Jobbik’s Portrayal of MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party): A Discourse Analysis

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**Abbreviations:**

Fidesz  Magyar Polgári Szövetség – Hungarian Civic Union  
Jobbik  Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom – Movement for a Better Hungary  
MDF  Magyar Demokrata Fórum – Hungarian Democratic Forum  
MIÉP  Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja – Hungarian Justice and Life Party  
MSZMP  Magyar Szocialist Munkáspárt – Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party  
MSZP  Magyar Szocialista Párt – Hungarian Socialist Party  
SZDSZ  Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége - Alliance of Free Democrats – Hungarian Liberal Party
Introduction:

The Other lies at the heart of radical right politics, and for the radical right, which understands the world in terms of struggle, in terms of “us” versus “them,” the Other is translated into “the Enemy.”

The situation in the entirety of Europe is very similar presently. The political sphere is seeing the rise of radical right wing political parties. These political parties are posing a threat to the very construction of the European Union at the supranational level, and posing a threat to democracy at the national level. Like the quotation above mentions, radical right wing political parties’ politics are viewed as existing in a dichotomy. This in turn creates a situation where radical right parties in general have an ‘other’ that they are constantly differentiating against. In numerous countries all across Europe, whether in the former Eastern bloc or the West, radical right wing parties have an ‘other’ that they are competing with. For example in many Western European countries, the issues are with immigrants coming to the countries and establishing themselves. They are the ‘other’ outside of the nation but inside the state. In Eastern Europe, the situation is somewhat different, where there is not the same number of immigrants coming, instead internal ‘enemies’ are often made to seem like the ‘other’. In this instance they are enemies within the state and within the nation. These ‘enemies’ hence pose problems for the radical right and they are specifically named as such, and the dichotomization beings. Often this situation is seen through the discourse that the radical right wing political parties produce towards their named ‘enemy’.

The case study being taken in order to further analyse the portrayal of the ‘other’ in political discourse is the situation in the Eastern European country of Hungary. The most active radical right wing populist political party presently is called, A Jobbik

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3 Ibid.
4 Named Eastern European due to the historical ties with the Soviet Union and not geographically.
Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik – The Movement for a Better Hungary). The Movement for a Better Hungary, or Jobbik, and its ‘enemy’ which they are constantly competing with is, MSZP – Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party). Arguably for Jobbik, MSZP is their main opponent. MSZP is Jobbik’s opponent because both parties are putting forward a different view of the current situation and the changes they hope to impose, which are very different mostly based on different ideological conceptions about the future of Hungary. The changes that Jobbik hopes to make are in response to MSZP’s former policies while in power. This rivalry comes in many forms but also in the competition for electoral votes.

In an effort to further explain the social relations and social circumstances surrounding this confrontation between Jobbik and MSZP, it is necessary to explain the social role that each political party possesses and the social relations between them. Jobbik is the radical right political party on the Hungarian political scene. Since the left side of the political spectrum does not have such an equivalent, Jobbik is alone in the radical camp. On the other hand, MSZP occupies the largest section of the left side of the political spectrum since they are the second largest party currently in Hungary. In a competition for more votes and thus power, Jobbik is presenting their view of the current situation in Hungary as in part a reaction to the former politics of MSZP. Power relations form a large part of this competition is mostly seen in the form of specific utterances.

Through the analysis of Jobbik’s discourse in the form of their political program, called “Radical Change 2010,” certain aspects will be taken into consideration in order to show the struggle for power relations between the two political parties. Jobbik is presenting themselves as a radical party hoping to make many changes if elected. In addition, with the use of tactics such as legitimacy, Jobbik is struggling to discredit MSZP through language use. The differences in views of the two parties stem from their different world views. The language used by Jobbik goes as far as to question the very limit of political discourse and potentially demonstrating instances of hate speech. This struggle for power relations further reinforces the situation of political polarization within the Hungarian political sphere. Jobbik is trying to make great changes in society,

5. The Movement for a Better Hungary will be referred to as Jobbik for the entirety of the thesis for simplification purposes.
6. The Hungarian Socialist Party will be referred to as MSZP for the entirety of the thesis for simplification purposes.
especially in the fields of religion, education, culture, the Roma minority, Hungarians outside the present borders of Hungary, and changing the way the demonstrations of 2006 are perceived. In these attempts to change Hungarian society, Jobbik needs to have radical discourse in order to have impact, gain attention and votes, and further polarize Hungarian society politically. Thus Jobbik is using discourse against MSZP to appear completely different, and reinforce the political cleavage.

The explanation of the theory behind political discourse analysis will be presented, along with all of the tools pertaining to the analysis. These tools are essential in order to complete the analysis. Then, a historical backdrop to the Hungarian political situation will be explained. This will have references to the history of both Jobbik and MSZP, an explanation of the 2006 demonstrations in Hungary which form a large part of the criticism against MSZP by Jobbik, and a further illustration of the history of political polarization in Hungary. Following the historical background will be the actual political discourse analysis of Jobbik’s program supported by numerous examples from the program translated from Hungarian to English by myself. These examples will further demonstrate the power relations between the two parties. The conclusion will be an assessment as to the harshness of Jobbik’s language, whether Jobbik has managed to stand out through their radical stance, whether there were instances of hate speech and how this has affected the Hungarian political divide.

Note: An important aspect to keep in mind is that Jobbik is one of the more recently formed political parties in Hungary. This being the case, there is a slight lack of truly academic literature on the subject. Although this is the situation, it allows for the opportunity to gather more information from a wider variety of sources, which places the subject also in a larger field. Moreover, since not much academic research has been done on the subject it enables a certain breech of new territory, which is very stimulating. Another consideration is that since the subject is very new, it is more susceptible to change, than something that has taken decades to be solidified. Therefore, the situation with Jobbik may change in order for the party to gain more votes and to crystalize its reputation.
Methodology:

This study is located in the general field of the social sciences, specifically in the field of political science. More precisely, Jobbik’s political party program released in 2010 will be analyzed with a focus on the sections directly dealing with MSZP. It is evident that the subject matter and the societal domain in which these statements are located are in the field of political science, and political party relations of power. The party’s program will be analyzed using political discourse analysis, as laid out clearly by Teun A. Van Dijk, from the University of Amsterdam. According to Van Dijk, political discourse analysis can give the reader further insight than just discourse analysis because it deals directly with the “reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination, through political discourse,”7 therefore further demonstrating inequalities within the political sphere that are manifested through conditions and consequences.8 This can be directly taken up because it is addressing Jobbik and its main opponent and their liaison in terms of power relations.

Using Jobbik’s political program, it is the most pure form of political discourse that it written by a political party, since it is the true expression of a political party’s view and plans for the future and about how a country should be. Jobbik’s views about the future of Hungary are in large part based on the previous actions of former parties, specifically the actions of MSZP. Jobbik focuses a large part of their political program on MSZP because many of the changes that Jobbik hopes to implement are past actions that MSZP had done that Jobbik disagrees with. According to Jobbik’s program, MSZP had done certain things that pose a threat to Hungarian values and culture and those changes should be reversed and the politicians responsible for those changes should be held accountable.

Moreover, discourse analysis is located in the interpretive paradigm. This paradigm is based on the assumption that, “reality as we know it is constructed intersubjectively through the meanings and understandings developed socially and

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8. Ibid.
experientially”\textsuperscript{9}. This directly relates to Jobbik, because they are trying to construct an altered view of reality where MSZP is entirely at fault for the problems in Hungary presently including the debt, the privatization in every sphere, the general decline of the standard of living, etc. Jobbik is producing discourse, which is affecting the Hungarians that vote for Jobbik and others with an altered view on MSZP and the political and economic situation in Hungary presently.

Also, the data will be interpreted for signs and examples of these power relations where Jobbik positions MSZP and the path that Hungary should and could be on in opposition moving further away from finding a common solution. An added question that will be explored is how these oppositional statements are representative of Jobbik and the whole situation in contemporary Hungarian society. How the language that Jobbik uses stands in terms of definitions of hate speech is another relevant question.

**Definitions:**

There are numerous important key words that are extremely relevant for this study. These words are: discourse, power relations, hate speech, and radical. These key words will be defined in the following section.

**Discourse:**

Since this paper will be analysing discourse, it is necessary to give a definition of what discourse is in this particular study and how it is used. According to Sara Mills’ book called *Discourse*, discourse has numerous meanings depending on the context. Mill states that there exists the general meaning of the word often found in the dictionary, but it also has a philosophical and theoretical meaning\textsuperscript{10}. Another way that discourse can be viewed is through ideology,

‘Discourse’ is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs etc. constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience – ‘ideology’ in the neutral non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which the discourse is embedded\textsuperscript{11}.


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 6.
This shows that Jobbik has a certain ideology from which they are presenting their views, and their statements encompass the beliefs, etc. of this perspective. Moreover, Sara Mills also uses certain interpretations of Michel Foucault’s definition of discourse. Foucault states,

Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’, I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as the regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.\(^\text{12}\)

This passage is then interpreted by Mills as having three working definitions for the word discourse. The first definition comes from the part about the, “general domain of all statements,” explained as any statement produced with meaning is in fact a form of discourse.\(^\text{13}\) This directly applied to the case study of Jobbik because the party has published a political program and hopes to make changes within Hungary. These new ideas are described in the program. The second meaning comes from the section about “an individualized group of statements,” revealing that certain types of discourse can be grouped together and have coherence and common features.\(^\text{14}\) In the application of this interpretation to Jobbik, it is evident that Jobbik’s discourse can be grouped together into those sections regarding MSZP. The third definition comes from the section about, “a regulated practice that account for a number of statements”. This is the most commonly used part and definition by theorists, trying to explain that the statement is of less concern than the actual context in which it is said.\(^\text{15}\) This is true in the case of Jobbik because their views on MSZP are stated in a context of projecting a specific view of their opposition party in order to realize their goals of electoral success accomplished through radical change. Jobbik is presenting a view of MSZP that is different than the view other political parties have about MSZP in Hungary. Since this is the case, each opinion is based on a different end goal that each party would like to achieve.


\(^\text{13}\) Mills, *Discourse*, 7.

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{15}\) Ibid.
Power Relations:

Power relations are an essential component of political discourse analysis because discourse shows the reproduction of power, through either domination or abuse. The roots of power relations are from a type of political relation. More specifically, political relations are defined as,

The various structural units identified … are connected by multiple relations, some of which are typical for the field of politics: Power, power abuse, hegemony, oppression, tolerance, equality and inequality, among many others, especially define how the State relates to its citizens, or how certain political groups are positioned relative to others.

Power relations are a type of political relation where the relationship between the political groups is defined by power and competition for power relative to each other. In essence this is the very definition of the relations between Jobbik and MSZP because they are in a competition with each other for more power. Through this competition for power, relations develop between the two parties. Power relation can be expressed through discourse with the use of certain statements and expressions denoting controversies or even criticisms, which is the topic of analysis of this thesis. Power relations are very important in this case because Jobbik has the power over their discourse to reproduce representations of MSZP. This power over their discourse is essentially what produces power relations, since both parties are in a competition. Through these images reproduced of MSZP, Jobbik is trying to gain more power over MSZP and in turn also trying to convince the electorate to see the situation in the same way.

Hate Speech:

There are numerous definitions of hate speech available to use within this study. Most of the definitions available generally pertain to hate speech and issues of racism, anti-Semitism and homophobia. It is rare to see a type of hate speech definition dealing with the political sphere against another political party. After looking at many definitions the one used by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, seems to be the most ideal and relevant for this subject matter. It states,

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17. Ibid., 7.
The governments of the member states, public authorities and public institutions at the national, regional and local levels, as well as officials, have a special responsibility to refrain from statements, in particular to the media, which may reasonably be understood as hate speech, or as speech likely to produce the effect of legitimising, spreading or promoting racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of discrimination or hatred based on intolerance. Such statements should be prohibited and publicly disavowed whenever they occur.\textsuperscript{19}

The reason for the selection of this particular definition is due to the fact that it states, “or other forms of discrimination…” which can pertain to political language used against “equals”. Using this definition allows the domain of political competition among parties to be included. According to the New Oxford Companion to Law, the definition states, “An expression which is likely to cause offence or distress to other individuals on the basis of their association with a particular group and/or incite hostility towards them.”\textsuperscript{20}

This second definition also allows room for the political sphere since it does not mention specifics, even though the definition is quite vague. Another scholar Stanley Fish states,

\begin{quote}
Indeed, it is only when hate speech is characterized as irrational that the label “problem” seems appropriate to it, and also comforting, because a problem is something that can be treated, either by benign neglect…, by education and dialogue…, [or] by quarantine and excommunication.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

This definition is also very relevant because it passes the recognition stage of hate speech to the point where solutions are selected to be able to deal with it. These solutions are necessary when hate speech is labelled as irrational when the arguments are not endowed with reason and are based in abstraction.

More specifically in Hungary the debate about hate speech and its prohibition has been a very lively one. According to the Hungarian historian Mária Schmidt, hate speech has been more actively used in Hungarian political discourse since the 1992 movement entitled, ‘Act against Hatred’.\textsuperscript{22} Within political discourse the word hate (gyűlölet in

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{19} Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, "Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on “Hate Speech’,” http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/other_committees/dh-lgbt_docs/CM_Rec(97)20_en.pdf (accessed 16 March 16 2012), 107.


\end{footnotes}
Hungarian) has always been used frequently. The word hate speech has been directly translated from English to Hungarian as gyűlöletbeszéd. This word has slightly changed its meaning in Hungarian,

Yet, in the Hungarian debate(s) the somewhat more controversial metaphrase can be applied to any kind of “hateful” speech in the public sphere. “Gyűlöletbeszéd” could be a concept for speech intended to degrade a group of people based on their voting preferences, to intimidate a politician, a single person symbolizing a group, or to harshly criticize a party, a church, a medium, or even an idea.23

Therefore in the context of the Hungarian language gyűlöletbeszéd has become less important with regard to issues like racism and sexism, and instead is used in political debates, sphere of publicity and pertaining to the identities of certain political agents.24 The word changed to be suitably used for the stigmatization of one’s adversary.25 Putting the word hate speech in the context in which it is used in Hungary is essential for the reader to understand the context in which Jobbik’s discourse could potentially be seen as hate speech. Whether Jobbik uses gyűlöletbeszéd in the Hungarian context or is actually committing hate speech in an irrational sense, based on the definitions given by the Committee of Ministers, the Oxford Companion and Stanley Fish, will further be explored in the analysis.

Radical:

Radical could simply mean a completely different or revolutionary change from the present situation. According to political science theory, radical denotes the speed at which change is taking place as stated by political scientist Patrick H. O’Neil.26 Generally radicals are placed on the left side of the political spectrum, but in this case, radical is also applied to Jobbik. Radical believe in, “…revolutionary change of the existing political, social, or economic order… [because] the current system is broken and cannot simply be improved or repaired but must we scrapped in favour of a new order”.27 Radicals believe in fast change, and in order to achieve this may be more inclined to justify using violence for their ends. On the other hand, some radicals also believe in

24. Ibid., 20.
25. Ibid., 20.
27. Ibid.
peaceful measures to bring about change like raising public consciousness, and public mobilization for important issues. Jobbik also uses the word radical in this sense, because it hopes to make changes in Hungary that are very different from what any other political party has done.

**Tools of Analysis:**

The specific structure to be used to analyse and interpret the party’s program was chosen to show the representation of MSZP by Jobbik. Content analysis is a tool that Van Dijk also uses in order to better understand the surrounding circumstances of the situation around which the discourse is presented. There are three important elements to take into consideration. The first is general semantic information the specific discourse. Next is the relevant information from the immediately processing events and circumstances around the presentation of the discourse. Last is called the macro information, meaning information about the whole interaction and how it fits into the larger context. This can show how Jobbik’s representation of MSZP fits into the Hungarian political situation.

According to Van Dijk’s, *What is Political Discourse Analysis?*, certain very apropos criteria were selected to enable the analysis of Jobbik’s political program. These include the following aspects of speech, format, intention, intended audience, topic, and the structure of argumentation, semantics, lexicon, syntax, and rhetorical devices. The first criterion of which is the format means the way in which the information is presented. The second tool is the statement’s intention and what Jobbik hopes to achieve by it. The third tool is the intended audience or the main recipients of the statements. The fourth tool is topic, discussing the main points of the statements and giving a summary to the reader. The fifth tool is the structure of the argumentation used in the program, and how the arguments themselves are laid out. The sixth tool of analysis is the local semantics of the text, including elements such as coherence,

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28. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 13.
34. Ibid., 13.
35. Ibid., 25.
36. Ibid., 29.
presuppositions, entailment, indirectness, implicitness, strategies of description and representation.\textsuperscript{37} The next tool is the lexicon used, which includes an analysis of the political language.\textsuperscript{38} Followed by, syntax, which discusses the use of deictic pronouns, word order, function, and active and passive sentences.\textsuperscript{39} The last tool is rhetoric, where the use of rhetorical devices will be analysed, and how they construe the discourse by making additions such as, words added or omitted, and how principles of substitutions are used.\textsuperscript{40} Partisan polarization is a theme that is represented in all of the tools used. Using all of these tools together will give an overall picture of how political discourse as a method is used by Jobbik, and showing how this discourse reinforces the divide between the radical right and the socialist electoral block. These tools are essential in order to further breakdown political discourse analysis into its smaller parts to then be able to use them on Jobbik’s political program with reference to MSZP. Political discourse analysis needs the tools mentioned above in order to further demonstrate power relations between the two parties.

Once these aspects of content analysis have been analysed, there comes the next part about the larger picture behind the meaning of this discourse. This will be the most insightful part of the thesis since it will give the reader a chance to see what these critiques and reproaches about MSZP are really about. What makes political discourse analysis more relevant than just a discourse analysis is after conducting the analysis, political discourse analysis can give more insight into the larger political process because it deals with power relations specifically. For this to be successful, political discourse analysis must be able to demonstrate how the structures play a role in the political process.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{Purpose:}

The purpose of the study is to further understand how MSZP is being characterized by Jobbik and more important, what further insight can this show the reader about Jobbik itself. Although there are many studies focused on this topic of radical right

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 38.
wing political parties and their rise in power, this research hopes to bring to light recent new trends of how Jobbik is portraying MSZP, in the background of the current political situation in Hungary. This demonstrates that this particular discourse is constructed in a specific socio-political environment. This particular socio-political environment has a lot of influence on the present view of Jobbik and about Hungary in general and how Jobbik sees MSZP and its policies. The method chosen for analysing Jobbik’s program is political discourse analysis because of its focus and potential revelatory features with regard to power relations in politics.

Assumptions:
Along with methodology come certain assumptions and standards that the author has about the conducted analysis. This is relevant to consider for the reader to better understand the work being done, and the assumptions of the author before the study. Firstly, studies of discourse are very specific and particular due to the subjective nature of the text being analysed. In discourse, words are the tools used to express certain views about a particular subject. It is assumed that words are the method for communication to be successful, “Words as these are deep rhetorical resources for, at once, they illustrate a way of speaking, direct us to ‘listen’ in a proper way, this referring to non-linguistic forms of engaging the world, while valorizing these as powerful, necessary practices”.

This is a necessary point of consideration since words are identified, and thus, interpreted to mean, show, and shape aspects of action, relations, social life, and identity. In general, looking at the rhetoric of Jobbik, it is visible that the changes the party is trying to implement are one aspect of their program, but on the other hand, the way they are presenting these changes is another issue because of the language that they are utilizing. The goal of the political discourse analysis is to demonstrate that the views Jobbik has about the economic situation and MSZP are tied together by the rhetoric that the party is using to describe their entire program.

In addition, it is assumed that the program being analyzed was written by political members of Jobbik and that it is the reality of how Jobbik sees the situation in Hungary.

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43. Ibid., 104-105.
This is necessary to interpret the program as being the word of Jobbik so that it does not cause confusion and that there is no doubt as to the origin of these words.

Within this study, it is assumed that Jobbik is radical, firstly because it is a self-classification that the party itself uses to describe their policies. Secondly, though reading Jobbik’s program, it is considered radical because Jobbik questions and wants to rid Hungary of any exterior influences or any influence that has the power to shape society. Also, any internal influences that Jobbik deems to be harmful to traditional Hungarian values should be eliminated. Jobbik calls for the rebirth of the Hungarian nation and a new social order that sees the nation as strong and worthy of its place in the world. It is noteworthy to mention that this type of populist discourse of over-simplification and presenting Hungary’s history and politics as black-and-white is typical of radical right wing political parties. All of the agreements and international organizations that Hungary has joined since the regime change, Jobbik hopes to renegotiate all of those treaties that, Jobbik says, limit the sovereignty of Hungary. This includes certain agreements with the European Union, and with NATO. Internally, according to Jobbik, the harm done has been by the implementation of measures deemed to discredit Hungarian values, like the new Bologna educational system, the cultural policies of MSZP, the relations with Hungarians outside the present borders of Hungary only being based on culture, and the accusations of politicians not being held accountable for their actions against Hungarian citizens. In general, Jobbik hopes to concentrate their policies on the preservation of Hungarian values, and if those values are questioned or threatened in any way, Jobbik is going to challenge them. Radical action would consist of Jobbik demanding a change to the compromising situation of eroding Hungarian values.

It is plausible that Jobbik would follow through with their actions because of the fact that Jobbik has a paramilitary organization associated to it in the form of the Magyar Gárda. This type of organization is reminiscent of the Arrow Cross Party of the Second

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World War and is very worrisome because if Jobbik feels that certain traditional and historical Hungarian values are being changed for the worse than they could resort to the use of the Magyar Gárda to ensure that the values remain intact. In addition, it is also worrisome because it could present the similar type of situation that took place during the Second World War, with intensive discrimination present against a specific group of people, in the case the Roma.

**Characterization of the Political Situation:**

In order to further situate the topic before the actual analysis, it is necessary to characterise the general circumstance of Jobbik within the Hungarian government.

- **Domain:** The domain in which this study is located is in the general field of politics.
- **System:** Democracy is the current political system in place in Hungary.
- **Institution:** The institution where the political process is taking place is the parliament. Both Jobbik and MSZP are elected representatives who are actors in the parliament.
- **Values and ideologies:** The values that are present on the political front in general include democracy, group and party ideologies.
- **Political actors:** Jobbik and MSZP, both elected party members are the political actors involved in this topic. The main political actor being investigated is Jobbik.
- **Political relations:** The political relations between Jobbik and MSZP are the ones that are being analysed through political discourse analysis including how Jobbik is portraying MSZP. More specifically, they are both contending for legislative power, to implement new laws and change certain aspects of the way Hungary is presently being run. Political relations are also dealt with through power, or social power demonstrated through social relations, social values, asymmetric roles in power relations, and
use of coercive display.⁴⁶ Political relations are manifested as power relations in the struggle for more support. Also, partisan polarization plays a role in power relations.

- Political process: The political process in which Jobbik is involved is for legislation, governing, elections, and opposition.
- Political action: Political action refers to the everyday interaction of politics of the issue being investigated.⁴⁷ In this case, Jobbik is making their declarations through their party’s program. This specific mode of expression is done in order to influence the Hungarian electorate in the perspective of political decision making.
- Political cognitions: Political cognitions include certain attitudes that a party has about relevant issues.⁴⁸ In this distinct case, Jobbik’s political cognitions include a conservative, nationalistic, anti-communist, and a Christian attitude. These cognitions are already at their base in opposition to MSZP’s views.

Now that these characterizations of the situation have been made, the analysis has a proper grounding to stand on. An explanation of the historical backdrop will be presented in the following section, before the beginning of the actual discourse analysis.

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⁴⁷ Van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” 18.
⁴⁸ Ibid.
Historical Backdrop:
The historical underpinnings and background are crucial to understanding the present ways in which Jobbik and MSZP have influenced each other. In order to be able to interpret the discourse of Jobbik representing MSZP, it is essential both to understand the foundations of Jobbik from the beginning up until the present. As well as, being able to understand where the majority of the criticism against the MSZP comes from, along with the origin of Jobbik’s distaste. The foundations of Jobbik are needed to be able to see the entire perspective of where Jobbik is coming from.

Foundations of Jobbik:
The official name of Jobbik is “A Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom” (The Movement for a Better Hungary). This name is a play on words with the Hungarian word Jobbik meaning right-leaning politically, as well as being right as in correct and it also means better as in for a better Hungary. The foundations of Jobbik will be divided into numerous sections and each section will be explained as to how it influenced the party.

Origins:
Jobbik was formed on October 23, 2003 as a political party. Before, it was a student organization with the same name composed of young, conservative university students formed in 1999. This organization, decided with the help and support of some well-known political and cultural figures like Pongrátz Gergely, Wittner Mária, (both from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution), and Usztics Mátyás (a famous Hungarian actor and director), to transform the organization into a political party. There were numerous reasons behind the transformation into a political party which included the defeat of the right-centrist party, Fidesz in the 2002 elections. Also, the many changes that Hungary as a country has undergone since the 1989 regime change that the members of Jobbik deem a failure. The other right wing parties in Hungary, according to the founders of

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50. Ibid.
51. Fidesz (Magyar Polgári Szövetség – The Hungarian Civic Union) will be referred to as Fidesz for the remainder of the thesis for simplification purposes.
Jobbik, had not defended the nation’s interests as desired. Even the previous radical right wing party, MIÉP - Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Truth and Life Party) suffered a humiliating experience and could not bounce back from it.\(^{53}\) With this same attitude the party believes that it stands up for the issues most pertaining to the life of the average Hungarian, which no other political party was doing at the time, or is doing presently. The formation of Jobbik was very much from the ground up bringing together those people that wanted to put extreme emphasis on seeing Hungary’s interests as a proud nation being represented in the political sphere.

**Electoral Results:**

In the 2006 general elections in Hungary Jobbik ran together with MIÉP in a campaign entitled *A Harmadik Út* (The Third Way). In this election the coalition parties did not manage to overstep the 5% political threshold in order to gain seats in the Hungarian parliament with only 2.2% of the votes.\(^{54}\) The first major success of Jobbik came in 2009 at the European Parliament elections when the party gained 14.77% of the vote, entitling the party to three seats in the parliament.\(^{55}\) As a result of this election there was only one seat difference between Jobbik and MSZP. Next, at the 2010 general elections in Hungary Jobbik gained 12.18% of the vote, and 47 seats in the Hungarian National Parliament.\(^{56}\) This success solidified Jobbik as the third largest party in Hungary which continues still today. According to newly published results, a Hungarian company called *Nézőpont*, stated that a general trend, followed from September 20\(^{th}\), 2010 until January 15\(^{th}\), 2012 that as of November 10\(^{th}\), 2011 Jobbik has surpassed MSZP as to whom the Hungarian electorate would vote for in elections.\(^{57}\) Thus Jobbik is gaining

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more success as time passes. The political situation in Hungary remains as it is, Jobbik is managing to convince the electorate of its future plans. This indicates that enough time has passed that Jobbik is gaining a solidified political reputation and that they are able to control their fate through party organization, party leadership and ideology.

Political Stance of Jobbik:

Jobbik is considered a radical right wing political party in Hungary. Jobbik is a nationalistic, patriotic, Christian, and conservative political party. It is anti-globalization, anti-European Union, anti-establishment and anti-communist. It is nationalistic because of the fact that it puts Hungarian interests above any other interest even before the rights of the minority groups living in Hungary. Jobbik has a very strict definition of what it means to belong to the Hungarian nation, based solely on ethnicity, defined through culture, language and blood, and the assimilation of minorities. This is disadvantageous for the largest minority in Hungary, the Roma, as well as the smaller German and Slovak minorities. Often Jobbik is called out for being racist especially towards the Roma minority in Hungary. Jobbik denies all of these allegations by stating that they are only speaking the truth. Also, Jobbik is claimed to be anti-Semitic by many, which Jobbik rejects, even though there is a growing anti-Semitism in Hungary. In fact anti-Semitism in Hungary can be characterised not by openly persecuting Jews, but by stereotyping Jewishness and anything foreign, which Jobbik takes up. Jobbik does this through the blaming of Jews and the Roma population for Hungary’s economics hardships. With the emergence of Jobbik’s paramilitary group, the Magyar Gárda, Jews, Roma and homosexuals are the groups that are considered to be most under threat. Jobbik shows their patriotic tendencies by contributing to the renewal of certain Hungarian historical

symbols. These include maps of the former greater Hungary, a renewal of the discourse about the Treaty of Trianon, the use of the Árpád flag, etc. Jobbik is known as a defender of Christian values since Jobbik believes that the basis of Hungarian law comes from the Sacred Saint Crown which was the crown of St. Stephen I who converted Hungarians to Christianity. Jobbik is considered a conservative party because they are more traditional in their values when looking at family, employment, the Hungarian economy, etc. The party is also against globalization and multinational corporations because they believe that it is these corporations that were in part those who destroyed the Hungarian economy and pushed many small and medium sized Hungarian businesses to bankruptcy. In addition, they believe multinational corporations are responsible for many of Hungary’s largest industries such as sugar beet, vegetable production, and milk production falling into foreign hands. Jobbik is against the European Union. The party believes that since joining the EU Hungary has lost more than it has gained. As well, Jobbik claims, that Hungary has lost its sovereignty to be able to lead the country out of the financial crisis because of its attachment to the EU. Jobbik sees the EU as a corrupt, capitalist, organization. Jobbik believes that Hungary has focused too much on Western Europe, and instead it should focus more to the East for example towards Russia, China, and India. Jobbik is also anti-establishment. Although the party does participate in the elections to the European Parliament, and the Hungarian general elections, if in power Jobbik advocates for radical change, thus these institutions would inevitably change. Jobbik is considered anti-communist, because they believe that the human rights violations committed by the former communists have still not been held accountable for their actions.  

Jobbik’s president Gábor Vona is very anti-communist because he comes from a family of farmers, whose livelihood has been made extremely difficult due to communism. Throughout the program there are incriminating remarks to the communist time. To sum up, “The 2006, 2009 and 2010 programs of Jobbik incriminate Hungary’s

enemies: communists, the post-communist elites, international companies, big business, cosmopolitism, globalization, political liberalism, corrupt politicians, the EU, and the axis ‘Tel Aviv-Washington-Brussels’”.

The Magyar Gárda (the Hungarian Guard):
In 2007 the Magyar Gárda Kulturális Egyesület (Cultural Association of the Hungarian Guard) was formed as a, “potential framework to awaken the active self-consciousness of the nation”. It is a very important factor of Jobbik, and their paramilitary branch. Officially the Magyar Gárda claims to: preserve Hungarian cultural, traditional, and social aspects, and keeping the nation in order, and defending it in times of disaster and danger. Any Hungarian citizen without a criminal record, who is above 18 years of age, and who has a strong Hungarian identity and pride in the nation, can join by taking an oath based on the Sacred Saint Crown and become a member. The Magyar Gárda was officially banned by the Budapest Municipal Court in December of 2007. The Magyar Gárda is criticized for parading in Hungarian villages and towns where there is a large Roma population as a sign to the Roma. Although the Magyar Gárda was banned, Jobbik appealed the sentence and started another organization called the New Hungarian Guard as the re-launch of the Magyar Gárda. This was in principle initiated because of the fact that on the opening session of the European Parliament when Jobbik was elected, one of their members wore the official outfit of the Magyar Gárda in parliament. One year later in December 2010, the Supreme Court of Hungary upheld the decision by the Budapest Court of Appeal to ban the Magyar Gárda including the New Hungarian Guard.

Clashes:
There have been numerous instances of violent interaction with the Roma population recently in Europe as well as in Hungary. It is a European issue since many

66. Ibid.
countries have to deal with this problem in the domain of minority rights and integration into society. There are problems with stereotypes in Hungarian society about the Roma. Jobbik has jumped on the issue of crime and made it seem as though criminality represents the entirety of the Roma population. Jobbik has elevated this misrepresentation to the point where Roma people are automatically associated with criminality.

The Roma in Hungary are an ethnic minority. Over the last forty years, the number of Roma in Hungary has doubled to about 400 000. Throughout the communist era in Hungary, the Roma people were dealt with as a social problem which included their forced assimilation into Hungarian society and eradication of any cultural differences that persisted. During the regime change, many Roma lost their jobs, and due to this occurrence very high unemployment emerged and hence a much lower standard of living than the average ethnic Hungarian. The situation of the Roma in Hungary has been difficult and presently with the rise of radical right political parties like Jobbik, the situation has appeared in the media more often due to the intensive accusations of Jobbik.

According to a study by the European Roma Rights Centre, between January 2008 and July 2011 there were 50 attacks on Roma people or their property in Hungary. Of the attacks mentioned there was a total of 9 deaths. In all of the 50 incidents reported there were about 10 who suffered life threatening injuries and dozens more with other injuries, 12 instances where hand grenades were used and 12 instances where shots were fired. The most significant events took place in the following rural areas: Nagycsécs, Kiskunlacháza, Fadd, Abádszalók, Sajóbáunya, Tiszalók, Tata-szentgyörgy, and Kisléta. In these areas, where lawlessness even in the form of murder was committed, often the Magyar Gárda parade around in black clothing to pose a threat. Already when relations

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72. Ibid., 16-17.
73. Ibid., 17.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
are tense the Magyar Gárda comes into villages, even when the organization as such is banned, and still continues its activities.

**MSZP - The Hungarian Socialist Party:**

The Magyar Szocialista Párt is the Hungarian Socialist Party in English. Officially the MSZP was formed October 7, 1989, from the former MSZMP – Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party). After the fall of communism in Hungary there began a series of roundtable discussions that changed the country into a democratic state. At this time in Hungary, there was a common belief that the left was dead in a political sense along with communism. When the new MSZP was formed and they lost the first free elections it was, in a sense, healthy for the party since it allowed time for political growth, change in political leadership and growth from opposition party to governing party. It was at this time as well that MSZP started projecting itself at the only party powerful enough to be able to win against the right wing parties. During the first liberal elections the MSZP was not elected and remain an oppositional party, only gaining 8.5% of the national vote. In 1994, when the next general elections were held, they were re-elected until 1998. Along with the SZDSZ (Szabad Demokrat Szövetség – Alliance of Free Democrats) in the coalition, MSZP had 72% of the votes.

Throughout MSZP’s early history, the party was always the voice of modernization, privatization and of capitalism. Due to this type of attitude often MSZP was criticized about speaking to the average Hungarian while their own party members were reaping the benefits of privatization and capitalism. In the early years, the main rhetoric of MSZP had two strands. The first appealing to the working class and the losers

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of capitalism who were nostalgic for the past, and the second one appealed to the modernists and the idea of catching up to Europe.\textsuperscript{84} This proved to be an effective strategy because it was seen as turning “soft-communism into soft-capitalism.”\textsuperscript{85} In 1995 MSZP introduced an austerity measure, called the Bokros Package after the finance minister at the time Lajos Bokors, to help the country which in fact drastically decreased the population’s wages and even cut the standard of living in the short term.\textsuperscript{86} On the other hand, in the long run from retrospect, it is evident that these austerity measures helped stabilize the economy in order to make room for improvements in the future.\textsuperscript{87} At the time Hungarian society in general rejected this austerity measure, the IMF and the West were generally in favour.\textsuperscript{88} In 1996 MSZP succeeded in becoming a full member of the Socialist International.

Again in 1998, MSZP was in opposition until 2002 when they won the elections. The time in opposition was bitter sweet for MSZP because during the 1998 elections, they had actually gained the majority of the vote as an individual party, but the right through a series of coalitions won the elections; it was “victory in defeat.”\textsuperscript{89} In this new term MSZP stayed on for two consecutive terms which had never been the case up until the 2006 elections which MSZP also won. When the party was elected in 2006, they governed for three more years until 2009. In the 2010 elections they gained only 15.28% of the votes which earned them 59 representatives in the Hungarian parliament.\textsuperscript{90} Currently they are in a disadvantaged position since Fidesz has a large majority in parliament; it is difficult for MSZP to put up a stance against Fidesz or to put legislation through.

Since the 2006 leaked video of MSZP’s leader at the time Ferenc Gyurcsány the reputation of MSZP has been severely damaged which was shown in the 2010 election

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 104.
\textsuperscript{88} Racz, "The Hungarian Socialists in Opposition: Stagnation or Renaissance," 325.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 337.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 336.
results. These results significantly reduced the governing capacity of the socialists because of the betrayal felt by the Hungarian electorate. Often this party has been under criticism due to the fact that many of their present members used to be in the Communist Party before the regime change. Although this is true, even before the regime change took place, the upper members of the communist party were already reformists; therefore there was not a need for change.\textsuperscript{92} In another instance, the former elite of the communist party also joined other political parties even on the right side of the political spectrum but the MSZP still remained their largest base.\textsuperscript{93} Combined with the 2006 demonstrations in response to the leaked video, MSZP has had a very interesting history.

**Descriptions of Demonstration Events in 2006:**

The demonstrations that were provoked in 2006 originated from the combination of a number of events. The first of which is the backdrop of the 2006 general elections in Hungary. During these elections Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán, and MSZP, led by Ferenc Gyurcsány, went head to head to the point where the competition was very intense. Throughout the election campaign both parties were making very generous promises to the electorate in the hopes of gaining more votes and eventually winning. In the end MSZP won. This was the first time that a political party in the former communist block of Europe had won two consecutive elections and remained in power for two terms.\textsuperscript{94} Before, in Hungary, as well as in the other former Soviet countries, every electoral term would bring a different political party into power. It should also be noted that in Hungary, in order to gain seats in the parliament, a party needs to have more than 5\% of the overall vote in order to pass the threshold and be able to sit in parliament.\textsuperscript{95} At this stage Jobbik and MIÉP were still consolidating their power and are in the running for the election but they pose no threat to the two larger political parties of the central camps since they have not gained much support and they just formed as a political party.

\textsuperscript{92} Bozóki, “The Hungarian Socialists - Technocratic Modernization or New Social Democracy?,” 95.
\textsuperscript{93} Racz, “The Hungarian Socialists in Opposition: Stagnation or Renaissance,” 328.
A couple of months after MSZP had won the election a video of the newly elected president was leaked to the media. Coincidentally, it was right before the local elections in Hungary scheduled to be held at the beginning of October, 2006. The content of this video is from May 2006, from right after MSZP had won the elections. The video is of Gyurcsány stating that he had lied about the financial situation of the country in order to win the elections and he will continue lying if need be. In fact, Hungary was in a dire situation with the domestic deficit being 10% the highest in all of Europe, at the time. Basically Gyurcsány had committed demagoguery in order to be able to win the elections by lying to the electorate about Hungary’s financial situation. Gyurcsány’s lie was to a huge extent; he knew that if the population had been aware about the actual financial situation of the country, than the majority of the population would not vote for him. The evening that this video was leaked a number of demonstrators gathered at Kossuth Square just in front of the Hungarian parliament. A couple of days later, on September 17, 2006, the video was officially aired on the local media, and that evening 10 000 people gathered at Kossuth Square in order to demonstrate against the present situation. The first couple of evenings of demonstrations proved to be successful yet remained peaceful. Occasionally throughout the whole demonstration there were some clashes between the radicals and the police. At first the police were unsure of how to handle the situation, but in the coming days the riot police were called and they used rubber bullets, water cannons, and tear gas on the population. Going from one extreme to the other the police were not prepared, trained, or equipped to handle such a situation, consequently a

97. Ibid.
seemingly minor incident escalated very quickly. The demonstrators came from a number of different fields and classes of society. There were numerous divisions formed among the demonstrators in order to try and evoke change to the current situation, all being led by right wing demonstrators either centrist or radical.

The situation of protests and demonstrations continued until October 23, 2006 during the commemoration ceremony for the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The commemoration ceremony was organized by MSZP because it was a state ceremony and they were in power at the time. Fidesz decided to boycott the ceremony because they claimed that there had been a betrayal committed by MSZP toward Hungary. Instead Fidesz organized another commemoration ceremony at the Astoria. The official ceremony was scheduled to take place on Kossuth Square but many of the demonstrators remained there and would not move to allow the ceremony to take place. After both ceremonies were over, the population began to disperse. The peaceful demonstrators became mixed with the radical crowed (part of the radicals’ plan) and the police charged at them on mounted horses in order to disperse the crowd. According to eye witnesses, the police were wearing masks and did not have their identification numbers or badges on them. The police used rubber bullets, tear gas grenades, and coloured water cannons to be able to later identify the radicals, all at head height, the demonstrators stated. Many of the demonstrators were held by the police without due justification. All in all, these violent acts continued into the morning hours of October 24th and caused many injuries, both physical and psychological to the demonstrators. The actions of the police were based on the misinterpretation of the law of assembly whereby they classified the

102 Ibid., 12.
103 Ibid., 25.
demonstrations as either an election rally or a cultural event. As a consequence the police was slow to act at the beginning, and in the end used unwarranted measures.

Throughout the course of these events, Europe’s eyes were on Hungary. The Hungarian revolution is something very significant to Europe’s history and to the history of the Cold War. Annually when these celebrations are scheduled to take place, there is always pressure on the government in power to make the celebrations noteworthy. In 2006, this proved to be no different, with even the Spanish King visiting Hungary, along with other foreign delegations, at the time, therefore there was immense pressure on MSZP to successfully be able to deliver a commemorative parade (even more so after the leaked video). Unfortunately this was not the case to the embarrassment of the MSZP. In the end, MSZP delivered their addresses to the nation only in front of foreign dignitaries and other officials with the Kossuth Square virtually empty. From the time of the leaked video of Gyurcsány to the celebrations, MSZP continuously condemned the violence of the radicals and Fidesz as well for associating itself with them.

**Fidesz’s Reaction:**

Right after the official airing of the video, Fidesz and a large number of their supporters went to Kossuth Square as a sign of protest against the occurrences. Viktor Orbán’s reaction was an official declaration to the public, and to MSZP demanding the resignation of Gyurcsány. Orbán presented this demand giving Gyurcsány 72 hours to resign. The situation remained unchanged, in that Gyurcsány never resigned. During those 72 hours, Fidesz gave speeches constantly at Kossuth Square, sometimes even to as many as 80 000 people. The fact that Fidesz and Orbán physically were out in Kossuth Square mobilizing the Hungarian demonstrators shows signed that Fidesz was actually running shoulder-to-shoulder with the radical right, Jobbik, and almost breaking parliamentary laws in place. When there was violence that took place, Fidesz always distanced itself from it. On the other hand, MSZP is the main opponent of Fidesz;

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105 Ahn, "Democracy or the Street?".
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
therefore the party could have acted out of pure competition against the MSZP, but without going to the point of calling for new elections. Fidesz took no time to use the situation to their benefit and show MSZP in a negative light even if it meant compromising their own success and their own view with those of the radicals. Fidesz used the situation in order to try and bring about justice to the actions of the socialist government and in turn evidently promote their image to Hungarians. Concerning the events of the commemorative celebrations, Fidesz organized a ceremony to take place on the 23rd but the location was at the Astoria, with over 100 000 people attending including children and elderly.109 Many of these people present were affected by the actions of the police.

**The Opposition Movement:**
There were numerous organizations formed throughout the long series of protests that shook Hungary from the end of September until the 23rd of October, 2006. The first group was composed of radical right wing party members, and their supporters who are completely against MSZP, which included Jobbik. Among this group there are also those that have a strong repulsion for the left in general and would use any opportunity to take a stance against them. There were others who are considered the losers of globalization and capitalism, and could not get a footing into the capitalist society after the regime change. There were those whose parents had been oppressed and their fortunes taken away during the communist time in Hungary. There were also those who had been former communists, and since the regime change had turned right-wing, who wanted to make a political statement. Those whom after the regime change received no compensation and remained unchanged and living in a difficult situation after 1989. In another instance there were the Fidesz supporters who were present every day at Kossuth Square, preaching to a decreasing population. There were those that were opportunists and took the demonstrations as a sign to cause violence and destruction, and were just using these events to be able to get their views across.

Throughout the course of the demonstrations there were numerous organizations which formed that, in the first instance led and organized the demonstrations, and in the second instance hoped to gain more power and credibility to potentially be able to rule

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109 Ibid., 16.
the country once Gyurcsány resigned. The first two of these delegations to be formed was the Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság (MNP, or in English, the Hungarian National Delegation) and the Forradalmi Nemzet Bizottság (FNB or in English, the Hungarian Revolutionary Delegation). These two groups were the largest on Kossuth Square. Their goals included the immediate resignation of Gyurcsány, willingness to further negotiate with the government, but not an illegitimate one, wanting to remove the 5% threshold barrier of gaining seats in the Hungarian parliament, and wanting to call a constitutional parliamentary meeting in order to be able to proposed resolutions and make declarations.\textsuperscript{110} There was another association formed called the Új Magyarországért Egyesület (New Association for Hungary), which seemed to be more moderate since they took democratic action by submitting a petition in order to evoke change.\textsuperscript{111} In addition, there were the rest of the Hungarian voices that were not part of any organization or association but who arguably were the most radical calling for the resignation of all members of parliament and for new elections. Within this last group István Csurka (former president of MIÉP) took part since he wanted to seek political opportunities in order to regain his previous standing, calling for MIÉP to decide the new government and advocating a change of the entire parliamentary system.\textsuperscript{112} More specifically, Jobbik also played a huge part in the opposition movement. Many of the members of Jobbik were part of the first two delegations which also had as members many survivors of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

\textbf{Jobbik's View:}

Overall, Jobbik highly condemns the actions of MSZP, the reaction of the police to the demonstration, and the demonstrators during this difficult time in Hungarian history. At the time, in 2006, Jobbik also wanted to see the fall of MSZP since the party is very anti-socialist. This is the reason behind the very strong rhetoric within their political program about MSZP and their actions. One interesting point to note is that only the police in certain instances were held accountable for the actions they took against the demonstrators, but the politicians themselves, like Gyurcsány, and other important people...


\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
members of his party, were not. For Jobbik this poses a huge problem since presently, according to Jobbik, it has been six years and no action had been taken. Thus one very important aspect that Jobbik hopes to bring about is the legal accountability for these unjustified actions. On the other hand, although Jobbik’s discourse is very strongly for political accountability an official report by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee states that,

The misuse of the right to assembly gives adequate legal foundation for the law enforcement to resort to using legitimate means to firmly step up in the interest of restoring public order. In this particular situation it was not only the right but the obligation of the law enforcement to intervene.113

Meaning that the actions of the police were completely justified because the method and actions of assembly of the people had violated Hungarian law, thus the police had an obligation to intervene. On the other hand, the official Amnesty International Report for Hungary for the year 2009, states that there were numerous cases of police violations during the demonstrations. Specifically there was a total of 200 complaints filed at the police station and of those, 173 complaints were dismissed as invalid.114 By the end of 2009, 24 filed complaints were still pending and there were only two delivered sentences. Of those two cases, in one instance the officer in question was ordered for retrial, and in the other instance the sentences given were reduced.115 Therefore, as the reader can see there are two oppositional views here. The first is Jobbik against both the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, and the yearly country reports by Amnesty International of Hungary. Jobbik is stating that many offenses did actually take place against the Hungarian demonstrators by one the police and by two the MSZP government. Although the report by Amnesty International does say that the issues surrounding the demonstrations in 2006 on Kossuth Square do pose concern, many of the complaints actually filed by individuals ended up being deemed that no law was violated. The report by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee goes further to state that there were no violations on the part of the police and that it was their obligation to intervene. Therefore, it seems

115 Ibid.
that Jobbik’s view about the fate of the demonstrators is in contradiction to two official reports dealing with the same incident. In addition, one of the issues that Jobbik strongly advocates is that the MSZP party itself needs to be held accountable for its action. Based on this statement, neither the Hungarian Helsinki Committee nor the Amnesty International Report mentions any reference to the issue of political accountability. There is clearly presented here a major conflict of interest that will become clearer during the analysis of the actual text itself. Thus, the strong opposition and competition rivalry between Jobbik and MSZP is also founded on strong historical occurrences that Jobbik entirely blames on MSZP which is the reason behind this extensive account of the events.

**Political Polarization:**

Since the regime change there has been a persisting, at times stronger than others, trend of political polarization within Hungarian politics. It is evident that some of the reasons for this polarization lie in the communist past of Hungary when there was only a one party ruling system and all other parties were painted as being against the communists. Next, the regime change brought about a plethora of political parties emerging in Hungary and hoping to gain more support in the first democratic elections that the country had seen. After these first elections, it was evident that only about a handful of these parties would actually gain seats in parliament, and less and less as time passed. In 1990, there were 6.7 different parties and in 2006, already there were only 2.7. Further in 1994, when Fidesz officially moved into the conservative camp and the SZDSZ moved their liberal political stance more to the left camp, the central liberal camp entirely disappeared and the polarization was further solidified.

In the post-communist era right after the regime change, the atmosphere showed that the parliament seemed distant from the people. The population had and still has low trust in political institutions and political parties. For this reason also, there is a high experience of disillusionment with the concept of democracy. This was further solidified by the fact that many Hungarian publicists, political scientists, and other

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117 Ibid., 9.

political actors are reflective of the views of political parties, and also the cultural sector, the media, and the religious elites. According to the president of the Magyar Politikatudományi Társaság (Hungarian Political Science Association), András Körösényi, a situation called ‘bipolar hegemony’ has developed. This situation has unfolded in this way due to major differences which have become separated into two camps and they each provide a source of identification for the population. In fact political party preference is a stronger indicator of personal relationships for Hungarian citizens than age, education or gender. These two camps, “continuously produce themselves as a political unity through the construction of the other camps as their counterpart”. This means that the trend of the divide mutually reinforces itself. Polarization in Hungary is used as a tool to further disassociate between the two sides. Hence, agreement can only be reached with those on the same side of the divide. Politics in turn becomes a meeting point of these clashes, where the opposing sides compete either for a majority or minority position with no compromise existing with the other camp. The camps continue to exist because of the assumption that for one to be right, the other has to be wrong, therefore there is the construction of the camps against each other.

Throughout the course of Hungarian elections, the polarization has at times widened and has at times become narrower but it has always remained and been the case. In Hungarian politics generalizations of the traits that belong to the two different camps include:

- Right: Christian, nationalist, conservative, anti-communist, clerical, traditionalist
- Left: communist legacy, libertarian, cosmopolitan, anti-clerical, culturally liberal

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119 Ibid., 319.
121 Palonen, "Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary Hungary." 319.
124 Ibid., 321.
125 Ibid., 322.
As seen, these issues mainly consist of cultural issues, which is the main domain of polarization in Hungary. Economic issues have always been secondary to cultural issues, when it comes to identification and polarization. With these distinctions on major issues, each of the parties has put large distances between themselves, they have different perceptions of the world, and polarization is demonstrated through confrontation. Polarization is necessary to take into consideration when looking at Jobbik and MSZP since both parties are part of the divided at opposite ends. In the following section, the political discourse analysis of Jobbik’s program will take place.

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127 Ibid., 181.
Analysis of Jobbik’s Political Program:

The Program:

Jobbik formulated and released the political program in question for the 2010 Hungarian general elections. One of the main themes that run throughout the entire program is portraying MSZP’s “faults” and Jobbik’s “solutions” to them.

Political Discourse Analysis:

In this section, the small details mostly pertaining to language will be analysed and given in the perspective of political discourse analysis. This is to linguistically demonstrate the power relations between Jobbik and MSZP through Jobbik’s political program. This information can aid in giving concrete examples of power relations and party competition in the current political context of Hungary between Jobbik and MSZP. Jobbik has strong opinions about MSZP and especially their previous eight years in power as the governing party. Jobbik believes that the main reason that Hungary is in its current position is due to the privatization and extreme capitalist schemes of MSZP. As shown by the subheadings below, Jobbik is using many different methods to try to demonstrate that the actions that MSZP took “destroyed” Hungary, according to Jobbik.

Legitimization is another very important issue that is taking place throughout the whole program and during portrayals of MSZP. Through the struggle of power relations, Jobbik is using the tool of legitimization in order to gain more credibility with the voters. Legitimization is grounded in the fact that Jobbik has a particular political role, and possesses a particular authority on a particular subject which it is presenting through its program.129 This is assumed since Jobbik is presenting the information as a political party in the running to being elected into parliament. Although this authority is assumed, it should not be forgotten that Jobbik and MSZP are on the same level, thus neither party has more credibility than the other. Some of the tactics that Jobbik uses that will be presented in the examples to come is through, “negative other-presentation, blaming, scape-goating, marginalizing, excluding, attaching the moral character of the adversary,

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and attaching the rationality of the adversary”.\textsuperscript{130} It is in these ways that Jobbik has positioned MSZP as always being at fault.

It is noteworthy to mention that Jobbik’s program is presented in Hungarian originally. Jobbik’s official website also has a translated English language section which contains an English version of their program. This version of the program is much shorter than the original (only 25 pages), and is not as extensive as the Hungarian version of the program. This being the case, the Hungarian version will be used and all of the necessary translations will be done by me. Following this will be the official political discourse analysis.

**Format:**

The program contains seven sections overall; the first section is a greeting by Krisztina Morvai. She represents Jobbik’s interests in the European Parliament. In this section Morvai states the specific goals for each different group of people who would potentially pick up the program to read. These groups are divided into those supporting Jobbik, those who are not sure who to support in the elections, and those that are not convinced by Jobbik’s propositions. Morvai is trying to convince all types of audiences of the validity of Jobbik’s views. The second section is an introduction by Gábor Vona; the president of Jobbik. In this section Vona describes Jobbik’s policies as the only party in Hungarian politics whose ideas are genuine and realistic; this being a common claim by many politicians in general. After the introductory remarks, there are subsections discussing Jobbik’s actual political program.

**Themes of the Structure:**

Jobbik has divided the core of their program into five main sections. The title of the first section is, “The Eco-Social National Economy”. It discusses issues like the Hungarian national financial situation, agriculture and Hungarian land, the environmental program, the energy program, the transportation and infrastructure program and the virtual and information technology.

The title of the second section is, “A Truthful and Thriving Society”. The subject matter of this section is a breakdown of the building blocks of the Hungarian nation, social programs, employment issues, health programs and sports and physical education.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
The title of the third section is, “A Proud Nation”. It discusses issues including the education system, culture and media programs, politics towards the Hungarians that live outside the present borders of Hungary, policies towards the church and the youth program.

The fourth section is called, “Order, Security, and Foreign Relations”. The subthemes include the issues of political accountability, the ‘keeping order’ program, national security, the protection of the home,¹³¹ foreign policy program and the program towards the European Union.

The last section is called, “Nation, Community, and Human”. This section introduces the legal program, the self-government principles, the truth determining program and the freedom laws. The presentation of the structure aids the reader in the ability to situate the issues that are the most relevant for Jobbik. All of the titles and issues have strong nationalistic connotations in line with the ideology of Jobbik.

**Method of Distribution:**
Jobbik’s program is widely available on the internet and it has become the common way to get a hold of this information. Since the program is a large 88 page document there are not that many hard copies in circulation, but they can be requested. Instead, sections in the form of pamphlets are distributed to the general public. With the growing importance of the English language on the world stage, it is wise for Jobbik to have an English edition of their program, which can be found under the English title “Radical Change 2010”. In addition, Jobbik’s website features the options to view certain sections of the website in German, Russian and French. Although Jobbik’s program is not translated into these languages, they nonetheless offer interviews and newspaper articles about Jobbik, also partially expressing Jobbik’s ideology and political changes. Evidently, Jobbik’s goal is primarily to the Hungarian electorate, but there are also options for others to gain access to get to know Jobbik. Looking at the linguistic diversity, Jobbik is also trying to gain support for their views in other European countries as well in order to potentially build alliances with similar parties.

¹³¹ Home in the German (Heimat) and Hungarian (Hon) senses of the word, the English definition of the word does not have the same connotation.
Intention of Statement:

It is evident that the primary goal of the “Radical Change” political program of Jobbik in 2010 was communication. Communication is used for others to have access to the views of Jobbik. Jobbik is using this political program in order to communicate their ideas in general for everyone. One of the main challenges for Jobbik is to make their program widely available for everyone desiring to listen. For the electorate to have access to the program is of key importance in order to have Jobbik’s ideas being heard throughout the country.

Power relations at this point already play an important role. Through the program Jobbik wants to gain more power, to enlarge their power basis, and to prevent MSZP from gaining more power. Power in this case comes in the form of votes cast by the electorate for their preferred political party. According to Van Dijk, power relations assume that the “exercise of power by A results in the limitation of B’s social freedom of action”, and secondly that, “A has power over B’s cognitive conditions of action like B’s desires, wishes, plans, and beliefs”. Therefore it is accepted that the more votes Jobbik gains, the less will go to MSZP (and the rest of the political parties), and hence their political weakening. On the other hand, with more votes Jobbik has control of MSZP’s actions or future steps since MSZP has less votes/power than before and potentially needs to enter into a coalition in order to attain its desired results.

Another intention of this political program was for the 2010 Hungarian general elections. When political parties release their programs for an election, their goal is to attract their electorate in the hopes that they will gain their confidence and their vote in the upcoming elections. Through gaining more votes Jobbik automatically gains more power. Indirectly, through their program Jobbik is also seeking to convince the Hungarian electorate of the reasons why Jobbik should be elected over another party like MSZP. With the other centre right parties like Fidesz, and MDF (Magyar Demokrata Fórum - Hungarian Democratic Forum) Jobbik wants to differentiate itself through the radical approaches of its program. Jobbik’s radical distinction from MSZP is seen through the different approaches to the subjects of importance. This is presented in a way

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133 Ibid., 29.
as to point out that Jobbik is the only logical answer to the question of putting Hungary back on the right track. Jobbik is presenting itself as the party with all of the right answers for the voters, and therefore claiming a certain amount of authority on a particular subject.

Furthermore, Jobbik is on the right side of the political spectrum, it is taking similar approaches as Fidesz, and as MDF on the subjects of importance like religion, appealing more to the rural than the urban, and having anti-communist, conservative, and nationalistic sentiments. Jobbik thus needs to differentiate themselves from the more centre right political parties on these subjects mentioned above since Fidesz and MDF also put emphasis on these subjects. Jobbik does this by further radicalizing itself and its program through the use of very strong measures that are rooted in Hungary’s historical past over all else. Measures such as a want to return to Hungary’s former glory, putting a strong emphasis on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, pledging to the Scared Saint Crown, and using the Árpád Flag as a symbol of one of Hungary’s oldest dynasties are all seen as attempts to reinvent Hungary’s past. Fidesz and MDF do not have as strong of an emphasis on the past. Even the claims about the past that Fidesz and MDF have are given up if they compromise integration and peaceful existence with other countries; a fact which makes Jobbik highly differential to the other right wing political parties. Although radical elements of Jobbik’s program are present through the way that they deal with certain subjects, but the steps to bring about such radical change are not evident to the reader.

**Intended Audience:**
The intended audience is to the Hungarian electorate in general. Anyone eligible to vote in Hungary meaning anyone above 18 years of age is included in the general target audience of Jobbik. More specifically, men, rural dwellers, the youth, and those considered the losers of globalization are the ones that most often vote for radical

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136 Ibid., 7.
right wing populist political parties.\textsuperscript{137} Generally those with authoritarian disposition or authoritarian aggressiveness are more likely to support radical ideologies.\textsuperscript{138} Therefore it is assumed that Jobbik will target these audiences most often. Also, another common trend of Jobbik is the extensive use of the internet and the people that are the most common internet users are the youth, it is assumed that this is another way that Jobbik is attracting its intended audience.\textsuperscript{139} Jobbik also has a very young supporter population. Since Jobbik was started by dissatisfied university students originally as a youth organization, it is clear that presently as well, a large portion of their leadership and representatives are under the age of 30.

Generally speaking, radical right wing political parties have more male dominated leadership, as well as, male party members.\textsuperscript{140} Therefore it is not surprising that men with authoritarian personalities will also more likely vote for this party. Since men are the prime audience of Jobbik and women play a minor role if any in radical right wing parties,\textsuperscript{141} then it is quite unique that Krisztina Morvai takes such a large role within the politics of Jobbik as a female. Morvai hopes to be the first female Hungarian president representing Jobbik.

The people considered the losers of globalization and modernization are also considered more likely to vote for Jobbik. This being the case, Jobbik has the chance to tie MSZP to the hardships experienced after the regime change. It is evident that for those who have suffered since the regime change, MSZP can easily be blamed for it since they were in power the majority of the time. Jobbik is using this connection between MSZP and the difficulties to its advantage in order to gain more votes. By presenting MSZP in a negative light, Jobbik is legitimizing itself as the best option without any doubt by playing on the axiological sense of the voters. For the losers of globalization, so much hardship has taken place in the last two decades; it is most likely that they will vote for

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{137} Ibid., 3.
\bibitem{140} Karácsony, "A Jobbik titka: A szélsőjobb magyarországi megerősödésének lehetséges okairól," 16.
\bibitem{141} Mudde, “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,” 100.
\end{thebibliography}
Jobbik because Jobbik is the only one directly talking about the hardships that they have experienced.

Pinning the MSZP at fault for some of the major problems in Hungary presently, Jobbik is also hoping to attract a smaller percentage of the votes formerly cast for MSZP. Jobbik hopes to collect those votes from the people that are unsure of the party for which to vote. In a study leading up to the 2010 elections, it demonstrated that 63% of voters within the Jobbik camp are dissatisfied about the current state of their country and voted for Jobbik in the hopes of affecting change.\textsuperscript{142} In addition, Jobbik and MSZP voters were the least sure of their votes while pledging to vote for those parties.\textsuperscript{143} This indicates the frustration with the current situation. This also indicates the disillusionment with Hungarian politics in general. In another study by the same organization, many voters stated that if they had a previous commitment for the day of the vote, of the 66% expected attendance, 56% would not come.\textsuperscript{144} Based on this data, Jobbik is also trying to project an image to the Hungarian voters of a party that is capable and willing to make the necessary changes for Hungary, in order to attract and ensure that all of the eligible voters come to vote.

**Topic:**
It is evident that the overall topic of political discourse analysis is politics. The reason that it can be identified as such is due to the nature of the elected representatives that are producing discourse/utterances and presenting the opinions of their political party on a specific subject. In this case the elected representatives of Jobbik have gotten together to write a political program about how they view the current situation in Hungary, why is it this way, and what they hope to change about it in the future if elected. Often political discourse analysis is reflexive since it is the opinion of the specific political party, based on some previous political actions, which have been put into a political program.\textsuperscript{145} Political discourse analysis tends to be future oriented due to

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” 25.
its political nature and the changes the party hopes to make in the future.\textsuperscript{146} The future is mostly looked at in a positive light since there is the hope that things will change and get better; Jobbik focuses a lot of attention on this in the sections entitled, “A Brighter Future”. In the same instance, the present is very much looked at in the most pessimistic light by Jobbik, specifically the past eight years of MSZP governance is look at even more negatively. The future and the most distant historical past of Hungary are the only époques that are looked at in a positive light. The future that Jobbik refers to is what the party hopes to bring about with its changes and new policies in an attempt to restore Hungary’s former glory. This is turn directly relates to the historical past of Hungary, and key moments such as the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Moreover, in political discourse analysis the discourses being studied are often met with ambiguous references to the past.\textsuperscript{147} As mentioned, this is not the case for Jobbik since it glorifies the historical past of the Hungarian nation.

In addition, the topics chosen by political parties to be discussed are usually said to serve a persuasive function.\textsuperscript{148} This is the case in this instance since Jobbik is presenting its political program and attempting to be persuasive. It is trying to show the Hungarian political situation in a different, more radical way. Through this new way, it claims that it is bringing about topics that were previously considered taboo in Hungarian political discourse, and through this method is attempting to appeal to Hungarians. Evidently all political party programs have a persuasive element to them, but what makes Jobbik’s party program different than the other centre right parties is the extremely harsh words that it has included denouncing the MSZP. Along with attempting to sway the voters, there is the natural attachment of having an evaluative function at the same time.\textsuperscript{149} The tactic that Jobbik uses when presenting its ideals for the future includes certain aspects that relate to the structure of the program. Jobbik is always emphasizing the negative aspects first and then stating their “solution” for that specific issue. This is the evaluative function in action when Jobbik is blaming the problem that it believes were often caused by MSZP and Jobbik’s solution to it.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{147} Van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” 27.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 28.
Superstructures:

The use of superstructures refers to: “discourse genres (that) may be organized by abstract, schematic forms, consisting of conventional categories that define their nature and the overall structure of the schematic ‘content’ (topics) of each genre.” Jobbik’s program is constructed in such a manner as to present Jobbik as the ‘heroic’ and ‘paternal’ party saving Hungary from the problems caused by MSZP. The overlying structure has strong nationalistic connotations through the constant emphasis of Hungarian values. Another important overlying structure is that the program emphasizes MSZP’s former governing role in Hungarian politics and is constantly using harsh words against the party. Jobbik bases many of their changes on policies that MSZP had introduced in the years that they were in power that Jobbik would like to reverse. This forceful opposition between Jobbik and MSZP contributes to the polarizing characteristic of Hungarian politics. Polarization is another overreaching superstructure of the entire program since it is present throughout.

Structure of the Program:

Jobbik has given an interesting structure and names to its political program. The names included all contain very patriotic symbols, words or connotations. For example, “Chose Hungarian Movement – Ensuring the Hungarian-ness of Hungarian products,” a play on words of the Latin expression *mens sana in corpore sano*, transformed into “sounds nation in a sounds body,” “Proud Nation,” “The Survival of Hungarians in Hungary,” “The Protection of the Home,” and “The Representation of Hungarian Interests.” These names are associated to Jobbik’s nationalism potentially appealing to strong Hungarian patriots. This is shown in contrast to MSZP’s political program without having such tactics.

Moreover, within the actual program, Jobbik describes its view always in the way that it presents a brief historical overview of a specific section, and then its opinion about

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150 Van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” 29.
152 Ibid., 46.
153 Ibid., 48.
154 Ibid., 57.
155 Ibid., 70.
156 Ibid., 74.
the last twenty years since the regime change on a particular subject. Jobbik then goes on to present the changes that the party hopes to make on that particular subject in the future. The sections outlining Jobbik’s changes are all called “A Brighter Future”. All of the criticism usually takes place in either the historical overview on a certain subject or in the section about Jobbik’s opinion in the last twenty years. Jobbik continues to use this tactic when presenting ideas to the audience, ensuring negative actions over the last twenty years are always in primary position. This indicates that whatever Jobbik has to say about a certain subject is always preceded by Jobbik’s opinion about the past. It is evident that all of the actions that Jobbik hopes to take will be somewhat influenced by the past, but Jobbik goes one step further and basis all of its plans for the future on specific actions that previous political parties have taken in the past. In this instance, the issue of the past can be a super structure since it is framing, shaping and supporting all of Jobbik’s statements.

More specifically when describing anything that MSZP has done in the past Jobbik is always presenting it in the primary position in the little historical overview of each section. MSZP’s constant position in the historical overview section entails the party as being so different from Jobbik, that it cannot even be in the same section and is further polarizing Hungarian politics indirectly by the allocation of the different positions. There are many conflicting issues and many different categories within which the criticism takes place and the structures of the specific mentions of MSZP are varied. The criticisms are usually based on the extent of damaged that MSZP has done in that particular field, according to Jobbik. The areas with the most criticisms include those areas dealing with the 2006 demonstrations, the Roma population, Hungarians outside the present borders of Hungary, culture, and corruption and accountability claims, further explained in the section entitles, “Themes”.

**Local Semantics:**

In terms of semantics, Jobbik is always considered the giver of information to the public; the speech participant. Both Jobbik and MSZP are in a direct competition against each other most importantly, but also against all of the other political parties (namely Fidesz). Through the form of communication, the parties are also negotiating for
Jobbik and MSZP are mostly competing against each other because their political programs and views of reality differ the most of all the other parties considered since they are the furthest from each other on the political spectrum. In this political competition, the negotiation for power comes in the form of political communication to convince the electorate. Through language, Jobbik is also trying to establish control over all of MSZP’s issues, mistakes, policies, and making the voters see that Jobbik is the only “solution” for the future. Control and gaining power through language is done through words and sentences with different characteristics and using different tactics.

**Use of the term ‘so called’:**

Through the entirety of Jobbik’s program, there is the frequent use of the expression ‘so called’. In Hungarian as in English, the term and its use have the same double connotation. Using the expression ‘so called’ indicates a statement about an alternate, commonly used, or popular name for a specific term. On the other hand, it can also have the meaning of being slightly sarcastic implying that a term is ‘so called’ because it has never occurred or is incorrectly named. For many issues including the regime change, Jobbik refers to it as the “so called regime change”\(^{158}\). This is indicative of the fact that Jobbik does not believe a significant change has taken place to be able to legitimately call it a regime change. By saying it is a ‘so called regime change’ Jobbik is further putting a difference between its policies and those of communism. This in turn can again be interpreted as Jobbik going against the MSZP, thought never really to have changed since 1989.

**Semantic Polarisation:**

“Semantic polarisation of the evaluative dimension of semantic macro-propositions is functional and effective in the political process,”\(^{159}\) as stated by Van Dijk because through competition it can aid the party to gain more votes, support, and legitimacy. A large portion of Jobbik’s program is built on differentiating between itself and MSZP. This in turn reflects the power relations between the two parties since they are both competing against each other and other parties like Fidesz. A key factor in

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\(^{158}\) *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás,“* 12, 33, 37, 41, 46, 57, 62, 64, 65, 74, 77.

\(^{159}\) Van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” 28.
polarisation comes into play in this instance by the fact that Jobbik is making a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is done firstly through the division of the discourse into two sections: the section of that past twenty years, and the section about a brighter future. In the sections entitled, “A Brighter Future”, there is never any mention of MSZP or any negative comments towards the opposition because Jobbik is vying for the support the electorate. In the “Brighter Future” section, Jobbik is only presenting positive changes that it will bring about if elected, presented in direct contrast to the other section.

Moreover, in the aspect of gaining legitimacy, Jobbik is very much concentrated on the competition claiming to hold the solution for Hungary’s future success. As MSZP is seen as the opposition by Jobbik, due to the history of political party cleavages in Hungary, it is evident that MSZP is seen as the rival and opposition of Jobbik. This idea can be traced back to Hungary’s history of political division since the regime change. As the opposition party is seen as the enemy, through the use of language Jobbik is trying to position itself as the legitimate answer to all of Hungary’s problems.

Furthermore, in order for Jobbik to gain more support they also need to show their potential electorate the other side of the picture by bringing up certain topics in political debate that were not widely discussed in parliament before. This includes the issues of the Roma community and the Jewish minority. But, more importantly, Jobbik is said to be presenting the true image and exposing the “faults” and “mistakes” that MSZP committed in the past. In a position of a rather weak political party vying for increasing support and seats in the parliament, Jobbik is trying to present MSZP in a negative light. Only through support is Jobbik going to gain a greater base, therefore they need to take on important issues and discuss the past as no other party in Hungary has done before. Presenting MSZP in a negative light is done through using explicit and direct details when discussing MSZP’s faults pairing this together with more general and indirect ways of Jobbik “solving” the problems.

Partisan Polarization:

This term means representing the ‘in group’, in this case Jobbik, in more positive terms than the ‘out group’, in this case MSZP. Through this action polarization will occur
resulting in contrasting meanings.\textsuperscript{160} This idea of partisan polarization is used throughout the entire program. It is noteworthy to mention that polarization in Hungarian politics occurs on two different levels. On the macro level the entire Hungarian political sphere is characterised by this dichotomy where the left and the right differ to a very large extent and they would never consider entering into a coalition with the other side. On the micro level, Jobbik and MSZP are dichotomized since they are coming from opposite sides of the political spectrum. Also, Jobbik has a profound distaste for MSZP, thus denouncing MSZP every chance that they have. Political polarization is demonstrated in various examples but also active just by the numerous comments presented by Jobbik of MSZP.

**Lexicon:**
This section refers to specific examples in words that Jobbik uses to describe MSZP. Words are the source of power in a political debate and discussion of which Jobbik makes very good use to denounce MSZP in order to gain power and legitimacy.

**Over lexicalization:**
Over lexicalization is the use of numerous different words or expressions to denote the same thing.\textsuperscript{161} This is frequently used by Jobbik to designate MSZP by using other terms to describe the party and often hinting towards it indirectly. For example, by using the following expressions, “the rule of the last 8 years,”\textsuperscript{162} the term “social liberals”\textsuperscript{163} and often just “liberal ideals”\textsuperscript{164} that only MSZP holds up. Often Jobbik mentions just a date, but it is evident to the voters that the reference is to MSZP since they were in power during that time.\textsuperscript{165} MSZP is, as noted earlier, the successor party to the former communist party, therefore justifying the name of socialists. MSZP adheres to liberal ideals of the left but liberalism in general. Previously Fidesz and another party called SZDSZ were considered more liberal parties in between 1990 and 1994.\textsuperscript{166} But as ideologies shifted SZDSZ became more aligned with MSZP and Fidesz went in the
opposite direction towards the Christian-nationalists.\textsuperscript{167} Based on these changes of ideologies, MSZP went to take on the more liberal ideals while the other bloc retained more conservative values in the traditional sense of the word.

Jobbik’s program is also characteristic of using the word “neoliberal”\textsuperscript{168} to denote certain liberal qualities are that more typically left leaning according to Jobbik. The term neoliberal generally notes those who believe in “free markets, greater individualism along with a tolerance for inequality”.\textsuperscript{169} With regard to the economic problems of the past Jobbik blames MSZP and their “neoliberal” model for the cause of these problems. “Throughout the course of extreme privatization no price reduction resulted; evidently here too the neoliberal economic model failed,”\textsuperscript{170} stating that the “neoliberal” model failed because of the fact that costs have not been reduce in Hungary’s energy provisions. Jobbik instead wants to rely less on external sources of energy and want to reduce the overall energy intake of Hungary.\textsuperscript{171} Using the example of the past eight years, “As the harmful politics of the past eight year have shown…”\textsuperscript{172} talking about Hungary’s Central Bank, denotes the pairing of the past eight years with the word “harmful”. This indicates the view that Jobbik has about MSZP regarding their harmful behaviour in the years when they were in power. Jobbik’s proposition is to bring the issue of the bank back within the realms of legal accountability.\textsuperscript{173} By placing MSZP at the same level as “harmful” is a strong statement against the politics led by MSZP. Jobbik is claiming that they can do better through their seemingly naïve suggestions and attempting to present an extremely easy solution, and thus trying to capture more legitimacy on a subject. Jobbik’s “solutions” are presented as a sweeping way of dealing with serious monetary issues.

Use of the term “left liberal”:

Another method which Jobbik uses to address MSZP is by referring to them as the “left liberals”.\textsuperscript{174} This is significant because Jobbik is stating that not only is it against the left but also against those ideals that the left holds as liberal. Being left can be defined in

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, “Radikális változás,” 9, 26, 51, 52 …etc.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 15, 33, 40, 41… etc.
its most basic form as people who believe, “…significant …change in a new direction will lead to great improvement in social and economic arrangements.” MSZP’s modernization initiatives and advocacy to joining the EU and NATO are demonstrative of the changes that they implemented in the hopes of improvements socially and economically. Being liberal emphasizes individual rights and liberties, a socialist/communist legacy, cosmopolitanism, emphasis on modernization and secularism. Jobbik on the other hand is strongly nationalistic, clerical, anti-communist and anti-socialist, conservative and traditional. All of these values come in stark opposition to MSZP and its more liberal views. What should be taken into consideration are the differences between economic liberalism and political liberalism. The latter refers more generally to a political attitude or ideology in support of free markets, individualism and a greater tolerance for inequality. The former indicates support for the state’s role in the economy to be minor. This is significant because Jobbik is not only strongly against MSZP but also the very foundations of its views and ideals. By calling MSZP the “left liberals” Jobbik is making a statement basically against liberalism, and therefore questioning the foundations of MSZP also. These questions of legitimacy go back to MSZP’s historical tie with the former communist party in Hungary. In this argument, communism plays an important role because Jobbik believes that the MSZP ideologically and as a political party have not undergone a significant transformation since the regime change. This is an absurd preposition by Jobbik because many of MSZP’s implemented policies, like their push towards EU accession, and the implementation of the new education system, are liberal and not communist. In addition, Jobbik wants to reverse many of the privatizations that MSZP has conducted over the

177 Ball, “Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal,” 302.
181 Ibid.
years, especially in the field of land, energy, and water. Privatization is an important quality of liberalism which favours a limited state role in the economy. Overall, the use of the term left liberal on the part of Jobbik to address MSZP is justified by not in the negative perspective that Jobbik states it is.

Avoiding Euphemisms:
A euphemism can be defined as, “a mild or vague expression substituted for one thought to be too harsh or direct”. Throughout the entire program Jobbik is critiquing MSZP more directly. The reasons behind questions of the existence of hate speech are due to Jobbik’s avoidance of euphemisms. Jobbik wants to expose MSZP in a way to the Hungarian voters, to show the party’s true colours ensuring that they will not get elected. For example, with regard to one of MSZP’s specific policies, Jobbik’s program states, “The 1997 judicial reform abolished political control of the courts; however it did not put any curb or restrictions [back] into the system”. Using direct and unambiguous language, Jobbik is plainly stating MSZP’s faults. In another instance, Jobbik explains, “Nowadays public services have become a vehicle of the left liberal government, and their function reminds many of the internal counter intelligence group, so called third group elite”. Through the use of this type of direct language, Jobbik is attempting to gain the voters confidence on these issues by representing the situation without any frills. This in turn can be associated to attracting the potentially less educated electorate.

Syntax:
This section explores the smaller entities in text used to create sentences and meaning. Through the use of syntax Jobbik is trying to gain power over MSZP.

Verb Tense:
Generally the verb tense when discussing MSZP is in the past. In Hungarian there are only three verb tenses therefore verb tense is not as expressive as in other European languages. Often the sentence begins with an expression that situates the action in the

183 Ibid., 27.
184 Ibid., 25.
188 Ibid., 68.
past such as, “in the past eight years,”189 “since the regime change,”190 or “the previous
government”.191 Then the next indicator of the action being done in the past is the verb
ending being used. For example, Jobbik describes, “Throughout the course of the left
liberal government’s frantic politics in the last eight years, the remainder of the profitable
corporations were in large part sold out [to foreign investors],”192 or Jobbik saying that
the social liberal government granted and guaranteed priority purchasing rights to foreign
investors.193 This demonstrates the past tense of the verb to sell out or to guarantee and
the mention of MSZP by the name of the left or social liberal government. The use of the
verb tense being in the past allows Jobbik to put another distance between the former
politics of MSZP and the new politics to be implemented by Jobbik for the future
reversing the privatization of many industries.194

**Sentence Form:**
The sentences are generally in indicative form, making a statement, in order to
remove any ambiguity about what the program is saying. Jobbik is just going ahead and
making critical statements about MSZP in an attempt to be as clear as possible, further
fortified by the structure in which the statement is said. Some sentences even go as far as
to demonstrate a declaration about MSZP. For instance, “In the fall of 2006, guided by
governmental politics, and unfortunately along with the assistance of the political
opposition, the unlawful police measures had become an everyday occurrence”.195 Jobbik
accuses MSZP of being constantly associated in illegal activities, which can be
considered a direct attack on MSZP.

**Sentence Sequence:**
The area where MSZP is mentioned in the program is always in the section
descrribing the past twenty years in Hungary. Thus the sequence of these events is always
in the past, is always being shown more in a negative light and the negativities are places
in the primary position. The method that Jobbik is employing through sentence

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189 Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 15, 18, 30, 35…etc.
190 Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 5, 33, 57, 63… etc.
191 Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 10, 19, 28, 41 … etc.
192 Ibid., 15.
193 Ibid., 19.
194 Ibid., 19.
195 Ibid., 64.
sequencing is that by presenting an issue from being very general until it reaches MSZP’s effect on the issue. The tactic used by Jobbik is to demonstrate that they are right about an issue. This is done from taking a very general stance on a particular subject and going deeper and deeper to the smallest little detail until the validity of the claim is made very difficult for the reader to deny. By breaking an issue down to the smallest aspect, the voters are more likely to see Jobbik’s legitimacy in a claim even though each individual claim might be true but it is not an accurate representation of the whole picture. For example, on the subject of arable land, Jobbik starts the points of with, “the land privatization in the 90s,” then goes to, “in the middle of the 90s,” and then concludes with, “the social liberal government’s involvement”. Through these selected points, Jobbik is turning the origin and present state of the problems into the fault of the MSZP. Another such case deals with the privatization that has occurred since the regime change that Jobbik blames on MSZP, claiming that the privatization was done spontaneously and without regard for Hungarian businesses. The example begins with “since the regime change,” continuing with the mention of, “the previous governments,” and ending with the “the past eight years of left liberal governance”. Therefore by presenting issues of the past since the regime change, Jobbik is targeting MSZP’s involvement and trying to show the harsh effects that specifically MSZP has brought about. By directly showing the sequencing from the beginning of the downfall and stating the hardships presently effecting Hungarians, Jobbik is manoeuvring itself to seem as if they are the only ones with the proper solutions. This is an aspect of legitimization based in the temporal dimension because it is over time that these “problems,” according to Jobbik, have taken place.

In terms of the construction of the sentences themselves, MSZP is constantly being placed in the position of a subject being discussed by Jobbik. Hence, there is always an element of distance on Jobbik’s part by stating their view of MSZP as the subject but never mentioning themselves thereby removing any attachment Jobbik has to

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196 Cap, "Towards the proximization model of the analysis of legitimization in political discourse." 23.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
MSZP. This distance created removes any potential relation since there are no common views in order to bridge the gap. This distance can also be associated with the tactic of scape-goating; Jobbik is placing all of the blame on MSZP. For example, “The experiences of the past six years show that they did not produce any achievement in the field of public procurement and legal infringement”. Through this example an element of distance on the part of Jobbik is created in order to make the offense undeniable that MSZP carried off. This distance is done by using “they” instead of calling MSZP by name. Also, Jobbik states, “the experiences of the past six years show” claiming to entitle Jobbik with a certain authority on the matter. Furthermore, when Jobbik discusses educational policy, it states, “The liberal educational policy will be replaced by an educational policy that is built around and centered on Hungarian tradition and conventional Hungarian values”. This statement is very impactful since, it creates the element of distance by using the mentioned criteria of the removal of names, in addition to making a direct, declarative statement. There are no elements of doubt in this sentence, and no words to produce any sort of ambiguity. This in turn creates a very strong statement without any direct attachment to Jobbik, but on the other hand creating an atmosphere of control.

Through the placement of sentences Jobbik is also further exemplifying the political poles in Hungarian politics. Jobbik presents an issue by only showing a negative image of MSZP and the effects of their actions, and directly contrasting this with Jobbik’s attempted “solutions” to the problem. This is demonstrating the impossibility of these two political parties ever coming together in order to find common solutions. Even the methods of handling a particular situation are radically different. This difference in political poles between Jobbik and MSZP is conducted through direct opposition placements. When discussing Roma politics, Jobbik uses a very interesting strategy by pinning itself in direct opposition to MSZP. Jobbik uses the word “extreme” to create this opposition to the neoliberal politics of MSZP, “Jobbik’s utterances were labeled extreme by those, whose extreme neoliberal economic politics reduced employment to such a point where the upcoming generation of the Roma are less likely to see employment as a

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204 Ibid., 48.
source of their livelihood...".\textsuperscript{205} By taking a word that many people use to describe Jobbik, and actually turning that word around and making it represent the politics of the opposition, Jobbik is presenting its natural authority over the issue. By appropriating the word extreme, Jobbik is showing authority over the word itself and over the situation in general.

Furthermore, when discussing the views of Jobbik on the European Union, Jobbik places MSZP along with Fidesz as serving the interests of the EU instead of the interests of Hungary, “We desire to break with those traitorous political practices, that MSZP, Fidesz and the rest of the political parties followed, that characteristically served the interest of the EU even at the expense of domestic interest”.\textsuperscript{206} This declaration indicates that Jobbik wants to break with the politics followed by every other political party in Hungary including MSZP, and claiming to protect Hungarian interests more thoroughly on the supranational level by not being as involved and integrated within the EU.\textsuperscript{207} By word placement within a sentence, Jobbik is trying to gain legitimacy over these particular issues.

\textbf{Complexity:}

Complexity in discourse refers to power and prestige with which social distinctions are made.\textsuperscript{208} Presenting a political issue in a way that commands knowledge and authority is also a part of discourse complexity.\textsuperscript{209} Going from the most basic level, unlike in English, the Hungarian sentence lengths on average are much longer and this is something that is accepted in literature and writing. Automatically the sentences in Hungarian become more complex just by the very length and language difference in itself. For example,

\begin{quote}
The left liberal government never even thought of independent families and demographical politics and the wrong actions were chosen to respond to the already incorrectly asked questions from the potential social political apparatuses.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

Since Jobbik is writing a political program, occasionally it makes its sentences less complex with fewer words that are shorter in length to make it understandable for the

\textsuperscript{205} Jobbik Magyarországi Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 40.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., 75.
\textsuperscript{207} Jobbik Magyarországi Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 18, 26, 39, 73, 74, 76.
\textsuperscript{208} Fowler, “Power,” 72.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{210} Jobbik Magyarországi Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 33.
average voter. For example, “The previous government’s misguided economic policies resulted in wasteful and expensive government functioning”\textsuperscript{211}. Generally the sentences being used to describe MSZP are shorter and concise but there are longer ones as well, in order not to leave any confusion about a situation. In the sections critiquing MSZP, the statements range from a single line to a maximum of a few lines. By using a combination of discourse complexity and the use of simple sentences Jobbik puts itself in a position of power since they are attempting to explain the situation and provide a “solution” suiting their policies. Through this position of power, authority is gained and through authority legitimization. The ability to explain a situation directly without complication demonstrates understanding, and therefore authority over the situation, Jobbik is attempting to create this illusion. Often, simplification of political questions is a tactic used to attract the electorate in populist ideology\textsuperscript{212}.

\textit{Modality:}

Modality indicates the speaker’s attitude toward the subject about which they are talking\textsuperscript{213}. Modality in discourse is often seen as an expression of authority or of legitimating authority. This happens repeatedly in the program of Jobbik. Jobbik is taking certain instances in the past such as the demonstrations of 2006 and trying to state them in a way as to ensure the reader that Jobbik is the only party that holds the answers and “solution”. Already based on the media attention given to Jobbik in Hungary, the voters often know that Jobbik is against the MSZP because it is something that is constantly being reiterated.

Furthermore, Jobbik’s attitude is evident since it is coming to critique the MSZP from a completely different political stance, on the opposite side of the political spectrum. Jobbik is radically right wing, and MSZP is from the centre left. Therefore the voters already know about the differences; Jobbik is rooted in tradition whereas MSZP is based more in secular-rational values\textsuperscript{214}. Jobbik is traditional in the sense that they are more for values like religion, the nation, and the family, to the opposite of MSZP which

\textsuperscript{211} Jobbik Magyarországt Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 30.
\textsuperscript{212} Ernesto Leclau, \emph{On Populist Reason} (London: Verso, 2005), 18.
\textsuperscript{213} Fowler, “Power,” 72.
\textsuperscript{214} O’Neil, “Essentials of Comparative Politics,” 72.
value individual autonomy.\textsuperscript{215} These differences exist because both parties are coming at the same issues with different opinions shaped by different angles of perception. For example, a critique by Jobbik was that the previous governments failed to give enough financial support to the churches and clergy of Hungary.\textsuperscript{216} This is against what Jobbik believes because religion is an important historical factor in Hungarian history therefore it is worth preserving. Thus, just because Jobbik’s value of the church is different than other parties, it automatically invites a critique by Jobbik. The churches were not about to be closed due to financial problems, Jobbik wants to upkeep them because of the historical value that they hold for Hungary.\textsuperscript{217} As demonstrated through the use of verb tense, sentence form, sentence sequences, complexity and modality, syntax plays an important role in the expression of power relations.

**Rhetoric:**

This section will examine the use of rhetorical devices in the context of Jobbik’s political program. Rhetorical devices help Jobbik in getting the point across by illustrating it in another manor. Rhetorical devices are a very commonly used in political discourse.

**Hyperbole:**

When two political parties clash to such extend as Jobbik denouncing MSZP there will inevitably be certain statements about the opposition that are exaggerated in order to prove a point and make the statement more effective. This is also a common tactic used by radical right political parties in order to present their opposition in a negative light. Arguably, Jobbik’s entire reference to MSZP can be considered a hyperbole in order to advance Jobbik’s own opinions contrary to MSZP’s views. Furthermore, the fact that Jobbik is primarily blaming MSZP for the problems facing Hungary today can also be a hyperbole. This being the case, however, it is important to mention that in certain aspects this is what political discourse is all about therefore Jobbik is doing this along with all of the other political parties around the world.

\textsuperscript{215} O’Neil, “Essentials of Comparative Politics,” 72.
\textsuperscript{216} Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 59.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
Expressions:

Throughout the program Jobbik uses Hungarian expressions to describe situations. These expressions are considered a tool for Jobbik to render the situation in question closer to the people, through the use of language. This in turn could create, for Jobbik, a more favourable environment, one with which the electorate is more comfortable. Familiarity is a quality of populism, the act of being closer to the people. Jobbik does this through the critique of MSZP, by using certain expressions to get the meaning across. For example, Jobbik uses the expression, “a fish rots from the head down”\(^{218}\) to denote MSZP’s time in political power. In order to change the smell, or evoke political change, the leadership or the head of the fish must also change. The change should begin with the leadership or the government that is initiating it. This expression is effective because the reader can tell that Jobbik means MSZP’s time in power. In another instance Jobbik uses the expression of a “time ticking bomb”\(^{219}\) in order to denote the situation of the Roma population in Hungary. Jobbik states that this issue needs to be dealt with as soon as possible since the situation will only get worse. Through the use of this expression, it renders the voters to act immediately to solve this problem by voting for Jobbik. The use of the word “bomb” helps get across the urgency of the situation. This expression used by Jobbik is aided in making the Hungarian voters understand Jobbik’s perspective of MSZP’s inability to do anything about the Roma minority; therefore this may lead the voters to believe that Jobbik is the only viable solution.

In another instance, Jobbik uses the expression “plastic surgery” to describe MSZP’s liberal stance on the economy, “The social market economy is no different than the liberal market economy made more agreeable by plastic surgery, which only reproduces the problems instead of eliminating them.”\(^{220}\) By using this expression many can appropriate the connection with plastic surgery as something pretty on the surface, and as something fake. Jobbik’s solution to the economy is an eco-social national economy. This type of economy is based on environmental and human dignity with

\(^{218}\) Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, ”Radikális változás,” 63.

\(^{219}\) Ibid., 40.

\(^{220}\) Ibid., 8.
Hungarian interests.\footnote{Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 8.} Jobbik’s solution is to build an economy protected from collapse and bankruptcy, but not to slow it down.\footnote{Ibid.} Instead of exactly listing what Jobbik hopes to change, they focus on the values that need to be preserved. The connection is clear to the reader that for Jobbik, MSZP’s economic policies only made the problems worse without aiding to resolve them while at the same time not providing concrete solutions only value preservation. Even though the response by Jobbik was to name values worth preserving instead of coming up with realistic solutions.

\textit{Comparison:}

One of the most easily recognizable attempts to demonstrate the major differences between these two political parties is done in the program through the use of numerous comparisons. One of the most interesting instances of the use of comparison is between MSZP and the Magyar Gárda. In the program Jobbik compares the Magyar Gárda’s qualities such as: the voice that they gave to the people to state their dissatisfaction and never breaking the law, claiming them as “good qualities” with the continuous law-breaking felonies of MSZP party members as the “negative qualities”.\footnote{Adam LeBor, "Marching Back to the Future - Magyar Garda and the Resurgence of the Right in Hungary," \textit{Politics Abroad - Dissent} (2008) dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1158 (accessed 17 March 2012), 34.} The Magyar Gárda is an organization that claims to protect Hungarian values and culture.\footnote{Magyar Gárda, Magyar Gárda Hivatalos Honlapja, "Rövid tájékoztató az Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalomról," http://magyargarda.hu/tajekoztato (accessed 19 January 2012).} The Magyar Gárda claims to have reinvented the feeling of being Hungarian, encouraging self-protection of the Hungarian people, giving a voice to the Hungarian people, and never violating human rights laws.\footnote{Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 87.} Then the Magyar Gárda is compared with MSZP party members who on countless occasions have violated laws.\footnote{Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 8.} Seeing the contrast of these two organizations, in the loose sense of the term, together with many different qualities, but there is some discretion since MSZP party members were never reprimanded according to Jobbik, and therefore the Magyar Gárda should also be allowed to exist if MSZP is still active. This is a very deep reaching comparison by Jobbik since it goes to the heart of the issue of political accountability questioning MSZP’s involvement
in the 2006 demonstrations. Another example is, “It has become clear today that the left-liberal government’s over emphasis on individual socio-political freedom rights have reached a dead-end”. By setting MSZP against a “dead-end,” Jobbik has succeeded in getting their point across about the results of MSZP’s previous actions.

Moreover, Jobbik goes on to state that, “The unpleasant memory of union relations from the socialist time has not been overridden, the willingness to work together has remained low, the local unions are not developing in due measure”. Jobbik is appropriating the unpleasant memory of socialism to the still present socialist party, MSZP. By comparing MSZP to the “bad memory of socialism”, Jobbik is blaming MSZP for the elements of socialism that are still present in Hungary today. Through this comparison Jobbik is again reinforcing the legacy of socialism which Jobbik does not want to remain, further implying that MSZP’s ideology has not changed enough for the party not to be called communist or socialist anymore. Since Jobbik is anti-communist, any remotely socialist aspects that MSZP might have in its program are automatically considered as unworthy by Jobbik. Through this action it is further moving the gap between the parties to a larger distance.

**List:**

Although lists in discourse are not generally classified as rhetorical devices, but in this instance it is necessary to include them, due to their use in numerous areas. Lists are an effective tool for Jobbik to use because they get directly to the point and enumerate the necessities to get a point across. Through the listing of negative qualities, Jobbik can easily catch the attention of the voters by making the information more easily accessible.

In the first instance a list is used to denounce the negative qualities, according to Jobbik, of the neoliberal approach to Hungary’s economic program. The direct words used include, “privatization, deregulation, and liberalization”. This list is going from worse to better, in terms of values. This sequence is in line with the rest of Jobbik’s program to firstly denounce the negative of the liberal MSZP party and subsequently respond with something positive that Jobbik will do in the future, further reiterating the fundamental structure of the program. Through the example of this list, the voters are

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228 Ibid., 13.
229 Ibid., 9.
able to see that MSZP is painted in a negative light and all the aspects that come along with modernization and globalization whether positive or negative are negatively associated to MSZP. To a certain extent this can be legitimized by the fact that since the regime change they have been in power for eleven years; the majority of the time. On the other hand, issues like privatization and liberalization come naturally with a regime change especially, and then also with globalization and modernization, therefore this is unjustified on Jobbik’s part. In the instance when the goal is to further polarize, then lists are an ideal way to get the message across. Through the direct use of particular negative words associated with the policies of MSZP in contrast to the benefits of Jobbik, the reader is directly able to see the opposition and the inability of these two political parties working together. During a study leading up to the 2010 Hungarian elections conducted by the Hungarian Gallup Organization, 78% of Jobbik voters said that they would never vote for MSZP and could never see the two parties in a coalition, compared with 71% of MSZP voters who would never vote for Jobbik and would never enter into a coalition with Jobbik. Therefore MSZP and Jobbik are the two parties the furthest from each other on the Hungarian political spectrum, another reason behind the intensive hatred of MSZP by Jobbik.

Another example that illustrates, through the use of lists, the negative qualities enumerated of MSZP, is on the subject of the regime change. Jobbik states, “The Republic of Hungary’s last larger configuration took place in 1989-1990. Since then, there have not been any systematically approachable, large-scale, or forward-moving developments that have taken place”. By using this list of adjectives that Jobbik is implying should have taken place, they are degrading any political party including MSZP that had any impact on the regime change itself and the policies to implement democracy during the roundtable discussions. Basically Jobbik is saying that in fact not enough changes took place in 1989 and 1990 for it to be called a regime change, therefore, Jobbik claims to be the next political party that if elected could carry out and complete the necessary changes. This is an absurd preposition by Jobbik, since it implies two contradictory things. The first being that according to Jobbik Hungary today is still a

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communist state and the second being that already all international organizations and bodies recognize the democratic system which is successfully in place in Hungary. By using the strategy of creating a list, it demonstrates the changes that, according to Jobbik, should have taken place, and thus, trying to gain more legitimacy on this subject. Jobbik is attempting to marginalize MSZP’s views by stating that in reality not enough changes have occurred. Through Jobbik’s use of rhetorical devices like the hyperbole, expressions and sayings, comparisons and lists, they are further trying to gain legitimacy and in turn delegitimize MSZP. Demonstrating political polarization is also made easy through the use of rhetorical devices.

Themes:

In the following section various subjects will be discussed as to sustain the model of polarization shown through the direct confrontation between Jobbik and MSZP. These confrontations come in the form of Jobbik presenting a certain image about MSZP. The subjects include educational policy, both parties’ views on religion in Hungary, the Hungarians outside Hungary’s present borders, the Roma minority in Hungary, political accountability and the 2006 demonstration, and cultural politics. Through the analysis of Jobbik’s portrayal of MSZP on these subjects, whether instances of hate speech have taken place will be analysed as well.

Education:

Educational policy is a very important issue where, within Jobbik’s program, there are indirect confrontations between Jobbik and MSZP. When describing educational policy, Jobbik starts by going back to the time of communist rule in Hungary. Then after the takeover by the MSZP government, the Hungarian educational policy “continued down the wrong road”.232 The educational policies of MSZP are described as, “weak,”233 “cannot guarantee,”234 “not at all fulfilling,”235 and “cannot take care of”.236 Using these verbs in contrast with Jobbik’s words of “bringing to life,”237 “instead of,”238

233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
“make stronger,”239 “instating,”240 and “according to our view,”241 show a direct contradiction. This comes in the form of all of the things that MSZP is doing wrong because they are not fulfilling the educational needs of the country, followed by Jobbik’s view to change and improve the situation. To improve the education in Hungary, Jobbik would like to make Hungarian society healthy again, since it has been made sick through the last sixty years of educational, cultural and media politics.242 Here again, Jobbik is listing the harm being done, instead of finding realistic and adequate solutions to the education system in Hungary. Even in the educational policy Jobbik states that there are not enough Hungarian values being taught243, therefore they would instill a type of education which would encourage graduates to stay in Hungary instead of going to work abroad.244 Specifically, in 2005, when MSZP was in power, they introduced a new two-tiered system of graduating high school. According to Jobbik, this worsened the quality of educational results.245 Jobbik directly counters this point by firstly saying that they are going to get rid of this system.246 For the majority of the section, there is an opposition to everything that MSZP had done in the past. Basically all of the policies that MSZP has introduced in the years that they were in power, Jobbik wants to reverse them all and to get back to how education was before all of the changes were made. This is a contradictory statement by Jobbik because one could pose the question of when was the education system representative of Hungarian values before the communist occupation because the education during the communist time cannot be representative of Hungarian values. This is another example of a direct contradiction that exists within Jobbik’s program with regard to their actual view on communism. The very strong example presented shows the degree of polarization taking place between MSZP and Jobbik. Thus, both MSZP and Jobbik have completely different ideas about the future of education in Hungary.

239 Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, “Radikális változás,” 49.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
Religion versus Secularism:
Like in many countries, the attitude or relation of political parties to the church is determined by which side of the political spectrum a particular party is on. This is the case in Hungary where the right are more clerically oriented than the left. Specifically Jobbik is advocating a re-invention of religion in Hungary since it has played a significant role in the country’s history.

MSZP being from the left did not support the church extensively throughout its governance since it is not central to their world view. Jobbik goes as far to say that MSZP’s politics are a continuation of a soft version of János Kádár’s politics of the communist regime.247 Jobbik claims, “… the left only dealt with church policy with harmful intentions”.248 Through this negative other representation of MSZP concerning the church, Jobbik is saying that only they can revive religion in Hungary. Jobbik would do this through: the preservation of a united Hungarian church, introducing Christian values into basic laws, financing the churches, compulsory religious or ethical education at school, and upholding the contract between the church and the state.249 This is necessary because of the fact that Hungary has a strong religious history, states Jobbik. Again, in this instance, Jobbik does present what they plan to do but, they do not present how they are going to do it, only focusing on the changes that need to be made because of MSZP’s former politics. Furthermore, Jobbik explains, “The liberal standpoints took the historical perspective of the church and made it unauthentic; from the societal building point of view, made the church insignificant, and questioned its effectiveness”.250 This is another example of political cleavage between the two parties. One is for the support of the church, while the other is against. Jobbik is blaming MSZP for making the position of the church in society less important.

On the subject of religious or ethical education, according to Jobbik, MSZP practiced a “liberal relativist dictatorship”.251 Using the noun “dictatorship” Jobbik is using very harsh hateful language against MSZP. Calling the present party of MSZP a dictatorship is an irrational accusation by Jobbik. According to Fish, when hate speech is

248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid., 60.
labeled as irrational it can be considered a problem. In the Hungarian political tradition, many politicians use harsh and hateful language in order to intimidate their opponents. Through the use of the word “dictatorship” on the part of Jobbik about MSZP, is justification for hate speech because of it is irrationality since during MSZP’s time in power they were democratically elected. In addition, MSZP did not have more “leeway to develop policies” even when in coalition with the SZDSZ than any other democratic party had in Hungary since the regime change. At the same time, this is another tactic that Jobbik uses to intimidate MSZP, but it is not successful since it has an irrational base. In this instance Jobbik’s use of hate speech against the MSZP is not justified since there were no dictatorships since the regime change.

**MSZP versus MSZMP?:**

Jobbik’s main critique of MSZP regarding religious matters is that it dealt no differently with the issue than the MSZMP did during the communist times. Since MSZP is the successor party to MSZMP, this is a direct implication that Jobbik is calling MSZP no different than the former Hungarian Communist Party. This is significant for the reason being that Jobbik is drawing a direct parallel of these two political parties. Jobbik sees no different between MSZMP and MSZP. Thus Jobbik is directly questioning Hungarian politics since the regime change because, although there were democratic elections, the socialist party did gain significant political advances.

As mentioned that Jobbik is anti-communist in their political stance and throughout the entirety of the discourse analysis is also heavily against the MSZP. Often times as demonstrated above that Jobbik criticizes MSZP as being communist, and practicing harsh socialist policies even within a democratic Hungary. Although MSZP’s policies are also criticized as being neoliberal and liberal, those pertain more to recent developments that have evolved from MSZP’s development as a party. What Jobbik explains as MSZP’s communist tendencies is their party’s former ties the MSZMP. This is seen in direct opposition to certain policies that Jobbik wishes to pursue by turning more of an eye to an Eastern direction and strengthening relations with Russia and China. Turning more towards the East is a priority for Jobbik even at the expense of

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253 Jobbik Magyarországt Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 10, 73, 74.
relations with the EU and other democratic countries. This is a direct contradiction, especially since Jobbik would like to strengthen relations with China, presently a communist country. Even though Jobbik is highly skeptical of communism and present socialists as well, it is more willing to partake in relations with China, than other democratic countries. It is clear that this issue is important for Jobbik to stand up for it, but at the same time, Jobbik is willing to look the other way when if relations with China would benefit Hungary even though they are against communism.

**Hungarians outside Hungary’s Present Borders:**

This topic provides a very clean example of the divide between the left and the right in Hungary. Historically the left has always been more for keeping a cultural connection between the Hungarians living outside of the present borders of Hungary in the sense of civic nationalism. Civic nationalism entails an allegiance to specific, civic, governmental institutions within a country. On the other hand, the right has been for a stronger attachment to those Hungarians in the sense of ethnic nationalism, where the nation is defined in terms of blood, culture, and language. The differences in ideas are based on different conceptions of nationhood and of national identity. Civic nationalism is an open community which allows others to join whereas ethnic nationalism is closed because it is related to blood or common decent. Previously in 2004, there was a referendum taken in Hungary about the question of whether to extend citizenship to those Hungarians outside of Hungary’s present borders. At the time this referendum was initiated by the right wing opposition, and it was discouraged by the left liberal/civic interpretations of this issue by MSZP. MSZP comes from a civic interpretation of national identity advocating the present Hungarian citizens against the extension of citizenship, in the fear of the new citizens exploiting Hungary’s social welfare programs. Although more people voted for the extension of the citizenship than not, the number of voters was too low to make the results valid.

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255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
Moving forward to 2010, when Fidesz won the elections, and the first law that they amended was the citizenship law, hereby extending citizenship to ethnic Hungarian outside Hungary’s present borders. Jobbik was in full support of this notion, since Jobbik also has an ethnic perception of national belonging. Directly in the program Jobbik stated that the previous governments since the regime change have not been taking the issue of the Hungarians outside Hungary’s present borders seriously.\(^{259}\) This can be seen as an indirect reference to all of the left leaning political parties, but specifically MSZP, because they were in power the rest of the time. Fidesz can easily be excluded from this statement since it was advocating citizenship during the time. Jobbik also states that the failure of the 2004 referendum was a “tragic set-back”.\(^{260}\) In 2010 as in 2004, the differences in the perception of nationality identity and what it is composed of, were seen to directly contradict, with the right, including Jobbik, viewing Hungarian citizenship as ethnic, and the left, including MSZP, viewing the nation in terms of loyalty to civic institutions.\(^{261}\) Thus based on the historical differences of the political left and right in the perception of national identity and nationhood, it is evident that in this example Jobbik is taking another stab at MSZP. This is further reiterated by the fact that this is a huge issue that Hungary has been continuously dealing with since 1920. Jobbik and MSZP have contradictory opinions about this issue, thereby moving the political cleavage further apart, and further polarizing Hungarian politics.

**Roma Politics:**

The topic of the Roma is one mainly brought to the forefront of political discussion by Jobbik, a fact that Jobbik continuously boasts. Before starting the analysis of the dividing positions of MSZP and Jobbik on this topic, there is the issue of address. Jobbik uses the Hungarian word “cigány”\(^{262}\) to describe the Roma people in Hungary. This is a name that Jobbik mentions is “used self-referentially,\(^{263}\) which automatically implies for Jobbik that it can use the word. However for this paper, this group of people

\(^{259}\) Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, “Radikális változás,” 56.

\(^{260}\) Ibid.


\(^{262}\) Meaning Gypsy in English.

will be called Roma people. The very fact that Jobbik has to mention this language implication is the awareness that it is a very sensitive issue. Since Jobbik believes that being politically correct is a liberal/leftist invention, Jobbik is disregarding MSZP and still using the self-designated terms by the Roma themselves and by many Hungarians. Cigány is seen as being politically incorrect since the literal meaning of the word means “untouchable,” potentially being derived from India’s caste system.²⁶⁴ Jobbik believes that the debates about the Roma population in Hungary have been taken over by the debate about being politically correct which Jobbik attributes to the left liberals.²⁶⁵

Through the simple use of language, Jobbik is again highly critical of MSZP. By using the word “cigány” Jobbik is indirectly countering MSZP and making a mockery of MSZP’s previous policies of political correctness. This is done through the fact that Jobbik claims that the important issues are not being discussed anymore because politicians are afraid of not being politically correct which has deteriorated the quality of the debate on the Roma issue. Jobbik’s complete unconcern for political correctness is measured by the harsh language used to describe the policies of political correctness. This situation includes painting Hungary’s Roma population as “poor,”²⁶⁶ “unfortunate,”²⁶⁷ “victim,”²⁶⁸ in contrast to the Hungarian people seen as, “xenophobic,”²⁶⁹ “intolerant,”²⁷⁰ “aggressors,”²⁷¹ thus making any debate on the Roma “fake”²⁷² due to these preconceptions, making a debate or dialogue difficult. Jobbik goes further in stating that, MSZP based on selfish political goals, turned the Roma population’s view of Hungarians as their enemy and thus started aggressive behaviour against the Hungarians among the Roma.²⁷³ Furthermore, during the past twenty years, the politics concerning the Roma population were important during the time of elections and then “their problems were

²⁶⁶ Ibid.
²⁶⁷ Ibid.
²⁶⁸ Ibid.
²⁶⁹ Ibid.
²⁷⁰ Ibid.
²⁷¹ Ibid.
²⁷² Ibid.
²⁷³ Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 41.
swept under the rug”\textsuperscript{274} The previous government, mostly MSZP, considered the Roma population as “easily bought votes”\textsuperscript{275} and nothing more.

\textit{Questions of Racism:}

As Jobbik is the political party in Hungary that brought the debate about the Roma population back into public discussion, it is being labeled as racist. Jobbik defends this statement by saying that they have only been telling the truth about the situation, being realistic, that in fact there are \textit{cigány} crimes\textsuperscript{276} being committed in Hungary. Jobbik resists these accusations by stating that the only reason they are being criticized is due to the political correct rhetoric imposed by MSZP. According to Jobbik, the overall policies of MSZP lowered the standard in Hungary to the point where the present younger Roma generation does not see employment as a legitimate form of living resorting instead to numerous forms of crime in order to survive.\textsuperscript{277} Jobbik is blaming MSZP for the worsening conditions of the Roma. Jobbik in turn proposes changes such as: fusing the education system, integration into the work force, allowing the church and other civil organizations to help, and most importantly facilitating dialogue between Hungarian and the Roma community.\textsuperscript{278} Here Jobbik is only highlighting the basic things to improve relations with a group and not going into specifics, whereby making it difficult for the electorate to dispute, even though Jobbik’s view of the Roma is very questionable. Making such a stark contrast between MSZP and Jobbik’s policies is another way that Jobbik can show the Hungarian voting population what MSZP has or has not done for the Roma. This complete degrading of MSZP’s Roma policies gives Jobbik the power to do or say almost anything in order to improve the situation. The electorate is looking for a change in the way the government has been trying to solve the question of the Roma population and Jobbik’s attempts to solve it is by cracking down on Roma crime will satisfy the electorate. By presenting two options, one of MSZP’s former policies and the new ones that Jobbik hopes to implement, the electorate is presented with an evident

\textsuperscript{274} Jobbik Magyarországi Mozgalom, “Radikális változás,” 40.
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{276} Translation for cigánybűnözés
\textsuperscript{277} Jobbik Magyarországi Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 40.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
choice for Jobbik. Jobbik presents this situation in such a way as to leave no doubt in the minds of the population for which party to vote for concerning this issue.

An Instance of Hate Speech?:

Taking all of these critiques against MSZP into consideration, there is some harsh language being used. Looking at the criteria of what constitutes hate speech as presented by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, it says that hate speech as a form of discrimination is based on intolerance. This is certainly the case as Jobbik finds MSZP’s Roma politics intolerable, hence its reason for denouncing it. According to the second definition of hate speech by the Oxford Law Companion, discourse turns into hate speech when it causes distress to individuals being associated to a certain group. In this case, MSZP is not in distress by Jobbik, since they know Jobbik’s perspective coming from the far right and are aware of the implications of Jobbik’s strong language and its attention seeking strategies. In the perspective of further polarizing the political sphere in Hungary, this speech is effective. With regard to MSZP’s Roma policies, Jobbik’s comments are not labeled as problem by MSZP. On the other hand, one has to reflect about the possibly implication in this instance of hate speech against the Roma community itself. As the trend in Hungarian political and public discourse has demonstrated, hate speech is also a common method used to denounce one’s political opponent. The critiques mentioned above by Jobbik towards MSZP are indicative of being used to harshly criticize MSZP. Since the language used against MSZP is more to denounce the party, in this instance hate speech has not occurred towards MSZP.

In another instance, Jobbik can definitely be considered as committing hate speech against the Roma community in Hungary. This is shown through the excessive use of harsh language towards the Roma. In a study conducted, the harshest form of xenophobia in Hungary takes place against the Roma. Since Jobbik’s electoral success, the racist remarks against the Roma have also increased.

Political Accountability and 2006 Demonstrations:

Further attention can be drawn specifically to the demonstrations in the fall of 2006 since they contribute to a large part of Jobbik’s program. Jobbik places a huge emphasis all throughout its program on the numerous faults and betrayals that MSZP committed against Hungarians. The reason behind the continuous discussions about the 2006 events is due to the problem surrounding political accountability. Jobbik states that the police, but most importantly, party members of MSZP like Gyurcsány have not been held accountable for their previously committed offenses against the Hungarian protesters. A direct example of one of these statements within Jobbik’s program is, “The liberals proved; together with the socialists that they are prepared and able, to brutally violate their reiterated discourse about defending human rights.” 281 Jobbik goes on to say that these violations in human rights were felt directly on the skins of the protestors, which is something that should never happen again. 282 Jobbik goes one step further by calling these human rights violations that took place on the 23rd of October as “bloody Monday”. 283 In this instance Jobbik is making direct accusations and representing MSZP in a negative light. Jobbik is positioning themselves as the defender of Hungarian human rights. Jobbik is at the same time putting themselves in a position of authority concerning human rights, and putting MSZP in a position of breaking human rights, a party who’s rationality can be questioned. This is effectively done through the use of word choice and sentence order and placement.

In another instance, Jobbik talks about harming human and political rights in Hungary,

Hungary today is not a constitutional state: the social-liberal government, used the law and the order keeping bodies for years against the governmental, state, and political dissidents, to restrained national interests and organizations. Meanwhile, political freedom rights and second generation human rights were heavily violated…. 284

Using this example, Jobbik is directly discussing the legitimacy of the state based on social-liberal ideals. This is a strong comment against MSZP and other social-liberal parties. It is significant because through this comment, Jobbik is attacking the moral character and the rationality of their opposing party. By questioning the moral stature that

281 Jobbik Magyarországt Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 86.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
284 Jobbik Magyarországt Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 85.
the previous government had regarding human rights and political freedom, Jobbik is making a harsh attack on MSZP’s views. Although the language in use is very formal and well formulated, there is a certain negativity that shows through against MSZP.

However, the most significant mention of MSZP within the issues of the 2006 demonstrations in Hungary is mentioning the historical actions of the MSZP since the regime change. Jobbik’s program states,

Half a decade after the failure of the party state, in the fall of 2006, with bloody reality, the once believed to be extinct autocratic totalitarianism resurfaced. This had an evident antecedent. In between 1994-98, during the time of the Horn government, then specifically since 2002 the country has experienced brutal political freedom rights violations. The ignorance of the police, and the disregard for the norms of their profession became a regular occurrence, against the anti-government demonstrators and organizations.  

This statement goes back stating that human rights violations of the left were not something that only took place in 2006 but that it has in fact been a build-up over the years, according to Jobbik. By taking the attack from a historical perspective, Jobbik is blaming MSZP for their continuous faults over the years that culminated in the 2006 demonstrations. Calling the human rights violations brutal, Jobbik is attributing negative other representation to MSZP. Throughout the entire section of the program dealing with this occurrence there is the constant contrast being drawn between the ‘law abiding citizens’ and the ‘the evil human rights violating politicians’. This contrast is reiterated throughout the entire section makes the voters more likely take the side of Jobbik since the negative actions are being expanded upon and demonstrated continuously as shown by the previously explained examples. In the historical section of the thesis it was stated that most claims against the government or the police have been dismissed by the courts as being invalid showing that this assertion by Jobbik is also not completely valid, even though there is support for this among the population. All of this taken in turn further reinforces the political polarization divide in Hungary. Even the 2006 demonstrations are divided among political lines as Jobbik and MSZP are both taking different stances and reacting to the situation in a completely different manor. Polarization is emphasised through the strong divide on this issue by the two political parties.

285 Ibid., 86.
An Instance of Hate Speech?:

Looking specifically at the citations mentioned in this section, it is indeed demonstrative of harsh language being used through vocabulary selection and it goes as far as to indicate hate speech on the part of Jobbik. Some of the words that Jobbik uses such as: “barbaric or brutal violation,”286 “prepared and able,”287 and “autocratic totalitarianism” are illuminating the harsh reality of the word selection of Jobbik indicative of hate speech. According to another definition of hate speech by Bhikhu Parekh, hate speech is when a form of discourse singles out a certain individual or a certain group based on certain characteristics, when this singled out target group has specific qualities assigned to it deemed highly undesirable, and when the target group is excluded and placed outside even any compatible, normal, and social relationship, constitutes as hate speech.288 Jobbik is again attempting to put MSZP outside of the realm of social relations. In this instance Jobbik has had a stronger success rate because of the view of many demonstrators that support Jobbik’s view regarding the 2006 demonstrations. To be able to remove MSZP from the realm of social relations would mean either completely dominating an issue to which the voters entirely agree with, Jobbik for example, or in the more extreme case completely removing MSZP from the sphere of politics with influence. Looking at the 2010 elections, MSZP lost a huge number of votes, arguably as a result of their actions and choices from 2006 until 2009. Thus in essence their scope of influence has been significantly reduced although not entirely attributed to Jobbik. Although the loss of influence and prestige from not winning the 2010 elections cannot be compared to a regular occurrence when one political party is traded off for another, because of the fact that MSZP’s influence and votes dropped dramatically. This could partly be explained by the demonstrations of 2006 and other choices that MSZP had made in the past.

Looking at the definition of hate speech by the Committee of Ministers and the Oxford Law Companion, Jobbik’s statements are in fact forms of hateful language not being tolerated and inciting open hostility because of the extent that Jobbik has gone to in

286 Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 86.
287 Ibid.
order to denounce MSZP. Calling a democratic political party totalitarian even when they always have been active in a democracy is simply outrageous implying irrationality. Jobbik in this instance is going very far and making explicit vocabulary choices in order to make its statement heard and also to gain more attention. Hate speech in the Hungarian context is used as a speech act in order to intimidate a rival is being used in this context. Jobbik is also using such hateful language to harshly criticize MSZP. Although with Jobbik in the Hungarian political party scene and making progress, MSZP now has to work harder in order to gain voters from the same amount of voter, but which will be instead distributed among three political parties instead of two. The three parties divided into two spheres of influence. Overall, in this case, hate speech in the English sense and hate speech in the Hungarian sense is being used against MSZP

**Cultural Politics:**

Cultural policies are another realm where Jobbik and MSZP, in order to materialize cultural support, both need to have strong cultural policies in place. Again in this domain Jobbik and MSZP’s views are polar opposites. The most significant and interesting aspect that Jobbik uses to describe MSZP’s cultural politics is, “liberal cultural dictatorship”.

This is another rhetorical device used by Jobbik, an oxymoron, pairing words like “liberal and cultural,” generally deemed as positive words, with the word “dictatorship” which has a negative meaning. What goes along with this criticism of MSZP is a criticism of the liberal education system which Jobbik automatically also ties to MSZP. This contrast of words allows Jobbik to take power over MSZP since Jobbik is the one that is calling MSZP out. What also needs to be taken into consideration is that Jobbik had no more legitimate authority than MSZP in the matter, even though Jobbik is acting as though it does. This technique is called scape-goating since Jobbik is directly blaming MSZP for their cultural policies.

Moreover, the references to the “cultural dictatorship” said by Jobbik of MSZP in this section include: “The elimination of the liberal cultural dictatorship,” “the fake

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290 Jobbik Magyarországró Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 51.
neo-liberal culture politics,”\textsuperscript{291} “dictatorial concentration of neo-liberal art,”\textsuperscript{292} and most importantly,

…Parties representing neo-liberal politics, while in a hypocritical way emphasize and claim the independence of politics from culture, they accomplish a kind of cultural terror in our country. Everything that helps their political goals, regardless of artistic values and its morbid existence is supported and everything that strengthens national identity is put on hold. We can safely state that today in Hungary, in the cultural field (as well), there is a soft liberal dictatorship.\textsuperscript{293}

All of these instances combined demonstrate the language that Jobbik is using to describe cultural policy in Hungary. It is interesting to note that Jobbik is calling the liberal cultural art “sick”, because Jobbik is taking an art form or type and producing a judgement which means that everyone that disagrees automatically does not support Jobbik. Jobbik is taking every issue to the point where the voters either agree or those who completely disagree with them as called “sick”. This is further reiteration of the polarizing situation in Hungarian politics. With culture, it is a more sensitive issue since cultural art is very interpretive therefore, if Jobbik is making a judgment and expressing it, the party is interpreting what cultural art should be like and expecting others to follow suit. In the same way that Jobbik is trying to manipulate the voters, Jobbik is also trying to manipulate cultural interpretations. Basically by the very fact that Jobbik is calling MSZP’s time in power “a dictatorship”, it is making a judgement and putting the voters in the same position as MSZP has supposedly put them. Using the word dictatorship to describe MSZP, Jobbik is completely discrediting the party, and questioning their democratic ideology.

\textit{Challenges to the Definition of Hate Speech:}

As upheld so far, this is again an instance of hate speech that has been demonstrated by Jobbik. The party goes as far to use the word “dictatorship,” even though it is only used to refer to culture, but the weight of the word is still present because “dictatorship” is a strong word. Using the criteria outlined in the methodology section, hate speech is presented based on the criteria, that Jobbik’s hatred of MSZP is based on irrational grounds. Moreover, there is also the presence of the word “cultural terror”. This is another instance of irrational language on the part of Jobbik. This

\textsuperscript{291} Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, "Radikális változás," 52.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 51-52.
statement is considered irrational because there were no incidents or incitement of terror, defined as “extreme fear or dread,”\textsuperscript{294} during MSZP’s time in power. Since there is the use of irrational language, it does pose a problem for MSZP since it is discrediting the policies of the party and leading the electorate in the wrong direction, and giving the wrong impression about the party. Jobbik is indeed inciting hostility and hatred towards MSZP through the use of language. Through the overall rhetoric of Jobbik, the political party is constantly challenging and moving the barrier of what constitutes hate speech, and what should and should not be tolerated. Specifically regarding the definitions of hate speech, the use of the word “dictatorial” is leading to hostility on the political level.

Furthermore, the language use of Jobbik can also be observed at two different levels. The issue discussed concretely is the cultural politics of MSZP which Jobbik calls dictatorial; this is assumed to be the micro level. In essence, this same situation can be looked at, on the macro level in the instance of hate speech in general in European politics because Jobbik is right on the edge between what can and should be accepted and what cannot and should not be accepted in political discourse. Certain statements of Jobbik are considered hate speech while others are not. This link between the micro and macro level in the instance of hate speech in done through the rhetoric of Jobbik. A word becomes a larger issue when it is directly threatening the ‘other’, who is made to feel as such by Jobbik but also by the constant reiteration of the system of political polarization in Hungary.

**Interpretations:**

In the following section, an interpretation will be presented with regard to the results of the political discourse analysis.

**Jobbik’s Image of MSZP:**

Jobbik’s image of MSZP has many aspects that pertain to it mainly shown in the form of contradictions. The numerous names assigned to MSZP indicate that the party possesses all of the qualities that Jobbik deems to be unworthy and hold no value. All of the qualities that MSZP has are in contradiction to what Jobbik believes. This can be seen through the numerous examples, which include views about religion, education, the

Roma, Hungarians outside Hungary, culture and the 2006 demonstrations. Pertaining to religion Jobbik discredits MSZP as being anti-religion since it did not financially support the church enough throughout its time in power. Regarding education, Jobbik would like to switch back from the two-tiered level of high school exams that MSZP implemented stating that it is too much a deviation from Hungarian values. Instead the two-tiered education system is more in line with the system that is being implemented across Europe, thus not Hungarian. Regarding the Roma, Jobbik would like to deal with them more brutally than MSZP did, which Jobbik claims was only for ensuring votes, whereas Jobbik has vague goals with regard to the Roma. Looking at Hungarians outside of Hungary’s borders presently, MSZP has maintained a relationship based on a shared culture with them. For Jobbik, this is not enough, the newly implemented citizenship law was necessary for Jobbik to strengthen this tie. Concerning the cultural policies of MSZP, they were considered “sick” and only serving the interests of liberal art. The demonstrations that took place in 2006, MSZP’s entire handling of the situation was done through breaking numerous human rights laws, and violating the basic rights of the demonstrators, claims Jobbik. It seems as though whatever MSZP has done is in direct contrast to what Jobbik would like to implement and change. The representation of MSZP as a disorganized, corrupt, anti-religious, anti-Hungarian, anti-traditional political party is the message that comes across through Jobbik’s program. This is an irrational characterization of a political party because the statements are in majority not based on reality.

Jobbik is portraying MSZP and their implemented policies as black-and-white. This is indicated by the fact that MSZP’s policies are presented and in the first instance and criticized. Jobbik’s “solutions” are only shown in the second instance. This presentation is indicative of the fact that Jobbik’s sees itself as right and MSZP as wrong. Through the use of harsh language to show hatred against the MSZP, such as calling the party a “dictatorship,” inciting “cultural terror” and as “autocratic totalitarian,” Jobbik is discrediting MSZP completely as a political actor. Jobbik is turning the political situation into an over-simplification where they position MSZP constantly at fault. This oversimplification is done again through presenting the elements of MSZP’s position according to Jobbik, and Jobbik’s betterment of these elements.
Another general characteristic of radical right wing political parties is their sweeping way of dealing with important and controversial issues. Jobbik also plays into this paradigm by suggesting that they hold the answers to all of Hungary’s problems. Throughout the analysis Jobbik has demonstrated that they do not provide concrete solutions to the problems that they claim MSZP as brought about. Instead Jobbik focuses constantly on the reiteration of Hungarian values and traditions instead of real solutions and steps the party would take to further bring about the change that they deem appropriate. This also feeds into Jobbik’s populist approach because Jobbik is dividing the political situation into the people against the elites. The people are considered the Hungarians and most importantly those that vote for Jobbik and the elite are considered those actors like MSZP, who according to Jobbik, are a detriment to Hungarian values.

**Reinforcing Political Polarization:**

Political polarization is something that has characterised the Hungarian political scene since the regime change. As seen through numerous linguistic examples above, Jobbik has different values than MSZP presented by Jobbik does, based on the different types of policies each party advocates. This is due to the differences in world view that the two political parties have. Gill Seidel calls these types of words ‘split symbols,’ which indicate a cultural cleavage where certain utterances have different meanings for each political party.\(^{295}\) Hence words like clericalism, nationalism, communism, and political orientation are able to be defined differently by each party. Jobbik’s and MSZP’s definitions of these words differ the most out of the political parties’ active in Hungarian politics presently. As demonstrated throughout the numerous examples of discourse, Jobbik is further pushing and distancing itself from MSZP in order to show that Jobbik is what Hungary presently needs and that MSZP and all of their politics of the past have only caused harm to the country.

Another important aspect of polarization is power. Power is needed in some form to be able to reinforce polarization of the political scene. Jobbik and MSZP have arguably equal power, although MSZP does have a couple more seats in the Hungarian parliament, but Jobbik is strongly attempting to grow its power through the downplay, and harsh

words against MSZP. Through political polarization, the countless examples of the representation of MSZP in a negative perspective and Jobbik in a positive perspective demonstrate partisan polarization as mentioned by Van Dijk. The partisan polarizations between these two political parties are examples of links to the more concrete dichotomy that exists overall of Hungarian political polarization. Part of the goal of this political discourse analysis was of tying the macro level in together with the micro level of the dichotomy of the whole situation. Through Jobbik’s constant aggression towards MSZP, they are directly contributing to the alienation of the two political poles in Hungary.

According to Mudde, in many Eastern European countries, radical right wing political parties are kept at bay due to the polarized political situation. Even in Hungary during the 2002 general elections, the radical right wing political party at the time, MIÉP, did not manage to gain a significant number of votes because the electorate was divided among the centre nationalist-conservative right and centre socialist-liberal left parties. Thus at the time polarization was bad for radical right wing political parties. What the difference is between the situation in 2002 and the present situation with Jobbik, is that Jobbik has managed to gain enough votes to become a part of one of the two main camps of competition. Jobbik has managed to enter into the rightist camp and has been able to gain votes by trying to take ownership of issues like nationalism, clericalism, etc. except in a more radical stance than Fidesz. Jobbik has managed to enter into one of the main camps through issue ownership by constantly politicizing that they are the party closest to the people.

**Control:**

By taking control over the content of the political program Jobbik is controlling the political discussion in a sense to steer it closer to topics of importance to Jobbik. In politics all political parties have control over their own program. Through this action, Jobbik is changing and setting the agenda for their preferred political discussion on the

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298 Ibid.
299 Ibid., 241.
political stage and in parliament. More specifically through agenda setting, Jobbik is moving their issues to the centre. The method used to effectively bring the issues about, is by taking a charismatic voice like Krisztina Morvai and having her fight for Jobbik’s views in the European Parliament. Also, Gábor Vona, and other prominent members in parliament representing Jobbik readily discuss their issues in order to bring it into the main sphere of political discussion. The issues that Jobbik would like brought into the forefront of political discussions are Jobbik’s interpretation of the political scene. Thus, the reasons for the countless mentions of MSZP throughout Jobbik’s program, is indicative of the faults that Jobbik sees with MSZP’s past actions. Overall, through the use of control as a tactic in order to spread Jobbik’s views about MSZP, it is contributing to the polarized atmosphere in Hungarian politics.

Another instance where Jobbik demands control is done through knowledge. The relationship between power and knowledge is through “strategies of relations of forces supporting and supported by types of knowledge”. Since knowledge is directly associated to power, especially in politics, Jobbik hopes to get ahead by having more knowledge about Hungary’s hardships. Relations of force come in the form of attacks against MSZP by Jobbik. Different types of knowledge are needed about various subjects to gain election results. These various types of knowledge can consist of being closer or farther away from the people and being able to connect with the electorate in order to gain the necessary votes.

Contradictions:

Parties active in politics are often full of contradictions, by statements being said for the sake of the argument, regardless of whether they hold true for the entire party or the party’s program. This can be argued is the case with Jobbik, where there are numerous contradictions within its program in different sections. These contradictions will be explored in the following section, touching upon a variety of different issues.

301 Ibid., 201.
302 Ibid., 203.
The Magyar Gárda:

The Magyar Gárda’s purpose and tasks are a stark contrast. Although not all of the Magyar Gárda’s actions can be associated to contradictions in Jobbik’s program, but the source of their actions certainly is noteworthy. Jobbik’s paramilitary branch claims to aid those Hungarians that are fearful of Roma crime in their rural areas. On the other hand, the Magyar Gárda are constantly wearing black for one, and for two parading around in large groups seemingly posing a threat. The very fact that the Magyar Gárda wears black is an evident reference to the Second World War that puts fear into the population. In large groups when gathering in villages they pose a threat. In their defense, the Magyar Gárda state that they are protecting ethnic Hungarians against Roma crime. This is questionable since their very presence is threatening and therefore posing a threat to ethnic Roma who are also Hungarian citizens. The Magyar Gárda says that they are protecting some but in reality they are threatening the right to safety and security of many citizens. The very aim of the Magyar Gárda is contradictory since they are only trying to protect a certain type of citizen and not another, when there is no major threat actually taking place.

Communist versus Liberal:

At the same time Jobbik is portraying MSZP as being both communist and liberal. This is seen as a direct contradiction because in theory and practice, communism and liberalism are very different. More specifically what Jobbik is referring to are different political attitudes that MSZP possesses, which are in contrast to Jobbik. Jobbik does not seem to realize that there is a theme, of the huge contradiction of what MSZP is, running throughout the entire program. What Jobbik hopes to achieve by calling MSZP communist is referring to the negative image of the communist legacy in Hungary. Through this action, Jobbik hopes to remind the population about the hardships of the Soviet occupation in Hungary dominated by the communist ideology. By calling MSZP communist, it is essentially equating MSZP with their predecessor the MSZMP, implying that the party has not undergone a large ideological change, and only a name change.

In the other perspective, Jobbik is portraying MSZP as a very liberal party. Jobbik claims that MSZP is a liberal because of their adoption of Western ideals, and their deviance from Hungarian traditions. The adoption of a liberal stance regarding culture,
the family, abortion, divorce, the economy and other major issues by MSZP, Jobbik is criticizing them of betraying Hungary. This liberal stance by MSZP is going against everything that Jobbik values and everything that Jobbik puts emphasis on within their program. MSZP’s liberal position stems from the preference for gradual change instead of radical change like Jobbik. The liberal stand that MSZP has adopted further differentiates the party from the former MSZMP, demonstrating Jobbik’s contradiction.

Although calling MSZP both liberal and communist is a contradiction, Jobbik uses this as another tactic to further challenge MSZP’s image. Through more individual freedom, a central quality in liberal ideology, MSZP is giving more power to the people to decide their fate instead of state intervention. This is characteristic according to political theory of attitudes of liberal parties like MSZP. This in turn creates the situation where it is in contradiction to Jobbik, who stands more for order in society with a morally conservative stance and wants change to take place radically. In essence Jobbik being self-characterized as radical is also a contradiction. In political science theory, radicals are generally those on the left side of the political spectrum who would like to see change take place at a faster rate, often by drastic means like the overthrow of the entire system. Since Jobbik takes a more conservative position on the right side of the political spectrum, it should call itself reactionary instead of radical as they want to switch back to how things were traditionally. These include different perspectives in political, social, economic institutions that have been changed since the regime change.

Although Jobbik is looking to the far past, often times certain institutions did not even exits, therefore it appears as though Jobbik would like to keep certain things from the communist time to be more traditional, even though their ideology is strongly against communism. Also, it seems as if the only reason that Jobbik wants to switch back, is because MSZP members were the ones that initiated the change in the first place.

**Democratic Parties versus Non-democratic:**

Democratic parties are active in governments through being elected by the population. This is the basis of the democratic system in the entirety of Europe, including

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305 Ibid., 59.
306 Ibid., 58-59.
307 Ibid., 58.
Hungary. There are some political parties that are in the race to gain more votes but whom as a party are not democratic themselves, but participate in the democratic elections. This is the instance with Jobbik. Throughout the history of radical right wing political parties, since the fall of the communist bloc, the most successful ever was Jörg Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party who during its success became the second largest party in Austria. The Freedom Party had to form a coalition government with the leading party. Austria was highly criticized for this by the European Union and member countries themselves. Taking this example where a non-democratic party, entered into the democratic race and was elected democratically against other democratic parties. A similar situation is presenting itself in Hungary with Jobbik. It has to be mentioned that Jobbik claims to be a democratic party but many of its policies claim otherwise like their attitude towards the Roma, being anti-establishment, being against the EU, their attitude towards MSZP among others. Jobbik is running for elections against the two largest political parties in the country (and against others as well), MSZP and Fidesz. Since the regime change, both MSZP and Fidesz became the two largest political parties in Hungary. Both parties are democratic, which has allowed them to be involved in politics since the regime change until presently. Jobbik on the other hand is quite different when the issue of democracy is concerned. Jobbik claims to be democratic but many of the parties policies are not, as mentioned above.

**Democracy Questioned by Critique:**

In another instance Jobbik is often putting to question the very foundations of Hungarian democracy (which does not have a profound history as it is) through the political language being used to describe MSZP. As mention in the theoretical background of this thesis, it is evident that both Jobbik and MSZP are functioning, and working in a democratic environment, in a democratic country. If democracy is built on the mutual voice of the people heard, then elected, and governed by a majority, then Jobbik through hatred and hate speech used against MSZP is pushing certain aspects of democracy to the edge. These aspects include the language that is tolerated in the political sphere in Hungary specifically with regard to minorities and other political opponents. As shown above with the instance of control over the political discourse,

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Ibid., 134.
Jobbik is vying for more attention on their issues, trying to take attention away from all other parties but also away from MSZP.

Using democracy, ideology and the Magyar Gárda as examples, Jobbik is also using contradictions in order to manipulate the electorate.\textsuperscript{309} This is another tactic to gain more attention from the electorate. Also, through the manipulation of the image of MSZP being represented from bad to worse, Jobbik is combining many negative aspects in order to give numerous negative impressions of MSZP.

**New Identity of Jobbik?:**

MSZP and Jobbik are seen and presented as polar opposites through the program and in Hungarian politics. With the situation of political polarization in Hungary, this reiterates the distance, opposition, and contradiction that exist between Jobbik and MSZP. Jobbik sees MSZP as their largest competition in the perspective of difference in world view. They are the farthest from each other on the political spectrum.

One of the sources for this profound critique of Jobbik towards MSZP is evidently for differentiation. Through the numerous uses of language, as demonstrated in the above mentioned examples, Jobbik is constantly opposed to MSZP’s policies. This opposition has further put Jobbik on the margins of the right side of the political spectrum because of the direct mention, critique, and opposition to MSZP throughout the entirety of Jobbik’s program relating to every key issue. With this opposition along comes a new identity for Jobbik in the form of being more confrontational and critical of others’ issues not relevant or considered unimportant for Jobbik’s version of Hungary’s future.

Part of this new identity consists of acting, and maintaining a certain type of political behaviour where the media’s attention is focused on Jobbik in order to keep the issues that they advocate in the forefront of the political debate. This type of behaviour can also be considered a strategy used by the leaders of Jobbik to stay in the media spotlight. Although it is important for every political party in any country to be able to stay in the media’s light, but what sets radical right wing political parties apart from the parties closer to the centre, is the radical element that they bring about. This radical element consists of the type of discourse demonstrated above, through using hate speech and

harsh language, power, controversial issues and taking a tough stance for example against immigration or the Roma. In Jobbik’s case it is a hatred for MSZP and all of their policies illustrated through hate speech.

In part, Jobbik is also filling in the void left by MIÉP. MIÉP attained their largest success during the 1998 Hungarian elections where they just barely made it over the 5% threshold. In the years since, they have not attained such results. Thus their party is regressing, especially now with the recent death of their leader István Csurka. Jobbik can be classified as picking up those former MIÉP votes in addition to even more votes that the MIÉP ever attained.

**Jobbik’s Political Performance:**
What can be interpreted as a political performance by Jobbik is the fact that they take complicated and multi-resolution needing issues and reduce them down to simple answers. Through the issues mentioned in the analysis of the program, Jobbik is making the “faults” of MSZP seen very grave by primarily emphasizing them while the “solutions” that Jobbik offers to these are very easily stated as if they would be very simply to change and implement. This contrast is part of the performance of Jobbik by making it seems as though they possess all of the answers. Although this thesis did not have enough space to analyse the live political performances of Jobbik for expression structures, some clues from their political program can also be taken because they are discussing the same points. Jobbik’s program is full of MSZP’s faults, according to Jobbik, that are placed in primary positions, and analysed very thoroughly and later taken up by Jobbik claiming to possess the easy, mess-free “solution” in the form of value reassessment. This is part of an act by giving the impression to the electorate that Jobbik easily has control over the situation. The impression holds characteristics of authority, legitimacy, and power, all of which are qualities that Jobbik is looking for in order to persuade the electorate to vote for them.

**Rise of Nationalism:**
Part of Jobbik’s performance and rise can be interpreted in the context of rising nationalist sentiment in Hungary. Since both Jobbik and MSZP have different views regarding nationalism and nationalist sentiment, on this topic there are oppositional views

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as well. The reason that Jobbik has been able to take the topic of Hungarian nationalism so far is because they have developed issue ownership over the concept. Historically, in Hungary there was always been a divide on this issue. In the 19th century, Hungary was divided as to their ties to the Habsburg monarchy between being for Hungary or for progress. In between the two world wars, Hungary was divided between the Jewish question and Hungary’s former territories. After the Second World War, there was debate as to the degree of attachment to the Soviet Union. After the regime change, the issue of nationalism became divided among the political left and the political right in Hungary. The right was considered as strengthening Hungarian national identity whereas the left was more focused on progress and Westernization. This divide also relates to the larger picture in Europe as well in the form of modernization through following the pattern of values from Europe’s centre or looking for another pattern to modernize. Coming back to Hungary, the left often criticizes the right for being too nationalistic whereas the right criticizes the left in not paying enough attention to Hungarian values. Ever since Jobbik emerged and has been successful on the political scene, they have taken this issue to a new height. This further creates a divide between the two parties. The fact that Jobbik has claimed this issue is and has the strongest views on the subject allows them to claim some of Fidesz’s electorate. Jobbik’s claim of the nationalist issue further widens the divide between MSZP and Jobbik.

**Jobbik and MSZP in Europe:**

In the European perspective, Jobbik and MSZP’s opposition is arguably unique. Radical right wing political parties exist in almost every single European country presently. Some parties are more successful than others. Particularly in Eastern European countries, these types of parties, due to the communist legacy, and the fall of the radical left, are gaining popularity. In Eastern Europe, those countries that, after the regime change, aided their citizens through welfare measures in order to lessen the effects of those who did not benefit from reforms, have had less opportunities for the development

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313 Ibid.
Taking this into consideration, since the financial crisis and the Euro crisis have taken their toll on Hungary, it has provided room for Jobbik to grow and to flourish. Many other Eastern European countries have seen the same effect. The issue of power relations between Jobbik and MSZP is similar to any other radical right political party and their rivals and opponents. What makes this situation unique is the open denouncing of MSZP by Jobbik throughout its entire program as presented above. This language, and hate speech against MSZP is framed in the background by the situation of political polarization.

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Conclusion:
Through the political discourse analysis presented, it is evident that Jobbik is using strong language against MSZP. This in turn further polarizes the political situation. Political discourse analysis was essential in order to demonstrate the power relations between Jobbik and MSZP. Through the use of direct quotations from Jobbik’s program, Jobbik is presenting a specific image of their opponent MSZP, as their political rival, as the source of Hungary’s numerous hardships, and of a political party that has caused more harm than good to the Hungarian nation, according to Jobbik.

Jobbik and MSZP:
The relationship between Jobbik and MSZP had remained stable and not changing for the time being. Until there are significant changes that correspond more to Jobbik’s world view, this strong disagreement between Jobbik and MSZP will continue. Using political discourse analysis, the power relations between Jobbik and MSZP were analysed to demonstrate the struggle for power by Jobbik through the criticism of MSZP, through the creation of their ‘other’. Through the creation of an ‘other’ of Jobbik, it is a tactic used for comparison, and to show what would and will not take place if Jobbik has more power. This dichotomy created ensuring the constant distance between the two parties where Jobbik always comes out looking like it has the “solution” to Hungary’s problems, and MSZP’s “faults” are exploited to such a point that they are made difficult to disprove, question or even challenge. Claims of legitimacy are tools that Jobbik uses throughout its entire discourse in relation to MSZP, for the reasons of disproving MSZP’s policies and claims. This battle is of legitimacy in done through numerous techniques on Jobbik’s part like appealing to reason and rationality, and using altruist reasons. Legitimacy is a key aspect of power relations that Jobbik shows through their portrayal of MSZP. Using the tools of political discourse analysis such as: format, intention of statement, intended audience, topic, superstructures, local semantics, lexicon, syntax and rhetoric, along with all of their subheadings Jobbik was able to distort the image of MSZP, being different from reality, from how they actually are.

Hate Speech:
The overall assessment of the entirety of Jobbik’s program with regard to hate speech was necessary in order to explain the extent of Jobbik’s discourse towards MSZP.
In the majority of the instances mentioned of issues that Jobbik holds important, hate speech was used as presented by the definitions given above. Harsh, brutal, and severe language by Jobbik towards MSZP was also used. In the sequence of issues presented such as clericalism, education, beyond the border Hungarians, Roma population, 2006 demonstrations, and culture, Jobbik criticises MSZP to the point of inciting hostility in an irrational way, whereby justifying the name of hate speech for the language used. Hate speech is also justified because of the language of Jobbik fitting into the definitions of hate speech mentioned above.

In the methodology section, three different definitions of hate speech were stated, and another definition of hate speech being practiced in the Hungarian context was also given. These definitions were useful and were well suited for this study. All of the definitions given leave room for another interpretation of hate speech in the political sense as political language, which is why they were so useful. On the other hand, there still is not a direct definition of hate speech pertaining to exactly the political sphere with regard to political opposition and in the case of extreme political competition. The overall assessment is that the definition of hate speech has not evolved to the point where a suitable definition would be of use directly in the political sphere. This is the case because hate speech as such as always been applied by a powerful group to an oppressed group. In this instance one group is not being oppressed by the other in the same instance as a particular ethnic minority group would be oppressed by a majority for example, the Turks being oppressed in Germany. In this instance, both MSZP and Jobbik have relatively the same political power, with MSZP only having a couple more seats in the Hungarian parliament. Oppression or manipulation has occurred within the political debate between Jobbik and MSZP but not proven by any specific definition.

**Polarization:**

Through the radicalized discourse of Jobbik against MSZP, it has reinforced the situation of political polarization in Hungary. Jobbik has done this by questioning the legitimacy of MSZP, and calling for their political accountability in numerous matters. Especially with regard to issues like education, culture, the Roma population, Hungarians outside the present borders of Hungary, clericalism, and the demonstrations of 2006, Jobbik proved that in every instance they were completely against the policies formerly
led and implemented by MSZP. In the instance of education, Jobbik’s view was that MSZP implement the Bologna education system, which Jobbik would like to reverse because of the fact that it does not support conventional and tradition Hungarian values. In the instance of culture, Jobbik called MSZP’s cultural policies as a ‘cultural dictatorship’, showing an instance of hate speech in Jobbik’s language use, while demonstrating their differences to MSZP. Within MSZP’s policies dealing with the Roma population, Jobbik claims that they were only used for getting votes and making false promises. Concerning the Hungarian outside the present borders of Hungary, Jobbik states that MSZP’s policies were only based on a cultural tie, whereas Jobbik supported a more legitimate, legalized tie. Religion is another issue where the two parties differ significantly, Jobbik criticizing MSZP for dealing with the church in a communist fashion. For the issue of the 2006 demonstrations, Jobbik revealed their view of MSZP’s as never having been held accountable for their actions in the demonstration against the demonstrators. Thus, looking at all of these instances, Jobbik denounces MSZP cruelly, and bitterly. In consequence, this further substantiates the political dichotomy in Hungary’s political sphere.

The Future:

Jobbik’s sudden and continuous rise to power within the Hungarian political system is something to watch for in the coming years and especially in the next general Hungarian elections. The electoral results of both parties will be an interesting continuation of this debate between Jobbik and MSZP. As well, it is going to be interesting to see if the situation of political polarization persists in Hungary and whether Jobbik’s role will change within this equation. Whether Jobbik will surpass MSZP is something to take into consideration in the next general elections. Whether in Hungary, the same political situation will evolve where the largest political party will be in opposition to Jobbik, which would significantly reduce MSZP’s political power. In another instance, Jobbik could be made to form a coalition with Fidesz which might damage Fidesz’s reputation in Europe. This rise of Jobbik is a threat to Hungary but also a threat to Europe in terms of democracy, minority and human rights. At the European level the rise of such parties like Jobbik taking place in almost every single European country is cause for concern. In order to try and counter the rise of radical right wing
political parties, the EU with all of their governing bodies need to band together in order to be able to put up a legitimate counter to prevent such hate inciting parties from rising to power in the future.
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