The Use of Evaluation as a Tool for Organizational Learning in UNOCHA from 1999 to 2009

A Review of Evaluation Reports for Major Disasters from 1999 to 2009 to assess Quality Improvement through Organizational Learning Mechanisms.

Research Report for Master Thesis
Master of Arts in Humanitarian Action (NOHA)
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<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Network for Accountability and Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<td>CMG</td>
<td>Core Management Group</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>Evaluation and Studies Section</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of India</td>
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<td>GOS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internal Displaced Peoples</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Link to Relief, Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Items</td>
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<td>NOHA</td>
<td>Network of Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OLM</td>
<td>Organizational Learning Mechanism</td>
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<td>PDSP</td>
<td>Policy, Development and Studies Branch</td>
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<td>PMIS</td>
<td>Program Management Information System</td>
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<td>PRA</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Rapid Assessment</td>
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<td>REA</td>
<td>Rapid Ethnographic Assessment</td>
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<td>RFE</td>
<td>Rapid Feedback Evaluation</td>
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<td>RTE</td>
<td>Real Time Evaluation</td>
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<td>SMT</td>
<td>Senior Management Team</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Tsunami Evaluation Coalition</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Term of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination</td>
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<td>UNDMT</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Management Team</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programs</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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Executive Summary

The main objective of this study was to seek to answer the research question: “To what extent do OCHA’s evaluation reports reflect quality improvement in evaluation practices from 2001 to 2008?” This central question was sub divided into three parts:

1. What methods does UNOCHA use for evaluation of humanitarian programs or projects?
2. What Organizational Learning Mechanism (OLM) is utilized at UNOCHA?
3. To what extent has the quality of evaluations reports improved through time?

To answer these questions, Kolb’s (1984) and Shaw and Perkin’s (1992) model of Organizational Learning Mechanisms were used as the theoretical point of departure. Further, the works of Cousins and Leithwood (1986) were used to identify six parameters for measuring quality improvement in evaluation reports. These parameters included: Quality, Credibility, Relevance, Communication, Findings and Timeliness.

A case study of UNOCHA Organizational Learning Mechanism (OLM) was used in this study to provide a detailed analysis of quality improvement in evaluation reports. Four sampled evaluation reports for disasters commissioned by UNOCHA were reviewed in accord with the six parameters to study the quality improvements in each of the reports. The four UNOCHA reports included; Gujarat, India Earthquake, 2001; Darfur, Southern Sudan Crisis, 2005; Tsunami, 2006 and Cyclone Nargis Myanmar, 2008. Other main reports and handbooks that this study reviewed included; Evaluation, Knowledge Management and Learning Mechanism of UNOCHA, 2006; The roles and formation of the ESS, 1993 and Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons Learned, 1999 were among the reports examined. Since I did not get the opportunity to interview UNOCHA personnel or directly participate and observe the practice at UNOCHA in regards to implementing organisational learning policies, my findings are limited only to what was documented in the UNOCHA reports and handbooks examined. The study employed documentation review strategy for collecting all the data, therefore all the data presented in this report is secondary data.

Out of the four disaster evaluation reports that were reviewed, three of the most recent evaluation reports employed the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) evaluation method in data collection. This method empowers the affected communities and enables communities to participate in program monitoring and evaluation exercise. In this study, the PRA was established the best method of collecting data for evaluating humanitarian programs (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). The Gujarat evaluation that was concluded in 2001 employed the limited data collection method of rapid feedback evaluation method. This therefore showed that UNOCHA learned and improved the way of collecting data for evaluating their programs as the most recent evaluation reports used an improved data collection method. The same trend of improvement was seen in the parameters of communication, timeliness and findings which were ranked good in the most recent evaluation report (Myanmar, 2008 evaluation report) and poor and/or fair in evaluation
reports prior to 2008. The parameter of credibility of evaluators was constant in all the evaluation reports, it may be deduced that UNOCHA had good policy regarding selection of the external evaluators since 2001.

Finally, the study showed that UNOCHA uses a combination of integrated and non-integrated OLM. It’s integrated in that the ESS unit that is responsible for generating the lessons learned through evaluations is the same unit that is responsible for implementing the lessons learned. UNOCHA OLM is non-integrated in that; external evaluators form an important part in the process for generating the lessons learned. Although the ESS unit supervises evaluations of all UNOCHA and provide the lessons learned to the (Senior Management Team (SMT), the evaluations are actually performed by external evaluators commonly called consultants. The combination of the integrated and non-integrated promotes the highest organisational learning, and independence of the lesson learned generation process (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998).
1. Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Statement of the Problem: poor repeated response

Ever since the heavily criticized humanitarian response to the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, humanitarians have devoted significant effort to develop policies, standards, guidelines and initiatives to improve the quality of their work (Erikson 58-67). However, the 2006 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) concluded that the humanitarian system continues to lack accountability to victims of disasters, still fails to ensure sustainability by working with the local structures in order to make aid more appropriate and effective and the quality of humanitarian programs remains inconsistent and poor (Harvey, 2010: 1-10). A report released by ALNAP in 2010, 16 years after the Rwanda genocide still concluded that during the Fiscal Year 2007/2008, the international humanitarian systems have continued to increase in resources, applied in-depth programming designs and improved coordination and linkages between actors, however, its performance although has improved, is still insufficient (Harvey et al., 2010; 49). In all the reports, lack of and/or poor coordination is highlighted as the major cause of inconsistencies and poor humanitarian emergency response.

In 1991, resolution 46/182 was passed by the UN General Assembly which entailed an effort to improve coordination within humanitarian programs and organizations and to ensure coherent response to emergencies by forming the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). To further ensure continuous learning and enhance improvement to responses to crisis, UNOCHA established the Policy Development and Studies Branch which is UNOCHA’s deliberate effort to improve accountability, knowledge management and learning (UNOCHA 53-55; 2008). The Policy, Development and Studies Branch (PDSB) is subdivided into six sections: the Disaster and Vulnerability section, Evaluation and Studies section, Intergovernmental Section, Policy Planning and Analysis section, Protection of Civilian sections and finally the Policy Development and Studies Section. The main mandate of PDSB are; first, to provide effective and efficient emergency response. Second, to promote evaluations and best practices, and finally, to ensure mainstreaming of humanitarian principles, protection concerns and lessons learnt and agreed policies into operational planning. Specifically, the Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS) is responsible for planning and implementing evaluations, which have two main purposes in OCHA; first, as a learning tool to improve response and second, as an accountability tool to measure performance and effectiveness. (UNOCHA 49, 52, 55, 56: 2009).

1.2 The Research Questions

With all the above institutional and structural measures to improve coordination and coherent humanitarian programs, the preliminary reports from the Haiti earthquake already points out to the fact that there was poor humanitarian coordination, ineffective leadership in the cluster and the inter cluster coordination among the humanitarian country team, yet these are actually the core mandate of OCHA (IASC, 2010). In context of the above problem statement, my central research question is:
“To what extent do OCHA’s evaluation reports reflect quality improvement in evaluation practices from 2001 to 2008?”

Arising from the above central questions, the following sub questions are derived:

1. What methods does UNOCHA use for evaluation of humanitarian programs or projects?
2. What organizational learning mechanism is utilized at UNOCHA?
3. To what extent has the quality of evaluations reports improved through time?

An evaluation is defined as a systemic investigation to ascertain the success and/or failure of a particular program, projects or events (Barker, 2003 p. 149). Evaluation is therefore a practical attempt, not an academic work, and it is not primarily an endeavour to develop theory or necessarily to build social science knowledge. The main objective of evaluation in social science is to provide information that can be used to improve program designs, implementations and quality. To summarize, an evaluation is the process of identifying, collecting and analyzing data which provide information for improving program implementation (Tripodil, 1987).

An evaluation utilizes various methods such as ethnography, survey research, randomized experiments and cost-benefit analysis. A variety of methods are applied because different methods have different weaknesses and strengths. Further, depending on the objectives and goals of the programs to be evaluated, various evaluation methods can be applied in identifying, collecting and analyzing information (Barker, 2003). The research sub question one will therefore strive to explore the various evaluation methods utilized by UNOCHA and establishes their weaknesses and strengths. In the theoretical framework, an overview of various evaluation methods shall be presented.

Sub question two shall explore the learning mechanism of UNOCHA. Organizational learning mechanisms are “structural and procedural arrangements which deliberately permit organizations to systematically identify, collect, analyze, store, disseminate, retrieve and utilize information that is pertinent to the performance of an organization and its members” (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998: 170). According to Popper and Lipshitz’s definition, evaluation is a subset of organizational learning mechanisms. Evaluation is the information provider to organizational learning mechanism. Organizational learning on the other hand, is defined as “the process in which an organization’s members actively use data to guide behaviour in a way to promote the ongoing adaptation of the organization” (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000: 185) Kolb’s (1984) renown model of how individuals learn from experience, asserts that humans are capable of learning because they possess the nervous and cognitive system which is created to perform the tasks of experiencing, reflecting, conceptualizing and memorizing. However organizations are not equipped to perform Kolb’s tasks (experiencing, reflecting, conceptualizing and memorizing) critical for learning since organizations do not possess the cognitive and the nervous system.
This creates a problem which was termed by Simon (1991) as anthropomorphism\(^1\) of organizational learning. To solve this problem Lipshitz et al. (1996) proposed that organizations learn with the aid of organization learning mechanism (Lipshitz et al. 1996: 293).

Organizational learning is also perceived as a multi-level dynamic process through which the thoughts and actions of individuals and groups change and become embedded in the organization over time (Vera and Crossan, 2004). This definition indicates that organization learning is accompanied by change in thoughts which are translated to formulate policies. The evidence that learning is accomplished by change is further ascertained in Popper & Lipshitz’s definition of a learning organization as an “organization that institutes organizational learning mechanism and operates them regularly to produce observable change in their operational modalities” (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998: 175). Sub question three therefore, shall attempt to establish quality improvement in the evaluation reports of UNOCHA. This study shall review quality improvement in the evaluation reports of UNOCHA in the last decade and what effect evaluation findings through the process of organizational learning mechanism have had on these quality improvements.

1.3 Rationale of the study

Based on my work experiences, I have noticed that evaluation reports for each of the humanitarian emergency response projects always had similar findings. In most cases these were poor coordination, limited or lack of local involvement, poor accountability to the beneficiaries and the donors’ inappropriate and/or ineffective program interventions. This research will satisfy my academic curiosity in understanding the underlying causes of poor or slow learning of International Humanitarian Organizations. Specifically, I am interested to explore why the findings in evaluation reports are not fully implemented and why humanitarian organizations do not learn by changing their policies to fit the different and often fluid environment they operate in.

On the societal level, almost all humanitarian projects implemented do not meet the needs of the affected population and the response provided always varied considerably from crisis to crisis and from organizations to organizations. Meeting the expectations of the affected population would result in reduced loss of human life and plight of the affected community. Also coordinated response\(^2\) would improve the local community participation in humanitarian project implementation and thus promote sustainability (Harvey, 2010). The findings of this research are therefore hoped to improve the quality of humanitarian programs and promote sustainability among the local or affected communities.

On a scientific level, it is my wish that the findings of this study may be used to develop more appropriate measures to improve learning of international humanitarian organizations.

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\(^1\) Anthropomorphism “is the attribution of human form or qualities to non human entities” (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998: 162)

\(^2\) In this report Coordinated Response refers to similar response to a similar nature of humanitarian crisis by different organisations.
1.4 The research strategy

The research strategy to be used in this thesis is a case study of UNOCHA in the time frame of ten years from 1999 to 2009. Babbie defined a case study as “a case-oriented analysis that aims to understand a particular case or several cases by examining them closely and in detail” (Babbie 2007: 379). This study will be mainly qualitative analysis which refers to a none numerical examination and interpretation of observations, for establishing underlying meanings and patterns of relationships (Babbie 2007, Yin 2010).

This research shall mainly use secondary data or text analysis from formal sources. A literature based strategy shall also be applied in this study research. Relevant articles, books, and reports or publications of UNOCHA will be reviewed during data collection process. A sample of four evaluation reports commissioned by UNOCHA shall be selected and examined in detail. In conclusion, this study shall examine evaluation reports and shall attempt to ascertain quality improvement in these evaluation reports through organizational learning in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

1.5 Reader’s guide

Chapter two of this research report will exclusively discuss theoretical factors that enhance the quality of evaluation reports. Chapter three will examine the research methodology and strategy that will be employed in the study. Chapter four will discuss the organizational learning mechanism (OLM) of UNOCHA as it is written in various reports and handbooks of UNOCHA. A total of 6 UNOCHA reports shall be examined and 1 handbook shall be reviewed to collect the data concerning UNOCHA’s OLM. In Chapter five, a detailed presentation of data collected from reviewing four evaluation reports of major disasters, commissioned and supervised by UNOCHA, shall be analyzed. Chapter six shall present a discussion of the findings linking them to the theoretical framework and theory of organizational learning and by doing so, the answers to the research questions.
2. Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

This chapter is composed of two main sections. In the first section I shall review the different methods of evaluation that are used by International Humanitarian Organizations. During the review I shall particularly focus on the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular evaluation method. I shall also review the three main phases of evaluations, these phases do not necessarily affect the qualities of an evaluation report but they are terms that enable practitioners to understand the purpose and when evaluations are conducted. These three phases are: Pre Evaluations, which are also known as baseline surveys or formative evaluations. The second phase is the Mid Term Evaluation, which has commonly been termed by different organisations as Real Time Evaluation or Progress Evaluation. Finally, I shall conclude the first section by examining other factors that affect the quality of evaluation reports.

In the second section of this chapter I shall examine, the theories of Organisational Learning Mechanisms (OLM) with particular attention to the different types of OLM. The various features and operations of OLM shall be examined.

2.1 Factors that Improve the Quality of Evaluation Reports

The advantages are theoretical factors that facilitate the application of evaluation findings within an organization. The main goal of every evaluation is to provide information for decision making and learning (Sirotnik, 1987). C.H. Weiss (1988a) emphasised that evaluators undertake their studies with the intention of helping decision makers to make wiser decisions. They also expect that the evaluation data will inform the decision making process and influence the actions that people take. However, when evaluations are undertaken, they are often not utilized (Weiss, 1988a).

Cousins and Leithwood (1986) identified six factors associated with quality evaluation reports. These factors include; Quality, which refers to the methodological sophistication, approach, and intensity; Credibility, which refers to the reputation and credentials of the evaluators and confidence in their work; Relevance, which is defined as the extent to which the evaluation is adapted to the stakeholders and is reflective of the organizational context; Communication quality, which refers to the nature, amount, and quality of dissemination of the evaluation findings; Findings, which is defined as the extent to which the findings are in agreement with the expectations of the stakeholders; Timeliness, this is defined as the extent to which the completion of the evaluation is congruent with the need for decision making (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986).

2.1.1 Evaluation Quality and Evaluation Method

Pursuant to Cousins and Leithwood (1986), more than 50% of studies conducted show clear relationships between evaluation use and quality of the evaluation. Evaluation quality is defined as ‘methodological sophistication, type of approach to the evaluation or the intensity of the
evaluation activities” (Cousins & Leithwood, 1986 p. 352). Evaluation quality therefore means the evaluation method. A number of writers report that increased methodological sophistication served to inhibit the use. However, simple methods that are understood by the all the stakeholders increase the implementation of evaluation findings or recommendations (Weeks, 1979; Van de Vall and Bolas, 1982). A similar view was shared by Yeh (1980) who noted that policy changes are more likely to be based on less sophisticated evaluation methods. Weeks (1979), Van de Vall and Bolas (1982) and Alkin et al., (1985) show that involvement of the beneficiaries and all the stakeholders is positively related to use in terms of support for policy change and implementation.

Further on the quality of the evaluation, Jordan (1979) indicated that evaluations with focus on program process or implementation process are more useful than those dealing mainly with outcomes (Jordan 1977). Other types of evaluation approach that enhance either the use or the potential for use include elaborate data collection, absence of bias in data collection processes, involvement of stakeholders and early planning of the evaluation process (Alkin et al. 1985). In the proceeding paragraphs, I shall present a detailed review of evaluation methods with particular focus on their strengths and weakness. In my reviews, the strengths of an evaluation report include factors such as; less sophisticated methods (simple), active participation of the all the stakeholders in the evaluation exercise and a fair process of data collection. On the other hand, weaknesses of an evaluation report include factors such as; complicated methods, none involvement of all the stakeholders and biasness in the data collection process.

2.1.1.1 Real Time Evaluation (RTE)

In response to the proliferation of humanitarian crises in the 1990s, the real time evaluation method was developed. The major challenge in using this evaluation method is achieving balance between speed and trustworthiness since this method of evaluation is done within a very short period of time and during the project implementation period. This evaluation method is used for rapidly evaluating the effectiveness and impact of program activities to responses to crises and to ensure that findings are used as immediate facilitator for organizational and operational change (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). Real time evaluations are commissioned as soon as a new crisis emerges or appears imminent; this implies that the evaluators are actually part of the crisis response i.e. implementers of an emergency program. Hence they systematically collect and review data as the crisis unfolds (Jamal & Crisp, 2002). Since the evaluators are part of the implementation team, RTE evaluators share their findings, observations and recommendations on an ongoing basis with program staff so as to correct operational problems quickly. This also implies that future potential problems are consequently avoided. However, since the evaluators are part of the implementation team, this may pose the challenge of conflict of interest and non disclosure of full mistakes that were made during program implementations (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).
RTE applies a mixed method of data collection which may range from semi structured interviews\textsuperscript{3} site visits, limited number of in-depth interviews, focus groups discussions\textsuperscript{4} and reviews of secondary documents. The use of various data collection methods ensures that sufficient data is collected which will represent a fair picture of the scenario (Sandison, 2003; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). At the end of the evaluation, the evaluators hold an interactive debriefing meeting with the organisation, and may include other stakeholders of the project such community leaders (Sandison, 2003).

2.1.1.2 Rapid Feedback Evaluation (RFE)

The method came out of Joseph Wholey’s (1983) notion that ‘rough approximations delivered at the right time are better than precise results delivered too late for decision makers to act on them’ (Wholey, 1983 p. 72). The process of conducting RFE involves the use of existing program data to make a fast, preliminary assessment of program performance. Pursuant to Wholey, RFE model has five major steps. First is the collection of existing data on program performance, this can be obtained by reviewing internal periodic program reports, program management plans, proposals and the grants documents. Second is the collection of new data on program performance, this mainly involves brief interviews with program staff and beneficiaries. The third step is termed as the preliminary evaluation findings that management can already use to redesign the program. The fourth step is the development and analysis of alternative plan for detailed evaluation. Some writers have criticised RFE because of this fourth step, which implies that RFE is only a prelude to a full scale evaluation. However, Sonnichsen (2000) argues that, in some cases, step 4 may be skipped. In various circumstances, ‘the data collected during RFE is sufficient to provide answers to the client’s questions and no additional evaluation may be required’ (Sonnichsen, 2000 p. 218; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).

RFE may be employed as a stand-alone approach to provide quick answers to highly particular questions. RFE is highly recommended to be used as a stand-alone if managers have already identified the problem regarding the program operations but still need confirmation in order to establish corrective measures or in situations where managers have specific questions about program performance, (McNall et al., 2004; Sonnichsen, 2000; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). Unlike RTE that employs both primary data and secondary data in providing information for decision markers, RFE relies solely on secondary data to provide information to decision markers.

\textsuperscript{3} Structured interviews is an approach which uses a few general questions to generate an open and two way conversation between the interviewer and the respondent (Sandison, 2003)

\textsuperscript{4} Focus group discussion is also referred to as group interviews. These two terms mean organized, small group discussions of a relatively homogeneous group of people such as mothers of children aged 0-2, the discussion may be focused on a particular topic such as breastfeeding (Sandison, 2003).
2.1.1.3 Rapid Assessment (RA)

This method includes techniques that are derived primarily from the traditions of ethnography and action research (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith 1985; Lewin, 1984) and participatory action research (Greenwood, White & Harkavy, 1993). RA has been found to be more rapid, cost effective and pragmatic compared to traditional ethnographic methods (Vincent, Allsop, & Shoobridge, 2000). The procedures of RA involves deploying teams of researchers to gather information from small samples of key informants and local residents using surveys, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, transect walks\(^5\) and mapping (Garrett & Downen, 2002; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). Secondary data are also used during RA to provide a more comprehensive picture of the problem (Aral, St. Lawrence, Dyallo, & Kozlov, 2005; Vincent et al., 2000). The main objective of RA is to quickly generate information to assist decision making, this is similar to RFE but RA is more often used to generate information about health and social problems to facilitate in the formulation of culturally appropriate interventions for health and social problems than to evaluate existing programs (Trotter & Singer 2005; Vincent et al., 2000; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).

RA are known to be highly pragmatic and action oriented. Information gathered using this method are always applied to either improve an existing program or service or to create more effective and culturally appropriate interventions. However, RA projects are not consistent in the degree of involving the targeted beneficiaries or representatives of local communities in the design or implementation of RA projects. The degree in which the stakeholders are selected to participate in the evaluation process varies considerably, to the extent that some RA evaluations are conducted without involving all the stakeholders (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).

2.1.1.4 Rapid Ethnographic Assessment

Similar to RA, Rapid Ethnographic Assessment (REA) was developed to give a rapid assessment of local situation in order to inform the formulation of effective program interventions. Also, the major focus of REA is on public health in developing countries. It has been used to effectively develop diarrhoea control programs in various countries (Bantley et al., 1988). A notable difference between REA and RA is that REA tends to make use of a more limited range of research methods and to more exclusively focus on exploring indigenous understandings of health issues than does RA. The main methods of data collection in REA include key informant interviews, questionnaires, and use of secondary data (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).

2.1.1.5 Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)

Participatory evaluation is defined as “applied social research that involves a partnership between trained evaluation personnel and practice based decision makers, organisation members with program responsibility, or a group of people with a vital interest in the program or primary

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\(^5\) A transect walk involves walking through a location, observing and asking questions to identify specific issues, such as natural resources and how they are being used by the local community (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007)
users” (Alkin & Taut, 2002:157). PRA has been mainly used in developing countries in the sectors of natural resources management, agriculture, poverty and social programs, health, food security and education. PRA is a combination of approaches and methods that enable the disadvantaged poor (rural people) to share, enhance, and analyze their “knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to implement and/or to act” (Chambers, 1994a, p. 953). PRA evolved in the early 1980s as a corrective tool to the biased and incorrect perceptions resulting from an evaluation method called rural development tourisms. Rural development tourisms involve rapid visits to the rural areas to collect data without an elaborate plan. This method was insensitive to the social context of the rural, the social norms of rural dwellers were not respected by the urban professionals, and this implied that the poorest were neither seen by the evaluators, listened to, nor learnt from. In summary, rural development tourisms evaluation method promoted misleading findings, bias and incorrect perceptions of the poor (Chambers, 1994a; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). As opposed to the above types of evaluation methods discussed, PRA’s main emphasis is on information gathering as a process with defined characteristics including: community involvement in the gathering and analysis of data, a holistic and systematic approach, multidisciplinary and interactive methods, flexible responses, an emphasis on communication and listening skills and visual display of information. Evidently, PRA has the “greatest variety of tools in its toolkit for collecting comprehensive data” (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007 p. 157).

The second strongest advantage of using PRA for humanitarian projects in developing or middle income countries is that the data is collected from a variety of sources such as secondary sources (document reviews), key informants, local residents, and observations. This ensure absolutely collection of unbiased data for analysis (Chambers, 1994a).

The third advantage of using PRA over all the other evaluation method is that it uses a variety of methods for collecting data. According to Chambers PRA uses 29 different methods of data collection, a few of them include: semi structured interviews, group interviews, oral histories (transect walks, mapping and modelling of local conditions, timelines and trend change analysis, and finally seasonal calendars which is the displays variations in local conditions, including rain, crops, labour, diet, illness and other seasonal events (Chambers, 1994b; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).

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6 Rural development tourism involves brief visits by urban professionals to rural areas, chosen to serve as trial villages. The main purpose of the visit was collection of data from the beneficiaries of development and/or humanitarian programs (Chambers, 1994a).
7 Oral histories involves recording people’s memories about their own experiences (McNall et al., 2007).
8 Mapping and modelling of local conditions involves local people in the constructions of maps of local demographics, health, resources, services and/or land use (Chambers, 1994b; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).
9 Timelines and trend change analysis involves local people in the development of chronologies of significant local events and changes in such things as land use, local customs and practices or population and migration (Chambers, 1994b).
Despite the fact that PRA uses a variety of methods in data collection, not all are used in every appraisal. This gives the evaluator flexibility to adopt their data collection methods according to the objective of the evaluation. In summary, the evaluators may use a particular mix of methods in any given evaluation dependent on what is suitable for the particular problems being investigated (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007; Chambers, 1994a; Chambers, 1994b).

As PRA is a participatory process, it involves both the participation of professional evaluators in community life and the participation of local community in the evaluation. The local residents may participate in evaluation activities such as data collection, analysis, presentation and interpretation of results with the guidance and facilitation of the professional evaluators. Consequently, data in PRA are “generated, analyzed, owned and shared by the local people as part of the process of their empowerment” (Chambers, 1994b p. 1253; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).

The fourth advantage of PRA is that it promotes utilization of evaluation findings. For ages, a lasting issue of concern for evaluators has been the utilization\(^\text{10}\) of evaluation findings (Greene, 1988; Patton, 1997, 1998; Preskill and Caracelli, 1997; Tores and Preskill, 2001). A number of authors suggest that many evaluation findings are misused or even unused by stakeholders (Mark and Henry, 2004; Patton, 1997; Rebien, 1996; Russ-Eft et al., 2002; Shulha and Cousins, 1997; Springett, 2001b). Consequently, evaluation researchers began to look at how stakeholders affected by the evaluative project could use not only the findings, but also the process of evaluation in the appropriate methodology (Shulha and Cousins, 1997; Forss et al., 2002; Preskill et al., 2003).

One feature that enhances the process use\(^\text{11}\) of evaluation findings is the involvement of stakeholders in many aspects of the evaluative process. The process use has influenced the development of participatory approaches in evaluation practice. A number of writers agree that involvement of stakeholders in the evaluation process ensure ownership of the stakeholders which has been found to greatly enhance the utilization of the evaluation findings and recommendations. McNall & Foster-Fishman (2007) therefore concluded that PRA greatly enhances the use of evaluation findings and recommendation. The evaluations results are not viewed by the beneficiaries, the organisation and the donor as resulting from outsiders, rather they view it as “our recommendations” (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007 p. 158; Brisolara, 1998; Burke, 1998; Patton, 1998; Cousins and Whitmore, 1998).

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\(^{10}\) In this thesis, utilization of evaluation findings means the application of recommendations to promote change in the organizational policy. The change in policy could be to improve the quality of evaluation reports (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007)

\(^{11}\) In this thesis, process use depicts “a process of organizational learning and individual changes resulting from involvement in a given evaluative process, that is, the evaluation use that takes place before lessons learned are generated and feedback processes are initiated” (Forss et al., 2002: 29)
In Table 1 below, I have provided a summary of all the different methods of evaluation reviewed in this chapter. The summary points out particularly to the key advantages and disadvantages of the each of the evaluation methods.

**Table 1.**
Summary Table: Advantages and Disadvantages of Evaluation Methods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Evaluation</th>
<th>Advantages (Strengths)</th>
<th>Disadvantages (Limitations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Real-Time Evaluation       | - Various data collection methods ensure sufficient/complete collection of information (UNHCR, 2002; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007)  
   - Findings are used immediately to correct the operational and organizational mistakes and future problems are prevented (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007) | - Conflict of interests and non-disclosure of full information (UNHCR, 2002)  
   - The balance between speed and trustworthiness may be hampered (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007)  
   - Other stakeholders are only involved at the debriefing session (UNHCR, 2002) |
| Rapid Feedback Evaluation  | - In highly focused evaluation evaluations, RTE may be used as a stand-alone to provide immediate answers. | - It only preludes to a full scale evaluation (Sonischsen 2000; McNall et al., 2004)  
   - Only applicable when managers have already identified specific problems and/or questions (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007)  
   - Not sufficient information is collected since only limited new data is collected by brief interviews (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007)  
   - The balance between speed and trustworthiness may be hampered (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007) |
| Rapid Assessment           | - Its more cost-effective & pragmatic (practical) and action-oriented compared to traditional ethnographic methods (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007) | - RA is more effective only when generating information about health and social problems (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007)  
   - Involvement of other stakeholders (beneficiaries) is not consistent (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007) |
| Rapid Ethnographic Assessment | - Provides a quick assessment of local conditions (grass roots community level) (Bentley et al., 1988) | - Applicable only for effective development of health programs (Bentley et al., 1988)  
   - Insufficient data collected since it employs limited range of research methods (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007) |
In summary and deducing from table 1, the most recommended method of evaluation that has been established to promote learning is Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) because it promotes ownership of the evaluation findings by the community and enables them to change their implementation strategies as recommended in the findings. This evaluation method also empowers the local community in decision making and empowerment is vital to organisational learning. Further, this method ensures that sufficient data is collected and finally, the method can be used in every humanitarian/development programs including Agriculture, health, poverty and social programs, health, food security and education (Chambers, 1994a).

2.1.1.6 Pre-Evaluation, Mid Term Evaluation and Post Evaluation.

Pre Evaluations (Baseline Assessments or Formative Evaluations) are methods of data collections that are performed prior to the start of implementation of any project, events or activities. During pre evaluation, the main purpose of the evaluators is to collect statistical data that will inform the development of the program or project proposal (Chambers 1994a). A typical example of pre evaluation is the Knowledge Attitude and Practice survey (KAP survey) conducted before program implementation (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). The most common methods of evaluation used during baseline assessments or pre evaluation include Rapid Assessment, Rapid Ethnographic Assessment and Participatory Rural Appraisal.

Mid Term Evaluation (Progress Evaluation) are evaluations that are conducted during the program or project implementation life cycle (Sonnichsen 2000; McNall et al., 2004). The output of this type of evaluations enables organizational managers to re-plan their implementation strategies. The exact time of conducting this evaluation is recommended mid way the
implementation, however, whenever program managers notice that program objectives may not be achieved, they may commission a mid-term evaluation at any time during program implementation (Brisolara, 1998; Burke, 1998; Patton, 1998; Cousins and Whitmore, 1998). All the above discussed evaluation methods may be used to obtain information, however the following methods are recommended for better results: Rapid Feedback Evaluation (RFE) and Real Time Evaluation (Brisolara, 1998; Patton, 1998; Cousins and Whitmore, 1998). The main purpose of progress evaluation is to assess implementation progress in achieving the goals of the program or project (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).

Post Evaluation (also called impact evaluation or summative evaluation) is conducted at the end of the program or project implementation period and after the timeframe posited for change has passed. The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess the impact of the program or project to the wider national, regional sector (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007; Brisolara, 1998; Burke, 1998; Patton, 1998; Cousins and Whitmore, 1998). Some writers also called this summative evaluation. Impact evaluation collects statistical data about outcomes and related processes, intervention strategies and program or project activities that led to the achievement of the program or project goals. All the above discussed methods of data collection are applicable in post evaluation; however, the following are known to produce better results: Rapid Assessment, Rapid Ethnographic assessment and Participatory Rural Appraisal (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007).

2.1.2 Credibility:
Cousins and Leithwood established a marked relationship between the credibility of the evaluators or evaluation process and quality of evaluation reports. A number of writers and social scientists viewed credibility as a function of reputation and years of experiences. The higher the number of years of experience of the evaluators, the better the evaluation is perceived by the decision makers (Alkin et al., 1979; Dawson & D’Amico, 1985; Cousins & Leithwood, 1986). When evaluators are seen by decision makers as having high face validity or whenever the evaluators emphasize their exercise as important activities, use and the potential for use of the evaluation are shown to be greater than when the evaluation exercised is given low importance by the evaluators. Committed evaluators, who meet deadlines, are not careless and take their work seriously, are established to produce the highest quality of evaluation reports which promotes the use of the evaluation findings (Brown et al. 1980; Williams & Bank, 1984; Daillak, 1983; David 1978).

2.1.3 Relevance:
Relevance is defined as “either the extent to which evaluation was geared to the audience(s) or whether the evaluator was internal or external to the organization” (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986: 353) Internal evaluators have more knowledge about their organization’s features than

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12 Evaluation process is defined as “the appropriateness of the evaluation criteria” (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986:352/353). However in this study credibility shall only apply to the reputation of the evaluators.
external evaluators (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). Majority of studies established that evaluation reports that reflected knowledge of the context in which the evaluation findings were to be used, appealed more to the decision makers. Evaluation that “sought consensus about the evaluation problem, or demonstrated insight into program operations and decision making, were associated with higher levels of use” (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986, p. 353; Dawson &D’Amico, 1985; Osterlind, 1979; Van de Vall and Bolas, 1982). Studies conducted by a number of social scientists confirmed that internal evaluators tend to exhibit higher level of relevance than external evaluators. Evaluators who understand the organisation, the program under evaluation and the background, in which the program is being implemented, show a positive relationship with high quality of evaluation report. Context in this case refers to the causes of the humanitarian crisis in which a program or project has to been designed to mitigate the effects of such crisis (McGowan, 1976; Wholey & White, 2002). Context is further expanded to include the social-economic and the political situation of the country and/or political domain where the humanitarian crisis occurred (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986).

2.1.4 Communication quality:

Communication is defined as the “dissemination strategy of the evaluation reports, ongoing dialogue activities and styles of delivering the information before, during and after the evaluation exercise” (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986; 353). Oral presentation of evaluation results along with written reports and coupled with the use of non technical language is found to contribute to higher impact, improved readability, greater awareness and appreciation of the evaluation results. Use of language that is clearly understood by the audience enhances the quality and further utilization of the report (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986; Bigelow and Ciarlo, 1976; Rossman et al., 1979). Enhanced application of the evaluation report was seen to be strongly related with constant communication and close geographical proximity between the evaluators and the decision markers. On going dialogue between the evaluators such as periodic briefing sessions during evaluation exercise was shown to improve evaluation report quality. Further, studies also ascertained that when both the evaluators and decision makers are within the same geographical location, community quality was improved subsequently, improving the quality of the evaluation report (Johnson, 1980; Cousins & Leithwood, 1986). Advocacy of the evaluation findings by the evaluators through workshops and meetings was established to be related to improved quality of evaluation report (Van de Vall & Bolas, 1982; Cousins & Leithwood, 1986; Dawson & D’Amico, 1985). Evaluation reports with greater dissemination breadth i.e. reports that are released to the wider public, resulted in higher utilization (Van de Vall & Bolas, 1982).

2.1.5 Findings:

This is defined by Cousins and Leithwood as “the extent to which the results of the evaluation are in agreement with the expectations of key stakeholders” (Cousins & Leithwood, 1986; 354). A number of studies reported that when evaluation findings are congruent with decision makers’ expectations, acceptance and utilization of the findings increased. In contrast, incongruent findings were ignored and other information was used for decision making (Wholey & White, 2002; Johnson, 1980; Kennedy, 1984; David, 1978; Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). According
to Alkin et al. evaluation findings were reported to be of most use for purposes such as legislation, organizational development, especially whenever the findings were practical and conclusive or when the findings identified alternative courses of action for policy makers (Alkin et al., 2000).

### 2.1.6 Timeliness:

Timeliness is defined as the extent to which the completion of the evaluation is congruent with the need for decision making (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). The timely provision of evaluation findings was shown to have a positive association with utilization of the report in policy change decisions (Dickey, 1980; Cousins & Leithwood, 1986). Patton et al. established that when evaluation reports were released late, the findings of such evaluations were never used by decision makers. Especially in humanitarian programs where timeliness is of essence, timely release of evaluation reports demonstrated positive relationship with use of the evaluation findings in decision making process (Patton et al., 1977).

### 2.2 Organizational Learning Mechanisms

#### 2.2.1 What is Organizational Learning Mechanisms (OLM)?

The notion of organizational learning appears challenging when defining differences between individual and organizational learning. Organizational learning is interceded by the learning of individual organisational members. Some authors equate organizational leaning with individual learning while others see the two notions as distinct processes. Hedberg (1981) noted that organizations do not have brains; however they have cognitive systems and memories. While individuals develop their personalities, personal habits and beliefs over time, organizations too change and develop their interventions, views, and ideologies (Hedberg, 1981; Popper & Lipshitz, 2000). Cook and Yanow (1993) stipulate that organizational learning is not necessarily a cognitive activity “because at the very least, organizations lack the typical wherewithal for undertaking cognition, to therefore understand organizational learning we must first look for attributes that organizations can be meaningfully understood to posses and use” (Cook and Yanow, 1993: p. 378)

Popper and Lipshitz (1998) argued that treating organizations as though they are humans blurs the differences between two distinct concepts of organizational learning: learning in organizations and learning by organizations. According to Simon (1991) all learning occurs inside an individual’s head, however an organization learns in two ways: first by the learning of its members and second, by acquiring new members with new knowledge to the organization. The first way represents learning in organizations. The second way represents learning by organizations; this locates organizational learning in processes that happen outside the human head, “it defies the reduction of Organizational to individual learning” (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000: p. 184). Comprehending organizational learning as learning in organizations creates a challenge as to how the learning of individual organization members becomes organizational. Learning by organizations creates a different challenge since it needs an answer on the question how learning occurs outside individual human heads.
Cook and Yanow (1993) proposed solutions to problems created by learning in organizations and learning by organizations by using an alternative approach, that used non hypothetical constructs that relates organizations to the experiences and actions of their members by examining the “structural and procedural arrangements through which actions by organizations’ individual members that are understood to entail learning are followed by observable changes in the organizations’ pattern of activities” (Cook and Yanow, 1993 p. 375). Popper and Lipshitz (2000) termed this as organizational learning mechanisms.

Organizational Learning Mechanisms (OLMs) “are institutionalized structural and procedural arrangements that deliberately permit organizations to learn actively, by collecting, analyzing, storing, disseminating and using systematically information that are important to the organization and their member’s performance” (Popper and Lipshitz, 1998; 184,185). An Organizational Learning Mechanism links learning in organizations and learning by organizations in a “concrete, directly observable and malleable fashion” (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000 p. 185). OLMs are operated by individuals within the organizations and they are organizational level entities and processes. Fittingly therefore, organizational learning is defined by Edmondson & Moingeon (1998) as the process in which an organization’s members directly use data to guide behaviour in a way “that promote the ongoing adaption of the organization and allow one to attribute to organizations the capacity to learn and help them build such a capacity, without using metaphorical discourse or positing hypothetical constructs” (Edmondson & Moingeon, 1998 p. 12).

2.2.2 Types and characteristics of Organizational Learning Mechanisms

There are three different types of OLM: Integrated, Non-Integrated and Designated (dual-purpose) Organizational Learning Mechanisms. The differences in the types of Organization Learning Mechanisms are dependent on when and who operates the mechanisms.

2.2.2.1 Integrated OLM:

An integrated OLM is one in which the operators and the clients are identical - the organization members are both responsible for generating and applying lessons learned. An after-action review such as conducting a Real Time Evaluation is an example of an integrated OLM. In this case, the units responsible for evaluation are part of the board responsible for implementing lessons learned. In this type of mechanism, learning takes place as the programs are being implemented. To avoid future mistakes, immediate corrective measures are implemented by decision makers immediately they are identified. In Rural Participatory Evaluation, where the beneficiaries participate vicariously in the decision making and in implementation process, is also an example of an integrated OLM. The main advantage is that subsequent future mistakes are avoided and corrective measures are established immediately (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000).

2.2.2.2 Non-Integrated OLM:

In this case the strategic planning units that are responsible for preparing reports for the management of an organization to utilize in policy decision making and formulation are different
from the team that generates lessons learned. The unit operating the OLM is therefore not responsible for implementing the lessons learned (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000). Unlike in integrated OLM, Lessons learned are not implemented by evaluators or by the same unit that develop the lessons learnt and propose appropriate actions. (Edmondson & Moingeon, 1998; Popper and Lipshitz, 2000)

2.2.2.3 Designated (Dual-Purpose) OLM

In a designated mechanism, learning occurs simultaneously as program activities are being implemented (task performance) i.e. as program personnel implement their routine activities, these personnel have the liberty to change their modalities of performing the tasks according to what they would have learned or experienced without consulting any specified unit and without an evaluation exercise. In this way, no unit is mandated with a specific task. In other words, specialization does not take place within this mechanism. There is no distinction between the unit for formulating policy and unit for implementing policies. Unlike in both Non-Integrated and Integrated OLM where there is specialization, with Dual Purpose OLM, there is no specialization. Also in Dual Purpose OLM, learning occurs simultaneously as program activities are being implemented whereas in both Non-Integrated and Integrated OLMs, learning occurs after program activities have been implemented. Routine reviews within a department in an organisation which are principally performed to deliver outputs are an example of dual mechanisms (Popper & Lipshitz, 2000; Roth, 1997).

Pursuant to Popper and Lipshitz (2000), a combination of non-integrated and designated (dual OLMs) shows the lowest level of organisation learning, although it is cheap to implement this OLM. In both Non-integrated and Dual (Designated) OLMs, learning is assigned to different categories of people who greatly reduce the chances of coordinated implementation due to the separation between learning and acting. However, a combination of Integrated and Non Integrated OLMs shows the highest level of organization learning, although this is most difficult to achieve and also costly to implement in an organisation(Popper and Lipshitz, 2000).

In conclusion, organizational learning and individual learning are similar since they both involve the same stages of information processing, i.e. data collection, analysis, abstractness and retention. However, they are different in two ways, first, information processing is carried at different systemic levels by different structures and secondly, organizational learning involves an important additional stage, dissemination which is the “transmission of information and knowledge among different persons and organizational units” (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000: 185). Humans do learn because they have the nervous system. Organizational Learning Mechanisms are the metaphorically equivalent of the human nervous system which enable organizations to learn. The best OLM that ensures the highest level of learning within the organization is the combination of the Integrated and Designated OLM. The main disadvantage of this combination of OLM is that it is challenging and expensive to establish within an organisation (Argyris, 1982; Roth, 1997; Popper & Lipshitz, 2000)
Chapter Three: The Research Methodology

The research strategy to be used in this thesis is a case study of UNOCHA in the time frame of ten years from 1999 to 2009. Babbie defined a case study as “a case-oriented analysis that aims to understand a particular case or several cases by examining closely and in details” (Babbie 2007: 379). The same notion is shared by Hartley (1993: 34) who defined a case study as “a detailed investigation, often with data collected over a period of time, of phenomena, within their context”. The aim of the study is to provide an analysis and context of the processes which enlightens the theoretical framework being researched (Hartley, 1993; Gomm et al. 2000).

The case study is suited for research questions which require detailed understanding of social or organizational processes since a large amount of data is collected for the study in question. In organizational research, the case study is likely to be one or more organizations or groups and individuals operating within or around the organization (Yin, 1994; Yin, 2010). The detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena cannot provide reliable information about the broader class, but it may be useful in the preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides hypotheses, which may be later tested systematically with a larger number of cases (Yin, 2010). This statement is however over simplified and can be grossly misleading. A case study is a detailed examination of a single example but it is not true that a case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader class (Downe, et al., 2002).

The research will employ a combination of methods including document analysis. According to Altheide (1996: 152), document analysis refers to “an integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving and analysing documents for their relevance, significance and meaning”. For this research a total of five evaluation reports commissioned by UNOCHA were identified, retrieved and analysed for their relevance of quality and characteristic of the reports. These four evaluation reports include: Gujarat, India Earthquake, 2001; Darfur, Southern Sudan Crisis, 2005; Tsunami, 2006; Cyclone Nargis Myanmar, 2008; and the Drought Response in the Horn of Africa, 2006.

Specifically, this study shall review 4 evaluation reports all commissioned by UNOCHA. Based on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, I examined the following elements in these reports:

1. Quality (evaluation methodologies)
2. Credibility of the evaluators
3. Relevance of the evaluation findings: Contextual knowledge of the disaster
4. Findings of the evaluation report
5. Timeliness
6. Communication (dissemination of the evaluation reports)
3.1 Quality: Evaluation Methodologies

Evaluation quality means the evaluation method (Cousins & Leithwood, 1986 p. 352). I will review 4 UNOCHA evaluation reports to determine the evaluation methodology that was applied, therefore for each of the sampled evaluation report; I shall seek to answer the “What Evaluation Method was used?” The evaluation method that involved the stakeholders and community in the process of data collection with less sophistication of processes shall be considered the best type of evaluation.

From Table 1 the five major methods of evaluation that were reviewed in the theoretical chapter can be classified as follows depending on their advantages and disadvantages;

Table 2:
Measure of Disadvantages and Advantages of the an Evaluation Method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Method</th>
<th>Number of Advantages</th>
<th>Number of Disadvantages</th>
<th>Score: the percentage of advantages against disadvantages.</th>
<th>Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real Time Evaluation (RTE)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2/5 is the advantage which translates to 40%</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Feedback Evaluation (RFE)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1/5 is the advantage which translates to 20%</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Assessment (RA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/3 is the advantage which translates to 33%</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Ethnographic Assessment (REA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/3 is the advantage which translates to 33%</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4/5 is the advantage which translates to 80%</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From table 2, I have chosen to use the number of advantages and disadvantages for each of the evaluation methods that were listed in table 1 to establish the score. The score in the above table 2 is defined as the percentage of the number of advantages. Mathematically this is expressed as follows:

\[
\text{Score} = \left( \frac{\text{Number of Advantages}}{\text{Total Number of both advantages and disadvantages}} \right) \times 100\%
\]

The score is an expression of uniformity of the percentage of advantages against the disadvantages. Consequently, higher percentages indicate better evaluation methods. In this method of the calculated quality of the evaluation method, I assumed that; first, all number of advantages and disadvantages were exhaustive in my theoretical review and second, the list of evaluation methods considered are exhaustive.

A score of percentage advantage below 30% is considered Poor, between 30%-50% is considered fair and above 50% is considered good. To conclude, the best evaluation method is
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) with a percentage advantage score of 80% and the worst method is the Rapid Feedback Evaluation with a percentage advantage score of 20%.

3.2 Credibility of the Evaluators
As noted in Chapter 2, a number of writers and social scientists view credibility as a function of reputation, academic qualification and years of experience. The higher the number of years of experience possessed by the evaluators, the better the evaluation is perceived by the decision makers (Alkin et al., 1979; Dawson & D’Amico, 1985). As I examine the evaluation reports, I shall endeavour to answer the following questions with regards to credibility:

1. What is the reputation of the team leader?
2. What is the number of years of experience has the team leader?

3.2.1 What is the Reputation of the Evaluator?
To answer the above question, I seek to ascertain the following:

a. If the evaluator is a member of any international bodies, such as academic institutions, UN and UN agencies, bilateral organizations and International NGOs. An evaluator who is a member of any international bodies shall be considered as having high credibility.

b. Publications of books, journals and articles in the humanitarian field. The more the number of publications the more reputable the evaluator shall be considered.

3.2.2 What is the number of years of experience of the team leader?
Number of years of experience in this case is considered the duration that an evaluator has spent working in humanitarian interventions at various levels ranging from the managerial level, the technical level to the administrative or support level. The following criteria shall be applied:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of years of experience</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Rational for Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 10 years</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>The team leader has experience in implementing various humanitarian interventions and hence better placed to provide recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 5- 10 Years</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>The team leader has relative experience in implementing humanitarian interventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 5 Years</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>The team leader has limited experience in implementing humanitarian interventions and may lack exposure to real life situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Relevance of the Evaluation Findings

Evaluators with appropriate knowledge of the disaster and organisation are known to produce evaluation reports with high quality (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). In examination of the sampled report, I will seek to answer the following questions:

a. Has the report described the context of the disasters? What were the exact causes of the disasters?

b. Has the evaluator worked with the organisation? Are they internal or External Evaluators?

The following criteria shall be used for measuring the context of the evaluation report:

Table 4
Summary of Rank of the Contextual knowledge of the Evaluation Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent of the context of the disaster in evaluation report</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-depth explanation of the context of the disaster with clear factors that caused disaster</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative explanation of the context of the disaster without factors that caused the disaster</td>
<td>Faire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No explanation of the context of the disaster and no records of factors that caused the disaster</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.1 Has the evaluator worked with the organisation?

External evaluators are considered to have limited knowledge of the organisation and may not provide clear recommendations to the organisation. Pursuant to Cousins and Leithwood (1986) an internal evaluator does not necessary have to be currently working with the organisation rather anyone who has ever worked with the organisation may be termed an internal evaluator (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). Therefore, internal evaluators who no longer work for the organisation are more transparent in articulating findings that reveal errors made by the personnel or management of the organisation. Internal evaluators who no longer work for the organisation do not have any conflict of interest in presenting their evaluation findings. In this thesis, the following criteria shall be used a measure of evaluators’ knowledge of the organisation.

Table 5
Summary of Rank of the Evaluator’s Knowledge of the Organisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational knowledge</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The team leader is an internal evaluator</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Team Leader is not an internal evaluator but a couple of the evaluation team are internal members</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The team leader is not an internal evaluator and none of the evaluation team are internal members.</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4 Findings of the Evaluation Report

This is defined by Cousins and Leithwood as the extent to which the results for the evaluation are in agreement with the expectation of key stakeholders (Cousins & Leithwood, 1986). While examining the sampled evaluation reports, I will endeavour to answer the following questions:

a. What were the expectations of the stakeholders;

b. What were the evaluation findings?

To establish the expectations of the stakeholders, I shall review the TOR of the evaluation exercise and list out the major expectations of the stakeholders. I shall therefore employ the following measuring criteria to establish the relationship between the expectations of the stakeholders and the evaluation findings.

Table 6
Summary of Rank of degree of decision makers and the evaluation Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of relationship between the expectations of the stakeholders and the evaluation findings.</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 5 major evaluation findings matched the expectations of the stakeholders</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 to 4 major evaluation findings matched the expectations of the stakeholders</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 2 major evaluation findings matched the expectations of the stakeholders</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5 Timeliness: How fast the evaluation report was completed.

Timeliness is defined as the extent to which the completion of the evaluation is congruent with the need for decision making (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). The degree to which the evaluation report was timely is independent on whether an evaluation was a pre evaluation, mid term evaluation or post evaluation. The only important factor considered is time taken from the period of commencement of the evaluation exercise to the time when the final report is written. The shorter the time taken to finalise an evaluation exercise, the more the findings shall be utilised. The following table demonstrates a set of criteria that shall be used to measure the timeliness of the sampled evaluation reports.

Table 7
Summary of Rank of the duration considered in Timeliness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of the evaluation exercise: from writing the TOR to completing the final report</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Final report was completed 3 Months after the finalising the TOR</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Final report was completed 4-6 Months after the finalising the TOR</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Final report was completed more than 6 Months after the finalising the TOR</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.6 Communication Quality

Communication is defined as the dissemination strategy of the evaluation reports (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). The best communication strategy occurs when the evaluation report is presented orally; the findings are compiled in written reports without using technical language that may not be easily understood by the stakeholders. Evaluation reports that are translated into the local language of the affected communities are known to have the best communication quality (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986; Bigelow and Ciarlo, 1976; Rossman et al., 1979). The following criteria shall be used to measure the extent to which an evaluation report was well communicated to the stakeholders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of communication</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before the finalization of the evaluation exercise, the stakeholders and the evaluators had a debriefing meeting. The final evaluation report was orally presented in a workshop and the mode of presentation was local language. The final report was dissemination in written form</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO debriefing meeting was held. The final evaluation report was orally presented in a workshop and in a foreign language. The final report was dissemination in written form</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No debriefing meeting was held, no oral presentation and only the written form of the report was released in a foreign language.</td>
<td>Poor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another aspect that will be examined in this research is the Organisational Learning Mechanism of UNOCHA. As already noted in chapter 2, there are mainly three different types of OLMs i.e. integrated, non integrated and dual OLM. These are not mutually exclusive and they operate in combinations. The combination of non-integrated and designated (dual OLMs) shows the lowest (although easy to achieve) level of organizational learning. The combination of integrated and designated OLMs shows the highest (although most difficult to achieve) level of organization learning (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000). Since in this thesis, I am interested in the level of learning or improvement achieved, I will assign the best rank to a combination that shows a high level of learning as demonstrated in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8 Summary of Rank of Communication strategies.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before the finalization of the evaluation exercise, the stakeholders and the evaluators had a debriefing meeting. The final evaluation report was orally presented in a workshop and the mode of presentation was local language. The final report was dissemination in written form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO debriefing meeting was held. The final evaluation report was orally presented in a workshop and in a foreign language. The final report was dissemination in written form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No debriefing meeting was held, no oral presentation and only the written form of the report was released in a foreign language.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Measures of Organization learning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of OLM</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Combination of Integrated and Dual OLM | a. Highest level of learning (Popper & Lipshiptz, 2000)  
b. Promotes ownership, sustainability and empowerment of the beneficiaries (Popper & Lipshiptz)  
c. Subsequent mistakes are avoided and corrective measures are taken immediately i.e. learning takes place within tasks performance. | Expensive to implement | Good |
| Combination of Non-Integrated and Dual OLM | Cheap to implement in an organisation | a. Lowest level of Learning (Popper & Lipshiptz, 2000)  
b. Learning tasks place away from task performance i.e. corrective measures are not implemented immediately, hence future mistakes are repeated. | Fair |
| Integrated, Dual and Non-Integrated OLM | Expensive to implement (Popper & Lipshiptz, 2000)  
Does not promote ownership, empowerment and sustainability (Popper & Lipshiptz, 2000) | Poor |

3.7 The document review

This study will be mainly qualitative in nature which means it is not a numerical examination and interpretation of observations for establishing underlying meanings and patterns of relationships (Babbie, 2007). Qualitative studies are essentially descriptive and inferential in nature but this does not mean that they are not important in social research. They can generate significant results that have to be described and interpreted. As noted by Yin 1994, facts do not speak for themselves; someone has to speak for them (Yin, 1994, 289).

The qualitative method focuses mainly on a special kind of information, such as what people tell you and what they do. In other words, qualitative method enables researchers to do the following; (1) to carry out an investigation where other methods such as experiments are either not practicable or not ethically justifiable, (2) to get the real detail or under the skin of a group or
organization to find out what really happens. This enables the researcher to comprehend the formal reality which can only be understood from the inside perspective, (3) to view the case from the inside out ‘to see the case from the perspective of those involved in the process’. (Bryman, 1988: 183; Altheide, 1996)

For this study a documentation review of UNOCHA publications has been applied. A total of seven UNOCHA publications were examined. These publications were written within the year range from 1993 to 2009. The period therefore covers the time when UNOCHA was established in 1992 to the period under scrutiny in this study i.e. 2009. The publication entitled “The Roles and Formation of the ESS (1993)” was examined in detailed to provide thorough understanding of the roles of UNOCHA in regards to emergency response. This publication is a UNOCHA report, the writers are UNOCHA employees working under the ESS section, evidently therefore, they are best suited to detail the roles of UNOCHA. Although the roles of UNOCHA has greatly evolved over the years and different structures have been introduced, this publication still provides a fundamental sketch of UNOCHA which has never changed since its establishment (UNOCHA, 1993)

In 1999, UNOCHA held a seminar in Stockholm to examine lessons learned on humanitarian coordination. The product of that seminar was compiled into a report entitled “Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons Learned (1999)” This seminar was a milestone in the history of UNOCHA and it was a high profile seminar. The resolutions of the seminar were meant to further improve humanitarian coordination - one of the most fundamental roles of UNOCHA. This report reviews the emergency response of UNHOC HA to complex emergencies. The seminar included the donor community such as delegates from the European Commission, delegates from the G8 countries and private sector such as the Ford Foundation, Bill Gates Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation. The report therefore presented a fair criticism of UNOCHA’s response to emergencies since the seminar included the participation of the other stakeholders (UNOCHA, 1999).

The “Organizational Structure for Coordination and Emergency” written in 2004 is a report that provides a detailed overview of UNOCHA. In this report the roles of the UN Resident Coordinator, UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT), Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Humanitarian Coordinator (UNDAC) were reviewed. This report was commissioned by UNOCHA but conducted by an external consultant, hence the issues of biasness was completely avoided by outsourcing this exercise. Like all the other reports, this particular report was not published in any academic journal and consequently remains grey material for academic purpose. A number of the recommendations from this report informed the 2005 Humanitarian Reform of UNOCHA (UNOCHA, 2004).

UNOCHA has written a detailed Handbook on “Evaluation, Knowledge Management and Learning Mechanism of UNOCHA”. The latest edition (2006 edition) of this handbook was examined for this study. This book explains the principles of evaluation, defines the system of
knowledge management and highlights the building blocks for the Learning Mechanism of UNOCHA. This book was published by the Policy Branch of UNOCHA and it provides step by step procedures and policies that are used by Policy Branch of UNOCHA. It provides a detailed insight in the work of UNOCHA. The handbook is designed for use by personnel of the Policy Branch of UNOCHA only and it both serves as an orientation handbook and reference handbook. In order for anybody to understand the mechanisms of evaluation, knowledge management and learning of UNOCHA, this handbook is a must read.

Although I read the handbook in detail and understood the policies and procedures for UNOCHA evaluation, knowledge management and Learning Mechanism, I never got the opportunity to examine whether the procedures written down in this handbook are applied in practice by all employees of UNOCHA. In this study therefore, I made the assumption that the practices of the personnel in Policy Branch department is in compliance of the procedures in this handbook.

Other reports published by UNOCHA that were examined for this study included: “Complex crisis and complex peace, Humanitarian coordination in Angola” published in 1998. This provided an overview of UNOCHA’s learning mechanism and compiled lessons learnt from the Angola crisis. “Saving Lives during Emergency” (2008) is a report compiled by the ESS of UNOCHA that focuses mainly on the weakness of the learning mechanism of UNOCHA. The ESS criticized their own work and it goes without a saying that it is possible that not all the weaknesses of learning mechanism of UNOCHA were detailed in this report. Finally, I examined the report “Structural improvements for Effective Response during Emergency (2009)”. This report focused mainly on the learning mechanisms of UNOCHA and proposed a number of changes that has been implemented to improve organisation learning of UNOCHA. This report was completed in 2009 and it is the latest UNOCHA report that this study examined in detail. The report was compiled by ESS and there are therefore issues of bias and lack of independence.

In conclusion of this Chapter, the information or data for this research shall be collected through documentation reviews; this will include letters, policy statements, regulations, guidelines and reports of UNOCHA. As stated by Altheide (1996) the data collected through document review will provide a formal framework to which one may relate to when investigating informal realities such as internal organization weaknesses (Altheide, 1996). The major limitation for documentation review method of data collection is that I did not get the opportunity to examine if written policies, procedures and guidelines documented in UNOCHA reports are actually practiced since I did not work with UNOCHA. Further this shall be a case study examining only a single example of humanitarian organization and a single type of emergency i.e. UNOCHA and natural disaster respectively.
Chapter Four: Knowledge Management, Learning and Evaluation Mechanism at UNOCHA

This chapter will examine and present the role and scope of evaluation in OCHA and OCHA’s OLM. As noted in Chapter 2, Organizational Learning Mechanisms (OLMs) are institutionalized structural and procedural arrangements that deliberately permit organizations to learn actively, by collecting, analyzing, storing, disseminating and using systematic information that are important to the organization and their member’s performance (Popper and Lipshitz, 1998). There are three different types of OLM, these include; Integrated, Non-Integrated and Designated (dual-purpose) Organizational Learning Mechanisms. The differences in the types of Organization Learning Mechanisms are dependent on when and who operates the mechanisms. These OLMs are not mutually exclusive, they operate in combinations. The combinations of Integrated and Dual purpose provide the best learning mechanism.

4.1 The Evaluation and Studies Section of UNOCHA

Although OCHA has not previously had a specialized evaluation unit, evaluation activities focusing on lessons learned have always been an inherent part of the OCHA’s Policy Branch (Jamal & Crips, 2002; Lautze, et al., 1998). A number of publications on lessons learned were produced by the lessons learnt unit since 2000. These reports included: “mine action capacities in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Angola” in 1996/97 and “coping with crisis, coping with Aid” (1996). However, in 2001, the lesson learnt unit became non-functioning and it was replaced by the Policy Branch that was mandated with implementation of reviews on a wide range of issues like OCHA’s performance in East Timor, the role of OCHA in emergency UN operations following crisis or disasters (UNOCHA, 2004).

In 2000 there was a change in management processes in OCHA which recognized that, OCHA needed to have a solid foundation for institutional learning, performance review and incorporation of lessons into policy and decision making process. In 2001, a commitment was made to strengthen the evaluation function by creating an Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS) within the Policy Development and Studies Branch (UNOCHA 1999).

Monitoring and Evaluation play key roles in identifying and promoting development work that has the most positive outcomes and biggest impact on the lives of people in developing countries. According to UNOCHA, “strong evaluation systems can contribute to positive development outcomes as part of a system of good governance, however, weak evaluation systems can lead to poor or at least suboptimal, development outcomes”. OCHA also views evaluation as a key management and learning tool. The main objectives of the evaluation function in OCHA include: “documenting and dissemination of lessons learnt of humanitarian coordination practices; promoting institutional learning and sharing and finally utilization of evaluation findings in policy development”. In conclusion, OCHA has been encouraged by the
evaluation unit to strengthen its evaluation function to allow for generating lessons learned and driving important information and knowledge in order to feedback into policy and program (UNOCHA, 2006: 32, 46/47, 58, ).

UNOCHA’s evaluation function is implemented through principles. One major principle is the independence of evaluation procedures. Evaluations are managed by OCHA’s Evaluation and Studies Section but undertaken by external consultants. Consultants must not have been involved in the formulation or implementation of the projects being evaluated. Evaluations must therefore be credible, transparent, fair and independent. All evaluation reports are made available to the public. All UNOCHA Evaluation reports include a Management response matrix (MRM) indicating specific measures to be taken (Christian Michelsen Institute, 2001; UNOCHA, 1999).

UNOCHA’s review on the other hand, analyzes a particular aspect, cluster or theme in the work program. Reviews often use the same methods as external evaluations and are undertaken by external consultants. Reviews are also managed by the Policy Branch (PDSB). OCHA’s studies are also managed by ESS or by the Policy Branch and are undertaken by staff and/or consultants. The findings of studies are shared with donors and other key stakeholders. Finally, Lesson learning reviews serve the purpose of learning from past experience and to incorporate these lessons into future activities and programming and institutional memory. They take the form of participatory exercises led by a facilitator. These exercises should be held once an emergency situation has stabilized and should include the key parties involved in the emergency operation, such as aid agencies, donors, NGOs, Governments, and representatives of the affected community (UNOCHA, 2006’; Braunmuelh & Kulessa, 2006; Donini, et al., 1996; Lautze, et al., 1998)

4.2 The Mechanism and Principles of Learning at OCHA

The learning mechanism of OCHA seeks to integrate accountability, performance review, use of evaluation findings (results or recommendations) for decision-making and institutional learning or knowledge sharing. In order to achieve organizational learning, “OCHA utilizes a multi-faceted approach that emphasises accountability and performance measurement through external evaluations and promotes learning-oriented organization through lesson learning exercises, internal reviews and strengthening of evaluative capacity” (UNOCHA, 2006: 48). To summarize, the objective of the learning mechanism is to refine policy, enhance OCHA’s activities in terms of planning and programming and to improve accountability to key stakeholders such as the member states (UNOCHA, 2006: Eaton, et al., 1997a; 1997b; 1997c; Wahlstrom & Hurford, 2001).

The learning mechanism of OCHA is based on six main building blocks as outlined in the following paragraphs. The first building block is: Participating in or managing systems-wide evaluations, involving the evaluation units of several UN agencies (UNOCHA, 1999; 45). All evaluations will either recognize the UN system’s response to specific thematic issues or
evaluate the UN response to a major emergency from which system wide lessons can be obtained. Following OCHA’s mandate, special emphasis will be paid to the coordination element of the response. Apart from evaluating whether objectives for that particular issue/operation were met, in each evaluation findings, recommendations should lead to a broader refinement of policy and programming. Therefore the terms of references of such evaluations should be agreed upon through the IASC mechanism\(^{13}\) and their implementation should be undertaken with the joint participation of IASC members (UNOCHA, 1999).

The second building block is *undertaking OCHA-specific evaluations to assess OCHA performance at country level, program level or technical level* (UNOCHA, 1999; 67; Eaton, et al., 1997a; 1997b; 1997c). OCHA specific evaluations are evaluations undertaken by external consultants but supervised by OCHA Evaluations and Studies Section (PSDB/ESS). The recruitment of the consultants and development of the terms of references for such evaluations is managed by the Evaluation and Studies Unit. The consultants are recruited through a competitive recruitment process using short-listing or requests for proposal procedures. Key criterion for selecting the consultants do not only include technical competence, credibility, gender balance and regional expertise but also the fact that evaluations are not undertaken by anyone who has been associated with the operation so as to maintain the independence and objectivity. The evaluations are managed by the ESS with support of respective field offices and OCHA branches. The results, findings and recommendations are shared with all the stakeholders including a management response matrix and implementation plan for all recommendations (UNOCHA, 2006).

The third building block is *undertaking system-wide situation-specific or theme-specific lesson learning reviews following a humanitarian crisis*: these would be undertaken in-country by field staff together with agency partners, facilitated by an external consultant (UN OCHA, 2006: 55). Unlike evaluations, learning reviews are reviews conducted by those who implemented a humanitarian assistance activity. The objectives of learning reviews include; provision of valuable insights into good and bad practice, information of future decision-making and program design. These quick internal learning reviews allow OCHA to capture and provide immediate feedback to managers and field staff and thus contribute to improving field performance. Learning reviews are participatory; involving other field stakeholders and they are done according to the standard guidelines provided by the ESS (UNOCHA, 2006; 1998; 1999; Porter, 2002).

The fourth building block is *undertaking desk reviews and case studies in support of policy-making* (Joint initiatives with policy staff) (UNOCHA, 2006: 97) Desk reviews and case studies are internal exercises that may involve an external consultant to help facilitate the process. Desk

\(^{13}\) Basically there are four sets of processes that constitute the ISAC mechanism: (a) the IASC is composed of the principals of IASC member agencies, (b) the IASC working group, (c) the subsidiary bodies and (d) weekly IASC meeting. The TOR for any evaluations passes through these groups before it’s approved. (IASC, 2010)
reviews and case studies are therefore not evaluations but are more research and policy oriented. If consultants are used they will be selected through a short listing or request for proposal process. There is a wealth of desk reviews and case studies that exists, hence to avoid duplication, the ESS collect all the lessons for policy and decision-making from these studies and disseminate these in the appropriate forum such as web page, newsletters, learning networks and UN Agencies websites (UNOCHA, 2006; Donini, 1996).

The fifth building block for learning mechanism at UNOCHA is promoting learning and participation in international and national Humanitarian Assistance initiatives, forum and networks and building strong learning partnerships with other UN agencies, donors and NGOs (UNOCHA, 2006: 112). This focuses on promoting learning, institutional memory building and sharing knowledge with partners. This activity is undertaken in line with OCHA’s core mission of mobilizing and coordinating effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors. OCHA needs to share and discus it’s lessons and experiences with other actors in the humanitarian field. Experience gained from OCHA activities, reviews and lessons learning exercises must be made available to other organizations. While other branches and field activities of OCHA can also undertake review and lessons learned exercises, the ESS can play a pivotal role in promoting internal and external knowledge-building and sharing and form an in house knowledge centre. Existing learning forum on humanitarian assistance such as the ALNAP should be supported and incorporated into any knowledge building strategy. The ESS seeks stronger partnerships in particular with the UN Peacekeeping Lessons Learned Unit, evaluation units of partner UN agencies, ECHO, donor evaluation units and also relevant national and regional academic and NGO learning networks and activities (Collins, 2000; Minear, 1999; Nan, 2001; UNOCHA 2006).

The final building block is strengthening OCHA’s evaluation and monitoring capacity and support to field offices (UNOCHA, 2006: 129). Strengthening OCHA’s evaluation capacity means building evaluative capacity throughout the organization. ESS focuses on strategic and thematic issues and provides technical guidance to field offices undertaking evaluations or reviews. A basic training course on evaluating humanitarian coordination is managed by ESS. The planned induction training for new OCHA staff should contain an evaluation module with a focus on organizing lessons reviews. Staff interested in evaluation could also participate as team members in the reviews and select evaluations. Basic evaluation guidelines will also be elaborated and the ESS has built a roster of qualified and tested evaluation consultants that can be tapped into by relevant units, field offices and partners. The webpage on OCHA-online is planned to facilitate easy internal and external access to evaluation reports, reviews and studies, key lessons, evaluation websites of partner organizations, and M&E tools (UNOCHA 2006; 1999).
4.3 Management of the Program Information System

All the final products from building block one to six feed into the Program Management Information System (PMIS)\(^\text{14}\). This is a large share drive that can only be edited by the Chief of the ESS. Once the final evaluation reports with management matrix are filed in the PMIS, all the users of UN world wide can view and retrieve the information but they can not edit. This strict measure is taken to ensure that much as the information is available to all UN users, the final approved evaluation reports are not distorted in any way. To enable the non-UN users to access these final products, some of the evaluation reports are shared on public portals like Relief Web (www.reliefweb.int). Evaluation reports may also be made available OCHANet and on OCHA On Line (UNOCHA, 2010). The ESS’s major role is to ensure that all the building blocks of UNOCHA learning system described above are carried out as planned every year. In that way, the ESS prepares annual evaluation work plan that includes all the six building learning blocks. The final annual evaluation work plan is approved by Senior Management Team (SMT)\(^\text{15}\) (UNOCHA, 2010).

Evaluation activities are not useful and provide no value-addition unless their recommendations and lessons are applied in current and future programming as well as in policy and decision making process. Both the evaluations and reviews (products of the six building blocks) themselves and the implementation of their recommendations form an important part of learning mechanism of OCHA. In particular, this system aims to share the results of the evaluations and reviews in a meaningful way by establishing a follow up mechanism. It is envisaged that following each evaluation a management response matrix will be prepared which indicates agreement or disagreement with the recommendations made in the report, what follow-up action will be taken, by whom and when. The ESS will monitor the implementation of these management response matrices (UNOCHA 2006; 1999; 1998).

A detailed dissemination strategy was developed by the ESS in 2002, in collaboration with OCHA’s Advocacy, External Relations and Information Management Branch. It looked at efficiency and effectiveness of different dissemination tools such as a newsletter, contributions to technical journals, a virtual library and web pages within OCHA-Online. The dissemination mechanism identified innovative tools for shared learning as Evaluation Implementation Systems and for ensuring that relevant past experience is made available at the right time to the appropriate user groups (UNOCHA, 2006).

The table below provides a summary of the type of responsibilities of ESS and how its relates to types of OLM discussed in Chapter 2.

\(^{14}\) In some of the UNOCHA publications, PMIS is also termed the Policy and Guidance Management Systems (UNOCHA, 1999; 2006; 2010).

\(^{15}\) The SMT members consist of all the departmental heads of UNOCHA. The chief of the ESS is a member of the SMT responsible for approving and implementing policies (UNOCHA 2010)
Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Role of ESS unit</th>
<th>Type of OLM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervise independent consultants (Evaluators) during evaluation exercise</td>
<td>Non-Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lessons learned are actually generated by the external evaluators who were</td>
<td>Non-Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supervised by the ESS unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons are filed in the PMIS</td>
<td>Non-Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General management of the PMIS to ensure that it is functioning appropriately</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons learned are implemented after the program implementation not during the</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>program implementation phase.</td>
<td>and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons Learned are implemented by the same unit (ESS) that operate the PMIS and</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the same unit that supervised the evaluation exercise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, the six building blocks enable UNOCHA to generate lessons learned and recommendations. The building blocks take the form of evaluations, lessons learned, internal reviews and studies. The final products from all the six building blocks with clear management matrix and plan of implementation are developed by the ESS and are approved by the SMT. The evaluation, study and review reports are generated by the support of external evaluators and/or facilitators to maintain credibility and independence of the findings and recommendations. The approved reports are filed in the UNOCHA PMIS, if these require editing then it’s only the Chief of the ESS who can edit these reports once they have been filled. All UN users can retrieve these reports online and some reports are posted on public portals for non-UN users to retrieve them (UNOCHA 2010).

The ESS is in charge of developing the annual evaluation work plan and contracting external evaluators according to the set guidelines within the six building blocks. In brief the following are the responsibilities of the ESS; (1) development and implementation of OCHA Evaluation policy and strategy, (2) supervise the implementation of the annual evaluation work plan, (3) ensure that all OCHA evaluations are performed in an independent way and in accordance with the set principles within the six building blocks (4) organise the briefing and dissemination events of evaluation findings and recommendations to all the key stakeholders. In the above context, ESS is both responsible for generating the lessons learnt and implementing them (UNOCHA, 2010).
5. Chapter Five: Review of Sampled Evaluation Reports

For this research a total of four evaluation reports commissioned by UNOCHA were identified, retrieved and analysed for their: Quality, as defined in chapter two is the methodological sophistication, type of approach of evaluation; Credibility which is defined as the reputation of the evaluators; Relevance is the extent to which the evaluation findings reflected knowledge of context; Communication is the dissemination strategy employed to distribute the evaluation findings; Findings is the extent to which the evaluation findings are congruent to the expectations of the decision makers and finally; Timeliness which refers to the period within which the evaluation report is made available for use, a short time demonstrates positive correlation with the application of the evaluation findings.

As I am examining improvement in the quality of evaluation reports as a result of evaluation recommendations, only the negative findings will be highlighted in this review. This goes without saying that there were areas where the UN’s and International Humanitarian Organizations’ response to disasters were good and needed no further improvements but this is not reflected in this chapter. The four evaluation reports include: Gujarat, India Earthquake, 2001; Darfur, Southern Sudan Crisis, 2005; Tsunami, 2006 and Cyclone Nargis Myanmar, 2008. For all the reports, a brief review of their respective TORs shall be provided. In the TOR the expectations of the decision makers are clearly stipulated.

5.1 The Gujarat, India Earthquake of 2001:

5.1.1 The impact of the Earthquake

The earthquake that struck India’s western state of Gujarat on 26 January 2001- India’s Republic Day Holiday- measured 6.9 on the Richter scale and lasted for about 110 seconds. The effect was devastating, and about 20,000 people were killed. More than 160,000 people were injured and approximately 400,000 houses were destroyed, resulting in almost a million people without shelter. Although the earthquake had an impact on 21 of the 25 districts in Gujarat state, five districts in the Northern-Western part of Gujarat were mainly affected and the most affected district of the five was Bhuj. In total, over 15 million people were directly or indirectly affected by the earthquake. Infrastructures such as schools, hospitals, health centres, community centres, roads and communication networks were severely disrupted both in the urban and in the rural settings. The total direct and indirect losses according to the Government of India were USD 4.5 billion. More than 50% were losses due to destructions of housing alone.

5.1.2 Review of the Terms of Reference

A detailed Term of Reference for the evaluation was developed and shared with members of the Inter-Standing Committee Working Group (IASC WG) before finalisation. Comments, reviews

16 The information regarding The Gujarat, India Earthquake of 2001 were obtained from the works of Margareta Wahlstrom and David Harland.(2001). The Role of OCHA in Emergency. UN Operations following the Earthquake in Gujarat, India-26 January 2001- A lessons learned study.
and remarks of the IASC WG were incorporated into the final TOR. The TOR highlighted the specific terms of the evaluation that included two major areas. First, the time focus of the evaluation: it was established that the evaluation would focus only on the emergency period i.e. the period from the 26th of January to the time when the Government of India declared the emergency phase of operations over, which was the 20th of February. This date is arbitrarily set since it is believed that only after the 20th February the response entered the phase of rehabilitation and recovery. It is true that search and rescue operations had ended before the 20th of February but the rescued members and those left without homes and foods needed relief for immediate survival. Second, the substantive focus; the evaluation was to describe and analyse the overall UN system for this particular response. In particularly, the focus should be on the UN organizational set up and the changes during the course of the response. The evaluation study would also describe and analyse OCHA’s role in providing initial assessment and technical leadership in coordination during the overall response. Finally, this evaluation would describe and analyse the mechanisms within the UN systems and OCHA’s functions that enabled liaison and coordination with other non-UN partners such as the Government of India, bilateral donor Governments and international search and rescue teams which included NGOs, Red Cross and the media.

Furthermore, the TOR stipulated the expected outcome of the evaluation to include: provision of clear and specific statements on the adequacy of the UN response, the effectiveness of OCHA’s assessment and technical leadership in coordination of humanitarian response and finally, the effectiveness and/or inadequacy of UN’s international organisation at the earthquake site. Upon establishing the effectiveness and/or inadequacy of UN response, the evaluation would provide recommendations and lessons learnt that are replicable for improved future response.

5.1.3 Quality:

The evaluation methodology included a thorough review of documentation. About 17 different publications were reviewed; all these publications provided documented evidence on the first response of the Gujarati earthquake. In Annex 1, a list of the publications reviewed for this evaluation has been attached. The second methodology strategy included extensive interviews. Extensive interviews indeed since the number of those interviewed included more than 80. Notably, the interviewees were from various organisations. All the members of UNDAC that were deployed and responded to the Gujarat earthquake were interviewed, as well as UN staff in Geneva, New York, Rome, New Delhi, Gujarati and other international organisations members in Stockholm and London. Public servants of the Government of India and the State of Government of Gujarat and other local Indian associations that responded to the earthquake were interviewed as well. A full list of those interviewed is detailed and attached in Annex 2.

The extensive were conducted with representatives of the Government of India, representatives of the UN country team, other partners such as Danish Embassy personnel, and representatives of the European Commission, the United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Swedish Rescue Services and
the Relief and Rehabilitation Program representative for CARITAS. These lists were exhaustive; however, the victims of the disaster were not included in the interviews.

Debriefing sessions during the evaluation process were held with mainly UN Agencies, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and other bilateral international organizations to discuss the preliminary findings of the evaluation. The search and rescue teams that implemented the rescue phase of the program were not involved during the debriefing sessions. Three debriefing sessions were held, first with the partners. The main feedback was the lack of coordination during the search and rescue phase. The second debriefing session was held with government of India and the bilateral international organisations. This session focused mainly on the use of funds during the initial search and rescue phase. Finally, the third debriefing session was held with UN Agencies to critically examine the coordination role of UNOCHA.

Rapid Feedback Evaluation (RTE) was employed as a stand-alone approach to provide quick answers on UNOCHA’s coordination role during the emergency. This type of evaluation is suitable in situations where managers have already identified the problem regarding the program operations but still need confirmation in order to establish corrective measures or in situations where managers have specific questions about program performance (McNall et al., 2004; Sonnichsen, 2000; McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). The main disadvantages for using this evaluation method include: it only preludes to a full scale evaluation (Sonnichsen 2000; McNall et al., 2004), since in order to obtain detailed recommendations it has to be followed by a full scale evaluation that includes the beneficiaries. Secondly, it is only applicable when managers have already identified specific problem and/or questions (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). Third, not sufficient information is collected since only a limited new data is collected by brief interviews (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007) and finally the balance between speed and trustworthy may be hampered (McNall & Foster-Fishman, 2007). Based on the above rationale I have ranked the quality of this evaluation report as poor.

5.1.4 Credibility:

Ms. Margareta Wahlstrom, who led the evaluation team, has more than 25 years of extensive national and international experience in disaster management, capacity building and institutional strengthening of local and international organisations. She has also been the Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and Assistant Secretary General in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Under Secretary General for Disaster Response and Operations and Deputy Director Operations of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Ms. Wahlstrom has held senior positions as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Chief of Staff and Director Area Coordinator for Relief Recovery and Rehabilitation in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In 2004, Ms. Wahlstrom was appointed the Assistant Secretary General for Disaster Risk Reduction and

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17 The evaluation report does not include members from the search and rescue team in the debriefing session but includes them in the interviews.
Special Representative of the Secretary General for the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action in the Secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. Currently, Ms. Wahlstrom is working as a member of the commission on Climate Change and Development, established by the Swedish Government.

Following the Alkin et al., (1979) definition of credibility as a function of reputation (Alkin et al., 1979; Dawson & D’Amico, 1985), then it can be concluded the team leader Ms. Wahlstrom is highly credible. From my methodology chapter; experiences of more than 10 years with steady career progress exhibits high credibility which should associate with high usage of the evaluation report. Therefore, the credibility of this evaluator is ranked as good.

5.1.5 Relevance:
India as a whole is a highly disaster prone area with much of the landmass lying within the earthquake risk zones and it is also prone to cyclones, flooding and droughts. Benefiting from the global economic growth, India has experienced steady economic growth for several years. In 2001, the Government of India expected the economy to grow by approximately 6%. India has good governance policies which promote openness to the outside world of the Indian administration. The Government of India further demonstrated openness by receiving international aid as spontaneously offered, despite the fact that the Government of India has had the policy not to ask for, or appeal for, international aid. The Government has a policy to accept “expressions of solidarity”. Although the policy did not change, in practice however, the Government did engage with the International relief community more fully than it had in the past.

In the recent past, Indian Authorities assumed all responsibility for responding to disasters through the use of its national resources. This made the UN system to have only limited prior experience in how to engage effectively with the Indian authorities in crisis response situations.

Pursuant to Cousins and Leithwood (1986) relevancy implies to what extent the evaluators and the evaluation report shows knowledge of understanding of the technical sector being investigated. Internal evaluators have more knowledge about their organization’s characters than external evaluators (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). The evaluation report showed that the evaluators had extensive knowledge on the context of India regarding disaster. Also from the credibility of the evaluators, they have had vast experience in UN systems and they have accurate knowledge of UN systems. The relevance of this evaluation report is good.

5.1.6 Timeliness:
The evaluation exercise for the response on the Gujarat earthquake was commissioned in March, approximately three months after the earthquake and by then, the search and rescue operations had long ended. The final report was written and presented to the UN for use and dissemination only on the 31st of May, 2001. As explained above, the evaluation focused only on the
emergency phase (search and rescue phase) that ended on the 20th of February, 2001. None of the findings listed below enabled the UN or international humanitarian organisations to re-plan their implementation strategies.

According to Alkin (2000), timeliness provides the opportunity for the implementers to establish corrective measures and to avoid future mistakes in the program interventions (Alkin, 2000). The report was completed after the search and rescue phase had long ended within duration of 3 months. The timeliness of the report is good.

5.1.7 Findings:

The main finding of the report was that the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) system was not effective. UNDAC was only able to establish an On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) one week after the initial quake. The UNDAC team arrived too late to contribute significantly towards the search and rescue operations. During the following phase of the emergency, after the search and rescue operations, UNDAC was too limited in number, and too poorly equipped to provide coordination mechanisms during the emergency. Internal coordination within the UN community was poor. Other concerns that affected the response were the issues of limited knowledge of the UNDAC members to work in India. In addition, on arrival in India, the UNDAC team leader was not able to meet with the Resident Coordinator until when the ERC arrived in India which was towards the end of the emergency phase of the operations.

The UNDAC team was deployed by UN Geneva without giving them the standard support modules which are designed to make them operational. UN Geneva assumed that the UNDAC team would be supported logistically by the UNDP in Delhi, hence during the deployment, UN Geneva did not adhere to the stand by agreements that stipulates that “in disaster situation, UN mobilise material support from member states to support the initiate and immediate responses to emergency” (Wahlstrom & Harland, 2001: 32)

The interview results from Ms. Maria Olga summarised the arrival and activities of the UNDAC team as “the UNDAC team arrived, established their presence on-site too little, too late. Too little, in that they never had resources and they were few in number than expected and too late to search and rescue any lives” - Ms. Maria Olga Gonzalez, Emergency Response Division, UNDP Geneva (Wahlstrom & Harland, 2001: 32)

Both the United Nations Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) and UNDAC did not know their precise roles during the emergency response. In a nutshell, there was need to clarify the institutional arrangements which govern the UN’s response to natural disasters and strong leadership systems should be instituted. The appeal documents with detail immediate needs, action plan and budget was issued too late by the United Nations Disaster Management Team in Delhi.
The appeal process for soliciting funds for the response was issued too late and could not be of any use during the emergency phase of the disaster. The ‘Immediate Needs and Action Plan’ was issued by UN Disaster Management Team in Delhi on the 8th February. This was already too late to improve any response during the emergency phase.

Response from national organizations (Government of India, Private Sector, Civil Society and Individuals) dominated the search and rescue phase and it was very impressive given the conditions in which the earthquake had affected the community. Sadly, there was no integrated approach between the national and international responses. UNOCHA did not coordinate the national response effectively and did not establish a technical leadership system. The community capacity was not strengthened by UN systems.

Finding is defined by Cousins and Leithwood as the extent to which the results for the evaluation are in agreement with the expectation of key stakeholders (Cousins & Leithwood, 1986). From the TOR the evaluators expected the evaluation to describe and analyse the overall UN system for this particular response; in particularly, the UN organizational set up and the changes during the course of the response. From the findings above, it can be concluded that expectation of the decision makers were met. The finding of this report was good.

5.1.8 Communication:
In the Terms of Reference for the evaluation, the consultants were to spend two days working in Geneva and about two weeks in the field (India) conducting Interviews. The consultant was then supposed to prepare a draft of the evaluation report and submit to UNOCHA for comments and reviews before the final evaluation was prepared. This process does not include dissemination of the evaluation. There was no evidence in the evaluation report that the report would be presented to UNOCHA or to other stakeholders orally.

Communication is defined as the dissemination strategy of the evaluation reports (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). Oral presentation of evaluation results along with written reports and coupled with the use of non technical language is found to contribute to higher impact, improved readability, greater awareness and appreciation of the evaluation results (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986; Bigelow and Ciarlo, 1976; Rossman et al., 1979). Although the report of this evaluation was published on Reliefweb and submitted to UNOCHA, there is no evidence that the findings of the evaluation was presented orally to the UNOCHA team. The communication strategy employed for this report was poor.
### Table 11

**Conclusion and Summary: Gujarat India Earthquake of 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Quality</th>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Rapid Feedback Method of evaluation was applied. Not sufficient data was collected, the beneficiaries who are very important stakeholders were not interviewed</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>More than 25 years of experience in the field of humanitarian program implementation</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Detailed knowledge of the disaster, context (economic and political situation of India) was discussed in the report. The Evaluation worked with UNOCHA and provided detailed structural knowledge of the organisation.</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>4 major evaluation findings matched the expectation of the decision makers. I.e. the roles of UN in Emergency response, the delays of UN in Emergency response, none involvement of the beneficiaries in program design, implementation and Limited resources provided by UN to appropriately respond to the emergency.</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>The final evaluation report was completed in May, 2 months after the commission of the report.</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>The final report was not disseminated in any workshop, no debriefing meetings were held with the stakeholders after completion of the exercise. The report was not written in the local language, only the English version was finalised.</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table, it can be concluded that the quality of the report was fair. Although the report ranked good in timeliness, relevance and credibility, the report ranked poor in the parameter of quality.

#### 5.2 Darfur, Southern Sudan Crisis, 2003-2005

5.2.1 The Impact of the Darfur Crisis

The Darfur crisis was considered one of the most serious humanitarian situations of its times. This was a gradually developing humanitarian situation due to conflicts between the Jee tribal group and another rebel group supported by Government of Sudan (GOS). Humanitarian efforts to respond to the massive needs in every sector such as protection, health, food and nutrition, shelter, water, hygiene and sanitation were hampered, among other challenges, by violence and armed conflict, lack of access, obstruction of humanitarian assistance, delayed funding, low

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staffing levels and other logistical challenge of providing aid in an expansive geographic area with very limited infrastructure. It was reported that “despite scaling up the humanitarian aid, these on-going challenges coupled with the scope and scale of the disaster ensured both that many needs remained unmet and that those affected” were vulnerable to other further forms of abuses (Hugo, 2004: 45)

The crisis resulted into displacement of an estimated 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) within vulnerable host communities that did not have a minimum level of humanitarian support and aid. Children and women constituted the highest number of IDPs and the most vulnerable to the effects of displacement, poverty, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. By the time of the evaluation more than 82% of IDPs lacked access to sanitation, 50% had no access to primary health facilities. The greatest shortfalls therefore were in the health and nutrition, and water and sanitation sectors and in IDP camp management.

5.2.2 Review of the Terms of Reference

The objective of the evaluation was two fold. First the evaluation was to provide recommendations to improve the operational response and second, the evaluation had to identify broader lessons learned in Darfur for future humanitarian action. The evaluation would review UNOCHA’s response from January 2003 and the findings would inform the Consolidated Appeals Process. The evaluation would further focus on “timeliness, coherence, coverage, appropriateness, relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and protection provided to the vulnerable population in Darfur” (Broughton and Maguire, 2006 p. 99). This evaluation ascertained the roles of UNOCHA during the emergency response in relationship with the wider response from implementing partners and NGOs in responding to the Darfur crisis. Recommendations of this evaluation was presented in way that would address other challenges surrounding early warning and preparedness, surge capacity and quality of the overall response with special focus to thematic areas such as food, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, protection and camp management.

As children and women constituted the highest number of IDPs and the most vulnerable to the effects of displacement, poverty, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, the evaluation focused special attention to gender issues and children’s rights challenges. The nature of the conflict has also caused widespread abuse of human rights and because of that, the evaluation paid particular attention to human rights dimensions of this crisis and matters regarding impact on protection assistance. To summarise, the evaluation focused on the roles of UNOCHA in relationship with other implementing partners, gender and children’s rights issues, human rights and international humanitarian law and issues regarding early warning and preparedness in the sectors of food, nutrition and health, water and sanitation, protection and camp management.
5.2.3 Quality:

An iterative approach was employed for this evaluation in which five phases and three distinct field visits were planned as follows: (1). The preparatory phase, (2). First field visit phase, (3). Agency and donor consultations phase, (4). Second field visit phase and (5). The third and final field visit phase. This iterative approach was meant to enable consultants to observe the response to the crisis as it unfolded to feed suggestions for immediate course corrections into existing mechanisms and systems. It would also facilitate consultation with responders’ realistic expectations for improvements in the response, against which progress could eventually be measured. The strategy for each visit was flexible, planned in consultation with and to meet the needs of actors on the ground. The first phase conducted September 2004 focused primarily to enable the evaluators to: 1) gain a first hand appreciation of the challenges and achievements of the agencies and NGOs in the field; 2) identify challenges and gaps in the quality of the response; and 3) determine the feasible expectations for improvements in the response.

The second phase that involved capital level interviews in October 2004 supported the preparation of the second visit. The second field visit that was longer focussed at obtaining primary information from frontline responders and beneficiaries who were situated in less accessible areas. The last field visit’s mainly aim was to gather more data and observation on needs of the beneficiaries. The main emphasis of this evaluation phase was to provide findings with practical sets of guidance on implementation.

Considering that the primary focus of this evaluation was learning, the study relied on the participation of OCHA and CARE staff who were not directly involved in implementing the response. The method of data collection was varied which included observation during the field visits, surveys, key stakeholder interviews, focus groups discussions, background documentation reviews and workshops. The main informants were the responders from UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and beneficiaries especially the internally displaced persons within the North, South and West Darfur. A number of government and key headquarters stakeholders were also interviewed in New York, Geneva, London and Rome. Interviews were also conducted with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) agencies, the department of political affairs and donor/member states of the GOS and the affected population. Further, the evaluation methodology included desk reviews of pre-existing literature on the crisis and the response to it during phases 1 and 3. The evaluation approach was groundbreaking in that it was the first time to attempt to comprehensively provide real time evaluation across all sectors of program intervention and functions using a participatory approach that involved key stakeholders and beneficiaries during the program implementation period. This provided the opportunity of real time evaluation which is essential for avoiding future mistakes and establishing corrective measures during the course of program implementation.

As noted by Alkin & Taut, 2002, participatory evaluation is defined as applied social research that involves a partnership between trained evaluation personnel and practice based decision
makers, organisation members with program responsibility, or a group of people with a vital interest in the program or primary users (Alkin & Taut, 2002). This evaluation method employed involved the beneficiaries at the IDP camps and areas that were not accessible. Also methods of data collection were extensive, ranging from documentation reviews, surveys, focus groups discussions, observations to participatory workshops. The evaluation method was PRA which is deemed a good method for data collection

5.2.4 Credibility:

From the evaluation terms of reference, it can be concluded that the evaluators were credible. The successful consultant needed more than 7 years of experience in evaluation with proven record of coordination and planning strategy. The evaluation team was composed of three international consultants; the team leader had to have demonstrated extensive operational experience in Sudan and an in-depth knowledge of the broader humanitarian systems, as well as a track record as an experienced evaluator. The expertise needed for the team leader included: protection, political advocacy, and the dynamics of humanitarian funding, internal displacement, logistics and gender. The evaluation team also included one Arabic speaker as a translator.

The team leader for this evaluation was Bernard Broughton who has extensive experiences in humanitarian responses in Africa and especially in Sudan. He is a specialist in Program Management and Design and has more than 10 years experience in formulation, design and implementation of humanitarian programs. He has written a number of publications on humanitarian project management, noticeably, the book entitled “bridging the gap: A guide to monitoring and evaluation, Co-Authored with Jonathan Hamspire (1997) published by Australian Council for Overseas Aid. Between 1981 and 2002, Bernard Broughton had written more than 8 publications and articles. Prior to becoming an independent consultant, Bernard Broughton worked with UNOCHA as a senior evaluator. In Annex 3 an online retrieved CV for Bernard Broughton is attached.

5.2.5 Relevance:

The contextual knowledge of the evaluators to the Darfur region in Southern Sudan was not documented in the evaluation report. The social economic status of Sudan as a country was lacking in this report. Also the structural organization and management of UNOCHA was missing in the evaluation report. Although the UNOCHA structure is international in each country, with the Emergency Relief Coordinator holding office of oversight and providing technical leadership during emergency, there are usually modifications in the international structure depending on the needs of the country (UNOCHA, 2004). The structure of UNOCHA was however not explored in this evaluation.

A majority of studies established that evaluations that reflected knowledge of the context in which the evaluation findings were to be used, appealed more to the preferences of the decision makers (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986, p. 353; Dawson &’Amico, 1985; Osterlind, 1979; Van de Vall and Bolas, 1982). In contrast, evaluations that did not reflect knowledge of the context in
which evaluations were to be used were associated with low levels of use (McGowan, 1976; Wholey & White, 2002). It can be concluded that relevance was lacking and is therefore expected to result in less utilisation of the report by the decision makers.

5.2.6 Timeliness:
This evaluation was commissioned in August 2004 and was completed in January 2006. The evaluation was done in four different phases; the first report was a working paper for UN country team and was completed by September 2004. The second report included observation and recommendations and these were completed by January/Feb 2005. The final report included the management metric which shows the plan of action for implementing the evaluation recommendations. The evaluation therefore took place in real-time over the course of three visits to Sudan in September 2004, January/February 2005 and June/July 2005 and the writing of the report was concluded by February 2006.

5.2.7 Findings:
Much as the humanitarian needs and protection issues in Darfur increased sharply in early 2003, following fighting between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and insurgents groups, the UN humanitarian and diplomatic community did not seriously begin addressing the crisis for almost one year, despite calls to do so from a number of high level humanitarian community officials. The Darfur crisis developed into one of the most acute humanitarian crisis in the world at that time and by 2004 when the evaluation was launched, almost 1.2 million internally displaced and vulnerable host communities were without even a minimum level of humanitarian support and aid. Although more than 90% of the affected population was accessible, there were continuing increases in the affected population and massive under-delivery of assistance. One year after scaling up of assistance, there were in any chosen sector, about 850,000 to 1.24 million people without assistance. By the end of June 2005, there were still noticeable gaps in assistance, continuing human rights abuses, lack of access to war affect in rebel-controlled areas and the quality and consistency of aid delivery and services were very poor and uncoordinated (Hugo, 2004; Victor, 2005).

Most UN agencies and Humanitarian Organizations were unable to mobilize the appropriate capacity to respond to the Darfur crisis immediately. The external surge capacity section of UNOCHA has the mandate to deploy qualified and competent personnel in crisis region. However, in Darfur, some of the staff deployed did not have the necessary expertise, training and experience. Also, the high volume of short-term assignments in Southern Sudan, from both internal and external surge capacity rosters, led to high turnover, which was disruptive to programming and resulted into a heavy administrative challenge that detracted from other tasks, like identifying long-term staff. The Evaluation established that by 2006 many critical positions were still vacant. Further, the living conditions, psychological welfare of the staff deployed remained unaddressed. This resulted in a high level of burnout, reduced productivity and tense working relationships. The needs and concerns of national staff were especially not addressed, hence, local capacity was not developed or utilised.
The humanitarian needs of all the war-affected communities would have been better met through more consistent, strategic and coordinated sector leadership and planning. In thematic areas such as protection, camp management and provision of Non Food Items (NFI), there was a lot of time wasted on negotiating roles and responsibilities amidst the response. In thematic areas such as the protection of Internally Displaced Person (IDPs), several UN agencies and other NGOs admirably stepped in to fill the gap, but the lack of expertise and capacity resulted in limited and inconsistent performance.

Although the original scope of the evaluation was broad to include a review of the effectiveness and impact of the system in responding to the needs of the beneficiaries in all sectors; the systems and agency tools needed for crisis response such as stand by arrangements, supplies and logistical arrangements; crisis management in areas of early warning, leadership, advocacy, information management, policy coherence and strategic planning and finally, funding mechanisms, not all these areas were actually covered by the evaluation and therefore the findings were limited. From the findings above, the team only focused on issues of advocacy, capacity and staffing. Inadequate funding was one of the major evaluation findings; this was not however foreseen by the UNOCHA’s management team at time of commissioning the evaluation.

5.2.8 Communication:

The communication strategy of this evaluation was appreciatively very good. More than 12 different participatory workshops were conducted during the evaluation process to disseminate preliminary findings and to obtain the views and comments especially of the beneficiaries. The preliminary findings were further disseminated at smaller groups such as during focus group discussions with all the IDP camps that were established. More than 8 focus group discussions were held to validate the preliminary findings.

Debriefing sessions were held at the end of each of the evaluation phase with field staff, frontline implementing partners, and UN agencies and at headquarter level. In total approximately 24 debriefing sessions were held.

After completion of writing the final report, an oral presentation of the report was made at the field level to participants that included the representatives from the beneficiaries, UN agencies, bilateral organizations, NGOs and Government of Sudan. At the end of each oral presentation, the final reports were distributed to each of the participants. The final report was developed in two formats, the summary report that was easy to read and had only 13 pages and the full expanded summary report. This was aimed at facilitating the dissemination strategy.
**Table 12**

*Conclusion and Summary of Review: Darfur, Southern Sudan Crisis, 2003-2005*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Quality</th>
<th>Findings from Review of the Evaluation Report</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal method was used for data collection. 3 phases of the evaluation was conducted. Exhaustive data collection was accomplished.</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>More than 10 years of experience in humanitarian program design, Monitoring and Evaluation and implementation.</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>The context of the disaster was not written in the evaluation report.</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>2 of major findings matched the expectation of the decision makers. I.e. the capacity of the staff and limited advocacy of the crisis in Darfur</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>The evaluation exercise was commissioned in August 2004 and the final report writing was done in Feb 2006, more than 12 months.</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Oral presentation was the report was done, various workshops were conducted. The documents were translated into Arabic for the understanding of the local community.</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the quality of this report was fair. The six parameters, 3 are ranked good and three are poor.

### 5.3 Indian Ocean Tsunami, July, 2006

#### 5.3.1 The Impact of the Tsunami

Even before the arrival of the Tsunami, the early morning earthquake of December 26, 2004 had already caused massive destruction in Banda Aceh and other parts of Aceh. It is not known exactly how many were killed by the earthquake since the tsunami overtook the rescuers. The earthquake led to an upward movement of the seafloor which generated a series of tsunamis that spread across the Indian Ocean killing approximately 228,000 and affected more than 14 countries. Severely affected countries included Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand (Telford, et al., 2006). More than 1.7 million people were left homeless by the disaster. Although the disaster was appealing to the media and attracted more than $13.5 billion USD, it was not the worst the world had ever witnessed. In the same year, flooding in Bangladesh destroyed one million homes, displaced 4 million people and affected more than 36 million people.

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19 The reference for the material except where is mentioned is Cosgrave J. (2006). Synthesis Report: Expanded summary. Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)
5.3.2 Review of the Terms of Reference

The evaluation reviewed five major areas: the coordination of the international response to tsunami-affected countries; the role of needs assessment in the tsunami response; the impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities; the links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in the tsunami response and finally, the funding response to the tsunami. The evaluation focused on the initial phases of the international response, up to the first 11 months after the disaster. The main aim of the evaluation study was to improve the quality of natural disaster policy and practice and secondly, to account to both donor and affected-country populations.

Also particularly unique to all the previous evaluations, the Tsunami evaluation had three main objectives; (1) to deliberately learn from the response to improve the quality of future humanitarian action, including linkages to longer term recovery and development; (2) to provide some accountability to the millions of people who gave, either directly or through their taxes, to the tsunami response, as well as to the public’s of the affected countries, and finally; (3) to test the evaluation model used by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) to inform future joint evaluations.

5.3.2 Quality:

Unlike all the previous evaluations commissioned by OCHA, the Tsunami evaluation was conducted by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) which is a multi-agency learning and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. However, this report still is a product of UNOCHA, since it was commissioned, supervised and the forward was endorsed by UNOCHA personnel. The central purpose of this evaluation was for learning and accountability. The TEC was formed in February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and the tsunamis of the 26 December 2004. The CMG was managed by a Core Management Group (CMG) which had representatives from Danida, SDC (Switzerland), Sida (Sweden), FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, NGOs/Red Cross, Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and OCHA which was the chair of the Core Management Group.

The data collection methods included desks reviews, interviews of key informants, UN agencies, the respective governments especially the Indonesian Government, the bilateral organisations and focus group discussions with the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were involved during the interviews. Since the local communities were the ones who responded most to the disaster, they were at the frontline of implementing aid, more than 200 people were interviewed. The study also involved surveys; costs benefit analysis of the situation and transect walks to establish the nature of the disaster. It can be fittingly stated that participatory rural appraisal evaluation methods were employed.

5.3.3 Credibility:

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition was conducted by 17 different evaluators. Each one of the evaluators had a specific technicalities and skills that were required for the evaluation. The TEC
encompassed academics, economists, environmentalists, mathematicians, lawyers, and professional humanitarian workers. The average years of experience for these researchers was 12 years and more than 5 researchers had 18 years of experience in consultancy and program management. The profile of the team leader is described briefly described below:

Christoplos Ian is a specialist in institutional issues related to rural development with particular focus to agricultural services and changing environmental landscape. His capacities and academic include capacity development and institutional change issues in relation to climate change adaptation, food security, poverty alleviation, disaster risk reduction, post-disaster recovery and development issues for developing countries. Christoplos has written a number of publications on development related issues and he has more than 25 years of experience in Humanitarian management. In Annex 4 the CV of Christoplos Ian is attached for further reference.

5.3.4 Relevance:
The contextual knowledge of the evaluators of the Tsunami affected countries was not documented in the evaluation report. Also none of the evaluators was a native from any one of the affected countries. The social economic and political status of any of the countries was lacking in this report. Also the structural organization and management of UNOCHA was missing in the evaluation report. Although the UNOCHA structures are international in each country, with the Emergency Relief Coordinator holding office of oversight and providing technical leadership during emergency, there are usually modifications in the international structure depending on the needs of the country (UNOCHA, 2004). The structure of UNOCHA was not explored in this evaluation.

5.3.5 Findings:
Generally, the evaluation established that the international response to the Tsunami disaster helped the affected people and reduced massive suffering. The TEC studies also identified many examples of good practice in emergency response and other innovations. However, overall the studies concluded that the response did not achieve the potential offered by the generous funding (Telford, et al., 2006).

The UN and the international agencies experienced challenges in scaling up their response and therefore did not actively participate in the emergency phase of saving life (search and rescue) operations. It was the local community who provided most of the immediate search and rescue operations in the early emergency support phase, as is commonly the case of sudden-onset disasters. However, agencies and organisations that had pre-existing links, and had invested in developing their emergency response capacity before the disaster were more effective in the response. Consequently, the study found that it were the local capacities that determined how many survived in the immediate aftermath of a sudden-onset natural disaster (Bennett, et al., 2006; Telford, et al., 2006).
Ironically, international agencies brushed the local capacities aside, even though they supported the norms and standards that call for engagement with and accountability to the local actors such as governments, communities and local NGOs. During the Tsunami response, international agencies often ignored local structures and did not communicate well with local communities and further, did not hold themselves accountable to the locals. The UN and the other international agencies were most effective in supporting and coordinating the activities of the local actors (Telford, et al., 2006; Scheper, et al., 2006).

Sub-standard quality of work was evident during the response to the tsunami, not only in the relief phase (search, rescue and provision of immediate humanitarian needs) but also in the recovery phase. Inconsistencies in the benefits received by the victims were paramount and inappropriate programming crowded the response. Although different international humanitarian response have over the past ten years launched several initiatives to improve the quality of humanitarian work, these initiatives typically set up norms or standards, but none of them has an effective mechanism to sanction agencies for failing to meet the norms, standards and guidelines (Telford, et al., 2006; Christoplos, 2006; De Ville de Goyet & Moriniere, 2006).

The Evaluation report provided in depth recommendations to include the following; the international humanitarian community needs a fundamental reorientation from providing emergency aid to facilitating communities’ own capacity to enhance the peace for relief and recovery priorities; All the implementing partners responding to a disaster should strive to increase their capacities and improve coordination to enhance consistencies in programming; the international relief systems should establish systems of earmarking poor performing agencies during emergency response and should promote good performing organizations; the member states and the donor communities should follow the guidelines and principles established in the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). In conclusion, the evaluation report provided extensive findings and recommendations which were in agreement to the expectation of the decision makers

5.3.6 Timelines:

The Tsunami disaster occurred on the 26th of December, 2004, and the search and rescue phase to the response was commissioned immediately by UN. The first frontline implementers of the search and rescue phase were the local communities and most especially the survivors of the disaster. The TEC was commissioned after the search and rescue phase, although the study was primarily focused on the search and rescue phase. The final report of the TEC was only available in January 2007, three years after the disaster.

The findings and recommendations were not useful for this disaster. It could not improve the quality of the programs and could not save lives any more. The report was way too late to substantially provide any corrective measures. From the ToR however, the TEC main purpose was for learning and improvement of future disaster responses.
5.3.7 Communication:

More than 8 different dissemination workshops were conducted during the evaluation process to disseminate preliminary findings and to obtain the views and comments the stakeholders. The preliminary findings were further disseminated in smaller groups such as during focus group discussions. More than 4 focus group discussions were held to validate the preliminary findings.

Debriefing sessions were held at the end of each of the evaluation phase with field staff, frontline implementing partners, and UN agencies and at headquarter level. In total approximately 13 debriefing sessions were held.

After completion of writing the final report, an oral presentation of the report was done at the field level to participants that included the representatives from the beneficiaries, UN agencies, bilateral organizations and NGOs. At the end of each oral presentation, the final reports were distributed to each of the participants. The dissemination strategy however lacked involvement of the governmental representatives. None of the affected countries’ governments were represented during the disseminations of the evaluation report.

The final report was developed in 3 formats, the summary report that was easy to read and had only 8 pages, the full expanded summary report and each report regarding the thematic areas of the evaluation (coordination of the international response to Tsunami; Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in Tsunami response; the role of needs assessment in the Tsunami response) was developed. This was aimed at facilitating the dissemination strategy and appeal to different readers. The reports were presented in detailed (4 thematic reports), expanded summary of the four thematic reports and finally the synthesis summary of the expanded reports.

Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Quality</th>
<th>Findings from Review of the Evaluation Report</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal method was used for data collection. Extensive interviews that included the beneficiaries were conducted.</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>More than 12 years of experience in humanitarian program design, Monitoring and Evaluation and implementation. Strong academic background in various fields</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>The context of the disaster was not written in the evaluation report. None of the evaluators discussed the social economic and political situation of the affected countries.</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>Five major findings were in agreement with the expectations of the evaluators: extensive funds collected for this emergency, limited participation of the local community in decision</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
making, the local community saved most the survivors of the Tsunami. UN response was delayed and un coordinated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeliness</th>
<th>The evaluation was commissioned in January 2005 but the final report was 2007 almost three years after the disaster</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication.</td>
<td>The final report was orally presented in various workshops, debriefing sessions and the report although was not written in the native language had three different versions with a simplified version meant for the beneficiaries.</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the quality of the report was fair. There is marked improvement in the methodology used for data collection and also highly qualified personnel were used to write this report.

5.4 Cyclone Nargis Myanmar, 2008

5.4.1 Impact of the Disaster

The Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar on 2 and 3 May, 2008, and most affected the area of Ayeyarwady Delta region, where the effects of the extreme winds were compounded by storm surges that exceeded five metres in some areas. Approximately 2.4 million people were severely affected by the cyclone. The official death toll was 84,537 however, 53,836 people were missing and 19,359 were reported injured. Cyclone Nargis was the worst natural disaster in the recorded history of Myanmar (Turner et al., 2008)

5.4.2 Review of Terms of Reference

The focus of the evaluation exercise was expected to be on the present or ongoing interventions. By the time of commissioning the evaluation exercise, information gathered from document reviews, interviews and focus group discussions pointed to a relatively good overall humanitarian response to the disaster. The Evaluation focused at describing the operational and strategic support needs of the humanitarian system and at reflecting and clarifying the roles of UN actors during the emergency response. Since this was proposed to be a real time evaluation, the findings and recommendations would allow for improvements of interventions and coordination mechanism while the relief and rehabilitation efforts were still ongoing. The evaluation exercise was therefore geared to reviewing the current operations and to provide real time feedback on the factors that could improve provision of aid and accountability of the affected communities.

The exercise was also expected to assess key challenges and needs on the ground, as well as accountability issues. Further the evaluation exercise was to analyse the findings in order to provide means of evaluating the effectiveness of the response in terms of meeting needs for the

beneficiaries. The evaluation was to highlight the effectiveness of remote management mechanisms. Finally, the information from this evaluation is intended to inform the planning and strategic interventions of the recovery and rehabilitation phase. To summarise, it was therefore expected that findings and recommendations would provide information that would improve the operational decision making process. The exercise would also provide preliminary feedback on results to date and at the same time it will provide lessons learned for future disaster responses.

5.4.2 Quality:
The method of information collection included document reviews, interviews of key informants\(^{21}\), and observation especially through attending the cluster, IASC and UN Country Team meetings. The evaluation team also conducted extensive field visits during the study with the aim of data collection. A total of 14 field visits were made in the township of Bogalay. The field visits were accompanied by focus group discussions. In total 17 focus group discussions were held in 10 different villages and in different corners of the township of Bogalay. Further, the team of evaluators interviewed UN agency staff in Bangkok, New York and Geneva. An extensive list of those who were interviewed is attached in Annex 5. The evaluation team can be said to have used a mixed method approach to further include debriefing and participatory workshops.

The collection of data was conducted in phases. First, there was the Orientation phase: in this phase, preliminary research and orientation briefings were conducted in New York, Geneva and Bangkok. The second phase was the Key Informant Interviews phase: the evaluation team spent approximately three weeks in Myanmar and interviewed over 120 key informants from UN agencies, government of Myanmar, INGOs, local NGOs, CBOs, private sectors and donor representatives. The interviews were conducted in line with Chatham House\(^{22}\). The third phase was observations: the evaluation team members participated in 9 different cluster meetings and spent more than 9 days travelling through different parts of Bogalay Township. Observation was also employed during field visits. The final phase was the formation of the focus group discussions and the workshops: the evaluation team formed 17 focus group discussions in ten villages i.e. at least one focus group discussion per village. The groups were separated by gender and age groups. The team also formed village leaders and religious leader focus group discussions and held further meetings with this group.

From the elaborate data collection methods that were employed by the team as well as the extensive interviews to include the beneficiaries in obtaining their needs, views, comments and remarks on the relief program interventions, the evaluation method employed was participatory rural appraisal (Cousins and Leithwoods, 1986)

\(^{21}\) A total of 120 different key informants were interviewed (Turner, R., Baker, J., Myo Oo, Z., & Aye, S.N.2008)

\(^{22}\) The Chatham House principles of interview is where details of interviews were not shared outside the team and no quotations or attributions appear in the report without the express written permission of the interviewee (Turner et al., 2008 p. 28)
5.4.3 Credibility:

The evaluation team consisted of four consultants, two international consultants and two national consultants. The national consultants were familiar with the local communities and language. The team leader Robert Turner is an international consultant, the second international consultant was called Jock M. Baker. The two local consultants were Dr. Zaw Myo Oo and Naing Soe Aye. The profiles of each of these consultants have been highlighted below:

Robert Turner has more than 10 years experience in humanitarian operations, planning and coordination. Specifically he is experienced in emergency and immediate post emergency settings. Robert Turner has worked with various NGOs and UN agencies as follows: First, with International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Burundi, Kosovo and Macedonia where he designed and managed multi-thematic programmes such as “Shelter, Water and Sanitation, Community Development, Health and Camp Management” (Turner et al., 2008: 32). Second, Mr. Turner worked with UNOCHA in the department of Peacekeeping operations. In the peacekeeping operations department, he was tasked with “planning and coordinating large-scale emergency operations” (Turner et al., 2008: 32). He also worked in recovery programmes in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Rwanda and Indonesia. Mr. Turner has worked in Sudan and was responsible for planning and coordinating operations that involved the return and reintegration of IDPs. By the time Mr. Turner took this evaluation assignment, he was based in Washington, D.C as an independent consultant.

The second international consultant was Jock Baker. Mr. Baker was the senior evaluator for the Cyclone Nargis evaluation exercise. By the time of this assignment, Mr. Baker was working with CARE International as Programme Quality and Accountability Coordinator. Since his time with CARE International, Mr. Baker has spearheaded activities such as editing of the 2004 edition of the Sphere Handbook and review of WFP’s evaluation functions. Before joining CARE International, Mr. Baker worked as a consultant on humanitarian and post conflict issues. He has extensive career of more than 15 years in humanitarian responses working with UN agencies such as UNHCR, WFP, OCHA and UNDP. While working for UN agencies Jock Baker “spent 6 years in Sub Saharan Africa and 8 years in the Asia/Pacific region”(Turner et al., 2008: 32). Mr. Baker holds a Master of Science Degree in Economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Dr. Zaw Myo Oo, was a national consultant. He is a trained Physician and Businessman. Occasionally, he has taken short term consultancy assignments with UNICEF. Dr. Zaw and his family were among the first responders to the humanitarian needs after cyclone Nargis.

The second national consultant was Naing Soe Aye. By the time of her participation in the evaluation exercise, Naing was pursuing her PhD in Philippines. She has worked as an educationist at different levels in Myanmar.
5.4.4 Relevance:

Similar to the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition report, the contextual knowledge of the evaluators of Myanmar country was not documented in the evaluation report. The social economic and political status of any of the countries was lacking in this report. Also the structural organization and management of UNOCHA was missing in the evaluation report. Although the UNOCHA structures are international in each country, with the Emergency Relief Coordinator holding office of oversight and providing technical leadership during emergency, there are usually modifications in the international structure depending on the needs of the country (UNOCHA, 2004).

Although both the team leader and the senior evaluator had ever worked in UNOCHA, they did not explore the structure of UNOCHA and roles of OCHA in Myanmar. To conclude, the relevance may have hampered the utilisation of the evaluation report to effectively create change in policies.

5.4.5 Findings:

Overall, the information collected during the RTE such as document reviews, interviews with some of the first responders, focus group discussions in affected villages, as well as mortality and morbidity rates revealed a relatively good humanitarian response to cyclone. The immediate response was mainly provided by the local community, led or coordinated by national organisations, individuals and national staff of international organisations. However, the response from international organisations and UN was delayed and inadequate during the immediate relief phase.

The evaluation further revealed that coverage of food, shelter, health care and other vital sectors was done extensively. Although the coverage was extensive, the assistance was not delivered on time, the geographic coverage was not always consistent with the needs of the beneficiaries and commitments made by a number of International Organization were not honoured.

Three challenges were revealed by the evaluation report that needs to be addressed; first the community consultation: the response was dominated by the nationals. This created both challenges and opportunities for strengthening capacity of the nationals. The challenge is that although the nationals responded quite positively to the disaster, a majority of them had no experiences with managing disaster to a large scale as hat caused by the Nargis. The opportunity this presented is that the nationals were offered the chance to learn. The nationals demonstrated a steep learning curve especially in planning and technical skills. These capacities should be nurtured and built in disaster preparedness planning since Myanmar is a disaster prone country.

The second issue to be dealt with is Disaster Risk Reduction and Livelihoods. The disaster in Myanmar was caused by the vulnerability of the community to the risk of the hazards (cyclone). The disaster caused preventable deaths and damages mainly due to lack of preventive mechanisms. Since Myanmar had never experienced a disaster of this scale, the country lacked
preparedness strategies. The international community can improve the vulnerabilities of the local communities by developing and operationalizing the Disaster Risk Reduction strategies for Myanmar.

The final issue was coordination: over the decades there has been improvement in coordination and this is evidenced in the findings of this evaluation which show that coordination was good at the central level. However, there is still room for improvement at the lower Township levels. The report demonstrated weaknesses in the coordination mechanism between the clusters and their counter-part in the field, beneficiaries and inter-cluster planning.

The Evaluation revealed that one of the most common mistakes in post disaster planning is the lack of consultation with the affected communities. The communities were not consulted or included in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the programs. UN and international humanitarian organizations designed and implemented the post disaster programs without being accountable to the beneficiaries. To avoid this mistake in the future and to enhance improvements in program quality, frequency of consultation will be required during the transition stage from relief to rehabilitation, recovery and development. The report further recommended that outreach to national organizations and affected communities needs to be further strengthened. The findings of the RTE revealed that geographic coverage was not consistent with the needs and that commitments made by individual agencies were not always honoured. Further, the humanitarian assistance delivered was not timely given the financial resources available.

The findings of this report were not in complete agreement with the expectation of the decision makers. The main focus of this evaluation was to improve the ongoing interventions. However, most of the recommendations were long-term and can only be achieved through linking Relief and Rehabilitation to Development. Some of the findings will only be applicable in the long term, for example, the recommendation regarding the development of the Disaster Risk Reduction strategies for Myanmar and improvement of coordination during disaster response. Although the decisions makers through the TOR had expected the findings to provide practical guidelines in streamlining the roles and structures of UN during response, the findings however, never mentioned any recommendations to that end.

5.4.6 Timeliness:

The real time evaluation was commissioned in October, 2008 approximately 5 months after the disaster. It was commissioned during the recovery phase and the final report was written and completed by the December 2008. The findings of this evaluation could still be effectively used in informing the future interventions for the recovery phase.

5.4.7 Communication:

The evaluation reported good community mechanisms. Following the field visits that were conducted, two workshops were held, one workshop was meant for the international NGOs and
separate workshop was held for the national NGOs in Myanmar Language. The mainly purpose for conducting the workshop was for dissemination and validation of the data collected. Debriefing and validation sessions were held for the cluster heads, the UN country Team, IASC and the local communities. The final evaluation reports were documented in two languages, in Myanmar language and in English. This widens the dissemination coverage which according to Cousins and Leithwood (1986) has a positive correlation to utilization of the evaluation report. The final report was orally presented to yet another two workshops i.e. for the international NGOs and bilateral organizations and for the national and local beneficiaries in their language of preference.

*Table 14*

**Conclusion and Summary of Review: Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Quality</th>
<th>Findings from Review of the Evaluation Report</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal method was used for data collection. Extensive interviews, focus group discussions were held in the villages.</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>More than 15 years of experience in humanitarian program design, Monitoring and Evaluation and implementation. Published a number of books and other journals on humanitarian programming.</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>The context of the disaster was not written in the evaluation report and the structure of UNOCHA was not explored in this report.</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>5 of major findings matched the expectation of the decision makers. i.e. limited resources, delayed response of UN to the crisis, the community was not involved in decision marking process and UN representatives were not qualified and lacked experiences</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>The evaluation exercise was commissioned in October 2008 and it was finalised in December 2008. 2 months to finalise the report</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Oral presentation was the report was done; various workshops and debriefing sessions were conducted. The documents were translated into the language for the understanding of the local community.</td>
<td>Good</td>
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</table>

Overall, the Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar 2008 was of good quality. Out of the six parameters examined only one scored poor and the rest scored good.
Chapter Six: Discussion of the Findings and conclusion

This chapter shall consist of two main sections. In the first section, I shall present a brief summary of the rational for this study and then highlight the research questions that this study sought to answer. Further in section one; I shall answer the research questions through discussion of the findings. The second section of this chapter shall seek to critically reflect on the entire study and I will conclude this chapter with a brief recommendation.

6.1 Discussion of the Findings

UNOCHA was established in 1991 with the main mandate to enhance coordination; planning and consistent humanitarian emergency programs. However in 2010 the preliminary reports from the Haiti humanitarian emergency programs pointed out that the main problem was poor coordination, planning and inconsistent humanitarian emergency programs among the international humanitarian organisations during implementation. Nineteen years after the establishment of UNOCHA, poor coordination, planning and inconsistent programs still existed among the international humanitarian emergency programs. In this context, this study sought to answer the central research question:

“To what extent do OCHA’s evaluation reports reflect quality improvement in evaluation practices from 2001 to 2008?”

From the above main central question, three sub questions were derived as follows:

1. What methods does UNOCHA use for evaluation of humanitarian programs or projects?
2. What organizational learning mechanism is utilized at UNOCHA?
3. To what extent has the quality of evaluations reports improved through time?

The rational for choosing this study was motivated at societal, scientific and personal level. At societal level, meeting the expectations of the affected population would result in reduced loss of human life and plight of the affected community. Also coordinated response would improve the local community participation in humanitarian project implementation and thus promote sustainability (Harvey, 2010). At scientific level, it is my hope that findings on this study may be used to develop more coordinated humanitarian programs. And finally at personal level, from my work experiences, I have noticed that a number of evaluation reports are not even read by the SMT and hence their findings are just shelved away.

To answer the research questions, Kolb’s (1984) and Shaw and Perkin’s (1992) model of organizational learning mechanisms were used as the theoretical point of departure. Further, the works of Cousins and Leithwood (1986) were used to identify six parameters for measuring quality improvement in evaluations reports. These parameters included; Quality, Credibility, Relevance, Communication, Findings and Timeliness.
The method used for this study was case study of UNOCHA Organizational Learning Mechanism (OLM). For data collection, I used four sampled disaster evaluation reports commissioned by UNOCHA. These UNOCHA disaster evaluation reports included; Gujarat, India Earthquake, 2001; Darfur, Southern Sudan Crisis, 2005; Tsunami, 2006 and Cyclone Nargis Myanmar, 2008. Other main reports and handbooks that this report reviewed for data collection included; Evaluation, Knowledge Management and Learning Mechanism of UNOCHA, 2006; The roles and formation of the ESS, 1993 and Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons Learned, 1999 were among the reports examined.

The table below presents a summary of my findings from reviewing the sampled evaluation reports:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The quality parameter showed a marked improvement. Of all the reports reviewed only the Gujarat evaluation report used the Rapid Feedback evaluation method, the other three evaluation reports (Darfur, Tsunami and Myanmar) all used the Participatory Rural Appraisal as evaluation method. In 2001 when the Gujarat evaluation report was written, the evaluation method did not include the beneficiaries and the affected communities. However, the Myanmar evaluation report that was conducted in 2008 demonstrated the best evaluation method- Participatory Rural Appraisal. The improved and exhaustive data collection method that was seen in the Myanmar evaluation is in contrast to the limited evaluation method (Rapid Feedback method) that was employed in the Gujarat evaluation. The parameter of quality showed improvement in all the other reports except in the Gujarat evaluation report.

A similar trend of improvement was seen in the findings parameter. The evaluation reports that were conducted in 2001 and 2005 ranked fair and poor respectively; however, the most recent evaluations conducted in 2006 and 2008 ranked good. The findings were in accord with the expectations of the decision makers. The parameter of timeliness showed more or less an oscillating trend. The first report showed that the timeliness parameter was good. However the reports that were concluded in 2005 and 2006 showed poor timelines and the one that was conducted in 2008 scored good in the same parameter. There was definitely improvement considering that 2005 and 2006 are only separated by one year.
Another improvement was seen in the communication parameter. The communication strategy of Gujarat evaluation report was limited only to a few key stakeholders and excluded the beneficiaries, the affected local communities, as well as the local community leaders. However, the evaluation reports for Myanmar and the Darfur humanitarian crisis were widely disseminated using outlets such as oral presentation in various dissemination workshops and debriefing sessions with local communities. Noteworthy was that the reports for Myanmar and Darfur humanitarian crisis were translated in the local languages of the communities. For both Darfur and Myanmar evaluation reports, it can be concluded that particular attention to debriefing sessions in the villages at grass root levels that deliberately targeted the local community leaders and religious leaders enhanced the communication of these reports.

In all the reports that were reviewed credibility of the evaluators showed consistency. All the evaluation exercises were conducted by evaluators who had more than 10 years of experience in the field of humanitarian emergency and in conducting monitoring and evaluation. All of them had either worked for UNOCHA or worked for other various International Humanitarian Organizations. Some had published books and journals on humanitarian management. The parameter of credibility ranked good in all the evaluation reports that were reviewed.

Although there were improvements in most of the parameters for measuring quality of evaluation reports, the parameter of relevance did not seem to show any improvement or change in all the evaluation reports examined. In the Gujarat evaluation report of 2001, the report had a great deal of the context of the humanitarian crisis. Further the report provided knowledge on the structure and management of the organization (UNOCHA). However, in all the other three reports (Darfur, Tsunami and Myanmar), the evaluation reports did not write in detail or at all about the context of the humanitarian crisis and/or the knowledge of the organization.

To conclude this section, in the application of Kolb’s (1984) learning model, Popper and Lipshitz’s (1998; 2000) facilitators of Organizational Learning Mechanism and Cousins’ and Leithwood’s (1984) factors that enhance the quality of evaluation reports, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. UNOCHA has a well established Evaluation and Studies section (ESS) which oversees all their evaluation process. This section is responsible for planning, commissioning, and implementation of the evaluation findings. From the reports examined, UNOCHA does not use only one evaluation method. Two evaluation methods were used, i.e. the Rapid Feedback evaluation and the Participatory Rural Appraisal. The Rapid Feedback evaluation was used only once in the Gujarat evaluation report of 2001. In the more recent evaluation conducts such as the Darfur, Tsunami and Myanmar, UNOCHA used the PRA evaluation method.

2. UNOCHA’s Organization Learning Mechanism has evolved and changed over the years but since the establishment of the ESS, the organization has been using combination of integrated and non-integrated OLM. Combination of integrated and
non-integrated OLM demonstrates the highest level of learning (Argyris, 1982; Roth, 1997; Popper and Lipshitz, 2000; 1998).

3. Using the parameters of quality, credibility, relevance, findings, timeliness and communication to measure the overall quality of evaluation reports, it may be concluded that the reports showed quality improvement. The Gujarat report in 2001, registered poor for quality, fair for findings and poor for communication, well as the Myanmar evaluation report written in 2008: 8 years later: registered only poor for relevance and ranked good for all the other five criteria used to measure evaluation quality in this study.

6.2 Reflections and Recommendations

The methodological strategy used in this study was documentation review. Although I read UNOCHA policy, procedures, guidelines, handbooks, various reports regarding evaluations, knowledge management and learning mechanism, I never got the opportunity to examine whether the procedures written down in these handbooks and reports were applied in practice by all employees of UNOCHA. In this study therefore, I made the assumption that the practices of the personnel in Policy Branch department is in compliance with the procedures in the handbooks and policy documents that were examined.

Pursuant to Popper and Lipshitz, OLM has two facets, first is the structural facet. These are the “institutionalized structure and procedural arrangements allowing organizations to systematically collect, analyze, store, disseminate, and use information that is relevant to the performance of the organization” and the cultural facet which focuses on organizational shared values and leadership (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000 p. 161). This study only focused on the procedural and systems facets (structural facet) of UNOCHA’s OLM. The second facet is the cultural facet. The cultural facet of UNOCHA’s OLM was not examined in this study. To examine the cultural aspects of the UNOHCA’s OLM, I needed to work in UNOCHA ESS sector and to participate in their routine operations. Since not all the entire facets of the OLM were researched in this study, the findings of this study are limited and not exhaustive.

The theoretical framework that was applied for this study was the criteria for good OLM and criteria for quality evaluation reports. According to Cousins and Leithwood (1986) one of the criteria for quality evaluation report that promotes learning is the independence of the evaluators. This refers to evaluators who were not part of the program implementation process. However, according to Popper and Lipshitz (1998) one of the criteria for a good OLM requires that the unit in charge of generating the lessons learned should be either a part or the board that is responsible for implementing the lessons learned. The criteria for quality evaluation reports and good OLM may therefore appear to be in contradiction. However that is not the case, the unit responsible for generating lessons learned are not the evaluators; this unit recruits external evaluators and only provide administrative supervision. Also the unit never participates in any of the program
implementation process. To maintain the independence of the unit that generate lessons learned, none of their members are not technical program staff and neither are they field staff.

My main recommendation is in regards to the relevance parameter. It may seem as though UNOCHA does not value the parameter of relevance in their evaluation policies as it rated poor in the most recent three evaluation reports that were examined. Most of the causes of humanitarian crisis are embedded in the countries political and socio economic systems. Therefore a clear understanding of the socio-economic and political context of humanitarian crisis is paramount in developing appropriate humanitarian program interventions (Wisner et al., 2004). Without an in-depth analysis of the context of disaster, the evaluation recommendations may not provide the needed information for effective response to humanitarian crisis. Further a solid knowledge of the organisational structure, management and culture is important in developing appropriate lessons that when implemented, improves the performance of organisation (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). To conclude, UNOCHA should improve their evaluation policies and procedures regards to the parameter of relevance.
References


UNOCHA. (1993). The roles and formation of the ESS. UNOCHA report. Geneva Switzerland


Wholey, & J.C.V White (2002). Rapid Assessment procedures of Malaria in low endemic countries: Social Science and Medicine 56, 701-712


Gujarat Indian Earthquake

4. OCHA Situation reports 1-11, issued in Geneva as of 26 January 2001
5. UNDMAT updates, issued in Delhi as of 26 January 2001
6. UN Press releases on Gujarat earthquake, Delhi.
7. UN systems action plan, issued in Delhi February 2001
8. Letter to all Resident Coordinators from Mr. G. Speth and Mr. S. Vieira de Mello, 26 March 1999
9. Cooperation between UNDP and the UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs
   UNDP/ADM/93/57. 3 September 1993
10. Terms of Reference for the UNDAC team.
11. UNDAC Field Handbook.
12. UNDAC selection criteria for UNDAC team Members. (OCHA Memo)
13. Various UNGA decisions re the creation of DHA and OCHA
14. UNGA resolutions on the ERC mandate in natural disasters. (Internal OCHA memo summarizing these)
15. OCHA in 2001. Activities and extra-budgetary funding requirements.

In addition, a substantial amount of internal material relating to the Gujarat earthquake response was shared by all the agencies and organisations met with in the course of this study.

Source: The Gujarat, India Earthquake of 2001 were obtained from the works of Margareta Wahlstrom and David Harland. (2001). The Role of OCHA in Emergency. UN Operations following the Earthquake in Gujarat, India-26 January 2001- A lessons learned study.


Gujarat Indian Earthquake

In Geneva

1. Mr. Ross Mountain, Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator and Director OCHA, Geneva
2. Mr. Rudolf Muller, Response Coordination Branch, OCHA, Geneva.
3. Mr. Shinji Matsuka, Response Coordination Branch OCHCA, Geneva
5. Mr. Thomas Peter, Field Coordination Unit, OCHA, Geneva.
6. Dr. Piero Calvi-Parisetti, Consultant, Geneva.
7. Mr. Thomas Linde, Policy Development and Studies Branch, OCHA, Geneva.
10. Ms Maria Olga Gonzalez, Emergency Response Division, UNDP, Geneva
11. Mr. Arjun Katoch, Chief, Field Coordination Unit, OCHA/Geneva
12. Mr. Gerhard Putman-Cramer, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA/Geneva
13. Mr. Jesper Lund, Member, UNDAC team for Gujarat earthquake and OCHA/ESB/FCSS staff member, Geneva.
14. Mr. Edward Pearn, Head of UNDAC team for Gujarat earthquake, Geneva
15. Mr. Simo Segioun, Member, UNDAC team for Gujarat earthquake.
16. Mr. Joseph Reiter, Member, UNDAC team for Gujarat earthquake and OCHA/ESB/MCDU staff member, Geneva.
17. Ms Solveig Thorvaldsdottir, member of UNDAC team for Gujarat earthquake, Reykjavik.
18. Mr. Joe Barr, member of UNDAC team for Gujarat earthquake, Canberra.
19. Mr. Steffen Schmidt, Member of UNDAC team for Gujarat earthquake, Geneva.
21. Mr. Werner Schleiffer, Director, WFP Office, Geneva.
22. Mr. Kenzo Oshima, UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Geneva.
23. Mr. Sharat Sabharwal, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Mission of India, Geneva.
24. Mr. Martin Griffiths, Director HD Centre, Geneva.
27. Mr. Toni Frisch, Head Swiss Disaster Relief, Government of Switzerland.
28. Mr. Ashok Koshy, IAS, Additional Chief Secretary and Commissioner, Government of Gujarat
29. Mr. Jonas Lovkrona, Deputy Head, Development Cooperation Section, Embassy of Sweden, Delhi.
30. Mr. Robert Mister, Emergency Response Division, UNDP, Delhi.

In London

1. Mr. Mukesh Kapila, Head, CHAD, DFID London.
2. Mr. Mathew Baugh, Head of Humanitarian Programmes team, CHAD, DFID London
3. Mr. Rob Holden, Crisis Response Manager, CHAD, DFID, London
4. Mr. Robert McGillivray, Save the Children Fund, London
5. Mr. Tony Vaux, Independent Consultant, London
6. Mr. Alan Matthews, Emergency Response team, CHAD, DFID, London

In New Delhi, India

1. Mr. Dennis Lazarus, DRR Operations, UNDP, Delhi/Convenor UN DMT, Delhi
2. Dr. Rajan Gengaje, UNDP DMT, Delhi
3. Mr. Jyoti Rao, UNDP DMT, Delhi
4. Dr. T. Walla, Deputy Head, WHO Country Office, Delhi
5. Dr. Egil Sorensen, WHO Regional Office for Southeast Asia
6. Mr. Ajit James, Procurement Officer, UNICEF, Delhi
7. Mr. George R. Aelion, WFP Programme Advisor (and UN DMT focal point), Delhi.
8. Mr. Ashok Koshy, IAS, Additional Chief Secretary and Commissioner, Government of Gujarat
9. Mr. Jonas Lovkrona, Deputy Head, Development Cooperation Section, Embassy of Sweden, Delhi.
10. Mr. Robert Mister, Emergency Response Division, UNDP, Delhi.
11. Mr. Alan Bradbury, Regional Disaster Preparedness Delegate, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Delhi.
12. Mr. Robert McKeown, Head of Regional Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Delhi.
13. Mr. Peter Delahaye, Deputy Director of Operations, UNICEF, Delhi.
14. Mr. Peter Medway, Emergency Programme Officer, UNICEF, Gujarat.
16. Mr. Pedro Medrano, Country Representative, WFP, Delhi.
17. Mr. R.R. Shah, Additional Secretary, Government of India, Delhi.
18. Mr. Mandhuka Gupta, Facilitator, UN Special Initiatives, UNDP, Delhi.
19. Mr Gopi Menon, Gujarat earthquake focal point, DFID, Delhi.
20. Ms Dorothy Gordon, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP, Delhi
21. Mr. Hiroshi Yamane, Counselor (Development), Embassy of Japan, Delhi.
22. Mr. Anil Sinna, Head, National Centre for Disaster Management, Delhi
23. Mr. Jaap Jan Speelman, First secretary and State Coordinator Gujarat, Netherlands Embassy, Delhi.
24. Mr. William S. Berger, Regional Advisor, United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Nepal.
25. Mr. Jose Felix Merladet, Head, Office of the European Commission, Delhi.
26. Mr. Luis Lechiguero, Advisor, European Commission, Delhi
27. Ms. Geeta Narayan, UNFPA, Delhi
28. Mr. Mandhuka Gupta, UN Special Initiatives, UNDP, Delhi.
29. Mr. Hiroshi Yamane, Counselor (Development), Embassy of Japan, Delhi.
30. Mr. Anil Sinna, Head, National Centre for Disaster Management, Delhi.
31. Mr. B. Murali, Senior Executive Officer, UNDP, Delhi.

In Gujarat
1. Mr. Praveen Singh Pardeshi, UNDP Programme Manager, Gujarat.
2. Mr. Mihir R. Bhatt, Disaster Mitigation Institute, Ahmedabad.
3. Ms. Reema Nanavathy, General Secretary, SEWA (Self Employed Women’s Action), Gujarat.
4. Mr. M. Sahu, Additional Chief Executive Secretary, Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority.
5. Dr. PK Mishra, CEO, Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority.
6. Mr. Sarath Dash, Project Manager IOM, Ahmedabad, Gujarat.
7. Dr. Yogendra Mathur, UNICEF Gujarat State Representative.
8. Dr. Siddharth Nirupam, Project Officer, UNICEF Gujarat State Office.
9. Ms. Geeta Narayan, UNFPA, Delhi
10. Mr. Sundhanu Sekhar Singh, Deputy Programme Manager, Catholic Relief Services, Bhuj.
11. Mr. Arockiam V., Chief Coordinator, Relief and Rehabilitation Programme, CARITAS, India.
12. Wing Commander Deepak Sathe, India Air Force Station, Bhuj.

In Rome
1. Mr. Jean Jacques Graisse, Director Operations, WFP Rome.
2. Ms. Angela Van Rynbach, Deputy Director Asia and CIS Regional Bureau, WFP Rome.
3. Mr. Francesc Stipolli, Head Office of Humanitarian Affairs, WFP Rome.
7. Mr. Thomas Keuters, Chief Logistics Officer, WFP Rome.

In Stockholm
1. Mr. Kjell Larsson, Head International Department, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Stockholm.
2. Mr. PA Berthlin, Senior Liaison Officer, International Department, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Stockholm.
5. Ms. Marika Fahlen, Ambassador, Global Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.

Source: The Gujarat, India Earthquake of 2001 were obtained from the works of Margareta Wahlstrom and David Harland (2001). The Role of OCHA in Emergency. UN Operations following the Earthquake in Gujarat, India-26 January 2001- A lessons learned study.
Annex 3: CV for Bernard Broughton

CV for Bernard Broughton

Contact details: Canberra +61 2 62480526, mob +61 407276420
Broughton@ConsultPDM.com

Nationality: Australian

Specialist areas: Strategic planning & program design
Monitoring & evaluation systems
Program review and evaluation

Qualifications: Bachelor of Arts and Laws (BA.LLB), Macquarie University, 1979
Nominated for the NSW Bar Association Law and Justice Volunteer Award for the establishment of the Macquarie Legal Centre in 1979
Admitted as a Solicitor to the Supreme Court of NSW, Sydney, 1982

Training: International Refugee Law, University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania 1980
Development Strategies at Times of Disaster, AIT, Bangkok 1989
Development Studies (by correspondence), Deakin University, 1992-93
Training for Advanced Facilitators, Strafen, Germany, 1997
UNICEF M&E systems trainer of trainers, New York, 2003
UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team training, Switzerland 2003, Singapore 2006

Associations: Member, Australasian Evaluation Society since 1998

Consulting experience: In: Afghanistan, Australia, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran,
Kirkint, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, Russian Federation, Samoa, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor Leste,
Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.

Work experience: In: Angola, Australia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Mozambique,
Somalia, Sudan, Timor Leste, Uganda, Zimbabwe.

Current employment (consultant):

Australia based consultant
1995-2009
Director of Project Design & Management Pty Ltd, a Canberra based
consulting company with six directors. PDM provides development and
humanitarian assistance planning, design and monitoring and evaluation
services to bilateral aid agencies, UN agencies, International Organizations
and NGOs. Consultancies follow by category.

Consultancies #1: Review and evaluation

Australia 2009
Review of Programs funded under Australia’s Pandemics and Emerging Infectious
Diseases Strategy (2005-2010). Reviewed and rated 15 funded programs
totalling $95 million; assessed their combined contribution to the achievement of
the Strategy’s objectives; and provided advice on a new Strategy. Contracted
by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)

Pacific 2009
Combined Review of the Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Project Phase 2 and the
South Pacific Sea Level and Climate Monitoring Project Phase 4. Led a multi-
disciplinary team in the conduct of desk research; field work in Fiji, Samoa and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Independent Completion Report (ICR) of the Infrastructure Component of Australia’s Aceh Rehabilitation Program. Led a multi-disciplinary team in the conduct of desk research, field work in Aceh, consultations in Jakarta, and preparation of draft and final reports. AusAID</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Review of AusReady, the Australian Government’s Emerging Infectious Diseases Facility. Led a review desk review of the Facility’s relevance and effectiveness and advised on whether or not to continue to fund the Facility (the recommendation, which was accepted, was to wind it up). AusAID</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Mid Term Review of Animal Health Emerging Infectious Diseases Program, M&amp;E specialist on team responsible Interalia for assessing the effectiveness of the program and project level performance information. AusAID</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Evaluation of the JI/UME Foundation. Conducted an independent evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of a rural development and environmental conservation foundation operating in Mwasawao, Tanzania. AusAID</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia &amp; Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Review of Australian Protection Officer Deployment Program. Team leader of a review of AusAID’s global funding for the deployment of protection officers (through Auscare and Rec ballet) with UN agencies. AusAID</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Emergency Response Supply Chain Review. Provided advice on concept and assessment method; helped develop questionnaire, reviewed reports, assisted working group agree on conclusions and recommendations for presentation to AusAID. Australian Council for International Development (ACFID)</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Review of WASH Cluster Response to Central Java Earthquake. Team leader for review of the effectiveness of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster agencies in responding to the May 27 earthquake. UNICEF</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Evaluation of AusAID’s Peace, Conflict and Development Policy. Evaluation specialist assisting in the design of the evaluation methodology. AusAID</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Regional</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Mid-term review of Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management and Institutional Development Projects. Reviewed Phase 1 and advising on whether or not to proceed to Phase 2. AusAID</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Evaluation of AusAID’s response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Participated as one of two independent peer reviewers of the draft report. AusAID</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2004 - 2005</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Response to the Crisis in Darfur. Team leader. Conducted over 18 months involving three missions to Sudan, three reports, and briefings to senior UN representatives in New York and Geneva. Commissioned by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>AusAID</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Review and conceptualisation of the integration of conflict and disaster related (i.e. humanitarian) activities in country/regional programs and AusAID’s management information systems. Desk study. AusAID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories and Lebanon</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Review of Australian funded humanitarian activities assisting Palestinians and the development of a revised humanitarian strategy for the aid program. Team Leader. AusAID</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Review of Australian funded humanitarian activities in Burma and on the Thai-Burma border and development of a humanitarian strategy for the aid program. Team Leader. AusAID</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Evaluation of WFP’s Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations in Iran - PPRO 6126 ‘Food Assistance and support for repatriation of Iraqi and Afghan refugees’. Team Leader. WFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Review of Australia’s Disaster Response Arrangements for the Asia-Pacific, focusing on Australia’s Disaster Stores for natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies, arrangements with the ADF, and support for OCHA and UNDAC. Desk review. AusAID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Evaluation of WFP’s Emergency Operations in East Timor - in particular EMOP 6177 ‘Emergency Food Assistance to Victims of Civil Strife in East Timor’. Team Leader. WFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Cluster Evaluation of Australian-funded NGO projects in Africa, evaluation of the performance of eight NGO projects (predominantly HIV/AIDS) with a focus on monitoring systems, achievement of objectives and Impact. Team Leader. AusAID</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Evaluation of Emergency Floods Operation. Member of team evaluating WFP’s emergency response to 1998 floods in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Anhui Provinces. WFP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>HMG Nepal-UNICEF Country Programme of Cooperation, Mid-Term Review. External component on progress in instituting a human rights approach to country programming. Team Member, UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Coﬁract Blindness Eradication Program, independent completion evaluation of four year AusAID funded project. Team Leader. Fred Hollars Foundation of Australia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Rumek County Primary Health Care Project, independent completion evaluation of three year AusAID funded project. Team Leader. Ox ﬁm GB &amp; Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Horn of Africa Program Review, Facilitator of review process. Community Aid Abroad/Ox ﬁm Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>District Development Programme Review, review of pilot project designed to test systems for devolution of the development budget. Team leader and M&amp;E specialist. UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe,</td>
<td>Review of Cataract Microsurgical and Intraocular Lens Training Project, which introduced advanced surgical techniques for implanting lenses. Team leader and M&amp;E specialist. Fred Hollars Foundation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya and</td>
<td>Evaluation of Australi an Assistance to the Drought in PNG, the main component of which was the provision of food relief provided by AusAID with assistance from the Australian Defence Force. Humanitarian relief specialist on evaluation team. AusAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Papua New</td>
<td>Evaluation of Ifugas Northern Upland Communities Sustainable Development Project, an AusAID funded integrated area development project implemented by Oxf am/Philippines Rural Reconstruction Movement. Oxf am Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Evaluation of Agricultural Rehabilitation Project. Independent evaluation of AusAID funded food aid projects implemented by a consortium of Australian NGOs and the Eritrean government. Food Security Working Group</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Review of AusAID’s Food Aid Policy. Author of papers on humanitarian food aid including role of food-for-work, needs assessment and targeting and relative performance of Australian NGOs and the WFP in delivering food aid. AusAID</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Evaluation of Agricultural Rehabilitation (Food Aid) Project. Independent evaluation of AusAID funded food aid projects implemented by a consortium of Australian NGOs and the Eritrean government. Food Security Working Group</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Evaluation of Agricultural Rehabilitation (Food Aid) Project. Independent evaluation of AusAID funded food aid projects implemented by CAA and an Ethiopian agency. Involved extensive use of PRA techniques. Oxf am Australia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Bilateral Food Aid Review. NGO specialist on team reviewing Australia’s bilateral development food aid programme. Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>&amp; Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Indonesia Country Effectiveness Review. Researcher on team reviewing the effectiveness of Australian development cooperation with Indonesia. Author of background briefings, discussion papers and financial analysis. AIDAB</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Indonesia Country Effectiveness Review. Researcher on team reviewing the effectiveness of Australian development cooperation with Indonesia. Author of background briefings, discussion papers and financial analysis. AIDAB</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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**Consultancies #2: Strategic planning, design documentation and appraisal**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australian Government Deployable Civilian Capacity (DCC) Program. Planning and design specialist responsible for developing strategic planning tools/formats and a 'management framework' integrating plans, targets and performance monitoring. AusAID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Pakistan-Australia Paediatric and Diabetes Related Eye Care Program 2008-2012. Planning and design specialist responsible for writing the Project Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Document, Scope of Services and Basis of Payment. The Fred Hollows Foundation of Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>PNG-Australia Sexual Health Improvement Project (PASHIP). Design specialist responsible for conducting a desk appraisal of project design/funding submissions from seven NGOs. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>HES Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation System. Planning and design specialist on team developing new planning, monitoring and evaluation systems for the Humanitarian and Emergencies Section. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>AusAID/NGO Periodic Funding for Disaster Risk Management. Technical Appraisal Panel member assessing and scoring NGO bids. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>South Asia and Africa funded initiatives. Technical assessment of the design of M&amp;E frameworks of several initiatives designed by UN agencies and NGOs and funded by AusAID. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Illicit Drugs Initiative, 2005-07. Design specialist contracted to assist with the concept submission and design note for Asia Transboundary Section. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Asia Regional Trafficking Project (ART). Design specialist contracted to appraise the draft Project Design Document (and LogFrame) to ensure adherence to design standards and adequate basis for contracting. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Emergency Response Cooperation Agreement. Technical Assessment Panel member assessing and scoring NGO bids. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Strengthening the disaster preparedness and response capacity of the Indonesian Red Cross. Design specialist contracted to appraise the proposal. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Vietnam-Australia Monitoring and Evaluation Strengthening Project Phase II. Design specialist contracted to appraise the draft design. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Australia-Indonesia HIV/AIDS Program Phase 2, Design specialist leading team to develop a strategy and draft a Project Design Document for second phase of Australia’s bilateral HIV/AIDS program in Indonesia. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Comprehensive Eye Care Program. Conducted in-country consultations and designed a five year cataract surgery program for submission to AusAID for funding. Fred Hollows Foundation of Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>District Development Project (Pilot). Tasked to design an M&amp;E system for the decentralisation of the national budget and programme implementation to Districts and Sub-Counties, Team Leader, UN Capital Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>Ngalum-Injilbardi Development Foundation. Together with another consultant undertook community consultations to design a development foundation to manage and monitor the use of compensation funds. Woodside Offshore Petroleum and the Ngalum and Injilbardi Native Title Claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>Martu Land Claim. Assisted native title claimants develop, document and present a strategy and rationale to the West Australian government. Western Desert Puntukurupama Aboriginal Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>English Language and Technical Courses Project. Design specialist on mission to develop a training project with the Ministry of Justice, Design Specialist. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Malaria Research Project. Design specialist contributing to the documentation of a research project subsequently funded by AusAID. Walter and Eliza Hall Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Consultancies #3: Training course design and delivery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Training for Asia Pacific National Representatives. Contracted to develop materials, facilitate one day intensive course, and provide advice on further training needs. Transparency International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Project design and donor proposal preparation training for members of Indonesia’s Department of Trade through AusAID’s IASTP III. Prepared and presented material on strategy selection and objective setting. AMSAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Emergency response procedure training primarily for AusAID Emergency Officers. Developed materials and facilitated training. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>M&amp;E Training for AusAID Program Support staff. Delivery of segment on evaluation for three groups of staff. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>M&amp;E Training for AusAID staff. Provision of training and advice to assist HES and other staff plan/manage M&amp;E exercises for humanitarian and disaster relief activities. AusAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Course for AusAID Development Program Managers. Co-facilitator of four week for national staff from Indonesia, the Phillipines, South Africa &amp; Mozambique. ANUTECH/PDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Reporting Workshops. Preparation of course materials and delivery of two day workshops in Sydney and Melbourne for NGO staff. Focus on utilizing AusAID formats. Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Course for AusAID Development Program Managers. Co-facilitator of four-week training course for A-based staff and national staff from Indonesia and Palestine. ANUTECH/PDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Landcare and community development. Presentation to Landcare facilitators on the relevance of community development as practiced in less developed countries to Landcare in Australia. NSW Landcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Rural Projects: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Course. Co-director of two separate four week training courses for development program managers. ANUTECH/PDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Planning, Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Workshops. Preparation of course materials and facilitation of two workshops for NGO project managers on planning, designing, monitoring and evaluating development projects. ACFOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Emergency Response Workshops. Preparation of course materials and facilitation of two workshops funded by AusAID for NGO emergency response managers on responding to complex humanitarian emergencies. ACFOA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additional employment history

New York
2002
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Senior Evaluation Consultant. Assisted OCHA’s Evaluation and Studies Unit to prepare and manage evaluations in Afghanistan and other countries (3 months)

East Timor
1999-2000
Caritas Australia, Relief Coordinator. Helped establish Caritas Australia’s emergency program, including food aid operations and a shelter program in the Oecusse enclave. (3 months)

Sudan
1993-95
OXFAM (GB), Relief and Rehabilitation Coordinator Southern Sudan. Established and coordinated a large rehabilitation and development programme in Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria, primarily for IDPs. Interventions included primary health, water supply and veterinary projects, and the distribution of cultivation tools, seeds and fishing equipment.

Cambodia
1992-1993
International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), Repatriation Coordinator. Managed the reception and resettlement of refugees returning from Thailand to areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge, KPNLF and ANK, in collaboration with UNHCR. Included monitoring respect for human rights, distributing food, agricultural and shelter inputs, and implementing quick-impact projects.

Cambodia
1991
Cambodian Red Cross, Development Delegate. Assisted the CRC establish an assessment capacity for food aid and rural rehabilitation needs. Included training in survey techniques, project design, monitoring and review.

Australia
based
1991

Australia
based
1989-1990
CARE Australia, Director of Relief and Rehabilitation. Field assessment and design and oversight of food aid and other emergency projects budgeted at over A$ 6 million. Programming and monitoring visits to Vietnam, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Sudan.

Uganda
1988-89
OXFAM UK, Relief and Rehabilitation Coordinator. Established and managed a large food aid and agricultural rehabilitation project in Kitgum District. Other tasks included the assessment of relief and rehabilitation needs in Soroti District and the reception of Sudanese refugees in Kaabong Sub-Country.

Somalia
1988
OXFAM UK, Galgaduud Region Project Manager. Established and managed a supplementary feeding project in collaboration with UNICEF.

Uganda
1984-88
OXFAM UK, Lalelia Development Project Manager, Karimoni Region. Established the project, living on site for several years in a mud hut. The project was initially a resettlement project, utilising food-for-work rations provided by WFP, and evolved into a widely respected community development project.

Uganda
1984
Save the Children Fund UK, Office Administrator. Responsible for stores and logistics and emergency distributions in the war torn Luwero Triangle (3 months)

Ethiopia
1984
Save the Children Fund UK, volunteer, Wolcho Region. Assisted in feeding centres in Korem during the height of the famine in the north (2 months).

Australia
1981-83
Allen, Allen & Hemsley, Sydney, Solicitors. Specialised in litigation and mining and petroleum law.
# Publications and articles

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Coordination Tools for OCHA, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), New York, 12 pages</td>
<td><a href="http://www.consultpdm.com/publications/cvs/bernard_broughton.pdf">Source</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>How Logframe Approaches Could Facilitate the Planning and Management of Humanitarian Operations, World Food Programme (WFP), Rome, 26 pages</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Safe Sex or Healthy Sex? Development Bulletin, Australian Development Studies Network, Australian National University (ANU)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid and War: Dilemmas and Challenges in Sudan, Oxford UK &amp; I Discussion Paper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Second Report from the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly upon Aborigines, Parliament of NSW, author of Section VII Culture, 37 pages</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[Signature]

December 2009
Annex 4: CV for Christoplos Ian

Curriculum Vitae
Ian Christoplos

Address
Ljungabovägen 358
SE-370 21 Glenningebro, Sweden
tel/fax: 46-(0)431-522203
mobile: 46-(0)733-887610
e-mail: ian@glemddev.com

Date of Birth: February 27, 1957
Place of Birth: Washington, D.C.
Citizenship: Swedish
Languages: English native tongue
Swedish fluent
Portuguese fair working knowledge
Spanish fair working knowledge

References available upon request

EDUCATION

1998 Filosofie Doktor in Extension Education
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden

1995 Filosofie Licenciat in Extension Education
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden

1987-8 Graduate studies in Cultural Anthropology
Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

1984 Master of Science in Development Management
American University, School of International Service, Washington, D.C.

1977 Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology and Photography
Evergreen State College, Olympia, Washington
SHORT-TERM ASSIGNMENTS

Fall 2009 World Bank
Team leader: Preparation of plans for comprehensive support to the African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services.

Fall 2009 Swiss Development Cooperation
Consultant: Preparation of plans for a global forum for agricultural advisory services, in collaboration with the Neuchâtel Initiative.

Summer 2009 World Food Programme
Researcher: Preparation of a review of local and national institutional factors related to food security and climate change.

Summer 2009 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Consultant: Preparation of policy recommendations for food security programming.

Winter 2009 ProVention Consortium

Winter 2009 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Consultant: Preparation of a desk study on Pro-poor agricultural aid for trade in a context of climate change.

Winter-Spring 2009 Overseas Development Institute
Research associate: Preparation of a scoping paper exploring areas of future research to integrate aspects of development and disaster risk.

Summer 2008 – Spring 2009 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Consultant: Support to drafting a chapter on the “Human Dimensions of Climate Change” to be included in the final report of the Commission on Climate Change and Development.

Fall 2008 – Spring 2009 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Advisor: Review of drafts of the second phase evaluation of links between relief, rehabilitation and development in response to the tsunami and earthquake in the Maldives, Indonesia and Sri Lanka for the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.

Winter 2008 ProVention Consortium

Summer-Fall 2007 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Advisor: Support to a multi-agency panel undertaking a professional peer review of the evaluation function of the World Food Programme.

Winter 2007 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Consultant: Preparation of an "approach paper" to be used as a basis for planning the second phase evaluation of links between relief, rehabilitation and development in response to the tsunami and earthquake in the Maldives, Indonesia and Sri Lanka for the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.

Winter 2007  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Evaluating: Member of a team evaluating the work of CATIE, the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Centre in Turrialba, Costa Rica.

Winter 2006 - 2007 FAO
Consultant: Preparation of a concept note for a resource desk and future overall approach for the Neuchâtel Initiative working with agricultural advisory services.

Winter 2006 – 2007 Overseas Development Institute
Researcher: Conducted a study of transitions from humanitarian programming to EU integration in rural development in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Fall 2006 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
Consultant: Review of publication on Market Oriented Agricultural Advisory Services for the Neuchâtel Initiative.

Spring-Summer 2006 Ramboll Natura
Consultant: Advisory input to assess performance related to capacity building through the Lao-Swedish Upland Agriculture and Forestry Research Programme of the National Agricultural and Forestry Research Institute of Laos.

Spring 2006 ProVention Consortium
Facilitator: Preparation of a discussion paper and facilitation of a session of the ProVention Forum in Bangkok on "The elusive window of opportunity for risk reduction in post-disaster recovery" and contributions to plans for inclusion of risk reduction issues in the Tsunami Recovery Impact Assessment and Monitoring System.

Fall 2005 – Winter 2006 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
Senior advisor: Advisory support and preparation of synthesis report for the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development evaluation of Indian Ocean tsunami operations on behalf of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, contracted by the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency.

Spring 2005 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Spring 2005 Channel Research
Team leader: Evaluation of the work of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

Winter 2004  ProVention Consortium
Evaluator: Desk review of the ProVention studies ‘Lessons Learning from Recovery Efforts’, which included studies of post-disaster recovery in Gujarat, Bangladesh, Honduras and Turkey as part of an overall evaluation of the ProVention Consortium.

Winter 2004  Centre for Biodiversity, Uppsala University/SLU
Researcher. Preparation of a concept paper reviewing key issues for consideration in analysis of the potential impact of land consolidation on biodiversity, focusing on the Western Balkans and Central Asia.

Winter 2004-Spring 2005 Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)
Researcher. Study of institutional capacity building in humanitarian assistance which was published as the theme chapter of the ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action in 2004.

Fall 2004 United Nations Development Programme
Team leader: Evaluation of outcomes of UNDP support to capacity building for disaster reduction in Vietnam.

Summer 2004 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Consultant: Preparation of Terms of Reference for a synthesis review of a multi-agency initiative evaluating support to internally displaced persons.

Spring 2004 Opto International
Consultant: International resource person for a workshop on extension alternatives for a milk and dairy project in Nis, Serbia.

Fall 2003-Spring 2004 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Researcher: Preparation of an issues paper on Agriculture and Livelihoods in Afghanistan.

Fall 2003 British Red Cross Society
Researcher: Preparation of a keynote overview paper for a workshop on Natural Disasters in Complex Political Emergencies.

Summer-Fall 2003 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Lead consultant: Design and preparation of a programme document for the Macedonian Agricultural Advisory Support Programme.

Spring 2003-Fall 2004 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Consultant: Advisory support to Sida’s Department for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management in preparation of a humanitarian assistance policy.

Winter 2003 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Consultant: Study for the mid-term assessment of the Lao Swedish Upland Agriculture and Forestry Research Programme.

Winter-Spring 2003 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Consultant: Preparation of a feasibility study for eventual support to a system of agricultural advisory services in the Republic of Macedonia, and a pre-feasibility study on agricultural advisory services in Kosovo.

Winter 2002-2003 Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)
Consultant: Drafting of the introductory and conclusion chapters for the 2003 ALNAP Annual Review focusing on “Monitoring for Learning”.

Winter 2002-2003 United Nations Development Program
Consultant: Editorial support for preparation of the UNDP “World Vulnerability Report”.

Fall 2002 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
Consultant: Preparation and presentation of a paper on extension and poverty at a conference on “Extension and the new rural space in Northeastern Brazil”.

Fall 2002 Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Consultant: Participation in an evaluation of “Support to Agricultural and Rural Development in a Private Sector Development Perspective”.

Fall 2001 – Summer 2002 Humanitarian Accountability Project
Real-time Evaluator/Methodological Resource Person: Evaluation and provision of methodological support for pilot field trials in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan of mechanisms to ensure accountability in the humanitarian system.

Fall 2001 – Spring 2002 Overseas Development Institute
Consultant: Participation in an evaluation/study of Sida area development programmes, focusing on cases in Ethiopia, Cambodia and Zambia.

Summer 2001 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Spring 2001 British Red Cross
Consultant: Guest editor, together with John Mitchell, of a special issue of the journal Disasters on Emerging Perspectives on Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness.

Fall 2000 – Spring 2001 Overseas Development Institute
Researcher: Participation in a major Sida and DFID supported review of the impact of agricultural extension on poverty and vulnerability, including a case study in Nicaragua.

Fall 2000 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency

Spring 2000 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Consultant: Preparation of a study of “Poverty Reduction, Sustainability and Learning: An Evaluability Assessment of Seven Area Development Projects”.

Winter 2000 Humanitarian Accountability Project
Consultant: Redrafting of a proposal to establish an international mechanism for improved humanitarian accountability.

Winter 2000 Overseas Development Institute
Researcher: Preparation of a case study on Sida approaches to developmental humanitarian assistance as part of a broad international survey of donor policies for developmental relief and related concepts.

Fall 1999 – Winter 2000 British Red Cross Society
Researcher: Participation in an international study of disaster mitigation and preparedness funded by ESCOR, including a study of changing approaches to disaster mitigation and preparedness in Nicaragua after Hurricane Mitch.
Winter 1999  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency  
Consultant: Team Leader for a mission planning agricultural rehabilitation programmes after Hurricane Mitch and outlining long-term rural development priorities for Sida/Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Nicaragua.

Fall 1998 & Fall 1999  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency  
Consultant: Participation in a supervision team to monitor the work of the Ethiopian/Swedish Rural Development Co-operation Programme in Amhara National Regional State.

Fall 1998  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency  
Consultant: Assessments and back-up support for a pre-feasibility study for a rural development programme in the post-conflict areas of Northern Nicaragua.

Fall 1997  Scandiaconsult Natura  
Consultant: Participation in planning of a Vietnamese national seminar on agriculture and forestry extension and presented a keynote address: “International Trends in the Context of Extension Services of Relevance to Vietnam”.

Spring 1997  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
Consultant: Together with a representative of the British Red Cross, evaluation of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Disaster Preparedness Programme in East Africa.

Summer-Fall 1996  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
Researcher & consultant: Programming support for Angolan rehabilitation planning and a study on provincial capacities and perspectives for post-war rehabilitation.

Spring 1996  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency  
Consultant: Participation in a team planning the Malange Economic Reactivation Programme in Angola, responsible for programming related to NGO co-operation.

Winter 1996  Swedish Red Cross  
Consultant: Study of long-term effects of floods on vulnerable sectors of the population and impact of relief activities in the Mekong Delta.

Fall 1995  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency  
Consultant: Preparation a study of agricultural extension structures and approaches, and organisation of a workshop for practitioners to discuss extension policies and practice.

Spring 1995  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency  
Consultant: Evaluation of a major fund for NGO emergency assistance in Angola.

Fall 1994  Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences  
Researcher: Coordination of an action research project entitled "Targeted Extension for Resource-Poor Farmers Through Local Community Organisations" in co-operation with the Mekong Delta Farming Systems Research and Development Centre.

Winter 1993 & Summer 1993  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency  
Emergency programme officer: Assessment of the plans and operational capacities of agencies involved with relief and rehabilitation activities in Angola.

Spring 1993  Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences  
Researcher: Survey of extension service structures, on-farm research methods, and village organisations in co-operation with Vietnamese research institutions.
Fall 1992  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Assessment delegate: Evaluation of Gambia Red Cross Society relief and rehabilitation efforts
in support of refugees arriving from Senegal, and advice to the Society in development of plans
for future assistance to displaced.

LONG-TERM ASSIGNMENTS

October 1998 – Present  Glemminge Development Research AB (formerly Christoplos
Consulting)
Director of a consulting firm specialising in issues related to rural development, agricultural
extension, humanitarian assistance and risk reduction.

August 2009 – Present  Danish Institute for International Studies
Senior Researcher: Analyses of issues related to the role of local institutions in relation to
poverty and natural resource management, with particular focus on climate change.

November 2008 – Present  Disaster Studies, Wageningen University
Guest researcher: Support in a major research programme on economic and food
security in fragile states.

January 2008 – Present  ProVention Consortium
Researcher: Leader of a research programme “Learning from Recovery” analysing long-term
recovery processes after major natural disasters, the first study focuses on Hurricane Mitch.

January 2008 – Present  Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Member of the Expert Group supporting the Swedish initiated Commission on Climate Change
and Development.

April 2007 – Present  Ramboll Natura AB
Consultant: Advisory support related to capacity development as part of the Upland Research
and Capacity Development Programme of the National Agriculture and Forestry Research
Institute in Lao PDR.

January 2005 - Present  GRM International (formerly OPTO International)
International senior technical advisor: Support to the Macedonia Agricultural Advisory
Support Programme.

February 2004 – Present  Department of Rural and Urban Development, Swedish
University of Agricultural Sciences
Researcher (former acting head of department): A range of research, supervision and teaching
tasks primarily related to rural development in Viet Nam in recent years.

November 1996 – Present  Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Consultant: Ongoing support to Sida’s collaboration with the “Neuehâdel Initiative”, an
informal forum for donor consultation working to improve agricultural advisory services.

February 2006 – February 2007  Opto International
Project director: Support to the project “Coordination and programme development for the Swedish support to agriculture in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

January 2003 – December 2005 Overseas Development Institute
Research associate: Research into “The changing roles of agricultural rehabilitation: linking relief, development and support to rural livelihoods” funded by the EC Poverty Reduction Effectiveness Programme, in collaboration with FAO.

July 1999 – December 2001 Collegium for Development Studies, Uppsala University
Director: Responsible for creating a dialogue between the academic and development communities focused on strategic policy issues, including humanitarianism, poverty, human rights and environmental sustainability.

January 1996 – July 1999 Department of Rural Development Studies (formerly International Rural Development Centre), Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Researcher: Co-ordination and implementation of a variety of research and consultancy tasks in Africa, Asia and Latin America focused on rural extension and the challenges of relating vulnerability reduction and local institutional development in humanitarian and development contexts.

January 1997 – December 1998 Swedish Red Cross
Researcher: Research co-operation with the Swedish Red Cross as part of work at the Department of Rural Development Studies. Preparation of a guide to Vulnerability-Capacity Assessment for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, support to the Swedish Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies related to Disaster Preparedness.

October 1993 – December 1995 Research Programme on Environmental Policy and Society (EPOS), Uppsala and Linköping Universities
Research programme officer: Provision of general support for research co-operation, primarily in the Horn of Africa and Vietnam, including preparation and assisting with research reports and project proposals on decentralised assessment, women’s organisations in agricultural development, dryland husbandry, and agricultural extension policy.

October 1990 - March 1992 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Disaster preparedness and branch development delegate: Support to the Angola Red Cross in developing decentralised structures and planning of the Society’s expected post-war redirection towards environmental health and rehabilitation projects.

March 1989 - July 1990 League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Divisional development delegate: Support to the Lesotho Red Cross in structural development of rural Red Cross branches throughout Lesotho. Training of branch members in needs assessment, project planning, implementation and evaluation.

January 1988 - July 1988 League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Field delegate/Programme officer for the Eastern Region and Darfur, Sudan. Assistance to the Sudanese Red Crescent in various matters, including: branch development, co-ordination between bilateral and League projects, vulnerability assessment, small project management, food for work policy and general administration.

January 1985 - May 1986 Lutheran World Relief
Logistics co-ordinator: Responsible for Sudanese port operations, warehousing and transport of relief supplies going cross-border into Eritrea and Tigray for the Emergency Relief Desk, a consortium under the direction of Norwegian Church Aid.

MEMBERSHIP IN COMMITTEES AND EDITORIAL BOARDS

Winter 2009 – present International Humanitarian Studies Association
Board member

Fall 2008 – present Humanitarian Policy Group
Advisory group member: Participation in advisory group of the IHPG of the Overseas Development Institute.

Fall 2005 – Fall 2006 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Independent advisory group member: Participation in reference group to review, advise and support the IFRC in its tsunami recovery efforts.

Fall 2000 – present Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Editorial board member: Participation in the editorial board of Currents, with responsibilities including acting as guest editor of two theme issues.

Summer 2000 – Winter 2004 Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance
Steering committee member: Participation in ALNAP as representative for academia and independent consultants.

Winter 2002 – Winter 2004 Sida Civil Society Centre
Advisory board member: Participation in the advisory board of the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency’s centre in Håndmark.

Summer 2002 – Spring 2003 United Nations Development Program
External reviewer: Editorial review and advisory support for the UNDP World Vulnerability Report.

Winter 2001 – Spring 2003 UK Department for International Development
Reference group member: Advisor on livelihoods issues for the Policies Research Programme of the Rural Livelihoods Department.

Winter 2001-2002, Winter 2003 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
PUBLICATIONS

Christopoulos, Ian, Simon Anderson, Margaret Arnold, Victor Galaz, Meryllyn Hedger and Richard Klein, 2009, The Human Dimension of Climate Adaptation: The Importance of Local and Institutional Issues, Commission on Climate Change and Development, Stockholm


Chipeta, Sannie, Ian Christopoulos and Elisabeth Katz, 2008, Common Framework on Market-Oriented Agricultural Advisory Services, Neuchâtel Group, Lindau


Baker, Joëc, Ian Christopoulos, Stefan Dahlgren, Susanne Frache, Ted Kliets, Zenda Ofir and Peta Sandison 2007, Peer Review: Evaluation Function at the World Food Programme (WFP), Sida, Stockholm


Christopoulos, Ian, 2007, Narratives of Rehabilitation in Afghan Agricultural Interventions, in Adam Pain and Jack Sutton (eds), Reconstructing Agriculture in Afghanistan, ITDG, Rugby


Longley, Catherine, Ian Christopoulos and Tom Slaymaker, 2006, Agricultural Rehabilitation: Mapping
the Linkages Between Humanitarian Relief, Social Protection and Development, HPG Research Briefing 23, ODI, London


Rocha, José Luis, and Ian Christopoulos, 2004, Interventions humanitaires dans un Etat néolibéral: les leçons de louragan Mitch au Nicaragua, in Interventions humanitaires?, Alternatives Sud, CETRI, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium


Buchanan-Smith, Margie, and Ian Christopoulos, 2004, ‘When it all happens at once’ Natural Disasters and Complex Political Emergencies, Report on a Seminar host by the British Red Cross Society, British Red Cross, London


Christoplos, Ian, 2002, Policy Analysis and Academia – In search of connections, in Aid and Academia – Reassessing the Relationship, Utsikt mot Utveckling 16, Uppsala University, Uppsala


Christoplos, Ian, 2001, Rural Development in Latin America (guest editor of a theme issue) Currents, 12/01

Christoplos, Ian, 2001, Extension, Poverty and Vulnerability in Nicaragua, Currents, 12/01


Christoplos, Ian, 2001, Emerging Perspectives on Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness (guest editor for a theme issue, together with John Mitchell), Disasters, 25/3


Rocha, José Luis, & Ian Christoplos, 2001, Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness in the Nicaraguan Post-Mitch Agenda, Disasters, 25/3


12

96
Diskett, Pat, & Ian Christophols, 2000, A Forward Looking Study of Health Contributions in Humanitarian Assistance, Sida Division for Humanitarian Assistance, Stockholm
Christophols, Ian, 2000, Natural Disasters, Complex Emergencies and Public Services: Rejuxtaposing the Narratives after Hurricane Mitch, in Paul Collins (ed.), Applying Public Administration in Development: Guideposts to the future, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester
Rocha, José Luis, & Ian Christophols, 1999, NGO’s in Nicaragua After Hurricane Mitch: Gaps and Opportunities in Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness, Currents, 12/99
Rocha, José Luis, & Ian Christophols, 1999, NGOs and Natural Disasters: Gaps and Opportunities [Las ONGs ante los desastres naturales: vacíos y oportunidades], Envió, 18/220
Christophols, Ian, 1999, Humanitarianism, Pluralism and Ombudsmen: Do the Pieces Fit?, Disasters, 23/3
Christophols, Ian, 1998, Humanitarianism and Public Service Integrity: Where is the Link?, News from Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, No. 3
Christophols, Ian, 1998, Sensemaking and Services: Perspectives from the Frontline in Relief and Development Practice, Acta Universitatis Agriculturae Sueciae, Agraria 92, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala
Christophols, Ian, 1998, Humanitarianism and Local Service Institutions in Angola, Disasters, 22/1
Christoplos, Ian, 1997, Extension, Poverty and Pluralism, Sida Publications on Agriculture and Rural Development Number 8, Stockholm

Christoplos, Ian, 1996, Poverty, Pluralism and Extension Practice, IIED Gatekeeper Series Number 64, London


Christoplos, Ian, 1995, Representation, Poverty and PRA in the Mekong Delta, EPOS Research Report Number 6, Linköping


Christoplos, Ian & Ulrich Nitsch, 1994, Extension and Learning, Forest Trees and People Newsletter, Number 24, June

Christoplos, Ian & Ulrich Nitsch, 1993, Changing Extension Paradigms, IRDCurrents, Number 6, October

Source: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Staff/Ian%20Christoplos%20_2_cv.pdf
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>24-Sep</td>
<td>Rashid Khalikov</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Director,OCHA New-York</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>New-York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24-Sep</td>
<td>Ivan Lupis</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Desk Officer</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>New-York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>24-Sep</td>
<td>Ben Negus</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>New-York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25-Sep</td>
<td>David Kaatrud</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
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