DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “Changing Beliefs. The Operational Code of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah During the Sierra Leonean Civil War”, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Sander Bos
August 8, 2013
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Preface

After a substantial period of reading, coding, analyzing, writing and rewriting, the final product of my thesis finally lies in front of you. My goal was to write an original thesis which used more than books and scientific articles as methods to find answers in a promising relatively unknown field of International Relations. By applying Operational Code Analysis in the civil war of Sierra Leone I think I succeeded in this goal.

I am grateful to Kars de Bruijne for introducing me in the field of Operational Code Analysis and supervising the whole process of writing this thesis from the beginning. It was a pleasure for me to work together on this project, especially the feedback I received throughout was very fruitful. Also I would like to thank Andrej Zwitter for making valuable suggestions at the initial stage of setting up the research design, meaningful feedback on previous drafts and overall supervision.

Last but not least I would like to thank my family, friends and colleagues who supported me throughout in various ways, ranging from guiding me in the maze of statistics to teaching me practical computer skills which I had not discovered yet, or any other form of support which helped me writing this thesis.

I found the whole process from beginning to end very valuable. Not only did I master a new approach and method in International Relations, additionally I acquired and improved many skills which I can use in the future. It is fair to say that it enriched my International Relations curriculum.

Sander Bos
August 2013
Important players in the Sierra Leonean Civil War

Ahmad Tejan Kabbah Was democratically elected president of Sierra Leone since 1996. Left office in 2007. Member of the Sierra Leone People’s Party.

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) Group of former Sierra Leonean soldiers that allied with the Revolutionary United Front. Following a military coup in 1997 they briefly ruled the country. The AFRC was the main responsible for the bloody assault on Freetown in January 1999.

Civil Defense Forces (CDF) Paramilitary organization comprised of several militias who fought on the side of the government of Sierra Leone against the rebel groups.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Regional group of countries in West Africa, of which Sierra Leone is a member.

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) Multilateral military force established by ECOWAS to enhance regional stability. ECOMOG commenced to restore order in Liberia in the early nineties. In the late nineties they played an important role in the defense of Sierra Leone.

Foday Sankoh Leader and founder of the Revolutionary United Front.

Kamajors Militia of the Mende ethnic group who fought on the side of the government. Later included in the Civil Defense Forces, of which they comprised the largest part.

Nigeria West African country which was the main financial and military contributor to ECOMOG during their presence in Sierra Leone.

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Together with the AFRC, the RUF was the main antagonist of president Kabbah and its government during the Sierra Leonean Civil War. Founded by Foday Sankoh to replace the government of Sierra Leone, however without a clear own ideology. Became a political party after the civil war, ceased to exist after the elections of 2007.

Sierra Leone Army (SLA) Officially the army of Sierra Leone, however during the conflict a lot of leaders and soldiers continuously switched sides. Therefore it was not an effective defense mechanism for the Sierra Leonean government.

Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) Political party which won elections in 1996 and 2002. Therefore it was the major political party during the Sierra Leonean Civil War with its leader, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, as president.

Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) Set up jointly by the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations to try those people who are most responsible for war crimes committed in the civil war since 1996. Three former leaders of the AFRC, two members of the CDF and three former leaders of the RUF have been convicted.
**United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)** A peacekeeping mission set up by the United Nations in 1999 to monitor the implementation of the then signed Lomé peace agreement. It was further authorized to protect civilians.

**United Kingdom** Former colonizer of Sierra Leone which intervened in the Sierra Leonean Civil War through Operation Palliser in May 2000.
1. Introduction

‘History will be kind to me for I intend to write it’ - Winston Churchill

In 1962, Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin edited a book called Foreign Policy Decision Making, which was written out of the premise that leading approaches to international relations at the time were not completely useful in explaining governmental behavior. The book argued, contrary to the reigning theories, that state action was the action of individual leaders, therefore the individual should be central in research questions (Hudson, 2002: vii-viii). Churchill’s quote reflects this idea: history is not only determined by structural forces, the actions of individual decision makers play a decisive role in steering the course.

A decision making approach to International Relations takes this as its starting point and researches how leaders come to certain decisions. An important role is hereby played by psychological factors affecting the decision making process. In other words, scholars should delve into the head of a decision maker to understand and explain the actions of this individual (Walker and Schafer, 2006: 25). In this way, the decisions of a leader can be understood, explained and ultimately predicted. A well-known example of this is ‘cognitive consistency’, where incoming information that does not fit to preexisting images and opinions of an individual is discarded (Mintz and DeRouen Jr., 2010: 98).

The beliefs of a leader are another important psychological factor. Beliefs as ‘subjective representations of reality’ steer the decisions of leaders by distorting, blocking and recasting information a leader uses to make a decision (Walker and Schafer, 2006: 6). In this way beliefs steer the decision maker in his end/means calculations and choices of action (Simon, 1985). In other words, beliefs act as a causal mechanism, or an independent variable for understanding, explaining and ultimately predicting the behavior of leaders. Operational Code Analysis (OCA) is a tool to establish what the beliefs of a leader are.

1.1 Do leaders change their beliefs?

However, when beliefs are deemed so important for explaining outcomes in international relations, a rather relevant question comes to the fore. Namely, are these beliefs constant or
are there some factors which influence the beliefs of a leader. In other words, are beliefs amenable to change? And if so, what might cause a change in the beliefs of a leader? The answers to these questions are important in order to use the beliefs of a leader to explain, understand and ultimately predict behavior of a person and the entity he leads. Therefore these questions are central in this thesis.

1.2 Research question

Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as president of Sierra Leone during the civil war which ravaged that country is picked as the subject of investigation. This is an interesting choice because in the existing literature no examples exist of applying OCA in the context of a civil war. Especially, no studies are available which look at the influence a civil war has on the beliefs of a leader. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became president of Sierra Leone in 1996, at a time when the civil war was already raging on for five years. However, Kabbah was democratically chosen in free but violent elections. In 2002, when the civil war finally came to an end, he still was the president of Sierra Leone. The question is whether Kabbah’s beliefs remained stable or rather were amenable to change during this time in office, which is the research question of this thesis:

‘To what extent did the beliefs of president Kabbah change during the Sierra Leonean Civil War, in the period 1996-2002?’

Beliefs are captured by the operational code as initially formulated by Nathan Leites (1951, 1953) and later categorized by Alexander George (1969) who specified ten different beliefs which together form the belief system, or operational code, of a leader. A belief in general is defined as a subjective representation of reality and define how an actor sees and perceives the world around him (Schafer and Walker, 2006: 4). Modern day OCA is summarized by Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker who wrote a handbook called *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics. Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis* (2006). In this handbook, OCA is defined as follows: ‘Operational Code Analysis asks what the individual knows, feels, and wants regarding the exercise of power in human affairs...because the exercise of power is a social phenomenon involving both self and others as either the subject or the object of the exercise of power, operational code analysis identifies a political belief system about self and others and how they interact with each other’ (Schafer and Walker, 2006: 29).
The beliefs are divided into philosophical and instrumental beliefs, with philosophical beliefs representing a leader’s perception of other actors and their exercise of power, and instrumental beliefs analyzing what an actor perceives regarding his own exercise of power in human affairs. Both sides have a ‘master belief’, which exemplifies what both philosophical and instrumental beliefs entail. For the philosophical side, this belief is capturing how a leader perceives the world around him and his political opponents, ranging on a scale from friendly to hostile. For the instrumental side, the beliefs also range from friendly to hostile, however here the master belief reflects how a leader perceives his own tactics and strategies (George, 1969: 199; Schafer & Walker, 2006: 31).

In order to investigate if Kabbah’s beliefs were amenable to change during the period mentioned, the question has to be split in several parts. Firstly, how can beliefs change? Secondly, when do beliefs change? And thirdly, which beliefs change? Jack Levy’s theory of experiential learning is used as an answer to the ‘how-question’ in this thesis. Experiential learning according to Levy entails ‘a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience’ (1994: 283).

Regarding the ‘when-question’, scholars argue about the definition of experience. Some scholars say that this means that by experiencing something in the form of an event, leaders’ beliefs are changed. In other words, certain main events are responsible for influencing beliefs. On the contrary, other scholars dismiss this theory and argue that leaders adjust their beliefs over time without the necessity of main events. This is dubbed the learning-in-office theory (Chrichlow, 1998). This thesis resides with the first interpretation of experience, chapter two elaborates on this matter further.

Scholars also argue about which beliefs are likely to change: only the philosophical, instrumental, or are both set of beliefs likely to change? Also, are beliefs ordered hierarchically and does a change in one belief cause a change in the other beliefs? In chapter two the several arguments are outlined and a justification is made for the premise of thesis that in principle both sets of beliefs can change, however it depends on the type of event which of them is most likely.
1.3 Plan of the thesis

Chapter two will present in more detail the discussions concerning OCA, especially on the ‘which- and when questions’. There it is also argued what theoretical standpoints seem most valid, and the position of this thesis in several debates is presented.

Chapter three elaborates on the history of the Sierra Leonean Civil War in two ways. Firstly a chronology of events is given to make clear what actually happened in the period 1996-2002. This to elucidate what events were most likely to have changed the beliefs of president Kabbah. Two events are singled out as being most important in this way: 1) the bloody invasion of Freetown by RUF rebels in January 1999, and 2) the intervention of the United Kingdom in the Sierra Leonean civil war in May 2000 through Operation Palliser. Secondly, chapter three also shortly outlines the perception of Kabbah on the civil war as provided in some public available material.

Above mentioned results in three hypotheses, divided in two sub-hypotheses, used to give an answer to the research question:

Hypothesis 1a: President Kabbah’s operational code changed significantly after the capture of Freetown by the rebels.

Hypothesis 1b: President Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs changed into a (more) hostile direction.

Hypothesis 2a: President Kabbah’s operational code changed significantly after Operation Palliser.

Hypothesis 2b: President Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs changed into a (more) positive direction.

Hypothesis 3: President Kabbah’s operational code remained the same in the year after the start of the British intervention.

Chapters two and three partially serve as the justification for these hypotheses, a justification which is summarized and more specified in chapter four. In this chapter on methodology, the method used to test these hypotheses is introduced. This method is the Verbs In Context System (VICS), which main premise is that by analyzing a leader’s verbal behavior,
especially his use of verbs, the beliefs of this leader can be determined. In this thesis several
public speeches given by president Kabbah are analyzed which results in multiple operational
codes of Kabbah throughout his presidency. Since the operational codes provided by VICS
are represented by a numerical score, these scores can be compared and further analyzed
using statistics. A complete explanation of VICS and the way it is used in thesis is given in
chapter four.

In chapter five the results of testing the hypotheses by using VICS are presented, while in
chapter six these results are further analyzed. In this chapter the influence of the results on the
different theories on operational codes and changes therein is put to the fore. Chapter six is
furthermore used to discuss surprising results. Above that the VICS method is analyzed
critically in chapter six. Finally, chapter seven will summarize the main findings and conclude
by giving an answer to the research question presented above.

1.4 Relevance

The aim of this investigation is twofold. Firstly, the purpose is to look substantively at the
operational code of Ahmad Kabbah, a president during a civil war. Secondly, theoretically
this research is aimed to contribute to the existing literature regarding change in belief
systems. What is extremely interesting is that this thesis is one of the rare attempts to apply
OCA and change in belief systems to a civil war. So far it has mainly been applied in the field
of foreign policy decision making. It is interesting to see whether assumptions of theories
dealing with changes in beliefs still hold for a leader in a civil war. Hopefully, this thesis can
provide insight into the operational code of leaders in such a stressful context.
2. Theory

‘To which field of International Relations does Operational Code Analysis belong? What is Operational Code Analysis? What is the existing theory regarding change in operational codes?’

This chapter will serve as the theoretical background for this thesis. Central of course will be the concept of OCA and the several theories used to understand changes therein. OCA takes off from structuralist paradigms in International Relations by focusing on the individual decision maker as the important unit of analysis for explaining and understanding developments in the international field. This level of analysis was mainly advocated by Richard Snyder, who argued that ‘State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state’ (1962 [2002]: 4). This work laid the foundation of an International Relations subfield called Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) which is based on the premise that the course of world politics is shaped by leaders’ decisions (Mintz and DeRouen Jr., 2010: 4).

In this thesis it is assumed that the individual level of analysis is fruitful in studying International Relations. Without delving deeper in the famous level-of-analysis discussion, this chapter will start by distinguishing between rational and so called ‘bounded rational’ individual agents. From the concept of bounded rationality follow cognitive approaches to the study of International Relations, a family of which OCA is a member. After the development of OCA over the years has been described, what follows is the theory regarding change in operational codes. Especially the questions regarding how, when and which part of the operational code is likely to change will be answered. Finally, a remark is given about the usefulness of OCA in the context of civil war, e.g. the context of this thesis.

2.1 Agents: rational or not?

A very straightforward and widely used way to study individual decision makers is by applying Rational Choice Theory. This theory, which was developed in the field of economics, has at its core that human beings make decisions on the basis of rationality. Paul MacDonald (2003) provides a workable definition of what it means for an actor to be rational. This consists of three components. Firstly, a decision is made on behalf of purposive action, which means that the outcome of a decision is only made because the actor has a specific goal in mind which he wants to reach. Habits, traditions or social appropriateness do not play a
role. Secondly, decisions are made on the base of consistent preferences. An actor has different preferences regarding what outcome of a decision is best. These preferences are ranked consistently from most desired to least desired and are transitive. This means that when the actor prefers outcome X over Y, and Y over Z, than logically he prefers outcome X over Z as well. The third component of rationality is that the actor chooses the action which results in his highest ranked preference. This is called utility maximization (MacDonald, 2003: 552). A fourth component of rationality can be added to this definition of MacDonald. This entails that actors must process information correctly to update their preferences (Kydd, 2008: 429).

But how realistic is it to apply the model of rationality to understand and explain the actions of decision makers? Decision makers operate in a very complex world, often it is impossible for them to go through all the steps required to act rational. This is what Renshon and Renshon call the Fundamental Decision Dilemma: ‘the enormous complexity of the real world, coupled with our inability to apprehend much less understand all its elements, leads to, indeed requires, methods of complexity reduction’ (2008: 511). To account for the problems of rationality, Simon (1985) distinguished between the Homo economicus in which the human decision maker is analyzed according to the principles of Rational Choice Theory and the Homo psychologicus in which the decision maker is characterized to be bounded rational (1985: 303). Bounded rationality means behavior that is ‘adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and the capacities of the decision maker’ (1985: 294). Psychological theories are needed to understand and explain the decision making process of human beings, because the human psyche intervenes in the decision making process. The emphasis lays here not on psychological features like emotions, character or sensations, but rather on a field called cognitive psychology which tries ‘to understand how an information processing system like the human brain solves problems, makes decisions, remembers, and learns’ (Simon, 1985: 295).

Robert Jervis is one of the pioneers who tried to incorporate cognitive psychology into the political science of decision making. In his book Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976) he established several cognitive processes of decision makers in order to show that ‘perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand’ (Jervis, 1976: 3).
Beliefs and belief systems influence the cognitive process of a leader. Beliefs are subjective representations of reality and define how an actor sees and perceives the world around him (Schafer & Walker, 2006: 4). In rational choice theories, beliefs are seen to mirror the reality of the decision maker and they have no influence on the actor (Schafer & Walker, 2006: 5). For example, neorealists assume that the world in which leaders operate is one of anarchy, in which survival and self-help are the main parameters for political action. A rational leader is aware of this context, this is mirrored in his beliefs about the world. In other words, every rational leader perceives the world to be anarchical, and rational actors are those who perceive survival and self-help as their main courses for political action.

However in cognitive theories, beliefs play a more independent role and are studied as acting in a causal relationship with the behavior of a decision maker. They do not only reflect the world the leader inhabits and simply mirror this reality. On the contrary, beliefs actively influence the perception of a leader’s reality, thereby creating a different reality for every single leader. In sum, beliefs enter the equation of decision making as an independent variable (Schafer & Walker, 2006: 5). In addition, recalling the above mentioned fundamental decision dilemma and the homo psychologicus characterization, beliefs about the world help leaders to impose meaning and order on the information they receive from the complex world they inhabit (Renshon, 2008: 823). OCA is based on this role of beliefs.

However, before elaborating on OCA, an answer should be given to the question raised in the title of this subsection: are decision makers rational or not? It is important to mention that the division between cognitive and rational choice approaches does not mean that cognitive approaches claim that decision makers often behave irrational. This is why Simon’s theory of bounded rationality is brought up before. With beliefs entering the equation of the decision making procedure, the decision in itself may not be objectively rational to an outside observer, but it is rational according to the beliefs of the decision maker. When one knows the beliefs of the leader one can predict his behavior, because he will always behave rational. Cognitive approaches, or bounded rationality, does therefore not mean decision makers are irrational. They may be objectively irrational, but the action is rational according to the beliefs of the decision maker. By using the concept of bounded rationality, beliefs are useful in explaining and predicting policy behavior. Indeed, when one finds a tool to investigate what the beliefs of a leader are, the researcher knows what the leader perceives to be rational. In this way a major advantage of rational choice theory, the predictability of individual agents, is
not lost. Such a tool to establish the beliefs of a leader is also known as Operational Code Analysis.

2.2 Operational Code Analysis

Above an overview has been given to place OCA in the field of International Relations. OCA fits within the general cognitivist research program in international politics (Schafer & Walker, 2006: 4). The study of operational codes originates in the work of Nathan Leites in the early 1950s. His two studies *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (1951) and *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953) looked at decision making processes in the Soviet Union. Leites identified that members of the Politburo responded in a similar fashion in decision making environments because they shared some rules and axioms which guided their action. According to Leites these rules and axioms resembled the worldview of the members of the Politburo. Later on he drew on different fields of study like psychoanalysis and social psychology to trace the origins of this worldview, and how this worldview was present in Soviet leaders Lenin and Stalin (Leites, 1951; 1953).

Some fifteen years later Alexander George acknowledged the power of Leites’ ideas to understand and explain policy decisions by leaders, but remarked that his work probably did not get a lot of attention because it was unusually complex, using different fields of study (George, 1969: 193). Especially Leites’ use of psychoanalytic tools resulted in the fact that political scientists at the time could not appreciate the worth of his method. George decided to focus on the operational code part of Leites’ work. He structured the different kind of beliefs mentioned by Leites, which resulted in a list of ten questions (George, 1969: 196). The answers a leader would give to these questions can be seen as the boundaries to rationality a leader faces when making a decision (Walker, 1990: 405). (E.g. recall here the concept of bounded rationality of Herbert Simon (1985) previously described). The answers represent the beliefs of a leader.

George divided his questions into philosophical and instrumental questions, e.g. philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Philosophical beliefs are external attributions that the leader makes about the political universe and other actors in the political universe. These beliefs reflect his views of the opponent, the role of chance in politics and an individual’s role in history. Instrumental beliefs are internal attributions that the subject makes regarding his or her own best approaches to political action, they reflect a leader’s beliefs about the end-means relationships in the context of political action (George, 1969: 199; Schafer & Walker, 2006: 3).
31). In other words, the answers to the philosophical questions provide insight to the perception of the leader of the world in which he has to make decisions, while the instrumental questions reveal a leader’s belief about the best way to reach his objectives. George’s ten question still form the core of operational code analysis, therefore they are listed in the tables below.

**Table 2.1. Alexander George’s philosophical questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical content of an Operational Code</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s opponent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Is the political future predictable? And in what sense and to what extent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>What is the role of ‘chance’ in human affairs and in historical development?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.2. Alexander George’s instrumental questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The instrumental beliefs in an Operational Code</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>How are the goals of action pursued most</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
effectively?

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best ‘timing’ of action to advance one’s interests?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

(George, 1969: 201-216).

When a researcher is able to formulate the answers a certain leader would give to these questions, the researcher has established the operational code, e.g. the political belief system of this leader. Question remains how a researcher can get an answer to the ten questions George formulated. A method called the Verbs In Context System (VICS) has been developed for this. By using VICS a researcher is able to provide quantitative answers to George’s questions, therewith making it more easy to perform statistical analyses. In VICS the questions are translated to several indices which provide a numerical value. This is done by applying so called at-a-distance psychology; the verbal behavior of leaders in public speeches, statements and interviews can be used to retrieve a leaders’ operational code. The exact procedure for VICS and how it will be applied in this thesis is elaborated upon further in chapter four.

2.3 Changing operational codes

In the previous parts of this chapter the operational code construct has been posited as part of the cognitivist theories of International Relations, where beliefs are part of the equation explaining outcomes in policies and decision making. As such OCA has also been used as an independent variable used to explain, understand and predict the behavior of leaders and decision makers. For example Lazarevsksa, Sholl and Young (2006) used OCA to distinguish between terrorist and non-terrorist leaders, the idea being that terrorists share a similar operational code which is different than the operational code of non-terrorists. However, to use OCA to explain and predict behavior, an important question is whether the operational code remains stable over time, or is instead amenable to change. Is it possible that beliefs change over time? How does this work? When do beliefs change? And if so, which part of the operational code is most prone to change? In other words, the operational code is taken as the dependent variable.
2.4.1 How?

The study of changing beliefs has been relatively marginal, because researchers implementing beliefs in their analysis of decision making were widely influenced by the cognitive consistency theory (Renshon, 2008: 823). Among other things, cognitive consistency means that people tend to fit incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there (Jervis, 1976: 143). Information that does not fit to a person’s beliefs is not noticed, and mostly information which does not accord to existing beliefs is often believed not to be true. All this results to the conclusion that belief systems should be relatively stable. A classic example of this in the study of beliefs and belief systems is the study of the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles by Ole Holsti (1962). Holsti argued that Dulles’ view of the Soviet Union was so hostile that all incoming information was perceived by him to fit to his pre-existing beliefs.

However, Levy (1994) argued that people’s beliefs can change through a process called ‘experiential learning’, which he defines as ‘a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience’ (1994: 283). Learning in this sense is cognitive, as opposed to rational learning. Rational learning assumes that all actors learn from certain experiences in the same way. Cognitive learning assumes that the rate and accuracy of learning from experience differs among actors because each actor has different cognitive structures, beliefs and processes (Levy, 1994: 296-298). Levy’s definition states that beliefs do not always remain stable, through learning these beliefs can change. However, the definition does not completely make clear when exactly beliefs change through experience, and if they change, which beliefs are most amenable to change. It is to these questions we now turn.

2.4.2 When?

Experiential learning does not provide the answer as to when certain shifts in the operational code of leaders occur. What experiences do exactly trigger a change? That the operational codes of leaders do change has been demonstrated in several studies using operational code analysis (Schafer and Gassler, 2000; Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998; Walker, Schafer and Marfleet, 2001; Chrichlow, 1998; Robinson, 2006). These studies for example show that major events like the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Robison, 2006) or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998) significantly alter a leader’s belief system.
Although Robert Jervis is known for his elaboration on cognitive consistency, he also stated that people learn from history and that certain events can affect a person’s beliefs (1976: 239). Especially when the event is witnessed firsthand in the early adult life, with important consequences for the decision maker or his nation and when the decision maker is familiar with some other events that provided alternative perceptions, a learning effect is likely to occur (1976: 239). Main events are thus likely to cause experiential learning, and with that a change in the operational code of leader.

However, previous research has shown that operational codes also change without the occurrence of a major event. For example, Chrichlow (1998) showed that the operational codes of both Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres changed significantly over a period of twenty years. This is what has been called ‘learning in office’. The idea is that a president learns and changes his beliefs over time, without the necessity of certain important events. This hypothesis too fits into the experiential learning concept, however a different meaning of experience forms the basis. While learning from events uses experience as a noun (e.g. *I have had an experience*), the learning in office hypothesis uses experience in the form of an adjective (e.g. *I am experienced*). The learning in office hypothesis therefore contradicts the theory that certain major events cause a change in beliefs, over time changes in the operational code occur without the necessity of major events causing this change.

### 2.4.3 Which?

Now that the previous sections have shown how and when the beliefs of a leader can change, question remains which part of the operational code is likely to change. The founding father of OCA, Alexander George, postulated the first philosophical belief, the perception of a leader of the political world in which he operates (P-1), as the core belief, meaning that the value of this belief determines the character of the code as a whole (1969: 217). This implicitly means too that a change can only occur in P-1. After this happens the other beliefs, both philosophical and instrumental, will follow consistently.

Schafer and Walker (2006) build on this idea of George, however they argue that the philosophical and instrumental beliefs can change independently from one another. Therefore they posit both the first philosophical (P-1) and instrumental, the leader’s perception of his best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action (I-1) as core beliefs, from which the other beliefs flow logically (2006: 33). This means that in contrast to George, the
instrumental beliefs can change without a change in philosophical beliefs. And when both sets of beliefs change, they do not have to change consistent with each other.

Another answer to the which question is provided by Renshon. After a comparative literature research, he concluded that a trend can be detected which predicts that the philosophical beliefs, and mostly the so called core beliefs, were amenable to change. Instrumental beliefs remained constant. When instrumental beliefs did change, it was only marginal (2008: 827). Because philosophical beliefs reflect how a leader perceives the other, these can be changed by learning from the actions of the other. Instrumental beliefs say something about how the leader perceives himself in the political universe, and therewith reflect on his identity. The idea is that one’s identity is fixed, while perceptions of other actors can be adjusted (Renshon, 2008: 841). Now, which of the above introduced theories is most useful in predicting which beliefs are most amenable to change?

A closer look to Renshon’s argument makes his thesis less convincing. His claim that there is an empirical trend in modern day OCA that philosophical beliefs are likely to change is besides his own study based on three other pieces of research (Schafer and Chrichlow, 2000; Feng, 2005a; Feng, 2005b). Later empirical evidence contradicts these findings, for example Malici (2006) and Robison (2006) found statistically significant shifts in both philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Especially the fact that the latter studies are published after the articles on which Renshon bases his claims, undermines the strength of the argument that there is an empirical trend towards a theory that philosophical beliefs are amenable to change and instrumental beliefs are fixed.

Additionally, Renshon’s explanation for the outcomes of his empirical investigation are not very convincing. He states that instrumental beliefs remain stable because they say something about the identity of the leader (Renshon, 2008: 841). However, as previously explained in this thesis, instrumental beliefs are internal attributions that the subject makes regarding his or her own best approaches to political action, they reflect a leader’s beliefs about the end-means relationships in the context of political action (George, 1969: 199; Schafer & Walker, 2006: 31). In other words, they reflect what a leader thinks is the best way to reach his goals (either to be cooperative or conflict oriented). In Renshon’s words, a leader for example keeps believing cooperative strategies are the best way to reach his goals, because it is part of his identity to behave like this. No major event or learning in office can change this. However it
is much more likely that a leader adjusts his believes about strategies and tactics through experience, e.g. the experiential learning theory.

In sum, empirical evidence actually reveals that both philosophical and instrumental beliefs can change, this is logical by looking at what this beliefs actually entail. This finding is consistent with the argument by Schafer and Walker that both sets of beliefs can change independently from one another, therefore this will be taken as main theoretical starting point regarding the question which part of the operational code is likely to change.

2.4 Operational Code Analysis in a civil war context

Now that in the previous sections of this chapter answers have been given as to what the origins are of the operational code construct and the way in which the operational code can change, one question remains to be answered. Is OCA useful in the context of a civil war, like the conflict in Sierra Leone? OCA stems from the subfield Foreign Policy Decision Making which investigates ‘the choices individuals, groups, and coalitions make that affect a nation’s actions on the international stage’ (Mintz and DeRouen Jr., 2010: 3). Accordingly, Schafer and Walker describe OCA as ‘a classic approach to foreign policy and international relations within the general cognitivist research program in world politics’ (2006: 4). This would mean that a civil war does not fall under this heading and OCA cannot be applied. In the existing literature it is hard to find a study which uses OCA in a civil war context.

However, OCA has for example been used to identify terrorists (Lazarevsksa, Sholl and Young, 2006) and in the study of rebel leaders in the 1916 Easter Rising in Ireland (Schafer, Robison and Aldrich, 2006). These studies do not directly entail decision making on the foreign policy level, therefore these can be taken as antecedents to the possibility of using OCA in civil wars. In a more logical way, one can also reach to the conclusion that there are no problems with using OCA in such a way. Recall that OCA deals with power relations in the domain of conflict, in which a leader’s beliefs about both self and others and how they interact with each other in this domain are established (Schafer and Walker, 2006: 29). In a civil war, more concrete in the Sierra Leonean Civil War, there is a self (Kabbah) and multiple others (RUF, International Community, etc.) which are either subject or object of the exercise of power. This must lead to the conclusion that all necessary conditions for OCA can be found, therefore the logical assumption can be made that OCA can be applied in the context of a civil war.
3. History of the Sierra Leonean Civil War

What has happened in the Sierra Leonean Civil War, especially between 1996 and 2002?

This chapter will briefly outline the history of the Sierra Leonean Civil War by providing a timeline of main events. In the popular media, the conflict is often simplified as a bunch of Africans fighting each other to control diamond rich territories. The 2006 film Blood Diamond directed by Edward Zwick can be taken as reflecting this view. This is not to say that this film is flawed, lacking historical accuracy. It is rather to say that a conflict so complex cannot be captured in two hours of film. A main feature of the conflict are the so called ‘chameleonic tendencies’ of it, meaning that soldiers, mercenaries, militias and rebels continuously switched sides (Truth and Reconciliation Report (2): 36). At times, it is hard to establish who was fighting who. Additionally, the conflict is characterized by some of its remarkable turn of events. One can say that fans of irony will have a good time reading the tragic story of the Sierra Leonean Civil War.

This chapter will not cover all root causes, switching of sides and unexpected developments of the conflict in Sierra Leone. This is not a detailed case study, it should rather be seen as a short enumeration of the major developments. To really understand a change in the belief system of president Kabbah, one has to know what actually happened that might have changed this set of beliefs. It is a chapter in support of the thesis, therefore most emphasis will be put on the invasion of Freetown in January 1999 and Operation Palliser in May 2000. However, to understand these events it is necessary to know in what context they took place. This is what really is the purpose of this chapter, to have a general overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone, in order to grasp the importance of the events which might have influenced president Kabbah.

The outline of this chapter will be as follows. In order to stick to the thesis, the invasion of Freetown in January 1999 and Operation Palliser in May 2000 will be put central. The enumeration of events will therefore be divided in three parts. Firstly the events between 1996, the election of president Kabbah, and January 1999 are put to the fore. Secondly, the events between January 1999 and May 2000. Thirdly, events between May 2000 and the

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1 The Sierra Leonean Civil War started in 1991 with rebels crossing the border with Liberia into Sierra Leone. Since Kabbah and his perceptions on the conflict are central to thesis, only the events since his inauguration until the end of the conflict are highlighted.
official ending of the war in 2002 are highlighted. This division does not mean that the two named events are turning points in the war. It rather serves to show which other things happened around the time of these events. If we will see a change in the belief system of Kabbah, then did the hypothesized events really were the cause of this change? Or were there other events which might have influenced the beliefs of the Sierra Leonean president? These questions concerning so called control variables will be further elaborated upon in chapter four. At the end of the chapter, a small biography of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah is given. Special attention is given to the way he perceived his efforts to bring peace to Sierra Leone.

3.1 February 1996 – January 1999

February 1996 – In free but violent elections the Sierra Leonean Peoples Party (SLPP) won and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became the democratically elected president after four years of military rule (TRC, 2: 9).

November 1996 – President Kabbah signs a peace agreement with the RUF in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, with the United Nations, Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity, and the government of Ivory Coast serving as moral guarantors. In trade for peace, among other things provisions were made to expel foreign mercenary forces out of the country. However the Abidjan peace accord was quickly breached, and its implementation halted.

May 1997 – On the 25th of May 1997, a group of soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) freed inmates from Pademba Road Prison, among whom was Major Johnny Paul Koroma. Koroma became the leader of the group of soldiers who proclaimed themselves as being the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). They ousted the government of president Kabbah and established a military junta, quickly suspending Sierra Leone’s constitution and banning all political parties. In a move symbolic for the switching of sides in the Sierra Leonean Civil War, the RUF rebels supported the coup and joined the soldiers in the junta, thereby publicly establishing the conjunction between the rebels and the army of Sierra Leone (Keen, 2005: 208). They proclaimed the military and political alliance as the ‘People’s Army’.

October 1997 – After severe international pressure, especially an embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council, the AFRC/RUF junta agrees to restore president Kabbah in office within six months (Hirsch, 2001: 121). However the agreement reached in Conakry
between ECOWAS and the junta was quickly flawed by AFRC/RUF forces who kept attacking ECOMOG forces present in the country (Human Rights Watch, 1999: background).

*February 1998* – An ECOMOG offensive succeeds in driving the AFRC/RUF junta out of Freetown, a month later president Kabbah is restored in office. In the next several months pro-government forces succeed to regain control over large parts of the country, however many rebels are able to retreat and stay armed (Human Rights Watch, 1999: background).

3.1.1 **January 6, 1999 - Freetown assault**

In fact all accounts of the Sierra Leonean Civil War, be it scholarly works, reports from human rights organizations or the report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, call the January 1999 Freetown attack the most horrific episode of the entire conflict (TRC, 3A: 326; Keen, 2005: 228; Hoffman, 2011: 47; Abraham, 2004: 211; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1999: summary). In an operation called ‘No Living Thing’ many civilians were killed, maimed and raped. Rebel units called ‘Cut Hands’ and ‘Burn Houses’ brutally lived up to their names (Hoffman, 2011: 48). When after several weeks ECOMOG finally succeeded in driving the invaders out, on their way back the rebels continued to commit atrocities in their wake. Many civilians, and among them a lot of children, were abducted (TRC, 3A: 329). The purpose of the attack seemed to be to kill as much people indiscriminately as possible, a good example being the attempt by some attackers to poison the water supply of Freetown (Traub, 2000: 62). In the end, estimates of the total number of casualties range from 3,000 (Adebajo, 2002: 95) to 10,000 (TRC, 3A: 329). Additionally, an estimated number of 5,000 houses have been burnt (TRC, 3A: 329). However shocking this enumeration already is, the documentary *Cry Freetown* by Sorious Samura ultimately provides the evidence for the horrors committed in January 1999. A picture is worth a thousand words.

Initially, it was widely believed that RUF rebels were the main responsible for the attack (HRW, 1999: summary). However, nowadays it is known that certain elements of the AFRC, ousted from power a year earlier, were actually the ones committing the assault. Certain RUF rebels joined, but the AFRC, under leadership of SAJ Musa, were the initiators (TRC, 3A: 317). In their advancement towards the nation’s capital more rebels joined and many villages were burnt, in the process abducting citizens who were forced to join the group. When the group reached Freetown on the 6th of January, it consisted of an estimated 10,000 persons (TRC, 3A: 324). A large proportion of this group consisted of women, children and new born
babies, making it hard for pro-government forces to protect the city (TRC, 3A: 324). Firstly, the rebel army looked larger than it actually was. Secondly, the abducted civilians functioned as a human shield, protecting the rebels. Once the rebel army entered the city, persons living in Freetown loyal to them joined to start committing the previous described horrific atrocities.

What were the motivations of the AFRC to do this? The Truth and Reconciliation Commission gives some clarification on this matter. Firstly, after ECOMOG forces in 1998 removed the AFRC/RUF junta from power, president Kabbah chose to make these forces, together with the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), the main responsible for the security of Sierra Leone. Actually, since its arrival in February 1998, ECOMOG became instantly a kind of surrogate national army. (TRC, 2004 (2): 87). Former soldiers of the SLA were disgruntled by this (TRC, 2004 (3A): 321). Secondly, following the overthrow of their regime in 1998, many members of the AFRC were held captive in Freetown prisons. Thirdly, and related to the previous point, in court martial proceedings, 24 former AFRC soldiers were executed. The TRC establishes this as the direct cause of the January invasion (TRC, 2004 (3A): 320-321). This does not yet explain why they chose to commit the orgy of atrocities against the civilian population. It has been suggested that they viewed the population as betrayers, supporting the Kabbah regime and ECOMOG troops. It was an attempt to somehow restore ‘respect’ (Keen, 2005: 247). However, one should attempt to avoid to ‘justify the unjustifiable’ in looking for explanations of this event (Keen, 2005: 247).

Although it has been previously explained that it was hard for ECOMOG to defend Freetown due to tactic of the AFRC rebels to use civilians as human shields, the question has been raised as to why it was relatively easy to take over the city. In fact, ECOMOG had some 12,000 troops in the country during the Freetown attack (Keen, 2005: 223). The main reason for this would be that ECOMOG forces were having weak leadership (Olonisakin, 2004: 231). The events of January 1999 undermined the confidence that was posed in ECOMOG after they successfully restored president Kabbah in 1998 and consequently were made the main responsible for the defense of the country (Olonisakin, 2004: 232). Additionally, a Human Rights Watch report reveals that the rebels were not the sole perpetrators of human rights violations. Witnesses have declared that ECOMOG forces were responsible for the execution of RUF prisoners, collaborators and suspected sympathizers. Mostly the victims were men, but there have been testimonies that women and children have been executed too (Human Rights Watch, 1999: summary). The previously mentioned documentary *Cry Freetown* confirms this image. The Truth and Reconciliation Report also points out that ECOMOG
forces were poorly defending the city and were responsible for human rights abuses, but nevertheless concludes that it was mainly ECOMOG forces who drove the rebels out of Freetown and prevented them from taking over the entire country (TRC, 2004 (2): 88).

3.2 January 1999 – May 2000

July 1999 – Several months after the bloody assault on Freetown, president Kabbah signed the Lomé peace accord with the RUF. This agreement contained some remarkable articles in the light of what happened only some months before. Pardon and amnesty was granted to RUF rebels and leadership; the RUF was transformed into a political party; the RUF were enabled to join government; Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, was appointed vice-president of the country, and chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development, giving him effective control over Sierra Leone’s diamond industry (Hirsch, 2001: 135-157).

The fact that Kabbah accepted these far stretching articles can be explained by several causes. Firstly, the events of January 1999 gave the president a feeling that the government was not able to win the war. Secondly, domestic developments in Nigeria caused that this country was set to withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone. Being by far the largest contributor to ECOMOG forces, this would practically mean that Kabbah would face a heavy decline in his means of defense. Thirdly, the international community was putting a lot of pressure on the president to negotiate a peace agreement (TRC, 2004 (3A): 331).

October 1999 – The Lomé Peace Agreement enabled for the establishment of a neutral peacekeeping force to disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and other paramilitary groups (article XVI) (Hirsch, 2001: 145). On October 22 the Security Council authorized a 6,000 chapter VII peacekeeping force called UNAMSIL ‘to ensure the security of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under immediate threat of violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Sierra Leone Government and ECOMOG’ (Hirsch, 2001: 127).

May 2000 – From the moment of the signing of the Lomé peace agreement, RUF rebels failed to live up to it. The envisioned disarmament was not going as fast as foreseen, instead it seemed that the rebels only gained more weapons (HRW, 2000). Human rights reports from the United Nations revealed that former rebel fighters continued to loot, rape and mutilate civilians (Hirsch, 2001: 129). Additionally, in May 2000 the RUF started to abduct
UNAMSIL peacekeepers. In no more than one week, in several instances peacekeepers were held captive, amounting to a total of more than 550 hostages at the beginning of May (TRC, 2004 (3A): 358).

*May (8) 2000* – Following the hostage taking of UNAMSIL peacekeepers, public opinion once again extremely turned against the RUF. In a massive demonstration, approximately 30,000 people marched towards the lodge of Foday Sankoh (Hirsch, 2001: 88). However peaceful in design, the protest march turned quickly into a mob (TRC, 2004 (3A): 416-420). Ultimately the mob erupted in an exchange of gunfire between armed CDF and Sierra Leone Army soldiers, and RUF members inside the lodge of Sankoh (TRC, 2004 (3A): 420). In the gunfire, 40 people, mostly civilians, were killed (TRC, 2004 (3A): 435).

3.2.1 *May 2000 – Operation Palliser*

The events of early May 2000 were the climax of a process in which the Lomé peace accord was breached in many ways. Not only did the RUF take many UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage, too were they again marching towards Freetown creating widespread fear in the capital of a recurrence of the atrocities committed in January 1999 (Keen, 2005: 264). The United Nations mission to keep the peace was on the brink of collapse and apparently president Kabbah was making plans to leave the country (Dorman, 2009: 69). Some parts of the UNAMSIL mission charged with the protection of the city already started to prepare themselves for evacuation (Keen, 2005: 263-264).

It is in the light of these events that the British decided that it was time for them to play an active role in the Sierra Leonean conflict. Having historical ties to Sierra Leone as being the former colonial ruler, the United Kingdom was to be the logical Western country that should act to prevent further escalation. However, many Sierra Leoneans had expected that the British would intervene much more earlier in the already decade old conflict (TRC, 2004 (2): 88). Nevertheless, in a mission called ‘Operation Palliser’ British troops were sent to Freetown to evacuate British, European Union, Commonwealth and United States citizens (Dorman, 2009: 61). However, it became quickly evident that UK forces were not about to leave after this evacuation. This would leave UNAMSIL very vulnerable to rebel troops, leaving them and the Sierra Leonean population in grave danger. Therefore the mandate was extended to protect and bolster UN troops, a mission for which they deployed the largest amount of troops since the Falklands War in 1983 (Keen, 2005: 265). Later on, the British
started training Sierra Leonean soldiers to the end that the country could take care of its own security in the future.

The effect of the British intervention on the dynamics of the Sierra Leonean Civil War cannot be underestimated. After a decade of conflict, the (Western) international community finally intervened effectively. The result was that the balance of power shifted in favor of Kabbah and pro-government forces (Keen, 2005: 265). The British forces played a pivotal role in the protection of Freetown, and additionally it boosted the confidence of both the Sierra Leonean population and UNAMSIL troops (UNAMSIL, 2000: 10).

3.3 May 2000 – January 2002

September 2000 – In August 2000, eleven British soldiers were abducted by a group called the West Side Boys (Hirsch, 2001: 133). In a dangerous operation called Operation Barras, British Special Forces managed to rescue the hostages. The hostage takers, The West Side Boys, were among the last splinter groups rebelling and participating in the hostage taking of international troops. After the stunning rescue mission by the British, in which a lot of West Side Boys got killed, a large part of the group demobilized (Keen, 2005: 285). According to Dorman (2009: 103), this episode was a turning point in the involvement of the British in the Sierra Leonean Civil War. It showed their clear commitment, power and determination to end the conflict.

November 2000 – In November 2000, the RUF and president Kabbah signed a cease-fire agreement to end the hostilities towards each other and towards international peacekeepers. In the Abuja cease-fire agreement, the commitment to disarm is reaffirmed.

Early 2001 – RUF forces start to cross the Guinean border, but are soon repelled. The Guinean forces track down remaining RUF fighters in the border district, and within several days the RUF military is dealt a severe blow. This confrontation with Guinean forces is seen ‘to represent the dying breaths of the RUF as a serious military menace’ (TRC, 2004 (3A): 460).

January 2002 – On the 17th of January, the UN’s disarmament program was declared complete (Keen, 2005: 287). A day later, the civil war of Sierra Leone was officially declared over. In a symbolic burning of collected weapons, all major factions who played a role in the Sierra Leonean conflict were present to underscore the end of the war, the ‘War Don Don’ (TRC, 2004 (3A): 462).
3.4 Some notes on president Kabbah

Since president Kabbah is the subject of investigation in this thesis, in this paragraph some information is given about his history and how he perceived the civil war. This will be mainly done by looking at what he substantively said about the conflict in his speeches, and by examining the testimony he gave before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2003.

Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was born on February 16, 1932 in a small town called Pendembu in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. He is a Muslim, however he went to a catholic school in Freetown. He obtained his university degrees in Economics and Law in the United Kingdom. Before becoming president of Sierra Leone he worked for the United Nations Development Program in New York and later was head of this program in several African countries.

As stated above, in February 1996 he was elected president of Sierra Leone after four years of military rule. In his inauguration speech he declared that bringing peace to Sierra Leone was the main goal of his presidency (Kabbah, 1996). These words were not in vain, several months later he signed a peace agreement with the RUF rebels in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

In his testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Kabbah revealed his view on the conflict and the tactics and means he used to bring an end to the civil war. Kabbah states that the he thought that the only way to end the war was by negotiated settlement (2003: point 17). He was so eager to bring peace, that for example he implemented some points of the Abidjan Accord with the knowledge that the RUF was already deceiving this agreement (Kabbah, 2003: point 20).

This eagerness for peace is once more reflected in the Lomé peace agreement signed in 1999. Kabbah states that the January 1999 invasion of Freetown was a sign of the dire need to accelerate the peace process (2003: point 30). He started negotiations with the rebels amidst a lot of misgivings from the people of Sierra Leone. The people demanded a defeat of the RUF by war, in order to bring peace by defeating the rebels on the battlefield (2003: point 30). Kabbah however was aware of the fact that he did not possess the means to do this, additionally developments in Nigeria resulted in insecurity about the continuity of ECOMOG forces to stay for the protection of Sierra Leone. Therefore he ‘chose the path of dialogue’ (Kabbah, 2003: point 30). Kabbah signed two additional peace agreements (Conakry, 1997 and Abuja, 2001), which seems to indicate that he thought cooperation and negotiation was the right track to bring an end to Sierra Leonean Civil War.
4. Methodology

‘How will I answer my research question?’

In this chapter an answer is given to the above raised question. The formulated hypotheses are introduced together with the method to test them, all in order to explain how an answer to the research question is reached:

‘To what extent did the beliefs of president Kabbah change during the Sierra Leonean Civil War, in the period 1996-2002?’

The previous chapters have outlined respectively the theory of beliefs, operational codes and changes therein, and the history of main events in the Sierra Leonean Civil War, with a main emphasis on the January 1999 Freetown assault and the May 2000 intervention of the United Kingdom through Operation Palliser. From these chapters logically flow the hypotheses which will be used to find an answer to the research question. In total there are three hypotheses formulated, all three are separated in two components. The first component hypothesizes what caused a change in beliefs (e.g. the ‘when’ question in chapter two). The second component hypothesizes what part of the code is likely to change (e.g. the ‘which’ question in chapter two). The invasion of Freetown in January 1999 and Operation Palliser in May 2000 are singled out as the events most likely to have caused a change in the belief system of president Kabbah. These events form the base of the first two hypotheses. The third hypothesis predicts that the beliefs of Kabbah remained stable in a period without main events occurring. Following chapter three it becomes clear that the year after Operation Palliser is a suitable period to test this.

Before these hypotheses are introduced in more detail, and the rationale for them is given, the Verbs In Context System (VICS) is introduced as the method to test these hypotheses. This content line is followed because some knowledge of VICS is necessary in order to understand why exactly these hypotheses are used to find an answer to the research question. After VICS and the hypotheses have been put forward, the chapter continues with the question as to how VICS is applied precisely in this thesis. After that the Kappa method is introduced as a tool to check the reliability of the outcomes of this thesis. The final part of this chapter deals with some possible problems which may be encountered when using VICS, these subsequently serve as control variables for the outcomes of this thesis.
4.1 Methodology of Operational Code Analysis – The Verbs in Context System

A main problem for scholars in the field of OCA is that they want to know something about the psychology of leaders by having them answer the ten questions formulated by George about the way they see the world, however they mostly do not have access to the leader they study to ask him these questions personally. For example, this thesis does not rest on interviews made by the author with president Kabbah to ask about his philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The solution for this problem lies in a method called ‘at-a-distance methodology’. The term implies it: one can get answers to psychological answers at a distance without direct access to the person subject of investigation (Schafer & Walker, 2006: 26). A casual example of this is that a person’s level of optimism can be retrieved from the fact whether he calls a glass of water either half full or half empty. The crux is that a researcher can get information about the beliefs of a leader by looking at his verbal behavior. VICS is developed to do this in a systematic way.

In line with the previous example of the glass, the VICS focuses on the way individuals speak about power relationships in the political universe (Schafer and Walker, 2006: 30). This will ultimately lead to an operational code. Especially by looking at speeches and the use of verbs therein, it is possible to retrieve what a leader’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs are. Because OCA turns around the exercise of power in human affairs, and power is conceptualized as a control relationship between self (the leader) and other (the world around him), transitive verbs can be used to establish the operational code (Walker and Schafer, 2006: 31). Transitive verbs are action verbs which describe a relationship between a subject who ‘does a transitive verb’ and an object who receives the verb. For example, \( I \) (subject) attacked (transitive verb) you (object). To study the way in which a leader uses transitive verbs therefore gives insight into his operational code.

As stated before, VICS turns around the analysis of speeches given by the person subject of investigation, in this thesis speeches by president Kabbah. To retrieve an operational code, first of all the transitive verbs and the associated subjects and objects are singled out, which together form (subject+verb+object) the recording unit, or so called ‘utterance’. Only the utterances which deal with actions in the domain of conflict are of interest, because we are looking for the operational code of Kabbah regarding the relationship between himself and other groups in the conflict of Sierra Leone. Therefore utterances in the domain of normal politics (e.g. the health care system, income leveling, etc.) are not part of the analysis.
The utterances in the domain of conflict can be coded and used to form the operational code. Firstly, the verbs are coded as either cooperative (+) (I help you) or conflictual (-) (I attack you). Secondly, the verbs are labeled as either a deed or a word. Deeds are specific actions someone has taken or takes; words are verbal intentions like threats, demands or promises. Thirdly, once the verbs have been coded as either cooperative or conflictual, deeds or words, a value can be given to the verb. The values range between -3 and +3, where deeds (conflictual or cooperative) are at opposite ends of this continuum. A conflictual deed has a value of -3, a cooperative deed +3. Words are given values between these opposite ends, which ultimately leads to the following scale regarding the exercise of power reflected by the utterance: punish (-3), threaten (-2), oppose (-1), appeal (+1), promise (+2) and reward (+3).

The coded utterances ultimately are the basis of the VICS. When the subject of the utterance is the leader self, the utterance can be used to establish his instrumental beliefs. In a similar fashion, when the subject is the other, it says something about his philosophical beliefs. The aggregation of the values provide answers to the ten questions posed by George. How this works will be elaborated upon next.

### 4.1.1 The VICS indices

The previous part has shown how VICS works. When the transitive verbs are coded according to this system, some simple mathematical play with these values can provide the answers to George’s ten questions. To put it differently, with these values the operational code of a leader can be established. Schafer and Walker (2006) have developed several indices based on the questions raised by George². These indices form the basis of this thesis about the operational code of Kabbah, therefore they are listed below.

**Indices for philosophical beliefs:**

P-1. *The Nature of the Political Universe: Friendly, Mixed or Hostile.* This reflects how president Kabbah perceives the other players in the Sierra Leonean Civil War. Are they mainly friendly or hostile in nature?

**Calculation:** a ratio between the number of positive (cooperative) and negative (conflictual) utterances in which the subject is other. This results in an index varying between -1 and +1,

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² Tables 2.1. and 2.2 sum up George’s questions.
negative scores indicating a hostile perception, positive scores a friendly perception of the other.

P-2. Prospects for realizing fundamental values: optimism versus pessimism. When Kabbah perceives the other players as being friendly, he is going to be much more optimistic about realizing his own fundamental values and vice versa. This belief is measured by looking at how Kabbah perceives the intensity of others’ actions. Recall in this sense the previously named continuum ranging from -3 to +3. The number of positive and negative utterances might be in balance, but when Kabbah perceives the negative actions as much more intense than the positive ones, he might be more pessimistic about realizing his own fundamental values. Intense means practically that when Kabbah ascribes a negative action to the other, he perceives the actions of others more as punishments (-3) than threats (-2) or opposition (-1).

Calculation: the sum of the value of the utterances in which the subject is other, divided by three. This results in an index ranging from -1 (pessimistic) to +1 (optimistic).

P-3. Predictability of the Political Universe: low to high. Did the other actors in the Sierra Leonean Civil War behave in a consistent and predictable way in the eyes of president Kabbah? P-3 looks at the way Kabbah perceived the consistency of the other actors in the conflict. To put it differently, it is about the variation in the values of the utterances in which the subject is other.

Calculation: The measure used to calculate P-3 is the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV). Only utterances in which the subject is other are used in this formula. One minus the IQV results in index ranging from 0 to 1, lower scores indicating low predictability and vice versa.

P-4. Control over historical development: low to high. P-4 indicates who president Kabbah perceives as being most in control, e.g. who takes most of the action, self or other? When Kabbah uses more utterances in which the subject is self than when the subject is other, he perceives himself as being in control over historical development.

Calculation: P-4 is the only index using utterances about both self and other. The formula is the number of self-utterances divided by the sum of self-utterances plus other utterances. This results in an index ranging from 0 to 1, low scores indicating low control.

P-5. Role of chance: low to high. The role Kabbah gives to chance in the political universe can be found by looking at the previous two philosophical beliefs. When Kabbah perceives
the world as very predictable (P-3) and he sees himself as being in control (P-4) then he will believe that the role of chance is very low.

**Calculation:** To have a low index score when the role of chance is perceived low, the formula for this index is: one minus the product of P-3 multiplied by P-4.

**Indices for instrumental beliefs:**

**I-1. Direction of strategy: cooperative, mixed, conflictual.** The calculation of the indices for the instrumental beliefs can be seen to mirror in large part the ones for the philosophical beliefs. I-1 looks at the way the actor, Kabbah, talks about his own actions. Are they mainly cooperative (+) or conflictual (-)?

**Calculation:** Percentage of cooperative utterances minus the percentage of conflictual utterances in which self (Kabbah) is subject, resulting in an index ranging from -1 to +1.

**I-2. Intensity of tactics.** Resembling P-2, this belief looks at the way Kabbah perceives the intensity of his own actions.

**Calculation:** the sum of the value of the utterances in which the subject is self, divided by three.

**I-3. Risk orientation: averse or acceptant.** This index looks at the way president Kabbah is either risk aversive or acceptant. The idea is that this can be traced from the level of diversity in Kabbah’s actions. Low levels of diversity result in high levels of risk, because when this type of action does not prove to be successful, there is huge potential loss. Spreading the types of action therefore indicate a lower acceptance of risk, e.g. risk averting behavior.

**Calculation:** I-3 resembles the calculation of P-3. Again one minus the IQV, only this time only utterances in which the subject is self are used to measure the IQV.

**I-4. Importance of timing of actions: low to high flexibility.** Schafer and Walker define the ‘timing’ of actions as the flexibility of the leader to choose between different types of action (2006: 36). This belief is separated between the flexibility to choose between cooperative and conflictual measures (I-4a), and flexibility to choose between words and deeds (I-4b). The outcome varies between 0 and 1, low scores meaning low flexibility in the timing of actions and vice versa.
Calculation: the formula for I-4a is as follows: one minus the absolute value of (percentage of conflictual (-) self-utterances minus the percentage of cooperative self-utterances). The same logic can be applied to measure the flexibility between the use of words and deeds, one minus the absolute value of (percentage of word self-utterances minus the percentage of deed self-utterances).

I-5. Utility of means: low to high. The final instrumental belief reflects what president Kabbah perceives as being the most effective means to reach his ends. The idea is that this can be seen in the frequency he uses those means in his verbal behavior. Does he find punishing (-3) to be the most attractive, or is he more cooperative which would reflect in for example a higher use of appeals (+1)?

Calculation: the answer to this part of the operational code lies in looking at the six different means in VICS, and establishing their relative frequency in the verbal behavior of Kabbah.

I-5 Punish (-3): sum of all self-utterances coded ‘punish’ divided by the sum of all utterances;
I-5 Threaten (-2): sum of all self-utterances coded ‘threaten’ divided by the sum of all utterances;
I-5 Oppose (-1): sum of all self-utterances coded ‘oppose’ divided by the sum of all utterances;
I-5 Appeal (+1): sum of all self-utterances coded ‘appeal’ divided by the sum of all utterances;
I-5 Promise (+2): sum of all self-utterances coded ‘promise’ divided by the sum of all utterances;
I-5 Reward (+3): sum of all self-utterances coded ‘reward’ divided by the sum of all utterances.


4.2 Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1a: President Kabbah’s operational code changed significantly after the capture of Freetown by the rebels.
As showed in chapter two, main events are the most likely variables for a change in the operational code of a leader. For example, Robison (2006) showed that George W. Bush’s operational code changed significantly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Furthermore, Robert Jervis stated that events with important consequences for the decision maker or his nation are likely to change the beliefs of a leader (1976: 239).

Chapter three established the January 1999 capture of Freetown, the Sierra Leonean capital, as a very important event in the history of the Sierra Leonean Civil War. Indeed, it is stated that all accounts of the Sierra Leonean Civil War, be it scholarly works, reports from human rights organizations or the report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, call the January 1999 Freetown attack the most horrific episode of the entire conflict (TRC, 3A: 326; Keen, 2005: 228; Hoffman, 2011: 47; Abraham, 2004: 211; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1999: summary).

Both general theory and specific case study work therefore provide the rationale for this hypothesis. Of course there are more main events in the history of the conflict in Sierra Leone, but this event can be taken as the most dramatic of all, and therefore suited best to investigate whether events trigger a change in beliefs.

**Hypothesis 1b:** President Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs changed into a (more) hostile direction.

As revealed in chapter two, both philosophical and instrumental beliefs can change independently from each other. Regarding the philosophical set, it is very likely that Kabbah changed these beliefs after the event of January 1999. Recall for example that P-1 reflects how Kabbah perceives other actors on a scale from cooperative to hostile. The January 1999 Freetown invasion was a very hostile act perpetrated mainly by the AFRC rebels (‘the other’), therefore it is likely that Kabbah changed his philosophical beliefs after this event.

The second part of this hypothesis states that the beliefs changed into a *(more)* hostile direction. The word ‘more’ is in italics because it is important to note what is defined as a change in the operational code. Change does not only entail the change from positive to negative beliefs (e.g. from ‘the other is friendly’ to ‘the other is hostile’). More negativity (e.g. ‘the other is hostile’ to ‘the other is very hostile’) also means change in the operational code. It is likely that Kabbah already had hostile philosophical beliefs before the January ’99 assault, because the civil war was already dragged on for several years. However the
hypothesis is that the Freetown invasion affected his beliefs in such a way that he saw the world around him as even more hostile than he previously did.

Instrumental beliefs are hypothesized to remain stable after this main event, nonetheless that by looking at the history of the conflict the argument can be made that these beliefs were subject to change. In July 1999, Kabbah signed the Lomé peace agreement with the rebels, suggesting that Kabbah might have adjusted his strategy in a more cooperative direction. However, there is an explanation for the fact that it is not hypothesized that Kabbah’s instrumental beliefs did change after January 1999. As chapter three showed, there were several reasons for Kabbah to sign the Lomé peace agreement: 1) Kabbah’s feeling to be unable to win the war; 2) exit of Nigerian forces and 3) international pressure. The first and second reason are more likely to influence P-2 (prospects for realizing fundamental values), the third reason is an exogenous variable explaining the outcome of a peace agreement. The hypothesis therefore is that it was not due to Kabbah’s cooperative instrumental beliefs that the Lomé peace agreement was signed.

_Hypothesis 2a:_ President Kabbah’s operational code changed significantly after Operation Palliser.

As described in chapter three, the interference of the United Kingdom, initially through Operation Palliser in May 2000, in the Sierra Leonean Civil War proved to be very effective and a landmark point in the history of the conflict. It shifted the balance of power in favor of Kabbah and pro-government forces (Keen, 2005: 265) and it gave a boost of confidence to the population that the war could soon be over (UNAMSIL, 2000: 10). The effect an intervention by a Western power has onto the populace of conflict torn country can be seen in the very recent example of Mali. The French intervention was perceived by the people of Mali as the point from which peace will return (BBC, 2013). However one should be precarious in making analogies between the intervention of Western forces in Sierra Leone and Mali, this can serve as an example to demonstrate the psychological effect of Western interference. Since this thesis is a rare attempt of applying the operational code construct in a civil war context, no precedents are available in the literature which show the effect of foreign interference in a civil war on the beliefs of a leader.

In order to argue that it is likely that Kabbah changed his beliefs after the intervention of the United Kingdom, recall that beliefs are defined as subjective representations of reality. In other words, the hypothesis is that Kabbah had a different representation of reality after
Operation Palliser. In his testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Kabbah explains that he felt that the International Community, and especially the United Kingdom, were letting down on Sierra Leone. This is why he turned to friendly African countries for assistance in defense, which ultimately resulted in the important role of ECOMOG (Kabbah, 2003: point 24). The idea in this thesis is that previous to Palliser Kabbah’s reality was that the International Community (Western countries) were indifferent to help. The intervention of the United Kingdom changed this reality, now it was clear to the president that Western countries acknowledged Sierra Leone’s cry for assistance.

Hypothesis 2b: President Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs changed into a (more) positive direction.

Regarding the question which part of the operational code is most likely to change because of the intervention, it is important to keep in mind that the UK only intervened when the civil war was already raging for a decade. The people of Sierra Leone felt that they were abandoned by the UK when they needed their former colonizers the most (TRC, 2004 (2): 88). President Kabbah also accused the International Community of not assisting Sierra Leone when the situation was precarious, however it is hypothesized that the May 2000 intervention changed his perception. Translated into the VICS indices this means that he changed his philosophical belief regarding the nature of the political universe to be (more) friendly (P-1). Additionally, as stated before, the intervention changed the balance of power in favor of Kabbah. This would mean that we can expect a change in his perception of the prospects for realizing fundamental values (the end of the conflict) (P-2), into a (more) optimistic belief.

The instrumental beliefs are hypothesized to remain stable. The intervention helped Kabbah in his struggle against the rebels, but this is captured in P-2. The intervention does not mean that Kabbah would change his strategies, tactics or objectives (instrumental beliefs) because they were the same throughout the conflict: creating peace in Sierra Leone.

Hypothesis 3: President Kabbah’s operational code remained the same in the year after the start of the British intervention.

As shown in chapter two, another theory exists as to how operational codes change. This theory, named ‘learning-in-office’, states that operational codes of leaders do change over time without the necessity of events happening in that period. E.g. events do not have an influence on the change in operational codes. This theory can be used as a control variable to
test whether or not the above mentioned events were responsible for a change. This can be done by investigating a period without the occurrence of events for changes in Kabbah’s operational code. Chapter three revealed that in the year after the start of the British intervention no large events took place, therefore this period can be used to check if events really cause a change. The hypothesis therefore is that the operational code remained stable in this time.

4.3 How to investigate the hypotheses?

VICS will be used to investigate the hypotheses. As stated above, a leader’s operational code can be retrieved by looking at his verbal behavior, more accurately by analyzing the speeches he gives. This will therefore be done in this investigation as well. The method is to code several speeches given by president Kabbah before and after the event central in the hypotheses. Because the aim is to test if specific events are responsible for a change in the operational code, only speeches which are given during a period where no other major events have taken place are used for this investigation. These speeches are selected only because they were given directly before or after one of the hypothesized events. In all other aspects they were selected randomly; they were given to different audiences and were not scanned on their content in advance.

Each speech forms a single unit of analysis, meaning that for each speech the VICS indices are calculated to create Kabbah’s operational code for this speech. The mean of these speeches provides the operational code in a certain time period. For example, the mean of the coded speeches given before the assault on Freetown forms Kabbah’s operational code before this event. In the same way, the mean of the operational codes retrieved from speeches given after the assault forms Kabbah’s code after this event. These mean operational codes are then compared to test the hypotheses. In line with general practice in OCA, each speech must contain at least fifteen utterances in order to be taken as a unit of analysis (Walker and Schafer, 2006: 44). However, when a speech contains less utterances than this cutoff point, the speech is aggregated with another speech most close in time and given for the same audience. In this way no data is lost. Based on the above described criteria for speech selection, the following speeches are used in this thesis. The means of the named speeches provide a mean operational code for each period.

3 These speeches are retrieved from the website www.sierra-leone.org
Table 4.1. Speeches used for Operational Code Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Speeches used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The selected speeches are coded by hand, in contrast with many contemporary research designs in OCA which use an automated coding program called Profiler Plus (for example Malici and Malici, 2005; Feng, 2005; Cooper Drury, 2006; Thies, 2006; Lazarevska, Sholl and Young, 2006; Renshon, 2008; Renshon, 2009; O’Reilly, 2013). However there are some advantages with automated coding, the main being the speed of coding, the major disadvantage is that context can be lost. In coding by hand, every sentence can be analyzed with an eye for context. The idea is that this will produce more reliable results.

4.3.1 The codebook

The main procedure for the coding of speeches can be found in the codebook (appendix 1), however some important steps are discussed here. Firstly, the speech is scanned for containing paragraphs which are on the conflict, e.g. the Sierra Leonean Civil War. When a paragraph is not on the conflict, it is discarded from the speech and not used for analysis. In paragraphs which are on the conflict, each sentence is scanned for subject-object relations with a transitive conflict-cooperation verb in the political domain. When these requirements are met the sentence is included in the analysis and coded in the way described above.
The subject of each sentence (the one who does the verb) is furthermore specified to fit into one of these categories: Side A (SLPP, Kabbah self), Side B (RUF, AFRC/RUF), Third party (International Community), Third party (warring parties) and Settlement. Especially ECOMOG is a special actor in the conflict. This multinational army set up by the Economic Community of West African States was fighting for the cause of the government during the entire conflict. By definition actions performed by this party should be coded as an action performed by ‘other’, therewith affecting the philosophical beliefs of president Kabbah.

However, an example will show that this will cause some problems. In the sentence ‘ECOMOG forces killed RUF rebels’, the transitive verb ‘killed’ should be coded as a negative deed, value -3. This would affect Kabbah’s beliefs in such a way that he would see the world as being more hostile. However, the killing of RUF forces by ECOMOG logically should not have this effect on Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs. Lacking an own army which he could use to counter the threat of the rebels, Kabbah saw ECOMOG as the main tool for the defense of Sierra Leone (Kabbah, 2003). ECOMOG effectively was the army of Sierra Leone, therefore, when ECOMOG is the subject of an utterance this will be coded as an action performed by self, affecting the instrumental beliefs of president Kabbah.

Besides ECOMOG, the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) takes a special place in the Sierra Leonean Civil War. Originally, the army served the government of Sierra Leone with president Kabbah as the commander-in-chief. This would mean that references to the SLA in the verbal behavior of Kabbah can be used to determine his instrumental beliefs. However, the SLA is one of those parties involved in the conflict which continuously switched sides, therefore it truly depends on the context whether Kabbah refers to an act of other or self when the SLA is the subject of an utterance.

Furthermore, next to ECOMOG and the SLA, the Sierra Leonean people (‘the people’) as an actor are a special group for coding. Mostly, the people are coded self, because Kabbah speaks on behalf of the people and he is the president representing those people. This is the crux for coding the people as either self or other: when context reveals that Kabbah is speaking on behalf of his people, the verb is coded as an act by self. On the contrary, when Kabbah speaks of actions performed by the people, but context reveals that Kabbah does not identify with these people, the utterance is coded as an act of other. Actions by others affect the philosophical, and acts by self the instrumental beliefs. In other words, the people is either
coded as self or other depending on what the utterance should reflect: Kabbah’s philosophical or instrumental beliefs.

Above remarks about the coding procedure reveal the advantage of coding by hand in comparison with the automated coding procedures employed in most contemporary research designs. In this way, there is an eye for context and coding can be performed according to how the outcome would affect Kabbah’s aggregated operational code.

4.4 Intercoder Reliability

In order to check whether the results of hand coding are reliable, Kappa is used as a method for intercoder reliability. The Kappa score (K) measures agreement among coders, adjusted for a percentage of expected chance that the coders agree. In a formula this is reflected as:

\[ K = \frac{P(A) - P(E)}{1 - P(E)} \]

Where K is the Kappa score, P(A) is the proportion of times that the coders agree and P(E) is the proportion of times that the expectation can be made that the coders agree by chance (Carletta, 1996: 252). The outcome for K lies between 0 and 1, where low scores reveal low intercoder reliability, high scores reveal high reliability of results. The minimal value of K needed to conclude that the results are reliable is not strict, however the score should be at least higher than 0.7 to have reliable results (Carletta, 1996: 252).

In this thesis, K is measured by coding several speeches a second time, several months after the initial coding. Although coding is done by the same person, this controls for development in coding habits throughout the initial coding process. Additionally, it serves as a self-check. Furthermore, as stated in section 4.3 and 4.3.1, hand coding leaves room for personal interpretation. In other words every coder has its own characteristics, therefore using two different coders for a Kappa test might flaw the results. By coding some speeches a second time, a Kappa score is given which is sufficient to prove whether or not the results of this thesis are reliable.

The speeches used for the reliability test are selected randomly. These are: May 22, 1998; February 1, 1999; May 14, 2000; May, 8; 2001. As said, these are coded for the second time, according to the procedure outlined in the codebook and in section 4.3 and 4.3.1. above. Agreement is defined as when in the same utterance, verb values are similar to each other. Every sentence of speech is analyzed to see if it contains an utterance to create an operational
code of Kabbah. Agreement is therefore reached as well when in a sentence no utterance is found in the first and second coding process.

4.5 Possible problems using VICS – Control variables

However promising VICS may seem to be, some problems with it can be identified, especially when used in the context of a civil war. These problems are listed below. In chapter five the results of the hypothesis testing using VICS will be presented, however in chapter six the problems below come to the fore to control for these results. In other words, the problems with VICS can be seen to serve as control variables in this thesis.

4.5.1 Audience

The first problem to be identified is about the audience of the speech, e.g. the identity of the group to which the speech is given. Before starting to code each speech used in thesis, the audience of each needs to be determined. For president Kabbah four different possible audiences are distinguished: the population, own side (SLPP, military etc.), other side (rebel groups) and the International Community (United Nations, ECOWAS, etc.). It can be that Kabbah changes his verbal behavior according to the audience he is giving the speech, therefore the type of audience needs to serve as a control variable.

4.5.2 Identity of other

A second problem is about the identity of the other in each utterance. When Kabbah speaks about an action taken by a group identified as other, than does it matter who is the other he is talking about? To put it differently, is it likely that Kabbah has other beliefs about the actions taken by the RUF compared to the actions of the United Nations? This assumption can be made intuitively. In each utterance the identity of the other is identified (see codebook, appendix 1), therefore this can be used as a control variable as well.

4.5.3 Causality

The third problem concerns causality. If there is a significant change in beliefs, than were the hypothesized events really responsible for this? The third hypothesis can be used to check this. When there is a change in Kabbah’s operational code without major events happening, than the strength of the argument that main events cause a change is undermined.
5. Results

‘What are the results of performing Operational Code Analysis?’

In this chapter the results of performing Operational Code Analysis with the Verbs In Context System on the selected speeches given by president Kabbah are outlined. Firstly, the number of utterances recorded is presented to show the amount of data on which the results are based. After the results have been given, the outcomes of the intercoder reliability test (Kappa) are presented to determine the reliability of the results. Finally, a provisional answer to the research question is formulated following the results of performing OCA.

5.1 Number of utterances per speech

In their handbook on OCA, Walker and Schafer stated that a minimum of fifteen utterances per speech is required in order to get a reliable profile (2006: 44). Logically, the more utterances per speech, the more reliable the profile. Figure 5.1. below reveals the aggregated number of utterances recorded for each time period.

Figure 5.1. Aggregated number of utterances

As exemplified by figure 5.1., there are differences in the number of recorded utterances. After the invasion of Freetown, a relatively high amount of utterances is recorded, while before Operation Palliser this number is relatively low. The other three time periods show an average number of recorded utterances. Since more utterances yield a more reliable profile, this outcome means that the results for hypothesis one and three are more reliable than for
hypothesis two. However, for each period the profile was based on more than the required fifteen utterances, therefore all results are valid and useful for statistical comparison.

5.2 Hypothesis one

Hypothesis 1a: President Kabbah’s operational code changed significantly after the capture of Freetown by the rebels.

Hypothesis 1b: President Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs changed into a (more) hostile direction.

Table 5.1. Results for hypothesis one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Pre-Freetown (n=3)</th>
<th>Post-Freetown (n=6)</th>
<th>F⁴</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the Political Universe (P-1)</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.351</td>
<td>2.104</td>
<td>0,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for realizing fundamental values (P-2)</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>-0.437</td>
<td>3.245</td>
<td>0,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability of the political universe (P-3)</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>2.921</td>
<td>0,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over historical development (P-4)</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of chance (P-5)</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>1.833</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction of strategy (I-1)</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td>4.054</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of tactics (I-2)</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk orientation (I-3)</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of timing of actions I-4 (a)</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>4.054</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of timing of actions I-4 (b)</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>1.177</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility of means: Punish I-5 (-3)</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.625</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴ F and p scores are found by performing a unifactorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test
Regarding the first hypothesis which predicts (a) a shift in the operational code of president Kabbah after the January 1999 assault on Freetown, more especially (b) a shift in the philosophical beliefs towards a more hostile and pessimistic view of the world, the results in table 5.1. can be used. This table is revealing that after the invasion five indices of Kabbah’s instrumental beliefs changed significantly. Furthermore three philosophical, and one instrumental index changed with values for $p$ between 0.10 and 0.20. This means that hypothesis 1a is approved with five statistically significant changes. Hypothesis 1b is not approved, since the statistically significant changes only occurred in the instrumental beliefs, not in the philosophical beliefs.

Firstly, there is a statistically significant shift ($p=0.084$) in the first instrumental belief, revealing that after the assault Kabbah attributes more utility to cooperative actions than conflict actions in his strategy. Secondly, the statistically significant shift in I-4a ($p=0.084$) shows that Kabbah was less flexible in his actions after the assault on Freetown. Thirdly, there are significant shifts in Kabbah’s beliefs regarding the utility of different means (I-5). He used significantly less threats ($p=0.007$) and rewards ($p=0.094$) in his verbal behavior, while he used significantly more promises ($p=0.030$). In addition to these significant shifts four indices change with values for $p$ ranging between 0.10 and 0.20 (P-1; P-2; P-3; I-5-appeal). Although these shifts are not statistically significant, these relatively low $p$ values indicate that these indices have changed relatively significantly after the Freetown assault.

Before the assault on Freetown, president Kabbah had a somewhat hostile view on the nature of the political universe, P-1, (-0.024), after January 1999 this view was definitively hostile (-0.351). The same can be said about his belief about the prospects for realizing fundamental values, P-2, which also changed from somewhat (-0.139) to definitively (-0.437) pessimistic. Regarding the instrumental beliefs, his beliefs on the direction of strategy, I-1, changed from somewhat cooperative (0.523) to definitively cooperative (0.767). Above has already been

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I-5 (-2)</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>I-5 (-1)</th>
<th>Appeal</th>
<th>I-5 (1)</th>
<th>Promise</th>
<th>I-5 (2)</th>
<th>Reward</th>
<th>I-5 (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>2.511</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>7.324</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>3.755</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mentioned that this change is statistically significant. Kabbah’s beliefs regarding the intensity of his own tactics, I-2, remained somewhat cooperative (0.413/0.443).

5.3 Hypothesis two

Hypothesis 2a: President Kabbah’s operational code changed significantly after Operation Palliser.

Hypothesis 2b: President Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs changed into a (more) positive direction.

Table 5.2. Results for hypothesis two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Pre-Palliser (n=2)</th>
<th>Post-Palliser (n=3)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the Political Universe (P-1)</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>4.491</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for realizing fundamental values (P-2)</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>5.707</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability of the political universe (P-3)</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>3.673</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over historical development (P-4)</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of chance (P-5)</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>1.241</td>
<td>0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction of strategy (I-1)</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>1.297</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of tactics (I-2)</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk orientation (I-3)</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>5.549</td>
<td>0.0998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of timing of actions I-4 (a)</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>1.297</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of timing of actions I-4 (b)</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>0.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility of means: Punish I-5 (-3)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>2.365</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten I-5 (-2)</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose I-5 (-1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>1.999</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal I-5 (1)</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>5.521</td>
<td>0.1003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding the second hypothesis, which predicts (a) a shift in the operational code of president Kabbah after the intervention of the United Kingdom in the Sierra Leonean Civil War through Operation Palliser, (b) especially a shift in the philosophical beliefs into a more friendly and optimistic direction, the results in table 5.2. are useful. What we can see directly is that one philosophical and one instrumental index changed significantly after Operation Palliser. In addition three indices changed with levels of p between 0.10 and 0.20. While not as strong as hypothesis 1a, hypothesis 2a is approved with two statistically significant changes. Hypothesis 2b fails. While one philosophical belief changed, the change is in a more hostile direction. This is contrary to the hypothesized positive direction. Besides that, the other statistically significant change is in the instrumental beliefs, not the philosophical beliefs.

Firstly, there is a statistically significant shift in Kabbah’s second philosophical belief (p=0.097) in a negative direction, meaning that after Operation Palliser Kabbah felt more pessimistic regarding the realization of his fundamental values. In other words, Kabbah described the actions of other with much more negative verbs after Operation Palliser than before. Secondly, his third instrumental belief changed significantly (p=0.0998), reflecting that Kabbah spreads his tactics much more after Palliser than before. This points to the characterization that Kabbah was much more risk averse after the intervention than before. Furthermore, three indices shifted at a level of p between 0.10 and 0.20 (P-1; P-3 and I-5 appeal). This means that although not significant, the relatively low values for p indicate that these indices have changed in a relatively large amount after Operation Palliser.

After Operation Palliser, Kabbah’s beliefs about the nature of the political universe changed from *definitely* friendly (0.575) to *somewhat* hostile (-0.057). An equal change is detectable in the second philosophical belief, revealing that Kabbah was *definitely* optimistic (0.446) about the prospects of realizing his fundamental values, though after Operation Palliser he held *somewhat* pessimistic beliefs about this (-0.156). No changes can be seen in his instrumental beliefs, both before and after the UK intervention Kabbah was *very* cooperative (0.947/0.735) regarding his direction of strategy and *definitely* cooperative (0.455/0.435) regarding the intensity of his tactics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promise</th>
<th>0.053</th>
<th>0.098</th>
<th>0.372</th>
<th>0.585</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 5.4 Hypothesis three

*Hypothesis 3:* President Kabbah’s operational code remained the same in the year after the start of the British intervention.

**Table 5.3. Results for hypothesis three**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Post-Palliser (n=3)</th>
<th>One year later (n=4)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the Political Universe (P-1)</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for realizing fundamental values (P-2)</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability of the political universe (P-3)</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>3.323</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over historical development (P-4)</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of chance (P-5)</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>2.629</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction of strategy (I-1)</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of tactics (I-2)</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk orientation (I-3)</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>2.072</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of timing of actions I-4 (a)</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of timing of actions I-4 (b)</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility of means: Punish I-5 (-3)</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten I-5 (-2)</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.429</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose I-5 (-1)</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal I-5 (1)</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>0.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise I-5 (2)</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward I-5 (3)</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding the third hypothesis, no shifts in the operational code in the year after Operation Palliser, a year where no major events happened, we can see that in no index there is a statistically significant shift. Two indices changed with a p value ranging between 0,10 and 0,20 (P-3 and P-5). Although not significant, these indices change relatively much in the year after Operation Palliser. These results provide the evidence to approve hypothesis 3.

All four ‘master beliefs’ (P-1, P-2, I-1, I-2) did not change. After Operation Palliser president Kabbah believed the political universe to be somewhat hostile in nature (-0,057), one year later he did not change this view (-0,043). Additionally he was somewhat pessimistic (-0,156) about his prospects for realizing fundamental values, one year later he was still somewhat pessimistic (-0,123). Regarding his instrumental beliefs he was very cooperative in his direction of strategy and definitively cooperative in the intensity of his tactics. One year after the intervention of the United Kingdom, a period where no major events happened, Kabbah held these same beliefs (I-1: 0,735/0,748; I-2: 0,435/0,424).

5.5 Intercoder reliability

How reliable are the results of the Operational Code Analysis performed in this thesis? In the chapter on methodology the Kappa method has been introduced as a tool to test this. Four speeches have been coded a second time in order to compare the results.

Table 5.4. Intercoder reliability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>not recorded</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not recorded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4. above reveals the results of the reliability check. The columns indicate the results for the first coding process, the rows are the results for the second process. The yellow cells reveal the number of agreements, the red cells are disagreements. In total, 148 utterances and sentences have been coded a second time, out of which 120 were the same as the first coding process. Recall the formula for Kappa:
K = \frac{P(A) - P(E)}{1 - P(E)}

P(A) is the proportion of times the coders agree, in this case 120/148= 0.831. P(E) is the value for the expectation that agreement is reached by chance. This can be measured by multiplying the sums of rows and columns and dividing these results by the total number of observations (148). P(E) is found by aggregating these values and again divide by the total number of observations, which results in a value of 0.222. These values for P(A) and P(E) result in a Kappa score of 0.783. This is higher than 0.7, therefore the conclusion can be made that the results of these operational code analysis are reliable.

5.6 Provisional answer to the research question

Based on the results presented above, the following provisional answer to the research question can be given:

President’s Kabbah’s beliefs did change during the Sierra Leonean Civil War. After the invasion of Freetown by the rebels and the intervention of the United Kingdom through Operation Palliser several parts of his operational code changed significantly (hypotheses 1a and 2a), while his operational code remained the same in a period where no major events happened (hypothesis 3). However, his operational code did not always change in the expected direction. After the invasion of Freetown his philosophical beliefs did not change significantly, while some of his instrumental beliefs did (hypothesis 1b). Following Operation Palliser his philosophical beliefs changed significantly, however not in the hypothesized direction. These results are reliable with a Kappa score of 0.783. In the next chapter these results are analyzed and discussed further.
6. Analysis

*To what extent do the results of performing Operational Code Analysis in this thesis provide new knowledge? How strong are the results after applying the control variables?*

In this chapter the results provided in the previous chapter will be subject of further analysis and discussion. Firstly, in part 6.1. the implications of the results of this thesis for the theory regarding change in operational codes are elaborated upon. How, when and which part of the operational code change are the questions to be answered, part 6.1. will provide the answers given by the results of this thesis. Furthermore, the results did not approve hypotheses 1b and 2b. In part 6.1. these outcomes are further discussed. Secondly, in part 6.2. the results of applying the control variables posited in chapter 4.5. are presented. Especially the results of distinguishing between the identity of other are remarkable. In part 6.3. this is taken upon further by discussing some weaknesses of the Verbs In Context System, the method used in this thesis to perform OCA. Is VICS the right method to provide answers to Alexander George’s ten questions? Finally, in part 6.4. an answer is given to what extent the results of this thesis might be useful for policy makers and intelligence officers.

6.1 Change in Operational Codes

In the chapter dealing with the theory on OCA (chapter two), special attention has been given to the existing theory on how operational codes could change. In this thesis the operational code is treated as the dependent variable as well, in this section attention is given to the impact the results of this thesis have on this theory.

6.1.1 How?

In chapter two a division has been put forward between theories which state that belief systems remain stable over time and theories which provide room for change. Regarding stable belief systems, Robert Jervis is the main proponent. His cognitive consistency theory predicts that people tend to fit incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there (Jervis, 1976: 143). In this thesis the experimental learning theory of Jack Levy is used to predict that beliefs of leaders do change. Experimental learning entails ‘a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of
experience’ (1994: 283). In other words, the discussion turns around the question whether beliefs remain stable (Jervis) or are amenable to change through the process of experiential learning (Levy).

Levy’s theory is confirmed by the results of this thesis. Hypothesis one revealed five out of sixteen statistically significant shifts, additionally four indices changed very close to the level of significance. This means that after experiencing the bloody assault on Freetown Kabbah significantly altered his beliefs about the world of conflict around him and his own tactics and strategies for the right political action. Additionally, the second hypothesis resulted in two statistically significant shifts with an additional three indices changing very close to the level of significance. In other words, the experience of the arrival of British troops as well altered his beliefs and perceptions significantly. All this provides evidence for Levy’s theory of experimental learning, e.g. in the case of president Kabbah beliefs were able to change over time. On the contrary, Jervis’ theory of cognitive consistency and stable beliefs is not supported by the results of this investigation.

6.1.2 When?

Levy’s theory of experimental learning can be used in two ways by giving a different meaning to the word experience. Firstly, experience can mean the direct experience of an event which has a high impact on the leader. This is a meaning of experience used in several studies using operational code analysis, which posit the operational code as a dependent variable (Schafer and Gassler, 2000; Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998; Walker, Schafer and Marfleet, 2001; Chrichlow, 1998; Robinson, 2006). The word experience is here used as a noun, experience in the form of witnessing a main event is likely to change the beliefs of a leader.

Secondly, experience can be used in the form of an adjective. This paves the way for the learning in office theory posited by Chrichlow (1998). This theory predicts that a leader changes and adjusts his beliefs over time, without the necessity of certain main events.

The results of this thesis show that president Kabbah’s beliefs only changed after a main event. Both after the invasion of Freetown in January 1999 and Operation Palliser in May 2000 there are statistically significant shifts in some indices of his operational code. Furthermore there are some shifts which come close to being statistically significant. On the contrary, in a period without main events, Kabbah’s beliefs did not change significantly. This
thesis therefore provides additional empirical evidence for the idea that main events are the main catalysts for changes in the operational code of a leader.

6.1.3 Which?

In this part, the consequences of the results presented in chapter five for the theory on which part of the operational code should change will be discussed. Firstly, a closer look is given to the non-hypothesized changes in the operational code of president Kabbah. Thereafter the theory on which part of the operational code changes is separated in two parts. Firstly, which part of the code changes? Mainly Kabbah’s beliefs about other parties in the Sierra Leonean Civil War (philosophical), perceptions of his own strategy and tactics in the conflict (instrumental), or are both amenable to changes. Secondly, are beliefs organized hierarchically? The results of this investigation are used to get answers to these questions.

6.1.3.1 Non-hypothesized changes in the operational code of Kabbah

Firstly, it is important to sum up the explanations for the changes in the operational code of president Kabbah which were not hypothesized upfront. It was hypothesized upfront that after the invasion of Freetown Kabbah would adjust his beliefs about his opponents, while his beliefs about the right strategy to bring an end to the civil war would remain the same. This is not mirrored by the results. Contrary to what was hypothesized, statistically significant shifts were detected in the instrumental beliefs. Kabbah’s perception about other actors did not alter significantly, however the changes were relatively high. The statistically significant shifts in Kabbah’s instrumental beliefs into a more cooperative direction can be explained by the president’s desire to end the war without the spilling of blood. From the moment he was inaugurated his tactic was to negotiate with the rebels instead of to fight them (Kabbah, 2003). His belief in this strategy and tactic is reflected in his decisions to let Foday Sankoh negotiate with his RUF comrades after the invasion of Freetown and later to sign the Lomé peace agreement.

Regarding hypothesis 2b, which predicted a shift in perception of other actors after Operation Palliser, Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs changed into a more hostile direction instead of the hypothesized friendly direction. Especially it is striking to note that apparently Kabbah changed his beliefs about the International Community into a more hostile direction. The intervention of the British through Operation Palliser prevented a new invasion of Freetown
by the rebel forces and it shifted the balance of power in favor of Kabbah and pro-government forces (Keen, 2005: 265). Additionally, it gave a boost of confidence to the population of Sierra Leone that the war could soon be over (UNAMSIL, 2000: 10). Furthermore, in his testimony towards the TRC, president Kabbah explained that many of his requests for assistance were turned down by the International Community, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, for now the conclusion has to be that Operation Palliser made Kabbah perceive the International Community to be less friendly. In chapter 6.2.2. it will be further analyzed whether this really was the consequence of the British intervention.

6.1.3.2 Instrumental versus philosophical belief change

In chapter two, several theories have been posited which predict which part of the operational code is most likely to change. Renshon (2008) claimed a trend, based on empirical evidence, that philosophical beliefs are amenable to change while instrumental beliefs remain constant. However, his empirical evidence was weak. The results of this thesis do not seem to make his claim stronger as well. In total, seven indices changed during the period under investigation; six were part of the instrumental beliefs, while only one philosophical belief changed. This is a major finding and directly contradicts Renshon. Two explanations are in place for this. The first refers to empirical findings in other researches, the second is revealed by a closer look to the changes in instrumental and philosophical beliefs.

Firstly, as already stated in chapter two, other recent investigations using OCA have found that leaders tend to change their beliefs about their own strategy and tactics after main events (Malici, 2006; Robison, 2006). The findings of this thesis are thus definitely not an outlier case. This is in line with Walker and Schafer (2006) who claim that both philosophical and instrumental beliefs are independent from one another and both are amenable to change.

Secondly, a closer look to what happens with the values of the first two philosophical and instrumental beliefs throughout the conflict shows graphically that both philosophical and instrumental beliefs were amenable to change throughout the conflict.
Figure 6.1. Values for first two philosophical and instrumental beliefs throughout the conflict

Figure 6.1. sheds a different light on the changes in philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The philosophical beliefs show relatively big shocks, while the instrumental beliefs remain more constant. In other words, by pure looking at the numbers not only Kabbah’s perceptions about his own strategy, but also his beliefs about other actors in the Civil War changed throughout the conflict. This is evidence for the fact that although the instrumental beliefs showed statistically significant differences, the philosophical beliefs showed big differences as well. The fact that they are not significant has to do with the method used in this thesis to test significance. Firstly, the scores for the different philosophical and instrumental beliefs are average values. They are the outcome of aggregating the results of different speeches. Secondly, the average operational codes before and after a main event are then compared to find statistically significant changes using an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test. ANOVA looks at the separate values of which a mean value is constructed. The more variance these separate values show, the less likely a difference between mean values is statistically significant.

A closer look to the calculation of the P-1 and I-1 average values before and after the invasion of Freetown can serve to show why instrumental beliefs changed significantly and philosophical beliefs remained stable. Recall that before the invasion of Freetown Kabbah’s beliefs about the nature of the political universe and his opponents therein (P-1), ranging on a scale from friendly to hostile, had a value of -0.024. After the assault, his belief turned more hostile to a value for P-1 of -0.351. This change was not statistically significant (p=0.19). His
beliefs about his own strategy (I-1), ranging on a scale from cooperative to conflictual, changed from 0.523 before, to 0.767 after the assault on Freetown. This was measured a statistically significant change (p=0.084). The P-1 and I-1 indices before the assault were measured by aggregating and taking the mean of three different speeches given by president Kabbah shortly before January 1999. The P-1 and I-1 scores for after the invasion of Freetown were measured by taking the mean of six speeches shortly after January 1999.

Now, by looking at the variance between the values these separate speeches provide for I-1 and P-1, an answer is given as to why the instrumental belief changed significantly, while the philosophical belief remained statistically stable. This variance is captured by the standard deviations, which are presented in table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1 Standard deviations for P-1 and I-1 before and after assault on Freetown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before assault n=3</th>
<th>After assault n=6</th>
<th>Absolute change</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>SD (^5) Before assault</th>
<th>SD (^5) After assault</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.351</td>
<td>-0.327</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-1</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 explains why the instrumental beliefs show statistically significant changes, while in absolute values the philosophical beliefs change more. The absolute change in the P-1 value is (-)0.327, however due to relatively high standard deviations (0.228 and 0.330) this change is not statistically significant. The absolute change in I-1 is lower (0.224), however the standard deviations are also much lower (0.083 and 0.195) which reveals why this is a statistically significant change.

The relatively large variance in speeches used to calculate the philosophical beliefs is the explanation for the fact that although the absolute differences between the philosophical beliefs before and after the invasion of Freetown are higher than the absolute differences in instrumental beliefs, yet the instrumental beliefs change statistically significant and the philosophical beliefs remain statistically stable. Furthermore, this analysis reveals that Kabbah expressed a lot of variance in his beliefs about other actors in the civil war each speech, a finding which can be used to conclude that his philosophical beliefs were definitely amenable to change.

\(^5\) Standard deviation (SD)
In addition figure 6.1 above reveals that Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs switched from the positive to the negative side. His instrumental beliefs always remained (very) positive, they are always located above the 0.400 line. This last finding is in conjunction with Kabbah’s own views on the conflict. At his testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission he declared that from his inauguration in 1996 onwards his main goal was to bring peace to Sierra Leone. His tactic was not to engage in war with his opponents, but rather to negotiate (Kabbah, 2003). A lightning example of this are the many peace agreements which Kabbah signed (Abidjan 1996; Conakry 1997; Lomé 1999; Abuja 2000). Kabbah’s statements before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission correspond to the beliefs he expressed in his verbal behavior.

In sum, empirical evidence from other studies support the findings of this thesis that statistically significant changes are mainly found in the instrumental beliefs after main events. There is no evidence found which supports Renshon’s theory that after main events leaders adjust their perceptions of the nature of their opponents, while they believe their own strategies to be stable. However, this is the answer when a change in the operational code is defined as statistically significant changes in the values for the separate instrumental and philosophical beliefs. Schafer and Walker already argued that both instrumental and philosophical beliefs can change.

Figure 6.1 shows that the philosophical beliefs actually showed bigger shocks in absolute values. By looking closer to changes in the first instrumental and philosophical beliefs after the invasion Freetown, the conclusion can be made that the mean philosophical beliefs scores have larger standard deviations, meaning that a change is not statistically significant but rather due to chance. However, following figure 6.1 it is hard to state that Kabbah’s beliefs about the actions of his opponents remained stable. A fair answer to this part of the which question would therefore be: the instrumental beliefs are amenable to change, six statistically significant changes in instrumental beliefs form the evidence for this. Philosophical beliefs changed less, only one belief changed statistically significant. However, figure 6.1 reveals that the conclusion cannot be made that the philosophical beliefs remained stable. Most changes are not statistically significant because the speeches on which they are based show large variance, as indicated by the standard deviations.

6.1.3.3 Hierarchy in beliefs?
The results of chapter five show that after main events, only some philosophical and instrumental beliefs changed. Walker and Schafer, the authors of the handbook on OCA, regarded both the first philosophical (P-1) and instrumental (I-1) beliefs as ‘master beliefs’, from which the other beliefs should flow logically (2006: 33).

For the philosophical side this means that when Kabbah has a hostile perception of the nature of the political universe and his opponents therein (P-1), the other beliefs should have complementary values. In this way, he should be more pessimistic about realizing his fundamental values (P-2). Nevertheless, it is not completely clear in which direction the other three philosophical beliefs should change complementary to P-1. P-3 reflects how Kabbah perceives the predictability of the political universe; P-4 his perception about how much control he has over historical development; and P-5 gives a value to how big a role Kabbah gives to chance.

P-1 and P-2 are calculated in rather a similar way, P-1 makes a ratio between positive and negative utterances about other, while P-2 is calculated by making a mean score of all utterances about other. P-3 is calculated by looking at the variance in utterances about other; P-4 makes a ratio between self and other utterances; P-5 is calculated by multiplying the values for P-3 and P-4. This insight in how the philosophical beliefs are calculated reveals that it is not a mathematical logic that all these beliefs should have the same values and change in the same direction. However, the claim can be made that P-1 and P-2 are related and thus should change in similar ways. This is justified by the results of this thesis. Figure 6.1. above demonstrates most clearly that these two beliefs are interrelated. The lines almost are similar. Figure 6.2 below shows graphically that P-3, P-4 and P-5 are not interrelated with the first two philosophical beliefs.

What this means is that when Kabbah perceived the world around him and the other actors therein as more hostile, he was accordingly more pessimistic about realizing his own fundamental values of bringing peace to Sierra Leone. He therefore believed that the character of his opponents was interrelated with his own chances of bringing peace, which seems to be a logical assumption. However, while he perceived other actors like the RUF and AFRC as more hostile, he did not change his beliefs about the predictability of their actions in a similar fashion. These beliefs remained relatively stable throughout the conflict. Also Kabbah’s beliefs about the control he has over altering the history of the Sierra Leonean Civil War and
the role chance plays in this pursuit, do not seem to be interrelated with his perception of the 
RUF, AFRC and International Community.

Figure 6.2 Philosophical beliefs throughout the conflict

Regarding the instrumental beliefs, I-1 and I-2 are calculated in the same way as P-1 and P-2. 
I-1 looks at how Kabbah perceives his own strategy, ranging from conflictual to cooperative. 
I-2 reflects the way Kabbah perceives the intensity of his tactics. Since I-1 and I-2 resemble 
P-1 and P-2, the only difference being that the calculation is now based on utterances in which 
self is subject, the claim for these beliefs can be made as well that they are related and should 
change in similar ways. However, this claim is not supported by the results of this thesis. As 
can be seen in figure 6.1. above and in the result tables in chapter five, I-1 changes while I-2 
remains relatively stable.

This means for example that although Kabbah’s beliefs about his strategy (I-1) were 
statistically significant more cooperative after the invasion of Freetown in 1999, his beliefs 
about the intensity of his tactics (I-2) remained the same. I-1 is a ratio between the use of 
conflictual and cooperative verbs in which self is subject. I-2 is measured by looking at the 
average value of verbs with self as subject. Recall that in OCA, verbs are tagged with a value 
ranging from -3 (punish) to +3 (reward). In other words, Kabbah used significantly more 
cooperative (+) verbs in relation to conflictual (-) verbs (I-1) after the assault on Freetown, 
however these cooperative verbs had low values (+1), resulting in the fact that the average 
value of verbs with self as subject (I-2) did not change significantly.
The fifth instrumental belief (I-5) reveals the perception Kabbah has of the utility of different means. To put it differently, I-5 shows which type of verb Kabbah used most in his verbal behavior. Recall that verbs can be either deeds (value -3 or +3) or words (value -2, -1, +1 or +2). Figure 6.2 below shows the frequency of the different types of verbs in Kabbah’s speeches before and after the invasion of Freetown.

**Figure 6.3. Utility of means (I-5), before and after invasion of Freetown**

Figure 6.3. above shows clearly that after the invasion of Freetown, Kabbah used more promises (+2) and appeals (+1) in his verbal behavior, while he used less rewards (+3). Table 5.1. already showed that the changes in promises and rewards are statistically significant. This means firstly that although Kabbah’s beliefs about his strategy where significantly more cooperative after the invasion of Freetown (I-1), these more cooperative beliefs are due to more use of words compared to deeds. This is an explanation for the fact that the intensity of his tactics (I-2) did not became more cooperative. In other words, there is no hierarchical relationship between the first two instrumental beliefs found in the results of this thesis.

What this play with numbers essentially means is that although Kabbah’s believed his strategy to be much more cooperative after the invasion of Freetown, he expressed this cooperative attitude in relative augmentation in his use of cooperative words. Apparently, he regarded a cooperative attitude the right direction to pursue peace after the bloody assault, however he chose not to be too cooperative. It were appeals to peace and promises of cooperation, the actual cooperative deeds were not yet there.
6.2 Control variables

Above, the results of the OCA have been discussed. However, in chapter four several control variables have been introduced in order to look more critically at these results. These controls concern (1) the audience of the speech acts of president Kabbah, (2) the identity of the other and (3) the question of causality; were the hypothesized events really the trigger for change? In this subsection these three control variables are applied.

6.2.1 Audience

As stated in chapter four, different results might occur when a distinction is made between the audience of Kabbah’s speeches. It can be that Kabbah uses different language when he speaks to the population than to for example the United Nations. There were four possible audiences identified. However out of the eighteen coded speeches, fourteen were given to the population, three to the international community and one speech was given to the own side (a speech at the opening of a training center for the new Sierra Leone Army). No speeches were given to the opponent.

In comparison with the VICS methodology as presented in chapter 4, the speeches are taken as a single unit of analysis, the mean of the aggregated scores provides the values for the indices. For this control variable, all philosophical and instrumental beliefs are tested to see if a difference in audience yields different results. Since there is only one speech given to the own side, a significance test is made only between the speeches given to the population and the international community. By performing a unifactorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test, F and p scores are found to establish whether there is a statistically significant difference between speeches given to the population and the international community. The results can be found in the table below.

Table 6.2. VICS scores for different audiences of speech acts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Population (n=14)</th>
<th>International Community (n=3)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the political universe</td>
<td>-0,165</td>
<td>0,156</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>0,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results presented in table 6.2 show that there are some differences in speeches given to the population and the international community. Especially, Kabbah expresses different
beliefs in the utility he sees in applying the means oppose and promises (I-5). The differences in these beliefs in speeches to the population and international community are statistically significant (p<0.10). However, it must be added that these speeches are based on relatively few utterances, therefore one should not put too much weight on these results. There are no other statistically significant differences, however it is remarkable to see that for the philosophical beliefs there seems to be some difference when distinguishing between the audience of a speech. This is reflected in p values around 0.20. For example, when speaking to the population, Kabbah’s beliefs about his opponents, the political universe and his prospects of realizing his fundamental values (P-1 and P-2) are hostile (negative scores), these same beliefs are friendly when the international community is the audience (positive scores). On the contrary, his instrumental beliefs do not reveal a lot of differences when distinguishing between audience. The lowest p score is 0.334. Furthermore, Kabbah’s beliefs about his own strategy and tactics (I-1 and I-2) are almost similar before different audiences.

For controlling between the audience of speeches the conclusion can be made that only two statistically significant changes were detected, however these results seem not valid to use for generalizations due to lack of utterances on which they are based. Leaving the significance criterion behind for a moment, a difference in Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs can be found before different audiences. Especially, Kabbah expresses less hostile beliefs about other actors in speeches given to the international community. An explanation for this can be that when Kabbah speaks to the international community, he speaks more about actions of the international community than actions of his internal opponents in the civil war. The idea behind this is that ‘the other’ as subject in utterances that resemble Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs, can be split up in several groups. Probably Kabbah has more hostile beliefs to one group than the other. In the next section this distinguishing between the identity of the other is further explored.

6.2.2 Identity of other

A second control variable is the identity of the other in Kabbah’s rhetoric. Because it is about utterances where the other is subject, this variable controls for the outcome of the philosophical beliefs. The idea is that Kabbah has other beliefs about the actions taken by the RUF compared to the actions of for example the United Nations. This distinction would be very logical since the RUF can be identified as the opponent, while the United Nations supported the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone during the Civil War.
In the codebook (appendix 1) five different categories of actors which can be identified as other are listed. These are Side B (RUF/AFRC); International Community; Settlement; Warring parties (Kamajors, SLA) and a category for subjects which cannot be placed in one of these groups. Alexander George’s first philosophical question entailed: ‘What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s opponent?’ (George, 1969: 201). This question is measured by VICS through P-1, therefore an analysis of the outcomes of this first philosophical belief is used to control for the identity of other. The result for the division between the identity is presented in table 6.3. below.

**Table 6.3. VICS scores after distinguishing between identity of other (P-1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P-1</th>
<th>Before ‘99</th>
<th>After ‘99</th>
<th>Before Palliser</th>
<th>After Palliser</th>
<th>One year later</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Side B</strong></td>
<td>-0,722</td>
<td>-0,541</td>
<td>0,333</td>
<td>-0,923</td>
<td>-0,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(53,7%)</td>
<td>(75,5%)</td>
<td>(16,7%)</td>
<td>(40,6%)</td>
<td>(42,1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Community</strong></td>
<td>0,917 (35,8%)</td>
<td>0,714</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,714</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21,4%)</td>
<td>(55,6%)</td>
<td>(43,8%)</td>
<td>(28,9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warring Parties</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3,0%)</td>
<td>(0,0%)</td>
<td>(0,0%)</td>
<td>(0,0%)</td>
<td>(2,6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Settlement</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0,0%)</td>
<td>(0,0%)</td>
<td>(11,1%)</td>
<td>(1,6%)</td>
<td>(2,6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unidentified</strong></td>
<td>-0,6</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0,333</td>
<td>-0,555</td>
<td>-0,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7,5%)</td>
<td>(3,1%)</td>
<td>(16,7%)</td>
<td>(14,1%)</td>
<td>(23,7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some results immediately draw the attention. First of all, there is a difference between the P-1 values for Side B and the International Community. At almost all moments Kabbah’s beliefs about Side B are negative, while for the International Community they are exclusively positive. To put it differently, Kabbah perceived Side B parties (AFRC and RUF) as hostile, while he believed the International Community to be friendly.
Secondly, the percentages in brackets reveal the relative frequency of subjects. For example, out of all the utterances recorded from speeches before the January ’99 Freetown invasion, 53.7% had Side B as its subject. It is revealing that for all periods coded, Side B and the International Community are the most occurring subjects. This means that when speaking about actions of others, Kabbah mostly referred to for example the RUF, AFRC, the United Nations or ECOWAS, suggesting that he perceived these as the most important players in the conflict.

Thirdly, it is notable that while Kabbah’s beliefs about the International Community remain relatively stable, his beliefs about the RUF and the AFRC are very different throughout the conflict. Main events were thus mostly influencing his beliefs about the rebel parties. Most strikingly is the fact that the president’s beliefs about the RUF and AFRC become less negative after the invasion of Freetown (from -0.722 to – 0.541). This while overall his philosophical beliefs became more negative (see chapter five). Nevertheless, Side B is most identified as the subject of his verbal behavior (75.5%). What is even more surprising is that his beliefs about the RUF and AFRC are positive before Operation Palliser (0.333).

Fourthly, it is interesting to see that after the invasion of Freetown president Kabbah starts to speak less about the RUF and AFRC in favor of the International Community.

The results of distinguishing between the identity of other results in some control on the outcomes of the OCA as described in chapter five. Indeed, it makes a great difference whether Kabbah speaks about Side B or the International Community. Running a unifactorial ANOVA test on the mean values of P-1 for Side B and the International Community reveals that Kabbah’s average belief about Side B had a -0.396 P-1 score. For the International Community this average score is 0.829. This difference is statistically significant with p=0.0007.

This is not a surprising result, since Side B can be seen as his opponent, while the International Community supported him throughout the conflict. However, regarding hypothesis one it is interesting to see that Kabbah’s change towards a more hostile view of the world was not accomplished by a more hostile view about his opponents, the ones who perpetrated the attack. On the contrary, his philosophical beliefs changed mainly because he perceived the nature of the International Community, his supporters, less positive. This does
not mean that hypothesis 1a and 1b are undermined directly by this result, however it would be more logical that Kabbah’s beliefs about the perpetrators would have changed in a negative way instead of his beliefs about the ones who condemned the attack.

Regarding the second hypothesis, which predicts a change in the operational code after Operation Palliser, it is interesting to see that Kabbah’s philosophical beliefs changed because of a change in his beliefs about Side B. More precise, he perceived the RUF and AFRC as being much more hostile after Operation Palliser than before this event. This directly undermines hypothesis 2a and 2b. Operation Palliser was a mission conducted by the United Kingdom, e.g. the International Community. A change in beliefs should therefore mainly follow because Kabbah would perceive the International Community in a different, in this case more positive, way. At least that was hypothesized upfront. This result shows that in the case of Kabbah, an intervention did not alter his beliefs towards the intervener coming to assist him. The in chapter 4 suggested psychological effects a Western intervention might have on the populace and leader of a civil war torn country are not found.

6.2.2.1 Alternative explanations

What is the most likely explanation for the above mentioned remarkable outcomes of controlling for the identity of the other? To provide an answer, a closer look is given to what the first philosophical belief actually means. Recall that philosophical beliefs are external attributions a leader makes about the political universe and other actors in the political universe (Schafer and Walker, 2006: 31). In the Verbs In Context System, the first philosophical belief P-1 captures the balance of the leader’s views of other actors in the political universe (Schafer and Walker, 2006: 33). These beliefs are placed on a continuum scale ranging from very hostile to very friendly views about other actors.

The operational code analysis resulted in the outcome that Kabbah held more hostile views about other actors after the invasion of Freetown in January 1999 (although not a statistically significant change, see chapter five). Distinguishing between the different identities of other revealed that Kabbah held more hostile views about the International Community, and less hostile views about the RUF and AFRC. This is remarkable since the AFRC was the main perpetrator of the invasion, in collaboration with the RUF (TRC, 3A: 317). Additionally, all accounts on the Sierra Leonean Civil War take the January ’99 invasion as the most horrific episode of the conflict (TRC, 3A: 326; Keen, 2005: 228; Hoffman, 2011: 47; Abraham, 2004:
It is rather remarkable that a leader perceives his opponent less hostile after they perpetrated a horrific attack on the capital, killing and maiming many citizens. It is hard to find a logical explanation for this outcome.

A second component is to explain why president Kabbah held more hostile views towards the International Community after the invasion of Freetown. ECOMOG was the Nigerian-led force who fought the rebels in Freetown and eventually succeeded in driving them out of the city (Hirsch, 2001: 74-75). However, methodologically ECOMOG is treated in this thesis as the army of president Kabbah, therewith making references to these forces affecting Kabbah’s instrumental beliefs. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission blames the rest of the International Community that they abandoned Sierra Leone or otherwise not intervened effectively when the country was in great crisis (TRC, 2: 88-90). It is possible that the invasion of Freetown was a consequence of the weak assistance of the International Community, therewith making his beliefs about them less friendly.

Another point which needs clarification is that after the intervention of the United Kingdom through Operation Palliser, Kabbah’s beliefs about the AFRC and RUF changed from a rather friendly (0.333) to very hostile (-0.923) perception. The 0.333 score is only based on three recorded utterances, therefore this index is not very reliable in capturing Kabbah’s perception of the AFRC and RUF. Therefore, the change from friendly to hostile is not further analyzed. That the scores for RUF and AFRC are so hostile can be explained by the fact that in the days around Operation Palliser, a massive demonstration in front of the lodge of RUF leader Foday Sankoh ended in a bloody scene; the RUF was keeping UNAMSIL forces hostage and there was fear that the people of Freetown would experience another bloody assault (see chapter three). These developments might have influenced the perception of president Kabbah of Side B parties.

In sum, the change in beliefs about the International Community can be explained, however Kabbah’s changed beliefs about the RUF and AFRC, especially after the assault on Freetown, is hard to legitimize. Questions can therefore be raised whether VICS is able to capture correctly the beliefs of a leader. The P-1 index should in the end provide an answer to the first philosophical question posited by Alexander George in 1969: ‘What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s opponent?’ (George, 1969: 201). Following the outcomes
provided by VICS, the answers to this questions should be that Kabbah sees the political universe as less of conflict and the character of his opponent is less hostile after a bloody assault on the nation’s capital. As stated above, this is hard to believe.

6.2.3 Causality

The results of all three hypotheses together have shown that there is evidence for the fact that main events trigger a change in the operational code of president Kabbah. Indeed, there were some statistically significant changes after both the invasion of Freetown and Operation Palliser. On the contrary there were no statistically significant changes in a period where no major events happened. Therefore, the claim can be made that certain main events cause a change in the belief system of a leader. However, this is not directly to say that the hypothesized events actually were the course of change. To guarantee for the most reliable outcome, speeches were selected which were held in a time frame without other main events, however it is possible that Kabbah experienced some events which might have influenced his belief system. Jervis (1976) states that people learn most from events they witness firsthand, these events leave disproportionate impressions (1976: 239-240). The context in which this OCA is performed is one of civil war. In chapter two it was established that all the conditions necessary for conducting OCA can be found in a civil war, however such a conflict is characterized by daily developments. In spite of this remark, the hypotheses of this thesis were based on thorough case study research, eliminating as far as possible that events other than hypothesized were responsible for the changes in Kabbah’s beliefs.

6.2.4 Control variables – conclusion

In conclusion, it is justified to say that the audience of a speech does not matter significantly for the operational code of president Kabbah. However, it is remarkable that the differences for the philosophical beliefs are relatively larger than for the instrumental beliefs. In speeches to the International Community his beliefs about the other were less hostile than were these beliefs in speeches to the population. Future research designs using VICS might want to be aware that the audience of a speech is a potential significant variable influencing the analysis of a leader’s verbal behavior. Controlling for the identity of the other, a relatively high difference is notable between the beliefs Kabbah had about different others, e.g. he had different philosophical beliefs about the RUF/AFRC and the International Community. This is an important control variable, especially it is interesting to see which group is responsible for
changes in his philosophical beliefs. Most strikingly is the fact that the more negative beliefs Kabbah had after the January '99 Freetown invasions were mainly caused by more negative beliefs about the International Community, not about the RUF. Additionally, Kabbah showed a marginal change in his perception of the International Community after Operation Palliser. The conclusion can therefore be made that a Western intervention did not have the hypothesized psychological effect on president Kabbah. It did alter his beliefs, but not about the expected actor.

6.3 Reflection on The Verbs In Context System

Above in the section of controlling for the identity of the other (6.2.2.) it has been put forward that VICS might not be reliable in providing answers to Alexander George’s ten questions. Empirical results from this investigation form the evidence for this. In this section, additional possible problems with VICS are analyzed. Firstly, the question of whether VICS is the correct method to give an answer to George’s questions is elaborated upon. Secondly, some further problems using VICS are discussed.

6.3.1 Does VICS provide answers to George’s questions?

As explained in chapter two, Alexander George can be seen as the founder of modern day operational code analysis. The indices formulated by Walker and Schafer (2006) are a direct translation of the questions George formulated (1969). VICS was developed to analyze leaders at-a-distance, providing quantitative answers to the ten questions in order to be able to make meaningful comparisons across different leaders and conduct statistical analyses (Walker and Schafer, 2006: 27).

However, the question raises whether the indices created are correct to provide the answers to the ten questions. Above, attention has already been given to the first philosophical question. One part of P-1 asks what the fundamental character of one’s opponent is. According to VICS, this can be measured by constructing a ratio between the number of positive (cooperative) and negative (conflictual) utterances in which the subject is other. However, the other is a very general term, in the context of the civil war in Sierra Leone the other could be for example the RUF or AFRC, but also the International Community or the Kamajors. Paragraph 6.2.2. showed that president Kabbah held very different philosophical beliefs about the different actors. While he perceived the RUF and AFRC as rather hostile, in general he
believed the International Community to be friendly. This distinction between different identities of other is not made in general operational code analysis using VICS, however it is very important in order to correctly answer George’s question. A main finding of this thesis is therefore that future researchers using VICS should be aware of the fact that the philosophical beliefs of a leader are measured by the VICS system by making an average of the beliefs a leader has about several actors in the political world. This is a flaw of the system, because in this way no specific answer is given to George’s question about the fundamental character of one opponent.

### 6.3.2 Additional problems with VICS

In the literature there are debates on the use of VICS to determine an operational code of a leader. Firstly, there is a debate regarding authorship and the difference between prepared and spontaneous speech acts. Central questions deal with the fact that most prepared speeches given by a leader are written by a speech writer, therefore they might not reflect the operational code of the leader but rather that of the speech writer. This is the so called ‘ghost writing’ effect (Schafer, 2000: 515). All the speeches used in this thesis were prepared speeches as well, though it is not clear whether they were written by a speech writer or by Kabbah himself. However, speech writers are paid functionaries which are hired to represent the dispositions of the persons they are writing for (Chrichlow, 1998: 690). A study in which Bill Clinton’s operational code was analyzed concluded that spontaneous speeches provide better results for operational code analysis than prepared ones (Schafer and Chrichlow, 2000). However, there is not much further empirical research on operational codes available which investigates the difference between speeches written personally or by a speech writer (Walker and Schafer, 2006: 47).

Another problem with VICS debated in the literature is that leaders might intentionally deceive one’s opponent in a speech act, a phenomenon called ‘impression management’ (Tetlock and Manstead, 1985). Especially in prepared speech acts, leaders might intentionally use other verbal behavior in order to mislead the opponent. As with the debate regarding authorship, there is not much empirical evidence available to prove whether impression management affects the outcomes of OCA. Walker and Schafer play down the effect of this phenomenon. They admit that leaders might alter some verbs to deceive their opponents, however in general a huge amount of utterances are coded, which swamps the effect of some intentional misleading (2006: 47). However, this thesis might reflect that president Kabbah
used some form of impression management. For example, paragraph 6.2.1 showed that his philosophical beliefs were different, although not significantly, when differentiating between the audience of a speech. It can be that he used different verbal behavior to describe his opponents relying on the audience on purpose. Nevertheless, it is hard to retrieve if this is really the case.

6.4 Practical implications of the results

Above, in section 6.1, it has been discussed what the results of this investigation have to add to existing theoretical discussions regarding change in beliefs and belief systems of leaders. After that, in 6.2 the variables used to control for these outcomes have been applied, while in 6.3 the VICS method used to obtain these results has been critically analyzed. But what are the practical implications of the results of this thesis for policy makers and intelligence officers? In international relations, the rationality principle is often used in order to be able to predict the behavior of leaders, however in chapter two it has already been stated that there is no objective criterion to label a decision as being rational. A leader acts as to what he perceives to be rational, i.e. a leader is so called bounded rational.

The results of this thesis add to this argument of bounded rationality. Indeed, Kabbah’s beliefs about other actors and his own strategies switched continuously, so that in any point of time he perceived other decisions to be right, or rational so to say. For example, after the assault on Freetown, Kabbah put much more weight on a cooperative strategy than before. Contrary to what might objectively be seen as an irrational step, some months later he signed the Lomé peace agreement with his opponents under favorable conditions for the RUF. In Kabbah’s eyes this was a rational act because he thought it was the only right strategy to bring an end to the Civil War (Kabbah, 2003). It is striking to see that the beliefs of Kabbah found in this analysis are in large part, especially on the instrumental side, similar to his testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Council after the conflict. This strengthens the worth of the method.

This is analysis in retrospect, however it may serve as an analogy for future peacemakers in civil wars. In contemporary approaches to conflict resolution, rationality of leaders and parties play an important role. An example is the use of game theoretic models like the Prisoners Dilemma to predict the development and outcomes of certain conflicts (Ramsbotham et. al., 2005: 16-17). This thesis shows that OCA can be used to determine what strategy a leader
beliefs to be rational at different points in time, as well as how he believes his opponents will rationally behave. Through OCA the predictive advantages of Rational Choice Theory are not lost. What this thesis mainly adds is knowledge about how, when and in what way a leader is likely to adjust his beliefs about what he deems to be rational. However, whether the beliefs of leaders in other civil war contexts change in a similar fashion as those of president Kabbah is up to further research.
7. Conclusion

This thesis opened by quoting Winston Churchill, who stated that he was writing history. In other words he proclaimed that he as an individual was responsible for certain historical developments, suggesting that for researchers it is important to study him in order to understand and explain international relations. This focus on the individual decision maker is exactly the starting point of this thesis: who decides matters.

In studying individuals, beliefs play an important role. As ‘subjective representations of reality’ they steer the decisions of leaders by distorting, blocking and recasting information a leader uses to make a decision (Walker and Schafer, 2006: 6). Therefore, beliefs enter the equation of how to understand and explain decisions by a leader as an independent variable. Operational Code Analysis, as developed by Nathan Leites and Alexander George, adheres to this role of beliefs and investigates especially what an individual feels and perceives regarding the exercise of power in political affairs.

However, when beliefs are deemed so important that they can be used to understand and explain decisions of leaders, it is rather relevant to know whether these beliefs are stable or if they are amenable to change. This was the central question of this thesis. To put it differently, in this thesis beliefs, as captured in the operational code of a leader, are investigated as a dependent variable. The quest being to find if operational codes are amenable to change, and if so, what variables are responsible for that.

In order to do this, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the president of Sierra Leone during the civil war which ravaged that country in the late nineties, was the leader subject of research. In this final chapter, the conclusion, an answer to the research question of this thesis is formulated:

‘To what extent did the beliefs of president Kabbah change during the Sierra Leonean Civil War, in the period 1996-2002?’

Belief change focused on three different aspects:

- How do beliefs change?
- When do beliefs change?
- Which beliefs change?
The ‘how question’ was quickly answered by using the definition of Jack Levy regarding belief change through experiential learning. Experiential learning according to Levy entails ‘a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience’ (1994: 283). However, experience in this definition can be interpreted in two ways: firstly, experience in the form of witnessing an event *(I have experienced)*, or secondly experience in the form of gaining experience over time without the necessity of main events happening *(I am experienced)*. As chapter two revealed, there is a discussion among scholars performing OCA whether the first or second interpretation of the word experience is responsible for a change in beliefs. In other words, there is no clear answer to the ‘when question’ in existing literature.

Furthermore, chapter two revealed that there is yet no clear answer to the ‘which question’ as well. As explained in the second chapter, an operational code is divided in a philosophical and instrumental part, each consisting of five different beliefs. The philosophical beliefs capture how a leader perceives the world around him and his opponents therein, ranging on scale from hostile to friendly. The instrumental beliefs reveal how a leader perceives his own tactics and strategies in this world, again ranging from friendly to hostile. Regarding the which question, debates exist which side (philosophical/instrumental) is most likely to change and whether or not a certain hierarchy within the five beliefs of these two sides exist.

Chapter three presented the history of the Sierra Leonean Civil War between 1996 and 2002, thereby elaborating on two events which were most likely to have caused a change in the beliefs of president Kabbah: the rebel invasion of Freetown in January 1999 and the intervention of the United Kingdom through Operation Palliser in May 2000. Furthermore this chapter showed that after the intervention of the British no main events did happen for one year. These findings, together with the theoretical discussions in chapter two served as the rationale for the hypotheses used to find an answer to the research question. In chapter four the VICS method to establish the operational code of president Kabbah and changes therein was elaborated upon, while in chapter five the results were introduced.

Chapter six started off with translating these results to the when and which questions regarding belief change. Regarding the ‘when question’ the results suggest that the beliefs of president Kabbah changed after main events like the invasion of Freetown and Operation
Palliser. On the other hand, his operational code remained the same in the year where no major events happened. Thus, the conclusion can be made that this thesis supports the theory that beliefs are likely to change after main events, while there is no empirical evidence found for the so called ‘learning in office’ theory.

Regarding the ‘which question’, some remarkable results were found. As stated, the ‘which question’ can be split in two separate parts. Firstly, there is debate over whether the instrumental or philosophical part of the operational code is likely to change. This thesis found most statistically significant changes in instrumental beliefs after main events, while during the conflict only one philosophical belief of president Kabbah changed. A result contrary to what was hypothesized. This would suggest that Kabbah was more likely to change his beliefs about which strategy was best to end the civil war, than did he change his perceptions about his opponents and other parties in the conflict.

However, figure 6.1. showed graphically that during the period researched, the philosophical beliefs showed rather big shocks, while the instrumental beliefs remained rather constant. The philosophical beliefs did not change statistically significant because there was a huge variance regarding values for the philosophical beliefs among the coded speeches. In general this thesis provides empirical evidence for the theory that all beliefs of the operational code are amenable to change.

Secondly, the ‘which question’ is also about hierarchy in beliefs. For the philosophical beliefs, the results show that Kabbah’s beliefs about the political universe and his opponents therein (P-1) and his beliefs about his prospects for realizing his fundamental values (P-2) always changed in a similar direction and amount. Whether there is a hierarchical relationship between these beliefs cannot be established, however what is sure is that these two are clearly interrelated. Regarding the rest of the philosophical side of the operational code, no interrelationship with P-1 and P-2 can be found. Kabbah’s beliefs about predictability (P-3), control over historical developments (P-4) and the role of chance in human affairs (P-5) did not change in similar directions and amount as the first two philosophical beliefs. Nevertheless, P-3, P-4 and P-5 are found to be interrelated towards each other.

On the instrumental side of the operational code, Kabbah’s beliefs about his strategy (I-1) were not entirely related to his beliefs about which tactics best correspond to this strategy (I-2). For example, after the assault on Freetown, Kabbah’s beliefs about his strategy became statistically significant more cooperative, however his beliefs about what tactics suit best for
this strategy did not change. What this means is that Kabbah’s more cooperative beliefs were corresponded by an increase in the use cooperative words, while he used less cooperative deeds. In sum, contrary to his philosophical beliefs, Kabbah’s first two instrumental beliefs were not interrelated throughout the period studied in this thesis.

Furthermore, chapter six discussed the results of applying the control variables. Firstly, no statistical proof was found to claim that Kabbah expressed other beliefs in his verbal behavior when speaking to different audiences. Nevertheless, there was some evidence that Kabbah’s beliefs about his opponents in the civil war and his belief in being able to end the conflict were less hostile and pessimistic in speeches given to the International Community. Future researches should therefore be aware that the audience of a speech might influence the verbal behavior of a leader.

Secondly, the outcome of testing hypothesis three showed that no significant changes in the beliefs of president Kabbah occurred when no major events happened. In other words, this is evidence for the fact that major events are the most likely catalysts for a change in beliefs.

Thirdly, the results of distinguishing between the identity of the other in Kabbah’s verbal behavior yielded remarkable results. Firstly, the results show that in his verbal behavior Kabbah subscribed most actions to the International Community (United Nations, United Kingdom etc.) and Side B parties (AFRC and RUF). This suggests that Kabbah perceived these as the most important players in the Sierra Leonean Civil War. A big difference can be found between Kabbah’s beliefs about these two parties. While Kabbah believed the character of the International Community (P-1) to be very friendly throughout the conflict, he believed the AFRC and RUF to be hostile.

A closer look to Kabbah’s beliefs about the AFRC, RUF and International Community provided somewhat surprising results. For example, although Kabbah perceived the AFRC and RUF still as hostile after their assault on Freetown, he believed them to be less hostile than before. On the contrary, he perceived the International Community to be less friendly after this assault. An explanation for the less friendly perception of the International Community was found in the fact that Kabbah felt abandoned by the world in Sierra Leone’s darkest hours. However, it remains unclear as to why Kabbah perceived the perpetrators as less hostile after the assault. Additionally, a closer look at Kabbah’s beliefs about other parties after Operation Palliser revealed that his beliefs about the International Community remained
relatively stable, suggesting that a foreign intervention did not have the hypothesized psychological effects in the case of Kabbah.

This thesis showed that it is very fruitful to distinguish between the identity of different others in creating the philosophical side of an operational code. Especially when VICS is used to provide answers to the questions Alexander George originally posited in 1969, researchers should keep in mind that what they measure using VICS really can be used to give quantitative answers to these questions. What this thesis showed is that to correctly answer the first philosophical question regarding what a leader perceives to be the fundamental character of one’s opponents, a researcher should distinguish between several opponents used in the verbal behavior of a leader. In previous studies on operational codes this distinction is mostly not made. Future research designs using VICS to establish the operational code of a leader should be aware of this if they want to use VICS to answer George’s questions correctly.

In conclusion, this thesis was designed to research how, when and which beliefs of leaders might change. For president Kabbah the answers are now there. However, it is not wise to formulate a new or adjust an existing theory regarding belief change because of two reasons. Firstly, Levy argued that every leader learns (and thereby adjusts his beliefs) from experience in different ways, because every leader has a different cognitive structure (1994: 298). Although the results of this thesis can be used for further theorizing in the OCA field regarding belief change, one should be careful making generalizations with this cognitive learning principle in mind. Secondly, by taking president Kabbah as the leader subject of research, OCA was used in a civil war context. Maybe not unique, but in any case a rare attempt to use the method like this. The assumption of the author is that belief change might work differently in a civil war context.

In a wider context it proved to be fruitful to study the beliefs of Kabbah, paving the way for future research in other civil wars. His operational code influenced which strategy he deemed rational to end the conflict. Modern day researchers and policy makers using the rationality principle to predict, explain and understand behavior should be aware of the fact that what an individual finds rational is amenable to change.

Winston Churchill intended to write his own history. How he perceived the nature of other characters in this play and what he believed to be the right means to let history be kind to him, probably changed throughout.
List of references


### Appendix 1 – The codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUT</th>
<th>EXPLANATION</th>
<th>OPTIONS</th>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Coding rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>The basic utterance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Include all sentences (A sentence is the complete phrase from upper case to dot). A sentence can include multiple times when a sentence has multiple subject-object relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence inclusion</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1. The sentence has a subject-object relation with a transitive conflict-cooperation verb in the political domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Only include utterances them when the paragraph is on the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. When sub-clause imply the same we only code the utterance once:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E.G.: the Kamajors started to engage the Army in battles causing the death of many soldiers. Only the Kamajors engaged (-3) the army and not battles caused death (-3) of soldiers. Because the battle is the specification of the first utterance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject &amp; Object</td>
<td>Syntactic position</td>
<td>As given</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO 2 When one or more requirements are not met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific_Subject &amp; Specific_Object</td>
<td>Specific Actor</td>
<td>SLPP 1 Side_A Sierra Leone Peoples Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RUF 2 Side_B Revolutionary United Front</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN_IC1 4 ThirdParty1_IC United Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECO WAS_IC 5 Economic Community Of West African States. Official start mandate from 1997, but active before.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OAU_IC3 6 Organisation of African Unity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria_IC4 7 Nigeria (after 08-1997 in ECO WAS mission, code ‘nigeria’ only when explicitly as Nigeria after 08-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(e.g. OAU, UN, ECOWAS) use the unspecified option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia_IC5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_IC6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_IC7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified_IC8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Unspecified International Actor e.g. the international community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA_W2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamajoisia_W7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kamajoisia or Kamajors (paramilitary organisation self-organising Mende civilians). From 04-1998 part of the CDF. When Kamajo after this period include a specific reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF_W8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Civil Defence Forces (all paramilitary organisation such as Kamajors, tamaboro, gbethis, kapras &amp; donsos). Only to be coded from 04-1998 onwards). See also kamajor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified_A1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Settlement Unspecified settlement/agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abidjan_A2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Abidjan (1996) Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conankry_A3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Conankry (1997) agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lome_A4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Lome (1999) agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuja_A5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Abuja (2000-2001) series of agreements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Self/Other_SUBJE CT & Self/Other_OBJE CT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reference to Self E.g. We (SELF) support the United Nations (OTHER) Note: when AFRC refers to SLA it is usually referring to the Self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reference to Other E.g. The United Nations (OTHER) support us (SELF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%null%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Unknown specification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Verb**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verb</td>
<td></td>
<td>Include only transitive verbs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transitive verbs imply a grammatical object and refer to actions. The verb does something. E.g. Russia invaded Afghanistan. *Invaded* implies that something is invaded. Intransitive verbs should not be included. Examples of intransitive verbs are for example; we *dine* or he *died*. They describe existence. Include only Verbs that express conflict/cooperative relations between subject and object. Verbs that do not fit either the conflict or cooperation label should not be included. Do not include verbs that have no political context (i.e. do not deal with a policy domain).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb Value</th>
<th>Verb Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A value between [-3, 3] for transitive Verbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine positive or negative:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Think for yourself – does it fit one of the categories?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Place the act on conflict-cooperation scale/positive-negative scale/friendly-hostile scale.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Observe what the subject (agent) does to the object (patent); is it a conflict act or a cooperation act? Is there a positive or a negative relation? E.g. Kamaboys fought for their local territories is a conflict act but Kamaboys and local territories are in a positive relation thus: +3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>appeal/support (1) OR oppose/resist (-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,-1)</td>
<td><em>Rhetorical wishes/encouragements category</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should ought + future act not a 2 but rhetorical construct thus 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2,-2)</td>
<td>Promise/benefits (2) OR threaten/costs (-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Future Acts</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deeds</td>
<td>Reward (+3) OR Punishment (-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Past or present acts</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>