has to be made from national coordination during the relief and rehabilitation phase slowly moving towards local coordination during development. This chapter will, therefore, deal with internal matters of aid organizations in Aceh regarding LRRD and on their coordination amongst each other. Asking the central question in this chapter: To what extent did aid agencies influence their own capacity in implementing LRRD in post-tsunami Aceh?

3.2 Internal matters

The effectiveness of LRRD depends on the extent to which the concept is integrated in organizations’ practices. Some organizations are able to work throughout the entire LRRD framework while most organizations have a mandate to only work on either relief or development. It is good to realize that development activities are often already happening before the offset of a high impact disaster. When relief agencies enter all too often development organizations leave, taking all their knowledge about the region. From this we can see the danger with these organizations, having only a single
mandate. When working solely on either relief, rehabilitation or development, organizations’ efforts might not be transferred into the following LRRD phases. Thus, when these organizations implement LRRD they only partially cover the LRRD spectrum and need to coordinate with other organizations to cover the rest. Organizations with a dual mandate, able to work both on relief and development, can play an important role in overcoming these linking gaps. When implementing LRRD, these organizations tend to put focus on protecting livelihoods early on in their humanitarian work (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 25). It is furthermore important to think how previous development activities can be re-started and integrated with relief and rehabilitation activities (Goyder et al 17).

But even when the principles of LRRD are adopted by organizations, it depends highly on their staff whether it will have an impact on the ground. LRRD implementation will, for instance, stay at the policy level when staff members are unaware of the meaning of this concept and therefore not translate into practice. In Aceh, it was exactly these recruitment difficulties that endangered successful LRRD implementation (Goyder et al 6). Because of the magnitude of the disaster and the aid response that followed, suddenly many people had to be hired. Save the Children, for instance, jumped from 23 staff members before the tsunami till 600 staff within weeks (Zeccola 317). Lack of knowledge in the region and appropriate skills amongst newly hired staff members were the main problems for aid effectiveness as well as LRRD implementation.

Moreover, it is tempting but rather naïve to think those organizations with the most thought-out LRRD policies have the highest impact on the ground (Goyder et al 18). Even if agreements have been made on policies in relation to LRRD the impact in the field is not guaranteed. Often, the processes of humanitarian aid distribution and the extent they follow the core principles of for instance the ICRC are likely to have more influence on the speed of recovery then LRRD strategies (Ramalingam and Barnett 5). For an effective link between relief, rehabilitation and development, those organizations with strong influences on ground level should be involved in the LRRD process. Coordination amongst these organization will cause a more effective linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development.
3.3 The importance of coordination and its shape in Aceh

It is hard to imagine a successful link between relief, rehabilitation and development without good coordination in the field. For aid organizations entering a region it is always important to know what has already been done, activities ongoing from other organization and where contributions can be made (Mardhatillah). As basic as this may seem, it simply cannot happen without good coordination. Not only does a general consensus exist on how greater coordination will translate into lives saved at the early stages of a disaster response, it can also smoothen the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development (Ramalingam and Barnett 5). A better linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development will occur when humanitarian and development actors coordinate from the earliest phases of a crisis response (Council 9). Coordination can avoid double work and bottlenecks which consequently will save time, effort and eventually a lot of money. Nevertheless, it remains one of the main issues often indicated as insufficient during LRRD.

Although coordination is important at all times, for LRRD it is most interesting to look at the coordination during the rehabilitation phase as relief and development organizations during this time are both working in overarching areas. During this time there were four leading bodies in charge of coordination in Aceh (Masyrafah and McKeon 24). As discussed in the previous chapter, the MDF was set up in order to coordinate the funding of donors. Furthermore, six months after the tsunami the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR) was set up by the Indonesian government to take charge of tsunami response coordination in Aceh (Masyrafah and McKeon 7). Simultaneously, the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) came into being for handling the conflict recovery (Senanayake 9). Lastly, the United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC) was established by the United Nations (UN) to coordinate the agencies of the UN and provide a single access point for BRR to the UN system (Masyrafah and McKeon 24).

Coordination took shape by several meetings, reporting processes and input mechanism to which organizations had to report (Mardhatillah). During that time, organizations working on rehabilitation of the tsunami had to send all project proposals through the BRR for approval. Although the BRR received lots of criticism on their way
of managing the situation, some might argue it was too much for them to handle (Rinanda). It was nevertheless fruitful for the effectiveness of coordination to have one big organization in charge. Therefore this model is often seen as a reason for the achievements made and the ultimate recovery successes in Aceh (Afifuddin).

The BRR organized many of these meetings, inviting all organizations involved in the tsunami recovery. Although almost all organization attended these meetings often the people sent lacked the responsibility or capacity to take the necessary decisions (Mardhatillah). Some of these meeting became therefore more information sharing gatherings instead of occasions where important decisions could be made. It was near to impossible to develop common approaches and strategies during these meetings making them ineffective. Little distinction was made between coordination at the operational level and the strategic coordination at the policy level (Bennett; Telford and Cosgrave 12). This lack of distinction made it difficult to create joined-up thinking necessary for LRRD (Goyder et al 6). In these cases where big meetings were found ineffective, further meetings had to be arranged with fewer actors and a narrower focus in order to get decision makers involved (Mardhatillah). This obviously took time and money, making coordination look better in theory than it might have been in practice.

Coordination went quite different during the relief and the development phase. During the relief phase there was no central body dealing with all the organizations present. There was coordination amongst organizations in the field but often described as only being to a small extent and not too effective (Sofyan). However, Sofyan argues that this was not a problem since activities of relief organization went more or less automatically without the need for much coordination. Therefore more coordination was not necessary in this early stage, but became more needed as soon as links had to be made with rehabilitation and development actors. After BRR left in 2009 they handed over their responsibilities to Bappenas, the national planning agency to support further development (ADB 6). However high concerns about their effectiveness have been expressed (Afifuddin).

What can be seen is that coordination is especially important during rehabilitation, the phase that should operate as a link between relief and development. However, some critics debate whether close coordination is indeed always stimulating for the
effectiveness of LRRD. Coordination can be timely, especially when it is not done efficiently and can therefore be seen as a burden for organizations with tight donor schedules. Although, in most cases it is still better to take this time for coordination and come to a better collective action. Furthermore, Anderson and Woodrow put question marks whether it is always beneficial for development actors to coordinate closely with relief agencies (90). For instance, if development agencies coordinate well and continue the structures laid out by relief organizations it could eventually obstruct development by creating dependency (Anderson and Woodrow 90). Structures of development, especially in the way of approaching beneficiaries are very different to that of relief and it can therefore occasionally be better to give organizations arriving a ‘fresh’ start and avoid creating similar expectations under beneficiaries. Still, this does not take away the importance of LRRD and even not necessarily the importance of good coordination. Although, the situation teaches us not to carelessly build further on previous relief efforts, good coordination could in this circumstance simply mean knowing what had been done before but choosing to continue with a different structure.

3.4 Coordination difficulties in Aceh

Although organizations generally see the importance of coordination they have to operate in a highly competitive field. Even though they want to do good, they also want to do well which often results in choosing organization interests over effective coordination (“Growth of Aid and the Decline of Humanitarianism” 253). As information means power, the flow of information necessary for coordination is sometimes compromised. Additionally organizations are often competing with each other for media coverage in order to raise more money (Ramalingam and Barnett 4). Although the issue of raising money was not directly the case in Aceh, still organizations wanted to get in the spotlight. Furthermore, the large amounts of funding created higher independence amongst aid agencies that reduced their incentives to coordinate.

The aim to link relief, rehabilitation and development is all too often sacrificed for organizational self-interest (Ramalingam and Barnett 5). Aid agencies tend to be more concerned with reaching their goals than coming to a joined approach to best fit the needs of the affected population. Nevertheless, there have been several positive outcomes for
LRRD in Aceh making transitions between the phases run relatively smooth (Afifuddin). Especially the relief phase can be seen as successful in Aceh and laid down a foundation for rehabilitation and development.

One must consider the magnitude of the disaster in Aceh when analyzing the difficulties related to coordination. Obviously in a disaster of this scale, where almost everyone was affected, either by the tsunami, the conflict or both, coordination difficulties occur. The disasters did not only cause many victims, it also destroyed the entire infrastructure of roads and houses in Aceh. A massive reconstruction was necessary to build back the province, for which it was almost impossible to address every issue (Afifuddin). Problems, which arose regarding coordination, should therefore be put in perspective of the scale of the response. Though, this does not mean these problems were not relevant for the effectiveness of LRRD.

An element that surely made coordination more difficult was the amount of aid organizations in the field. Some say there were far too many agencies, making coordination more expensive and less effective (Telford and Cosgrave 13). The low barrier for organizations to enter the system created a high inflow of variable aid agencies. The diversion amongst these organizations further complicated coordination, especially since it included inexperienced and at time incompetent actors. From the total of 463 agencies estimated to be involved in post-tsunami Aceh 436 were NGOs, 27 donors (including UN agencies) and the BRR as a government agency. Amongst the NGOs in Aceh 326 were a very diverse group of international organizations (Masyrafah and McKeon 8, 9). However, 15 actors dominated during the rehabilitation of Aceh making coordination somewhat easier than expected (Masyrafah and McKeon 18).

Problems of overlap and bottlenecking occurred which could especially be seen in the lack of coordination regarding housing issues. Although BRR was in charge of the reconstruction in Aceh, the building and rebuilding of houses was popular amongst many aid agencies. 500,000 people had become homeless due to the tsunami, causing a high need for new houses (Herlinger 11). Addressing this need gave organization a perfect and relatively easy way to be seen and show their capacities. A total of 16,000 houses were built in Aceh, mostly by NGOs and the BRR (Sofyan). Rinanda argues that there might
have been too much focus on housing issues, causing people to be able to get assistance from different kind of organizations.

The problem with this was that there was not a coherent set of standards for building houses or criteria in providing these houses. Which resulted in the various organizations providing houses of different sizes and quality. The quality of those provided by NGOs, especially the bigger ones, was often much better than those of the BRR only having a limited budget to spend (Ventura). Making people to be better off if NGOs were present in their area with relatively more money to spend. As many agencies worked on housing, the lack of criteria for providing these houses made it possible for people to get houses from different organizations complicating coordination. However, some NGOs also lacked knowledge in building houses, providing people for instance with homes without reinforcements or homes which were not adjusted to cultural habits and standards (Ventura).

Even though Acehnese people could get housing assistance from different sides, not all regions where sufficiently covered. Even up to this date some people still claim not to have gotten housing assistance. As most organizations do not have the capacity or mandate to work on infrastructure they often planned their activities at places where access was best. Consequently, It was in these areas where overlap was high and regions where access was a problem where needs of people were left unaddressed. The MDF and BRR tried to fill this gap even though with better coordination with the government these infrastructural problems could have been decreased.

Furthermore, lack of coordination with government and beneficiaries resulted in empty and badly maintained buildings. For instance, in one of the districts in Aceh they built a village but there was no infrastructure to support these buildings (Fakhurrurrazi). In another district a small health facility and a school were built but not made government assets. Therefore, nobody took responsibility over these facilities, leaving them empty and poorly maintained. Both situations show poor coordination of implementing organizations with governments and other entities. When there would have been coordinated better with the government or beneficiaries they might have been able to take over the maintenance of built facilities or warned for not being able to build the infrastructure around the facilities. Thus, lack of coordination or operation mechanisms to
check provided houses can result in situation where facilities have no sustainable use. An important opportunity to link relief, rehabilitation and development is therefore missed by poor coordination.

The move during LRRD from nationally coordinated to more local coordination needs a certain level of decentralization (Masyrafah and McKeon 40). Streamlining response is useful during relief and rehabilitation development practices will need a more regional appropriate response. The highly centralized relief and rehabilitation efforts had a lasting effect for future development (Hedman 70). Decentralization is problematic in Aceh, just as it is within the whole of Indonesia that formerly knew a highly centralized government under Suharto (Feith 5). In Aceh, decentralization seems even more problematic, where only recently new agreements were made in the MoU about the role of the government. Already in 2001, Aceh was granted special autonomy by the GoI, giving Aceh more autonomy over its natural resources and Islamic law (Brassard 636). The MoU reaffirmed this special autonomy, after the tsunami had exposed the failings of the Indonesian authorities in the region (Billon 420). However, due to devastating tsunami the government of Aceh was paralyzed for while. As the region was recovering from the conflict and natural disaster, simultaneously the government of Aceh needed to recover and further develop. With this recovery, particularly the capacity of the local governments stayed behind (Masyrafah and McKeon 26). What could therefore be observed was a decentralization from country to province level but not yet from province to district level, making LRRD more difficult.

3.5 Conclusion

Implementing LRRD in not easy for aid-organizations operating in such a complex and competitive field. Organizations addressing the linkage issue need to be careful in hiring their staff. As the extent to which organizations can implement LRRD into their own activities depends on their mandate, they will need to coordinate with other organizations to strengthen the impact of LRRD. Coordination can therefore be seen as a vital component for successful LRRD implementation. It cannot only prevent overlap it can also save substantial amounts of time and money. The case of Aceh showed that due to the magnitude of the disaster and extreme amount of diverse actors in the field
coordination got more complicated. Besides, the incentive to coordinate and address the linkage issue often gets compromised by organizational self-interest. Coordination problems in Aceh like overlap, bottlenecking and bad practices where therefore numerous. All in all, coordination should not necessarily mean a continuance of structures set out during relief efforts, but one should be aware of activities already done in the area. The structure set out by the Indonesian government to have one organization in charge, although not always working a 100 per cent effectively, stimulated better coordination. In the end, the shift during LRRD from national to local coordination remains problematic in the highly centralized authority structures of Aceh. Although, the province has been granted special autonomy over its region, capacity of the districts stays behind. Slowly local authorities should become in charge of coordination efforts, as aid agencies hand over responsibility, in order to stimulate development.
Chapter 4: Cooperating partners

4.1 Introduction

Within the aid sector, one single aid organization is only a small entity within the big aid-system. On its own, it often has little influence and will need to work together with other entities to grow in power. It is therefore useful for organizations and often necessary to cooperate with other organizations for strengthening their own projects. Additionally, cooperation between relief-, rehabilitation-, development organizations and other actors stimulate the effectiveness of LRRD. During the LRRD contiguum a transition has to be made from cooperation amongst international agencies, NGOs or local contractors and civil society in the relief phase to working with local communities during rehabilitation and eventually being strongly involved with the government during development (Steets 10). Question remains to what extent aid agencies are willing to cooperate and indeed make this shift in cooperating partners during the phases of LRRD. Cooperation can be problematic as organizations’ principles might stand in the way for this to happen. The main question in this chapter will therefore be: To what extent did cooperating partners influence LRRD implementation of aid-organizations operating in post-tsunami Aceh? Analyzed will be the importance of cooperating partners and the incentive of aid organizations to cooperate. Special focus will be put on how humanitarian principles influence the choice of cooperation partners and consequently LRRD implementation. The shift in cooperation partners during LRRD is ultimately a shift in responsibilities. As the final shift within LRRD is one towards cooperation with the government, the role of national authorities will be analyzed in this chapter.

4.2 Incentives to cooperate

Cooperation has a lot of overlap with the issue of good coordination. In both circumstances organizations, governments and other entities try to reach a common goal by a collective approach. However, coordination had far less consequences for an organization than cooperation. While with coordination, organizations communicate their practices to avoid overlap, cooperation implies working more closely together to reach a
common goal. The difference for cooperating partners, therefore, lies in the effect this cooperation will have on these organizations. When organizations cooperate they will be associated with the principles and actions of their cooperating partners. Potential wrongdoings or statements of other organizations could, in this case, reflect badly on your organization. In fragile situations like complex emergencies, it is therefore important to carefully choose these partners. Nevertheless, experience shows that without close co-operation successful intervention in crisis situations is not possible (DG Development 2).

However, in Aceh, the incentive for organizations to cooperate decrease as they gained more independence. Since most international organizations obtained enough resources for themselves it was no longer necessary for them to cooperate in order to reach their goals. This was, however, felt by local organizations, not having the same means to reach their goals. Therefore, imbalances occurred between local and international organizations, this while local organizations generally have more knowledge about the region. Ramalingam and Barnett argue that international aid agencies ‘use such terms as ‘endeavoring’, ‘striving’ or attempting’ to work with local partners, instead of ‘will’, ‘shall’ and ‘must’(2).

Since cooperation has substantial consequences for aid-organizations, both positive and negative it is used as one of the main arguments by opponents of LRRD. Feared is that LRRD would undermine the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence (Steets 3). This since LRRD implies a certain level of cooperation between relief and development actors. Thus, if it would undermine the basic humanitarian principles the area or ‘humanitarian space’ in which relief actors operate could be harmed. Therefore, relief agencies are reluctant to cooperate with certain organization or government entities as it might undermined these principles. Whether this was the case for aid-agencies in Aceh will therefore be discussed in the next section of this chapter. Consequently, the principles of aid-organization during LRRD relate strongly to the way they cooperate with government entities.
4.3 Cooperation and the humanitarian principles

Organizations’ principles are important, not only for organization and their staff but also for their donors and beneficiaries. Principles are used as a guiding factor for the activities of aid organization and determine where they stand in the LRRD spectrum. They furthermore give meaning to organizations’ activities and guide them when, where and how to act. Setting clear principles makes it possible for organizations to show beneficiaries and donors what their organization stands for. In this way, beneficiaries will know what to expect from organizations, a clarity that will make it easier to attract more donors. It is, therefore, logical that organizations that are living by clear humanitarian principles will not easily step away from these principles.

The fear of having to compromise the core humanitarian principles when implementing LRRD evolves mainly from the relationship of development actors with the government. For development aid to reach its goals it is necessary to create institutional relations of compliance with the state (ODI 3). Development organizations cooperate, therefore, closely with the government that makes their actions conditional, leaning on acceptance of the government for its presence in the country, while relief aid is unconditional (ODI 3). From this we see the difference in humanitarian principles and those of development, willing to take sides and pursue political agendas (Koddenbrock and Büttner 117). Development and relief organizations can, however, complement each other when it comes to non-discrimination and the ‘do no harm’ principle (ODI 3). Therefore, when implementing LRRD clear decisions have to be made to what extent organizations are willing to work together (Koddenbrock and Büttner 117).

For relief organizations jeopardizing their core principles in order to link relief to rehabilitation and development can have certain dangers. It first of all risks undermining the credibility of humanitarian actors amongst the local population (ODI 3). This could especially be dangerous in conflict situations, where authorities often play party to the conflict (White and Cliffe 320). One could lose access to people in need and jeopardize staff safety, while it is their goal to reach all people in need and secure the humanitarian space. However, the access to population of in some situation already restricted when security of humanitarian personnel deteriorates in politically sensitive countries (Koddenbrock and Büttner 11). In these situation lines between humanitarian actors and
the military often blur, endangering a ‘pure’ humanitarian space. The importance of sticking with the core humanitarian principles is explained by Médécins Sans Frontières (MSF) stating that ‘it is unethical to trade the saving of lives now for the potential saving of lives in the future, which it sees as the central implication of integrated action that aims to deal with root causes of conflict.’ (Charny 14) It is furthermore argued that when relief organization get involved with political issues, they take away the responsibility of the state to find a solution to an ongoing conflict (Zeccola 312).

Linking implies a broader humanitarian mandate and the willingness to compromise the purity of the humanitarian principles (Koddenbrock and Büttner 121). However, the existence of a space for ‘pure’ humanitarianism is simply unrealistic. For relief actors to reach their goals their actions often have to be in line with diplomatic, political and, if necessary military action, remaining neutral and independent is therefore close to impossible (Charny 14). Therefore, neither relief, rehabilitation nor development is politically neutral (Mackintosh 5). Even the mentality of the ICRC, the organization laying down the foundations of these principles, has slightly changed. Although sticking to their principles and emphasizing their importance they nevertheless recognized that humanitarian action should consist of more than adherence to the core principles (Charny 14). A narrow definition of humanitarian action has not been proven more effective and could miss important development opportunities (Koddenbrock and Büttner 126; ODI 3). Critics of this narrow view began to argue that relief fails to resolve root causes of conflict and only deals with the consequences of a disaster (Zeccola 310).

With LRRD implementation, sacrifices have to be made on either the humanitarian or the development side. Although, this might sound a little drastic, these sacrifices are often already made in an unconscious manner (Ramalingam and Barnett 5). A broader idea has to be developed about the meaning of the concepts relief and development. For development actors this will often mean they have to shift their focus more on local needs and to a lesser extent on political matters. Relief organizations in Aceh made concessions on the core humanitarian principles due to domestic political concerns, donor restrictions and resistance among certain NGO chiefs (Zeccola 308). If relief agencies would have stayed truly neutral, impartial and independent they should not have agreed to the separation into tsunami and conflict victims. Additionally
principles of relief organizations were compromised when these agencies, for instance, did not raise human rights issues in order to remain a presence in Aceh (Zeccola 314).

Relief organizations forced to direct their projects on either tsunami or conflict actually compromised the principle of impartiality. Impartiality simultaneously with equality, nondiscrimination and proportionality were compromised due to the separate approach to the tsunami and the conflict (Zeccola 318). Conflict victims were in this regard not evenly assisted as their tsunami-affected neighbors. Furthermore, concessions were made on the principle of neutrality, let alone by the government approval necessary to get involved in Aceh’s emergency response. International response was welcomed for the tsunami victims but the Indonesian military did not want foreigners to meddle in the conflict (Zeccola 316). Amnesty international was, for instance, denied entry to Aceh, but even for the tsunami-victims, internationals were initially only allowed to stay until the end of March 2005 (Zeccola 316). This created the dilemma to go and sacrifice core principles, or not to gain access to any of the tsunami-affected areas.

It is difficult to precisely determine the extent to which principles of relief, rehabilitation and development agencies can be linked without endangering access and staff safety. The possibility for an effective linkage depends on the nature of the disaster. The importance of LRRD is often found after a natural disaster in order to protect local livelihoods and to encourage better coordination between humanitarian and development actors (Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs 14). This, while during complex political emergencies it is often important to remain neutral in order for gaining access to the affected area (Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs 14). One must keep in mind that LRRD implementation does not necessarily mean relief has to merge with rehabilitation or that rehabilitation should segue into long-term development cooperation (Swiss Red Cross 2). However, there is no real consensus on this matter resulting in unclear agreement between the several actors and vague promises for LRRD. Especially cooperation with government entities remains a problem in the linkage discussion.

4.4 Government cooperation

Moving towards development means getting more and more involved with the government. Cooperation with the government can be tricky for relief agencies but is
important for LRRD. Eventually, the government should take over the responsibility to deal with the situation in its own country and thus be responsible for further development activities. In Aceh the government did take over to a certain extent but there are still many problems to be overcome for the region to fully develop (Sofyan). The earlier the government is involved in aid activities, the more likely their capacity to deal with the situation will grow. The EC argues that when governments are not a party in the conflict relief should be integrated within the government structures (COM “on LRRD 2). In this way the shift in participation partners is already overcome at an early stage in the LRRD contiguum making it easier to link humanitarian action and development. It can be observed that in countries with relatively strong governments it is found easier to create this enabling environment for LRRD (Goyder et al 7). It is, however, still possible to link relief, rehabilitation and development without early cooperation with the government. When there is no legitimate government to cooperate with or relief agencies are unwilling to sacrifice humanitarian principles LRRD implementation will need good coordination. Without cooperation with development actors clearly LRRD will be more difficult but relief actors could still take development under consideration by minimizing negative effects for development and coordinating their actions.

Sometimes NGOs are reluctant to cooperate with the government due to principle matters or not wanting to be associated with a government they might not approve of (Idria). There are also cases where there is only a weak government or no government at all making cooperation simply impossible (Goyder et al 8). This was, however, not the case in Aceh where during the rehabilitation phase cooperation with the government agency BRR was a must to gain access for the tsunami reconstruction. Some exceptional situation where NGO were not working with the government at this stage problems occurred in poor documentation of activities and lack of responsibility for given assets (Sofyan).

On the other hand, the government was not always willing to cooperate with international organizations either. The dual disaster in Aceh was separated into a tsunami and a conflict response for the simple reason that the government wanted to prevent international NGOs from getting involved in the conflict. The peace talks already started before the tsunami and the government wanted to avoid the conflict from being
internationalized. There was a foreign mediator involved in the peace process but local organizations and the GoI did most of the conflict recovery. Only certain organizations were accepted to work on conflict recovery and for them it was important to be extremely careful in choosing organizations to work with. Some deliberately selected a mixture of partners to keep a sense of neutrality. Organizations could often work together to promote human right issues but found themselves on thin ice when their actions became over-political (Zeccola 313).

4.5 Conclusion

What can be seen is that cooperation remains a delicate subject for aid-organizations. While principles are useful guidelines for organizations, they could hinder successful LRRD implementation, because organizations are often reluctant to compromise their own principals for the sake of linking the three phases. LRRD implementation needs some kind of compromise in organizations’ principles from either the relief side or the development side. However, one must not underestimate the importance of the core humanitarian principles. Stepping away from these principles could endanger staff safety and access to people in need. Nevertheless, reality shows that ‘pure’ humanitarianism does not exist and compromises are often already made unconsciously. The extent to which relief, rehabilitation and development actors can cooperate depends highly on the nature of the disaster. It is often easier with natural disasters than with complex political disasters in which it is more important for relief actors to stay neutral. However, in Aceh, being a complex emergency humanitarian principles were actually compromised to gain access in the region. In general, the earlier the government gets involved into the LRRD process the easier implementation will be. Still, possibilities for LRRD are available when there is no government cooperation at an early stage but it will make linkage between the several stages more difficult. Furthermore, incentives to cooperate have to be of a substantial level for LRRD to work, something organizations are either reluctant to do or tend to forget in striving for short term organizational goals.
Chapter 5: Beneficiaries

5.1 Introduction

During LRRD, organizations shift from focusing on helping individuals during the relief phase towards supporting communities with development. Choice of beneficiaries is therefore essential in LRRD as well as strategies to move from one beneficiary group to the other. The linkage issue can be affected by this choice of beneficiaries and simultaneously by the way local people are able to participate. Often humanitarian action is based on free aid, where there is hardly any participation by the local population. On the other hand, community participation is often high during the development phase. Whether these elements influence LRRD implementation in Aceh, beneficiaries and local participation within the aid sector will therefore be discussed in this chapter focusing on the question: To what extent has LRRD implementation been influenced by the beneficiaries of aid and their participation in post-tsunami Aceh? This chapter will include the identification of beneficiaries, expectations raised and participation possibilities.

5.2.1 Identifying Beneficiaries

The choice of beneficiaries during LRRD is dependent on the phase in which aid agencies act. This is heavily determined by the mandate under which organization have to act. Right after a disaster, those people in the most vulnerable situations will be in the highest need. Therefore humanitarian assistance does not distinguish people on their socio-economic background but rather address all those affected by the disaster. Development, on the other hand, is often aimed at the poorest sections of society. It is not surprising these two groups sometimes overlap as poor communities often have lower capacity to cope with the effects of a disaster (AusAID 8). The overlap is generally higher after natural disasters where vulnerabilities are frequently derived out of long lasting poverty, whereas conflict can suddenly make people more vulnerable (AusAID 8).

Although, theoretically relief is supposed to focus on vulnerable people and development on poor communities the choice of beneficiaries is not always based on
these analysis. All too often aid agencies choose their beneficiaries in a way their work can be seen and valued by donor communities to guarantee future activities (Ramalingam and Barnett 4). Additionally reaching organizational targets often prevails over addressing needs of the populations. Dwi Rinanda explains a situation in which the Red Cross offered to provide 150 houses if the IOM could find the beneficiaries for this. The IOM agreed to this and searched for a community, however, after the houses were built the community turned out to be in need of only half the amount of houses (Rinanda). Here, the desire to deliver a certain number of houses to reach organizational targets was clearly chosen over the importance of making a good assessment of the situation.

Since the humanitarian response in Aceh was divided into the dual nature of the disaster, organizations had to focus either on tsunami victims, conflict victims or both if multiple projects where implemented. However, when tsunami victims for instance were chosen as the target group it was impossible to avoid taking the conflict into consideration. Victims overlapped and in many areas in Aceh making the division between these kinds of victims from time to time rather artificial. Therefore, many organizations focusing on the tsunami had made their projects conflict sensitive (Mardhatillah).

Moreover, in approaching beneficiaries it is important to be aware of local customs and culture. Disruption of these customs could potentially harm long-term development. Humanitarian assistance should therefore be flexible and address beneficiaries in way that relief items and distribution systems match local culture and society (COM “on LRRD” 2). Acehnese were, at least prior to the tsunami, known for not being fond of outsiders (Ventura). Although this mindset is said to have changed after the tsunami, one should be as cultural sensitive as possible. There were numerous malpractices found in Aceh in which aid was given without considering the local context. For instance, the Red Cross was heavily criticized for handing out meals containing pork to the dominantly Muslim society in Aceh (Telford and Cosgrave 10). Furthermore, many projects were implemented under a ‘one-size-fits-all’-formula with strong stereotyping of options for women, small farmers and small entrepreneurs failing to adjust to local standards (Telford and Cosgrave 17). On the other hand, sometimes, traditional gender roles do have to be taken into consideration. This is shown in the example of an
organization handing out boats to both men and women in a fishing community, while women never went fishing (Fakhrurrazzi).

It can be difficult to identify beneficiaries accordingly and provide them with the right forms of assistance. Especially since personal post-disaster situations varied widely, some had lost almost everything due to the tsunami while in other cases peoples’ household remained intact (Steinberg and Smidt 28). Those who had lost their homes stayed in temporary shelters in various locations. Many people had lost their home and many former heads of households had died making it necessary to determine new standards for who would be in the right to claim housing assistance. The already mentioned, problematic criteria for providing houses was complicated by the rule that not only former house owners could claim housing compensation but also those who previously lived in rented houses (Steinberg and Smidt 28). It was however, very difficult to define these groups due to poor pre-tsunami registration and many forms getting lost during the tsunami (Steinberg and Smidt 29). Realizing these decisions had to be made quickly one can imagine the problems regarding data collection. This got further complicated by people trying to manipulate data in order to get more houses.

5.2.2. Expectations

During aid work, beneficiaries obtain certain expectations regarding the impact and size of the support. For LRRD to be successful it is dangerous to raise these expectations beyond realistic achievements (Rinanda). Making empty promises will only lead to disappointments resulting in heavy criticism on projects and organizations. Avoiding this was especially difficult in Aceh where the huge amount of aid given did not only pressure organizations to perform, it also rose expectations of beneficiaries significantly. Although, the support given in Aceh was received by many and to a very high extent people sometimes do not realize what they got (Afifuddin). Resulting into heavy demands made by the Acehnese and making it almost impossible to satisfy people (Ventura).

Furthermore, the shift from an individual based to a community based approach was difficult to make in Aceh. Although organizations did shift their focus, the interviews pointed out the sense of community was lacking amongst Acehnese. People in Aceh
where and are still very much focused on their own family and close friends, the tsunami just brought this characteristic of the Acehnese further to the surface. Its often said that Acehnese only unite as a community once they have a common enemy, an enemy which fell away after the Helsinki peace agreements (Idria). The emergency made people look even more after their own family and circle of friends (Ventura). Due to the high amounts of funding available people became greedy, a mentality that shifted into the rehabilitation phase. For instance, people started to manipulate data to get more houses. Suddenly the recovery of the tsunami became an opportunity for people to get as much as possible (Mardhatillah).

5.3 Participation

The most prominent misperception about beneficiaries remains the one of the ‘helpless victims’ (Ramalingam and Barnett 4). In this light, beneficiaries are solely seen as victims of a disaster without any ability to regain their own lives. This while victims can play a major role in strengthening their own life and that of the community. When relief organizations come in, they tend to completely take over the situation ignoring local capacities and leaving no responsibilities to their beneficiaries. For instance during the early relief phase in Aceh, the military was assigned to cook for people living in the shelters, while this could have easily been done by the people themselves. Moreover, it is important to realize that with the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development this international response has to eventually be taken over by local actors (Telford and Cosgrave 17).

Therefore, local participation stimulates a smoother transition from relief to rehabilitation and development. Getting people involved in decision-making procedures will furthermore stimulate needs based aid. Relief should therefore aim to build on local capacities and support indigenous attempts to recover from a disaster rather than overruling these by own measures (Goyder et al 16). One of the key contributions to the successfulness of conflict recovery in Aceh was indeed this involvement of the community. This involvement happened through *musyawarah*, a tradition to sit together and discuss together in order to come to consensus (UNDP 18). Sofyan puts empathizes on this process of sitting together and talking as it can help overcome grievances both of
tsunami and conflict (Sofyan). Furthermore, another Indonesian traditional way to overcome disaster situations is by the system of *gotong royong* by which people are mobilized for voluntary labor (Goyder et al 36)

Additionally, the role or local organizations is often underestimated. While international response is often seen as the one making the biggest impact, it should not be forgotten that local organizations are often the ones to first arrive to the emergency situation. This was no different during the tsunami response, which got heavily dominated by international NGOs sometimes underestimating local contributions. On the other hand, was the capacity of some local NGOs heavily affected by the tsunami. Reza Idria explains how Tikar Pedan, a local cultural NGO, was paralyzed for about six to eight months after the tsunami. This since employees had themselves fallen victim to the tsunami or lost friends and family members making it emotionally impossible for them to work (Idria). A good analysis is therefore necessary to see how local capacities can be used to recover from the disaster. Not involving local organizations at an early stage may weaken, marginalize and alienate existing capacities (Telford and Cosgrave 17).

Excluding the local population from participating can be dangerous for LRRD. Affected populations were often not informed about reconstruction plans, limiting their capacity to make decisions about future plans and livelihoods (Christoplos 10). During humanitarian assistance, people in Aceh became used to receiving a lot from aid organizations creating dependence on these funds. Extreme amounts of funding were just being handed out to people, not as a loan but as a gift. Reducing the capacity to be self-dependent and motivation of people to work hard, instead people started increasing their demands and became greedy. This created a setting where people would act as *tangan dibawah*, people simply holding out their hand to receive (Mardhatillah). For instance during Lebaran, a Muslim holiday, it is the tradition in Indonesia to buy meat but instead of doing this a lot of people went to NGOs to ask for it (Rinanda). Furthermore, the sense of responsibility disappeared for the resources they acquired. This resulted in poor maintenance of buildings and therefore a deficiency in taking resources obtained during relief and rehabilitation into long term development. Sometimes people were provided with a kind of luxury they were not used to and unable to maintain. In these circumstances more time should have been spent in teaching people.
Even though these negative effects of dependency and lack of responsibility were present in Aceh there was actually a quite substantial matter of local participation within the aid agencies. In the period up to 2009 about 30 percent of the Acehnese worked for aid organizations present in Aceh, mostly NGOs (Mardhatillah). However, local people were often not in decision-making positions. One must realize that it was not always easy for organizations to hire local staff, since people were not always qualified to do the job or work ethics did not comply with those of the organization. But for locals it was not easy either to find their way into international organizations. Not only was it difficult to get into higher positions within an aid organization there was also a division in scale of salary between international and local staff which could obviously lead to frustrations. Besides, within some NGOs local staff members did not always feel as if they were treated respectfully (Rinanda).

A generally known program stimulating local participation is the Cash for Work (CFW) program. In Aceh, Mercy Corps was one of the organizations implementing these programs (Doocy et al 292). Many positive impacts derived from these programs for the local economy. Jobs were provided, enhancing people’s livelihood and capacity took take care of themselves which continuously stimulated the re-establishment of markets and economic recovery (Doocy et al 292). As the project was short-term and flexible disruptive effects to development were minimized. However, due to these programs people were sometimes reluctant to support local organizations, as they were not able to provide them money, especially the system of gotong royong was undermined in Aceh (Christoplos 50). Working for local NGO with often more knowledge in the region was seen as a missed opportunity to earn money from international organizations. But even with these participatory programs, dependency remains a concern. Although it provides people work, this work is only temporary making it necessary to transfer into more sustainable solutions.

Although there is indeed a risk of inducing dependence upon people White and Cliffe see the risk as often being overstated (White and Cliffe 321). The dependence created through relief and rehabilitation effort is mostly of a short-term nature. When most international NGOs left Aceh in 2009 there was indeed a vacuum in resources to earn money (Mardhatillah). The disappearance of these organizations suddenly created a
massive unemployment as many had been formerly employed by these organizations. The high inflation brought by NGOs made prices rise substantially, especially those of food stayed high even when the NGOs left the province. However, soon livelihood activities started going back to normal as people were aware they could no longer depend on NGOs (Afifuddin). The realization of NGOs leaving made people regain their own initiative and work for themselves.

In the end, those who benefitted most from the high influx of aid were people owning a business. They could profit from the added value pumped into the economy and easily continue their practices when NGOs left the province. The individual capacity of people working for NGOs increased compared to those of who had not. Due to the aid work, a lot of ex-GAM members were integrated into society. Furthermore, the international organization brought a more disciplined working style and made Acehnese more open for outsiders. (Afifuddin; Mardhatillah). However, for people without specific skills such as drivers it was difficult to find a new place in society (Rinanda).

5.4 Conclusion

Although beneficiaries of aid and their participation within the system are highly important for the effectiveness of LRRD their role often gets underestimated, leaving them with little influence on the linking process. To benefit LRRD it is of great importance for organizations to choose their beneficiaries accordingly and to be aware of local customs. Furthermore, one should be careful in raising high expectations since it could frustrations may rise towards aid organizations when these expectations are not being met. This could be seen in Aceh, where the extreme amount of aid rose local expectation drastically. When stimulating local participation one should be careful not to undermine local capacities in handling crisis situations, as local systems like Musyawarah are often most sustainable for a region. The greatest misperception about beneficiaries remains the one of the ‘helpless victim’. This, while beneficiaries of aid could contribute a great deal to their own livelihoods. Community participation can either occur within local or international organizations, or within the several projects implemented by these organizations. Benefit of this participation is that it is likely to reduce dependency, although this inducement of dependence should not be
overestimated, increase the sense of responsibility and stimulate LRRD. However, international organizations tend to dominate the field undermining the capacities of local actors and missing the possibilities to strengthen these. In the end, those who benefited most from the aid in Aceh were people owning a business as they were not only able to receive the aid but also had the capacity to transfer it to sustainable means.
Conclusion

It is clear that within the given aid structures, it was rather difficult for relief, rehabilitation and development organizations to implement LRRD in post tsunami Aceh. Although, there are many benefits to gain from LRRD, certain influences restrain organizations from integrating the concept into their activities. The concept remains rather vague in its conceptualization. There are all sorts of ideas, similar to LRRD, used by aid organizations to address the linkage issue. These, however, blur the linkage discussion and fail to find a comprehensive model for LRRD implementation. Overall, the relief phase in Aceh has been seen as rather successful and laying down a good basis for the following rehabilitation and development phases. However, the rehabilitation phase, which should function as the link between relief and development, was more problematic. The case of Aceh has furthermore shown how situation specific LRRD implementation can be. In some instances lack of funding can lower the capacity of LRRD while in other cases, like Aceh, a high recourse capacity can lower the incentive for organizations to implement the concept of LRRD.

The ability for aid organizations to implement LRRD is influences by several actors. First, donors have a quite substantial, and often negative, influence on LRRD implementation as funding structures can be complicated and overly restricted. Although it has been little researched, there could be quite substantial benefits in LRRD for donor agencies. For effective LRRD implementation, donor agencies would need to integrate this concept into their own funding structures. The amount of funding in Aceh was, at the time, unlike any other emergency response situation. Especially due to all the private funding made available, increasing the flexibility for aid agencies to implement LRRD.

Second, the competition and troubles to find appropriate staff members made implementation more difficult. Aid organizations need to look at their internal organization structures to better implement LRRD. It is often dependent on an organization’s mandate in which way the linkage issue can be addressed. Furthermore, coordination amongst the several aid agencies is of great importance at could even been
seen as an absolute necessity for LRRD. This coordination was difficult in Aceh due to the magnitude of the disaster. However, since the BRR and BRA where in charge of coordination during the rehabilitation phase the coordination went relatively good. Still, coordination problems occurred, especially regarding housing issues.

The third influential actors on LRRD implementation are the cooperating partners of aid organizations. These partners are strongly dependent on the principles that organizations have adopted. For relief organizations a fear exist that with the implementation of LRRD, their core humanitarian principles will be undermined, endangering staff safety and field access. However, in Aceh some of these principles had already been compromised due to the separation in conflict and tsunami victims. Often, organizations agreed to solely focus on tsunami victims to gain access in the region. Furthermore, cooperation with the government remains a delicate topic. Many organization are unwilling to cooperate with government entities even though cooperation stimulates LRRD.

Fourth, beneficiaries play role when it comes to LRRD implementation of aid organization, even though their role is often underappreciated. The local population should be those most profiting from an effective link between relief, rehabilitation and development. However, expectations amongst Acehnese were driven to such a high level, due to the enormous amount of funding, that it was almost impossible to fulfill peoples’ wishes. Local traditions and capacities should be taken into consideration when implementing LRRD. Furthermore, high community participation during the relief and rehabilitation phase will eventually have a positive effect on future development. In Aceh, almost 30 percent of the population was involved in the aid sector. However, people often had a small and not very influential role within these organizations. It is therefore important to minimize the negative effect on communities and their people when organizations leave the area. There was some dependency in Aceh, but this seemed only of short duration. However, due to insufficient coordination and participation there seems to be a lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in empty and poorly maintained buildings.

All in all, an effective link between relief, rehabilitation and development will never happen without a strong incentive of aid agencies to address the linkage issue. At
the same time, donors and implementing partners need to think of ways to integrate the linkage issue into their own activities. The role of beneficiaries and local organizations needs to be rethought as they could positively influence LRRD. This shows that even in a situation as Aceh, where resources were largely available, LRRD implementation is a very difficult task. The extent to which development will be able to prepare people in Aceh for a potential future disaster is yet to be seen.
Suggestions for further research and limitations

There is still lot to improve on the implementation possibilities of LRRD for aid agencies. As LRRD is a very broad concept there are many aspects within the concept that would be eligible for further research. From this thesis, further research on the benefits of LRRD for donors can be derived. In addition, as LRRD is case specific, further case studies, preferably comparative case studies, should be performed to better grasp the possibilities and difficulties faces for LRRD implementation.

Unfortunately, this research knew certain constraints to fully examine the possibilities for LRRD implementation in Aceh. Time restriction was one of the main limitations for my research. For a better image on implementation possibilities of LRRD it would have been better to have done research during all three phases in Aceh. This would, however, been a very timely matter which was not available for this thesis. Furthermore, as my Indonesian language skills were very basic, interviews were taken in English. Possibly, interviews in Indonesian either by me or with an interpreter could have benefitted the research as more people could have been interviewed.
Bibliography:

- Afifuddin *project officer EEAS-Banda Aceh. Delegation of the European Commission to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam* Personal interview. 10 Nov. 2011.


- Borgese, Nic *VIDA volunteer* personal interview 10 Nov. 2011.


• Fakhrurrazzi, *senior program manager at Forum Bangun Aceh (FBA)* Personal interview 10 Nov. 2011.


• Idria, Reza Tikar Pandan. Personal interview. 29 Oct. 2011


• Mardhatillah, Fuad *former Deputy or Religion, Social and Cultural Affairs within BRR NAD-Nias. Teacher at IAIN Ar-Raniry* Personal interview. 29 Oct. 2011


• Rinanda, Dwi *formerly employed at Governor Office in Banda Aceh and International Organization for Migration (IOM)* personal interview 5 Nov. 2011.


• Sofyan, Safriza deputy of Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF) personal interview 20 Oct. 2011.


• Ventura, Roy R. *USAID Aceh Road Reconstruction Team Leader* Personal interview 30 Oct. 2011.

