Unofficial Third Party Interventions:

Civil Society Actors in Peace Process

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Master Thesis, 30 ECTS

Master in International Humanitarian Action

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Uppsala University, Spring 2011
Abstract

This thesis aims to figure out the role unofficial civil society actors play in international peace negotiation and conflict resolution. The thesis explores unofficial civil society actors’ activities, working approaches and strategies in the Track One, Track 1.5 and Track Two Diplomacy as well as grass-roots level intervention. A comparative analysis of unofficial civil society actors’ performance in drafting the Geneva Accord and Kalman’s problem-solving workshop in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is conducted. Based on the comparative study of unofficial civil society actors’ role in Track Two and Track 1.5 Diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the thesis debates on how unofficial civil society actors can better contribute to peace promotion. Based on the potential, limitation and challenges analysis for unofficial civil society actors, the thesis argues that a reasonable strategy for unofficial civil society actors in international peace negotiation and conflict resolution is to draw a clear line between Track One and Track Two diplomacy and remain their independence. The thesis also suggests that unofficial civil society actors could go down to grass-roots level mediatory.
Acronyms

NGO  nongovernmental organization
PSW  Problem-solving Workshop
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization
UN  United Nations
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Preface

The thesis is the result of two-year study in master program of International Humanitarian Action. The main purpose of the study is to explore the roles and functions of civil society actors in international peace negotiation and conflict resolution, a field dominated by states, UN and governing elites. It is intended to assist policy makers and practitioners in the field of peacebuilding to pay attention to the capabilities of these unofficial actors in peace process. Civil society actors can reduce conflict and facilitate the conditions necessary for peace negotiation.

I wish to thank my supervisor Mr. Shane Quinn. Shane provides lots of valuable comments and thought-provoking reflections to my work, and without his help the thesis could not have been completed. I also extend thanks to my teachers and classmates in NOHA program. I sincerely appreciate the time spent together with them in Uppsala University.
1 Introduction

As Crocker noticed, “the multiplication of mediators is less a matter of choice than a fact of life in today’s world”.¹ Many unofficial civil society actors such as NGOs have engaged in the process of international conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In aspect of peace negotiation and mediation, besides traditional programs of relief delivery and development, unofficial actors also involve in the process of facilitation, consultation and dialogue for conflict resolution. States and international community have notice the significance of unofficial actors in peace mediation. Their close relations with local civil society are usually the entry point of mediation. As the broadening of their activities space and strengthening of their capacity, unofficial actors increasingly win confirmation and trust from the international community. As the nature of conflicts changes from state interest based to human dominion, unofficial actors are increasingly joining into the process of conflict mediation and peace negotiation.

Researchers of international peace negotiation usually focus on Track One actors such as states, UN or other governing elites. Non-state actors usually confront exclusion from elite-driven peacemaking and hard to get a seat at the negotiation table for peace accords². However, it is worth noticing that active involvement of civil society actors in peace negotiation is beneficial to the resolving of conflicts and is helpful in producing sustainable peace agreements.


1.2 Purpose and Research Question
This thesis analyses the role of unofficial civil society actors in peace negotiation and conflict resolution. It explores unofficial civil society actors’ approaches and strategies in the Track One, Track 1.5 and Track Two Diplomacy as well as grass-roots level intervention. Their potential, limitation and challenges are analyzed. Through a comparative study of unofficial civil society actors’ activities in Track Two and Track 1.5 Diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the thesis discuss on how unofficial civil society actors can better contribute to peace promotion. Based on the potential, limitation and challenges analysis for unofficial civil society actors, I argue that a reasonable strategy for unofficial civil society actors is to draw a clear line between track one and track two diplomacy and remain their independent. The thesis also suggests unofficial civil society actors go down to grass-roots level mediatory.

This thesis aims to elaborate the role civil society actor plays in transformation of conflicts and felicitation of peace negotiation. Besides, through case study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the thesis also tries to analyses what are conditions that allow civil society actors to contribute to peace negotiation.

1.3 Analytical Structure
The analysis in this thesis has three levels: unofficial civil society actors in Track 1.5 Diplomacy, Track Two intervention and grass-roots facilitation. The paper proceeds as follows. The first chapter is a review of unofficial civil society actors in traditional Track One peace negotiation and their growing involvement in multi-track peace mediatory and conflict resolution. In this part research purpose and research question, and analytical structure will be figure out. The second chapter identifies the
methodology adopted this thesis. It includes identifying dependent and independent variables, definition of key concepts and terms, operationalization and Sources of Materials. The third chapter describes the theoretical framework in the thesis. The fourth chapter discusses how unofficial civil society actors engage in the three tracks of peacebuilding. Chapter six provides a case study on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. This part analyses the function of unofficial civil society actors in conflict resolution and peace negotiation. Though a comparative analysis between Kalman’s Problem-solving Workshop and Geneva Peace process, I propose principles for successful intervention for unofficial third party actors in track 2 intervention, track 1.5 diplomacy and grass-root level facilitation. Chapter seven analyses major potential, limitations and challenges for unofficial third party intervention in peace process. In the end, the thesis concludes with a strategy for unofficial third party intervention to outbreak the dilemma between official negotiation and grass-root level intervention.
2 Methodology

2.1 Concepts
The thesis contains large amount of terminologies in conflict mediation. Some terms are crucial in understanding the process of peace negotiation and working method and strategy of unofficial third party intervention. These concepts and terms in clude:

**Unofficial Civil Society Actor.** Unofficial Civil Society Actors in this thesis include refers to those international NGOs, grass-roots organizations, foundations, academics and intellectuals, ethnic and religious leaders, think tanks and influential individuals that special on conflict resolution and peace mediation.

**Peace Process.** In this thesis, peace process refers to the period before large scale post-conflict construction starts when conflicts are still going on and peace negotiations are intermittent. The role of unofficial civil society actors especially NGOs in peace prevention and post-conflict construction has been affirmed by large amount of works. Therefore this thesis does not include the evaluation of their activities in the early warning or post-conflict period.

**Track Two Mediatory.** According to Montville, Track Two Mediatory can be defined as “unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict.”\(^3\) In this

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thesis, Track Two Mediation is activities conducted by unofficial civil society actors who adopt a peaceful and flexible method to mitigate conflict. It belongs to Lederach’s second level in Pyramid of Levels of Involvement in Ethno political Conflict Management model.⁴

**Power Mediation** Power Mediation is a kind of mediation includes the use of leverage or coercion ⁵. It is usually used by powerful mediator such as states and intergovernmental organizations. They mediate conflicts by providing promised rewards or threatened punishments based on the resources and power they have.

2.2 Method and Operationalization
This study employs case study to interpret the dynamics of conflict so as to analyze the role unofficial civil society actor play in peace process. The cases in this thesis will be used to test theory on unofficial third party intervention strategies. The purpose is to see whether the fact in Israeli–Palestinian conflict “strengthen or reduce the theory, narrow or extend the scope conditions of a theory or determine which of two or more theories best explains a case, type, or general phenomenon”.⁶ Within the case study, a comparative method is used to compare two unofficial third party interventions in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. One is the Geneva peace process, the other is Kalman’s problem-solving workshop before Oslo Accord. Through comparing working

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⁴ See figure 1.


methods, and strategy of the unofficial third party actors in the two cases, a conclusion on factors determine whether unofficial third party can conduct successful intervention is made.

2.3 Sources of Materials
This thesis includes large amount of primary and secondary sources. They can be divided into four kinds of literature: first, literature provides theoretical framework for unofficial third party mediatory such as Lederach’s three-level negotiation theory, Fisher’s contingency approach and Kalman’s Problem-solving Workshop as well as Paffenholtz’s seven functional approaches in civil society studies. Second, direct case study on Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Third, literature describes the nature and functions of unofficial third party intervention in peace negotiation such as Wanis-St. John’s analysis of approaches NGOs involve in multi-level negotiation; Forth, literature assesses unofficial third parties’ role in peace negotiation including Aall and Baharvar’s argument on unofficial third party strategy, Van Tongeren’s summary of NGOs’ potential, Belloni Anderson, Forster, Orjuela, Baharvar and Aall’s analysis on the challenges unofficial third party faces during peace negotiation.
3 Theoretical Framework

3.1 Theories: Schools in the Study of Peace Process

The role of unofficial civil society actors in peace process is controversial. Realist-inspired theories and other idealist-inspired theories hold opposite attitudes to their functions and impacts in conflict resolution and peace negotiation. Conflict management theory usually ignores unofficial civil society actors’ influence while conflict resolution and conflict transformation theory confirm their role in peace negotiation and encourage the involvement of unofficial civil society actors into peace negotiation.

3.1.1 Realist-inspired Theories

Unofficial interventions are usually seen as complementary to official actors in peace negotiation. In the view of realist-inspired conflict management theory, non-state actors’ influence in peace process is usually insignificant. Although realists admit NGOs’ ability in facilitating a number of peace negotiations such as Community of Sant’ Egidio in Mozambique peace negotiations and Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in the first Aceh peace negotiation. But these cases are usually regarded as special cases. The behaviour of the unofficial civil society actor actually has no

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7 This part is based on my school work "The Role of NGO in Peace Negotiation" Huiting Jia, Uppsala for the course Review Writing in Peace and Conflict Research Department, Uppsala University.


difference from official mediators. Among the three approaches of peacebuilding, the earliest conflict management approach stresses the role governing elites and intergovernmental organizations in mediating conflict and assumes that negotiation and medication would have better effect with limited number of actors involved. Negotiation theories such as game theory and effective communication theory also follow the above assumption.

### 3.1.2, Idealist-inspired Theories

As the development of Multi-Track Diplomacy and peacebuilding theory, conflict resolution theory and conflict transformation theory unlike conflict management approach, devote to resolving the underlying causes of conflict and begin to analyze the role unofficial civil society actor play in peacebuilding. The difference between the two theories is that conflict resolution theory focus on external actors such as international NGOs while conflict transformation theory pays more attention to local and national grass-roots actors such as local community and grass-root NGOs.

McDonald-Diamond’s multi-track model suggests that mediation and dialogue can take place at different levels of society besides Track One official intervention. Along the line of multi-track peacebuilding, Lederach builds a peacebuilding framework, identifying a wider space for unofficial actors’ activities in peace process. He divides

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10 Paffenholz and Spurk, *Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding*, p44


actors in peacebuilding process into three levels: first, political elites at the top, which are the main actors in official negotiation and mediation. Second, civil society elite, NGO representatives, academic and intellectuals who provide training, consultation and dialogue for all parties of conflict. Besides, they also lobby and advocate, seeking for local and international support. Third, grass-roots civil society leaders and the affected population. Lederach notes grass-roots civil society is the primary sources for conflict resolution which should not be omitted.13

Civil Society actors can play a significant role in all the three levels of peacebuilding. In peace process they mainly focus on practical tasks related to crisis management, humanitarian relief and setting long term goals beyond the settlement of an immediate conflict. Lederach recommends that unofficial intervention by civil society actors should focus on the middle level and grass-roots level. They can participate in activities related to problem-solving, lobby, advocacy and training. Civil society actors have the capability to address the root causes of conflict, improve conflict parties’ skill in conflict resolution and promote dialogues between Track One and Track Two14.

3.2 Theories on Unofficial Third Party Intervention

Unofficial intermediary are also called private diplomacy, public peace processes, problem-solving workshops or transformative mediation.15 According to Davidson and Montville, unofficial third party intervention referred to activities of non-state actors

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14 Gutlove, P and Thompson, G. The Potential for Cooperation by the OSCE and Non-Governmental Actors on Conflict Management in *Helsinki Monitor* Vol. 6 No.3 1995.p125

who devote to “developing strategies, influencing public opinions, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict”. The proliferation of unofficial third party intervention in conflict is the result of changing nature and environment of conflict and peace process as development, human rights, media more and more involve into conflict resolution and peace negotiation. Multi-track conflict transformation becomes attractive as the bad records of official interventions disappoint people. Unofficial third party intervention is a broad concept which was not limited to track two interventions. It also includes track 1.5 diplomacy and Track Three grass-root interventions. Actors of unofficial third party intervention can range from NGOs, grass-roots organizations, citizens, business agencies and influential individuals.

Unofficial third party intervention compared with official third party intervention is more fixable and diverse. In terms of unofficial intermediary, it has diverse patterns of mediation including consultation, sustainable dialogue, premeditation seminar, brainstorming session and so on. However unlike official third parties, unofficial third parties do not have resources or leverage to propose conflict resolutions and peace agreement or force warring parties to accept mediation.


18 Chigas, Diana. (2007), "Capacities and Limits of NGO’s as Conflict Managers” in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, edited by C.A. Crocker Chester, Fen
Transfer is a core concept in unofficial third party intervention. According to Lederach, the purpose of unofficial intervention is to facilitate the transformation of needs and interests of conflict affected groups into fair, practical and mutually acceptable solutions. 19 Fisher notes unofficial interventions can provide positive effect to peacebuilding by transferring warring parties’ attitude and convincing them that “a perceptual shift and a move to cooperative, bilateral behaviour are both realistic and potentially rewarding” 20.

Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 2007)p153


4 Unofficial Third Party Interventions in Three Tracks of Peacebuilding

Civil society actors can participate into peace negotiation through multiple channels. Sometimes, civil society representatives are granted seats at Track One official negotiation table. In most cases, when these actors can not directly participate in official negotiation, the alternative way is holding parallel civil society forum to the official Track One negotiations with a consultative mandate. If neither of the above is possible, there can be a bidirectional communication between the Track One negotiators and civil society actors from Track Two. Besides Track One and Track Two, many civil society actors are actively engaging into the conflict resolution in grass-roots level.

4.1 Civil Society Actors in Track One Diplomacy

"Track One Diplomacy" usually refers to the official negotiation among governments of sovereign states. In conflicts, states and UN are the main actors in peace negotiating. However, in many cases, Track One negotiations alone can not involve all


warring parties and reflect their interest especially in ethnic conflicts when one conflict party is a non-state actor such as a rebel or seceding group. Track One official negotiation usually involves national interests of great powers besides resolve conflicts and reach peace agreement. It is not necessarily peace-oriented and is often influenced by state power politics. States’ main purpose in peace process is to find a proper resolution to their own interests rather than develop a resolution leading to sustainable peace. States can not be absolutely neutral and they always expect to gain political benefits from peace negotiation even at the expense of losing innocent life.

Only rely on official negotiations dominant by state actors usually can not truly resolve problems.

Different from states and intergovernmental organizations, civil society actors usually adopt flexible methods to promote a solution. Compared with Track One Diplomacy, civil society actors have much more space to exert influence in Track Two level peace negotiation. Non-states actors can support Track One negotiation through private interpersonal and intergroup reconciliation to reduce barriers of conflict resolution. In certain case, valuable unofficial actors are usually invited to join Track One negotiation based on their Track Two work. Besides, as intermediary actors, unofficial civil society actors can establish communication chains between government and


factional leaders when official negotiation is not mature or when Track One negotiation stalls. For example, in the peace negotiation process between Israeli and Palestinian, some unofficial representatives worked as facilitator to clean obstacles for official negotiators. Under the unofficial reconciliation, a model agreement Geneva Accord of 2003 was reached when the two sides were not ready to reach a final peace agreement. Unofficial civil society actors also adopt lobbying, rallying public opinion, providing expert advice and information or supporting on key positions advocated by parties to exert influence to negotiation.

4.2 Track 1.5 Diplomacy
Besides Track One Diplomacy and Track Two Diplomacy, there is a Track 1.5 between them. Track 1.5 is hybrid diplomacy between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy. Tack 1.5 differs to Track One and Track Two Diplomacy mainly in its participants. The leading Role in Track Two diplomacy is unofficial civil society actors while in Tack 1.5, official governmental representatives as well as prominent politicians, academic scholars, and religious leaders also join in the peace process. Track 1.5 Diplomacy stresses the involvement of official representatives into unofficial dialogue or workshop so as to influence official decision making. Track 1.5 emerges when both Track One and Track Two Diplomacy are not ready to response to the resolution of conflict. It acts as a communication channel between government and unofficial individuals and organizations through which top leaders and mediators can get information from grass-root level. Besides the strategy of Track Two Diplomacy


discussed in the paper, it also adopts strategy of Track One such as power mediation. Track 1.5 Diplomacy takes in the advantages of both Track One and Track Two Diplomacy, at the same time it also has the weakness they have. As Track1.5 relies on the leverage and resources from official actors to propel peace process, it is less independent and is more easily driven by governmental agendas. In this thesis, Track 1.5 diplomacy has important application in the analysis of Geneva process of Israeli–Palestinian Conflict.

4.3 Track Two Diplomacy

Civil society actor is the leading role in Track Two diplomacy. The biggest difference between Track Two diplomacy and Track One diplomacy is that Track Two diplomacy is more flexible and less coercive. Track Two diplomacy seeks to foster conditions for negotiation at the local level instead of employing coercion or power. Track Two diplomacy stresses the resolving of underlying causes to conflicts and the changing of attitude of warring parties. As Track Two diplomacy involve diverse actors ranging from NGOs, to academic and local leaders, they tend to be more effective in dealing with conflicts that are deeply rooted in cultural and historical background. As Chigas and Montville argue that “value-based conflicts about identity, survival and fears of the other can only be effectively addressed by Track Two diplomacy.” Besides, Track Two Diplomacy contains many different strategies such as Problem-solving Workshop.


third party consultation, dialogue, training and facilitation. As an unofficial peace channel, Track Two diplomacy can easily bring antagonists to dialogue for peace and dissolve their worries about making any commitment. Compared with Track One Diplomacy, Track Two diplomacy is less cost and with low risk.

4.4 Unofficial Intervention in Grass-roots Level

Unofficial intervention in grass-roots level is an important communication and information channel between people affected by conflict and policy makers. Unofficial civil society actors therefore can adopt a bottom-up method to build peace.

Besides providing humanitarian relief and development programs, civil society actors can also mobilize people to join into the peace process and engage into the resolution of conflict. The intervention on this level is deferent form Track Two. Civil society actors on the one hand still focus on transferring of attitude and convoying of information, on the other hand, the intervention pays attention to the dealing of minor disputes and practical matters of survival and quality of life. Unofficial civil society actors transfer local communities’ living standard, knowledge and value so as to shift their view on conflict and peace process.
5 Strategies of Unofficial Third Party Intervention

Successful mediation requires power and leverage as conditions. Therefore powerless unofficial actors in a traditional point of view can only be a complement or substitute to official mediators. However, Aall based on Joseph Nye’s hard power and soft power theory and Jeffrey Rubin’s six different bases of power argues that unofficial actors can also employ referent, expert, legitimate and informational as soft powers to employ mediation in peace negotiation. Aall gives the example of a NGO called Community of Sant’ Egidio’s which successful facilitated the assignment of peace negotiation in Mozambique civil war. Community of Sant’ Egidio on the one hand take advantage of its good relationship with Mozambican peacemaker, the bishop of Beira to enhance its moral authority, on the other hand, made allies with states including U.S. and Italy, and kept them informed of its activities. Its activities provided it with leverage and enabled it to employ reward and coerce power in the mediation.

Unofficial actors can employ several kinds of approaches according to the stage of conflict. Unofficial actors can use problem-solving workshops or contingency model. In contingency model, based on different stage of conflict, actors can use conciliation,


33 Jeffrey Rubin’s six different bases of power refer to rewarding and coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, expert power and information power. P45

pure mediation, third-party consultation and conflict analysis. On the grass root level, unofficial intervention can employ skill training in conflict resolution, facilitation and dialogue to deal with disputes.

5.1 Problem-solving Workshop

For unofficial civil society actors, a common method to join in peace process is to establish workshops and hold informal dialogue between warring parties. According to Fisher, problem-solving workshop is a platform for both official and unofficial parties in conflict to have “non-committal, low-risk forum for the exchange of perspectives, a mutual diagnosis of the conflict, and the creation of innovative alternatives worthy of official consideration”. 35 The purpose of the workshop is to reflect opinions from civil society actors to Track One level formal mediatory. Problem-solving workshop usually occurs prior to formal peace negotiation. Kelman and Cohen identified the function of Problem-solving Workshop as testing the feasibility of dialogue before negotiation and addressing difficulties of implementation of agreement and analysis long term obstacles after negotiations. 36 Fisher further comments that Problem-solving Workshop can also find potential topics for further negotiation and propose plans for the implementation of peace agreement by engaging warring parties. 37 From this point of view, unofficial intervention in Track Two is beneficial complement to official Track One Diplomacy. Problem-solving Workshop could change the mind of


individuals towards negotiation and provide analysis of possible win-win outcomes. It also has the potential to shift decision makers’ attitude of both sides to be cooperative and open-minded.

5.2 Contingency Approach

Contingency Approach is based on the assumption that conflict is a dynamic process constructed by objective and subjective elements whose interaction result in the escalation and de-escalation of conflict\(^\text{38}\). Although conflicts change over time, effective third party intervention could flexibly provide different solutions according to the stage of a conflict. Contingency Approach is a model of unofficial intervention which provides intervention based on the matching of stages of conflict escalation and subjective perspectives of parties\(^\text{39}\). The model aims to propose appropriate intervention for each stage of escalation to de-escalate the conflict and bring it to resolution.

Unofficial third party intervention limited by its leverage and resources, is more inclined to treat subjective elements as the entry point of their intervention to dissolve misperceptions and mitigate confrontation. Fisher’s model identifies four stages of conflict escalation: Discussion, Polarization, Segregation and Destruction. As the conflict escalates, subjective attitudes of warring parties move from negotiation to

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\(^{39}\) See Figure 2
mutual distrust, threats and finally to violence. The perceived possible outcomes also shift from win-win to win–lose and finally lose–lose consequences\textsuperscript{40}.

In the stage of discussion, warring parties are willing to see a win-win outcome and hope to attain their goal through communication. Therefore on this stage, the strategy for unofficial intervention is conciliation that aims to clear obstacles for formal mediation on Track One level. In the stage of polarization when trust is missing and direct discussion and negotiation are not attainable, consultation of unofficial actors is needed as the leading strategy to de-escalate misperceptions. In the stage of segregation and destruction, controlling hostility and achieving settlement on specific issues are the central topic and power mediation on Track One is needed. Unofficial civil society actors constrained by their power and resources, usually can not perform as an effective mediator by providing rewards or punishment to limit escalation of conflict. But after confrontation is controlled and warring parties agree to negotiate, there is a space for unofficial actors to mitigate the relationship between the parties and address difficulties in implementation to attain resolutions\textsuperscript{41}. In the stage of destruction when peacekeeping is needed, unofficial consultation can follow to conduct a deep analysis of the root causes of conflict such as social inequality, or justice and racism and then propose strategies to prevent future outbreak of the conflict.


5.3 Consultation, Facilitation and Training\textsuperscript{42}

Consultative approach is another effective method to conflict resolution. Consultation is a form of mediatory adopted by unofficial third-party to facilitate the resolve of disputes with their expertise, information and analysis based on observation. Unofficial third parties can provide state actors or other warring parties with helpful information to shift their attitude to conflicts. Third party consultation can also strengthen parties’ ability to negotiate through training. Berkovitch points out that consultative approach is especially effective when the crucial cause for lasting conflict related to miscommunication and mistrust\textsuperscript{43}. Consultation as the pre-mediation preparation for formal peace negotiation can potentially increases mutual trust and understanding between warring parties and greatly increases a negotiation’s chance to succeed\textsuperscript{44}.

Facilitation refers to both the beginning stage of mediatory and an approach of unofficial third party intervention in conflict mediation. It aims at building communication channels and mutual trust among parties. Through the first touch, facilitation fosters a new understanding of conflict and even consensus among warring parties. The facilitative approach has many applications including The Kettering

\textsuperscript{42} This part is based on my school work "The Role of NGO in Peace Negotiation" Huiting Jia, Uppsala for the course Review Writing in Peace and Conflict Research Department, Uppsala University


\textsuperscript{44} Berkovitch, Jacob. "International Dispute Mediation: A Comparative Empirical Analysis,"
Foundation's "sustained dialogue" in Tajikistan, John McDonald's concept of "multi-track diplomacy" applied in Cyprus and Liberia.\(^{45}\)

Thompson regards training to all parties in conflict as an important conflict management intervention. Conflict parties are more willing to join a training program than a negotiation meeting. During conflict management training, conflicts parties can discuss their difficulties and lessons can be learnt from experiences of other successful conflict management around the world.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{46}\) Gutlove, P and Thompson, G. 'The Potential for Cooperation by the OSCE and Non-Governmental Actors on Conflict Management' in *Helsinki Monitor* Vol. 6 No.3 1995.p12
6 Role of Unofficial Civil Society Actor in Peace Process: A Case Study of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

6.1 Historical Background of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Israeli–Palestinian Conflict is an identity-based conflict mixed with a series of other issues including ethnicity, religions, land and water disputes, refugee, security, Palestinian freedom of movement and so on. Jews and Palestinian treat the conflict with different views. Jewish extremists regard the conflict as a battle for religious nationalism and the land of Israel is given by God. Islamic activists and ethno nationalist of Palestinian view the state of Israel as an unacceptable Western intrusion and a challenge to their survival.\(^\text{47}\)

The conflict began as the rising of political Zionism and existence of Jewish in Palestine. The conflict can date back to 1898, when Jewish immigration gradually moved to the Palestinian part of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1948 when State of Israel was established, conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbour never stopped. The first war in 1948 resulted in hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. Through wars in 1956, 1967 and 1973, Israeli dominant West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. The 1967 war shifted the focus of regional conflict from Arab-Israeli conflict to a conflict between two peoples Palestinian and Israeli over the same land.\(^\text{48}\) The resistance of Palestinian to Israel changed the character of the conflict


to interminable violence and enmity between Israeli and Palestinian. Treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979 did not resolve the conflict between the two people. Later, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) change its political agenda and put establishing a Palestinian state to its priority. The first intifada in the late 1980s and the Gulf War in 1991 made situation worse. The 1993 Oslo Accord failed to realize a two state solution. As the breakout of the second intifada, the conflict developed into unilateral action of both sides, declaring the failure of efforts of international community to end violence and occupation in this area.

In the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, unofficial third party actors are not direct parties in negotiation as official third party actors such as United Nations, European Union and are not as influential and powerful as United States to both sides, but they help to create political atmosphere conducive to negotiation and establish channels for bilateral communication.49 These unofficial actors acted in diverse forms including connecting with parties, providing platform to discuss, conveying information, proposing options for peace and helping to implement agreements50. The following part will adopt the theoretical framework mentioned in last chapter to analysis the role unofficial civil society actors played during the peace process.


6.2 Geneva Accords: Unofficial intervention in Track 1.5 Diplomacy

The Geneva Accords is a draft agreement for the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict produced by unofficial civil society actors in 2003. The Accord was produced by a group of Israeli and Palestinian. It aims to end conflict between Israelis and Palestinian by providing a comprehensive framework to the official peace negotiation at the Camp David Summit in 2000. The Geneva process actually is another form of problem-solving workshop but the different is that it aims to produce an agreement as the model for final resolution. The participants of both sides include not only unofficial actor but also government officials. The negotiating groups in the Palestinian side include ministers and members of parliament, while in Israeli sides there are public activists, academic scholars, authors, civil society representatives. In October 2003, the 25 participants from both sides signed the model agreement which was open to the public.

The unofficial diplomacy in the process actually employs an “outsider strategy” by putting international pressure to Sharon government so as to affect government policy. However as Gurkaynak comments, the unofficial diplomacy indeed is useless and potentially dangerous. It indeed brings a series of spill-over effects. The Geneva

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Accords failed to convince Israeli policy makers that negotiations are attainable but strengthen Sharon’s will to expedite unilateral disengagement. Although the Accords won wide public support in Israel and was seen as alternative to Sharon’s unilateral attempts at disengagement in Gaza, the accord according to the Office of the Prime Minister, frozen opportunity for further negotiation by undermining Israel’s efforts to isolate Arafat and impose Palestinian renunciation of terror as a condition for negotiations.

In the Geneva process, unofficial diplomacy exposed its three main weaknesses. First, in the relationship with official actors, although the Geneva process involves participants from government, it lacks a mechanism to assess to decision makers. On the Israeli side, initiators of the process failed to communicate with Sharon and made an erroneous assumption that Sharon would not accept Geneva Accord. In this point of view poor communication with official actors made unofficial actors as the replacer of government instead of facilitator and mediator of peace process. Second, the initiators choose ‘‗outsider strategy‘’ as the entry point of peace negotiation, failing to consider the standpoint and interest of state. The public support to Geneva Accord isolated Sharon Government and tends to replace governmental proposal which shut the door for further negotiation and force Sharon government take unilateral diplomacy. Third, the initiative purpose of Geneva process is to convince the government to join the negotiation, however during the process, they drop this goal and replace it with producing a draft resolution and force government to adopt it.

6.3 Unofficial Civil Society Actors in Track Two Diplomacy

In the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, many unofficial actors act as conveyors and facilitators. In the problem-solving workshops, many unofficial actors act as conveyors to bring adversaries and other official and nonofficial actors into informal discussion to pave ways for official negotiations or restart stalled negotiations. The participants of these workshops are usually individuals who have tie with leaders of warring parties and therefore can influence the policy making. Kelman and his colleagues are famous for their academic-based unofficial third-party interventions with an interactive problem-solving model. He organized approximately 60 workshops with Israelis and Palestinians before Oslo Accord.\textsuperscript{55} The mandate of these workshops is not to negotiate agreements as official mediation but to transfer. Kalman aims to transfer the attitude of political leaders, mediators and governmental-bureaucracy. Kalman realized that tighten the linkage between Track Two and Track One is a reasonable method of transfer. The coordination between track-two and track-one in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is usually realized through workshops where some participants may move into official roles\textsuperscript{56}. Many officials of both sides regard the workshop as a “cheap cost” channel to share information and exchange opinions with each other.

The conflicts are usually viewed as a zero-sum game around ethnical identity. Kalman argues that the key resolution for the conflict is mutual reassurance and mutual


recognition (Kalman 1995). Problem-Solving Workshop therefore aims to create condition to realize mutual reassurance and mutual recognition.

Problem-Solving Workshop reflects the flexible character of unofficial intervention. As official talks initiated in 1991, the workshop shift their focus from facilitating dialogue to addressing obstacles in the implementation of agreement. With the signing of the Oslo accord, the workshop stopped their traditional work and establishing working groups to analysis the real environment and conditions for Oslo accord.

At the pre-negotiation stage, Problem-Solving Workshop is a useful strategy to create peace atmosphere and facilitate the transformation of conflict. It was particularly helpful at the beginning of the negotiation by providing adversaries with opportunities to get more information from the other part and dissolve misunderstanding with each other. According to Kalman, the Problem-Solving Workshops are constructive to the later Oslo Accord in three aspects: first, the workshops potentially influence mind of participant of official negotiation. Second, the workshops convey information and useful analysis and are important preparation for official negotiations. Third, the workshops create a political atmosphere conducive to peace negotiation.

6.4 A comparative analysis between Geneva Process and Kalman’s Problem-solving Workshop in Israeli–Palestinian conflict

What can unofficial actors do in peace process is a problem puzzled many scholars and practitioners in peacebuilding. Broadly concludes that unofficial third party actors can prepare for official dialogue, initiating negotiation and implementing agreements is not
a satisfactory answer. The space for unofficial third party actors to initiate mediation is relative limited in Track Two and Track 1.5. As Louis Kriesberg comments that unofficial third party actors can not select the presenting parties for negotiations, use leverage or resources to manipulate negotiation or reframe the conflict. All of these are the privilege of powerful official actors. Unofficial actors can at best carry out problem-solving workshops in the stage of pre-negotiation along the lines of official negotiation; analysis the obstacles for the implementation of peace agreement during negotiation and discuss the proper solution for the difficulties in implementation. Although Kriesberg’s view is pessimistic, it disclose the fact that in Track Two and Track1.5 diplomacy, if unofficial third party mediatory activates want to obtain positive influence to peace process, its work must be coordinate with official negotiation as supplement instead of substitution.

In the case of Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the success of Kalman’s problem-solving workshop and the failure of Geneva process best illustrate this view. There is several causes lead to the success of Kalman’s problem-solving workshop. First, Kalman’s problem-solving workshop successfully engaged in influential political leaders into the negotiation and dialogue process. Before the Oslo Accord, a group of highly influential elites of both sides were involved into continuing workshops. They get together to hold in-depth discussion on the potential road to peace. Second, the workshops are continuous. They hold four workshops between November 1990 and July 1992. Third, a good condition for the unofficial intervention is that at that time both official actors and the communities are not ready for negotiation and did not have a concrete plan for conflict resolution. The workshops then fully display its consultation and dialogue

functions for the policy makers to gather useful information and opinion from experts. Leaders from both sides hope to find new idea to outbreak present situation. Fourth, the workshops have strong professional support from experts. The workshops were facilitated by a group of social scientists who are expert in problem-solving skill and conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation as well as historical background of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Fifth, the mechanism of consultation and facilitation are governed by the principle of respect, equality and trust. In order to avoid confrontation and polemic, the workshop introduced discussion mechanism to adjust the asymmetries between representative of Israeli and Palestinian in real conflict. The workshops encouraged each party to define themselves in the conflict to avoid disagreement.

Compared with Kalman’s problem-solving workshop, the unofficial intervention of Geneva process omitted many elements conductive to successive intervention. The participants from Palestinian side and Israeli side existed asymmetry. Palestinian side included official representatives such as ministers and members of parliament, but in Israeli side there are only civil society representatives such as public activists, academic scholars and authors. There are no representatives from Israel government or communication channel to talk with Sharon. The initiators of Geneva process did not do anything to adjust the asymmetry and assume that Sharon government will not be persuaded to accept the accord. Then the result is that Sharon government held a suspicious attitude to Geneva Accord and regarded it as a challenge to governmental policy. Geneva process went beyond the usual mandate of unofficial third party intervention which aims to create atmosphere for bilateral negotiation and facilitate

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conflict resolution instead of producing peace agreement by itself. Through public advocacy, initiators of Geneva Accord tends to employ international pressure to force Israel government accept the accord. They omitted that Sharon government had its own policy at that time and their behavior actually challenge the authority of Israel government. In addition, after the publishing of the accord, pubic advocacy became the solo strategy for the initiators but they never try to compromise certain content within the accord with official intention from Israel government and powerful mediators such as United States and United Nations. The accord unlike Kalman’s workshop have a strong support of experts, the participant are restrict within civil society representatives and government officials.

Through the comparison, the conditions determine the success and failure of unofficial third party intervention become clear: 1) In Track Two and Track 1.5 diplomacy, the role of unofficial third party interventions are restrained to preparation of official negotiation in the pre-negotiation stage. 2) In these levels, unofficial third party interventions are supplement instead of substitution to official conflict resolution. 3) Unofficial third party actors can employ advocacy strategy to gain public support to create atmosphere of peace in the condition that they should not stand on the opposite side of government and intention of major official actors.

6.5 “Bottom-Up” Peace: Unofficial Third Party Intervention in Grass-root Level

According to Rouhana, more and more conflicts are irrelevant to tradition state interest but closely link to basic human needs. These deep-rooted human dimension conflicts
are incompatible to the formal mediation as they are not aiming to mediate identify, fear and historic grievance\(^5^9\). In addition, official interventions by government and inter-governmental organizations usually have their own superiorities. In certain filed, unofficial actors can do better than official actors such as mitigating relationships and establishing mutual trust among warring parties. In the case of Israeli-Palestinian peace process, compared with official intervention, mediation and facilitation in civil society level on human dimension are more practical and efficient in arriving agreement between the two communities\(^6^0\).

Grass-root level intervention by unofficial actors can facilitate the dealing of conflict in civil society level and sometimes their work can pave the road for leadership level negotiations. Paffenholz argues actors in civil society can act as facilitator on the regional level such as bring warring parties or violence groups into informal talks aiming at solving practical problems\(^6^1\); as representative of community to talk with warring parties about freeing the hostages, set a peace zone or discuss temporary


ceasefire issues; facilitate communications between aid agencies and conflict groups or local community to ensure aid service delivery.

On the grass-root level, unofficial interventions usually use the approach of facilitation and training mediators to settle disputes between the two communities. There are several civil society organizations trained mediators to mediate disputes around resources. For instance, Joint Environmental Mediations Team is a network of environmental mediators of Israeli and Palestinian created to address environmental disputes. Jerusalem Mediation and Arbitration Center is another organization trains mediators to deal with small disputes between Israeli and Palestinian in Jerusalem area because Palestinian refuse to recognize the legitimacy of Israeli court and this organization was created as a dispute resolution mechanism. Some Scholar and NGOs also engaged in the training of skills of conflict resolution which teaches people to address disputes with peaceful and nonviolence method. However these kinds of organizations are still limited and on the grass-root level, disputes are usually settled in the form of intergroup social cohesion.

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Intergroup social cohesion is an approach to facilitate communication, understanding and trust between different ethnic groups in Israeli and Palestinian. Civil society actors including NGOs, academic institutions, business associations are active involve in the grassroots level relationship-buildings. In the people-to-people workshops, the peace education changed young people’s attitude to peace towards a positive direction. But the effect is not apparent with Palestinian youth as Israeli youth. The workshops are helpful to change the asymmetry between Israeli and Palestinian by empowering Palestinian. There is still large space to change people’s attitude and beliefs rooted in culture and history. Compared with elites and professional level workshops, the grass-root level relationship building is less efficient in the short term. However, this kind of workshops are still needed because it helps to resolve the conflict from its root causes and link the political settlement with coexistence of two culture and religions.

The grass-root level intervention faces many challenges in Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The bottom-up unofficial peacebuilding approach is deeply influenced by outcome of Track One negotiation. If the official negotiation collapsed or staled, the intergroup social cohesion is insignificant and will quickly go backward. The ongoing Israeli occupation and human rights violation limited the progress of unofficial actors’ project to dissolve people’s worry and establish mutual trust. Constrained by donor’s agenda and fund, many organizations reduce activates on grassroots level relationship-buildings and shift their attention to Track Two elite and professional level consultation and dialogue or social advocacy.

7 Dilemmas Facing Unofficial Civil Society Actors: Potential, Limitation and Challenges in Peace Process

7.1 Potential
Unofficial civil society actors’ expertise, flexibility and ability of rapid response, familiarity with the local conflict environment, and mobilization power to the public as well as closer relationship with local community and grassroots organizations determine their capacity and influence in peace negotiation. Van Tongeren summaries their potential in peace negotiation as:

"a) function without being constrained by narrow mandates of foreign policy imperatives, b) achieve access to areas inaccessible to official actors, c) talk to several parties without losing their credibility, d) deal directly with grassroots populations, e) operate in confidentiality without media, parliamentary or public scrutiny, f) take the greatest risks, given their public advocacy and social-justice agendas, g) effectively network, given their longstanding relationships, built on trust, with civil society in the conflict zones, h) draw upon public opinion to galvanize political will to focus on a longer-term perspective than governments are able to." 

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68 This part is based on my school work "The Role of NGO in Peace Negotiation" Huiting Jia, Uppsala for the course Review Writing in Peace and Conflict Research Department, Uppsala University

Unofficial civil society actors have the ability that official actors do not obtain. They can provide creative approach to peace resolution and fresh opinion beyond the traditional negotiation framework; build trusted but informal channel of communication between parties in conflicts; expand connections with groups especially those do not allow government representatives to participate\(^70\). Unofficial actors can also build a channel to transfer public opinion from middle level and bottom civil society level up to official level of peace negotiation. At the same time, policies and decisions from high level can pass down to civil society level, linking public with official negotiation processes\(^71\). Unofficial civil society organizations can also influence the nature and implementation of peace negotiation\(^72\).

### 7.2 Limitation

#### 7.2.1 Neutrality

The purpose of unofficial actors in peace negotiation is to “transform the way that torn societies deal with a conflict and to improve the process of conciliation”\(^73\). In order to

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< http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/34/4/445> (May 4, 2011).


do so, unofficial mediators can not take with one side or another during their peace mediation and facilitation activities. Baharvar argues once they take sides in peace process they will betray their primary mission and purpose to build understanding of the interest of all warring parties. Unofficial interventions should intend to promote the process of conflict resolution rather than promoting particular agreements. However, in order to reach peace agreement many unofficial actors can not keep neutrality and easily drop their initiative goal. The case of Geneva process is a vivid illustration. However, scholar Saadia Touval and William Zartman argue that third party intervention that are biased towards one party can also be constructive to peace. In the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there exist asymmetry of power between Israeli and Palestinian. Unofficial actors tend to empower Palestinian by enhancing their negotiation capacity, socializing Palestinian community with democratic value and consolidating identity supportive to peace. The biased attitude to empower the weaker party actually serves to narrow the gap between the warring parties.

Once unofficial interventions betray their mission and propose, it is highly possible that their intervention indeed exacerbates conflict. Belloni and Anderson both believe during conflict, unofficial interventions may unintentionally fall into the same camps with one conflicting parties. Mary Anderson analyzed that through providing aids


NGOs could unintentionally exacerbate conflict by “preferring recipients from one side of the conflict; fostering inter-group conflict through different benefits; funding war parties by not preventing theft of aid goods; releasing funds for war; destroying local markets; and legitimizing war factions.”77 As notes by Aall, if NGOs can not keep neutrality and favor any party in a conflict even if unconsciously, their ability and credibility as a mediator will be damaged by their or other NGOs’ earlier actions.78

7.2.2 Legitimacy

Unofficial actors’ legitimacy in peace process is usually challenged and accused by lack of democracy, transparency and accountability. For instance, NGOs can not gain legitimacy through democratic elections as government. Fischer believes NGOs engaged in peace process can acquire legitimacy by demonstrating their efficiency and effectiveness during the implementation of mandates; gaining transparency and credibility by giving publicity to their finances and funding, internal decision-making processes as well as strength regular evaluation and monitoring system79. According to Baharvar, NGO’s legitimacy is based on trust and credibility grows over time as third party interveners. Trust is the key to build public confidence on NGOs. The strategy for NGOs to be trusted is knowledge about the history of conflict, local culture and society. Only base on the knowledge, NGOs as mediator or facilitator can display their expertise in conflict resolution.


7.2.3 Outsider and Insider
During peace negotiation, unclear relationship between outside international organizations and donor and local organizations usually bring troubles to unofficial interventions. INGOs can access to external funding and support and use these material resources to support activities of local NGOs. The relationship chain grant external factors including INGOs, donors, national states and other interest groups the power to influence local NGOs’ behavior in peace negotiation. Some critics arise to these international NGOs. Orjuela mentions the ‘NGO-ization’ especially the monopolization of INGOs in peace process weakens grass-roots level engagement in peace process.\(^{80}\) In order to get funds, some INGOs tend to reflect donor’s interest in their interventions of peace negotiation without consideration of the demand of local community\(^{81}\). Donor-driven NGOs initiatives damage social capital and put local NGOs in a weak position in peace negotiations.\(^{82}\). Reich and Fischer notes NGOs especially western NGOs tend to bring technocratic versions into conflict resolution and impose many western cultural concepts on local society\(^{83}\).

All of the above are challenges facing unofficial actors involving in peace negotiation. They are also the obstacles preventing unofficial actors to expand their roles in peace

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\(^{81}\) Belloni, “Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transition”; Orjuela, Camilla 2004. *Civil Society in Civil War.* P65

\(^{82}\) Belloni, “Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transition”. p65

negotiation. Anderson and Olson regard the trend that civil organizations become more dependent on external funding and increasingly accountable to donors rather than local community is dangerous, and a clear distinction between insider and outsider is critical. Local civil society organizations should take the lead role in identifying problems, initiating peace interventions and mobilizing public support.

7.3 Challenges

The conflict dynamics are changing all the time, which require intervention adjust is original intervention design and implementation plan quickly according to the real situation. New issues emerge outside or inside a conflict can usually shift the focus of a conflict, create new opportunity for confrontation or dissolve parties’ will to negotiate. Under such condition, unofficial third party actors usually face the difficulty to adjust their present work. They are easily fall into dilemma that whether to drop a project or continue to operate it as the fluctuation of donor fund, aggravating and escalation of violence and shift of leaders’ attitude. In the case of Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as the escalation of conflict, many organizations have to drop their programs on intergroup relationship building as the leaving of donor fund to Track Two level elite-driven mediation and consultation and the aggravating attitude of both sides. How to remain the program and avoid people’ attitude to peace going backward is a topic puzzles unofficial actors on the grass-root level.

8 Conclusion

This thesis aims to identify the role unofficial civil society actors play in peace negotiation and conflict resolution. In Track One level, limited by their power and resources, the case of unofficial actors acting as mediators is rare and they can hardly be selected as participants in the formal official negotiation. In the Track 1.5 and Track Two diplomacy, unofficial actors gain a wider platform to exert their influence on the peace process. Compared with traditional mediating strategy of official actors, unofficial actors can employ more flexible approaches to mediate and facilitate conflict. They can adopt Problem-solving Workshop to provide consultation and dialogue opportunities to parties in conflict at the pre-negotiation stage. They can comprehensively take advantage of their expertise, close relationship with top leaders, mobilization ability to advocate policies, contact with grass-root organizations and conflict-affected communities, dialogues involving warring parties and skill training of conflict resolutions to expedite peace process. In this process, unofficial civil society actors fall into a dilemma between going up to official level and going down to grass root level.

The choice was usually determined by the outcome of conflict resolution. In the case of Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Kalman’s problem-solving workshop which closely related to official actors seems to be more successful and influential than independent track two interventions in Geneva proves and grass-root level relationship building. The success of Kalman’s problem-solving workshop and the failure of Geneva process encourage the involvement of official actors into Track two level diplomacy and the coordination between track one and track two diplomacy. The failure of Geneva process seems to remind people once unofficial actors outbreak its traditional mandate
as supplement to official negotiation, their fate will be inconvertible defeat. Unofficial third party intervention should not have its own independent mandate because it is easily been seen as challenge to the authority of government and their nonbiased figure as mediator and facilitator will be damaged. The failure also convoys the information that relies on public opinion or close contact with grass-roots level opinion are dangers.

In Israeli and Palestinian, the operation of grass-root level programs by unofficial organizations are becoming more and more difficult compared with track two consultation and dialogue program which closely link to official negotiation. International donors tend to shift their fund to track two level once conflict escalate and relations between the two communities get worse. Many programs that have the potential to fundamentally resolve root causes for conflict are facing termination or without enough support to broaden their influence. Peace process is therefore moving far away from people who are directly affected by the conflicts. Peace arrangement therefore is the solo refection of state’s will and interest instead of human need of individuals. The depression of grass-roots level intervention by unofficial actors in Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a dangerous signal of this trend because as many unofficial actors go far away from the core purpose of unofficial third party intervention to “facilitate the transformation of needs and interests of conflict affected groups into fair, practical and mutually acceptable solutions”.  

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Unofficial civil society actors have great potential to contribute to conflict resolution and peace negotiations. But constrained by their neutrality, legitimacy and effectiveness in peace negotiation as well as the challenges of unstable conditions in conflict, their effectiveness to deal with conflict and expedite peace process suffer from many challenges. From the above analysis, a reasonable strategy for unofficial civil society actor is to draw a clear line between tracks one and Track Two diplomacy and reshape their independent. Track 1.5 as the communication channel between government and unofficial individuals and organizations should be further institutionalized to avoid brainwash from government policies. It does not mean that unofficial actors should exclude official participation into their activities. On the contrary, establishing communication mechanism to transfer information and public opinions from bottom level to top level is a crucial mandate for unofficial civil society actors. However, unofficial civil society actors should have their own attitude to conflict which should not be influenced by official policies. They should be the representative of human dimension needs instead of state will and interests. On the other hand, unofficial civil society actors should go down to grass-roots level mediatory. There is lots of daily minor disputes need facilitation and mediation before they develop into conflict. Unofficial civil society actor has potential and talent in dealing with the minor disputes with its flexible and diverse mediation approaches. The only problem is how to attract fund to support those programs that are energy and time consuming but can resolve root causes for conflict in the long run.
Appendix

Figure 1 Level of Unofficial Third Party Intervention

Lederach’s Levels of Peacebuilding

Figure 2 Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Intervention Sequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Conciliation (assist communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization</td>
<td>Consultation (improve relationship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Arbitration Power mediation (control hostility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (control violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultation (improve relationship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultation (conflict analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development aid (reduce inequity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pure mediation (settle interests)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted with revisions from Fisher (1990) reprinted with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
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