Public Information and Media Building in Post-Conflict Societies

An UNTAC and UNTAET Case Study

NOHA Master's Thesis
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>C4D</td>
<td>Communication for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>IFJ</td>
<td>International Federation of Journalists</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<td>LPT</td>
<td>liberal peace theory</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OCPI</td>
<td>Office of Communication and Public Information</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>public information</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operation</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the UN Secretary General</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>(UN)DFS</td>
<td>(United Nations) Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>(UN)DPI</td>
<td>(United Nations) Department of Public Information</td>
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<td>(UN)DPKO</td>
<td>(United Nations) Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

This thesis investigates the role that public information (PI) and media building efforts play in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) of the United Nations (UN). It draws from the so-called liberal peace theory (LPT), which states that armed conflict is less likely to occur between states which have a liberal democratic type of government. It then uses this argument to determine whether the UN is effective in supporting liberal peace through its efforts in managing PI and fostering free media in peacekeeping.

In this first chapter the topics of free media, public information, liberal democracy and liberal peace theory and their logical linkages will be briefly introduced. After that, the objectives and research question will be presented and the separate chapters and the subquestions they address are described shortly. Attention will also be given to the relevance and importance of this research.

1.1. Some definitions

Before moving on it is wise to pay attention to some definitions of the topics and concepts that will be used in this thesis. The most important ones are post-conflict societies, public information, media building and liberal peace theory. Post-conflict societies are defined in this paper as societies where an armed conflict has come to an end no more than ten years before the date of investigation. This research focuses on situations where the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or its predecessor, the Department of Special Political Affairs, has conducted operations, excluding post-conflict work carried out by other organizations and referring mainly to post-conflict peacekeeping contexts. Public information is defined as the information disseminated by all parts of the UN to any audience in support of the mandates of peacekeeping operations specifically and the UN as a whole in general. Media building means the support for, fostering of or even establishment of information channels intended for the dissemination of independent non-partisan news and information. The independent character of the information is key, as this characteristic fundamentally separates media building from public information. And lastly, liberal peace theory is understood to mean the body of theory that has as its

1 See the website of Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research for authoritative definitions and demarcations of armed conflicts; <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions>.
2 See the website of UNDPKO for a list of past and ongoing operations: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>. 
core thesis that armed conflict is significantly less likely to occur between two states if both of them have a liberal democratic government.

1.2. Free media, public information, democracy and liberal peace theory

The importance of high-quality free media for the functioning of a democratic society is a well-established thesis in contemporary Journalism Studies. In a democracy, citizens participate in the process of governing using different means such as voting in elections and referendums, running for public office, becoming a member of political parties or interest groups, informing themselves on legislation and expressing their opinions about public policy. For many of these activities, the free flow of information, facilitated by a free press, is considered paramount.

Journalism makes “possible the conversations and deliberations between and among citizens and their representatives so essential to effective self-governance” [Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2009, 3]. This assertion echoes the earlier writing of Jürgen Habermas, who envisioned mass media as a virtual public sphere. In this forum day-to-day democratic discourse and debate takes place, debate that in turn influences and transforms the same public sphere in which it occurs [Habermas 1989, 2]. Influential media scholars Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel even argue that the very freedom of individual citizens in a democratic society depends on the existence of a free press: “Journalism provides something unique to a culture - independent, reliable, accurate, and comprehensive information that citizens require to be free” [Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007, 3]. A free media sector is thus an important if not essential part of contemporary liberal, western-style democracies.

The fostering of such democratic societies in turn is one of the central objectives of modern peacekeeping efforts undertaken by the UN, the world's largest international organization. The meaning and content of peacekeeping is identified in one of the core documents in the history of peacekeeping, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace. There, the former UN Secretary General states that peacekeeping entails the “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.” [Boutros-Ghali, 1992].
More recently, in the 2009 policy document of UNDPKO, *A New Partnership Agenda*, all peacekeeping operations are said to share the characteristic that “Each operation takes place at the request of the Security Council and in accordance with the basic principles of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate. UN peacekeeping missions provide a transitional security presence to which different political, police and civilian components can be integrated” [UNDPKO and DFS 2009, 2].

Defined as such, the basic goal of peacekeeping is to end conflict and facilitate the development of peaceful post-conflict societies, without specific preference for the makeup of such societies. Within the official documents, however, a more specific conception of the ideal design for this post-conflict society can also be distinguished: there appears to be a preference for western-style liberal democracies. One author states that once the decision has been made to deploy a peacekeeping mission, the goal is always to “facilitate the (re)building and (re)establishment of a liberal democratic political system” and “the territory or nation is expected to follow in the footsteps of the western liberal democracies” [Berman 2008, 817-818].

Although this formulation of the argument has an almost imperialist ring to it, official policy documents also demonstrate that the UN ideally would like to see post-conflict societies developing into such western-style liberal democracies, although the rhetoric is more implicit and indirect. For example, according to the *Capstone Doctrine*, the most important policy document on UN Peacekeeping Operations, two of the core objectives for PKOs are to “a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights; b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance” [UNDPKO and DFS 2008, 23]. Human rights here are synonymous to the 'civil liberties' that are seen as an essential part of liberal democratic government [Norris 2010, 8]. The fact that the word 'democracy' itself is conspicuously absent from the *Capstone Doctrine* may be caused by the political sensitivity of 'democratization', especially after this concept was used, or misused, to justify for example the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

This preference for liberal democracy as the post-conflict ideal-type form of government that peacekeeping should establish can be explained by taking note of the
so-called 'liberal peace theory', which holds that liberal democratic societies seldom if ever wage war on each other. One proponent of the theory, Michael W. Doyle, states that “Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another” [Doyle 1983, 213]. Although numerous exceptions to and hard-hitting critiques of this law of liberal peace exist, there is significant evidence to suggest at least a strong correlation between liberal democracy and peace, which explains why this system of government is seen as ideal by official peacekeeping documentation.

Establishing democratic governmental institutions is particularly important for transitional administrations, a specific kind of comprehensive and wide PKO which has developed over time. In the early years of peacekeeping such statebuilding activity was not a part of the work of peacekeepers. Peacekeeping entailed little more than the monitoring of a ceasefire or peace agreement by (sometimes unarmed) blue helmets. In the case of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) for example, the mission was solely to “supervise, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the ceasefire between India and Pakistan; and to assist the Military Adviser to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), established in 1948” [UNMOGIP 2011].

As peacekeeping became a so-called 'flagship activity' [UNDPKO and DFS 2009, 2] of the UN however, its missions would take on increasingly comprehensive mandates. The most inclusive version of a peacekeeping operation thus became the so-called 'transitional administration', which includes tasks such as organizing elections, maintaining law and order and promoting and safeguarding human rights - in short, temporarily engaging in “all the activities of government” [Bellamy and Williams 2010, 255]. An example of this kind of operation is the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC, 2011]. The progressive inclusion of a wider range of tasks in peacekeeping mandates is also reflected in the New Partnership Agenda, which mentions that “UN missions and the Secretariat are moving toward a more comprehensive definition that goes beyond mere physical protection” [UNDPKO and DFS 2009, 20].

Under the umbrella of these widest of peacekeeping operations, fostering post-conflict reconstruction towards a liberal democratic society and the establishment of

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1 See Chapter 2, page 13.
free media then go hand in hand. Because free media are essential to a democratic society and the goal of (wider) peacekeeping is the establishment of such a society, fostering free media is of central importance to (wider) peacekeeping operations. This is also mentioned explicitly, though very briefly, in the Capstone Doctrine: mission activities should support the “development of free and independent media, and the adherence to the highest journalistic ethics and standards” and help “to build local capacities” [UNDPKO and DFS 2008, 83]. From a more general human rights perspective this also makes sense: human rights form an integral part of wider peacekeeping operations and the right to freedom of opinion and expression, which is closely related to media freedom, is included in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR 2011].

Because often in post-conflict societies the media infrastructure is either not equipped or may not be willing to fully support all the information activities the UN wants to deploy, many peacekeeping missions include a division that is responsible for PI. This often includes activities that can be qualified as media building, such as the establishment of a national radio station operated by the UN. The importance of PI activities for the success of a peacekeeping mission has been receiving growing recognition. Ingrid Lehmann for example argues that the omission or inadequate execution of PI efforts will lead to great difficulties for any peacekeeping operation "as its public image deteriorates, its message gets lost and its internal communications wither" [Lehmann 1999, 19]. This is also reflected in the Capstone Doctrine, which subsumes the importance of free media for the success of peacekeeping operations under the wider and seemingly more important public information strategy [UN DPKO and DFS, 83]. Because media building and PI efforts are so closely related and because both can contribute greatly to the success of peacekeeping operations, this thesis analyzes the UN's efforts in both areas.

Due to the limited scope of this thesis, instead of looking at the entirety of UN PKOs two specific examples are selected for a comparative case study. Firstly, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is analysed because it has been recognized as one of the first missions in which the UN departed from dealing mostly with the symptoms of conflict as in more classical peacekeeping, moving instead to the wider concept of peacebuilding to also address the root causes of a situation [Richmond and Franks 2009, 19]. Secondly, this thesis investigates the
United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) which was a mission similar in scope and mandate and which took place in the same region. These similarities offer great potential for comparative analysis and the possibility to draw conclusions about the extent to which lessons were learned during the period separating the two missions. The exact methodology of this comparative case study research is specified in Chapter 2.4.4

All of the above leads to the following research question: To what extent is the UN effective in its public information and media building efforts in post-conflict societies, more specifically in UNTAC and UNTAET, from an LPT perspective? The word 'effective' here must be understood as a qualitative indicator, not as a mechanical or absolute black or white statement. The term is further operationalized in Chapter 2.5

1.3. Relevance and importance of the research
Although there exists an ample body of academic writing on the importance of free media for a democracy and on the role of the media in different societies in general, research on the management of public information and/or the establishment and nurturing of a functioning, high-quality media apparatus in peacekeeping post-conflict societies is far more scarce. From the International Relations and Development Studies field, research on peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction pays little attention to the topics, instead focusing on more political scientific approaches about for example the evolution of different types of peacekeeping [Bellamy and Williams 2010, 4-9]. From the field of Journalism Studies, most of the attention focuses on the intricacies and implications of reporting about or from conflict zones [Morris 2011].

By combining the two perspectives of wider peacekeeping and focusing specifically on the fostering of free media and management of PI, this thesis offers a unique, interdisciplinary synthesis of these fields, answering a question that is relevant for both of them. Secondly, the results of the research will provide critical refinements for the larger project of LPT.

Lastly, next to the academic importance of the research, the question is also relevant in a more practical sense. The research outcomes have direct implications for policy in the field of peacekeeping operations and aim to provide directly usable

4 See Chapter 2, p. 21.
5 See Chapter 2, p. 16.
recommendations. The research thus hopes to take a first step in remedying the palpable lack of research in this important area.

1.4. Chapter content and structure
The following chapter begins by explaining in more detail the origins, critiques and value of LPT. It then introduces two more specific and related frameworks which will be used to assess the effectiveness of PI and media building efforts in peackeeping operations, before moving on to the methodology section.

Chapter three will be dedicated to an extensive exploration of previous academic and policy literature available on the two topics. The most important contributions to the literature landscape are individually analyzed, in order to answer the question to what extent there exists a body of academic literature and empirical evidence on the topic of this thesis.

After this, the core of the research is presented in two case study chapters. Chapter four analyzes UNTAC and the fifth chapter looks into UNTAET. Both will answer the question to what extent the respective missions had effective PI and media building components.

The sixth and last chapter summarizes the findings of the research and presents recommendations for both United Nations Peacekeeping policy and for the refinement of LPT, and finally a bibliography is provided.
Chapter 2 - Theoretical framework and methodology

As stated in the introduction the theoretical underpinnings of contemporary peacekeeping operations can to a certain extent be linked to LPT which has as a basic thesis that liberal democratic societies hardly if ever wage war on one another [Doyle 1983, 213]. Building on this thesis as a premise, peacekeeping operations then attempt to establish such liberal democratic societies in post-conflict situations [Berman 2008, 817-818]. After explaining briefly the history and present status of LPT, the role that PI and free media play in the framework is assessed - both in general terms and for post-conflict societies specifically. Following this, two approaches to determining the effectiveness of PI and media building efforts are introduced and discussed, before ending the chapter with an elaboration of the research methodology used in this thesis.

2.1. History, critiques and current value of liberal peace theory

Some forms of LPT can be traced back to the Enlightenment era, most famously in the writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant stated that liberal peace depended on three sets of laws inhibiting rulers to undertake belligerent action, which he calls 'definitive articles': constitutional laws (which must be republican), international laws (regulating a "federation of free states") and cosmopolitan ones (applying to men as 'citizens of the world') [Kant 1903, 120-137].

Nevertheless, LPT was only popularized in social and political sciences in the 1970s and 80s, finally and firmly being placed on the theoretical mainstage by Michael Doyle [Hook 2010, 2]. Based on Kant's three articles, Doyle states that the three key conditions for a democratic peace are republican representation (creating an accountable relationship between voters and their government), a normative commitment to fundamental human rights (promoting trust in liberal principles internationally between liberal regimes) and transnational interdependence (between states maintaining elaborate and complex economic relations with one another) [Doyle 2005, 463-465].

Even though the correlation between liberal democratic states and peace among those states is strong, there is no consensus about what causes this correlation - or if the correlation is even between peace and liberal democracy.6 One alternative is

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6 For a discussion of four prior but related alternatives to LPT see Rasler and Thompson 2005, 10.
that there might be an earlier, deeper cause that is the real cause of both liberal peace and democracy itself. Although a thorough exploration of such broad considerations falls outside of the scope of this thesis, the complex causal explanations given to support LPT do deserve mention. In the so-called "maximalist" approach to LPT a set of ten interdependent variable complexes is used as an explanation for the liberal peace. These ten sets can be considered extensions and specifications of the three pillars identified by Doyle, all of them limiting in some way the bellicosity of rulers. Examples include the existence of an internationally shared value-system, the existence of an electoral punishment risk dependent on transparent government, international economic interdependence and support for the international status quo [Rasler and Thompson 2005, 5-10].

**Critical approaches**

The strength of LPT's basic thesis has also not precluded the existence of academic debates on the rest of the theory. According to Hook [2010, 4] these debates can be divided into two general categories: debates concerned with the theoretical validity and empirical strength of the theory on one hand and debates about the extent to which the theory can be and has been applied in foreign policy, particularly that of the United States on the other. The first strand is mainly semantical in nature, focusing on the fact that there is no consensus on how to define key concepts in LPT such as war, peace and democracy. The main criticism consists of the accusation that supporters of LPT tweak their definitions until their data gives them the desired result. The second strand of critiques concerns the wrongful incorporation of LPT into foreign policy focused on 'coercive democratization', a development particularly palpable in United States foreign policy [Hook 2010, 4-10]. Especially this second strand of criticism is relevant for this thesis as we have seen that contemporary peacekeeping is widely considered to be equally geared towards establishing liberal democracies in post-conflict situations [Berman 2008, 817-818].

Latching onto this second critique is also the volume edited by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, *Rethinking the Liberal Peace*, which opens with the understated realization that liberal peacebuilding initiatives have left much to be desired, before making the more explicit claim that "liberal peacebuilding is in 'crisis'" [Tadjbakhsh, 2011, 1]. After presenting a number of critical approaches - including communitarian,

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7 As opposed to minimalist interpretations, that merely observe the correlation between democracy and peace without providing a definite cause.
social constructivist, post-modernist and post-colonial critiques - Tadjbakhsh cum suis provide an overarching alternative labeled "post-liberal peace" or "an emancipatory ethos that responds to the ensemble of critical claims" [Tadjbakhsh 2011, 222]. This ethos is claimed to be much more locally focused, placing the experience and needs of the everyday average citizen in post-conflict societies at the very heart of peacebuilding efforts, or "engaging with those who cannot speak" and returning to "the original conception of peacebuilding as a grassroots, bottom-up activity, engaging with societies, cultures and identities, going far beyond the institutions of statehood" [Tadjbakhsh 2011, 234].

Current value and status of LPT

Despite all of the critical approaches that in many different ways find room for improvement in many different parts and areas of LPT, there is a consensus that the core thesis of the theory remains standing. As Rasler and Thompson state, the finding that democracies do not fight other democracies "has come to be regarded as a law-like cornerstone of knowledge about international politics" [Rasler and Thompson 2005, 3]. Hook confirms this, quoting another author saying that "the idea that democracies almost never go to war with each other is now commonplace. The skeptics are in retreat and the proposition has acquired nearly law-like status." [Hook 2010, 2]

In this thesis, a slightly expanded version of the minimalist approach to LPT will be taken, meaning that the theory's basic thesis is taken at face value and the entire ten sets of explanations are not one by one empirically investigated. Instead, the focus will be on those factors influencing liberal peace that are directly related to PI and media building. Although slightly unsatisfactory, the scope of this research does not permit a more elaborate, maximalist approach. The outcome, as mentioned in the introduction, will therefore necessarily be limited to a contribution to and refinement of the variable(s) in LPT that is (are) related to information and media. However, the critiques of LPT are not cast aside without further ado. They will return in the conclusion in relation to a first step towards a critical theoretical approach to PI and media building in peacekeeping.

2.2. Public information, media building and liberal peace theory

As explained in the introduction, the importance of a free flow of information, supported most importantly by the existence of media freedom, for the functioning of
a democracy is a well-established thesis in journalism studies. Thus, freedom of information and the existence of free media as pillars of liberal democracy also support LPT itself. Although the literature on freedom of information as a relevant support for LPT is somewhat more scarce, this subchapter will connect the available evidence on this topic to PI and media building in general and for the two concepts in post-conflict societies in particular.

**Freedom of information and media in LPT**

The importance of free information for the functioning of a democracy was addressed in the introduction. A small number of authors however also directly include the free flow of information in the wider framework of LPT, without using democracy as an intermediate step. Lektzian and Souva, for example, argue that through the existence of open information channels, democracies are able to reduce uncertainty in negotiations and conflicts which allows them to more slowly escalate these conflicts. Simply put, because free media will make elected officials pay for bluffing during negotiations by harming their chances of reelection (the so-called "electoral punishment risk" or "audience cost"), democratic governments are less likely to escalate irresponsibly quickly [Lektian and Souva 2009, 21-22].

This argument or variations of it are also present in two other sources. Firstly, Bellamy and Williams quote former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who said that "The accountability and transparency of democratic governments to their own citizens, who understandably may be highly cautious about war as it is they who will have to bear its risks and burdens, may help to restrain recourse to military conflict with other states." [Bellamy and Williams 2005, 4] Secondly, Rasler and Thompson include a variable cluster called "transparency/signaling" among the ten they claim are the cause of liberal peace. They also relate this cluster to the electoral cost or punishment argument, which they consider another cluster, leading to more clarity and certainty in international interactions, more resolve and more lasting commitments which in turn foster peace. However, for this thesis the focus will mostly be on the intermediate goal of stable, peaceful, liberal democracies and the important role that free information and media, and thus an effective PI and media building policy, play in the promotion and realization of that goal.

**Public information and media building in peacekeeping**

Turning to peacekeeping and post-conflict contexts specifically, free information takes two different forms. From the first moment an operation is deployed, at least
ideally and in theory a PI element is also included. As Lehmann concludes: "field missions must have integral information programmes" [Lehmann 1999, 152]. Especially in cases where media infrastructure has been completely or partially destroyed, these elements take care of the most important part of the local population's need for reliable information [Loewenberg 2006, 4], as long as there is no local independent media capacity. The second element are the media building efforts, which ideally foster such local media capacities until these can function independently again, taking back the role of most important source of free and independent information.  

Summarizing, PI and media building efforts in post-conflict and peacekeeping contexts thus support LPT both directly and indirectly. They support it directly through providing the free channels of information that allow the processes of audience cost and electoral punishment risk to take effect, decreasing the bellicosity of governments in their international relations. They also support it indirectly because free media are an essential pillar for the functioning of a democracy and democracies in turn are the cornerstone of LPT. This last point will be central in the further argument presented in this thesis.

2.3. Effectiveness criteria for public information and media building

Although LPT provides the wider theoretical backdrop for this thesis - much in the same way it does for contemporary peacekeeping, as was elaborated above - in order to be able to carry out case studies we must move to a more specific level. Two authors provide criteria for the effectiveness that is the key term from the research question. Following the above, effectiveness is defined as "the extent to which the audience cost/electoral punishment risk is increased" - since a perfectly effective PI and media building component will ensure a large enough increase in this area to significantly contribute to the establishment of the liberal peace.

Public information

Firstly, Lehmann lists six criteria (she calls them "principles") that are used as benchmarks for measuring the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations from a communications and PI point of view - *id est*, the extent to which peacekeeping

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8 See chapter 5 for an example of reduced UN activity in the media field after local capacities are restored.
operations take them into account determines the effectiveness of the PI efforts in those operations. The criteria, slightly abbreviated, are:

1. Public perceptions are a strategic factor;
2. They emanate from international public opinion and local public concerns;
3. Public and internal information programmes must be included from the outset;
4. Education is an important component;
5. Campaigns must be culturally sensitive but maintain free media and human rights;
6. Transparency of policy and objectives is a key characteristic [Lehmann 1999, 18-19].

Lehmann emphasizes that the principles are no guarantee for success, but rather their contravention will lead to great difficulties for any peacekeeping operation "as its public image deteriorates, its message gets lost and its internal communications wither" [Lehmann 1999, 19].

**Propaganda risk and other critiques**

Although sometimes her arguments and rhetoric seem biased in favor of the UN, Lehmann does emphasize the importance of neutral, objective language in PI, conforming to strict criteria of impartiality [Lehmann 1999, 24]. This is reflected in the sixth criterion for effectiveness, regarding transparency in public information. In addition, because of the close scrutiny it is under, she does not think it likely that UN PI in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts would get caught in one-sided propaganda [Lehmann 1999, 23]. This point is echoed by Michel Bonnardeaux, a DPKO Public Affairs officer who stated that any bias in communications will immediately be picked up by the audience - for example in the case of the UN's mission radio in Ivory Coast whose ratings dropped dramatically in response to observed bias [Bonnardeaux 2011].

However, some authors are more critical and do fear the risk of a biased information supply; referring to UNMIK, UNDPI official Susan Manuel states that it "faced the dual challenge of how to communicate directly with the population about the authority of its transitional administration while at the same time fostering the development of independent and responsible media" [James 2004, 39]. Leon Willems, director of international media support non-governmental organization (NGO) Free Press Unlimited, even believes the UN's PI efforts in practice boil down to "hearts and minds campaigns comparable to those of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan"
Willems is a proponent of establishing a separate unit taking care of PI within DPKO, instead of leaving this responsibility to DPI. This unit would also have to be more transparent than DPI currently is to increase credibility of the information operations in the field [Willems 2011].

Besides the debate about bias in public information, Lehmann's criteria may also seem somewhat self-evident; her basic conclusion that information programs are an essential part of PKOs seems quite obvious. However, interestingly enough she concludes that no strategic guidance is in fact offered and that a lack of attention for the importance of information components persists [Lehmann 1999, 152]. This conclusion is confirmed by Mogens Schmidt, a former Deputy Assistant Director-General for Communication and Information of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), calling the reality of PI in peacekeeping "ad hoc-ish" and stating there is no "automatic and coherent policy in the implementation of field efforts" [Mogens Schmidt 2011].

**Media building**

As Lehmann's book does for public information, regarding media building efforts the work of Bill Orme, an expert on international media with a background in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), offers a list of specific criteria that may be used to gauge their effectiveness in increasing the audience cost. Again, slightly shortened, they are:

1. There must be UN Security Council backing for a media building component;
2. A bright line must be drawn between UN PI and media building;
3. Media building must be considered part of democratic institution-building;
4. UN supported media should follow relevant independent media standards;
5. Partnerships with local and credible media outlets take first priority;
6. These partnerships are formed systematically and transparently through open bidding;
7. An on-call expert roster must be drawn up by DPKO, DPI, UNESCO and UNDP;
8. There must be dialogue and data sharing with local media;
9. An exit and handover strategy must be planned;
10. Local independent media should be supported [Orme 2010, 9-10].

Orme is highly critical of the media building efforts undertaken by the UN in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts. He states for example that there "is no example anywhere to date of a UN peacekeeping mission making it a planning priority or dedicating significant resources to build better national media independently of the UN’s own radio service" [Orme 2010, 31] and condemns the lack of responsible exit and handover strategies [Ibidem, 8]. However, if the four relevant parts of the UN that are mentioned work together and pay close heed to the criteria listed, Orme believes media building efforts can "fulfill UN ideals and make lasting contributions to free media in the countries that peacekeepers are sent to stabilize" [Ibidem, 9].

Orme's criteria are echoed in several other publications, both academic articles and more practically focused policy manuals. In the Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding, for example, Ross Howard emphasizes the importance of partnerships and local capacities (criteria 5, 8 and 10) and a solid exit strategy (criterion 9) [Howard 2002, 20]. A report by Putzel and Van der Zwan stresses the cooperation with and primacy of local actors and efforts (criteria 5, 8 and 10) as well as the place of the UN in intervening "expeditiously and mindful of the appropriate roles" with regards to media (criteria 1, 3 and 7) [Putzel and Van der Zwan 2006, 1-2]. A report by Bajraktari and Hsu, Developing Media in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, also recommends identifying (remaining) local capacities and making sure they are put to the best possible use (criteria 5, 8 and 10) as well as making sure that these capacities are not left to wither after the involvement of international actors ends (criterion 9) [Bajraktari and Hsu, 2007].

It should be evident from the above that several of Orme's criteria overlap somewhat. Specifically criteria 5, 6, 8 and 10 all concern themselves with local media capacities that must be taken into account and supported in some way. While the fact that Orme repeats different parts of this argument four times illustrates the importance of local capacity in his framework, for the sake of simplicity and avoiding duplication the four criteria are taken together under a single one. In addition, criterion 7 is more a general recommendation than a real benchmark for effectiveness of specific missions - although the roster would no doubt benefit the effectiveness of media building in those missions significantly. Therefore, after reformulation and

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9 Orme's paper most deeply investigates UN Radio and broadcasting. However, his criteria are valid for all kinds of media and applied as such here.
renumbering Orme's list becomes the following:

1. There must be UN Security Council backing for a media building component;
2. A bright line must be drawn between UN PI and media building;
3. Media building must be considered part of democratic institution-building;
4. UN supported media should follow relevant independent media standards;
5. An exit and handover strategy must be planned;
6. Local media capacities are a central priority that must be supported in partnerships formed through open bidding as well as general dialogue and data sharing.

Both Orme's and Lehmann's criteria, although providing a useful guideline for assessing effectivity, seem to suffer somewhat from a lack of clarity. Their lists will therefore be operationalized in the methodological section below to facilitate satisfactory use of them as a research tool.

Peace journalism and other critiques

Although Orme's framework is thus a highly useful tool for assessing the effectiveness of media building efforts in peacekeeping, when compared to the other authors mentioned here his approach does seem slightly conservative. This may be due to the fact that he is the only one writing specifically about peacekeeping contexts whereas the other sources mostly take a broader development approach.

However, it is worth mentioning that in these wider approaches much attention is given to so-called 'peace journalism', 'conflict sensitive journalism' or related terms. In the words of Pippa Norris, peace journalism "involves avoiding demonizing language and taking a nonpartisan approach and a multiparty orientation. This contrasts with war journalism, which is characterized by a focus on the present problems rather than their causes and solutions, an elite orientation, and a dichotomy of good versus bad actors in the conflict." [Norris 2010, 357]. By advocating this strand of journalism these authors not only provide criteria about what free media should do but also about how they should be doing it. Howard, for example, defines five types of "media interventions" in which the end result of the fifth type is media which are "specifically intent upon transforming attitudes, promoting reconciliation and reducing conflict" [Howard 2002, 11]. Another author argues that media building efforts need to foster a "holistic approach" which takes into account political processes, technological factors, the safety of media workers, the structural environment, the unpredictability of people, and the monitoring and evaluation of all
of these things [Betz 2011, 5-8].

Instead of proposing a wider approach to media building focused on conflict sensitive journalism, some authors adopt a critical approach that disputes the very assumptions of media building efforts. They argue that it is foolish to attempt to establish free media based on a liberal democratic model in post-conflict societies, where democracy is often either quite a novel concept or sometimes even hardly a practical reality. Putzel and Van der Zwan conclude that "the development of an open and free media environment, like other liberal projects, requires the presence of a strong state which includes, among other features, a well functioning legal and judicial environment that is able to apply checks and balances" [Putzel and Van der Zwan 2006, 2]. Allen and Stremlau agree and add that media building efforts often ignore muddled and contradictory local realities in favor of pushing the liberal agenda [Allen and Stremlau 2005, 12-14].

Both of these critiques are valid and will thus be used to complement Orme's framework where it is appropriate - taking into account that the conflict sensitive 'developmental' journalism critique loses some of its force in conflict or immediate post-conflict situations. However, it is also clear that media building efforts in peacekeeping are not likely to cease existing in the near future and Orme's (adapted) list of criteria provides a useful tool for assessing their effectiveness. Also, as was mentioned in reference to the mostly minimalist approach this thesis takes, unfortunately an exhaustive exploration of all the flaws of peacekeeping is not feasible within the constraints of this project.

2.4. Methodology
Now that the theoretical framework of liberal peace theory as overarching background with the two smaller and more specific frameworks by Lehmann and Orme has been established, the research strategies and methods used in this thesis must be elaborated. Although a number of methods is used, the core data of the research is analyzed with a comparative case study method, in the two case study chapters four and five.

Before that however, the next chapter is a literature study which paints an overview of the available literature on the topic. To arrive at this list of available sources a two-part search strategy was employed; firstly, a number of keywords related to the topic was used in three university library catalogues - that of the
University of Groningen, the Universidad de Deusto in Bilbao and Columbia University's library. After finding a first basic list of references, study of these sources led to a snowball strategy which was complemented by reformulated keyword searches (exempli gratia, where first "peacekeeping operations" and "peacebuilding operations" were used, later "peace operations" and "peace support operations" were also included). The second part of the literature gathering process was done through a protocol developed by the Social Science Research Council for their research project in cooperation with the London School of Economics and others, commissioned by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID).10

Chapters four and five, as mentioned, follow a case study methodology; more specifically the methodology as elaborated by Yin [2009] was followed as closely as possible. The sources for the case study chapter included academic literature (books, articles, research papers), policy literature (from United Nations agencies and departments but also from several relevant NGOs) and as a source of original information a series of six in-depth interviews with relevant officials or experts (one for each case study mission and four overarching background interviews). The interviews were semi-structured in nature and carried out over the telephone and via e-mail.11

By making use of a case study methodology, the thesis aims to clarify the process of applying policy formulations in a complex reality. According to Baxter and Jack, case study research “allows the researcher to explore individuals or organizations, simple through complex interventions, relationships, communities, or programs and supports the deconstruction and the subsequent reconstruction of various phenomena” and there are four main characteristics that determine if a certain phenomenon is fit for case study research: the focus of the study must be to answer “how” and “why” questions, the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study, the researcher wants to cover contextual conditions because he believes they are relevant to the phenomenon under study and the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context [Baxter and Jack, 544]. Yin adds to this that case studies make use of various sources of information, such as official documents, artifacts, interviews and observations [Yin, 11]. All of these criteria apply

10 An earlier, shorter version of chapter three was contributed to this research project.  
11 In which case the semi-structured element was in the fact that sometimes several e-mails with questions and answers were exchanged.
to this thesis and the research has been designed to attempt the inclusion of a wide variety of sources - as was mentioned; official policy documentation, academic publications and a series of in-depth interviews.

The peacekeeping missions in Cambodia (UNTAC) and East-Timor (UNTAET) were selected for several reasons. Firstly, as they are both transitional administrations, the mandate of the missions is as wide as possible and thus it is likely that not only PI but also media building plays a significant role in them - as opposed to more classical peacekeeping missions that are only mandated to supervise a ceasefire. As Thompson and Price [2002, 1] note, especially in the way it managed information UNTAC was "very much the forerunner" of subsequent transitional administrations. Secondly, the two missions provide an interesting chronological sequence, with UNTAC preceding the other mission by several years. This offers the opportunity to identify if any improvement has been made in this period of time.\(^{12}\) And lastly, both missions, however different they may be in various ways, can be characterized as examples of liberal statebuilding, based on the 'peacebuilding consensus' that is derived from LPT [Richmond and Franks 2009, 9].

Before moving on to an exploration and assessment of the available academic literature on the topic of this thesis, it is necessary as mentioned to operationalize the frameworks of criteria that Lehmann and Orme present, to avoid any ambiguities and maximize research validity of using these criteria to establish to what extent PI and media building have been effective in increasing the audience cost.

Lehmann's list of six criteria for an effective PI component begins by stating 'public perceptions are a strategic factor'. This would mean that policy documents at the highest level of the UN include an emphasis on PI in the mission context - documents such as UN Security Council or General Assembly resolutions or reports from the UN Secretariat. Both the quantity and the strength of formulations including PI as an important part of the mission influence the score on this criterion. Additionally, it is highly relevant how the mission, once deployed, actually implements the PI policies or even goes beyond the mandate in this area.

Secondly, Lehmann emphasizes that the mentioned perceptions emanate from international public opinion and local public concerns. Although somewhat more

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\(^{12}\) For example, whereas UNTAC is often qualified as a media and communication success story, it significantly failed to effectively hand over - something that officials have claimed was remedied in later missions. See Chapter five for a discussion.
vague, this principle means that PI should be aimed at local as well as international audiences and that the essential objective of all PI is maintaining a positive image of the mission among these audiences - which, as mentioned earlier, is the key difference with media building. This can mainly be verified by looking at the way the mission deals with critical attention from the media and the local and international public; is it open to criticism and honest about problems or does it attempt desperately to hide these and to spin a positive image at all costs?

Thirdly, PI and internal information programmes must be included from the outset. The evidence for this criterion is alike to that of the first, although here it is more a technical observation. It is not that important how often or how important PI is made in policy documents, merely that they reflect a coherence and an appropriate sense of urgency regarding the organizing of PI efforts - and again, the extent and way in which this policy is implemented.

Fourthly, Lehmann mentions that education campaigns on specific issues such as human rights, electoral processes and the rule of law are likely to be an important component of peacekeeping. This again can be verified by looking at the mandate and the manner in which it is implemented.

Her next criterion mentions the importance of PI being culturally sensitive, while also maintaining a principal commitment to free media and human rights. Indicators for this are to be found mostly at the operational level - in tone and style of communications, for example, or the manner in which PI interacts with existing information structures.

Lastly, transparency of policy and objectives is seen as a key characteristic of the mission management. A key observation to make is that it is not transparency as such about the entire mission - as this would conflict with criterion two - but merely regarding policy and objectives. The extent to which the mission takes this criterion into account can be verified by looking at both the way its staff communicates about them and the general perceptions of the audience; do they understand the objectives and policies of the mission?

For media building, the revised list of seven criteria by Orme starts with the assertion that there must be Security Council backing for a media building component. This is strikingly similar to Lehmann's 'strategic importance' criterion and thus has the same sources of verification; high-level policy documents and - to a lesser extent since it is specifically about Security Council support - the implementation of these
policies at a mission level.

Secondly, Orme mentions that a bright operational line must be drawn between PI and media building. This is a direct translation and support of the earlier argument about the difference between media and PI. Verification can be found in design of the mission and practical realities on the ground.

Thirdly, media building must be considered part of democratic institution-building, on a par with establishing human rights bodies, election authorities and so forth. Again, the design of a mission will demonstrate the fulfillment or lack thereof for this criteria, the behaviour of mission staff functioning as a secondary source of evidence.

Fourthly, UN supported media should follow relevant independent media standards; this refers to media norms as codified by UNESCO in several documents but principally its "Declaration on Fundamental Principles" [UNESCO 2011] as well as relevant regional guidelines such as the code of conduct of the International Federation of Journalists [IFJ 2011].

Orme's next criterion is that an exit and handover strategy must be planned. This means having a plan ready from the moment the mission takes off and make sure that supported media are self-sufficient before the mission end date. This criterion can only be judged from the actual performance in the field and the activities undertaken to specifically foster independent media - independent here used not as 'with no official ties to government' but as 'able to support itself in all areas of operation'.

Lastly, Orme mentions that in an effective media building component, local media capacities are a central priority that must be supported in partnerships formed through open bidding as well as general dialogue and data sharing. This can be seen as a criterion for the UN to conform to 'good governance' practices and evidence to assess its fulfillment can be found again in the practices of the peacekeeping mission in the field.

2.5. Conclusion
This chapter has introduced LPT as the wider theoretical framework undergirding this thesis, as well as the more specific and related frameworks as elaborated by Lehmann and Orme. The links between PI and media building in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts on one hand and LPT on the other were demonstrated as well as the
methodology that will be used to answer our research question taking guidance and structure from LPT, Lehmann and Orme.

Before moving on to the core of two case study chapters however, it is necessary to explore the academic literature and policy documentation that exists on PI and media building in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts in order to establish the status quo of knowledge and evidence on these topics in a more general sense.
Chapter 3 - Review of academic literature and policy documentation

Although PI and media building efforts have formed a part of peacekeeping operations since the very foundation of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 1992, attention for these efforts and their relevance for the goals of peacekeeping operations has lagged behind at the policy level [Orme 2010, 11, 28 and Lehmann 1999, 2]. Nevertheless, the realization that these efforts are vital for the success of peacekeeping operations has been catching up recently, as demonstrated by the proliferation of UN and NGO manuals and handbooks on the topics. But what about the academic community? This chapter assesses the available quantity and quality of both academic and policy literature - especially those studies presenting new local level empirical evidence - on these topics. It will answer the question to what extent the available evidence in this literature can show the effectiveness of the contribution PI and media building efforts in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts make to the growth and establishment of liberal peace.

3.1. The United Nations - division of labour

Within the United Nations, four departments *casu quo* agencies are principally involved in the management of PI and media building efforts; the already mentioned DPKO, DPI, UNESCO and UNDP.

As summarized by Orme, with regards to peacekeeping contexts DPI and more specifically the section Peace and Security engages purely in PI; DPKO undertakes efforts in both areas, its media building function mostly consisting of establishing radio programs in operation areas; UNESCO chiefly is involved in media building, with a specific mandate and expertise but at the same time lacking field resources; and UNDP also mostly engages in media building, but unlike UNESCO they do have both a mandate and an extensive field presence and experience [Orme 2010, 10]. Both mandated responsibilities and practical realities regarding PI and media building thus overlap and intersect quite a bit. According to Lehmann this highly intertwined situation sometimes leads to "interdepartmental tensions", which she concludes reflect the "major, recurrent policy disagreements between substantive

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departments (i.e. DPKO) and 'service' departments (such as DPI)" [Lehmann 1999, 26].

3.2. Policy literature

As was mentioned, public information and media building have received increasing amounts of attention in policy documents and handbooks over the past few years. This subchapter reviews some of the most important examples of this, drawing parallels in terms of content and issues that are addressed by these documents as well as signaling possible gaps that need to be addressed.

Key guiding policy documents

For peacekeeping operations, the most important policy document is the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, often referred to in brief as the Capstone Doctrine. In the introduction it was briefly pointed out that this document contains only very minimal reference to PI; the same is true a fortiori for media building. Indeed, the entire one hundred page document contains only a single one on public information which indicates each mission's PI's main objective to be the fostering of support for the mission, both locally and internationally [UNDPKO and DFS 2008, 82]. It agrees with Lehmann's core conclusion, stating that "Public information should be thoroughly integrated into a United Nations peacekeeping operation at all stages of planning and deployment." [Ibidem, 83 and Lehmann 1999, 19] It also supports some of her specific criteria, for example the one stating that PI should be included from the outset of a mission [Lehmann 1999, 19].

The same situation occurs in the more recent, unofficial policy publication by DPKO, referred to as the 'New Horizon Document' [UNDPKO and DFS 2009]. Only half a page is dedicated to the importance of PI. It does add to the Capstone Doctrine consideration two more of Lehmann's criteria, the one concerning cultural sensitivity and the one regarding transparency about mission policy and objectives [Ibidem, 15 and Lehmann, 19].

For media building, the only reference in the two key policy documents for peacekeeping consists of the phrase "mission public information activities should be geared towards helping establish an environment that promotes the development of free and independent media, and the adherence to the highest journalistic ethics and standards" in the Capstone Doctrine. [UNDPKO and DFS 2008, 83]. This only
reflects Orme's criterion regarding relevant ethical codes for media [Orme 2010, 10] and obviously leaves a large gap to be covered in terms of policy formulation. Although DPKO does not itself have a specific media building mandate, reference should at least be made to the organization of media building efforts in cooperation with the relevant parts of the UN family. Also, media building has a legitimate place in policy literature as a part of peacebuilding - more specifically, democratic institution building as described by Orme [2010, 10] - something that is overlooked in the two key guiding documents.

**Handbooks**

The minimal attention for PI in the two guiding policy documents is expanded somewhat in two manuals, a rather lengthy one by DPKO and one brief booklet which was prepared by DPI after a workshop. Additionally a little more space is devoted to the place PI occupies in peacekeeping in a handbook on PKOs in general.

The two manuals are somewhat old, dating from 1997 [UNDPKO and DPKO 1997] and 1999 [UN System Staff College and UNDPI 1999] respectively.\(^{14}\) The DPI booklet from 1999 contains highly specific instructions for public information officials - not surprising since it was prepared following a workshop on the issue. Only the one page summary seems to link the instructions to the wider policy background, limiting its usefulness. The core of the document seems to be the maintenance of a positive image for the UN and countering criticism, regardless of the validity of such criticism. This is in line with Lehmann's second criterion [Lehmann 1999, 18]. The DPKO manual from 1997 also contains highly specific instructions, covering all phases of a peacekeeping operation extensively. It stresses the strategic importance of PI and the fact that it should be included from the outset, the inclusion of local cultural considerations such as language and capabilities of local staff - both criteria of Lehmann's [1999, 18-19]. Lastly, in the general handbook on PKOs the space for PI is again limited to two pages out of over two hundred. This document provides little new information, although in the short space it occupies it supports three of Lehmann's criteria - strategic importance of PI, the advantage of inclusion of PI in the mission from the outset and the importance of specific education campaigns on certain issues [UNDPKO 2003, 52-54].

As with PI, the attention for media building is scarce in official peacekeeping

\(^{14}\) According to Michel Bonnardeaux, a public affairs officer with DPKO, one of the reasons that there has been no update since is because they are "just" guidelines [Bonnardeaux 2011].
policy documents. However, several manuals and handbooks on the matter have been published by NGOs and governmental organizations over the past years. UNDP, the World Bank, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) all have created documents on the matter after 2007 (except for the DfID handbook which dates from 2000). They all stress the importance of information in conflict situations as well as the media's potential to prevent violent conflict [e.g. DfID 2000, 4 and Bajraktari and Hsu 2007, 1].

Next to this common characteristic, each one has a specific accent. The document by the World Bank has a strong focus on media building as a part of democratic institution building, or 'good governance' reform as they call it [Kalathil 2011, 3-4]. The UNDP guide emphasizes the concept of "communication for development" or 'C4D', also moving close to the notion of conflict sensitive journalism [UNDP 2009, 5-6]. USIP's publication centers on the importance of a well-developed, coherent and effective media strategy, providing guidance to help 'interveners' develop and implement such strategies [Bajraktari and Hsu 2007, 1-2]. Lastly, DfID claims not to provide a 'how-to' guide but to focus more on the question what the role of media is in conflict situations and how DfID employees should work with this information [DfID 2000, 6].

Attention for PI and media building in policy circles has thus been picking up steam over the last decade. Although media building is not nearly as extensively covered by UN documents as PI is, the activity of NGOs and other organizations in this area partially makes up for that omission. Nevertheless, with so little policy literature on media building it is not very likely the reality of peacekeeping missions will pay adequate attention to this important concept.

A second interesting characteristic of the available policy literature, both UN and non-UN, is that it shows several of the criteria mentioned by Lehmann and Orme. The next section explores the most important academic literature available on the two topics, focusing on the availability of evidence incorporating local level empirical data and examining, in parallel with this section, the extent to which the criteria of Lehmann and Orme are used as analytical frameworks.

3.3. Academic literature - public information

The academic literature on PI in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts is very sparse.
Although as mentioned the importance of including PI as a strategic priority in the planning of peackeeping is recognized in several DPKO policy documents, the scientific research has not followed the same line. There is some sporadic evidence from individual case studies but the two topics of UN peacekeeping and PI are rarely combined in a comprehensive and methodologically sound manner, making it difficult to assess the overall success rate of PI components in peacekeeping operations.

Three notable exceptions to this general situation exist: Charles Hunt's Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations, Shira Loewenberg's United Nations Media Strategy: Recommendations for Improvement in Peacekeeping Operations and most importantly the already mentioned work by Ingrid Lehmann, Peacekeeping and Public Information. Although the first two publications have a specific geographical focus, because all three contain interesting and relevant analyses of the key issues in the overlapping fields of PI and peacekeeping operations, based partly in local level evidence, their content is briefly presented and qualified below.

Charles Hunt - Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations

This study focuses on the growing importance that has been accorded to PI efforts in peacekeeping operations and argues that it should be considered a mission critical component of such operations, especially in situations where the local media infrastructure is absent or so weak that it is unable to provide credible information [Hunt 2006, 5].

The author, who at the time of publishing was a Research Associate at the Kofi Annan International Peackeeping Training Centre, uses a significant amount of pages to introduce the topic and elaborate the context (around a third of the total space) before coming to the core data chapter in which a double case study, of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), is

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16 Loewenberg's study carries a second subtitle: Case Study: UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.
17 Currently a PhD candidate under the supervision of professor Alex Bellamy at the University of Queensland.
elaborated. Lastly, a chapter is devoted to a look ahead, identifying future challenges and opportunities for PI in peacekeeping operations.

In that central third chapter, the evidence base consists of different UN policy documents, a few academic references and most importantly six different interviews with UN officials. Only the latter sources provide any local level evidence and this is heavily skewed towards the UNMIL case. One might also ask if six interviews is sufficient material for nearly 25 pages of writing. In general, the chapter seems sparsely referenced, with some pages having no more than one source or even no apparent source at all. This may explain why the two missions are, sometimes slightly awkwardly, paired together in a single chapter; the source material included for UNAMSIL indeed does not seem to merit a separate chapter.

The last criticism also applies to the paper in general; especially academic references seem very rare, instead relying mostly on policy literature and interviews. This is of course legitimate but it may indicate a somewhat limited critical perspective on the subject. Also curious is the absence of a bibliography.

This sparseness of evidence is detrimental to the strength of the paper's conclusions, which in itself seem slightly self-evident, namely that through creative and innovative development, PI has become a mission critical component of peacekeeping missions. This conclusion was noted already by Lehmann, seven years earlier in the first part of her book [Lehmann 1999, 18]. However, rather than a criticism of the paper, this should be interpreted as a lack of progress in terms of local level evidence in this field to base new academic work on.

Shira Loewenberg - United Nations Media Strategy: Recommendations for Improvement in Peacekeeping Operation

In her paper Loewenberg, a consultant to non-governmental organizations and former PI officer in two UN missions, addresses the structural issues within the UN - mainly DPI and DPKO - taking the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as a case study she claims to be representative for all of UN peacekeeping and communication strategies in post-conflict in general.

The paper is thoroughly researched and sourced throughout even though the layout is slightly curious and a table of contents is lacking. More importantly, her

\[\text{18 Only two of the interviewees have UNAMSIL experience.}\]
paper is interesting because of some of the recommendations she makes. Several of these are in line with one of the key recommendations William Orme makes in his paper (see below); that it is highly important in peacekeeping operations to draw a clear line between media building efforts which are potentially highly critical of UN efforts, and PI which almost always is geared purely towards maintaining a positive image and popular support for the peacekeeping mission. She even makes the recommendation to bolster the Peace and Security section of DPI, or otherwise to establish an individual PI unit within DPKO. This interestingly reflects to a large extent the comments made on this topic by Leon Willems (see page 16).

A last point of interest is that although throughout the paper references are made to interviews conducted with a seemingly large group of UN officials, these are not explicitly referenced or incorporated in the bibliography. This would of course have been a great opportunity to expand the existing body of local level evidence, however no specification of either the pool of interviewees or the interview protocols and procedures is made.

**Ingrid A. Lehmann - *Peacekeeping and Public Information***

The most comprehensive and in-depth analysis of PI in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts is the book by Dr. Ingrid A. Lehmann, former director of DPI and currently teaching international political communication at the University of Salzburg. Her monograph analyzes the effectiveness of PI in peacekeeping, focusing on success factors, the consequences of (in)effective PI, the bureaucratic constraints for this success and the ways around these constraints [Lehmann 1999, 3].

The book consists of two background chapters, including a brief but insightful analysis of the institutional relations between DPI and DPKO, and of five case studies which are comparatively analysed in the last chapter. The basic tenet of the study, that "communication is a strategic management function for international organizations, particularly when they operate in a peacekeeping mode" [Lehmann 1999, 19], is hardly revolutionary - although more so when the work was first published in 1999. Nevertheless, the five case studies contribute interesting local level evidence, collected from interviews with experienced field officials and from her own research results from surveys and field visits. Every chapter includes multiple sources of original evidence, thus adding to the strength of the conclusions and the available
body of evidence. This original research does remain on the level of a qualitative case study methodology however, as the information from the interviews, surveys and field visits is not processed in a statistical manner.

From the case studies, Lehmann distills a list of six criteria for success of a peacekeeping operation's PI component - not so much guarantees for success, but principles or rather prerequisites that, if contravened or omitted, will have very strong negative consequences. She indicates one principle as absolutely paramount: that peacekeeping missions have an integral information programme.

3.4. Academic literature - media building
Although sometimes the lines between PI and media building are blurred in policy and academic literature because of their conceptual kinship, as emphasized in Chapter 2, from a communications theory perspective they are two very different concepts even though they may overlap at times. The main criterion to separate them is their independence and critical function: these should be present in journalistic media and should thus form part of the objectives of media building, but are not necessarily an important part of PI efforts which focus on maintaining a positive image. As the UN engages in both activities in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts, this presents the organization with "the dual challenge of how to communicate directly with the population on the authority of its transitional administration while at the same time fostering the development of independent and responsible media" [Manuel 2004, 39].

The academic literature that focuses mainly on media building by the UN in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts, like that on PI, is relatively scarce. Most literature focuses on the influence of established local and international media on peacekeeping operations\(^{19}\), or on media building in conflict settings in general or by non-UN actors.\(^{20}\) Again, a few papers do make a relevant contribution to the topic, providing evidence on the effectiveness of media building in peacekeeping operations. As for the papers on PI, these contributions are briefly assessed below for content and quality.


Emily Berman - *Democratizing the Media*

Berman provides an interesting and critical argument against unconditional fostering of free media in post-conflict situations. Based on case studies of media building efforts in Bosnia (non-UN) and Kosovo (UNMIK), she argues that free media operating in a stable democracy are both a cause and a consequence of this very stability, justifying a departure from classic liberal democratic principles towards more controlling measures in the early days of newly established media. This is in line with the second critique of media building presented in Chapter 2, which argues that these efforts might be in vain and somewhat foolish in post-conflict situations where the appropriate conditions for media building are completely absent.\(^\text{21}\)

The paper itself is well-founded, based on a combination of policy documents and handbooks, academic literature, legislation and case law. In the first background chapter of the work this review of the legal context is so extensive it almost amounts to a separate (sub)paper, written out in the annotation.\(^\text{22}\) Although perhaps readability suffers somewhat, it indicates clearly the legal expertise of the author and her understanding of the context.

In providing case study evidence for her hypothesis, Berman contributes an interesting critical perspective to the question of the role of media building in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts. The caution she advocates and the careful consideration of specific contexts constitutes a valuable and refreshing approach to the matter, even though she bases herself in existing literature and does not present new local level evidence.

Bill Orme - *Broadcasting in UN Blue: the Unknown past and Uncertain Future of Peacekeeping Radio*

In his seventy page paper Bill Orme, an experienced UN Development Programme (UNDP) official and media researcher, investigates the efforts the UN has undertaken in the supporting, establishing and running of radio stations in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts. He argues that UN radio is by far the most influential media building activity the UN engages in - even if DPKO is not explicitly mandated to this end. After the introductory chapters Orme carries out six brief case studies to arrive at

\(^{21}\) See Chapter 2 on page 12 and 13.
\(^{22}\) Not surprisingly perhaps for a Law Review article.
a list of ten recommendations for radio building efforts - and by extension, media building efforts in general - in peacekeeping contexts.

These include the clear separation of PI and media building efforts by the UN, consistent Security Council support in terms of resources for media building, cooperation with local media and the establishment of clear guidelines for media building efforts.

Orme bases his paper on media sources, UN policy documents and Security Council resolutions as well as several academic papers. Interestingly, he also refers to an informal collection of background information, gathered by a working group composed of DPKO, DPI, UNESCO and UNDP officials. The informal nature of this document has however precluded the publication of it which is of course an immense shame from the point of view of the available local level evidence.

Although Orme's contribution makes for very interesting reading and his recommendations are very relevant and to the point, the paper seems to be missing a link to the body of theory surrounding the topic of media building in conflict situations. This gives the paper a somewhat unstructured and haphazard feel to it from time to time. Adding theoretical depth would have improved the quality of this nevertheless interesting paper greatly.

3.5. Conclusion

An exploration of the available scientific and policy literature on PI and media building in UN peacekeeping contexts has shown that although the topics are receiving a small amount of attention at policymaking levels, the academic interest in them has lagged behind - especially in terms of gathering local level empirical evidence. Papers on the topics are hard to come by, not all of them make use of original empirical evidence and the evidence that is gathered often consists only of interviews with UN officials or related experts at the policy level. Data gathered by interacting with affected populations seems to be nonexistent.

What little evidence is available is mostly focused on quantitative case studies: large scale statistical analyses of peacekeeping missions are not to be found anywhere. At the same time, there is a lack of studies that can draw strong and credible conclusions about peacekeeping in general, conclusions that are more solid than the average case study extrapolation (which nevertheless does have some value
of course). As mentioned before, rather than trying to criticize any individual researcher, this status quo should be interpreted as a lack of progress in terms of local level evidence and academic research in this field to base new academic work on. It is not immediately evident why academic research has not followed the growing importance accorded by policymakers to the topic. It could be that the popular "CNN effect" as a phenomenon has drawn much of the interest of research away from wider issues of public information and media building in peacekeeping, but this remains a tentative hypothesis to be further investigated.

The lack of academic and policy attention to these themes seriously hampers any real and sustainable progress in the areas of free information and media, thus also creating very large obstacles for the further development of peaceful post-conflict societies. Much work thus remains to be done, firstly in the gathering of local level empirical data - not only interviews with officials but research among the 'end user level' affected communities. Secondly, a large gap needs to be filled by composing larger quantitative and comparative studies based on this end user, local level empirical data. And thirdly, although policy documentation pays more attention to PI in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts, media building has been largely overlooked in UN policy circles - something that also needs to be addressed.

With the evidence available, the question to what extent media building and PI efforts in post-conflict peacekeeping contexts contribute to the progressive growth of liberal peace cannot be answered in a methodologically sound way. This question will be the central part of the following two chapters which present case study evidence on the matter, attempting to provide at least a piece of the puzzle towards finding an answer.
Chapter 4 - Case study of UNTAC's Info/Ed

This chapter will investigate the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia as the first of two case studies that make up the core of this thesis. This example of transitional administrations ran quite briefly - from November 1991 to September 1993 - but was nevertheless unprecedentend at the time as the largest, most expensive and most widely mandated peacekeeping operation.\(^{23}\) UNTAC is recognized as one of the first missions in which the UN has departed from dealing mostly with the symptoms of conflict as in more classical peacekeeping, moving instead to the wider concept of peacebuilding to also address the root causes of a situation [Richmond and Franks 2009, 19].

This chapter will firstly give a brief introduction of the historical background to the mission and the most important historical facts of UNTAC itself before drawing some conclusions about its results, successes and failures - all of this based on academic and policy literature. Secondly, following the case study methodology detailed in chapter 2, the mission's public information and media building efforts will be assessed according to the specific (adapted) frameworks of Lehmann and Orme. Lastly, the chapter's conclusion will relate the findings to the wider framework of liberal peace theory and list some implications for the theory.

4.1. Historical background and design of UNTAC

Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953, becoming a constitutional monarchy under the rule of King Norodom Sihanouk. The first regime after colonial rule did not prosper for long, however; in 1970 a military coup ousted the king, sparking a five year civil war between the military regime of Lon Nol and Pol Pot's Maoist Khmer Rouge movement which, at least in name, was allied to the king. After the victory of the Khmer Rouge in 1975, Pol Pot \textit{cum suis} unleashed a four year lasting genocide in which at least twenty-five percent of Cambodia's 7.3 million inhabitants were murdered, starved or worked to death. Vietnamese forces invaded the country in 1978-1979, adding a Cold War dynamic to the complexity of the situation in which the Soviet Union supported Vietnam and the United States and its allies backed the Khmer Rouge. As the Cold War ended and the two superpowers

\(^{23}\) The cost of the entire mission was approximately $1.7 billion, the maximum personnel deployment numbered 15,991 military, 3,359 civilian police, 900 polling station officers and 50,000 local electoral staff. \textit{Source: United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia} <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html>
disengaged from the conflict, spaces for conflict resolution opened up. Starting in 1987 multiparty peace talks were held which resulted in the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 [Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004, 122 and Heininger 1994, 10-12].

*From Paris Peace Accords to UNTAC*

The accords were signed on October 23rd 1991 and consisted of three different documents: one detailing a political settlement between the belligerents, one guaranteeing Cambodia's sovereignty, independence and neutrality and one committing the nineteen signatories to assist in Cambodia's reconstruction.

After the accords were signed, a first authorization for a UN contingent of 116 military personnel was given24 which went to Cambodia to monitor the ceasefire and prepare recommendations for UNTAC's size and makeup [MacLeod Hall 2006, 65 and United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia 2003]. Following the reports of this advance team, the UN Security Council endorsed the peace accords and moved towards an implementation plan for UNTAC by adopting resolution 745. In that resolution, the emphasis was placed on the organization of free and fair elections, to "produce a just and durable settlement to the Cambodia conflict, thereby contributing to regional and international peace and security" [UN Security Council 1992, 39]. This priority would also become the most important one in the daily practice of the mission [Heininger 1994, 38]. There were more tasks however, as assigned by the Paris Accords and falling in six different categories: in addition to elections there were refugee repatriation, cease-fire and demobilization, human rights, civil administration and rehabilitation and reconstruction.

An Information Service was added to this list by the office of the UN secretary-general [Heder and Ledgerwood 1996, 26]. This service would come to occupy a role of great importance in UNTAC, becoming as Dan Lindley observes "critical to its success and to the election in Cambodia." [Lindley 2004, 608] Even so, the initiative for informational activities to a large extent had to come from the local mission level; for example, one criticism levelled is that there was too much duplication of efforts, inconsistency and therefore lost opportunities in this area which was not remedied until the Deputy SRSG took action [Findlay 1995, 151].

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24 Named the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia, UNAMIC, its mandated strength would soon after rise to 1,090.
UNTAC's mandate supports the fostering and establishment of a liberal democratic regime - the underlying objective of contemporary peacekeeping operations - in two important ways. Firstly, UNTAC was to ensure that Cambodian political parties would allow liberalization of the political landscape [Heder and Ledgerwood 1996, 15]. Secondly, the Paris Peace Agreements stipulates that "the constitution will state that Cambodia will follow a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism" [Paris Peace Agreements, Annex 5 art. 4] even though this provision is tucked away in the fifth annex.

4.2. Results, successes and failures of UNTAC
The academic literature on UNTAC generally views the mission as a success, although of course it was not completely immune to problems and there are several critical observations to be made before moving on to an assessment of the PI and media building components in the mission.

General evaluation of UNTAC
Considering the complexity of the local situation in Cambodia when the UN intervened, the "revolutionary and unprecedented mandate" [Richmond and Franks 2009, 18], with UNTAC basically in charge of running an entire country and lastly the extent to which the UN was unexperienced in projects of comparable size and difficulty, it is in fact astonishing that the elections took place as they did in May of 1993. Contrary to predictions, the most important spoiler of the peacebuilding process, the Khmer Rouge, did not violently disrupt the elections - which as mentioned were a major priority for the mission - and more than ninety percent of the electorate participated [Heininger 1994, 1]. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin [2010, 122] point to several authors that similarly argue for the success of UNTAC, identifying the mission as potentially the "high point in multidimensional peacekeeping"; Richmond and Franks [2009, 18] call it a seeming "post-Cold War triumph for the United Nations, and for the liberal peace".

However, most authors also acknowledge that an "enormity of problems" [Heininger 1994, 119] remains and that Cambodia failed to become a politically stable country after the UN left, exemplified by the violent coup of 1997 carried out by Hun Sen, the then Second Prime Minister of the nation. The most pressing problems included a weak and unstable political infrastructure, an economic bubble including high inflation fueled by the sudden influx of UN investment and a general
lack of reconciliation between the different parties [Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010, 125].

Peou [2007, 207] argues that these problems could cause Cambodia to recede from a nation with a democratic government into one having an 'electoral dictatorship'. MacLeod Hall [2006, 11] states even more categorically that although the mission was "initially heralded as a partial success (...) UNTAC is a considered a failure by the criteria used in this study" because no self-sustaining democratic transition was effected. Interpreting the at best imperfect results of UNTAC from an LPT point of view, Richmond and Franks [2009, 18] argue that the mission has in fact been far from successful, creating no more than what they call a 'virtual peace', which they argue may please international elites but provides little concrete benefits for the local population.

Specific successes and failures
UNTAC did of course have elements in its mandate that can be classified as successful - three out of seven in total, as is shown below. The most relevant for this thesis is of course the PI and media building component, which within UNTAC was called 'Information and Education' or simply 'Info/Ed'. Heininger qualifies the work of this division "UNTAC's most unqualified success" [Heininger 1994, 116] - a success that will be explored in more detail in the following part of this chapter.

A second important element that was highly effective was the electoral department. As was mentioned, threats of violence by the Khmer Rouge did not materialize and 4.2 million Cambodians (ninety percent of the electorate) cast their votes. Even MacLeod Hall, who otherwise is very critical of the mission's outcomes, concedes that the balloting process was successful, quoting Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) at the time, who called the elections "free and fair" and who found that voters had participated without fear in a calm atmosphere with hardly any violence and intimidation [MacLeod Hall 2006, 80].

Thirdly, the repatriation of refugees is considered a success. Around 360,000 refugees returned to Cambodia over the course of the operation - through heavily malarial regions with transport infrastructure in a terrible condition and into a country littered with mines, facing an uncertain political future and uncertain employment prospects [Heininger 1994, 48]. However, apparently all of these obstructions could not stop the refugees from returning home. Also, there were several incentives to
motivate them to return such as Thai pressure on the refugees and UN promises of cash, jobs, food and/or land [Lindley 2007, 164].

The remaining four mandate objectives of UNTAC however were less of a success story. For human rights, although some progress was made, widespread abuses persisted throughout the mission's deployment [Lindley 2007, 166-167]. In rehabilitation and reconstruction UNTAC's efforts suffered from incomplete aid disbursements and lack of neutrality in its operations which caused blockage of access in Khmer Rouge controlled areas [Heininger 1994, 64 and Lindley 2007, 164]. Regarding cease-fire and demobilization the mission's military component faced a Khmer that was actively breaching the cease-fire and encouraging others to do so as well, thus stalling demilitarization, and the civil police component was generally considered a disaster [Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004, 124]. Finally, in civil administration UNTAC failed to create a neutral political environment [Heininger 1994, 90] and in addition it faced logistical issues as well as a Cambodian government that in practice continued to govern parallel to it [Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004, 125].

Thus, even though UNTAC is usually cited as an example of effective peacekeeping and in important mandate areas it did very well, in several other areas there was significant room for improvement. The following pages investigate if the PI and media building efforts are justly qualified as highly succesful, as they generally are, or if a more humble evaluation is appropriate.

4.3. Case study of public information and media building efforts
Using the methodology detailed in Chapter 2, the following pages assess the effectiveness of the PI and media building efforts by UNTAC from an LPT point of view, analyzing academic literature, official UN documentation and two in-depth interviews with relevant experts.

Public information and media building in UNTAC: Info/Ed
As mentioned above, the division of UNTAC that was responsible for both PI and media building was called 'Information and Education', or simply 'Info/Ed' (see the structure of UNTAC in Fig. 1 below. This division was envisaged in several documents issued by the UN secretariat [UNDPI 1995, 177-179] and was mandated to employ a total of a hundred and sixty staff members [Schear 1996, 149] including some forty-five international staff of whom fourteen had experience in Cambodia,
including knowledge of Khmer [Leder and Hedgerwood 1996, 26]. As the Info/Ed division office engaged both in PI and media building, its efforts will be separated along the different definitions of the two stated earlier and analyzed with the operational criteria of Orme and Lehmann.

**Public Information**

Info/Ed consisted of four units: Production, including Radio UNTAC, which was in charge of producing radio programs, video messages and other PI materials; Control, which was responsible for checking the information of political factions and the government to maintain a neutral political climate; Dissemination, whose main responsibility was to ensure that UNTAC's messages reached all parts of the country and all layers of society; and lastly Analysis, which attempted to measure the reach and impact these messages actually had in reality [Manuel 2011; Lehmann 1999, 63-70; Heininger 1994, 109-111; Marston 2002, 186].

*Figure 1 - UNTAC Organizational Chart*

Judging the effectiveness of PI in UNTAC, as detailed in the operationalization of Lehmann's criteria, is mainly based on two sources of evidence: high-level UN policy documents (Security Council and General Assembly

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25 *Sources:* Heininger 1994, 40; Lehmann 1999, 63; Schear 1996, 150. Interestingly, Schear erroneously places Info/Ed under the authority of the Deputy Special Representative.

26 See page 22 and onwards.
resolutions, UN Secretariat reports and memoranda) and sources discussing the implementation in the field, including the conducted interviews. Looking at the policy literature gives the image of a PI component that scores moderately well on the list of Lehmann's criteria. PI is mentioned only briefly in the Paris Agreements, where 'information' is referred to as one of the areas that will receive special attention by UN supervision to ensure an "environment conducive to free and fair general elections" [UNDPI 1992, 10]. In Security Council Resolution 745 no mention is made of an information component at all (only demobilization is mentioned specifically as an area of attention). However, the resolution does make reference to a report by the Secretary-General which is the basis for UNTAC [UNSC 1992, 39]. After describing the design of the main components of UNTAC, a page of this report is dedicated to detailing the rationale for, tasks of and significance of the Info/Ed division. Info/Ed thus does appear although judging by its placement in the document it is considered less important than all of the other components of UNTAC. The criterion regarding PI as a strategically important component so far is thus only partially fulfilled.

The importance of public perceptions is more thoroughly present; a "major requirement" of the Info/Ed programming would be to "establish and maintain UNTAC's credibility". This because "Experience has shown that this is a key element in enabling the success of missions of this type." [UN Secretariat 1995, 177] The last formulation also demonstrates considerations of PI as a strategically important element of the mission, improving the score on this point slightly. Additionally, the fact that PI is included from this point on shows that the matter receives a relatively high sense of urgency which is relevant for the third criterion on Lehmann's list of six.

Specific education campaigns also are explicitly mentioned, in the three areas of human rights, mine awareness and electoral matters. The report by the UN Secretariat mentions "massive civic education campaigns" [UN Secretariat 1995, 177] on these three subjects, thus fulfilling the policy side of Lehmann's fourth criterion to a great extent.

The fifth benchmark for PI effectiveness, cultural sensitivity while upholding freedom of the media and human rights, is less well addressed in the report. Except for a mention of the need to translate all materials into Khmer, no specific reference is made. The last criterion, of transparency about objectives and policy, is dissipated throughout the Info/Ed section. By performing its aforementioned tasks well, PI should also be able to communicate their policies and objectives transparently.
Although not all criteria are addressed in a completely satisfactory manner - especially the cultural sensitivity aspect is lacking and the omission of PI from the Security Council resolution indicates the limited, although existent, realization of PI's strategic importance in UNTAC - the policy literature does fulfill the majority of Lehmann's criteria and thus provides a reasonable probability for effectiveness [UN Secretariat 1992, 177-179].

The practical realities of implementation of this policy literature shows a similar success rate. Regarding the strategic importance of PI, Heininger states that while Info/Ed's work was essential, it was "not widely recognized during most of UNTAC's tenure as being critically important" [Heininger 1994, 116]. UN senior staff itself was even skeptical about the extensive PI campaigns and although the Analysis unit of Info/Ed was intended to measure actual impact, the full effects of the information campaign could not be seen until election day [Schear 1996, 169]. Even so, the fact that as shown in the diagram, Info/Ed fell directly under the SRSG, shows that it was also in reality given a relatively prominent place in the mission structure.

The importance of public perceptions took shape on the ground in the aforementioned Analysis unit of Info/Ed. This unit had a staff of six which travelled throughout Cambodia gathering information from political factions and the population about UNTAC's image. Where UNTAC was perceived as 'bad', this would give the mission a chance to "make necessary image corrections" [Lehmann 1999, 64]. Perhaps most tellingly these efforts in spinning criticism are summarized by the following quote: "In light of these persistent criticisms, UNTAC had to act to counter the allegations, justified or not" [Lehmann 73, emphasis added]. So even if incorrect behavior by UNTAC staff was justly denounced, PI was supposed to counteract these negative messages by putting a positive spin on them.

On the criterion of including PI in missions from the outset, the reality proved more complex than anticipated. The Phnom Penh based transmitter of Radio UNTAC for example was not powerful enough to cover the entire country, making additional stations for the provinces necessary and resulting in a three to five month delay [Heininger 1994, 110]. Difficulties concerning the recruitment of personnel and procurement of equipment were a second cause for delays [Schear 1996, 169]. This slow deployment, according to Schear [1996, 175], was present mission-wide and deprived it of precious momentum early on.
However, the large scale civic education campaigns on human rights, elections and mine precautions are again considered successful by several sources. Heininger for example contends that UNTAC did "a superb job of mass instruction in some of the basic tenets of democracy" [Heininger 1994, 121]. Susan Manuel in an in-depth interview indicated that the Human Rights component and Info/Ed worked together very closely and that the head of Human Rights at the end of the mission even became the new head of Info/Ed [Manuel 2011].

On the criterion of being culturally sensitive while maintaining freedom of the media and human rights, UNTAC did quite well. It managed get its message across to an audience which was initially somewhat suspicious, possibly due to years of isolation, lacking education and widespread illiteracy [Lindley 2007, 169]. It succeeded in doing so by tailoring the messages to their audience - for example, using local actors, local scenes and appropriate level dialogue in video messages [Marston 2002, 188] - and by including to a large extent Cambodian information officials and journalists in dialogues about PI [Manuel 2011]. UNTAC also worked hard with these local partners towards establishing legal frameworks for freedoms of media and information - efforts that will be elaborated in the media building section below.

Lastly, transparency about policy and objectives of the mission was again transversal in the whole PI effort. Providing clear explanations of the UN mission, the Paris Peace Accords and the electoral process was a key part of all of UNTAC's information activities which included Radio UNTAC, "TV programmes and debates, outreach programmes, banners, posters, brochures, etc. etc. and mobile video units" [Manuel 2011].

Thus the reality of the implementation of the drafted PI policy is not without problems but also sufficient to qualify for the epithet 'effective'. In strategic importance and including PI from the outset of the mission several difficulties were encountered which decreased the effectiveness of the PI component. However, in the other four areas UNTAC's efforts were quite well-executed, explaining and justifying the generally large acclaim for UNTAC's Info/Ed component.

*Media building*

Although UNTAC did not have a specific mandate regarding media building nor any resources to facilitate it, the mission did engage in activities that supported the emergence of media in Cambodia - significantly more so than many other peacekeeping operations [Manuel 2011]. The general goal of the efforts was to
encourage the development of a more independent and objective media and effecting a transformation towards greater freedom of the media [Marston 2002, 180]. The three most important efforts that were undertaken in this regard were the establishment of legal guidelines for media which formed the basis for more formal media legislation, the creation of a journalists' association and the creation of Radio UNTAC, which became the most popular station in the country, at its peak broadcasting fifteen hours a day [Lindley 2004, 610].

As was described above, media building is not explicitly mentioned as a separate group of activities in the policy literature. The information intervention in UNTAC was a first example of media building as a part of post-conflict peacebuilding and largely relied on the ad hoc improvising of local officials [Marston 2002, 180]. This immediately puts a dent in the possible effectiveness of media building. Following Orme's adapted list, Security Council backing is obviously not sufficiently present if not a single one of the high-level policy documents contains references to media building.

Secondly, if there are no guidelines on separation of media and PI efforts, the separation of these efforts is much less likely to take place, as is the case for the planning of an adequate exit and handover strategy. Both of these criteria were indeed far from fulfilled in the case of UNTAC, as will be elaborated below [Manuel 2011]. The third criterion which states media building must be seen as a form of democratic institution building such as electoral and human rights support, is also overlooked in the policy documents - unlike the other two examples of democratic institutions. Lastly, when there is no media building strategy in the policy literature, details about using local resources first by partnering with local partners are also absent from it.

Nevertheless, if a policy framework provides no details whatsoever regarding how, when and why media building should be undertaken, the actual efforts in the field can still attain a modicum of effectiveness in increasing the audience cost - and UNTAC did so for two of six criteria. Firstly, on the criterion of following relevant independent media standards, the Control unit of Info/Ed took steps towards developing a Media Charter, envisioned as a strong legal instrument which "declared basic principles of the freedom of the press, as well as its basic ethical obligations" [Marston 2002, 180]. In the end however, the charter was reduced to little more than guidelines and the actual media law that was introduced turned out to be much more
strict and conservative than these guidelines which were "quite liberal" in nature and drew upon American and British media ethics [Manuel 2011].

Partial fulfillment of the sixth criterion, on prioritizing local media capacities, can also be found in the starting of a journalists' association, again by Info/Ed's Control unit. Additionally, in both of these processes local journalists and information officials were very much included from the start [Manuel 2011].

Thus, despite its acclaim, the field efforts of UNTAC's Info/Ed division do not score high on Orme's list of criteria. Due to the novelty of media building, coherent and enduring UNSC support was manifestly lacking, as was the realization that media building is a part of democratic institution-building. Even though Manuel maintains that "public information was not really mixed with media building" [Manuel 2011], there was no clear, distinguishable line between PI efforts and media building activities. Furthermore, the lack of handover of Radio UNTAC - "it was shuttered and silenced, its local staff dismissed, its equipment flown back to DPKO warehouses in Italy" - is considered one of the greatest failures of the mission [Orme 2010, 39]. Lastly, the lack of established independent media made success regarding the sixth criterion almost impossible. General information conditions in Cambodia were poor [Lindley 2007, 168] which was in part the result of a decade-long deliberate isolation by the international community [Findlay 1995, 199]. The media outlets that did operate were all intimately related to one of the political parties or factions of Cambodia, with coverage corresponding to regional power divides - a situation that had existed in more or less unchanged form since 1979 [Marston 2002, 178]. All of these problems make that the media building efforts of UNTAC cannot be judged to qualify as effective in terms of Orme's criteria.

4.4. Conclusion - UNTAC's Info/Ed Division and Liberal Peace Theory
In the ideal situation, UNTAC's Info/Ed division would have implemented a perfect PI and media building policy, fulfilling both Lehmann's and Orme's criteria completely and leading to a significant contribution to the development of a peaceful post-conflict society.

However, as we have seen Cambodia was not fortunate enough to see a perfect effort in PI and media building. Regarding PI, on both the policy level as in the day-

27 The media law would for example be used as a basis for imprisoning journalists in the post-UNTAC period [Marston 2002, 180].
to-day reality on the ground UNTAC's efforts qualified as effective, although on both levels there was room for improvement - significantly, in both policy and daily reality the strategic importance of PI for mission success was insufficiently realized.

For media building difficulties and lacunas were much larger, making it impossible to judge the efforts in this field as effective. On a policy level media building was virtually ignored and in the field this lack of attention could only be remedied to a very limited extent by the interventions of present personnel. Good intentions and hard work in developing media guidelines that were supposed - but ultimately failed - to evolve into full-blown legal regimes for media regulation and facilitation, as well as efforts such as starting a journalists' association could not remedy the lack of fulfillment of the other criteria.

UNTAC's Info/Ed division is justly credited with increasing the short term peaceful post-conflict development, as is evident from the successful first elections that were held [Heininger 1994, 116]. However, the history of Cambodia since then has shown that this was not a sustainable development. Critics have stated that UNTAC withdrew from Cambodia before a stable, long-term peace had been achieved. Subsequently, the country slid back from the ideal-type of liberal democracy that peacekeeping envisions based on LPT, to a more authoritarian form of rule where democracy is barely surviving [Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004, 127].

Thus, an important part of these efforts was unsuccessful. Consequently, the liberal peace, if it materialized at all, did so only to a very limited extent. As Richmond and Franks state, although "Cambodia is perceived by most as an orthodox liberal peace; yet it [...] may not even fit on the liberal peace axis at all" [2009, 46].

Critiques and recommendations for theory

Returning to the critiques of the effectiveness criteria elaborated in Chapter 2, a number of critical reflections is in place regarding media building efforts in UNTAC. Firstly, the critique of media building as a foolish endeavor in a post-conflict society where no significant historical tradition of democracy exists, applies to an extent. Susan Manuel very tellingly sums up some of the most acute problems UNTAC encountered in it's media building efforts, identifying them as a "[local] lack of knowledge of or trust in a liberal democratic media; a society we really didn't
understand. Lack of corresponding institutions which could support a liberal, democratic media. Encouraging the benefits of a free and liberal media, while allowing a cynical political arrangement, after 'democratic' elections, which allowed the loser to stay in and in fact gain even more power." [Manuel 2011]

Secondly, and this is more a cause for praise than criticism, UNTAC's media building efforts also went further than required by Orme's list in one important way. The way in which it dealt with information came quite close to concepts of conflict sensitive journalism as discussed in Chapter 2. According to Marston, this way of working has played an important part in effecting that "the people who disagree without shooting each other are increasing" [Marston 2002, 199].

Although Marston's claim is quite strong, the two critical additions to Orme's framework demonstrate that the list of criteria for successful media building efforts perhaps may need an expansion to include these two components.

The following chapter will likewise reflect on these matters, for East Timor this time. Given that several years separate the two missions, the extent to which lessons from UNTAC have been learned and implemented in UNTAET will be an additional important focus of the second core chapter of this research.
Chapter 5 - Case study of UNTAET's OCPI

This chapter presents the second case study in the core part of this thesis. It investigates the mission of the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor. This transitional administration ran for three years, from October 25th 1999 to the independence of East Timor on May 20th 2002. After independence a less substantive presence was maintained in the form of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). UNTAET's tasks were to "administer the Territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period and support capacity-building for self-government" [United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor 2011].

As in the previous chapter, the structure here will be as follows: after a brief introduction of the historical background to the mission and a brief chronology of UNTAET there follows an analysis of its results, successes and failures. Again, for this part both academic and policy literature are used as the source material. Following this is the assessment of the mission's public information and media building efforts, using Lehmann and Orme's adapted frameworks of criteria. Because of the relative dearth of information on this topic, a more prominent place is given to an interview that was conducted with a relevant and experienced official which is subsequently analyzed. In the conclusion the findings will again be related to liberal peace theory, listing possible implications for the theory.

5.1. Historical background and design of UNTAET

Before the independence that followed several years of UN oversight, East Timor (alternatively called Timor-Leste or Timor Lorosa'e) had already endured a long history of foreign domination and colonialism. The Portuguese had maintained a presence on the island as far back as the sixteenth century, but the island had also seen rule by the Japanese during the second world war and the Indonesians following a first Timorese declaration of independence in 1975. Because of repeated human rights violations, the Indonesian regime failed to gain legitimacy with the local population however and several resistance movements surfaced - one of the prominent resistance leaders, Xanana Gusmão, would later become East Timor's first president [Smith with Dee 2003, 36-42].

The UN became highly involved in the small island nation in 1999, when after international negotiations Indonesian president Habibie announced that East Timor
would have the chance to choose, via a referendum, for either 'special autonomy' within Indonesia or full independence. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was deployed to oversee this popular consultation and to assist in the move towards independence, should that be chosen. [United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 2011].

The lenience of Indonesia in letting go of this territory was not shared by all parties involved, however. Particularly the Indonesian army objected and when it became clear that the East Timorese favored independence, it started training pro-integration militias which embarked on a systematic campaign of destruction and terror. In this violence over 1,000 persons were killed, most buildings and utilities on the island were destroyed and 250,000 East-Timorese were forcibly moved to the western part of the island which was not part of the independence vote. In the face of this gruesome violence, most of UNAMET's presence was evacuated. The international community did not back off permanently however. It responded quickly and decisively by sending in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), a multinational peace enforcement force with a strong mandate that was to restore peace and security [Smith with Dee 2003, 44-45].

*From INTERFET to UNTAET*

The efforts by the multinational force were highly effective in fulfilling its mandate. During the five months of its deployment it was able to negotiate with the large Indonesian military presence, preventing the tensions between them and Australian forces which dominated INTERFET from erupting into outright war. After Indonesia conceded *de facto* authority over the island to the UN on 28 September 1999, the UN stepped back into the situation by authorizing a mandate for setting up UNTAET [Dunn 2003, 361-362].

Security Council Resolution 1272 of 25 October details this mandate of UNTAET. The mission was endowed with the overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor. It was to have three components: governance and public administration, humanitarian assistance, and a military component of up to 8,950 troops. These components were mandated to take care of six areas: maintaining law and order, establishing an effective administration, assist development of civil and social services, manage humanitarian aid and development initiatives, support

UNTAET's mandate contains even less explicit reference to the fostering of liberal democratic state institutions than was observed in that of UNTAC in the last chapter. According to Richmond and Franks however the liberal peace was again the background motivator, although they argue that the intervention has only succeeded in creating "a virtual peace and a state that has all the appearances of a liberal democratic institution but has little substance" [2009, 106].

5.2. Results, successes and failures of UNTAET

UNTAET, like UNTAC, is generally seen by many as a relatively well-executed, successful operation. Nevertheless, here as with the previous case study even the most enthusiastic evaluation identifies some room for improvement. Before moving to the case study itself, an aggregate assessment of these evaluations is presented below.

**General evaluation of UNTAET**

Following up the nearly complete destruction of East Timor with a successful bid for independence and a subsequent peaceful, fair and free election of a first president within three years is quite the achievement for UNTAET by any standards. The mission, like UNTAC, was one of the most comprehensive transition administrations and one of the biggest missions in the entire history of UN Peacekeeping operations at the time. In addition, it is seen by some as representing the direction of "innovative developments that have been the hallmark of UN Peacekeeping" in the post-Cold War era [Owada 2003, 3].

Smith, publishing his book even before Timorese independence, argues that the international community generally judges not only UNTAET but also the preceding UN missions in East Timor as successes because all of them "delivered on each of its mandates" [Smith 2003, 17], thus greatly assisting the country in "becoming an independent state and the newest member of the UN" [Ibidem, 119]. Dunn emphasizes that even independence alone was often dismissed as unrealistic ten years before it finally came to pass in 2002, and that because of these achievements the mission has "understandably been proclaimed as the UN's most successful mission of its kind" [Dunn 2003, 375].

Interestingly, the SRSG for UNTAET Sergio Vieira de Mello, is more critical. He recognizes that "mistakes were made, things could have been done better, and
opportunities were missed" [Vieira de Mello 2003, 16] and although it seems that after almost ten years of independence East Timor has made significant progress towards sustainable peace, it is important to note that in 2006 a backslide into widespread factional fighting occurred and the temporal return of UN Peacekeepers was needed to stop the violence. Nevertheless, progress has indeniably been made since the years of Indonesian oppression. As a recent newspaper article observes: "the levers of a functioning democracy - governance, political opposition, a free press, civil society, trade, infrastructure development and the like - are clearly moving in Timor-Leste" [Economist 2011].

Before analysing in more detail the successes and failures of UNTAET, it is striking that although fostering liberal democracy in East Timor seems to have been quite successful, the role of information and media in this is nowhere mentioned - reaffirming the conclusions of Chapter 3 that attention for these themes in general is sorely lacking.

Specific successes and failures
The main successes of the mission, facilitating free, fair and peaceful elections and the attaining of independence where many had thought this impossible [Da Costa and Soesastro 2002, 118], have already been noted. Of course, the shadow of the preceding systematic and widespread violence which more than 200,000 Timorese their lives looms large. This is especially painful since the prime cause of the violence, the annexation in 1975 by Indonesia, was in violation of the UN Charter and the whole tragedy may, according to some, thus easily have been prevented [Dunn 2003, 379]. Still, the end result of UNTAET remains a relative success.

However, there were of course problems and difficulties. Firstly, one of the more problematic items was the development of the local economy during the mission. Although East Timor has significant mineral wealth which has in recent years bumped the national budget from twenty million to over one billion US$, in other sectors like tourism UNTAET missed opportunities to develop initiatives. In agriculture some headway was made although unemployment remained an issue and continues to do so today. The development is often judged as too Dili-centric and seems to remain so, whereas 85% of the population lives in rural areas, poverty rates exceed 40% and the country has the third-highest rate of child malnutrition [Dunn 2003, 377 and The Economist, 2011].
Another problem faced during UNTAET's rule over East Timor was the cooperation with local leaders and structures. The planning process in New York had not involved Timorese stakeholders at all, which led to the perception that UNTAET had no plan whatsoever to involve the East Timorese themselves in the mission [Soesastro and Subianto 2002, 15]. Telling examples of this situation are the large administrative bureaucracy that was set up and filled entirely with international personnel, and a growing rhetoric that claimed "fundamental incapacities coupled with a significant lack of knowledge and experience among local East Timorese" [Fox 2002, 47-48].

The bringing in of all this international personnel slowed down the buildup and subsequent overall implementation of the mission's mandate, leading to more local criticism and also international discontent. SRSG Vieira de Mello took steps to counter this situation by speeding up the political transition, nicknamed 'Timorization'. This entailed establishing the East Timor Transitional Administration with five East Timorese 'ministers' [Smith with Dee 2003, 64-65]. However, the local 'ministries' suffered from lacking overarching coordination, slow recruitment and language constraints which limited the transfer of knowledge between international and local staff [Subianto 2002, 146-147].

Elaborating further on this criticism is the observation by Richmond and Franks that this failure to involve local people is a wider problem in international statebuilding projects in general. As they state; "The most telling question, that does not seem to have been asked, is what do they need and want? Until this is answered and the conditions of the Timorese people are improved, we may not see an end to the cycles of conflict in East Timor." [Richmond and Franks 2009, 107]

Summarizing the mission in general can be judged a qualified success, with significant problems in the areas of economic development and local ownership of the processes however.

5.3. Case study of public information and media building efforts
To what extent does the effectiveness of PI and media building in UNTAET match this qualification of imperfect but successful that the mission in its entirety receives? As in Chapter 4, the following section uses the methodology detailed in Chapter 2 to answer this question from an LPT point of view, analyzing academic literature and official UN documentation. However, since literature on this mission is relatively
scarce for these specific topics, after an assessment of this literature a more prominent place is given to an interview with Mario Zamorano, who was the head of the office in UNTAET taking care of PI and media building efforts.

Public Information and media building in UNTAET: OCPI

As in UNTAC, PI and media building efforts are both carried out by the same part of the peacekeeping mission. In UNTAET, this part was called the 'Office of Communication and Public Information' or OCPI for short. This office thus took care of fostering support for the mission locally and internationally through image building as well as of supporting the establishment of free and independent journalistic media in the ravaged country.

Looking at the available evidence on specific PI efforts, it becomes clear that Lehmann's criteria are not satisfactorily met by UNTAET. The consideration of public perceptions as strategic concern only surfaced after the mission deployed, judging by the lack of attention given to the topic in the relevant Security Council resolution [UNSC 1999, 2-3]. This is all the more surprising as in UNTAET's predecessor mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in East-Timor (UNAMET) had, in the space of three months, undertaken significant PI initiatives [Wimhurst 2002, 287] which were a demonstration of the "UN's good reputation in this area" [Smith with Dee 2003, 136]. Once UNTAET was deployed attention for PI did increase, judging by reports of the Secretary General which include a separate section on PI - albeit a small one [UNSC 2001, 8].

This lack of strategic attention subsequently also means that PI efforts were insufficiently included from the outset. Additionally, the slow start and the fact that it took several months to realize a full staffing of the PI office are telling signs of this [Smith with Dee 2003, 65]. The cause behind these factors can be found to an important extent in a lacking planning and preparation at the headquarters level [Ibidem, 136].

Although there had been attention for human rights and the electoral process previously (mainly in UNAMET), again the mandate for UNTAET does not place specific emphasis on these areas as an opportunity and task for PI. The criterion stating that such programs have an important role to play is thus also not fulfilled.

As far as cultural sensitivity goes the only reference, as in UNTAC, seems to be the fact that there is a publication that transmits its messages in four different languages [UNSC 2001, 8]. The earlier mentions that the local population was very
much excluded from the mission is further evidence to demonstrate the insufficient attention paid to this point, both in policy and practice.

Thus, the PI criteria for which enough information exists to make an informed judgment are not fulfilled. Again, this is all the more surprising in light of the PI efforts that had already been developed in predecessor missions and faulty planning is an important factor in causing these gaps.

The media building efforts of UNTAET seem to fare little better, although the even greater lack of evidence on these initiatives complicates an adequate assessment. Tellingly, in the 2001 report by the Secretary-General, the only mention of this topic is the brief line stating that "The Media Development and Training Unit focuses on helping the independent East Timor press to re-establish itself." [UNSC 2001, 8] In the report that followed a year later, the coverage of media building efforts had disappeared altogether [UNSC 2002]. This is clearly insufficient to satisfy the first criterion of support of the Security Council for media building.

As was noted before, in UNTAET as in UNTAC there was no separation of PI and media building efforts, which runs counter to Orme's second criterion. Combining the data from the two case studies with observations by Mr. Bonnardeaux mentioned earlier\textsuperscript{29} seems to justify the conclusion that this failure to systematically separate media building from PI efforts is structural in peacekeeping operations.

Regarding exit and handover strategy, UNTAET was followed up by a successor mission called the United Nations Mission of Support in East-Timor (UNMISET) in May 2002. The last report of the Secretary-General on UNTAET specifies that over a period of two years "the successor mission would ensure that all operational responsibilities are fully devolved to the East Timorese authorities as soon as is feasible" [UNSC 2002, 10]. Nevertheless, in the report no specific attention is given to handover of media building efforts or the importance of the media sector.

Thus, although the lack of evidence complicates a fair and accurate assessment somewhat, in general the conclusion must be that the media building components did not fulfill the list of criteria. Furthermore, the fact that in both academic and policy literature reference to media building is so difficult to encounter may be interpreted as an indication of the level of attention that was given to this topic in UNTAET - a level that falls well short of the desirable.

\textsuperscript{29} See Chapter 2, page 16.
Interview with Mr. Mario Zamorano - former head of OCPI in UNTAET

To complement the scarce literature that is available on PI and media building in UNTAET, an abbreviated transcript of an interview held with Mr. Mario Zamorano, former head of OCPI in UNTAET, is provided below. This is followed by a brief assessment of the new information Mr. Zamorano presents, along the lines of the familiar methodology and framework of criteria.

- What were your tasks and responsibilities working with the UN in East Timor?
"I was head of the office for communication and public information under the supervision of SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello. I supervised international and local personnel of the radio, tv and print channels, as well as the external relations. It was a very critical time, as we were in the final period of UNTAET, leading up to the elections and preparing for leaving. We therefore had to downsize, reduce the size of our personnel. This of course was very painful, mostly for the employees we had to let go as a UN job for a local individual is almost like winning the lottery."

"One example of our activities was the distribution of a lot of Japanese solar radios, which was very new and impressive to these people who are the poorest in the region, with a literacy rate of 50 to 60%. In the end, we helped a completely abandoned people to establish TV and radio and train a large group of professionals in the topic."

"Indonesian militias destroyed radio and TV broadcasting equipment in the few months that the UN was absent, which is of course a total tragedy. After this the UN rebuilt facilities, including 13 radio stations. It was an extremely complicated operation but we provided the country with a functioning and very professional radio and TV channel."

- To what extent did UNTAET personnel, public information officials as well as others, consider public perceptions a strategic factor for the success of the operation?
"In general, the SRSG realized the importance of public information. UNTAET ran the whole country for seven to ten months; we built radio and TV channels, but also assisted and educated Timorese to be able to understand the elections, their own decisions and the consequences of these decisions."

- What was the importance of education campaigns on issues such as human rights in the PI component of UNTAET?
"In the campaigns participation was an important concept. And even though we coped with material restrictions, wherever I went I would see people huddled over a single TV set, watching the news tapes of the day before we would send out to local broadcasters."

- **To what extent was there a strategy for handover after closure of UNTAET radio and how did this work out in practice?**

"As always there is a bit of risk involved as you don't know who to hand over to, if they will handle it well and if it can work at all. But we did it, handed all the equipment and necessary paperwork and information over, including a budget calling for 4,5 million US$ over the course of 3 years and one of 2,5 million for one year. We provided enough resources for the first few months and later the international community stepped in, a process in which the UN also assisted."

"After the handover and transition from UNTAET to UNMISET, the local journalists we trained took over and the UN information component largely was reduced to public information functions."

"All in all, it was a very critical period as we witnessed the birth of a new country. Especially radio and television were important in the mission. UNTAC serves as a good example of lessons learned for us in terms of exit strategy; while the mission there was in function, it's information component worked very well but it fell apart after the UN left. Nevertheless, every mission is extremely different so there is no one prescription."

Although Mr. Zamorano understandably paints a slightly more rosy picture of media building and PI efforts in UNTAET than can be distilled from the rest of the available evidence, it does deserve recognition that his office made the best of a far from ideal situation. The problems mentioned earlier, with a hardly ideal preparation and planning, lack of willingness to incorporate local expertise to a large extent and overall slow startup as a consequence, progress was made.

However, this does not change the overall assessment of PI and media building as insufficiently effective from an LPT point of view. Another important piece of evidence demonstrating this is a look at recent data on the media sector in East Timor. This shows that although progress was made during UNTAET, this has not led to the firm establishment of a flourishing media sector. Donor contributions remain necessary for the survival of media outlets and general access to information.
for the Timorese population even seems to have diminished since the closure of UNTAET [Kalathil 2006, 3].

5.4. Conclusion - UNTAET's OCPI and Liberal Peace Theory
As for UNTAC, the ideal situation would have seen a perfect implementation by UNTAET's OCPI of a perfect PI and media building policy, fulfilling both Lehmann's and Orme's criteria completely. This would have strengthened international liberal peace by increasing the electoral punishment risk/audience cost by a significant amount.

No such luck has befallen the media building and PI efforts in UNTAET, however. Although the mission as a whole can be judged as quite successful, even the scarce evidence available shows that the relevant criteria were not fulfilled in East Timor. From the assessed evidence and the original material provided by Mr. Zamorano it becomes clear that, although admirable, the efforts of OCPI left important gaps in several areas.

Most importantly was the lack of strategic importance given to both topics at the highest levels and the consequences this had for a satisfactory realization of PI and media building. The relevant Security Council resolution as well as the reports by the Secretary General mention both topics only sporadically and sometimes overlook the issue altogether.

This fact, that as was mentioned can be attributed to a great extent to a planning and preparation process which left much to be desired, subsequently negatively affected many other criteria such as the inclusion of PI from the outset, the lack of education campaigns on topics such as human rights and the lack of Security Council support for media building efforts.

Perhaps one of the few successes of OCPI as deducted from the interview with Mr. Zamorano is the fact that there was a relatively well-executed handover strategy. Nevertheless, reality has shown that the media sector in East Timor is hardly flourishing and continues to depend heavily on support from international governmental and non-governmental aid.

As in UNTAC, the short term electoral cost did rise to a level where it supported international liberal peace, as the first elections took place fairly and freely. Differently than in Cambodia however this is probably not or not mainly OCPI's merit as so few of the criteria were fulfilled. Likewise, the fact that the country is now
relatively stable can not be attributed to a strong media sector because this simply
doesn't exist. Rather, as was mentioned the economic boost from mineral exploitation
is most likely the crucial factor in this development.

Critiques and recommendations for theory
Looking back to the critiques of PI, media building and LPT suggested in Chapter 2,
mainly the first one is relevant for the case of UNTAET. The observation that it is
unwise to undertake or impose any sort of exogenous media building in a country
with little or no history of democratic governance seems quite appropriate in this case,
especially when it is noted that no sustainable media sector has as of yet emerged -
possibly due to the fact that there is simply nothing resembling a market economy for
media as LPT presumes exists. The reflection of Mr. Zamorano, that "there is no one
prescription" and that local context is of paramount importance clearly supports this
point. Thus, as was the case in the previous chapter, the assessment of the UN's
operation in East Timor also supports the inclusion of a criterion regarding some level
of familiarity with the key concepts of LPT before any endeavor in media building is
likely to succeed.

The following, concluding chapter will present a coherent summary of all the
observations and findings so far and present an answer to the research question of this
thesis as well as some suggestions for further research. Lastly, it details a brief list of
recommendations for policy on PI and media building as well as for the adaptation of
LPT in this specific area.
Chapter 6 - Conclusion and recommendations

"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" [UDHR 2011]. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights already in 1948 laid down the fundamental importance of freedom of information, opinion and media for any human being. Over the following decades, the importance of these freedoms and mainly the functioning of a free media - often simply described as a 'free press' - for the functioning of a democracy has become a central element in Journalism Studies.

In turn, the existence of a group of liberal democracies coexisting peacefully has become the cornerstone of LPT and attained law-like status and strength in political and social sciences. Between the macro-level of LPT and the micro-level of individuals exercising their rights to free information and freedom of expression, the importance of accurate and free information, distributed with often great difficulty by UN personnel as well as local journalists and other media professionals in often unstable post-conflict societies occupies an essential intermediate level. The two logical chains of free media and liberal peace are also linked together directly through the concept of electoral punishment risk/audience cost, which entails that free media will increase transparency in government, making it costlier for elected officials to adopt unpopular aggressive foreign policy strategies thus leading to peaceful international relations between liberal democracies. The scope of this thesis however makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions about this last point.

We have seen that the roots and final objectives of United Nations Peacekeeping operations to a certain extent can be linked to LPT, however implicit or cloaked in politically neutral discourse these objectives may be in specific mission mandates and communications. Because free information and a free media sector are important for the functioning of a liberal democracy and thus for LPT as a whole, theoretically at least PI and media building play an important role in the execution of peacekeeping operations in general. This is especially true of the widest interpretations of these UN operations, the so-called transitional administrations.

And indeed, the evidence presented in the study of available academic literature and policy documentation, as well as the evidence reported in the case study chapters, has shown that both LPT as a wider framework and backdrop, and the fostering of free information channels and establishment of a free media as more
specific examples of implemented policy do take center stage in some UN operations, in the form of elaborate and extensive PI and media building programs.

However, the chapters also have shown that for PI and media building this appropriate attention within the statebuilding projects that transitional administrations are was not always granted. This thesis attempted to answer the question *To what extent is the UN effective in its public information and media building efforts in post-conflict societies, more specifically in UNTAC and UNTAET, from an LPT perspective?* Based on the adapted frameworks that Ingrid Lehmann and Bill Orme provided for the assessment of PI and media building effectiveness respectively, the assessment of the two UN transitional administrations showed that much was left to be desired in these two examples and that the answer to our question must clearly be "only to a very limited extent".

Particularly the example of UNTAET has shown that the consideration of PI and media building at the highest policy levels can be sorely lacking sometimes - with very negative consequences for the field levels of implementation. If there is no strong support at the Security Council level for a strong PI and media building component nor a careful and methodical planning beforehand, it was demonstrated that efforts of field personnel, however admirable, can never fully remedy this lacuna.

In addition, when due consideration is accorded to PI and media building, this nevertheless does not automatically or necessarily lead to an ideal implementation. In the case study of UNTAC's Info/Ed division, it was demonstrated that even though the division received a prominent spot in the overall mission, several points of improvement remained such as the realization of PI's strategic importance and the general lack of attention for media building specifically. This meant for example that media guidelines that were supposed to evolve into full-blown legal regimes for media regulation and facilitation ultimately failed to do so.

Important factors guaranteeing effective PI and media building were not included in an adequate manner and although this does not seem to have precluded authors from judging the missions in their entirety as a qualified success, it is most certain that a better implementation of these two elements would have led to better and most likely more sustainable results.

In addition, it is disconcerting to observe the relative lack of learning that occurred in the years between the two case studies in the areas of PI and media building. One exception to this is the planning of an exit strategy which was more
carefully considered and executed in the case of UNTAET. However, overall it seems that the earlier experiences of the UN in Cambodia did very little to inform the people in UNTAET. The fact that, as was shown in chapter 3, little to no academic research has been carried out in these areas only makes this situation more preoccupying.

Recommendations for LPT and UN Peacekeeping policy

This section provides a number of brief recommendations, both for adaptations of PI and media building within LPT in the wider sense and more specifically for UN Peacekeeping policy. For starters let us look back to Chapter 2 where the frameworks of Lehmann and Orme were presented and for each of the lists of criteria a number of critical reflections were presented. After having conducted the empirical research, these reflections can be briefly evaluated and given a place within the frameworks.

Firstly, the observation that there is no coherent policy on PI and media building in UN peacekeeping. The contrasting of UNTAC with UNTAET poignantly illustrates that the absence of policy guidance does not necessarily mean a disaster - in UNTAC’s case as was noted the Info/Ed division was relatively effective in the PI field at least - but that it does make success much more difficult. Adequate planning and preparation are key.

At the same time, however, there must be the realization that policy guidelines can only do so much to provide a template. As was noted several times, no peacekeeping situation is alike and even more; attempting to impose one uniform policy on differing situations is counterproductive and indeed foolish. Therefore enough room should be available for personnel in the field to adapt the guidelines to the local needs, culture, capacities and resources - but there should nevertheless be a guiding framework. The adapted lists of criteria by Orme and Lehmann could very well function as a basis from which to proceed in this matter.

Secondly, suggestions for institutional reform, where a new unit could be established within DPKO to take care of PI in the field more coherently [Willems 2010 and Loewenberg 2006], and efforts for media building could be centered in UNDP. This would likely be a very efficient way to ensure more close compliance with the effectiveness criteria and do more justice to the rhetoric of how important communication and media development is for the success of peacekeeping operations.

Thirdly, a problem that was encountered especially in the case study of UNTAET, and an issue that was also extensively covered in Chapter 3, is the lack of available empirical evidence and academic research. There seems to be little research
that pulls together several sources of information on PI and media building in peacekeeping and most of the little material that is available does not go beyond a small single case study or when it is a larger contribution only pays cursory attention to the topics of PI and media building. Although this thesis has attempted to contribute to the filling of this gap, it will be clear that much more work remains to be done, especially in terms of comprehensive comparative studies of media building and PI efforts in peacekeeping. Hopefully such a study would in addition incorporate the conclusions and critical reflections reported in this paper.

Finally there is the criticism of LPT's applicability as a whole that leads to a recommendation. As was elaborated in Chapter 2, even if critics concede that LPT's basic thesis is correct, they hold that to attempt to build liberal democracies in countries with very different political histories and present realities is pure idiocy [Putzel and Van der Zwan 2006, 2]. Our case studies have provided some evidence to demonstrate there is a strong point to their criticism; Cambodia can nowadays hardly be characterized as a functioning liberal democracy, and East Timor is quite successful but seems to lean heavily on a resource fueled economy rather than truly strong democratic institutions.

Therefore, future peacekeeping operations would do well to consider the extent to which a nation has experience with democracy before it begins implementing the standard package of measures to foster liberal Western-style democracy - PI and media building efforts included, thus supporting Berman's arguments about this presented in Chapter 3. In addition, the case studies have shown that a much stronger focus in PI and media building should be placed on local needs and capacities. Arguments by Tadjbakhsh about re-introducing a much more locally, end-user focused, grass-roots approach [Tadjbakhsh 2011, 234], by Orme emphasizing four times the importance of local capacities [Orme 2010, 9-10], and by Zamorano about the impossibility of a uniform recipe because of the "paramount importance" of the local context [Zamorano 2011] all support this recommendation.

Thomas Jefferson is often reputed to have said "I would rather have a free press and no government, than a government and no free press." This thesis would disagree however, arguing rather that it is not a matter of choosing a free press over a government but a matter of supporting both, all the while paying the closest attention to the local, end-user dimension, including the extent to which traditions of democratic government and free media exist.
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