A Regime in an Identity Crisis: Scenario Building & The OSCE

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DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “A Regime in an Identity Crisis: Scenario Building & The OSCE”, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

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“Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight” – Hugues de Jouvenel
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Introduction

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) celebrates in 2015 its forty years anniversary. In the last forty years many changes did occur, both within the organization as outside of the organization. When the organization (originally the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) was created, the heat of the Cold War was still going on. In the mean time, the Cold War already is many years behind us. The original goal of the organization was to decrease tensions between the capitalist West and the communist East, now however the OSCE is much more occupied with the intensification of cooperation and the strengthening of democratic foundations. Other international organizations pursue also goals in this area and are perhaps more efficient than the OSCE. The OSCE’s right to exist is under pressure and the organization needs to show where it added value lies and what its unique selling points are. This indicates both threats as opportunities for the future.

The celebration of the OSCE’s fortieth anniversary is taking place in 2015. The preparations for this celebration started in the last months of 2012. The members are negotiating at the moment whether or not they will come up with a new big declaration to provide the OSCE with the much needed new élan. The organization is in an identity crisis at the moment. Evaluation and recommendation reports state that the foundations of the organization are at stake. Multiple scenarios can be indentified. At first sight, three possible scenarios seem plausible. The first scenario incorporates a standstill, which means that the OSCE in 2015 remains unchanged. The organization loses more territory every day to the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe, which means that a standstill is de facto a decline. The second scenario would be a clash between the negotiating parties. Countries go for the areas which they consider important without giving space for the other areas which other countries consider important for the organization to occupy itself with. Experts describe the scenario as a ‘leverage scenario’, until eventually nothing rests for the organization to deal with. A doom scenario in other words. A third scenario finally, might be a breakthrough between the negotiating parties. They reach an agreement and issue a strong declaration in which the OSCE is able to refocus on its goals, and play a meaningful role in the areas in which it is going to operate. Experts from the field however are sceptical towards this option.

The question now becomes: What possible scenarios on the future of the OSCE in a security regime perspective deem plausible and what are the consequences of each specific scenario? At first sight, after only trivial research, three possible scenarios, come into the picture. Please bear in mind that these scenarios are formulated in their pure forms and that combinations of these scenarios (hybrid forms) are possible. Further research is necessary, to verify whether the existence of these three scenarios is indeed the case, or to find out what adjustments need to be made. Of course, the scenarios need to be clearly demarcated. In this thesis I will do a study of scenario building on the OSCE, based on the principles of scenario building theory provided by Iver Neumann and Erik Øverland. I choose these authors because they describe the method of scenario building and make a connection between the building of these scenarios and the planning with them. Where these authors fall short I complete my input with other scholars such as Hugues de Jouvenel. In conclusion, I will deduce scenarios from scholarly literature, delineate them, test the plausibility of the various scenarios and interpret them according to their consequences. This all is the main piece of this thesis.

Structure of the thesis

“Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight” – Hugues de Jouvenel
This thesis consists of two parts. The one part is the actual scenario building based on the scenario building theory of Neumann and Øverland. The other part consists of preparatory activities. It is simply not possible to outline the several scenarios for the OSCE without a very minimal background of the security sector, since the OSCE is still foremost a security organization. Therefore, we also need to very briefly capture the other international organizations that deal in this sector. In short: I need to place the OSCE in a perspective and context of security regimes and the inter-organizational aspects that play a role here. I need to find out what security regimes are, and I will do that by the help of regime theory. The explanation of regime theory forms the first chapter of this thesis.

A thesis in the studies of International Relations is in most cases based upon or structured alongside the lines of theory, or a set of theories. We will either test the theory by the help of a specific case or explain a case by the help of a theory. In this thesis, I will go for the second. I will elaborate on the future of the OSCE by the help of certain theories. In my opinion, the thesis is structured in the most efficient manner when I first provide the most important elements of the theoretical framework accompanied of course by the reasons why I choose this specific theoretical framework for my thesis. Once the theory is outlined sufficiently, I am able to cite from this in later chapters of this thesis. In other words, I am able to apply parts of the theory in the empirics. I will create in this way a dialogue between theory and practice. Besides this, it is also true that starting with the theory is quite the logical thing to do in this thesis. I just mentioned that I am going to explain a case by the help of a theory. It follows from this that it is best to make a brief sketch of the case as I have done in the part above and then do an extensive explanation of the theory.

In this thesis, two theories run through the entire piece and it is very important to distinguish between them as soon as possible. I use regime theory and scenario building theory in this writing. Regime theory is for the content of this thesis and scenario building theory is procedural. Earlier I wrote that this thesis consists of two parts (the main part and the preparatory part) and for reasons of style and clarity I decided to begin both parts with an explanation of the theory. Regime theory in the first part, scenario building theory in the second. Another advantage of the way as I plan to do it is that we are able to establish a clear top-down structure. We begin very broad and general with the theory, we narrow it down in the second chapter with the security sector. Finally, we proceed in the third chapter with one specific regime dealing in this security sector, e.g. the OSCE.

The security sector forms the content of the second chapter. This chapter serves the only goal of providing information in order to fully grasp the multiple scenarios on the future of the OSCE. The chapter is about the threats posed to the security regimes anno 2014, such as interstate conflicts (most important one!), terrorism, international trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings, human rights violations and so on. Interstate conflicts are discussed in the chapter, a descriptive overview of other issues in the security sector can be found in Annex I, since this information is merely informational. It is in my opinion simply not possible to outline scenarios on the future of the OSCE which might for instance a bigger role in the area of terrorism when we do not have certain informational basis about what is going on in, for instance, terrorism. I cannot explain the, in this example, bigger role of the terrorism, let alone its consequences, when I have not yet delved into the numbers, figures and most recent scholarly literature about terrorism.

When an outline of security regimes and the security sector is produced, it is time to narrow things down to the actor level, which is in case the OSCE. This master thesis cannot be
written without a historical overview of the regime, an analysis of the structure of the organization, its goals, its functioning and possible threats and opportunities for the future. This chapter contains a descriptive overview of the history of the OSCE as well as an analytical counterpart of the organization’s functioning. The analysis is based on conversations with employees working in an OSCE-related field, email contacts with staff members and a study of the most relevant policy documents. Once a certain basic level of knowledge on the OSCE is created, we are completely able to proceed with the second part of this thesis, which is the actual scenario building, commencing with scenario building theory.

The second part of the thesis begins, again, with an explanation of the relevant theory. As was announced, I base myself primarily on Neumann and Øverland here and whenever that fails to be sufficient, other authors are used as well. That is for instance the case when scenario building is discussed, because Neumann and Øverland theorize mainly about scenario planning and that is not the same. The theory is in this chapter is used as some sort of blueprint for the remaining chapters of this thesis and since the theory included a roadmap, the only thing I need to do is follow the roadmap. The roadmap consists predominantly of an identification of the relevant key variables, the gathering of sufficient data, the outlining of several scenarios and the –in my own words- inclusion of consequences. These steps then form the basis for the rest of the chapters. The identification of certain key variables is chapter five, the outlining of the scenarios is chapter six and the inclusion of consequential aspects is chapter seven. Additional information is provided in the annexes.

Relevance
We use theories in order to better understand patterns, structures, systems and so on. We are able to sometimes explain with the help of those theories and sometimes to predict due to those theories. Scholars do not theorize for the purpose of theorizing, but because they can help others with the assistance of those theories. These others can be citizens, entrepreneurs, business associates, but also military officers, politicians and government officials. That is my wish too. I hope that others who are in some way involved in the matters where this thesis is about are in any form supported by what thesis has to offer. There is a very concrete circumstance of the OSCE existing 40 years, leading up to the process Helsinki +40, where politicians have to make a decision. This occasion is the main reason for writing this thesis. Several scenarios might happen and I want to outline to them what these scenarios are and what the consequences of these scenarios are. It is however, not my intention to adhere a degree of likeliness to the various scenarios; that is up to the readers to decide. This thesis is further unique in that it combines the OSCE with scenario building theory and regime theory.

Personal note
My affection for the Eastern region and the OSCE in particular, dates back to a couple of years now. This appears from the things I occupied myself with and the countries I travelled to, such as the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, and almost every former Yugoslavian country. In 2011, I did an internship that caused me to visit Poland and Georgia and experience projects there that relate to democratization, freedom of speech and the freedom of media. In 2013, I did an internship in the Dutch national parliament with a member of the Dutch liberal party. She was at that time responsible for the defence domain and partly for foreign affairs. In that feature, she was also a member of the OSCE Parliamentarian Assembly. For her I enacted research on the question what the OSCE could contribute to the Netherlands, also in the light of Helsinki +40 (the 40 years anniversary negotiations). That research was only limited in a limited amount of time and it was my desire to continue investigating in the OSCE a lot further in a broader and also more scholarly perspective.
Chapter 1: Regime Theory

Definitions
In the early 1980s, Stephen Krasner laid a theoretical foundation for regime theory, among the grand schools of theories. What is regime theory and why is it relevant for this thesis? Explaining always begins with defining; after the definition is provided for, explaining can be done with the specific parts of this definition. The definition of regime theory, actually a definition of regimes, developed by Stephen D. Krasner is most commonly accepted and sounds like the following: ‘Regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.’ (Krasner, 186). It stems from this definition that there are four crucial elements here. First, it is about principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Second, they can either be implicit or explicit. Third, it is about expectations of ‘actors’ and finally, it has to do with given areas of international relations.

Regarding the first element, Andreas Hasenclever has provided for clearly distinguished definitions of the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures (Hasenclever, 9), assisted by an example of nuclear non-proliferation. It is therefore not necessary to write these definitions down here. The second part seems quite obvious to me, it is not necessary for a regime to exist that its principles are written down in some charter, etc. Thirdly, the crux is in the actors’ part, which consists basically of states. Regime theory is quite state centric, which is therefore one of the major critiques of Susan Strange, to which will be returned later. Finally, the last element is also not that difficult, it just means that regimes can exist in basically any area of international relations, for example the monetary, migration, nuclear non-proliferation, food, water, human rights, etc.

In addition to the above I mention Peterson, who states that ‘the 1982 definition indicates three primary elements: 1) an interrelated array of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, 2) a group of actors using that array to guide their expectations regarding their own and others’ behaviour, and 3) an issue-area where that array and those expectations will be engaged.’ (Peterson). There are some other definitions on regimes as well, which describe regimes as instances of rule-based cooperation (Hasenclever, 1); however we stick to the 1982 version of Stephen Krasner.

Peter Haas correctly notices that through this definition of regimes, International Relations theory is very present. The study of International Relations is known for its dual focus on ideas (norms and principles) on the one hand and more material aspects (rules and decision-making procedures) on the other hand (Haas). This also means that there are multiple approaches to regime theory. They can either be knowledge-based (Cognitivism), or they can be power-based (Realism) or interest-based (Neoliberalism). The purpose of this thesis however is not to capture the debate that took place between this grand schools of theories, I only mention here that there are several approaches to regime theory. This fits with the ontological point Peter Haas makes, namely that there is no such thing as regime theory. There are, however, multiple theories of regimes. This point is also addressed by the critiques of Susan Strange, and again, we will return to this in a later stage.


Relevance

There are three main schools of thought on the relevance of regimes. But first of all, there is a general agreement on the relation between basic causal factors and outcomes/behaviour. The relation is that outcomes and behaviour are influenced by basic causal factors. Nothing shocking so far. Regimes however can be intervening variables standing between basic causal factors and outcomes and behaviour (Krasner, 185). The disagreement on regimes comes in place when discussing to what extent regimes actually have an impact on outcomes and behaviour. Here there are three schools of thought, who basically are saying that regimes only have a trivial impact (1), regimes can have impact, but only when certain conditions are met (2) or regimes do have a certain impact (3). It is important here not to confuse the relevance of regimes with the effectiveness of regimes; we are discussing here the first.

It is also possible to go for the compromise here, by assuming that ‘their substantive character and impact varies by the issue they address, the region of the world in which they operate, the era in which they operate, or the characteristics of the problem they are intended to mitigate or resolve’ (Peterson). I am not convinced by the scholars stating that the relevance of regimes is only trivial. They state that changes in behaviour and outcomes are influenced by changes in basic causal factors, which can either be economic or political. The reason I am not convinced is because I only need to look at the European Union, which has become a major entity, with strongly developed principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, which more than once changes an already made decision of an actor (behaviour), thereby proving impact. I therefore go for the scheme, made by Krasner, as shown below, in which regimes are an intervening variable standing between basic causal factors and outcomes and behaviour:

Basic causal variables $\rightarrow$ regimes $\rightarrow$ related behaviour and outcomes

Another variant is the following:

Basic causal variables $\rightarrow$ Regimes $\uparrow\downarrow$

Basic causal variables $\rightarrow$ Related patterned behaviour

(Krasner, 193)

Effectiveness

Regimes and institutions are not the same; the existence of an institution however indicates mostly the presence of a regime. Institutionalism therefore is a major piece of regime theory. According to Hasenclever, institutionalism therefore is a major piece of regime theory. However, there are minimalist and maximalist versions to what extent (Hasenclever, 2). The question to what extent depends on the regime ‘effectiveness’ and the regime ‘robustness’, says Hasenclever. A regime can be more or less effective and can be more or less robust or resilient. A regime is effective when (1) members abide by its norms and rules and (2) its achieves certain objectives or fulfils certain purposes. A regime is robust when (1) it shows ‘staying power’ of international institutions in the face of exogenous challenges and (2) the extent to which prior institutional choices constrain collective decisions and behaviour in later periods. (Hasenclever, 86).
So a regime is also effective when members abide by its norms and rules. The assumption here is that members base their decisions upon rationality. In other words, the motivation for international actors is based on rationality: consistent, ordered preferences; calculation of costs and benefits; maximizing their utility in light of those preferences, Keohane’s words (Hasenclever, 115). Here we got unnoticed a little side-tracked towards the interest-based approach. Interests alone can effectively sustain order, states Stein (Krasner, 199). Hasenclever also mentions contractualism here. Contractualism is a situational precondition, which means that states active in the issue-area must share common interests which they can realize only through cooperation. (Hasenclever, 30). The existence of such interests is a necessary, but however not sufficient condition for cooperation. These interests can consist of reducing transaction costs, improve quality and quantity of information available, establishing legal liability, etc. It is obvious here that these interests should outweigh costs of regime formation and maintenance, according to Keohane (Krasner, 196).

For the sake of completeness we should also address the power-based approach towards regime theory. A power-based approach might lead to other insights, discovers Peter Haas. He states that ‘power based analyses expect regimes to have greater impacts on weaker parties, whereas institutional analysis with its emphasis on resolving transaction costs and structural impediments to cooperation would be more likely to expect more uniform effects.’ (Haas). The explanation for this greater impact on weaker parties might be found in the role of a hegemon. What exactly is the influence of a hegemon within a regime? Do regimes need hegemons for their sustainability? Krasner thinks so. He says that when a hegemon’s relative capabilities decline, a regime will collapse. (Krasner, 200). Or there might be another explanation for the greater impact on weaker parties within a regime. The explanation being formed by the balance of power. This is Strange’s argument. She argues that regimes have little or no impact. Impact can only take place by changes in the balance of power or by national interests. With this we have returned to the perspective of regimes as non-relevant.

**Emergence and sustainability**

How does a regime actually emerge? Peterson has devoted a major part of his article to this question, asking questions about understanding how and when the phenomenon emerges, changes, or disappears. Regime formation can take place spontaneously, agreed upon and enforced by powerful actors. These are the three tastes we have. When there is no converging on principles, norms and rules, assuming regime formation, analysts should be open to the possibility that none emerges (Peterson).

Since regimes are more than temporary arrangements, a certain resilience is presupposed. The various scholars all mention their threats to the sustainability. We already discussed the influence of a hegemon, addressed by Krasner. Peterson mentions the existence of multiple international regimes, both within and across issue-areas. We should question ourselves how they do fit together, in particular when they are mutually reinforcing or mutually weakening. (Peterson). A very justified issue raised here, which will be made concrete in later chapters of this thesis. So we will return to this. Other questions raised by Peterson are about how and to what extent changes in actors’ beliefs or perceptions reinforce or erode the regime? What happens when actors’ attitudes are no longer uniform? According to Peterson, that will have consequences for compliance. (Peterson). But what does that mean for the regime? Krasner explains: Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within the regime, provided that principles and norms are unaltered. Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. (Krasner, 187)
Critiques to Regime Theory
Susan Strange has launched a critique towards regime theory, commanded by, in her own terminology, five dragons. These are metaphors for the five points of critique that she has. According to Strange, regime theory does too little for a long-term contribution to knowledge. Second, the concept is imprecise and woolly. Strange means with this that people mean different things when they use the concept of international regime. Third, the concept is value-based. Fourth, regime theory overemphasizes the static and underemphasizes the dynamic elements of change in world politics and last but not least, the concept is narrow-minded due to state-centred paradigms. Susan Strange is extremely sceptical of regime theory, which leads to ‘obfuscating and confusing in stead of clarifying and illuminating’ (Strange, 479). Although Strange does make certain points (regime theory is indeed mostly state-centred), I however deem not all of her arguments that strong. For instance that the concept is value-based. She argues that the word ‘regime’ puts forward some negative associations, like the Stalin regime or the Pinochet regime. This might be the case, but ‘regime’ is unfortunately a word with multiple explanations. The explanations do not all need to be as factual as desired. There are more words one could think of that have a very factual significance, and a second more value-based meaning, for instance like ‘communism’. To state however that the whole concept of regime theory is value-based does not do justice to the useful tools regime theory provides. And to argue that regime theory does too little for a long-term contribution to knowledge is a little premature at the time of her writing. An interesting question to do research on would indeed be about to what extent regime theory has contributed to scholarly literature, however not for this thesis. And finally, that the concept is imprecise and woolly is just a matter of providing good definitions, as many have been developed.

International organizations versus regimes
The difference between organizations and regimes is also very relevant for this thesis, since I also addressed the OSCE as an organization in the Introduction. And because this is the place for conceptual clarification, it is now a suitable moment to address this issue. I have jet explained what regimes are, I presume the definition of international organizations as common knowledge at this stage. One might easily use the definitions interchangeably, I do that in this thesis myself also, and therefore it is important to distinguish between the terms. There are examples of organizations who are not regimes, because there is not a situation of shared principles, but only a formal cooperation for practical reasons. There are also examples of regimes that are not an organization, because they lack for instance a founding charter, an organizational structure or an option of membership. An example of this is the OSCE which has been a regime from 1975 when it was still the CSCE and later became also an organization in the 1990s, while it was renamed to the OSCE. A regime can also consist of multiple organizations. This is also the case with the OSCE and for instance the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which are formally organizations independent from each other, but they constitute together the same regime. This is something that recurs later in this thesis, when we delve into the organizational aspects of the OSCE.

Conclusion
We addressed the definition of regimes as it is most commonly accepted. It is true however that other formulations pass on in the scholarly literature. As Strange said: People mean different things when they use the concept of international regime. It might very well be the case that I make myself guilty to this as well. We discussed the function of regimes, which is to coordinate state behaviour to achieve desired outcomes in particular issue areas. (Krasner, 191). The function of regime theory, or actually the theory of regimes, is then the search for common factors and general rules. In other words: the essence of regime analysis (Strange,
We also discussed that there are multiple approaches possible to this. I will finish with one concrete example of this, mentioned by Stephen Krasner. He says that Realists see regimes as phenomena that need to be explained, where Grotians see regimes as data that need to be described. (Krasner, 194).

This chapter started with the questions: What is regime theory and why is it relevant for this thesis? The reason for such an extensive discussion of regime theory is that all the specific parts discussed will be applied in a concrete case study on the OSCE. We will see that norms and principles, rules and decision-making procedures will be addressed from interest or power-based perspectives or both. Without this theoretical chapter, it is not possible to process the case study in a right way. Remains open: why is it relevant for this thesis? In other words: why have I chosen regime theory as the theoretical starting point? I used regime theory, because the presupposed perspective of the OSCE as a regime is far more useful than the OSCE as simply an organization. The theory provided insights on the emergence of regimes and more important, on the sustaining and possible disappearance of regimes. What I also like and considered useful is the distinguishing of principles and norms and of rules and decision-making procedures which I can relate very easily to parts of the OSCE in a contentual perspective. When weighing the added value of the OSCE as a regime we have to incorporate costs and benefits and that is also something that is in regime theory.

The question then becomes whether the OSCE is actually a regime? Therefore, we have to look into the OSCE and focus on its principles, norms, etc. That will be done in chapter three. However, between the theory and the OSCE as the concrete case, there is something in between. That is the security sector and (other) security regimes. I have chosen to put most information on issues within the security sector and security regimes in the annexes I and II, since this information is not analytical and merely informational. I did not however want to move all information to the annexes, therefore chapter two provides a brief overview on the security sector before we descend to the OSCE at the individual level. We continue now with the next chapter which is about the security sector.
Chapter 2: The Security Sector

Historically, the world has been facing times where war and (relative) peace alternate each other. The threat of war however has never been far away. Also, it is incorrect to state that ‘the world is at war’ or ‘at peace’. There are always countries facing wars, whether they are intrastate or interstate. There are always countries that are completely isolated from the struggles going on in the rest of the world, for instance in the Pacific. How exactly is today’s security sector actually characterized? Sub-questions in this chapter are: What issues are important? What issues become less important? How do these issues reflect on policies within the countries for instance on their amount on military spending?

Interstate warfare in general

The report last year from The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies states that the numbers of interstate conflicts have risen significantly in the last few years. Today, the number of conflicts even equals the number of conflicts in the times of the Cold War. Even more so, more than 90 percent of conflicts worldwide are an interstate conflict (Report HCSS, 15). This means that first of all, the embedded idea that state-versus-state-conflicts are something of previous times is no longer maintainable. What else does this mean? It also means that countries are forced to re-prioritize their available finances in a context of spending on their armed forces. The most recent turmoil in Ukraine revived this discussion in a certain amount of NATO member states anyway. Already voices are raised stating that the Cold War has returned, in certain articles in newspapers. Although this obviously seems a bit preliminary, the issue at stake here is that security, even in Europe, never is fully self-evident. Of course, the reader has to bear in mind here that I have not done any research to the nature of the interstate conflict numbers, provided by the HCSS Report.

Another instrument for measuring the world’s security level is by looking at the trends in world military expenditure. SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has done so and published a report on this a few months ago. One of the main conclusions of this report is that for countries in the Western hemisphere, expenditures fell, whilst in the countries besides the Western countries, expenditures on the military rose, with a net 1.9 per cent decrease due to the Western countries (West- and Central Europe, Northern America, Oceania). The largest increase in spending took place in Africa, by 8.3 per cent. There are according to the report 23 countries that have doubled their military expenditure since 2004. The report concluded here that these countries share certain characteristics, which are very strong economic growth, high oil or gas revenues and/or significant armed conflict or other violence (SIPRI report 2014). The developments as observed by SIPRI are also described in other publications, see for instance the Military Balance 2014, where an analysis is added about reasons for individual countries to raise their military expenditures.

There is more or less a general agreement in opinion on the shifting of power from the Western region (mainly Europe) to other regions of the world (mainly Asia, but also South-America, the Middle East and Africa). I think that this agreement is being supported by the numbers above on military expenditure. These numbers represent the developments that are going on, with one of the consequences being the United States focuses less on Europe and more to other regions in the world. The consequences of this development for the (future of) the OSCE are very interesting, I will return to this point later in the thesis. Of course, the security sector has more assets than only the military, therefore it is necessary to emphasize these areas as well.

“Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight” – Hugues de Jouvenel
The goal of this chapter is not to capture all the interstate and intrastate conflicts taking place all around the world. We do not have the place nor is it necessary to discuss them in this thesis. However, I am going to mention very briefly some conflicts interfering with the OSCE member states, based on the data also provided by ‘the Military Balance 2014’. The document is dated from February 2014, the current crisis in Ukraine is therefore not included.

**Crisis Ukraine**

In February 2014 negotiations towards an EU-Ukraine association agreement reached its climax, resulting in the non-signing of the agreement from the Ukrainian side. This decision of the Ukrainian government caused anger with a large part of the Ukrainian people, resulting in people’s protests. The demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine evolved into calls for resignation of the Ukrainian president. The move of Ukraine towards a closer cooperation with Western Europe worried Russia, especially because a lot of ethnic Russians live in Ukraine. Russia saw its interests in Ukraine threatened and decided to intervene in Ukraine’s border areas, especially in the Crimea with a strong Russian majority. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine with military means is considered in many Western countries as a violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the non-intervention principle, adhered strongly in many other situations by, ironically, Russia. The crisis in Ukraine led to many condemnations from other states and international organizations, developing eventually into sanctions from lots of Western countries towards Russia. At the same time, de-escalation negotiations were going on to solve this dispute as soon as possible. The OSCE was considered a useful platform to facilitate the reconciliation and did send a mission of observers to Ukraine to monitor the compliance of the terms of agreement. At the time of writing, this crisis is still going on.

**Other military or non-military conflicts involving OSCE member states**

In the last few years, the OSCE territory has known a couple of conflicts, or in OSCE border regions. During 2013, fighting in the Middle East and North Africa worsened. First there is the civil war going on in Syria, taking millions of civilian lives so far, with as absolute rock-bottom the chemical weapons that were used in August 2013. Second, the situation in Iraq, where Al Qaeda groupings were becoming more powerful once more. Iran’s nuclear programme and support for the Assad regime in Syria, continued to provoke regional and international concern. There are civil wars going on in Mali and the Central African Republic, which are not so much OSCE border regions, but they are countries housing some humanitarian and intervention missions (MINUSMA and MINUSCA) fueled predominantly by OSCE member states. In Asia is one dealing with some border disputes and maritime incidents. The Military Balance 2014 mentions the Chinese announcement of an air-defense identification zone over part of the East Chinese Sea. Tensions between China and Japan seem to have risen substantially. Both China, Japan and India are investing heavily in becoming a bigger maritime power, by purchasing the most modern aircraft carriers. Finally there is Afghanistan, an OSCE border state, which still is a very insecure country. Nevertheless are Afghan forces gradually assuming the lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan. They are aiming to reach the sole responsibility by the end of 2014, when almost all foreign soldiers are left.

**Other issues in the security sector**

Obviously, I am not able to dig into all security threats to the international community nowadays. That is not the aim of the thesis, and of course, this thesis lacks the space to do that. Instead, I tried to focus on the most threatening security issues, as the are also formulated by the National Defense Magazine (2012), such as: terrorism, cyber warfare, transnational crimes, etc. When outlining scenarios whether or not the OSCE as a security regime should...
continue to exist, we obviously first need to now if there is a need to, and if so, how big that need is. The relevant data therefore can be found additionally in appendix I. Here is in this chapter, I continue for now with this security concerns in relation to security governance. This issue is where Elke Krahmann’s article is about. She describes a development where ‘governments and international organizations have shifted their primary security concerns from interstate war to asymmetric threats, limited resources, lack of expertise in non-traditional areas of security, and divergent interests among governments have facilitated a growing fragmentation of security policymaking’ (Krahmann, 18). This ‘fragmentation of security policymaking brings us first at annex II, which is an overview of some fragments, and secondly at the next chapter which singles out another fragment which is the OSCE.

Source: Andy Singer. Cartoon on terrorism versus militarism

‘Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight’ – Hugues de Jouvenel
Chapter 3: The OSCE

The OSCE is a very unique security organization operating in a security field as discussed in the previous chapter. The OSCE has been very successful in some distinct areas and still is in very particular cases, like its observation missions during nation or regional elections. But what exactly is the OSCE? In the chapter we are going to discuss its creation and the continuing history, during and after the Cold War. We will deal with its organizational structure, and also with the challenges that it is facing of the contemporary times.

History of the OSCE
The OSCE was created in 1975 as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This conference started in 1973 and achieved its climax in 1975 by presenting the Helsinki Final Act, by which the CSCE became a fact. In this Helsinki Final Act, the negotiating parties and members to the Act agreed to cooperate in the fields of economy, environment, transportation, culture, science, and much more. The fact that the CSCE tried on so many grounds to establish a cooperation and bring the members together can partly be explained by the given that at the time of 1975 much less international organizations did exist. The development of international organizations accelerated quickly in the 1970s and nowadays much more international organizations have specialised themselves to areas of environment, human rights, trade relations, health care, culture and so on. The reason that the CSCE in 1975 went for a broad range of policy fields can also be explained by the political sentiments of that time. The protection of human rights was placed higher and higher on the agenda, but gained insufficient priority and willingness from mainly the East European countries under the direction of the Soviet-Union. The Soviet-Union preferred a cooperation in the political-militaristic dimension and secondly, in the economic dimension. Because of this more or less an agreement was reached where the west emphasized a cooperation in the field of human rights protection (the third dimension) and the east focused on the political-militaristic cooperation (the first dimension). The second dimension was about the economy and the environment and was regarded as politically less sensitive, however valued greatly. The first dimension was considered most important, also because the need for cooperation in the security sector the direct cause was for the creation of the CSCE.

Back to 1975, which is in the middle of the Cold War. One says that because of the period of ‘détente’ negotiations between east and west could start, which eventually lead to the CSCE (Hong, 316). A direct confrontation between East and West had not happened so far, but nevertheless, the countries between the blocs sought for cooperation as much as possible, predominantly in the military area. Already in 1949 created the Western powers NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), in which they united themselves in order to cooperate militaristically. For east Europe, NATO proved a direct threat and until the day today, there are strong negative sentiments in the former Soviet countries towards NATO, even though the Cold War is already far behind us. When at 1975 both Eastern Europe as Western Europe saw that they could both take advantage of a decrease of the mutual tensions, but NATO lied politically too sensitive, conversations were commenced which led to the creation of the CSCE. The CSCE was and is principally a security organization, aimed at promoting and enforcing peace and security. One does agree in general that the creation of the CSCE was responsible for a big part to the collapse of communism and with that the end of the Cold War (Hong, 311).
The text of the Helsinki Final Act was based on the non-intervention principle and a peaceful resolution of disputes, which is understandable in the time back then. In 1990, the Helsinki Final Act was updated, mainly because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War. In the Charter of Paris were other accents laid, which can again be explained by the developments of that time. There is in the Charter of Paris for instance for more emphasis on the recognition and valuing of human rights, the promoting of human rights and the immediate ending of human rights violations. Apparently, the East European could consent to that in 1990, where in 1975 they held on to the principle of non-intervention. After the signing of the Charter of Paris the cooperation between the member states was intensified. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe became more permanent and was renamed to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. The organization got a headquarters in Vienna, and from now on I will speak of the OSCE.

The goals of the OSCE have their effect on the organizational structure of the OSCE. The OSCE is an organization with 57 member states, residing in Vienna. The organization also has its offices in The Hague, Prague, Warsaw, Geneva and Copenhagen. The Summit for heads of government and heads of state takes on average place every two years. In this Summit the course of the organization is determined. The organ below this Summit is the Ministerial Council, in which the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states have their seats. The Council takes most important decisions and gathers twice a year. Below the Ministerial Council is the Permanent Assembly, which consists of delegates from all member states. They assemble every week and speak about the daily businesses. Another organ is the Parliamentary Assembly, a conference of members of parliament from the member states. In this Assembly they are able to vote on resolutions, which can encourage the member states to take certain actions, or refrain from taking certain actions. The Parliamentary Assembly is (financially) independent and has its own secretariat. The Assembly gathers a few times a year, in a general meeting or in smaller committees and sub groupings.

In the years of its existence, many initiatives have been taken to improve the organizational structure of the OSCE, to make sure that every time the OSCE is completely ready for the challenges of the future. This initiatives were not always accepted easily. One of those initiatives was under Slovenian presidency the Panel of Eminent Persons, which had the task to produce a report of importance, filled with recommendations for the OSCE. The OSCE is more and more conviced of the function of measuring and evaluating, which appears also from the annual report of the OSCE’s Audit Committee 2012-2013: "...the Secretary-General issued an 'Evaluation Framework' as an Administrative Instruction. The Framework defines more clearly the quality standards all evaluations done by the OSCE must meet. It also clarifies the fundamental differences that exist between so-called self-evaluation, commissioned evaluation and independent evaluation. Knowledge from evaluations should be shared with and between executive structures." The Audit Committee exists of independent experts who are going to review the rules of procedure and make some recommendations.

On the other hand must we acknowledge that the OSCE in the last few years quite successful was when it comes to common declarations, agreements, treaties, and so on, despite the given that within the OSCE is voted with unanimity. This could be considered quite an accomplishment. The OSCE has booked successes in the fields of national minorities, terrorism, water management, border control, environment policies, election matters, etc. It is even so that certain agreements have a binding status. This can be, because the Ministerial Council votes with consensus, implying an explicit consent of each member state, making matters binding. Countries can hold each other to these binding commitments, and address...
each other when there is a case of non-compliance. It even goes further than these binding commitments. In the so-called Moscow Document (A product of the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Moscow 1991) is the Moscow Mechanism established. This Moscow Mechanism involves the possibility of the creation of ad hoc committees (existing of independent experts) who ought to report to the Ministerial Council. The creation of these ad hoc committees is possible without the consent of the member state in question. The Moscow mechanism also involves that politically binding decisions can be made, also with the state where it is about, is opposed. This is the so-called consensus-minus-one. The Panel of Eminent Persons concludes that human rights no longer belong to the exclusive internal domain of a state, but that its protection is as well an individual responsibility as well as a collective one. The Moscow Mechanism is a far-reaching instrument within the OSCE.

Other developments
In the current economic crisis we see that the added value of international organizations is seen in a new perspective. The crisis began in 2008 and is anno 2014 still not over, although many signs of recovery have presented themselves in the mean time. Many Western European countries have gone through major budget cuts in their budget and also international organizations are not spared from saving on their expenditures. High costs are reconsidered and wastes of money are dealt with. A development also acknowledged by the OSCE. "The OSCE has been facing, and will probably continue to face, a trend of declining resources, as many other organizations and States do under the pressure of the economic crisis, but also as a part of adapting the Organization to changing demands." In the past fifteen years the OSCE budget has decreased significantly. Where the budget was 211.5 million Euros in 2000, only 162.7 million Euros were left in 2006. The member states have agreed to a nominal growth of zero percent. The budget does not grow, which means de facto a budget cut due to inflation. In the last few years budget cuts have been taken place. The OSCE even counts on further budget cuts. The budget for projects and missions on location has been decreased by a large amount, for a big part due to a lesser willingness to finance it from the member states. In 2013, the OSCE budget amounted around the 150 million Euros.

Conclusion
In this chapter we have dealt with the question what exactly the OSCE is. The OSCE has certain unique selling points, which involve the comprehensive approach of the three dimensions, the decision-making procedures involving unanimity and finally, the territorial inclusion of almost the entire Northern hemisphere. Since 1975, the number of international organizations has grown significantly. At that time, specialised organizations in the field of nature, environment, transportation and culture barely existed, now things have completely changed, even more so, these organizations have defeated the OSCE in expertise in the discussed domains. Therefore, the OSCE needs to justify itself in order to occupy itself in these areas, which it does now. The organization has changed and modernised itself in the last few years, but there are still many opportunities for the OSCE. The OSCE could develop more towards a 'network-organization', as the Panel of Eminent Persons also recommends (Report Panel of Eminent Persons, 15). This means that significant cuts on bureaucracy can take place. The OSCE should prioritize then on some main themes. In the next chapters we will discuss some of these recommendations, which mostly are also addressed within the various scenarios. From now, we will continue with the future scenarios for the OSCE.
Chapter 4: Scenario Building Theory

When building a house, the first one does is establishing a foundation, doing the groundwork. That is what I have done in this thesis in the first few chapters (and additional annexes). When planning to do a scenario building on the OSCE, it is necessary to identify the crucial variables, which have been discussed in the chapters before, which are the OSCE itself, other security regimes and the security sector in more detail. We now have all the ingredients to execute the recipe, but what exactly is the recipe? What steps do we need to take? That is what we need to learn in this chapter. We need to find out what scenario building theory involves, so that we –again– can bring the theory into practice. We focus mainly in this chapter on the scenario building theory as written about in their article by Iver Neumann and Erik Øverland. Sadly, the Neumann and Øverland article lacks certain elements, which is why this chapter is being supported by the article of Hugues de Jouvenel. With the help of these two articles together I am able to answer the question: What entails scenario building theory and how do we do a proper study based on scenario building and scenario planning?

Let us start by providing some definitions of what a scenario is. The first one is the working definition for this thesis, namely: a scenario is an internally consistent hypothesis of how the future might unfold (Neumann and Øverland, 259). Neumann and Øverland mention other definitions, such as the one of Van der Heijden, which is: a set of reasonably plausible, but structurally different futures. Recurring theme in these definitions is obviously the role of the future. What Neumann and Øverland leave out in their discussion, but what is included in the De Jouvenel article is the whole determinism versus free will debate. This debate is not considered important for this thesis, nor is it required to reach certain conclusions. However, I suffice here with the mentioning that I assume a situation of free will, where the destiny of the OSCE is open to any possibility. The role of time is logically very important in scenario building theory. Scholars have debated a lot about the matter to what extent we should incorporate historical junctures in the building of scenarios. Neumann and Øverland capture this debate in their article. They state that: arguments that reach back into the past and parse out one or two causal variables that are then posited to be the major driving forces of past and future outcomes. (Neumann and Øverland, 258). Neumann and Øverland discuss the establishment of a certain ‘baseline’, a point in time from where on the scenario building takes place and at the same time a point of departure from where to look back. The golden rule here would be that the period of time that the scenario building is about (for instance: 35 years) requires the same amount of time in history to draw the variables from (in this case, also 35 years). If we live in the year 2000, and we want to do a scenario building on the year 2010, we need to go back to 1990 to look for historic arguments. This argument and line of reasoning is developed by Kahn: one should first go back in time as many years as one intended to speculate into the future (Neumann and Øverland, 262). De Jouvenel however is more careful. He adheres to the line that trends spotted by historians not necessarily are going to repeat themselves. This line of thought is also addressed by Neumann and Øverland by going into this debate. They address the issue that the input of historians is not always of much help. ‘History must be comprehended backwards, whereas planning must be carried out forwards.’ (Neumann and Øverland, 263).

**Scenario Building versus Scenario Planning**

While we are still in the phase of conceptualisation, it is important to address the difference between scenario building and scenario planning. Unfortunately, this difference is not properly discussed by Neumann and Øverland in their article, so that it partly comes down to
my interpretation of the matters. Neumann and Øverland do pay attention to the misconception about scenario planning. Scenario planning is not the planning of scenario, but the planning with the help of scenarios, they explain (Neumann and Øverland, 266). The term ‘scenario’ is conceptualised, but ‘scenario building’ however is not. I think that that the reason for this is that Neumann and Øverland actually do not pay attention to scenario building (which is in my opinion nothing more than the creation of scenarios), despite that the title of Neumann and Øverland’s article indicates otherwise. Their goal is not so much to work out the method of scenario building, although they do state that in their introduction. Their goal is to break with traditional socio-economic scenario planning in an IR perspective and they do that by the inclusion of perspectivism. In my opinion, that is why the Neumann and Øverland article lacks a clear explanation of what scenario building is. One would have expected an extensive step-by-step-guiding plan of how one actually can build scenarios. The Neumann and Øverland article lacks this step-by-step-guiding plan. The article of Hugues de Jouvenel however does include this plan and I will return to this explanation very soon. I can only conclude here that scenario building (the creation of scenarios) is the first step here, and when the building of scenarios is finished, the planning with the help of scenarios (scenario planning) can commence. This clarification is an omission in the Neumann/Øverland article and more than once I got the idea that they used the terms interchangeably.

**Scenario Building**

As elucidated earlier, the aspect of time is very important in scenario building. Here we need to make clear that scenario building is not about one possible future, but about multiple futures. And it is also not about predicting those futures, but about assigning probabilities to those futures. Once we have established the baseline, we need to think of multiple possible futures that might unfold. Neumann and Øverland acknowledge that it is difficult to conceive of one present and one future, or indeed of any finite number of presents or futures (Neumann and Øverland, 268). Therefore it might be helpful to clarify the matters with the help of drawn schemes in which might become clear how the variables affect each other, making the causal chains more visible. It is possible in this way to create ‘clusters of intersecting realities’ (Neumann and Øverland, 269). De Jouvenel states the following: “if we cannot see ahead very well, let’s be adaptable.” (De Jouvenel, 40).

How then does the actual scenario building take place? Since this part is missing in the Neumann/Øverland article, I base myself here on De Jouvenel. He identifies five stages in the prospective procedure: (1) defining the problem and choosing the horizon; (2) constructing the system and identifying key variables; (3) gathering data and drafting of hypotheses; (4) exploring possible futures, often with the help of tree structures; and (5) outlining strategic choices (De Jouvenel, 42). Since this part is very important for my thesis, I will devote some more attention to this matter and discuss the stages step by step. The first step is defining the problem and choosing the horizon. According to the De Jouvenel it is very important here to clearly delineate the topic under research here. It is necessary to make clear what is going to be included and what is going to be left out. I think this first stage deserves no further explanation. The second stage is about the key variables and of course this point is also addressed by Neumann and Øverland. They call these certain variables ‘predeterminers’ (Neumann and Øverland, 265). According to De Jouvenel it is a matter of ‘identifying all kinds of variables that do or may influence the problem under study’ (De Jouvenel, 43). The question then becomes: is it the causal relations between these key variables that can cause multiple futures or is it the key variables themselves that ‘go on the move’? According to De Jouvenel it is the first, it is these causal relations who are responsible for the impact, whether causal or potential. The third step is gathering data and drafting of hypotheses. That is
something what I actually considered part of the preparatory activities and what I have done in the chapter 2, 3 and the annexes I and II. Except of course for the drafting of hypotheses. In my opinion, it is simply not possible to come to any of the scenarios, or at least to a sufficient understanding of the scenarios, without a proper informational background. For reasons of a better understanding of this thesis I have chosen to do so in the chapters before. The fourth stage is exploring possible futures, often with the help of tree structures. Here we come back to points mentioned earlier, such as the schemes of intersecting realities as manner of making the possible futures visible. De Jouvenel argues that it is important to ‘analyze the relations among variables often with the help of a crossimpact matrix in which the variables are aligned and placed in columns’ (De Jouvenel, 43). Elements in this stage are a proper system analysis and the incorporation of advantages and disadvantages, risks and probabilities (Neumann and Øverland, 261). The fifth and final stage according to De Jouvenel is the outlining of strategic choices. This stage is more or less about the consequences of the scenarios and about the planning with the help of scenarios (scenario planning), so this stage in the De Jouvenel classification is going to be discussed later in this chapter.

Imagination and simulation

It is necessary here to lay a special focus on the fourth stage of De Jouvenel. According to this author, there are two main types of simulation, which are models and scenarios (De Jouvenel, 45). De Jouvenel defines models as: ‘systems of equation through which we try to represent how variables interact among themselves within a subsystem that we have already isolated; i.e., equation systems, which serve to generate simulations of the future’ (De Jouvenel, 45). Scenarios on the other hand are:

A scenario comprises the following three elements: (a) the base, nothing more than the representation that we create of the current reality and of the dynamics of the system that we are studying; (b) the paths created in looking at the system according to a time scale; we build the trees of possible futures, potential descendants of the present; (c) the last images are obtained at different periods, and according to the horizon line of the study, the result of the paths or routes mentioned thus far (De Jouvenel, 46).

The difference between models and scenarios in my opinion is that models automatically generate simulations of the future, whereas this is not the case with scenarios which are about ‘building the trees of possible futures.’ In this building the trees of possible futures with the help of distinguished key variables and the causal relations between them, I miss one crucial element in the article of De Jouvenel, which is the role of imagination. Neumann and Øverland however devote at least some attention to this matter. They quote Kahn and Wiener when they are saying that ‘wild speculation’ is a necessity in the phase of imagination, because then scenarios are able to obtain ‘deeper and more exact meaning’ (Neumann and Øverland, 262). But who completely covers the weight is Marieke de Goede, who adds the term ‘premediation’. According to De Goede, premediation is about ‘thinking the unthinkable’. She uses a quote from Fagan when saying: ‘Imagine your most unthinkable nightmare of the next terrorist attack. Now try to imagine something even worse.’ (De Goede, 155) In other words, premediation is about ‘thinking outside the box’. Neumann and Øverland address this issue to some extent in their case study on Norwegian future policies when incorporating ‘a scenario where all environmental problems were solved’. Impossible according to this employee from the Ministry of the Environment. However, there is a difference between scenarios one could think of, which are subsequently considered impossible and scenarios one could not think of. This point is unfortunately insufficiently addressed in the Neumann and Øverland article.
Perspectivist scenario building

In the above paragraph, I announced the term ‘perspectivist’ in relation to scenario building. That deserves some further attention, since perspectivist scenario building is quite the thing that Neumann and Øverland’s article is about. I searched for a scholarly base of how I should develop this thesis regarding the aspect of scenario building and what I found was an attempt from two scholars that wanted to bring a new ‘perspective’ in traditional scenario planning. Although this finding was by-catch, there are some interesting aspects of perspectivist scenario building, also for this thesis. Perspectivism means that a view is always a view from somewhere. There is scenario building and there is scenario building executed for a specific state, organization and/or institute. Neumann and Øverland describe this as a shift ‘in upgrading the importance of the actor for whom the planning was done’ (Neumann and Øverland, 264). Since the purpose of my thesis is not mainly about the planning with scenarios, the relevance of this perspective is relatively minor. This would be different however when I was writing a report for OSCE officials and the question would then be to what extent that given would have affected this piece of work.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have defined the most important terms such as scenarios, scenario building, scenario planning, models, etc. This terminology is important, because it should provide the reader the required clarity for the rest of this thesis and it should help me avoiding the interchangeable use of certain concepts. The program for the remaining part of this thesis is the following, based on the various stages as explained by De Jouvenel. Chapter five will be a very short recap on the definition on the problem, a re-gathering of the relevant data and most importantly, an identification of the key variables. Chapter six will be about the exploration of the possible futures of the OSCE, basing myself predominantly on the available scholarly literature and conversations with the people in the field. One element on scenarios needs to be added here in this paragraph. According to De Jouvenel, there are two kinds of scenarios. There are exploratory scenarios, which do the groundwork of what could happen, whereas strategic scenarios explore what one could do (De Jouvenel, 46). In this thesis we will use the first kind of scenarios, because our focus is on what could happen. I recall the main question of this thesis here: What possible scenarios on the future of the OSCE in a security regime perspective deem plausible and what are the consequences of each specific scenario? This thesis is not meant as an policy report directed at OSCE officials of what they should do. This thesis is written as an analytical analysis on the various OSCE scenarios and the consequences of each scenario. Therefore, chapter seven will be about the consequences.

As I recalled, my main question is partly about the consequential aspects. My reasons for including this in the main question have been given earlier, in the introduction. To come to consequential aspects there are two options from where to start. These have been addressed in this chapter, they are models or scenarios. I chose the use of scenarios, because then the concept of premediation is more suitable. In my opinion, premediation is a very interesting concept and I like to use it a lot. When one decides to employ scenarios, an incorporation of scenario building theory might be self-evident. That and the fact that the combination of international relations issues and scenario building is not that common (yet) is my main reason of the usage of scenario building theory.
Chapter 5: Identification of the Variables

Recap of the problem
The OSCE was created in 1975 in some way as a forum between the opposing parties East and West. The collapse of one of those parties, the Soviet Union, was the reason for a new deciding moment, whether to continue with this forum and reform it, or to end it because the reasons for being were no longer there. The countries decided the first, they reformed the OSCE (into an organization) and shifted the priorities from the politico-military cooperation to cooperation in the field of human rights. In the last twenty years, we can witness a few developments concerning the OSCE. The first one is the lack of an unanimous opinion among the member states about the content that the OSCE should occupy itself with, and this lacking is becoming more and more important and noticeable and affecting the organization. The second development is that the areas where the OSCE could be relevant have altered. The chance on state versus state warfare has diminished significantly, although we might witness a slight fallback with the crisis in Ukraine. Since 1975, the number of international organizations has expanded enormously, and they also have become more specialised than the OSCE in the fields of transportation, the environment, free trade, health care, etc. It is also the case that other matters occupy the security sector compared to 1975, such as terrorism, cyber warfare, etc. In conclusion, the world around the OSCE has changed tremendously. A third development is the expansion of international regimes, such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the European Union, both in tasks as in membership. In some way, the OSCE must more compete with these mentioned regimes. The right to exist for the OSCE is more than ever at stake. Next year, the OSCE exists 40 years, and although the same discussion took place at the 30th and the 35th anniversary of the organization, this time more than ever, the OSCE stands for the choice about which way to head.

Identification of the key variables
In the above text it is possible to derive several key variables. The several key variables will be mentioned here and developed below one by one. They are: (1) the role and power of some (influential) member states, (2) issues in the security sector as discussed in chapter two and annex I, (3) elements in the organizational structure of the OSCE and (4) the role of other international regimes. In an earlier study I did on the OSCE I focused on the added value of the OSCE in the light of Helsinki +40 where I produced a SWOT analysis. SWOT is the abbreviation for the analysis on Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. In this matrix, I put the strengths and opportunities as opposed to the weaknesses and threats. The key variables mentioned above were for a big part comparable to the content of the matrix. (De Haan, 19). In this matrix, the role of other international organizations (4) was composed as a threat. Issues in the security sector (2) however, can be considered an opportunity. Elements in the organizational structure (3) can be put both in the strengths-box as definitely also in the weaknesses-box. The key variables have been spread both on the actor/unit level as on the system level. In other words, the key variables now were chosen during an earlier analysis, basing myself back then on articles, reports and contacts with people working in the field. At this moment, I only polished the variables into variables that I can work with in this thesis. In the discussion of the key variables one by one we will both go into the power-based perspective as on the interest-based perspective as we have learned by Peter Haas in chapter one. After we have discussed the key variables individually, I will come up with a concluding paragraph in which we will take a moment to comprehend the causal relations between the key variables and value how strong this possible link is. Only then we are able to a ‘web of interconnectedness’ which is able to produce certain scenarios.
The above graph demonstrates the nature of the key variables in relation to the OSCE. The graph however does not demonstrate the mutual relations between the variables. Basing myself on articles and reports from authors that will be mentioned in this chapter (Panel of Eminent Persons, van Willigen, Entin and Zagorsky, CORE, etc), these four variables come up every time in one form or another. Using imagination, I am not able to think of other variables that deserve a place in the above graph. The occurring of global events is for now being shared under the title ‘issues in the security sector’, for instance the event of the terrorist attacks on 9-11, since they mostly are.

Key Variable 1: The role and power of (influential) member states
The OSCE has 57 member states, which cover predominantly the Northern hemisphere of this planet (North America, Europe and the Northern parts of Asia). The OSCE has member states ranging from the very small states as Andorra and San Marino to the large ones as Russia, Canada and the United States. Although the OSCE is known for its decision making by unanimity in the Ministerial Council (registered in the Rules of Procedure) which grants all member states per definition the same amount of power at first sight, we will focus in this paragraph however on the more influential states and their power and interests in the negotiating process that is going on right now. By looking at the more influential states, I will first distinguish who those influential states are, what their stance is towards the OSCE, what they contribute to the OSCE (the financial matters) and what relations between those influential states are of relevance.

The determination of most influential states can take place based on several grounds. Those can be GDP, number of inhabitants, spending on national armed forces etc, but also by looking at their contributions to the OSCE (both financially as regarding personnel). When looking at the GDP, the top six countries consists of the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain. With the number of inhabitants, the top six is: United States, Russia, Germany, Turkey, France and the United Kingdom. The six biggest spenders on armed forces are: The United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy.
Regarding staff employed with the OSCE, the top six is composed of the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Austria and Russia. The contribution of the member states to the extra-budgetary budgets is lead by the United States, Norway, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the unified budget however is financed mainly by The United States, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Russia. The reader has to bear in mind here that most OSCE-projects take place in mainly South-East Europe (Balkan) and secondly in East Europe and Central Asia. The OSCE headquarters is located in Vienna, Austria.

Based on the indicators above we can distinguish three blocs, which are the United States, Russia and the European Union (e.g. Germany, United Kingdom, France and Italy). It might be obvious that this conclusion is not very surprising and I was already informed by this in the conversations I had with people working for the OSCE institutions and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This tripartite division also comes back in the article written by Prof. Rosenstein and others from the University of Illinois which is about the tough relationship between these three blocs. Professor Rosenstein argues that it is not correct to categorize in two parties (East and West), because the European Union is internally divided. Predominantly the West-European states pursue a better relationship with Russia (normalization), because of the chances that that would create for trade. The East-European states however are anxious for more Russian influence and domination, obviously they have not forgotten their Soviet Union history. (Rosenstein et others, 1). Of course, this was all before the Ukrainian crisis. The question now becomes whether the three blocs consist of more than only these countries themselves or not. For instance, can we regard the United States bloc as only the United States or perhaps as the United States plus Canada. And the European Union bloc is obviously more than only the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy. The Russian bloc at least can be argued to consist of Ukraine (aside from the crisis), Belarus, Moldova and the Central Asian countries. It is very interesting to question ourselves whether these blocs as mentioned secondly are all regimes of their own (do they have implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures of their own around which these actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations?) or are they perhaps regional security complexes as meant by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever? I would love to go into that, because the assumption of the existence of three regional security complexes within the OSCE might be very interesting. But unfortunately will this assumption be a piece of writing on its own and this thesis sadly lacks the space to accommodate that. Therefore, I will suffice here with the referral to the book of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever: Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security.

Now that we have identified the three relevant actors (United States, European Union and Russia) we can go into their stance towards the OSCE. The discussion on whether or not leaving the OSCE is from all times and from all blocs. Entin and Zagorsky go in their article into the arguments that support the decision on whether or not the OSCE should be left and if the OSCE would survive a departure from one of the most influential member states. In the 1980s, a debate took place in the United States about the issue of a possible leaving of the CVSE, because of disappointment about the results of the Helsinki process so far. The arguments against a leaving eventually won, and sounded like the following: A possible leaving would (1) grant Russia (then Soviet Union) a more dominant position in the CVSE (OSCE), (2) would be a sign to West European allies of decreased US interest in Europe and (3) would lead to less opportunities to influence East European (and Central Asian countries, no member back then) on issues of human rights (Entin and Zagorsky). It is very interesting to reflect upon these arguments from the 1980s in the context of the year 2014. The question then is: to what extent are these arguments still valid?
Bearing in mind that the United States still finances the largest amount to contribute to European security through NATO, one could argue that the arguments provided by Entin and Zagorsky still hold power. Of course, it is true that United States’ interests in Europe have decreased in the last years (and focus has shifted to other regions in the world), the situation is still a situation of a strong commitment with Europe from the American side. The American doctrine of development through democratization and human rights protection is also unabatedly strong. Discussions about leaving the OSCE are not purely something typical for the United States. Walter Kemp, Director at the International Peace Institute (IPI) blogged mid 2012 about rumours of Canada intending to leave the OSCE. And also Kemp came to the conclusion that it is better for Canada to stay with the OSCE for reasons of Eurasian interests, the OSCE as being the security organization for the Northern hemisphere, the dealing of the OSCE with many issues that belong to Canadian foreign policy priorities and last but not least, the OSCE is a relatively cheap organization to be a member of. Canada’s membership fee is only a lousy eight million Euros. The discussion similar to the Canadian one was in Russia not that different. Russia’s frustration is based on a feeling that the OSCE focuses too much on human rights and democratization and revolves too much around countries East of Vienna. Entin and Zagorsky describe Russian sentiments due to a, according to Russia, geographic imbalance (the organization’s work is focused primarily “east of Vienna;” that is, in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union) and a thematic imbalance (from Russia’s point of view, there is an unjustified overemphasis on human rights to the detriment of other areas, among them security, economy and environment). Entin and Zagorsky are the first to notice that it is indeed true that OSCE projects take place in most countries East of Vienna, but not in the former Soviet countries. Around half of the OSCE projects take place in the Balkan countries. Entin and Zagorsky argue further that a possible departure of Russia from the OSCE would ‘hardly bring about the collapse of the OSCE’, mainly because all of Russia’s neighbours are in one way or another interested in the OSCE.

The authors mentioned above did a very good job in describing the motives and arguments in the decision about whether or not leaving the OSCE that countries apparently struggle with. But they do however miss one crucial argument, than can be found back in the literature. This argument is about regimes and is mentioned by Andreas Hasenclever by the help of Robert Keohane. Hasenclever explains the argument in short as that often the costs of creating a regime, and thus the costs of leaving a regime with the ambition of creating a new one, is more expensive than staying with the current regime. Keohane formulates this as follows: ‘Regimes persist despite the declining satisfaction of their members, precisely because creating a regime in the first place is so difficult. Thus, in many situations, the expected utility of maintaining the present suboptimal (albeit still beneficial) regime will be greater than that of letting it die (which is returning to self-help behaviour) in order to rebuild it, which is likely to result in a situation where no regime exists at all.’ (Hasenclever, 39). This follows also from an observation of regimes in recent history, such as NATO, the United Nations and the European Union, where (almost) never a member state left the organization. This in contrast to the for instance the League of Nations, where lots of states left. Apparently, the degree of interconnectedness and mutual interdependence has become so much stronger after the Second World War that the costs of creating a new regime and leaving the current one where too high so that countries remained member of NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations for instance. The same discussion is going on in the Netherlands right now where, luckily, still a majority of the people comprehends the higher costs of leaving the European compared to staying despite highly unpopular transactions to Mediterranean states.
There is said enough about stances on a possible departure from the OSCE, but what about other stances towards the OSCE. Every now and then has this point passed before, therefore for now a quick summary of the most important issues is sufficient here. There has been much disagreement between the OSCE members, which varies from the issues that the OSCE should occupy itself with, the regions and member states that deserve extra attention and the form in which the OSCE should operate. Regarding the first point, things about this have been said throughout this thesis. There is a majority of Western countries (America and most West-European countries) who plead for a strong focus from the OSCE on humanitarian issues (human rights, democratization, free and fair elections, etc). The East-European countries lead by Russia argue that the OSCE is a security organization, pictured as a counterpart towards NATO and therefore should occupy itself mainly with politico-military cooperation, as is NATO’s function. Between the politico-military cooperation (first dimension) and the humanitarian cooperation (third dimension) is the economic and environmental cooperation (second dimension). This dimension is politically less sensitive and is therefore not much of a hot potato. A cooperation in all three dimensions became some sort of a compromise.

Regarding the regions and member states that deserve extra attention also have some things been said before. It is the case that the main focus of OSCE projects is on the East of Vienna, about 50% is on Balkan states and about 20% on former Soviet states, according to Entin and Zagorsky. Russian desire to shift the OSCE focus to Western states with a subsequent disapproval (there is always room for improvement), has very little chances. It is simply a given that that is the domain of the European Union and this organization can most of the time achieve things better. Of course there are exceptions, such as in the Hungarian case on negative reforms in the legislation process, where the EU could do little, because it has no binding powers in the political sector, but the OSCE did have binding powers in this field. But these are exceptions. This is also the reason that the OSCE is most effective in countries which have perspective of joining the European Union. They have an incentive of achieving certain reforms, in order to join the EU. But more about the competition with other international organizations later in this chapter. The same goes about the organizational reforms (elements in the organizational structure).

Key Variable 2: Issues in the Security Sector
In chapter two, we had a very short insight in the issues that trouble the security sector (in general). Now, we must lay the connection to the OSCE and analyze to what extent the OSCE’s future is influenced by these issues. There is literature on that available and with the help of that literature we can delineate these issues as forms of input for the OSCE as a regime. First of all, it is important to note that these issues mentioned were not the purpose for the OSCE originally to be created. To put it in one sentence, the OSCE was created to soften the tensions between East and West and to provide for a mutual approach. The creation had nothing to do with terrorism, cyber criminality, drug trafficking and so on. When the OSCE wants to occupy itself with these issues, that concretely means an extension and/or alternation of its tasks. What does this mean for the regime? Since norms and principles on security has not changed, but the rules might do (due to an extension and/or alternation of tasks) this means that we have to speak of a ‘change within the regime’. This is explained in chapter one.

The Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) has published a report in 2007 which goes, amongst many things as well, into the issue of the acquaintance of new tasks. The report advises the OSCE to pick up the task of border security and management, because border security entails the promotion of free and secure movement of persons, goods, services and investments across borders. It would reduce the threat of terrorism and prevent and repress transnational

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organized crime, illegal migration, corruption, smuggling and trafficking in weapons, drugs and human beings (CORE, 27). The OSCE grasps new opportunities to become relevant with both hands, considered its press statement on cyber security dated from the beginning of this year. On cyber security, the OSCE itself says: ‘The OSCE has an important role to play, particularly as by building confidence among participating States the risk of conflict can be reduced and cyber/ICT security enhanced in the entire region. This is especially relevant in this area where the potential for misperception and escalation remains a growing concern.’

The CORE report also makes recommendations which are about the addressing of ‘new politico-military tensions in Europe’ and the measures that can be taken to prevent an outbreak of interstate conflicts. The report employs the term Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), which can for instance be the renewal of the CFE Treaty (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe), which has only been ratified by a couple of CIS-states at the moment. An OSCE-wide ratification of the treaty as once was intended can be considered as a serious effort to control arms and gain mutual confidence. Unfortunately, crises such as the one in Ukraine right now are contra-productive in the process of confidence and security building. Both Westerns as Russians felt the need to show their military powers, for instance with air force and naval force, the launching of missiles and the practising of exercises. The situation once again demonstrates the urge for an ongoing effort to enforce Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, because a military escalation is never that far away.

**Key Variable 3: elements in the organizational structure of the OSCE**

The OSCE being a regime is constituted as a whole of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. This part of the thesis is about the rules and decision-making procedures. Components of these are for instance the voting with consensus agreement, the absence of effective instruments within the Parliamentary Assembly and the judicial form of the OSCE as an organization, to name a few. To clarify one thing, the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly might be (officially) two different organizations, they constitute however one and the same regime. We will evaluate here shortly to what extent the regime is paralyzed in its decision making procedures in order to determine the regime’s effectiveness. Please bear in mind here what we have earlier discussed on regime effectiveness, namely that a regime is effective when (1) members abide by its norms and rules and (2) its achieves certain objectives or fulfils certain purposes.

For both the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the decision making procedures are written down in the so-called ‘rules of procedure’. In these rules of procedure is for instance established how boards are elected, how meetings are conducted and recorded and, how voting takes place. The most important decisions are taken by the Ministerial Council and countries work here with consensus, which in principle means that all member states have to agree. Exceptions here are for instance the so-called Moscow Mechanism, which has been discussed earlier. The abolition of the voting with consensus has both advantages as disadvantages. The advantage is that the decisiveness of the organization will profit in the short run, indeed decisions only then require an absolute or two-third majority. But when this becomes possible, the risk exists that member states will withdraw, because they possess no longer the option to veto measures which they are absolutely against at. The voting with consensus can be seen as a tool to keep all member states on board. In their report, the Panel of Eminent Persons advice to keep the voting with consensus agreement intact, assuming that the OSCE cannot afford itself to lose influential member states such as, for instance, Russia (The Panel of Eminent Persons, 21). Obviously, this is kind of contradicting to the
Entin/Zagorsky stance. The question then becomes to what extent the OSCE really can be effective with the voting by consensus agreement incorporated and this is something that is rather difficult to find out because the minutes of meetings of the Ministerial Council are not available for public.

Let us continuing with the topic of voting, because that is also kind of an issue within the Parliamentary Assembly. Resolutions are one of the instruments of the OSCE PA, with which they can influence the OSCE policies. Therefore, a very brief explanation of the procedure. First must a member of parliament (of a member state) guarantee his or herself from sufficient support in order to submit the resolution. This Member of Parliament must ensure twenty signatures from at least four different member states. When complied, the resolution can be handed in and is it discussed in the Standing Committee of the PA. This committee exists of the board of the OSCE PA (without voting rights) and the leaders of all national delegations. The Standing Committee decides whether or not a resolution is being forwarded to the Plenary Session and this happens only with a two-third majority within the Standing Committee. All member states are represented within this committee, so it can happen that resolutions that are politically too sensitive are being blocked and subsequently end in the trash can without a public debate. The Plenary Session in that case literally has nothing to say.

When a resolution is discussed in the Plenary Session voting takes place immediately after deliberations. An absolute majority is required in order to pass the resolution, and when that happens, the resolution is being forwarded to the Ministerial Council for them to give a reaction. Unfortunately, there is nothing arranged within the Rules of Procedure from both the OSCE as the OSCE PA about giving a reply, neither as a possibility nor as an obligation. This is a big omission within the procedures of the OSCE. The Parliamentary Assembly sadly is not able to enforce a response from the Ministerial Council, let alone that there are terms for it. This omission can be explained as a consequence of the non-existence of a formal relationship between the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Formally, they are independent from each other. A same situation can be seen with another instrument that parliamentarians have, in case the ability of the asking questions. According to the Rules of Procedure, parliamentarians are able to ask questions to individual ministers of foreign affairs of member states. This is by the way maximized to only three per year per parliamentarian, so they have to be careful with the number of questions asked. Again here we see that there is no possibility to enforce a reply to the questions. We might however assume that ministers do answer the questions out of politeness.

In national politics it is mostly arranged that the controlling powers (Parliaments, Senates, Municipal Councils) have a number of instruments in their possession. Instruments like the adoption of resolutions or the asking of questions. Sometimes they have more instruments like the right of interpellation, the right of initiative and the ability to send disfunctioning governments away. Certain powers would contribute to democratic legitimacy internationally, but unfortunately they are underdeveloped in international politics. But despite the fact that the Parliamentary Assembly lacks efficient instruments, one should not underestimate the power of the PA. It is true that lots of necessary steps have to be taken, but one should also notice that in the last ten years many improvements did take place within the organization. The Panel of Eminent Persons also made a lot of recommendations in this area. An undecided issue in this is still the question about legal personality of the OSCE as an organization.

For many years now voices are raised to strengthen the OSCE as an organization by the acquiring of legal personality. It is also advised by the Panel of Eminent Persons who state

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that: The OSCE’s standing as an international organisation is handicapped by its lack of legal personality. The lack of a clear status also effects OSCE personnel when stationed in crisis areas without the protection that diplomatic recognition would give them. (The Panel of Eminent Persons, 19). The Panel recommends measures taken to these, and that this is no dispensable luxury was sadly proved a couple of months ago, when OSCE staff members were kidnapped and taken hostage during the crisis in Ukraine. The Panel’s stance in this is being supported by a couple of member states, one of them being Russia. Russia has been a strong proponent of making the OSCE a legal entity. The overall goal of Russia is the streamlining of the organization, a subsequent centralization of the organization in Vienna and bringing more relatively independent OSCE body parts under the rule of the Permanent Council. Russia meets resistance here in its desires by other member states (mainly the US), which fear confining autonomous OSCE institutions in a rigid corset of political consensus. This would make the organization’s efficiency dependent on the success or failure of political bargaining between Russia and its OSCE partners, and would throw the organization back into the times that were not very successful for it, namely the 1980s (Entin and Zagorsky).

To conclude this paragraph, this key variable is all about efficiency and effectiveness. About doing more with less resources. This representation of efficiency is being demonstrated in the graph below. First we have the input part. That can be struggles, conflicts, treaty violations, human rights violations, threats of terrorism, civil wars, etc. Actions that the OSCE can and/or should act upon. On the other part of the graph we have the output. The output can consist of declarations, resolutions, treaties, sanctions etc. That what is in between is the OSCE regime.

Graph 2: OSCE as a system

The question following this key variable regarding the future scenarios of the OSCE is: in what way can a more efficient organization have an impact on the futures of the OSCE? Assuming that there is a relevance, the question then is: to what extent? This is something that is dealt with in the subsequent chapters.

Key Variable 4: the role of other international organizations
All the relevant organizations that play a role in the security realm are being mentioned in annex II. This is the place that we continue and build on the information that is being provided in this annex. The problematic relations that the OSCE has with other international institutions in nicely captured in an article written by Niels van Willigen, Professor at the Dutch University of Leiden. Van Willigen wrote an article about effective multilateralism and focused mainly about the relationship between the OSCE and the EU, but of course also the Council of Europe and NATO passed by. In annex II, also some other organizations in the security sector are mentioned such as Organization of American States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation but although they have a territorial overlap, they are not a threat to the OSCE because they have a whole other regional
focus. And then there is of course the United Nations, which is also no danger to the OSCE, because it is an earth-covering organization, whereas the OSCE is a regional one. Of course, it is true that with every expansion of the OSCE (2012: Mongolia), the difference with the United Nations becomes smaller, but for now we leave the UN out of the picture.

The core issue here is that the EU, CoE and NATO are moving more and more into the areas of the OSCE both in a territorial way as in competences as in objectives. Van Willigen states that ‘the membership and mandates of the three organizations (OSCE, NATO and EU, red.) increasingly overlap (Van Willigen, 137). He outlines a development of a couple of organizations that very slowly consume the OSCE, although they pretend not to do so, because more than once, initiatives were taken to strengthen the cooperation between the OSCE and for instance, the EU. In 2002, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, spoke of the OSCE and the EU as ‘natural born partners’ (Van Willigen, 136). But the problem here is, and this also recognized by Van Willigen, they are unequal partners. The EU has a much stronger political, legal and economic position (Van Willigen, 136). Since a couple of years (especially since the major EU expansion in 2004) the European Union forms the biggest bloc within the OSCE. Although more expansions are not likely the happen in the first few years (Iceland might be the exception) a couple of OSCE member states in the Balkan (which is a region where the OSCE for now still plays a relatively influential role) have received a candidate member status within the EU. There are Macedonia in 2005, Montenegro in 2010, Serbia in 2012 and very recently, Albania in mid 2014. The expectation is that once these countries have become a member of the European Union, OSCE activities in these countries shall shrink very quickly, or even in the period before accession, as has happened in Croatia, where the OSCE mission transformed very rapidly in only an OSCE office with a few staff members (Entin and Zagorsky). And the European Union is not the only one expanding eastwards; NATO grew in membership in 2004 as the EU did and NATO’s latest additions were Albania and Croatia in 2009.

The OSCE is reported to be in an institutional crisis and experts generally agree on this. It is also widely recognized that the EU and NATO ‘are partly responsible for this crisis the OSCE has been in since the start of the twenty-first century’ (Van Willigen, 137). Van Willigen correctly notices that ‘the added value of the OSCE in European security often is summarized by referring to its inclusiveness and comprehensive concept of security’. But both the EU and NATO ‘adopted multifaceted and multidimensional conceptions of security’, concluding that there is much overlap in ‘their basic security assessments’ (Van Willigen, 137). Same goes for the Council of Europe, which has, as is mentioned in annex II, also been extending its activities, not so much in new and other member states, as in having an extended view on what exactly all is related to humanitarian issues. As a consequence, Van Willigen writes, in spite of the OSCE’s human right profile, the EU seems in some ways to prefer cooperation with the Council of Europe over the OSCE (Van Willigen, 138).

We should be careful however to provide here for an image of the OSCE and the EU being in a die hard competition which the OSCE is very likely to lose. It might also be the case that the EU is strengthening the OSCE and that the EU is of help to the OSCE in becoming more effective. This is also a question that Prof. van Willigen asks himself: To what extent has the EU contributed to the effectiveness of the OSCE? First of all, as is written above, the EU more than once declared the OSCE valuable and reaffirmed its importance for the EU. Second, the EU is one of the biggest contributors to the OSCE’s unified budget and extra-budgetary funds (OSCE Annual report 2012, 103), this despite the decrease in financial resources coming from the member states in the last few years. Van Willigen concludes that
the EU ‘prefers focusing on concrete issues that need to be addressed by the OSCE, but that, unfortunately, there is no grand EU strategy of making the OSCE more effective (Van Willigen, 142). Rafael Biermann went into the concept of ‘inter-organizational networking’. He acknowledges a trend where ‘inter-organizational cooperation, increasingly moving beyond the dyad into more complex configurations, has begun to take shape of a network’ (Biermann, 152). Biermann points out that networks can achieve better policy output through synergy (Biermann, 155). According to Biermann, the added value of this inter-organizational networking (EU, NATO, OSCE, etc) lies in the possibility to share burdens and can create resource independence (Biermann, 160).

Conclusion

The above discussed key variables can all be categorized as external or internal variables. The influential member states and elements in the organizational structure are internal variables, other international organizations and issues in the security sector are external variables. This distinction is important for the next step in this thesis, which is the outlining of several scenarios. An understanding of this might contribute to the developing of these scenarios, because it might for instance be the case that external variables are more influential than internal ones, or vice versa. It has also to do with what we learned in chapter one about the relevance of regimes (partly formed by these internal variables) and the impact on outcomes. In the next chapter we will delve deeper in the mutual relations between these key variables.
Chapter 6: Possible Futures of the OSCE

In the previous chapter, all variables were identified. Therefore the next step is, to put it unacademically, to ‘play with them.’ We can blend them and then come to all various scenarios. But is that really the way it goes? Before we did the identification, we were already able to distinguish three different scenarios, based only on common sense. A regime as the OSCE can do two things: Either quit (scenario 1) or continue (scenario 2). The second scenario can again be spread in two scenarios, either continuing and change nothing (scenario 2A) or continuing and change (scenario 2B). There are not any more options. And quite surprising is it exactly these scenarios that came across in the conversations with people working in the OSCE field or read in OSCE-related articles. Or was it that surprising…? Of course, these scenarios are scenarios in their purest forms and obviously, all hybrid versions are possible, but it is just the case as it is with theories; they are often extremes in their spectrum, in order to make their point. The question of this chapter is: How do the key variables influence the various scenarios and how are scenarios worked out by the help of these key variables and their mutual relations?

Scenario 1: A collapse of the OSCE

As is explained earlier, the current constellation with the three dimensions within the OSCE has been a trade-off between the parties in the 1990s. In their report, the Centre for OSCE Research, even used the term ‘package-deals’ (CORE, 4). Earlier, we have gone into the different stances of the blocs within the OSCE towards these three dimensions. This thesis was introduced with the current negotiations that are going on leading up to Helsinki +40. It is not unthinkable that these negotiations have an ethos of new rounds, new chances. And that the countries have to fight (negotiate) for their interests. Their interests might lie in one dimension, or perhaps in multiple dimensions. A scenario that might unravel is that countries within the OSCE towards these three dimensions. This thesis was introduced with the current negotiations that are going on leading up to Helsinki +40. It is not unthinkable that these negotiations have an ethos of new rounds, new chances. And that the countries have to fight (negotiate) for their interests. Their interests might lie in one dimension, or perhaps in multiple dimensions. A scenario that might unravel is that countries will not focus that much on what they think the OSCE should occupy itself with, but instead of what they think the OSCE should absolutely not occupy itself with. It might be that they have such strong opinions on this that they veto certain areas for the OSCE. A veto is very much possible since all voting takes place within the OSCE with unanimity. The question now is, how likely is the event that vetoes will be used because of these strong opinions?

In Russian national politics, very strong sentiments about the OSCE exist, as we learned from Entin and Zagorsky. Sentiments that strong that even a departure from the OSCE is considered. The probability of parties taking firm decisions therefore is not that unlikely. A vetoing of domains in which the OSCE might have a role to play threatens the constellation of the three dimensions on which the OSCE was build. A package-deal can only remain a package-deal, when it remains a package. Cherry picking would destroy the package. A scenario that then might develop is the one where countries veto the things that are important to the opposing party. A situation along the lines of ‘if I can not have what I want, you can not have what you want’. Very concrete, this can mean that Russia does not want the OSCE anymore to be involved in humanitarian issues, therefore Western countries no longer have a reason to cooperate with Russia in the military atmosphere. This scenario is not considered unlikely by for instance by people who are working in an OSCE environment, such as Bob Deen, working for the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The described scenario might then escalate towards a trade-off in the negative form, where states are vetoing issues important to the other until eventually nothing remains for the OSCE to pursue. This scenario is described as a ‘doom-scenario’ for the OSCE, because without things for a regime to pursue, the reasons for being do no longer exist and countries are no longer willing to
finance the costs of the regime. We spoke of this issue earlier, when the costs of maintaining a regime become too high compared with the expected utility, it is better to let the regime die.

What else has the theory to say about this? In chapter one, we also discussed that the sustainability of the regime was at stake when a regime was no longer effective. The question to what extent regimes mattered was also dependant on a regime’s robustness. Recapturing from chapter one: A regime is robust when (1) it shows ‘staying power’ of international institutions in the face of exogenous challenges and (2) the extent to which prior institutional choices constrain collective decisions and behaviour in later periods. (Hasenclever, 86). What are these ‘prior institutional choices’ Hasenclever speaks about? Does he for instance mean the OSCE’s comprehensive ideas on security and its subsequent tri-dimensional constellation? These are the ‘principles’ in the regime-definition of Krasner. Or does Hasenclever mean the voting-with-consensus-agreement, which is a decision-making procedure in Krasner’s definition. In my opinion, Hasenclever meant the latter, but I could be wrong here, which means that the organizational elements (key variable 3) are decisive in a possible constraining of the regime, thereby affecting the regime’s robustness. When stating that there are certain conditions to a regime’s robustness, obviously the possibility is there that a regime might not be robust. The question about if that is the case for the OSCE depends on the key variables.

In this scenario where countries block each others priorities leaving the OSCE empty, obviously key variable 1, the role of influential member states is of biggest importance. Without a readiness to grant the opponent some profits, a regime in general can not function. Negotiations are tough because they are negotiations between unequals. West (Americas and European Union) and East are unequals, because they do not need the OSCE in the same amount, probably East needs the OSCE more than West does. After all, West has the European Union and NATO to form economic and military communities. There are lots of factors that make the Helsinki +40 negotiations very complex, more than I can discuss in this thesis. Therefore, it is the influential member state than can create or averse scenario 1. But what about the other key variables? The issues in the security sector are a chance for the OSCE to renew its relevance (opportunity in the SWOT-analysis, see previous chapter). When the scenario about the dissolution of the OSCE unfolds, issues in the security sector that might ‘save’ the OSCE apparently played no (significant) role. What about organizational elements then? I think they are of importance in this scenario but not as strong as the key variable 1. The fact that the OSCE is no legal entity and lacks a well functioning instruments toolbox also did little to contribute to the regime’s surviving in this scenario. The more firm something is rooted, the harder it is to ‘get rid of it’, that is a rule that generally applies. Further, the possibility of vetoing obviously played its role in this scenario, as is explained above. Therefore one can conclude a slight positive correlation between this key variable and the unfolding of this scenario. Last, but not least, key variable 4. Did the existence of other international regimes contribute to the evolution of this scenario as it did? I think yes, because of the arguments announced earlier. Regimes continue to exist because it is often cheaper to maintain a regime than to create a new one. In this case (scenario 1), there are already ‘new ones’, which makes maintaining the OSCE as a regime too expensive. Regarding the EU, expansions Eastwards are still happening, and with every step, the added value (read: the reason to maintain the regime) becomes smaller. NATO and the Council of Europe are also expanding their activities. Are the steps taken by these regimes decisive in the unfolding of scenario 1? No, there is a positive correlation, but it is not as positive as key variable 1. This also appears from historical experience. Competing regimes are expanding for many years now, but still have not caused the OSCE to collapse.

“Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight” – Hugues de Jouvenel
Scenario 2A: The OSCE at a standstill

In 2015 the OSCE is going to celebrate its 40th anniversary and that is not new, the OSCE has celebrated anniversaries before. Also with the 30th and the 35th anniversaries, the members within the OSCE tried to renew the regime in order so that it can become more relevant again. Those efforts proved fruitless, or at least absent of any major successes. Therefore it is not that unthinkable that the same scenario unravels next year again. Negotiations are going on since 2012 by predominantly governments officials and the negotiations are not easy. While there is a chance that countries might give in to their fellow member states (scenario 2B), there is also a chance that they might not. It might turn out the way that the member states are not capable to reach a conclusion about which way the OSCE should head and in what form it should do so. This has happened before and it might happen again. The outcome then is that the OSCE remains as it is, perhaps of course with very little changes. Bear in mind here that these scenarios are extremes and that hybrids are possible. The Summit of the Heads of State that by then has taken place turned out to be very disappointing and state leaders accuse each other of being too stubborn during the negotiations. Other than that, nothing really happens. In this case, Helsinki +40 turns out to become a standstill for the OSCE.

When everything regarding the OSCE as a regime remains the same, might that de facto imply a regression and decline. The OSCE has been losing the competition with other regimes for many years now and as the times passes by, it is foreseeable that the OSCE will also lose its former relevant in the Balkan territory, due to EU expansions in that area. Very recently, Eastern partnerships were closed (Association Acts) between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. These partnerships might be a sign a future full membership of the European Union. So again, when the time goes by, the OSCE becomes less and less relevant. Therefore, a standstill of the OSCE after Helsinki +40 means de facto a decline.

What has the theory to say about this? Recapturing from chapter one; regimes are more than temporary arrangements, therefore a certain resilience is presupposed. We mentioned Peterson who addressed the existence of multiple international regimes, both within and across issue-areas. In chapter one, I asked the question how they do fit together in particular when they are mutually reinforcing or mutually weakening. Now let us get into that. In the current times, there are opposing developments going on. On the one side, the world is still getting more and more interdependent and as a consequence, the number of international organizations is still increasing (see also the Yearbook of International Organizations). On the other side, especially since 2008 when the current crisis began (but the trend already was started before that), countries are saving on their government’ costs, also international-wise and proved also less willing to finance and contribute to international organizations, as was the case with the OSCE as well. More is left to the markets (in all sectors) and fewer budgets are available to finance government’s costs. These developments might cause regimes starting to compete with each other, perhaps in some cases unconsciously. In might be the case that regimes might reinforce each other mutually, as one did try with the EU and the OSCE (see before), but more often such regimes prove mutually weakening. Countries can spend their money only once and many European countries prefer to spend it on a military regime as NATO in stead of the OSCE. In my opinion, regimes are mutually weakening when there is a situation of too much overlap, which can be in membership, objectives, activities and tasks.

How did the key variables contribute to this scenario? Starting with key variable 1, the same logic actually goes as for scenario 1. It is the member states that are not capable of finding a compromise, with as a consequence the OSCE that remains unchanged. Without this role of the member states, this scenario would not have unravelled. In the process of writing this
thesis, I found out that key variable 1, the influence of influential member states is far-reaching in the scenario building. Perhaps, I should have teared down this key variable into smaller pieces to have it become more equal with the other key variables, but that is something you learn along the process. Regarding key variable 2, issues in the security sector, I concluded a negative correlation. The issues as terrorism, transnational criminality and cyber threats might have been the new big thing for the OSCE to pursue countering these, but apparently, that did not happen in this scenario. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that these issues maximally played a very marginal role in the development of this scenario. About the organizational aspects can not be said that much. The aim for the OSCE to become more efficient was apparently not that convincing for the member states to agree with, because if it was, the OSCE would have been changed. Did the organizational structure contribute than in a negative way to the unfolding of the scenario? Perhaps. If in the negotiations progress was vetoed, it would have. If the voting-with-consensus kept all parties on board during the negotiations, then it perhaps did not contribute in a negative way. In this scenario where everything remains the same it is hard to incorporate key variable 3 into the story. And finally, key variable 4: it is the situation the other international regimes play a role in the consequential aspects of the scenario, but they do not in the building part of the scenario. Because if they did, the scenario would have had another outcome. Since key variable 4 is a variable ‘under construction’ (I mean with this that developments in it are ongoing, consider for instance the ongoing expansion of the EU), an influence in the scenario building process would have established a positive correlation. It however, did not.

Scenario 2B: A breakthrough for the OSCE

The thing is with negotiations is that they can either fail or succeed. The option of failure just has been discussed but it might also very well be the case that the member states reach an agreement. Is that likely to happen? It might very well be, considered that in 1975 the Helsinki process (which were also negotiations) also ended successfully. And when one reminds that back then the negotiating parties (East and West) had a much bigger distance between them (recap that they were fighting a Cold War), and even in that circumstance they were able to find each other in the middle. In the early 1990s after a period of much turbulence (the collapse of the Soviet Union), the parties were again able to reach for each other and issue a new strong declaration, renewing the regime. They issued then the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Times have changed since then and the question now is whether they have changed in that way that the parties are no longer able to find each other in the negotiations. In my opinion, in the negotiations, the tri-dimensional constellation within the OSCE has to be maintained. This concept with the three dimensions characterizes the OSCE and can be considered one of its unique selling points. In my opinion, when one of the three dimensions is removed from the OSCE, the whole structure collapses and it is also because of this that experts in the field recommend to keep the tri-dimensional structure intact.

In the negotiations some breakthroughs on certain enduring issues has to be enforced. The issue on the legal personality of the organization has to be solved. Western fears that certain (for now) relatively independent OSCE institutions are becoming constraint have to met by the establishment of certain securities. When one wants the OSCE regime to be as effective and efficient as possible, organizations within the regime should have the powers to do so. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly should be equipped with effective instruments and the relationship between the OSCE and the OSCE PA should be intensified. An argument for this as well is that international (governmental) organizations always have to deal with the issue of democratic legitimacy. Within the OSCE regime, this is being addressed by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The OSCE PA has a strong forum function, but in order to fully
comply with the boundaries of democratic legitimacy, it needs to become more powerful. The OSCE PA itself also strives for a more influential role in the policy making process. They send a weekly newsletter and in the editions 494 and 496 they wrote: "...new monitoring mechanisms that would enable the PA to oversee the implementation of relevant second dimension commitments." and "the OSCE PA should be more involved in policy formulation". And also: "... citizens of OSCE countries should have a bigger role in international cooperation." I think the message is clear.

Another reform that must be taken is the making of the OSCE a more compact and flexible organization. The volume of the bureaucracy within the OSCE is still very high and when during this research became clear to me how many committees and working groups there are still into business, then one might conclude that efficiency profits still must be achievable. The OSCE must become more of a networking organization, and should cooperate more with think-tanks, scientific research institutes and educational organizations. This cooperation is already there, but can be extended and intensified. The Panel of Eminent Persons also addresses this point in its report. It says: "By linking international actors with significant resources to host countries with specific needs, the OSCE could promote a programmatic approach without unnecessarily (and unrealistically) trying to develop and manage large-scale projects on its own" (Panel of Eminent Persons, 15). Let us assume now that the member states on the examples mentioned in these paragraphs find each other and are able to reach an agreement which this scenario is about. The Summit of the Heads of State then has a happy ending, state leaders display their happiness about the agreement. 2015 is then marked as a new start for the regime and hopefully, the OSCE receives the so hardly desired new élan.

Any words from the theory on this? This scenario has been all about change and reform. We refer once again to Krasner who said: Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within the regime, provided that principles and norms are unaltered. Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself (Krasner, 187). The question now is whether the above described changes are changes of the regime or changes within the regime. The issue on organizational reforms are changes in the ‘rules’. The point regarding the instruments is also about the decision-making procedures. Concluding it is safe to say that the above described reforms would constitute a change within the regime. The OSCE’s principles such as ‘the objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security’ or ‘the commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-operation’ and ‘the respect of each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty’ have not changed. The 1990’s change at the signing of the Charter of Paris which laid more emphasis of the respect of human right and less on the respect for territorial integrity might have constituted a change of the regime at that time.

Again, in this scenario, the influence of key variable 1 is decisive. Further clarification has been given above. Without the effort of the member states to reach an agreement that constitutes a change, scenario 2B would not have unfolded. Regarding key variable 2, the issues in the security sector, I could say the following. This scenario is about the reaching of an agreement at the end of Helsinki +40 that would save the OSCE out of the identity crisis that the OSCE is in right now. It is very difficult to scientifically prove at what change/reform that is the case. I have addressed some possible outcomes in the paragraphs above. It might also very well be the case the OSCE transforms into an exclusive security regime and drops the second and third dimension. Politico-military cooperation (desire of the Russian bloc)
might then be counterbalanced by tasks and activities in the domains of border management, drugs, arms and human trafficking, terrorism, cyber criminality etc. which are also all priorities of Western states. In that case, issues in the security sector as being a key variable definitely contributes to the effectuation of scenario 2B. As for key variable 3, it is the case that when there exist organizational imperfections, there is at the same time an opportunity for organizational improvement, which is scenario 2B. This leads to the establishment of a positive correlation between key variable 3 and the ‘breakthrough scenario’. Last but not least, in what way did other international regimes influence this specific scenario? In my opinion negatively, because the decision of the member states to continue with the OSCE indicates added value of the OSCE in the international community context. Added value that apparently could not be substituted by activities of regimes as the EU, the CoE and/or NATO.

**Conclusion**

Based on the three scenarios as they are now clearly distinguished, we are now able to capture the correlations between the scenarios and the key variables in a scheme. Table 1 more or less speaks for itself, it is a summary of the chapter six and seven, which also might be seen as an inscription for table 2. This table (2) displays in what way the specific scenarios are influenced by the key variables. A ‘+’ indicates a positive correlation and a ‘-‘ is a negative one. In the table as well as in the text on which the table is based, degrees are applied. These degrees stand for the extent to which these variables were influential in the scenario. Obviously a singular ‘+’ or ‘–‘ represents a normal degree of influence. A double plus or minus stands for extra influence. The scheme is an extra outcome of the steps in the process as was instructed by De Jouvenel.

| Key variable 1 | Influential member states |
| Key variable 2 | Issues security sector |
| Key variable 3 | Organizational elements |
| Key variable 4 | International organizations |
| Scenario 1 | Collapse |
| Scenario 2A | Standstill |
| Scenario 2B | Breakthrough |

Table 1: Schematic summary of the variables and the scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key variable 1</th>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2A</th>
<th>Scenario 2B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key variable 1</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key variable 2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Key variable 3</td>
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<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key variable 4</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Degree of the key variables influencing the scenarios

In this chapter, we have discussed several scenarios, without intentionally arguing which one of the scenarios is most likely to happen. This is up to the reader to decide. My only goal was and is to outline certain scenarios, to analyze upon the relationships between the key variables and the specific scenarios and to demonstrate how one could use the theory at the events of unravelling certain scenarios. Now that the scenarios are sufficiently clarified, we can continue with the last part of this journey, which is about the consequences of each scenario.

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Chapter 7: Consequences of the Scenarios

In the previous chapter we have outlined the specific scenarios and went already a little ahead of the consequences that would come along with each individual scenario. In this chapter we will continue with this. In the theory on scenario building and scenario planning, we learned that the last step is to take the consequences of each scenario into account. When all consequences are displayed, policy makers can begin the actual planning with the help of scenarios. This is all discussed in chapter four. The question for this chapter now is: what are the consequences of each individual scenario, more specifically, the main features of it?

Consequential aspects of scenario 1:
When member states want to retreat from the regime is it likely when they do that with allies at the same time, or when they are one of the influential states mentioned earlier, they can do that on their own. It is likely for smaller states to act as a group in this, because the risk of acting alone and subsequently you are not followed by other states simply places you outside of the group, and you might be off worse. The collapse of the OSCE therefore would probably be happening shockwise. The collapse of the OSCE, although in a crisis for a long time, might still come as a shock to the international community. Once collapsed, a number of pieces are set in motion. I will focus at first on two issues here: (1) the consequences for bilateral relations and (2) the response of other international regimes.

Regarding the bilateral relations, the coin can fall on two sides here. The first possibility is that the angle of frustration, because of OSCE issues, between East and West has been removed. The second option is one of the forums (of course, there are more forums, but still) is gone, resulting in a loss of a communication possibility between diplomats and politicians, which might contribute to a worsening of the relationship. The responses to the collapse of the OSCE might be either positive or negative, although it is more likely that they are negative. After all, the OSCE regime was established to ease the tensions between East and West and apparently, that lead to a failure. Of course, there have been more occasions that contributed negatively to East (Russia)-West (US)-relations, such as the war in Georgia (2008), expansions of NATO (last ones in 2009) and the crisis in Ukraine (2014). Are there any reasons to assume that a breakdown of the OSCE is that much worse for US-Russia-Europe relations than for instance the Russian occupation of Georgia?

It is my expectation that other international regimes shall not be very sorry about the disappearance of the OSCE, although they shall of course all state in press releases how bad it is that the OSCE ceased to exist and what a loss this is for the dialogue between the many OSCE member states. They shall also state that the OSCE did much good work in the field projects and that they deeply respect all the good OSCE initiatives taken. And after that they will continue with the daily practices. This for the response in the very, very short term. What about the longer term? I think that the other international regimes are not that hesitant to fill in the gaps the OSCE has left. The European Union will continue expanding Eastwards with at first Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The Council of Europe will take over the activities of the election observation missions, which it already partly did. Certain military activities will be taken over by both NATO and CIS and perhaps they find a way to improve and intensify their cooperation. The Caucasus might turn to Europe for a eventual accession to certain regimes as it already has. But it can also join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Further, the OSCE has a Parliamentary Assembly, but the Council of Europe and NATO are having this as well, so the forum for parliamentarians to meet remains existing. In short, other
regimes might attend the remnants of the OSCE as some sort of ‘scavengers’; in the end, everything is replaceable, as is the OSCE along with many other things.

Now, let us look at the arguments that were given against a departure of influential members from the OSCE, which I addressed earlier in chapter five. A couple of arguments no longer hold, since it is no longer about a departure of one actor from the regime, but it is now about all actors from the regime, since the regime no longer exists. Arguments such as ‘the other dominant states gaining more power’ and ‘sign of decreased interest in European politics’ are no longer relevant. But some of arguments are. For instance as Entin and Zagorsky argue that Western countries lose an opportunity to influence East European and Central Asian countries on issues of human rights. This partly belong to the earlier mentioned forum function that the OSCE as regime has. This not only counts for Parliamentarians that speak in the OSCE PA but also for Ministers (Ministerial Council) and government officials in the biannual implementation meetings of the specific dimensions. The forum function entails that these people can meet each other and discuss certain issues on international sessions, meetings and conferences and can speak about issues that are important to each other. They can exchange contacts information, data, examples, best practice practices, tips and recommendations. Eventually, it is important that everybody is fully aware of the need of a well functioning democracy, an independent rule of law and an effective protection of human rights. Only when policy makers are aware of this necessity, progress for these countries is possible and that begins with the people who are in control. The disappearance of the OSCE in this context might be a tremendous loss, but a certain forum is at first only a platform. The contacts take place also in other contexts, for instance through conferences from the NGO communities, such as the Civic Solidarity Platform etc. Again here, in the end, everything is replaceable.

The OSCE is unique in its composition, which is a regime that houses both the European countries and the Central Asian ones. There are few other organizations/regimes where that is the case. Since it is not likely that the Central Asian states (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, etc) will very soon access for instance the EU and NATO, it might also turn out that a new regime will be created that suits the Eurasian interests economically and humanitarian-wise. These are all consequences that policy makers should keep in mind when scenario 1 might happen.

Consequential aspects of scenario 2A:
The consequences of scenario 2A were already kind of discussed in the previous chapter. My hypothesis there was that a standstill for the OSCE would eventually turn out to be a decline, since other (competing) regimes are not standing still. There is no need to repeat what I already said there; I only want to stress here, following the words of Prof. van Willigen, that there is a competition (relationship) between unequal partners and it only will become more unequal. The bigger issue here is the increased institutional overlap in the security sector, and what exactly are the consequences of that? That is a question where the article of Stephanie Hofmann mainly is about. Because of course it is not only the case of EU versus OSCE and NATO versus OSCE but also NATO versus the EU. According to Hofmann, the consequences of this institutional overlap are twofold. The first is a ‘generation of chessboard politics shaping member state strategies.’ This point is partly addressed in the next paragraph Consequential aspects of scenario 2B. The second consequence is ‘the generation of a number of feedback effects’ (Hofmann, 45). According to Hofmann, the ‘chessboard politics’ involve for instance ‘hostage taking’ (members using one regime to obstruct the relation with another regime) or ‘turf battles’ (shaping the capabilities and mandates of one regime at the expense of the other) (Hofmann, 47). Feedback effects involve the expanding of tasks and activities as a consequence of this institutional overlap (Hofmann, 48).
And even if we approach the various regimes not from a perspective of competitiveness but from a perspective of partnership, how long for instance can the European Union then state (as it did) that the EU and the OSCE are natural born partners when the OSCE is going to turn into an implementation agency of the EU? The old rule is that one is relevant when one has power and how can the OSCE remain powerful with a budget that becomes smaller and smaller? The consequential aspects of scenario 2A are therefore not particularly promising. Further, it is easier to write about consequential aspects of a scenario that is a major change compared to the current situation than about a scenario where nothing changes and (almost) everything remains the same.

When it turns out that countries, in the negotiations, are not able to agree with each other on the necessary reforms that might lead the OSCE out of the identity crisis, another scarf between East and West is obtained. It will not do anything for the best of East-West relations. The people in power within the OSCE have been trying to reform the regime for at least a decade. The question then is: how long are they able to continue with these tries without the reforms actual taking place? At any moment, the willingness and efforts might be gone? The thought then enters the mind: to what extent is scenario 2A in the long run really maintainable? It crossed my mind: perhaps scenario 2A can only be a real scenario until the next scenario building moment appears? Scenario 2A is then when that is true *per definition* only temporary.

**Consequential aspects of scenario 2B:**
The OSCE is not unique in its receiving of critique on the inefficiencies and constraining aspects in the organization. The OSCE is also not unique in that it is characterized as a regime in an identity crisis. NATO has received the same comments on this as well. Let us also not forget that the European Union has enough internal issues that it can focus on, such as the recurring struggle on the EU budget, the European Court of Auditors that has failed to give the EU a clean bill of health for 27 years already, the incapability of the EU to move the Parliaments’ seating from Strasbourg to Brussels exclusively and so on. The point here is, every organization has its problems, one organization has only more than the other. The OSCE should therefore not aim for a solution of all the problems, but it should strive for as many as possible. On this aspect, the OSCE should therefore definitely not give up the competition with other regimes. If the OSCE manages the reform the regime, and that is the case in this scenario, it therefore can potentially become influential once more. Let us now assume as we do in this scenario that the OSCE becomes, after reforming, more of a networking organization, cheap in terms of finances and decisive in its decision making procedures, the consequences might then be the following.

The approach I use here is almost a bit entrepreneurial, following partly the analysis of Stephanie Hofmann here. Countries all have their priorities and interests in international politics. To achieve those goals, they are in a constant search to find the appropriate means that would suit them. These platforms they search might mostly be the European Union, sometimes NATO and sometimes the OSCE. The OSCE in this respect is not the end, but the means to an end. When the reforms as were described above and earlier all take place, the consequence might be that the OSCE is more suitable as a tool. And when that is the case, the secondary people (personnel, interests of the politicians) and finances will follow automatically. When states decide that the OSCE might be serving their goals they also recognize that they have to provide the OSCE with the money to do so. Of course, we should be aware of the chicken and the egg-discussion here. I mean with this that we can have the

“Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight” – Hugues de Jouvenel 39
theoretical thought that the member states will not equippe the OSCE with the necessary financial resources because of a lack of relevance and that subsequently the OSCE has a lack of relevance due to an insufficient amount of resources. But that is a discussion that I will not continue any further in this thesis, because it does not serve the goal of this chapter which is analyzing the consequences of the various scenarios.

What then are the consequences of a relevant OSCE? In my research I found out that the OSCE has very little knowledge with the people in the Western states. The people do know the European Union, they don’t know the OSCE. Sometimes the OSCE is in the news, as was very recently with the OSCE observers that were taken hostage in Eastern Ukraine, but ask the ordinary man or woman on the street and they do not know what the OSCE is. The OSCE is though a little more known in East European and South-East European states, and in the Central-Asian countries it is even better. Most people do know the OSCE there, as I was told by people working for the OSCE. The OSCE also has a couple of current projects in these Central-Asian countries and its comprehensive approach to security is still very useful there. I will give an example to illustrate this. Central-Asia is home to some conflicts that are about energy supplianice and water management. Kirghizia for instance, is an upland mountain state, where a couple of rivers are originating and subsequently flowing to lower lands, such as Uzbekistan. Kirghizia has no natural resources like gas, but the lower situated Uzbekistan does. Kirghizia is able to generate energy from a dam. Logically, Kirghizia does this mainly in the winter, because then it needs most energy for heating. So the water floods in the winter and not in the summer. Uzbekistan on the other hand is dependant on the water mainly in the summer, it needs water for irrigation. It appeared that these situations caused disputes, where in this case water management and energy supply were able to form a threat to regional insecurity. This is a very concrete example where the OSCE has been relevant. To conclude: the OSCE’s adherence to comprehensive security still is not outdated.

Conclusion
This chapter was building on the chapter before and when writing it I partly used the premediation concept as was explained in chapter five. In the theoretical underpinnings of regime theory, we also addressed the power-based and the interest-based approach to regimes. This chapter was eventually more interest-based than it was power-based. The reason for that is that within the OSCE regime there is no clear situation of the presence of a hegemon. Let us recap from chapter one: We wondered whether regimes need hegemons for their sustainability. Krasner argued that when a hegemon’s relative capabilities decline, a regime will collapse. (Krasner, 200). Within the OSCE regime there are certain blocs, but there is not a single member state that is dominant and overruling. All member states have a veto power and regarding the finances, there is no dominant contributor such as is the case with NATO, where the United States pay up to two-third of the budget. Therefore, the hypothesis of Krasner was not involved in the scenarios and the consequential aspects.

The consequential aspects that I have described are not sufficient for policy makers to formulate their policies. When the consequences are mapped, one could assign a likelihood to it (based on a mathematic formula) and after that, incorporate a risk analysis in the scenario planning. That however, is out of the reach in this thesis. My only goal was to outline the various scenarios of the OSCE, given the occasion of Helsinki +40, and consequential aspects to these scenarios. That now, has all been done. In the next chapter we will reach conclusions.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

Will 2015 be the year for the OSCE? And if so, will that be in a positive way or a negative one? Those are the options discussed throughout this thesis. This thesis is original in that combines multiple elements of theorizing about international relations. The OSCE proved a ideal starting point here, because on the one side the OSCE was a very suitable case to approach it from a perspective of regime theory and on the other side, the occasion of Helsinki +40 was a good cause to do a case study by the help of scenario building theory. I established the OSCE as a regime and decided that I could build from there on. During this writing process, it was tempting to go into the aspects that came across the story that I was telling. That is also this thing with theories. They get you to think, think about certain aspects that you had not thought of otherwise. That mostly would be a good thing, although I also in some circumstances had to be severe and decide to leave this matter for what it was, because here in this thesis it was not the right place and it was not the right time.

Speaking of place and time, that brings us with scenario building theory. In this thesis I set out to sketch the situation of and around the OSCE, develop certain scenarios by the help of scenario building theory and regime theory, to do that by the help of the key variables and finally, outline the consequential aspect of each and every scenario. I wanted to use these theories in order to better understand certain patterns, structures and systems. I wanted to develop these scenarios in order to assist anyone who is in some way involved in matters around the OSCE. I incorporated the consequences of these scenarios, because I wanted to make a start with agenda setting, so that policy makers can pick up the shoe and proceed with assigning likelihoods and including risk analyses. Previous reports that have been published about the OSCE’s current state are mostly about concluding that the regime is in an identity crisis and that therewith, recommendations are formulated that would improve the OSCE. The thought that the OSCE could collapse is mostly scrupulously avoided. I choose another approach in this thesis. In my thesis, recommendations are also interwoven with the text, but I also deliberately incorporated the scenario of a destruction of the OSCE. As I also made clear, on purpose there is not assigned a degree of likeliness to the three specific scenarios. A degree of likeliness would state which scenario is most probable to take place. I want the reader to think about this. I only outlined the scenarios, described how I came to these scenarios, elaborated on the contexts of these scenarios and incorporated the consequences of the scenarios, which of course, throw back at the originating of the scenarios themselves. After all, human decisions play a role in the policy making and the scenario building that is partly based on the policy making of the OSCE member states.

The main question for this thesis was: What possible scenarios on the future of the OSCE in a security regime perspective deem plausible and what are the consequences of each specific scenario? There are three possible scenarios in their purest forms: The OSCE can do two things: Either quit (scenario 1) or continue (scenario 2). The second scenario can again be spread in two scenarios, either continuing and changing nothing (scenario 2A) or continuing and change (scenario 2B). I could also have chosen to divide along the following: The OSCE can either go back (diminish) (scenario 1), stand still (scenario 2) or advance (scenario 3). I chose the first option, but for the conclusion it does not make much of a difference. These are the three scenarios that come up when we address scenarios that are also plausible. In the concerning chapter therefore, I had every time to prove this plausibility to the reader. I did that with the help of historical examples, such as the OSCE on a standstill with the 30th and 35th anniversary when discussing scenario 2B. To clear things up here, there is a difference
between the plausibility of a certain scenario and the likeliness. The plausibility of a certain scenario involves the question of a scenario might happen, and the likeliness is about – once it is established that a certain scenario might happen – how probable it is that the specific scenario is going to take place. As I made clear, I specifically addressed the plausibility of the scenarios and did not address the likeliness.

One of the purposes of scenario building is that policy makers can plan their policies helped by the existence of certain scenarios. To do this well, they also need to take the consequential aspect of the various scenarios in mind. That is why I included the consequences of the scenarios into the main question of this thesis. ‘Consequences’ is sadly a very broad concept and unfortunately I did not devote any attention to develop an explanation of what exactly is meant by ‘consequences’ in this thesis. Of course, the consequences can be either short term or long term, they can either be internal or external, and I could have chosen to address them in this very categorical manner but for the sake of keeping the things as shortly as possible I did not. Plus I made the link with arguments mentioned by other authors.

The scenarios are all predominantly based on the now available information and on the assumption that actors act rationally. I could have decided to incorporate pieces of behaviourism in order to make the scenarios more comprehensive. When writing a thesis, there are constant moments when one has a choice to either include or exclude and it is up to the writer (me) to justify these choices. In my opinion, an inclusion of behaviourism would eventually not contribute to a better outlining of the various scenarios. And the same goes for the inclusion of unpredictable events, which is what I mean by based on the now available information. Neumann and Øverland quote Kahn who stressed ‘the importance of holding the door open for “wild” speculations.’ (Neumann and Øverland, 263), but at the same time Neumann and Øverland acknowledge that sometimes we have deal with ‘radical and unpredicted events.’ Must I therefore add a possible escalation of the Ukraine crisis, leading to a Third World War and the consequences for the OSCE in the scenarios? I chose not so.

What I learned from the writing of this thesis is that the power still lies with the member states. That given is something that on some level one already knows, but demonstrated rather clearly here when we are making comparisons with variables as other international regimes, the security spectrum and organizational aspects. That is in this respect one of the main conclusions of this thesis. There have been reports published on how to improve the OSCE, for instance by the Panel of Eminent Persons, and although these recommendations are mostly making a lot of sense, the question becomes to what extent they matter in a perspective of influential member states. Are there any reports written on how to move the member states to various agreements on certain aspects and what are the recommendations on that? Of course, it is true that certain variables relate to each other. Improvements in the organizational structure (one of the variables) of course has its consequences for the stance of various member states (also one of the variables). It also has its consequences for the competition with other international regimes (also one of the variables). In other words, there is a broad array of relationships between the variables, meaning influence. That is what we call interdependence. But, as I have made perfectly clear in the table in chapter six, the key role lies here with the power of (influential) member states, and that is also my message to the reader: think about this aspect when observing the Helsinki +40 process.

Another finding of this thesis is a start of the plotting of the consequences of a dissolution of the OSCE. Of course, what I have written about that is only the beginning of the begin. One can write an entire thesis about just this aspect. But what is true is that there is barely any
literature that is about a collapse of the OSCE. There has been written about member states leaving. There has also been written about multiple member states leaving. But there has not been written, or at least as far as I know about that many states leaving (preceded by an ending of the payment of the contribution) so that the regime disintegrates. But the ceasing of organizations/regimes to exist has happened before, for instance with the Western European Union (WEU) or with the Warsaw Pact. The innovative aspect of my thesis is that I included this scenario and its consequences in the total picture. I did this by the help of assuming some sort of causal chain of events. ‘If this state did that, then that state would be doing that and leave, and if those states left then the organization would be doing this and finally we are plotting the consequences of a dissolution of the OSCE, a territory where many authors did not dare to come before. The use of scenario building theory made this step possible.

This thesis is therefore successful in that it did two things. First, it demonstrated that there are only three scenarios for the OSCE, given the circumstances. In the thesis is spoken about the line of thought behind the scenarios, about how the scenarios were established and about what they can contain. It is now up to others to argue with me where my reasoning went wrong. It is also reasoned that there are in principle four pieces of influence (variables) that have a strong effect on the implementation of the scenarios. This thesis is also successful in that I was mostly perfectly able to accomplish the steps according to scenario building theory as it is phrased by Neumann and Øverland and De Jouvenel and by this, put the theory into practice. And when arrived at a point where my key variables and scenarios are no longer challenged, we are able to discuss about the consequences. This thesis therefore is also successful in that it, given the limited amount of space, captured most short and long term consequences, so that others can build on them subsequently.

After all the things that have been said so far, I am left with the sentiment that the prospects for the OSCE are very important to us all, despite some opinions that the OSCE is not relevant nowadays anymore. These prospects matter not because of the thousands of people that work for the organization, not because of the millions of Euros that flow through the organization, but because of what the OSCE means for European security dynamics. If the constellation goes, it is to some extent uncertain what the new situation exactly will be. Whatever the new the situation will be, uncertainties will remain there. Therefore, it seems appropriate to me here to end this thesis with a quote about uncertainties of Hugues de Jouvenel who has been an important author for this thesis. He said:

“If we cannot see ahead very well, let’s be adaptable.”

‘‘Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight’’ – Hugues de Jouvenel
List of References:


“Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight” – Hugues de Jouvenel


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“Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight” – Hugues de Jouvenel


"Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight" – Hugues de Jouvenel
Annex I:

Chapter two discussed the most dominant issues in the security sector, which are the interstate and intrastate conflicts. But, as were announced, there are other issues as well. Since these issues are not the centrepiece of these thesis, and they are mainly informational, I chose to mention this information in the annexes, because they are very helpful though for a complete understanding of this thesis and its conclusions reached.

**Terrorism**

Terrorism has been existing for decades, but gained much more relevance after the events of 9/11. Terrorism is defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The problem with terrorism is that one is mostly dealing with non-national groupings, which are more difficult to counter. Big terrorist attacks continued to take place after 9/11 as for instance in London, Madrid, Moscow and Boston most recently. An estimation of the number of incidents varies each year between the 2000 and 4000. It is important to add here that terrorism not only has direct casualties (victims) but also impact on national economies, for instance regarding tourism, foreign direct investment and savings and consumption, stock markets etc. Due to the many direct and indirect costs of terrorism, numbers about these are available (see for instance the book by Walter Enders and Eric Olson about ‘measuring the economic costs of terrorism’) but need a proper amount of space to clarify these, which is unfortunately not at this thesis.

**Cyber warfare**

Cybercriminality is considered one of the most upcoming threats to national security. As once quoted by The White House: ‘The very technologies that empower us to lead also empower individual criminal hackers, organized criminal groups, terrorist networks and other advanced nations to disrupt the critical infrastructure that is vital to our economy, commerce, public safety, and military.’ It is estimated that with the current means, entire economies can be disrupted due to technological innovations. To counter this development, in many countries extensive budgets are made available to develop innovative solutions towards this danger. The National Defense Magazine described an ongoing cyber-arms race between national security agencies and malicious actors. According to Janczewski and Colarik, malicious groups and/or organizations may do this in order to create fear, possible benefits out of negative speculation and/or the demonstration of possible vulnerabilities. (Janczewski and Colarik, XV)

**Transnational Crime**

Transnational crime or transnational organized crime is defined by scholars in this matter as ‘systematic criminal activity’ (Edwards and Gill, 14). It is a broad concept that might for instance involve arms smuggling, human trafficking and drugs trade. Issues that are still regular crimes in the OSCE territories. These crimes very often do not stand on their own, but are related to for instance terrorist groupings as well, something that is also recognized by the National Defense Magazine (2012). Also, not once there is corruption involved. The estimation is that these threats are going to persist in multiple environments over the next 10-plus years (National Defense Magazine). The fact that is being dealt with (in most cases) non-state actors makes things extra difficult. The United Nations estimated in 2012 that the global costs of transnational organized criminal activities rose over the 870 billion (!) dollars. The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime also stated that ‘transnational organized crime reaches into every region, and every country across the world.’

‘Necessity is nothing more than the result of a lack of foresight’ – Hugues de Jouvenel
Annex II:

The first chapter was about regimes. We have seen that regimes can be categorized according to the issue-area with which they occupy themselves. The step then to security regimes therefore is quite logical. After all, this thesis is not about telecommunication regimes or international fishing regimes. It is of course also true that security entails more than only politics and the military. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever there exist also economic security, societal security and environmental security, which effectively makes almost everything a security issue. So we have made the step to security regimes, which makes it almost self-evident to shortly discuss the most relevant security regimes that exist nowadays. This is also very important because of the issue raised earlier, namely that the OSCE loses more territory every day to international organizations as the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe. These organizations pursue also goals in same area as the OSCE and are perhaps more efficient than the OSCE.

I do not aim here to provide for a complete overview of these organizations, but to sketch the landscape and to make a starting point with the discussion about to what extent organizations actually compete with each other. Two encyclopaedias proved really helpful which are the Yearbook of the Union of International Associations and the Yearbook of the Europa Directory of International Organizations. In this annex we will focus on the most relevant security regimes. The Council of Europe is not so much a security organizations, but since the OSCE occupies itself also with humanitarian issues, we will also devote some words to the Council of Europe. To prevent this annex from becoming an encyclopaedia, we will at least focus on regimes active in the Northern hemisphere (the OSCE territory) and skip the really small ones. Since the aim of this annex is to provide an overview of the organizational landscape, we will continue with the term organizations in the rest of this annex. The distinction between regimes and organizations has been dealt with in the thesis.

The United Nations
The United Nations is the world’s most principal global organization with anno 2014 at 193 member states. The United Nations is almost some sort of overarching organization, and has dozens of sub-organs and other related organizations, such as the WHO, the IMF and the ILO. The UN has organizations (sub-bodies) in all parts in the world and is also specialised (mainly in committee and/or programme structure) in nearly every policy field, such as for instance the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The United Nations security and defence policies are further discussed in the UN Security Council, one of the main organs of the UN and one of the leading security actors in the world. The UN Security Council is primary responsible for the enforcing of international peace and security. Its resolutions are binding, and has the ability to conclude sanctions and in exceptional circumstances, authorize the use of force.

NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is created in 1949 and has 28 members. The organization was a reaction to Soviet threats. NATO was thought necessary to guarantee the West-European states’ safety and security and is therefore more of a military organization than a political one. NATO is unique in its charter in which is arranged that an attack to one member state is considered as an attack to all member states and that subsequently, all member states have an obligation (not taken lightly) to assist the state being attacked. The NATO is also known for its taking the lead or at least major responsibilities in the military missions abroad such as in Kosovo or Afghanistan.
The Council of Europe
This organization is seated in Strasbourg and has 47 member states. The Council of Europe is not a security organization, and therefore has nearly nothing to do with military policies. But the Council of Europe is an important player within the OSCE territories on humanitarian issues. The Council is the main establisher of the European Convention on Human Rights, nowadays a major guideline and authority in the human rights field. The Council of Europe has its own Court, which is attainable for the inhabitants of most member states. Since 1990, the Council of Europe occupies itself also with the election observation missions, thereby competing on this part directly with the OSCE. The last years, the Council of Europe is extending its businesses more and more to other domains, like culture, education, sports, etc.

The European Union
The European Union has 28 member states and has on lots of areas supranational powers. On the foreign policy issues it does not, but there have been taken some initiatives to coordinate foreign policies between the member states, for instance by the creation of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The same development occurs in the military domain. The national armed forces fall completely under national jurisdiction, but following the Kosovo War, a desire for an own army developed, resulting in the establishment of the EU battle groups. Beside those battle groups, some smaller initiatives also exist, but are not worthy to be mentioned here. The EU has the respect for human rights highly ranked as a value, and its members have in most cases signed and ratified a whole complex of treaties and declarations to that end.

Other organizations
Of course, the organizations above are not the only players in the field of security politics. Globally, there are more than 100,000 international organizations globally, and they are (almost) all named in the encyclopaedias mentioned above. They are for instance the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, has also military component), the Organization of American States (OAS, the goal being to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, one of the goals being to uphold international peace and security) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, also conducts military activities).