DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “Bounded by thoughts? A Governmentality Analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name:

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Date:
“Beyrouth: ‘Mirage ou Réaltié’” (Beirut: Fact or Fiction?) by L. Ghorayeb and M. Kerbaj, 2010
(Source: Lebrecord: Lebanese Art Magazine at:
http://lebrecord.com/?p=3647#!prettyPhoto)

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Conclusion

Literature
This thesis is the closing piece to seven years of studying, experience, old, new or renewed interests, epiphanies, frustrations, theories, bright lights, writer blocks, study blocks, practice in the field, research, extracurricular activities, history, economy, sociology, politics, law, philosophy, and enthusiasm.

I made my choice for International Relations and International Organizations after a lecture for high school students. The lecture was about the personal background and characteristics of US presidents and how these were reflected in their policies. I was amazed how micro level experiences could have an influence on macro level iconic moments in history. The relation between the individual and the global, and between history and contemporary developments, were the first sparks that lighted my passion for IR.

Along the way I came to the opinion that, in order to understand this complex world, the main theories in IR are insufficient in their explanations. During the last phase of my bachelor, a world of academic possibilities opened for me due to courses as Methods of International Relations and a seminar on conflict resolution. After this I studied in Mexico for six months, an academic environment where teachers still preferred Marxism over Liberalism. Although the focus on Marxism was somewhat too intense for me, the sparks that pulled me into IR were lit again during this year.

Critical theories can shine a different light on issues, although they rarely offer a satisfying solution to problems in the world. Foucault once supposedly said “I am not a prophet, I just make walls into windows”. This description seems striking for his line of thought. He does not aim to change the insides of the house, but he lets us be aware of the existence of the house.

I decided to focus my master thesis on a concept of Foucault: ‘governmentality’, because I felt that this would be both an addition to, as a completion of, my academic curriculum. All my academic interests come together in this thesis: the difficulties faced by democracy promotion attempts, the rationalities and practices of the European Union and political philosophy.

I would like to thank dr. mr. C.L.B. Kocken for serving as my supervisor and encouraging me to challenge myself academically. Special thanks go to my mother and sister, who truly facilitated the thesis writing process.

Yvonne Hage
ABBREVIATIONS

CSO: civil society organization
DG: Directorates-General
DP: Democracy Promotion
EIDHR: European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EMP: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI: European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
EU: European Union
IFI: International Financial Institutions
IGO: intergovernmental organization
IR: International Relations
NGO: non-governmental organization
OSCE: Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe
UN: United Nations
WW II: World War II
INTRODUCTION

This year, 2014, it has been ten years since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy’s aim is to promote democracy, the rule of law and free markets in partner countries. The tenth anniversary gives rise to reviews of the policy, showing that most of the critics are not positive about its effectiveness. The unrest in many of the partner countries illustrates that the ENP goals have not been accomplished in the last decade. Some critics even say that the ENP is the least effective of all European Union (EU) policies.[1]

The absence of intended outcomes can be explained from different academic points of view. In general, democracy promotion (DP) by the EU is criticized for two main reasons. Firstly, EU DP activities supposedly lack engagement with local actors, political cultures and economic situations. Secondly, DP policy makers would primarily promote their own techniques of government as universal effective (Zanotti, 2006). A third explanation intertwines the two previous critiques but focuses more on structural shortcomings of the ENP. This explanation is that the EU is bounded in its actions by internalized regimes of thought and practices of government.

The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) aims in his works to shed a light on underlying assumptions of governance. A foucauldian perspective enables the analysis of tacit ways of thinking and how these limit the actions for policy makers. It is guided not by the ‘who governs and why’ question, but rather by the ‘how’ question of government (Dean, 2010). ‘Governmentality’ is one of the concepts introduced by Foucault to gain insight in how power is exercised within a certain framework of knowledge. Governmentality is the exercise of power based on neoliberal rationalities and techniques, which enables a subject to self-regulate its behaviour. Governmentality analyses offer a research framework in which it is possible to assess both the rationalities and the practices of governance.

In this thesis I illustrate the inability of the EU to adjust its strategy when the ENP does not have the desired outcomes in The Republic of Lebanon (Lebanon) from a governmentality perspective. By 2012, the goals of the ENP Action Plan of 2007 in Lebanon had been achieved to a very limited extent. Lebanon can therefore serve as an example to assess the incapacity of the ENP policy makers to step out of their own framework of thoughts. A governmentality analysis of the ENP and its response to unsatisfactory outcomes can contribute to IR scholarship by questioning ‘the normal’ in democracy promotion.
activities. The objective of this analysis of governance is not to provide an alternative for the ENP and its practices. Instead, the added value of a governmentality method lies in a better understanding of EU foreign policies. This allows policy makers to be aware of tacit ways of thinking and the limiting effects these have on the scope of possible actions.

The research question of this thesis is therefore: How can the concept of governmentality explain the response of the EU to obstacles for the implementation of the ENP Action Plan in Lebanon? In this study, I argue that the EU is limited in its possibility of actions by certain framework of thoughts. Due to these restricting frameworks of thoughts, changes can only be made in the instruments of the ENP when little progress is made in the partner countries. The overall objectives of the ENP remain the same, regardless the lack of progress of the implementation of the Action Plan. The analysis is based on a funnel model, starting with an assessment of the wider global context in which the EU acts, followed by the rationalities of the EU in general and of the specific rationalities of DP activities of the EU. Subsequently, I assess the practices of the EU and the ENP, followed by a specific analysis of the case study.

The analysis is based on a range of sources, mainly literature, policy documents and progress reports. The neoliberal rationalities behind democracy promotion activities in the global arena have been topic of much research. A brief analysis on existing literature on the rationalities in democracy promotion is therefore sufficient to illustrate the broad neoliberal context of the ENP. Policy documents and other primary sources are used to identify the specific rationalities of the ENP. The scope of the research excluded the option of field research.

**Structure of the thesis**

Firstly, in order to conduct an analysis of the ENP from a governmentality perspective, it is crucial to have a full understanding of what is meant by this concept. To this effect, the first chapter sets forth a conceptual framework on governmentality. First, the main concepts of Foucault on politics are assessed, followed by a paragraph elaborating on the meaning of governmentality. The last part of this chapter discusses how governmentality can be applied to analyse international power relations.
The subsequent chapters build on this through an analysis of the conditions of government. In other words: the rationalities and practices of government that form the basis on which problematizations are made. This analysis illustrates how governance takes place within the ENP. The second chapter discusses the rationalities of government in the global political domain, the rationalities of the EU as a whole and the rationalities of democracy promotion practices of the EU in specific. The third chapter then continues by examining the governance practices or ‘techniques’ resulting from the neoliberal rationalities of governance. In this same chapter, I argue that the ENP policy instruments can be perceived as governmentality techniques that aim for the subjects, the partner states, to self-regulate their behaviour.

Finally, the fourth chapter assesses the response of the EU to failing outcomes in Lebanon. This analysis illustrates that due to neoliberal rationalities and the techniques which are based on these rationalities, the EU is only able to enhance its strategy in Lebanon. The enhancement of the ENP strategy prevents the Union from structural changing the strategy. The analysis focuses on the EU Action Plan and the Progress reports of the Action Plan of 2008 and 2011. These progress reports are written according the same structure as the Action Plan and provide a thematic overview of the progress made on different sub goals. Within the scope of this thesis, it is only possible to assess one country. Lebanon serves as a suitable case to study because it has been relatively stable in comparison with other countries within the ENP. Most other countries have additional complicating circumstances which influence the implementation of the ENP Action Plan, such as revolts in the context of the Arab Spring or extraordinary ties with Russia. These types of intervening factors would make the assessment of the response of the EU based on this conceptual framework less reliable.

CHAPTER 1:
GOVERNMENTALITY FRAMEWORK

Introduction
1.1 Foucault on politics
   1.1.1 Discourse
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   1.3.2 Advantages
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to make visible the tacit ways of thinking which influence and limit the way in which the EU governs in the ENP by using the Foucauldian concept of governmentality. In order to use this concept, an understanding of its meaning and conceptual context is necessary. Therefore, this chapter starts off with an overview of the key Foucauldian concepts on politics and government and connects these to the concept of governmentality. This overview is especially important considering the criticism of governmentality studies, saying the concept is often used in too simplified ways, which comes with the risk of losing the theoretic strength of governmentality (Lemke, 2001; Dean, 2010). Secondly, the concept of governmentality itself is introduced. Finally, applications of the concept of governmentality within International Relations (IR) are elaborated on.

1.1. Foucault
In this paragraph Foucault is introduced shortly, followed by the three main concepts in his earlier works that relate to governmentality. This enables us to understand the foundations on which the concept of governmentality is built.

Foucault’s work has strong connections with Critical Theories and more specific, post-structuralism. Critical Theory arose from the writings of, among others, Marx, Hegel and Kant and is characterized by emphasizing the political nature of knowledge claims and
analysing the underlying structures of abuse and domination in order to overcome them. These forms of ‘Critiques’ imply an association with truth and right, based on its use by Kant and others (Dean, 2010). Analyses based on the work of Foucault, however, are more adequately named ‘criticism’, rather than a ‘critique’. Foucault’s study of governmentality is a criticism of political reasoning ‘in as much as it seeks to investigate some of the hitherto silent conditions of truth and right’ (Dean, 2010, p. 59). Foucault illuminates underlying structures in politics, without offering solutions (Foucault, 1982), in this sense he is more adequately described as a post-structuralist.

Generally, one can state that post-structuralism contributes to the political theoretical tradition in three ways: (1) it tries to expose the connection between power and knowledge, (2) it reveals the political choices behind competing interpretations by textual strategy of deconstruction and (3) it broadens the range of political options by rethinking ‘the political’ in general (Burchill e.a., 2009). In line with the post-structuralist thoughts, Foucault does not make claims in his works about universal truths. His approach is to historicize grand abstractions rather than truths. He does not aim to define an absolute and objective ‘human nature’, but rather defines the social functions that the concept ‘human nature’ plays in the context of economic, social or political practices (Rabinbow, 1984). Discourse, biopolitics and government are three main concepts in Foucault’s work and lay at the basis of governmentality in the Foucauldian sense. To fully understand the concept of governmentality these main concepts in the line of thought of Foucault are briefly discussed below.

1.1.1. Discourse

Foucault’s work on governmentality is based on his assumption that power and knowledge are interlinked concepts (Lemke, 2001). Foucault links power and knowledge by the concept ‘discourse’. In this paragraph discourse as a concept is explained to assess this knowledge/power relation.

According to Foucault all people have ‘collective presuppositions’, or historical systems of thought, also called: discourse (Foucault, 1982). ‘Political economy’ per example, is a discourse. Foucault based the concept on the idea that power and knowledge reciprocal constitute each other (Lemke, 2001; Moses and Knutsen, 2007). This reciprocal element is
crucial: thinking determines behaviour. This means that the spread of knowledge can determine behaviour. So knowledge cannot exist without constituting power and power cannot exist without constituting knowledge.

Foucault understood ‘knowledge’ not as an absolute truth or fact, but rather as constructed. The formative mechanism in the construction process is language (Lemke, 2001). Discourse, as a culturally constructed representation of reality, defines what is possible to talk about and defines subjects. Discourse thus constructs knowledge. Therefore behaviour is influenced by discourses (Foucault, 1982). Foucault critically discusses in his work liberal and capitalist discourses and the way how knowledge is constructed to maintain power relations (Selby, 2007).

Concluding, the concept discourse constructs knowledge. Knowledge and power constitute each other, therefore discourses produce power relations. In the following paragraph we will discuss how power is exercised over people according to Foucault. In other words: Foucault’s view on politics will be discussed.

1.1.2 BIOPOLITICS

Foucault introduced the concept ´biopolitics´ as a specific modern form of exercising power in the 1970s. He uses the term inconsistently throughout his texts in three different ways (Lemke, 2011). In this thesis we will use the interpretation of biopolitics as a liberal art of government, as further explained below.

Foucault opposes biopolitics to the concept of sovereign power. Sovereign power or ´repressive power over death´ is the top down exercise of authority of a state over the subject within a definite territory by means of deductive practices, such as taxes and punishment. Biopolitics or ´power over life´, governs people in a broader sense and deals with living beings instead of legal subjects (Dean, 2010; Lemke, 2011). Issues such as health, politics, insurance and sexual education all lay in the range of biopolitics. Biopolitics ´empowers´ subjects to take decisions on their own. Individuals who are giving responsibility and who are educated will show behaviour in line with their knowledge. The freedoms and knowledge of an individual lead to ´self-regulation´. Biopolitics is therefore a facilitating power (Lemke, 2002). This facilitating form of exercising power is a corner stone to the concept of governmentality.
1.1.3 Government

After discussing discourse as a source of power, biopolitics as a form of exercising power, we now address what or who exercises power, in other words the government. The foundations for the concept “governmentality” lay in Foucault’s lectures on ´government´ at the College of France in 1978 – 1979, which were first published in 2004 in France. The English translation of these texts was published in 2008, under the name “The Birth of Biopolitics” (Foucault, 2008). In these texts Foucault defines government as the ‘conduct of conduct´ (Foucault, 1982, 2008) and it entails any attempt to shape aspects of our behaviour according to a set of norms (Foucault, 1982, 2008). Government can thus take many forms; it can differ both in actors, means, and goals (Dean, 2010). It is also not limited to a specific geographical scale, as it can refer to a broad range of geographical and non-geographical units within and outside the state, such as self-regulation of the individual, families, companies or governing populations (Lemke, 2001, p. 191; Ferguson, 2002).

Dean (2010) distinguishes three main pillars of government in the Foucauldian interpretation: (1) rationalities, (2) technologies and (3) perceived identity (Dean, 2010). Rationalities are the thoughts on governance and form the basis of government; technologies are the scale of possibilities for governmental practices and shape the form of the government. Finally, the perceived identities of those who govern and of those who are governed also shape the form of government (Dean, 2010, Walters and Haahr, 2005). In most cases governmental power develops following problems that emerge in a state of freedom. The notion of government as the ´conduct of conduct´ is based on the assumption that those who are subjects to the governing have a primary freedom: the capacity to think and act. This also accounts for those who govern, because in order to govern one needs to think and act. This is what Foucault refers to as ‘mentality’ (Dean, 2010).

The thoughts and actions of the government are constructed by a certain discourse. A government can therefore only exercise facilitating power, or biopolitics, in line with this discourse. Foucault’s introduction of ‘mentality´ in the construction of government eventually leads to the concept of governmentality, where rationalities and techniques lead to self-regulation of the subject.
1.2 Governmentality

Discourse, bio-politics and government as three Foucauldian concepts, are the foundations of governmentality. In this paragraph the concept of governmentality is further elaborated on by discussing two different interpretations of it. Foucault did not develop any systematic tools to assess governmentality, nor did he concretely define the concept. Rather, the concept has been shaped by Foucault’s during his lectures at the College of France in the late seventies (Foucault, 2008). Currently, two interpretations of the term “governmentality” exist in the literature: a general, broad interpretation of governmental techniques based on rationalities and a more narrow neoliberal interpretation of governmentality (Dean, 2010; Larner and Walters, 2004). Both interpretations will be discussed below after which I will explain why the neoliberal interpretation is used for the analysis of the response of the ENP to obstacles of the Action Plan in Lebanon.

The first interpretation is a general interpretation, which links the concept of ‘thought’ to government. The concept in this broad definition is used to analyse mentality which is made practical and technical in government techniques (Dean, 2010). In governmentality in the broad sense, the conduct of others is regulated by techniques based on specific rationalities. The relationship between government or power on the one hand and knowledge on the other hand, is strongly intertwined. In this form of representation, power is rationalized by a discursive field. This is done by delineating objects, specifying borders, justifications and arguments. The used governance techniques specify a problem and at the same time offer strategies to handle this problem. In this way the techniques structure the forms of interventions by the government. Techniques of government will result in a state of domination, because they stabilize and regulate power relations, which will lead to one actor being dominant over others (Lemke, 2002).

The second interpretation is governmentality as the exercise of power based on neoliberal rationalities and techniques, which make a subject self-regulate its behaviour. This is the most commonly used interpretation of governmentality in Foucauldian studies (Dean, 2007; Lemke, 2001). Governmentality has the population as its subject, political economy as its principal form of knowledge and the ‘apparatus of security’ as its main instrument. The apparatus of security of the state is broader than just military security. It contains governance aspects in areas such as health, welfare and resources (Walters and Haahr,
Governmentality in this definition will also lead to a form of domination due to techniques which stabilize power relations (Lemke, 2002). Governmentality in the neoliberal interpretation differs from the concept biopolitics because its focus on wealth and welfare; this implicates an inherent notion of economy in state practices.

In this thesis when reference to governmentality is made, this refers to the neoliberal interpretation of governmentality. Before going into more detail over governmentality, the work of Foucault on neo-liberalism will be briefly elaborated in order to fully understand the concept and how it is based on neoliberalism.

1.2.1. NEO-LIBERALISM

As stated above, the definition of governmentality as used in this thesis is based on neoliberalism. Therefore, it is useful to provide a brief overview of neoliberalism in a Foucauldian perspective.¹ The rise of neoliberalism introduced a new rationality of government: the idea that society is a natural state of the state and that this society constitutes the basis and limits of governmental practices (Lemke, 2011). Foucault describes neoliberalism not as an ideology, but rather as a set of practices (Dean, 2010), an ‘art of government’ (Joseph, 2009) or a political rationality (Lemke, 2001, p. 204).

Neoliberalism came up after World War II and developed from traditional liberalism. Traditional liberalism was concerned with how to limit the state and how to establish economic liberty within it. Neoliberalism redefines the relation between the state and the economy. In the classic liberal thought the state defined and monitored the market, it supervised it. Neoliberalism sees the market as the organizing and regulative principle underneath the state. In the neoliberal thought the market thus controls the state and society instead of the other way around (Foucault, 1979).

Neo-liberalism also differs from traditional liberalism because it perceives another basis of government. The basis of government in the classical liberal thought is the natural state of freedom of an individual. In the neo-liberal thought there is no longer a pre-given

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¹ Please note that in this paragraph the concept neoliberalism refers to the moderate alternative to liberalism as proclaimed by the German Freiberg School in the 1930s. Foucault referred in the late 1970s to this interpretation of neoliberalism, which was the common interpretation at that time. It is important to make this distinction because in contemporary literature the concept neoliberalism often refers to market fundamentalism. For further reading please consult Boas and Gans-Morse, ‘Neo-liberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan’, 2009.
human nature as the basis of government, but rather an artificial form of behaviour of the economic-rational and manipulable *homo oeconomicus*, ‘a free and autonomous “atom” of self-interest’ (Hamann, 2009).

From a neoliberal point of view the government governs by the assumption that individuals are characterized by rational choice and that the variable ‘environment’ can be changed (Foucault, 1979, Lemke, 2001). From this perspective neoliberalism can be perceived as a certain manner of creating subjectivity in which individuals are constituted as subjects of ‘human capital’ (Read, 2009). This ‘human capital’ consists of two components: (1) a preconditioned set of physical, genetic skills and (2) skills acquired through life as a result of ‘investments’ in terms of education, training but also nutrition and even love. Every individual is an entrepreneur endeavouring surplus: the wage they earn represents the investments they made (Lemke, 199-200). Neo-liberalism in this sense is a political rationality that applies to governmental techniques to govern ‘the social’ under the same conditions as the economic, or better said govern the social as a form of economy.

1.2.2 NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY

As explained above, neoliberal governance treats the social as a form of economy. However, neoliberal governmentality is broader than this. In this paragraph the specific aspects of governmentality as a political project are assessed.²

Kurki (2011) distinguishes four core analytical assumptions of Foucault on governmentality, which give a clear view of the neoliberal logics within it. 1) The economy is analysed as a rationality, constituted by a certain set of practices. This economic rationality plays a crucial role in the creation of meaning of the social and political. 2) The rationality of liberal economy is not about sole freedom, but rather about the active production of the use of this freedom. The ‘perfect’ state of the economy can be achieved by deep-running interventions of government in society. 3) The creation of the ‘entrepreneurial self’ is the key mode of production of the ‘free individual’. An individual can be seen as ‘human capital’ which can be further developed. This ‘homo oeconomicus’ addresses all forms of social life, not just the economic sphere. 4) Civil society is a governmental technique and it is the

² From this point on the concept ‘governmentality’ will refer to neoliberal governmentality
concrete ensemble within which the ‘homo oeconomicus’ is placed so that he can be managed (Kurki, 2011).

The object of government in a governmentality is to insure that individuals and their skills and capacities are fostered, used and optimized (Dean, 2010). Governmentality thus has the population as its subject, using techniques such as social and economic policy to govern free individuals. Power in governmentality is defined as ‘government’ and is related to other forms of power: sovereignty and discipline. Joseph defines the relation between these different kinds of powers as a ‘power triangle’ sovereignty-discipline-government. Government stands out because of its focus on the population and its facilitating techniques of governance (Joseph, 2009; Dean, 2010). The object of sovereign power is how to rule and maintain the rule over a given territory and it subjects. It’s instruments are law, violence, military traditions and ostentation. Disciplinary power has as its object the ‘body’ and tries to create calculable subjects. It operates through institutions like schools or prisons and uses normalizing techniques and surveillance (Walters and Haahr, 2005). All three forms of power are present within governmentality, although government is the main source of power.

Neoliberal states retain their traditional functions regarding security, jurisdiction and legislation or the ‘state apparatuses’, but also take on indirect government techniques (Lemke, 2001). These indirect techniques aim for controlling individuals without being responsible for them. This leads to the shift of responsibility to the individual which is expressed by ‘self-care’ and self-regulation. The social risks such as illnesses, unemployment or poverty lay with the individual and can be dealt with by self-care. The individual becomes an entrepreneur of its own life and deals with his life-choices in an economic rational way as a homo oeconomicus (Lemke, 2001). Self-regulation occurs when an individual deliberately adapts to norms and identities endorsed by the government. This is a process of ‘normalizing’ or ‘socializing’ the subject. These identities and rules for behaviour as endorsed by the government are constructed by the neoliberal discourse (Ferguson, 2002; Zanotti, 2006).

In sum, the subject of neoliberal governmentality has to be guided into a free and responsible individual. The market logic is expanded over all spheres of social life and interactions. Personal responsibility and self-regulation are main concepts of
governmentality as a neoliberal strategy. Power in this sense can be described as both positive and productive: it enables its subject to self-regulate according to the dominant discourse. This not only accounts for individual actors, but also for collective bodies and institutions, corporations and states. These subjects all have to be autonomous, flexible and fit to be efficient and competent for competition (Lemke, 2001). Concluding, governmentality as a political project creates a social reality that it suggests already exists.

In the next paragraph we will assess governmentality as a form of analysis. As a form of analysis governmentality enables researchers to shine light on the effects that neoliberal governmentality has on systems of regulation.

1.3 GOVERNMENTALITY IN SOCIAL SCIENCES
In this section we will first discuss the ways in which the concept of governmentality is used in social sciences. Secondly, the advantages of the concept in analysing politics are discussed. Thirdly, an overview of the main criticism on governmentality studies will be given and the choice for a governmentality approach will be justified. Finally, I will explain why a governmentality approach is suitable for IR studies in general and for analysing the ENP in specific.

1.3.1 GOVERNMENTALITY ANALYSES
Lemke distinguishes three main contributions of a governmentality study: (1) it has the critique of the ‘juridical-political discourse’ as its central reference point, (2) it distinguishes between different kinds of power relationships such as technologies of government and domination and (3) it is meant to study the ‘autonomous’ subject of governance’s capacity for self-control and how this self-control is linked to forms of political rule and economic exploitation (Lemke, 2002). In this thesis we will focus on the first two aspects because the object of analysis is the EU-policy makers and not the subject of governance. Governmentality studies in general are done by assessing the rationalities and techniques of governments. These studies consider the means, mechanisms, instruments, procedures, strategies, technologies, techniques and vocabulary that establish authority and rule (Dean, 2010).

However, while most authors focus mainly on governmentality rationalities and techniques as the two instruments of governmentality research (Dean, 2010; Merlingen,
2003). Walter and Haahr add two more instruments to this toolbox: governmentality as (1) a form of power and (2) the conduct of conduct. The angle of governmentality as a ‘form of power’ is used to identify a particular way of thinking of about exercising political power. Governmentality in this sense is a form of power. It has the population as its target, political economy as its source of knowledge and the apparatus of security as its instrument (Walters and Haahr, 2005). The ‘conduct of conduct’ is the way in which the conduct of subjects is directed. The nature of the governed is important, or at least the assumption of the nature of the governed by the governors, this is called ‘political subjectivity’ (Walters and Haahr, 2005). Foucault sees power as relational and universal. It is not possessed, but exercised from different points in different relations. Power exists everywhere, not solely in the state, also in global or local relations (Walters and Haahr, 2005). Power thus also exists in relations between the EU and the subject states of the ENP.

Together with rationalities and techniques these two angles result in a toolbox that does justice to the complexity of Foucault’s statements on governmentality. We will further elaborate on governmentality approach in IR after having discussed the advantages and critiques on governmentality studies in general.

1.3.2 ADVANTAGES
Lemke names two advantages of the use of governmentality for an analysis of neoliberalism. First, in a governmentality approach the line that liberalism drafts to separate public from private, itself becomes an object of analysis. Through governmentality this separation can be assessed as an instrument or effect of government, rather than the basis of it. Second, from the perspective of governmentality, government forms a continuum that stretches from top-down political leadership to self-regulation (Lemke, 2001). This broadens the scope for analyses of governance, which does justice to the complexity of issues of government.

Walters and Haahr explain the advantages of the governmentality approach in their analysis of the European integration process with two arguments. First, the approach is able to provide an innovative view on power relations by analysing a broader picture. Second, governmentality as a form of political analysis has a conceptual-empirical orientation. It combines discourse analysis with a focus on the history of governance practices. This leads to an analysis where issues can be situated in relation to rationalities and techniques of
government. This can discover rationalities which lie underneath the surface and where the actors involved are not fully conscious about (Walters and Haahr, 2005).

McKee describes four main advantages of the governmentality approach. (1) Governmentality approaches can highlight how mentalities of rule are made practical and technical in organized practices to conduct human conduct. Governmentality as a political project both problematizes life and seeks to act on these defined problems. Government policies are seen as ‘social artefacts’ with a specific historical background. (2) The scope of Foucauldian governmentality approaches is broader than merely the analysis of institutions of the state. The ‘art of government’ is the ‘conduct of conduct’ and can also be practiced by non-state groups, individuals or institutions. In this way a governmentality analysis is usable for any context where the regulation of human conduct is an issue. (3) The perception of power in a governmentality analysis differs from most theories on power structures. In governmentality analyses power is seen as productive, facilitative and creative. Power is exercised by shaping and mobilizing subjectivities. This power is not a power that can be overthrown or abandoned; it works through the individuals themselves. Power is exercised by both the governor, using political strategies, as the governed, that exercises its power by self-regulation and resistance. (4) Foucault does not make moral judgements on what good governance is, where most literature on governance tends to describe how individuals are and should be governed. Governmentality analyses are not made to provide a value judgement on how government should be (McKee, 2009).

Other benefits of a governmentality analysis include the following. In contrast to most discourse studies which are solely based on texts, a governmentality analysis is based on empirical data, texts, practices and historical context. In this way, a governmentality approach can provide a broad perspective to discourse research. Furthermore, the innovatory view on neoliberalism as an art of government enables political analyses to be done in a rapidly changing world (Larner and Walters, 2004). Finally, in other critiques on neoliberalism, concepts are approached in a dualistic manner. Power is opposed to knowledge, state to economy and subject to repression. This dualism sketches a rather black and white image of neoliberal practices. The Foucauldian concept of governmentality can contribute to these studies by bridging dualisms. This allows for a more comprehensive
account of political processes since it couples knowledge in different forms to strategies of power (Lemke, 2003).

1.3.3 Critiques

However, there also exist some critiques on the usability of governmentality. These critiques can be divided in two trends: first, critiques on the governmentality approach of Foucault in general and second, critiques on the use of the concept in post-foucauldian governmentality analyses. Both trends of critiques will be discussed here and I will refute these critiques or explain how I overcome them in this thesis.

To start with, I will discuss critique on the foucauldian governmentality approach in general. The lack of identified actors is by some seen as a disadvantage (Larner and Walters, 2004). I refute this critique because Foucault knowingly does not focus on actors; he rather speaks of decentered subjects which are objectified. The decentered subject is constituted in mentalities of rules, forms of truth and practices which are analyzable (Foucault, 1984). The decentering of the subject in the analysis of government to illustrate limiting ways of knowing is one of Foucault’s main contributions to IR. Moreover, the rejection of state theory by Foucault is often criticized in IR literature. It is argued that the state can play a central role of power depending of the situation (McKee, 2009). However, in a governmentality analysis the state is perceived as a part within a bigger context; a broader form of power is assessed. This power, an overall, analysable structure of rationalities and practices, enables states to act and legitimizes states to govern (Rose, 1993).

Furthermore, there are the critiques on post-foucauldian governmentality studies. These studies are accused of misusing the concept of governmentality in a way which lacks the original attention of Foucault on specific situations of governing. Governance can exist both within official governing institutions and in everyday practices such as education or even within families. Governmentality studies are criticized for lacking the ability to distinguish governmental from political (Larner and Walters, 2004). However, the subjects of analysis are the EU policy makers, which are bounded by rationalities which make their acts of governance possible. Other forms of governance, outside the EU, are thus irrelevant for this research.
McKee describes three other critiques on post-foucauldian governmentality studies, which I will discuss at once, before explaining how I overcome these risks in this thesis. The first critique regards the over-focus on the discourse of governmentality in government documents, rather than the material practice. This disconnects the social relations where the governmentality is embedded in. Foucault’s original approach was concerned with the ability of the individual to think and act otherwise, in order words the ‘technologies of the self’ or resistance (McKee 2009; Foucault, 1997). The second critique of McKee is that governmentality studies often reduce politics to mere rationality. This contributes to a disregard of the freedoms of the individual and human agency. It cannot be presumed that power always realizes its effects. Thirdly, governmentality studies often fail to address social inequalities. According to McKee one cannot assume that ‘power falls equal over all’ (McKee, 2009).

This research overcomes the above mentioned critiques, by using governmentality to analyse the limits of actions and the inability of policy makers to adapt the ENP when they encounter undesired results. In other words: were power is not realizing effects. The focus lies thus on the response of the ENP policy makers to obstacles or stagnation. For this aim a governmentality study is very suitable to illustrate how rationalities construct practices and limit the scope of possibilities of actions. The analysis focuses both on texts as practices. The latter are assessed by using policy documents, where the focus lies also on the effects of these practices and not merely on the linguistics. However, it is necessary to simplify certain aspects of the ENP in Lebanon in order to be able to do a governmentality analysis within the scope of 25.000 words.

1.3.4 GOVERNMENTALITY IN IR

Although Foucault used the concept of governmentality mainly to the domestic context, the concept is also well-equipped to analyse international relations. In this section arguments of three academics will be discussed that endorse this view.

To begin with, Dean gives three main reasons for this. First, governance and its rationalities may exceed national borders. Many problems of states, like immigration, pollution and security happen between, across or at the borders of states, as such a common way of thinking and talking about these problems, i.e. rationalities, is needed to jointly
address these issues. Second, the use of governmentality in the field of IR is justified by the emergence of a form of ‘global governance’ by actors such as the UN and the EU and the emergence of global civil society of NGOs. Third, governmentality studies could provide an analysis that exceeds the visible powers of states and make visible the underlying power structures of IGO’s and other international networks of states. This can be done both on a regional international level as on a global level (Dean, 2010, p 228-229).

Second, Joseph (2012) claims that the international is not plainly a neo-liberal domain due to the diversity of its actors. Whether the governmentality approach can be applied, in theory or in practice, depends case by case according to Joseph (Joseph, 2012). He states that IGO’s are a reflection of the rationalities of government of its members. Besides, the main international governmental organizations (IGO’s) are concerned with issues of wealth, well-being and health of an international population (Joseph, 2009). As such, they may be considered as international governmentalities. According to Joseph, these IGO’s solely address the population of their member states. Therefore, member states are the target of their intervention

Third, Walters and Haahr (2005) state that the governmentality approach has two main advantages for analysing EU policies. First, it allows an investigation of how the EU government functions, whereas many EU policy studies solely focus on the why questions. Second, it denormalizes the ‘normal’ in the EU. In the own words of Walters and Haahr: “there are only particular regimes of thought and practice within which certain ways of European government become possible” (Walters and Haahr, 2005).

These arguments help to explain the growing interest in the concept of governmentality within the IR field. However, in the case of the ENP the EU governs outside the scope of its own member states. While governing outside its own territory, the EU policy makers still are bounded by their regimes of thought on governance and governance practices. To illustrate this we will address the academic debate regarding the possibility of a global governmentality in the paragraph below.

1.3.5 Global Governmentality
A theme for debate on governmentality studies in the field of IR is the question whether a global governmentality exists (Joseph, 2009; Larner and Walters, 2004; Dean, 2010). Larner
and Walters introduced the term global governmentality, not as a strict definition of one form of global governance, but rather as a concept that can refer to any kind of governance that crosses state borders. Be it bilateral, multinational or cosmopolitan (Larner and Walters, 2004).

Merlingen (2003) makes the concept of global governmentality more specific and argues that global governmentality exists in the sense that populations are subjected to continuous monitoring and comprehensive regulations by IGOs. IGOs within global governmentality aim to socialize their member or partner states by neo-liberal government techniques. The state institutions are directly affected, whereas the population is only indirectly subject to the regulations of involved IGO’s (Merlingen, 2003). The ENP can serve as an example of such a socialization attempt of the EU.

Joseph (2009) claims that the term global governmentality can be applied when IGO’s require the implication of neoliberal government techniques by subject states, which are not member states, in order to receive development support. In this sense the ENP Action Plans of the EU can be seen as global governmentality techniques. Instead of individuals, the partner state as a whole is the subject of the governmentality techniques of the EU. Joseph claims, however, that global governmentality techniques rarely have the aimed effects in the subject states. Many developing countries lack micro-level structures leading to a lack of social cohesion and solid state structures. The extent of failure, or success, of global governmentality techniques can be measured by the extent to which the governing institutions of a subject state have changed their behaviour.

CONCLUSION
Foucault historicizes grand abstractions to illuminate underlying structures in politics. He links power and knowledge within the concept ‘discourse’. Such historical systems of thought construct knowledge and thus influence behaviour. Biopolitics or ‘power over life’ is a facilitating form of exercising power. By granting freedoms and education to an individual, this individual will be enabled to self-regulate. Foucault defines government as the ‘conduct of conduct’. These three concepts lie at the basis of governmentality.

Governmentality is a form of exercising power which is based on neoliberal rationalities; it forms subjects into “free” and “responsible actors” which self-regulate their
behaviour. This can be seen as a socialization of the subjects. Governmentality can be analysed by two instruments of analysis: political rationalities and governmental techniques. In this thesis governmentality is applied across EU borders. A governmentality approach beyond the domestic domain is legitimized by Foucault’s emphasis on different forms of government and relational power.

The concept global governmentality in this thesis is applied to the conduct of conduct by an IGO of the government, national or local, of a subject state. In a global governmentality, regulations of the IGO are guiding and the implementation in the subject state is safeguarded by constant monitoring. In the global governmentality context government techniques often fail in their aims, because their effect depends on the deployment of macro-power structures through micro-power structures. In the following chapter I will argue that the EU is subject to a neoliberal regime of thought on government, and the power exercised within the ENP can be described as a global governmentality.
CHAPTER 2:
RATIONALITIES OF EU GOVERNMENT

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INTRODUCTION
Building on the statements in the previous chapter, in this thesis the EU is assessed as a subject of a global neoliberal governmentality where it is bounded by. Power or government are not general terms within governance practices, there always lies a particular rationality behind it, which characterizes the form of power or the form of government (Foucault, 1988). Assessing the historical and global context of the ENP will help create an understanding of the conceptual framework of the policy and its limits. In this way the particular rationalities of the policy makers and political reason beneath the policy can be exposed. Foucault described the academic value of investigation of rationalities as follows: ‘[investige] various forms of rationality is sometimes more effective in unsettling our certitudes and dogmatism than is abstract criticism’ (Foucault, quoted in Brown, 2001: 116).

First, the concept ‘rationalities’ within governmentality is further explained. Next, the global context will be briefly assessed before discussing the historical developments of the EU in general. This assessment will provide an image of rationalities of the EU. In the following part of this chapter the specific rationalities of the foreign policies in general of the EU will be addressed, which enables the assessment of the rationalities of the ENP. At the end of this chapter there will be a general overview of the conceptual framework of the ENP where the rationalities behind the policy are assessed.
2.1 Rationalities
A governmentality approach highlights rationalities as the way through which governance is made thinkable. To highlight rationalities behind the ENP the use of the concept in this thesis needs further consideration. Merlingen describes rationalities as discursive formations that produce effects of truth in practices of governance. In Merlingen’s own words:

“The latter [rationalities] are not ideologies that stand in opposition to truth. Neither are they carriers of neutral information. Rather, they are discursive formations, intimately linked to structures of power that produce effects of truth with regard to specific fields of governance, such as madness or crime.” (Merlingen, 2003 p. 367)

Dean’s definition of rationality as a systematic way of reasoning and calculating a problem of government slightly differs from Merlingen’s interpretation. He describes political rationalities as forms of thinking that seek to be systematic, clear and explicit about the identity of individuals or what this should be (Dean 1999). In this sense rationalities lead to practicing principles which underpin governmental techniques; this makes governmental power a regulated form of power rather than a spontaneous one. Practicing principles can be seen as a coupler between the general rationalities and the government techniques. In this chapter the underlying rationalities of the ENP will be discussed based on the definition of Merlingen. The practicing principles of the ENP will be further discussed in the following chapter, together with the governmental techniques.

Neoliberalism is the main rationality of governmentality. This rationality creates freedom of subjects of government, to optimize and steer their behaviour through focusing on the belief in open-markets, procedural democracy and civil society. Neoliberal governmental techniques based on this rationality construct the normality of free and responsible subjects that can self-regulate (Rose, 1996). Further, governmentality is based on disciplinary and sovereign principles (Dean, 2010). These three concepts will therefore be part of the analyses of rationalities of the ENP. Other principles that attribute to the creation of freedoms and responsible self-regulating subjects will also be assessed.

2.2 Global context
The EU has developed since the 1950s and has been a subject within the arena of a global governmentality among the Worldbank, UN, IMF and other institutions. This makes the EU a
subject to a certain set of rationalities in the global context (Joseph, 2009). In the line of thought of Foucault, universal values do not exist because of the specificity of different societies all over the world (Rosenhow, 2009). Besides, the international cannot be seen as one uniform arena, it is a very uneven environment that cannot be treated as solely a liberal or neo-liberal domain (Joseph, 2012) However, in the most IGO’s it is possible to distinguish certain dominant rationalities, including ‘neoliberalism’ (Rosenhow, 2009). Neoliberalism is not a universal value per se, but can be perceived as the dominant view in international organizations and institutions such as the GATT/WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. Also in the UN the modern liberal countries are a dominant and influent factor ((Mitchell, 2006; Chorev and Babb, 2009; Joseph, 2009).

Neo-liberalism can be defined by certain key aspects such as deregulation, privatization, government activities devolving to market forces and internationalization (Joseph, 2012). Since the mid-80s there has taken place a development of neo-liberal reform policies and ideology of production and power relations on a global scale, In the past two decades there has been an extension and entrenchment of neoliberal reform policies, ideology, and technologies of production and control worldwide (Mitchell, 2006). Based on the neoliberal values the market is seen as a leading principle for the state and society. This is in line with Foucault’s statements on neoliberal governmentality (Foucault in Lemke, 2008).

However, as rationality in the global regime, neoliberalism is broader than merely an economic rationality. Neoliberalism as a rationality also constructs the freedom of subjects of government, to optimize and steer their behaviour in other ways. Concepts which emphasize the freedom of individuals and their responsibility for their own lives also fall under the neoliberal rationality (Rose, 1996). Examples of common concepts in the international regime of states are ‘peace’, ‘human rights’, ‘rule of law’, ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’, ‘good governance’ and ‘multilateralism’. These concepts are all present in treaties and other policy document of the UN and other IGO’s (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006; Zanotti, 2006). These concepts all fall within the scope of neoliberal rationalities of government, because they enhance the normality of a subject of governance which is granted with human rights, in a free and peaceful environment with different layers of government.

Another main concept in the international is democracy (Zanotti, 2006). Democracy is one of the pillars of neoliberal rationality of governmentality, which constructs free and
responsible subjects (Rose, 1996). Since 1990s Western democracies began to actively engage in democracy promoting activities in third countries. The end of the Cold War provided good circumstances for DP attempts, because western societies did no longer need to support autocratic pro-western regimes. Democracy and human rights promoting activities by western countries became more systematic since the 1990s. From this period on IGO’s have been increasingly concerned with mechanisms to assess, monitor and regulate the way that states govern their populations. ‘Normality’ is identified as a certain form of democracy and threats to democracy are perceived as threats to international peace (Haukenes and Freyburg-Inan, 2012) The following statement of the UN on its website illustrates the normality of neoliberal government:

“Democracy is one of the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations. It is based on the freely expressed will of people and closely linked to the rule of law and exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN website, Global Issues - Democracy, 2014)

The statement that democracy as a value is universal and indivisible, together with the assumption that people can express their will freely, shows that neoliberal rationalities are accepted as the norm within the UN. The UN has 193 member states, because of this its statements can be considered as representing the dominant rationalities of the international regime.

The ideal members of the international, the ‘states’, are seen as predictable, peace-loving, responsible, productive and have transparent administrations and codified internal law (Zanotti, 2006). The international regime normalizes subject states in two ways: institutional disciplinarity and governmentality, which intersect and overlap. Institutional disciplinarity concerns the reform of governmental institutions into orderly, predictable and disciplined administration to make states orderly and predictable by institution building, surveillance and punishment. Governmentality is meant to model state behaviour. It operates through the spreading of international knowledge and mechanisms of control. Institutional reforms, codification, discipline, regulation and monitoring mechanisms can be serving elements for social change to democracy and development (Zanotti, 2006). I will further elaborate on this while discussing the government techniques in the following chapter.
The managing of ‘risks’ is an important aspect in the international. This indicates an underlying rationality of ‘security’ (Rasmussen, 2001). The rationalities and institutions of disciplinary and sovereign traditional forms of power are used by IGO’s to invest in, optimize and use the behaviour of the subjects in order to accomplish a secure society. Risks are unpredictable and international interventions have become an aspect of an international disciplinary security regime to avoid potential threats. The risks are managed by normalizing states to the global norm to prevent instability. (Zanotti 2006).

The EU is subject to the rationalities of government in the international expressed by the concepts often used in the international, such as peace, human rights, freedom and liberty, democracy and the rule of law. The focus on democracy and human rights led to a focus of democracy promotion attempts on NGOs and empowerment of civil society (Guilhot, 2005). This empowerment of civil actors became thus a form of exercising power upon the subject state. The use of concepts such as security, human rights and democracy can all be viewed as rationalities of governmentality because they are aimed at protecting the well-being and freedoms of individuals and enable them to make responsible choices.

Concluding, although the global cannot be treated as a single domain, neoliberal western states dominate many of the IGO’s and institutions that constitute the international regime of states. Because of the influence of western societies, certain rationalities of the international regime can be distinguished. Open-markets, deregulation, international trade, democracy, the rule of law, multilateralism, human rights, fundamental freedoms, solidarity, good governance, security and normalizing by disciplinary strategies are all rationalities of the international regime. The international parallels a governmentality in the sense that practices of government are based on neoliberal rationalities. Governance by IGOs in general targets the well-being of populations of states and with rationalities such as democracy and human rights, normalizes freedom and responsible individuals. The EU is a part of this international regime and therefore is bounded and influenced by it. The specific rationalities of the EU will be discussed in the following paragraph.

2.3 European rationalities

Within the European international community the EU is the most important actor. The EU itself has been described as a liberal community of democratic states (Schimmelfennig, 2001). The identity of an organization explains a great part of its political rationalities and
can be distinguished by interactions with other actors and within the organization itself (Tonra, 2010). The identity of the EU is, contrary to most IGOs and states, under constant construction due to developing institutions, expansion of member states and changing practices. This state of an unfinished project had become part of the Union’s identity itself. Bretherton and Vogler (2006) distinguish two collective identities of the EU. First, the EU as an inclusive, value-based community and second, the EU as an exclusive, security-centred community also described as ‘fortress Europe’.

The rationalities of liberal human rights form the basis of practicing principles such as social pluralism, rule of law, democratic participation, representation, solidarity, private property and a market based economy (Schimmelfennig, 2001). This is illustrated in the constitutive documents of the EU. In the preambles of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) is stated that member states have to be democracies bounded by the rule of law and human rights (Articles F and O). The Charter of Human Rights which was formally proclaimed in 2000 by the EU institutions also emphasizes human dignity, equality, freedoms, solidarity, democratic rights of citizens and the rule of law (2010/C 83/02). Besides these governmental principles, the liberal human rights form the basis for a neo-liberal approach to the economy of countries. In the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) is stated that new members must conform to the principle of an open market economy with free competition (Article 3a). In the EU in the period of 1990-2000 there has been a trend towards monetarism and a growing liberalization of the market. The introduction of the Euro in 2002 institutionalized the monetary policies of the EU (Mitchell, 2006). This indicates a further swing to neo-liberal rationalities.

These political and economic conditions are also present in the Copenhagen criteria set out for new member states by the European Council in 1993. These criteria emphasize the necessity of stable democratic institutions which guarantee the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities. Besides, new members must have a well-functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitiveness and forces of the EU-market. Finally, new members have to comply with all the obligations of membership (SN 180/1/93 REV 1, Art. 7. A.iii). The obligations for member states are set out in the ‘acquis communitaire’ of the EU. Summarizing, the rationalities of liberal human rights are expressed in political, economic and legal principles such as democracy, the rule of law, open, competitive and strong markets and the *acquis communitaire*. 
Other aspects of the liberal human rights rationalities, such as solidarity, give rise to the Keynesian social democratic model as a rationality of government (Mitchell, 2006). Walters and Haahr see the social democratic model as a distinct rationality. They stated that the neo-liberal project prevails over the social democratic project. Walters and Haahr name this combination of neoliberal and social-democratic rationalities the ‘third rhetoric’ (Walters and Haahr, 2005). I agree with Walters and Haahr to the extent that the European neo-liberal project is influenced by social-democratic principles such as social justice, social cohesion and open government. However, I argue that the social-democratic principles enhance the overall neoliberal rationality within governmentality by creating educated, free and responsible individuals.

2.3.1 THE EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL PLAYER

To understand the context of the ENP we will assess the identity of the EU as a part of the international. Identity, in the poststructuralist sense is relational, malleable and socially constructed. As stated above, identity is not only how an actor perceives itself, it is also defined by how it is perceived by others (Tonra, 2010). In the early years of the EU foreign policies its identity in the international was described as a ‘civilian power’ by Francois Dûchene (1972) he described the European Communities’ interests as the domestication of relations between states, both within as outside its borders, based on a sense of common responsibility and the structures of contractual politics. This is partly a normative statement because it assigns a civilian role to the EU.

The adherence of liberal human rights by the EU is translated in their foreign policies with the use to the concept of democratic peace and multilateralism (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Bretheron and Vogel (2006) see the EU as an inclusive and an exclusive actor within its foreign policies, likewise as how they see the EU in its internal policies as described above. The first understanding is that of the EU as a singular, inclusive and value-based actor which has three functions in the international domain: a model for other IGO’s and states, promoting its values and a counterweight for the US. The policies of the ENP fall within the first two functions of the EU as a model and as a promoter of its rationalities. This inclusive approach uses networks of communication and cooperation rather than military power. The second understanding is that of the EU as an exclusive actor, protecting its own citizen and
Member States anticipating to threats of prosperity, stability and security, mainly through strict immigration policies.

Lucarelli and Manners (2006) analysed the rationalities and principles of the EU foreign policy and found a core set of principles that shape the EU’s international identity and form the basis of its governmental techniques. The EU principles are based upon the rationalities of the international regime, such as human rights, freedom and liberty, democracy, peace, justice and the rule of law, equality and solidarity (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). Later on, other rationalities developed such as ‘good governance’ interpreted as regulated liberalism or capitalism and ‘sustainable development’ or ecological modernization. These rationalities are translated in core principles that form the basis of EU policies (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006).

These principles are divided in four categories: ‘prevention principles’ in relation to peace and ecological modernisation, ‘conditionality principles’ for human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance, ‘mainstreaming principles’ in equality issues and broader principles such as ‘multilateralism’ and ‘free and regulated trade’ (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). Korosteleva adds a fifth principle to this list: ‘partnership’. ‘Partnership’ is a relatively new principle to the EU development policies and is aimed at the joint-ownership of reforms in the partner states. The concept was introduced after critiques on the unilateralism of the EU foreign policies. It is an integrated approach to development, which is meant to be owned and practiced by the country concerned and based on mutual trust (Korosteleva, 2012).

The rationalities and principles of the EU contribute to the images of the world that form the base of EU foreign policies. They are part of the discursive formations that produce effects of truth in practices of EU governance The EU’s image of the world is based on a liberal view of international cooperation which can contribute to a ‘better world’. As stated on the website of the European External Actions Service (EEAS):

“The EU’s external policies [...] have four key aims. They support stability, promote human rights and democracy, seek to spread prosperity, and support the enforcement of the rule of law and good governance” (EEAS website, Policies, 2014)
From this statement the adherence of neoliberal rationalities can be deducted. For example the aim to support ‘good governance’ implies that both good and bad governance exist and that the governmental techniques of the EU are considered as ‘good’. The EU view on foreign policy is based on the Kantian idea of perpetual peace of democracies and a form of cosmopolitan law combined with the belief that regulations and international law have positive effects (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). Especially the specific interpretations of the EU of the rationalities of the international regime are of interest here, because these illustrate how the EU is part of, and therefore bounded by, an international form of governmentality.

The rationalities of the EU affect the manner in which the EU tries to conduct the conduct of subject states within their foreign policies in six ways. First, by structural prevention, the EU tries to address the causes of problems, instead of the symptoms, in structural foreign aid. These foreign policies are aimed at transformation of the status quo. Second, the institutionalization of EU government principles through policies and multilateral treaties and legal arrangements is a way of steering the conduct of subject states. Third, EU foreign policy makers focus on national regulations to accomplish democracy or human rights. Fourth, another aspect of EU foreign policy is multilateralism as a form of international regulation. Fifth, the EU tries to establish partnerships with states or other actors, emphasizing dialogue, constructive engagement and positive conditionality. The EU refers in this strategy from the use of sanctions and negative conditionality. Finally, the EU focuses on solidarity solutions for individuals, a bottom-up approach. This includes cooperation with civil society, NGOs and other social partners. The focus on the individual differs from other strategies of EU foreign policies that are more focused on the state institutions (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). These six strategies of foreign policy show that the EU tries to conduct the conduct of states in positive ways, with the goal of conduct the conduct of the population. This is can be described as a global governmentality approach because it tries to conduct the conduct of subject states, transforming them into responsible subjects which act according to the international norm. The EU regulations are guiding and the implementation in the subject state is ensured by monitoring.

The EU regards itself, and is seen by other actors in the international, as a ‘global transformative force’ (Korosteleva, 2012 p. 19; Pace, 2007). The EU sees it as it task to
transform countries in transition to the liberal-democratic standards of the Western international community (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2007). The focus on transforming subjects into market-led states, with participating democracy and civil society displays neoliberal rationalities. These rationalities lead to governmental practices that create free and responsible subjects which regulate themselves to normality (Foucault in Lemke, 2008). In the EU foreign policies, states are the subjects of governmental practices.

2.3.2 DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

The ENP is one of the DP policies of the EU. To assess the specific rationalities of the ENP, I will first assess the general rationalities of EU DP activities. European DP policies can be distinguished roughly into two types: first, subject countries where there is the prospect of EU-membership and second, states where this prospect is not an instrument (Youngs, 2004). The importance the EU gives to neo-liberal and democratic concepts is illustrated by the enlargement criteria for new member states (Zanotti, 2006). The Copenhagen criteria, which set the conditions for EU-membership, are based upon norms of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The EU considered these norms to be the best practice of ‘international standards’ (Hughes and Sasse, 2003). Copenhagen criteria draw upon a liberal form of democracy, emphasizing the procedural essence and commitment to democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Conclusions of the presidency of the European Council, Copenhagen 1993). The EU’s adherence of the neoliberal principles of the international regime is also shown by the conditions the EU set for new member states to comply to the WTO trade regime (Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen, 1993).

The DG Enlargement initially conceptualized the ENP, so the ENP has been constructed along the same rationalities and practicing principles as the enlargement policies (Korosteleva, 2012). Two phases can be identified in the enlargement strategies of the EU. The first phase is the ‘democracy conditionality’ which aims at the institutionalization of liberal democratic aspects in a country. The second phase is the ‘acquis conditionality’ which aims at changing the legislation in such a way that it conforms to the EU acquis communautaire. The acquis communautaire is based on the idea of an open and competitive market (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). DP attempts by the EU also focus on local ownership or civil society; this leaves the impression of power devolving away from the state to the people. Civil society organizations can stabilize power relations and
allow subjects to act responsible and free only within the framework of neoliberal rationalities. Individuals, or subjects, are encouraged to take responsibility, but the views of what is responsible behaviour are forced upon the subject states (Kurki, 2011).

EU’s DP attempts, although they differ in forms, are driven by the neoliberal governmental rationalities of procedural democracy, open-market principles and civil society. Within DP attempts the EU exercises power by providing a set of rules for subject states. The ties of the EU with a form of global governmentality are shown by the fact that the EU itself refers to the universal aspect of its values and principles. This reference to universal values is a way to legitimate the EU foreign policies. This illustrates that the rationalities of the EU do not stand alone and that the EU creates the image of itself as part of the international regime.

2.3.3 THE BARCELONA PROCESS

The Barcelona Process, or ´Euro-Mediterranean Partnership´ (EMP), is the predecessor of the ENP and was launched in 1995 by the EU and 14 countries in the Mediterranean area. It was based on three pillars: (1) ´Political and Security Dialogue´, focusing on peace and stability, sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights. (2) ´Economic and Financial Partnership´, aiming at the gradual establishment of a free-trade area and promoting shared economic opportunity through sustainable and balanced socio-economic development. (3) ´Social, Cultural and Human Partnership´, emphasizing mutual understanding and intercultural dialogue and facilitated exchanges between civil society actors and citizens. Since the introduction of the ENP in 2004, the Barcelona Process became the ´multilateral forum of dialogue´ between the EU and its Mediterranean partners and the bilateral relations are managed mainly under the ENP (Website European External Action Service (EEAS), 2013).

Summarizing, The EU’s perception of its own identity is as a comprehensive ‘community of values’. This identity has been further developed over the years, starting with the founding treaties of the EU, forming a red line within the internal policies of the EU and in its foreign policies. In its foreign policies the EU tries to normalize subject states in such a way that they conform to the regulations of the EU. This form of exercising power can be
described as global governmentality. The EMP, as the predecessor of the ENP, forms an example of the EU functioning as a community of values

2.4 Rationalities of the ENP

The analyses of the global, the European and more specific the EU foreign policies contexts have provided a broader context for the ENP. The constitutive texts of the ENP will be discussed in the last part of this chapter, in order to distinguish the specific rationalities underpinning the ENP framework. The analysis of the rationalities underlying the ENP is based on the legal framework of the policy, namely ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’ of the European Commission (COM(2004) 373 final), the Council Conclusions on this Communication of June 16, 2003 (10447/03, 2003), the Council Conclusions on the ENP of the Council of the General Affairs and External Relations of June 14, 2004 (10189/04, 2004) and the Communication of the European Commission ‘Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ of March 11, 2003 (COM(2003) 104 final).

2.4.1 The ENP

In 2004 the EU was extended with ten new member states and along with these new members came new neighbours. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was therefore developed and launched in 2004 to create a ‘Ring of friends’ (Lavenex, 2008; COM (2003) 104 final). The ENP is mainly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country, the constituting documents of the Commission and the Council serve as an umbrella over the individual Action Plans of each neighbour state (EC ENP website, 2013; Lavenex, 2008). The Action Plans are perceived by the EU as the most important instruments of the policy (10447/03). The Commission stated that Action Plans and accompanying benchmarks should be established by the Council, based on proposals from the Commission and wherever possible with prior discussion with the subject states (COM(2003) 104 final). The general EU policy documents on the ENP therefore remain vague, in order to leave room for the Action Plans to incorporate country specific aspects (Lavenex, 2008; COM(2004) 373 final). Although the documents lack concrete strategies, they do set out the underlying goals and rationalities and principles of the policy.

2.4.2 Goals
The overall goal that the Commission elaborated in their communication on the Neighbourhood policy in 2003 was “to work with partner countries to foster the political and economic reform process, promote closer economic integration and sustainable development and provide political support and assistance”. The Commission states that on the long term the goal is “to move towards an arrangement whereby the Union’s relations with the neighbouring countries ultimately resemble the close political and economic links currently enjoyed with the European Economic Area” (COM(2003) 104 final; COM(2004) 373 final). This implies that the state structures of the partner countries will have to be reformed on economic, political and legal level.

In 2003 the Council defined the two main goals of the neighbourhood policy. The first goal is building an ‘area of shared prosperity and values´ and preventing conflict, together with the partner states (10447/03). This aim for becoming an area of shared prosperities and values denotes a degree of social society. The commitment of the EU to efforts of both promoting its own image in the neighbourhood as combatting stereotypes within the EU on the partner countries, also implies an aim for becoming some form of a society of partner states (COM(2004) 373 final). The second goal is to anchor the benefits the EU grants to partner states that make progress in the areas of political, economic and judicial and home affairs (10447/03). In 2004 the Council stated that the objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was to share the benefits of an enlarged EU with neighbouring countries in order to contribute to increased stability, security and prosperity of the European Union and its neighbours (10189/04). The latter statement focuses more on the security aspects of the ENP, whereas the statements in 2003 encompassed a broader view of security, economics, political issues and legal and home affairs. However in the 2004 document the importance of state institutions that guarantee the shared values such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and open-market principles, is also emphasized (10189/04).

2.4.3 RATIONALITIES

The shared values of the EU and the partner states include democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human right (COM(2003) 104 final; COM(2004) 373 final). With respect to economic matters the Council stressed concepts such as market economy, free trade, sustainable development and poverty reduction (10189/04). These values together
with the more specific aims of the ENP can illustrate the rationalities behind the ENP. The rationalities are divided here in the four fields of interest of the ENP: economic, political, judicial and security rationalities.

The neoliberal rationalities underneath the ENP are based on principles of the open market and international trade. In the Communication of the Commission is stated that the ENP should contribute to ensuring competition within the partner states and that “all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (...)” (COM (2003) 104 final). The WTO obligations are explicitly mentioned and membership of the organization is perceived as ‘an integral part of a positive economic agenda’ and a precondition for increasing international trade. The EU offers assistance for countries to comply with the membership conditions of the WTO as soon as possible. The WTO conditions are based on neoliberal values (Chorev and Babb, 2009) EU investments within the ENP are meant to catalyse and promote investments by the IFI’s and from private actors. Sustainable development and poverty reduction are also mentioned as goals of the ENP. (COM (2003) 104 final).

In the socio-political aspects of the ENP, neoliberal rationalities can also be perceived, such as procedural democracy, good governance and civil society. The Commission and Council documents explicitly mention the need for strong democratic institutions and institutionalizing respect for human rights based on common values (COM(2004) 373 final; 10447/03). ‘Good governance’ is a term that appears regularly in EU texts on state building or democracy promotion. It is not explicitly mentioned in the ENP constitutive documents, but it is referred to on the website of the ENP multiple times as one of the goals of the policy (ENP website, 2013). Good governance is mainly directed at transparency, participation and social learning (Korosteleva, 2012). The importance of ‘civil society’ is emphasized by the Commission and Council, along with the ‘basic liberties’ of democracies such as freedom of expression and association. Also, aspects of health and environmental protection, education and social safety are addressed (COM (2003) 104 final; COM(2004) 373 final).

The legal aims of the ENP focus for a great part on institutionalizing the neoliberal rationalities of structural democracy the open market principles and the functioning of civil
society and therefor are discussed as technologies in the following chapter. However, it is also possible to distinguish a neoliberal rationality of government from the statements on legal matters. The emphasis on multilateralism, international law and the acquis communitaire illustrate this. Also the EU appeals in the ENP texts to international organization such as OSCE, the Council of Europe and the IFI’s for assistance with setting benchmarks and supporting the needed reforms (COM(2004) 373 final; COM(2003) 104 final; 10447/03).

Besides, neoliberal rationalities, security is another important rationality behind the ENP (Youngs, 2004), this is illustrated in the way the EU stresses issues such as migration flows, border criminality, conflict resolution and prevention and globalization as reasons for enhanced cooperation between the neighbours and the EU (COM(2003) 104 final). The EU tries to promote stability and security in its neighbourhood by joint responsibility, burden-sharing and enhanced interdependence, both political and economic. In the communication of the Commission is claimed that the EU is willing to take the greater share of the burden in post-conflict situations, this implies an underlying power relation (COM(2003) 104 final). The EU emphasizes the responsibility of the partner states; this contributes to the construction of the states as responsible actors that can self-regulate.

Finally, the EU’s emphasis on the neighbourhood as a common area of prosperity and the references to a common market imply a rationality of ´inclusion´ to become a society of states (COM (2003) 104 final; 10189/04; 10447/03; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Korosteleva, 2011). This implies the socialization of the subject states. The EU has claimed in the constitutive documents of the ENP that the policy is based on common values: democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion and that these values are universal (EC, 2004). The repeated use of the concept ´shared values´ in the ENP texts reaffirms that these values are perceived as universal (COM (2003) 104 final; 10189/04; 10447/03). These references to common values implicate the normalization of subject states. An open dialogue with the partner states and the free exchange of ideas, cultures and traditions are emphasized and the EU explicitly mentions its aim for a reciprocal relationship (COM (2003) 104 final; 10189/04; 10447/03; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). An exchange of values is, however, not in question in the text, which enhances the assumption that the EU and the partner states share the same values. The universalness of these values is, however,
highly contested in studies on this subject (Kurki, 2011; Korosteleva, 2012; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2007; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006).

Conclusion

The EU is an institution within the international domain and its actions are based upon. The EU is limited by the rationalities and practicing principles in the global society. The international cannot be perceived as a whole; however, the dominant forces within the most influent IGO’s are western liberal societies. The international domain in this way can be seen as a global neoliberal governmentality using indirect governmental techniques to steer the conduct of the states. The references the EU makes to the important IGO’s and International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) demonstrate the strong connection the EU has with the global society. The same neoliberal rationalities which exist in the global international society are intertwined in the EU’s legal foundations. The EU perceives itself as a transformative norm-taker within the global society.

In line with the identity of the global normative force the EU perceives itself to be, the ENP is constituted. With this policy, the Union tries to transform partner states in such a way that they comply with political, economic and judicial conditions based on shared values that are perceived as universal. These shared values are defined by the EU as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human right, the principles of the open market and social cohesion, these can be perceived as neoliberal rationalities. ‘Inclusion’ is a neoliberal rationality of the ENP which implies the goal of normalizing and socializing partner states. Finally, another underlying rationality for the EU is security, security issues are emphasized throughout the constitutive documents. These rationalities, which form the basis of the legal foundations of the ENP, limit the scope of possible practices and processes.

The neoliberal rationalities behind the ENP lead to political subjectivity. The EU perceives the ENP partner states as subjects of freedom and choice, which can become responsible actors by self-regulation and as compliant norm-takers. The strongly set goals for countries imply that the EU sees the partner states as ‘subject’ states rather than partners. The EU aims to steer the conduct of the governmental actors of the states in such a way that they will comply with the values of the Union and create an ‘area of shared prosperity and values’.
CHAPTER 3:
TECHNIQUES OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Introduction
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  3.3.1 Democracy Promotion
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Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of ‘government techniques’ is an aspect of a governmentality approach, it concerns ‘how’ or ‘by what means’ questions. The mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, technologies and vocabularies of the ENP will be addressed in order to answer the question how the EU tries to influence the subject countries within the ENP. The analysis of techniques allows identifying underlying assumption. The political rationalities as defined in the previous chapter, lead to practicing principles and government techniques. The governmental techniques of the ENP can limit the possibilities and flexibility of the executives of the policy in practice. The use of techniques reaffirms the underlying rationalities and represent ‘normal’ behaviour (Walters and Haahr, 2005). The techniques of the ENP are made clear in its constitutive documents and Action Plans which describe what should, can, should not or cannot be done. More techniques can be identified by studying literature on practices in the field.

In order to distinguish the techniques of the ENP framework adequately, a detailed definition of governmentality techniques will be provided first. Next, the governmental techniques that IGO’s use in general in the global society are assessed. This assessment contributes to an understanding of how the EU is influenced by global governmentality. After this, traditions of European techniques in general EU foreign policies are elaborated, which lay down the context of the ENP techniques. Finally, the practicing principles and specific governmental techniques of the ENP and their limiting effects are analysed.
3.1 Government Techniques

Governmental techniques make rationalities practicable (Merlingen, 2003). Neoliberal rationalities in a governmentality lead to techniques of government that apply these traditional rationalities to the social sphere. Dean distinguishes four features of government techniques in a neoliberal governmentality or ‘practices of governmentality’: (1) the practice of government is economically and fiscally using power: it has to be efficient. This coincides with the ideas of political economy. (2) Governmentality retains and utilizes the institutions of sovereignty and discipline, but it also recodes these two concepts. (3) Governmentality seeks to control its population by means of institutions such as traditional armies, police or intelligence services, and all other institutions that form the welfare of the state, such as education or health systems. These are the so called: ‘apparatuses of security’. (4) The power of government has pre-eminence over all other sorts of power (Dean, 2010).

Ferguson defines the techniques of governmentality in her study of the World bank and the IMF as mechanisms which aim for governmental results by laying risks and responsibility on the entrepreneurial subject. The subjects will become increasingly empowered to discipline themselves (Ferguson, 2002). These indirect techniques for controlling individuals without being directly responsible for them, lead to the shift of responsibility to the individual which is expressed by ‘self-care’ and ‘self-regulation’.

3.2 International Government Techniques

IGO’s and IFI’s such as the OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe or the World Bank intent to steer the conduct of countries, including their governments, civil societies and individuals, in a form of international governance. This is done by two forms of government techniques: techniques of discipline and socializing techniques. Governmental techniques of discipline, such as surveillance or hierarchical observation, normalizing and examination, are employed by international institutions. Discipline seeks to form ‘docile’ subjects that perform well when measured against the discipline’s norms and at the same time submit to the established order of things (Merlingen, 2003; Zanotti, 2006).

Besides normalizing disciplining techniques IGO’s aim at forming the norms of subjects, partners or member states by ‘socialization’ by soft governmental techniques (Merlingen, 2003). Socialization mechanisms are meant to internalize values and beliefs, in other words: the adaption of rationalities and techniques into the subject’s own behavior.
(Schimmelfennig, 2000). IGOs operate by means of targets, benchmark setting indicators of reform, competitiveness and openness to the world market (Joseph, 2009). Merlingen (2003) provides four governmentality mechanisms of socialization in his study on the OCSE that can account for IGO’s: teaching, intermediation, social influence and material inducement. Teaching in IGO’s is a process by training, workshops and seminars to teach the norms of the organization to the subject states. Intermediation is an open-ended process on a reciprocal dialogue base; both parties are open for arguments of the other. Social influence is based on the consequences that governmental changes may have for the international position of subject states. When states comply with certain international norms, they have to prospect of membership of IGO’s and partnerships or, if they are already a member, a stronger legitimacy within these organizations. Finally, material inducements are positive incentives, or ‘conditionalities’, mostly economic, for governments on the condition that they make structural changes in accordance with the rationalities of the IGO (Merlingen, 2003; Zanotti, 2006). Disciplinary assessing and steering conduct by indirect government are thus the key techniques of IGO’s within the global governmentality. With this dual approach IGOs endow themselves with instruments for knowing, assessing, educating, rewarding and punishing subject states governmental activities.

‘The ‘outside-in dynamic’ of DP attempts by IGO’s illustrates the exercise of power by western countries over subject states (Joseph, 2012). This exercise of power by western states is legitimized by the dominance of neoliberal rationalities in the global society of states. Neoliberal government techniques are considered ‘normal’ and desirable for all countries. A problem that occurs with the international deployment of neoliberal techniques of government is that even though national government structures are adapted to the new rules of behaviour, the population does not adapt as easily (Zanotti, 2006). The techniques of governmentality that IGO’s deploy reflect the rationalities of the countries where they are based or which are most dominant within the organization. The neoliberal rationalities of IGO’s do not evidently correspond with the dominant rationalities of government in subject states.

In governmentality on a domestic level governments deploy neoliberal indirect governmental techniques to individuals to transform them into responsible entrepreneurs. In governmentality on the global level neoliberal rationalities are also present, but the
techniques function in a different manner because these are applied to states and not directly to the population. The states are to address the neoliberal techniques to their populations. This extra level of government forms an extra barrier for normalizing subjects to the international set rules of behaviour because of the weak social structures in developing states (Zanotti, 2006).

Summarizing, in promoting democracy the rules of behaviour are internationally set by the international regime. IGO’s use two forms of techniques: disciplinary and socializing techniques. The performance of subject states is continually monitored and mechanisms of dialogue, advice, reward and punishment promote change or ‘conduct the conduct’ of states. The normalizing and socializing of states by the use of disciplinary, security and indirect governmental activities can be seen as techniques of governmentality. International governmentality practices in DP activities attempt to normalizing and socializing states into ‘normal’ members of an international society. Problems occur in socializing the local governments in line with the international rules of behaviour due to different governmental rationalities.

3.3 European government techniques
The rationalities of the EU, as defined in chapter 2, are based on liberal human rights and can be described as governmentality rationalities. As regards to the governmental techniques of the EU in general, Walters and Haahr state that the organization governs its member states by employing disciplinary and socialization governmentality techniques. The EU uses techniques such as benchmarking and best practices in its internal policies (Walters and Haahr, 2005). The EU’s views on governance have changed over time from ‘old governance’ to ‘new governance’ or ‘good governance’. The old governance was concerned with internal rule-making and their implementation. New governance has an external dimension: it concerns the transfer of EU rules to non-member states (Korosteleva, 2012; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2007). With its foreign policies the EU uses techniques of governmentality on countries, outside the EU, which lack the inside-out dynamic of governing Member States (Joseph, 2012). This can be problematic, as stated in chapter 1, because the approach lacks a strong link with the social conditions within these countries.

The DP strategies by which the EU tries to ‘conduct the conduct’ of states outside the Union will be discussed in the following part of this chapter. First, the general DP techniques
of the EU used in developing countries without the prospect of membership will be discussed. Next, the techniques deployed in the enlargement policies of the EU are elaborated on because these policies forms the basis of the ENP.

3.3.1 DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
The EU promotes democracy in developing counties along the line of neoliberal rationalities. Policy makers aim to promote good governance by governmental techniques such as partnerships, networks and methods of decentralized decision-making (Youngs, 2009; Walters and Haahr, 2005). In the early 2000s EU democracy promotion focused for a great part on formal procedural components of democracy such as elections (Youngs, 2003). Recent activities of EU democracy promotion programs have a more grass-roots approach and give a greater importance to civil society. Conditionality is an important practicing principle in these activities (Ethier, 2010; Kurki 2011).

The EU-interventions guide subject states and their populations towards the ‘right kind’ of freedoms: activity centred, entrepreneurial, state-challenging and cost-effective (Zanotti, 2006). By financing independent civil society organizations (CSOs), the EU is actively involved in the creation of democratic institutions and market mechanisms. The effect of this is that civil society organizations will be perceived, and perceive themselves, as entrepreneurial, rational actors competing for funding in order to change the society. (Kurki, 2011) The financing of CSOs and the focus on ‘local ownership’ are governmental techniques which ensure that subjects regulate themselves in responsible, cost-effective, decentred and entrepreneurial manners. An active and productive civil society thus facilitates freedoms, and by this ways institutionalizes the nature of individuals, society and government institutions in the subject states (Kurki, 2011).

Democracy promotion of the EU in the Mediterranean countries in specific focuses on both procedural reforms and grass-roots changes. DP activities of the EU in this area are involved with dialogues, economic liberalization, social development, regulatory harmonization to the ‘acquis communitaire’ and cultural cooperation. These indirect governmental techniques are described by Youngs as a ‘network mode of governance’ (Youngs, 2009). The neighbourhood policy is an example of this network mode of governance.
To conclude, the techniques which the EU deploys in its DP activities are based on neoliberal rationalities. These rationalities make DP policies of the EU possible. The EU perceives itself as a global normative force which legitimizes its DP activities. Subject states are given responsibility, CSOs facilitate freedom of individuals and the socialization and normalization of the states is ensured by monitoring and networking. The ENP is part of the broader scope of democracy promotion practices by the EU and is therefore based on the rationalities and techniques of the other EU foreign policies.

3.3.2 Enlargement Policies

In this paragraph the enlargement policies of the EU are discussed, because these policies form the base of the ENP (Korosteleva, 2012). In the accession process of new Member States, the government techniques used were aimed at the implementation of EU legislation. This served to illustrate that the EU and the candidate state spoke ´the same language´. The main subjects of the policies were the political elites in the candidate states (Raik, 2004). In the EU enlargement approach conditionality has been used as a governmental technique (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Furthermore, the EU used surveillance methods to prevent potentially non-neoliberal movements in these countries (Mitchell, 2006). Through this monitoring the states where disciplined to accept the necessity and normality of their own transformation to market-based neo-liberal societies.

In the EU enlargement activities there is little to no room for non-EU states to influence the rules that they import from the EU. The EU uses the negotiations to explain its rules to the other state rather than discuss them. Negotiations between the EU and the other state thus do not involve possibilities for new or adapted rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). This implicates that the definition of ´good governance´ as promoted by the EU is a given fact and therefore non-negotiable. To take the interpretation of good governance for granted, limits the flexibility of the EU to adjust to different situations in different candidate states.

Concluding, the enlargement policies of the EU are based on the belief that both the EU and the candidate state are committed to government techniques of the EU. There is no flexibility on the desirable outcome of the transformation of the candidate states. The form of good and democratic governance is perceived as common knowledge. The EU uses
socializing and disciplinary techniques to conduct the conduct of the candidate states. Although the ENP target states are not potential new members, the policy is based on the same rationalities and governmental techniques as the enlargement policies (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Korosteleva, 2011). The ENP is thus based on some of the same limiting rationalities and techniques as the enlargement policies.

3.4 Government Techniques of ENP

With the neighbourhood policy, the EU as an actor in the international society aims at socializing its neighbours (Korosteleva, 2012). The neoliberal rationalities of the ENP, as defined in Chapter 2, are democracy, the rule of law, respect for human right, the principles of the open market, sustainable development and security. These rationalities form the basis of techniques of government. The techniques of government make the rationalities technical and practical. In analysing the techniques of the ENP first, the practicing principles that translate the rationalities to general strategies will be assessed after which the concrete techniques will be defined.

3.4.1 Practicing Principles

Practicing principles are the first step of making the thoughts on government practical (Korosteleva, 2012). The rationalities that underpin the ENP extend to certain specific practicing principles such as ‘conditionality’, ‘progressivity’, ‘partnership’ and ‘differentiation’ which form the basis of the governmental techniques of the policy (COM (2003) 104 final; Korosteleva, 2012).

The ENP has a clear set end-goal: transforming the neighbour states of the EU into democratic and stable states, which function based on the open-market principle and adapt their legislation to the ‘acquis communitaire’ (COM (2003) 104 final; COM(2004) 373 final). The basis for this goal is laid down in Article 8 (1) of the EU treaty:

“*The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.*”

In order to reach this goal the EU uses the practicing principle of ‘conditionality’ (COM (2003) 104 final; COM(2004) 373 final). The concept of ‘conditionality’ is one of the principal
means for policy transference (Kelley, 2006). Conditionality is based on the governance strategy of reinforcement by reward. Conditionality socializes partner states into an international regime based on the rationalities of the EU and it encourages states to reform (Sasse, 2008). The concept differs from a ‘partnership’ because conditionality implicates an unequal power-relationship (Korosteleva, 2012).

In general, ‘conditionality’ can be seen as a process. A process denotes fluidity and evolution over time. Conditionality as a process is open to adaptations en-route (Sasse, 2008). Within the ENP ‘benchmarking’ is used as a form of conditionality, because it is predictable and it can offer certainty to the partner states as regards to the end goals (COM(2003) 104 final). In other words, it is very specific in its end-goals and therefore not an ongoing ‘process’. This predictability and certainty leave little room for adaptations en-route, which is a clear indication of the inflexibility of the EU policy makers within the ENP.

‘Progressivity’ is an explicitly defined principle by the Commission within the legal framework of the ENP and is closely linked with the conditionality principle. Partner states are evaluated and rewarded for the progress that they make (COM(2004) 373 final). This progressivity as an explicitly stated principle implies a rationality of the EU that the partner states are on a road to comply with the governance standards of the EU. Progress is defined as adapting to the EU member states. This is a process of socializing the subject states into the international regime of neoliberal governance. The EU has access and even control over the reform process to accomplish the political, economic and judicial goals.

Assumptions of the nature of the subjects of governmental techniques are called ‘political subjectivity’ (Walters and Haahr, 2005). The governed partner states of the ENP are perceived as consenting norm-takers (Korosteleva, 2012). The partner states are perceived this way because there is no doubt as to the rightness of the EU standards of governance. Due to the progressivity principle, the partner states are thus subjected as norm-takers who are socialized to fit in the neoliberal international regime.

Another practicing principle of the ENP is ‘partnership’. Korosteleva (2012) distinguishes four main elements as regards to ‘partnership’: shared values, joint ownership, commitments and responsibilities. Partnership in this sense is based on joint interests and gains and entails adjusting to each other’s values and behaviour (Korosteleva, 2012). The
ENP agreements are also described as partnerships based on shared values (COM(2004) 373 final). However, the use of ‘partnership’ by the EU is often criticized because it appears to be an inclusive and open partnership, which can preclude other interpretations of reality (Fowler, 2000). The ENP agreements with partner states also include the term ‘joint ownership’, which implies a relation where both parties work from a set of shared interests and goals. However, the ENP is structured in a vast way, and its interests and goals are already determined within its legal framework. This leaves little room for truly combined ownership (Korosteleva, 2012). The partner states have some ownership, but the EU rationalities are leading in the policy. Neoliberal rationalities underlie joint ownership and partnership, because these principles give responsibility to the partner states so they can self-regulate their behavior.

‘Differentiation’ is explicitly defined as one of the leading principles within the constitutive texts of the Commission and the Council. The concept refers to the individual state-approach through the Action Plans. The country-specific Action Plans take into account the existing policies of the EU regarding the country and the specific state structures (COM(2004) 373 final; 10447/03). While the measures and instruments of the ENP partnership agreements differ significantly, the final aims and end-goals of the agreements differ very little from each other (Korosteleva, 2012). Therefore, differentiation in terms of practicing principles is not reflected in the overall aims of these individual agreements.

In summary, in the case of the ENP the practicing principles form the basis for techniques of inclusion through norm-setting, monitoring the progress and rewarding desirable changes. The shared values are the norm as reflected in the progressivity principle. This principle, together with the conditionality principle, lays the foundation for monitoring and assessing techniques and the rewards. The principle of partnership and joint ownership give responsibility to the partner state causing these states to self-regulate their behaviour according to the set of norms.

3.4.2 Techniques of the ENP

The Barcelona Process was a multilateral framework, in the ENP the EU deploys a bilateral strategy by using the country specific Action Plans. The ENP uses existing power structures to reach the goals set in its legal framework (COM(2003) 104 final; COM(2004) 373 final).
The general policy documents on the ENP remain rather vague regarding the used techniques and the Action Plans differ strongly in both goals and measures (Orbie, 2008; Balfour and Rotta, 2005). However there are some general and common techniques which can be distinguished.

The ENP is described as a ‘holistic democratization instrument’ because it aims to guarantee rights of individuals, establish the rule of law, create market based economies, implement EU legislation and develop democratic processes and institutions simultaneously (Barbé and Johanssen-Nogues, 2008). The most important instruments are political dialogue, the prospect of access to the internal market and financial support, which all contain the aspect of conditionality. Conditionality is exercised by positive and negative instruments. The positive incentives include access to EU-market and further integration with the EU (Balfour and Rotta, 2005, Malmvig, 2006). The negative ‘punishments’ can be the withdrawal of aid, the postponements of summits or suspension of an agreement (Balfour and Rotta, 2005).

Dialogue is emphasized as one of the most important instruments to accomplish the aimed reforms (COM(2004) 373 final; 10447/03; 10189/04). However an official institutional framework for bilateral or multilateral dialogue is lacking within the ENP (Balfour and Rotta, 2005). The prospect of entering the internal market lead to certain additional requirements to prepare the states for this especially in the area of justice and home affairs, energy, transport, environment and research (Balfour and Rotta, 2005). The EU offers training for customs cooperation, intellectual property rights and trade facilitation (COM(2003) 104 final; 10447/03; 10189/04), which contribute to competitiveness of the states. Legal reforms are aimed for by measures of legislative approximation, regulatory convergence and institution building. The EU supports the reforms by mechanisms such as the exchange of experience, long-term twinning arrangements with member states or participation in Community programmes and experiences (Balfour and Rotta, 2005; Orbie, 2008). Other instruments are exchange programmes for education, culture and research, training for journalists (COM(2003) 104 final; 10447/03; 10189/04). Dialogues, training, education, and exchanges are soft governmental techniques that can be used to socialize the subject into a responsible actor.
The reforms should be implemented using loans and risk capital from the European Investment Bank (EIB), through the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) as well as the other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (COM (2003) 104 final; COM(2004) 373 final; 10447/03; 10189/04). Furthermore, the EU emphasizes multilateralism and international values by referring to commitments of the partner state to IGOs such as the UN, the NATO and the OSCE (Orbie, 2008). In this way the EU enforces the global norms and enhances its own image of an actor in a global society.

The implementation of the Action Plan is monitored by committees, which are constituted in these plans. Besides the monitoring of committees, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission (EC) publish progress reports for the Action Plans on a regular basis (COM(2004) 373 final). In the individual Action Plans is stated that either party is allowed to take ‘appropriate measures’ when the other party does not fulfil its obligations. These appropriate measures are not further defined, neither are the specific conditions under which they are aloud (Balfour and Rotta, 2005). This implies a possibility for punishments for undesired developments.

Summarizing, the general techniques of government of the ENP are political dialogue, the prospect of access to the internal market, financial support and loans, training, exchange programmes, monitoring by committees, evaluation by progress reports and the legitimization of the need of change by referring to the norms of other international organizations. These techniques are expressions of neoliberal rationalities because these are based on the human rights and freedoms and they lay the responsibility at the subject state. The subject states are normalized by monitoring and disciplining, using instruments such as withdrawal of aid and evaluation committees and reports. The subject states are socialized through the transfer of knowledge by education, training and the exchange of experiences.

3.4.3 LIMITING EFFECTS OF THE ENP TECHNIQUES
One implication of the principle of differentiation is that the bilateral dimension is privileged over regional frameworks (Balfour and Rotta, 2005). Although explicit references are made to the importance of regional cooperation, in practice the relations are mostly bilateral (Orbie, 2008). Regional authorities and local actors are specifically mentioned in the EU documents on the ENP, this implies a bottom-up approach (COM(2004) 373 final; COM (2003) 104 final; 10447/03; 10189/04). The ENP Action Plans reaffirm the importance of a
bottom-up approach and are construed mostly in cooperation with the political elites in the partner states (Pace, 2007). These political elites do not always interpret the concept of ‘shared values’ in the same way as the EU (Pace, 2007). Besides, ENP efforts have been criticized for passing by CSOs in the course of the Action Plans in the subject states. The organizations that have been consulted were approved by the governments of the partner states (Barbé and Johansson-Nogues, 2008; Pace, 2007). Evaluations of the ENP show that the political opposition in the partner states also was poorly involved and informed in the creation of the Action Plans (Orbie, 2008). This limits the possibility for affecting the population, because only a small part of the population is engaged in the process.

The partner states face difficulties with reflecting their own political priorities in the Action Plans. With the differentiated Action Plans the EU adapts to specific circumstances in partner state to a certain extent. For some countries the focus lies on economic reforms and democratic values are set aside in order to reach an agreement (Orbie, 2008; Barbé and Johansson-Nogues, 2008). However, these adjustments do not mean that the EU adjusts to political priorities of the partner states which lie beyond the scope of the European rationalities. The Action Plans have lesser goals, which are determined mainly by the EU, instead of fundamental different goals. After evaluations the country specific Action Plans became more homogeneous instead of more specific (Seeberg, 2008). All the Action Plans thus contain in a broader or smaller extent goals that fit within the neoliberal framework.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has linked the neoliberal rationalities of the EU to the specific techniques of government of the ENP. The distinguished rationalities in Chapter two bound the scope of thinking about governmental practices of the EU and lead to practicing principles. These principles eventually lead to governmental techniques. The EU as an actor in the global society is influenced by the DP traditions of other IGOs. In general, IGOs use both disciplinary techniques to promote democracy, such as monitoring, surveillance and punishments and soft, socialization techniques, such as training, dialogue and material inducements.

The EU democracy promotion attempts in general focus on procedural democratic reforms and grass-roots developments by using techniques based on conditionality. The enlargement policies also included disciplinary techniques. The ENP is based on both these
enlargement policies and on the previous European democracy promotion activities in the neighbourhood. The practicing principles of the ENP are conditionality, progressivity, partnership and differentiation. The EU emphasizes ‘differentiation’ and country specific approaches in the ENP Action Plans. The emphasis on country specific approaches, together with the ‘partnership’ principle, creates the idea that the EU is flexible as regards to its practices. However, the clear end-goal as regards to political, economic and judicial issues and the principles of ‘conditionality’ by benchmarking and ‘progressivity’ limit the range of possibilities of the Action Plans.

The governmental techniques of the ENP focus on trade and an open market to improve the competitiveness of the subject states. The techniques further include soft government techniques such as education, training and exchanges. The EU monitors the developments through committees in the country and progress reports by the EC and the EEEAS. This approach contributes to the self-regulation of subjects to make responsible choices. The appropriate measures that both parties can take when the partner does not fulfil its obligations, can serve as a punishment technique. Furthermore, in both the constitutive documents and the Action Plans links are explicitly made with IGOs, this illustrates that the EU is an actor in a global society and it legitimizes the ENP end-goals.

The individual Action Plans are set up by the EU and the governments of the subject states. Opposition parties and CSOs are not actively involved in most cases; this limits the influence of the population on the Action Plans. When faced with difficulties in the constitution or execution of the Action Plans the EU can reduce its requirements for democratic reforms. However, the adapted Action Plans remain in line with the EU rationalities; adaption to specific political priorities of partner states is not visible present. To the contrary even: after evaluations of the different ENP Action Plans, the Action Plans of the different partner states become more similar to each other. The adjustments which are made are all made along the same line of reasoning, more specific: neoliberal reasoning.

Besides, the use of concepts such as educating, training and evaluation implies the assumption that the partner states do not know good governance yet and they can be taught to govern rightly. In other words, the partner states do not know what is good for
them; this assumption justifies the paternalistic power relation within the ENP for both the partner states and the EU.
CHAPTER 4:
The European Neighbourhood Policy in Practice: A Case-Study of Lebanon

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INTRODUCTION
This case study is meant as an illustration of how global governmentality rationalities and techniques can limit the flexibility of the ENP approach of the EU. The way in which the EU responds to stagnation in the implementation process is assessed. Due to the scope of this thesis we will only focus on the overall objectives of the EU in Lebanon and on how the EU’s approach to the ENP Action Plan has changed based on the progress reports. Even though the ENP is a particularly diverse and characterised by large differences (Manners, 2009), the governmental techniques in all the partner states are based on the same underlying EU-rationalities. In this sense the ENP approach to Lebanon can serve as an example for the whole policy.

The case of Lebanon is chosen for this case study because even though the Lebanese political situation is tumultuous; it is relatively stable compared to other Arab countries of the ENP where the Arab spring causes significant turmoil. Besides, the ENP countries of the Southern Caucasus and East Europe have an extra complexity to them regarding their history and relations with Russia. Israel and Palestine have the complexity of a severe internal conflict. Finally, Morocco has an exceptional position within the ENP because of the significant progress the country has made in implementing the ENP objectives, which does
not allow for a thorough investigation of the EU response to obstacles of implementation (ENP website, 2014).

In the first part of this chapter an overview of the specific circumstances of Lebanon and its relation with the EU is given. After which general aspects of the EU-Lebanon Action Plan are discussed. In the second section the goals of the Action Plan are thematically assessed. Per theme the specific goals of the Action Plan are elaborated, followed by an assessment of their progress and the policy response of the EU. The analysis will be done based on the texts of the EU-Lebanon Action Plan (2007), the mid-term progress report on 2008 (SEC (2009) 518) and the progress report of 2011 (SWD (2012) 117 final). The timeframe for this analysis is 2007-2011, because this coincides the time frame of the Action Plan (Action Plan, 2007). Only EU-documents, such as Action Plans and Progress reports, are used because the topic of research of this thesis is the rationalities and practices of the EU itself.

4.1 CONTEXT OF LEBANON
In this paragraph a brief overview of the political background of Lebanon and its relations with the EU is given, which forms the background on which the EU-Lebanon Action Plan is based. Hereafter the general aspects of the Action Plans, which form the context for the concrete objectives of actions, are shortly discussed.

4.1.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Lebanon is a special case in the Arab region, because of its mix of Christian culture on the one hand and Islamic culture on the other. With this mixed tradition, the country forms a bridge between the western and the Arab states. This explains the strategic importance of Lebanon for the EU (Kail, 2002). The first official relations between the EU and Lebanon were established in 1977 with a Cooperation Agreement. The Barcelona Process established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995, a policy for the entire region with long-term objectives. An Association Agreement between the EU and Lebanon entered into force in 2006. This agreement sets out areas in which the relations could be developed bilaterally. This was the bilateral framework in which the ENP Action Plan for 2007-2011 came into being (SEC (2009) 518).
In 2006 Lebanon was in conflict with Israel, after this, conflict internal tensions kept having impact on the stability of the state. The results of these tensions are weak state institutions and continuous preoccupation with security issues. These circumstances made Lebanon a passive partner as regards to the construction of the Action Plan (Emerson, Noutcheva and Popescu, 2007) A general problem in the construction of the ENP Action Plans is that it only addresses elites and not the population (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). In Lebanon, political elites are especially influential. The banking sector is also dominant in the Lebanese economy and is interlinked with national politics, because a great part of its assets are devoted to holding the high government debt (SWD (2012) 117 final). The crisis of 2008 did not affect Lebanon severely, although a slowdown of growth did occur (SEC (2009) 518). However, the political turmoil in the region in 2011 did severely hit the Lebanese economy (SWD (2012) 117 final).

4.1.2 ENP ACTION PLAN FOR 2007-2011
In 2007 both the EU and Lebanon signed the EU-Lebanon ENP Action Plan (ENP website, 2013). The Action Plan describes partnership perspectives, priorities for action and the specific actions for implementation (Action Plan, 2007). The seven partnership perspectives that are opened by the ENP are (1) a significant degree of economic integration in the European market and the possibility for Lebanon to participate in aspects of EU programmes, (2) an greater scope for political dialogue, (3) an opportunity for convergence of economic legislation and the reduction of trade barriers, (4) increased financial support of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), the EIB and the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), (5) technical support and twinning, (6) the deepening of trade and economic relations to the service and agriculture sector, (7) direct cooperation through the committees set up in the Action Plan (Action Plan, 2007). These perspectives can be seen as the ‘awards’ of good behaviour.

The priorities for action, which are described in the Action plan are extensive and designate the areas of special attention of the Action Plan. Political and cross-cultural dialogue, human rights, the freedom of media and expression, the equality of minorities and women and other democratic issues are explicitly addressed in the priorities. The development of an independent, impartial and capable judiciary is ought to ensure this. Economic priorities are a healthy fiscal position of Lebanon, the improving of business
conditions to enhance growth and increase investments, the enhancement of Lebanon’s export potential by the liberalisation of trade, simplifying customs legislation and improve industrial standards, poverty reduction, renewed legislation for businesses and products and improving social conditions of the citizens. Security issues such as migration and regional cooperation are also priorities of the Action Plan. Finally, cooperation in the field of research, innovation and climate issues is affirmed as a priority. These priorities reflect the neoliberal, human rights rationalities of the EU (Action Plan, 2007). The specific actions for implementation will be discussed below.

The Action Plan established institutional cooperation through the EU–Lebanon Association Council, the EU–Lebanon Association committee and ten subcommittees in order to execute its goals (Action Plan, 2007; SEC (2009) 518). In these committees, representatives of both parties exchange views on the developments and advances of the implementation of the Action Plans. The progress reports are based on the conclusions of the committees (SEC (2009) 518). The difficult political situation led to a deadlock situation in 2008, which significantly slowed down the process of implementation of the EU-Lebanon ENP Action Plan (SEC (2009) 518). Lebanon preserved its relative stability in the unstable Arab region in 2011 in comparison with other countries in the region. However, it was severely affected by the turmoils in the region, especially in Syria. This was mentioned by the EU as one of the main reasons for stagnations of the objectives of the Action Plan (SWD (2012) 117 final).

4.2 EU RESPONSES TO PROGRESS REPORTS ON ACTION PLAN

The EU responses to the progress reports on the EU-Lebanon Action Plan, are analysed in seven different themes of interest. First, the initial objectives of actions in the Action Plan are analysed per subject. After which an overview of the progress made in 2008 is given, followed by an assessment of the EU’s response to this progress and finally, the progress made in 2011 and the EU’s response to this progress. The emphasis lies on the policy areas where the least progress has been made in order to assess how the EU response to stagnation. The seven themes of interest correspond with themes of the Action Plan: ‘Political dialogue and reform’, ‘economic and social reform’, ‘trade related issues’, ‘market and regulatory reform’, ‘cooperation on justice, freedom and security’, ‘transport, energy, environment and research’, ‘people-to-people-contacts, education and health’ and finally an
‘overall assessment’. After analysing the response of the EU on insufficient progress of implementation, a generally conclusion can be made of the priorities of the EU and the extent to which the Union adjust to obstacles in the field.

4.2.1 Political Dialogue and Reform
In the Action Plan the objectives for actions as regards to political dialogue and reform are divided into five subthemes. The first subtheme is ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’ which prescribes cooperation to promote shared values and the rule of law including ‘good governance’ and transparent and stable institutions. Other objectives of action are to combat corruption, reform the electoral law and framework and the improvement of the judiciary. The second subtheme is ‘Human rights and fundamental freedoms’, where the EU emphasis a human rights strategy by focusing on adherence to international human rights treaties, a national Ombudsman, the support of freedom of media, expression and assembly, the development of a strong civil society, fighting torture, guarantee the rights of women and children, combatting discrimination and the promotion of fundamental social rights. The third theme is the ‘reform of the security sector’ by strengthening the administrative bodies of security actors and institutionalizing respect for human rights by these actors. The fourth theme is ‘Co-operation on foreign and security policy’ by strengthening political dialogue and cooperation with the EU and other international actors and adherence to international treaties. The fifth and final theme is ‘Regional and international issues, conflict resolution and crisis management’ which prescribes actions for regional cooperation for conflict prevention and resolution, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combatting terrorism (Action Plan, 2007).

As regards to the ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’ objectives, the progress report on 2008 stated that there was insufficient progress of the electoral reforms. The EU granted a package of 4 million euros to assist the Lebanese authorities in implementing electoral reforms. The EU also aimed for an Election Observation Mission for the 2009 elections, which was welcomed by the Lebanese authorities. Insufficient progress was also made in the area of judicial reforms, however, Lebanon expressed its intentions for reforms and the EU was willing to provide financial support. Also in the area of administrative reforms and combatting corruption, the made progress was insufficient. In the field of ‘Human rights and fundamental freedoms’ there also were certain areas of insufficient progress. The
Lebanese government delayed the implementation a comprehensive human rights strategy, a number of international conventions were still not ratified. The legal basis for an Ombudsman was made, but the position remained unfilled in 2008. In 2008 several cases of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners were reported, in the field of freedom of expression insufficient progress was made and little progress was made to the conditions of migrants and refugees. Regarding the cooperation on foreign and security policy and international issues, a little progress have been made, but there is still room for improvement (SEC (2009) 518). The EU did not change its strategies or objectives in Lebanon, the only changes in its approach to the country concerned extra financial resources.

In the progress report on 2011 the same themes and objectives were assessed. In 2011 the electoral reforms were still insufficient and the EU expresses its plans for to continue this objective in the new Action Plan in 2012. As regards to the independency of the judiciary there is still progress to be made, the court is not completely independent and civilians are not ensured of a fair trial. The EU plans to continue its financial support for reforms in this area. The actors of national security have made progress, but the EU continues its strategy for reform in this sector after 2011. Administrative reforms plans are still in the making in 2011 and the EU plans to support these reforms with an additional 9 million euro. The combatting of corruption and the improvement of rights of children, women, prisoners and refugees have failed or stagnated over the period 2007-2011. The EU does not explicitly mention new techniques to improve these areas. However, in the overall assessment it is mentioned that these issues ‘remain challenges’. As regards to the ratification of international conventions, regional cooperation, political dialogue, civil society organizations and the freedom of media and expression, sufficient progress have been made (SWD (2012) 117 final).

Summarizing, the main remaining challenges in the area of political reform in 2011 are increasing the efficiency and independence of the judiciary, the circumstances in prisons, abolishing the death penalty, respecting human rights in migration issues and the position of women (SWD (2012) 117 final). The EU continues most of its strategies to support reforms by providing more support, or at least defining areas where insufficient progress has occurred as ‘remaining challenges for 2012’.
4.2.2 **Economic and Social Reform**

The Action Plan divides the objectives for the economic and social reform of Lebanon in seven subthemes: ‘fiscal policies, monetary and exchange rate policy’, ‘Functioning of the Market Economy’, ‘Social Development, employment and poverty reduction’, ‘Agriculture’, ‘Fisheries’, ‘Regional development’ and ‘Sustainable Development’. Regarding the first subtheme ‘fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy’ the Action Plan aims at fiscal sustainability, macro-economic stability, competitiveness and sustainable growth by fiscal discipline, debt reduction, a national macroeconomic stabilisation programme, contract enforcement and property rights and improving the public finances. In the field of the second subtheme ‘Functioning of the Market Policy’ the objectives of action are improving the business environment, stimulating investments, creating jobs, privatisation programmes and improving transparency and accountability of public administration. The third subtheme ‘Social development, employment and poverty reduction’ describes objectives of action to create conditions for employment generated growth, social measures to economic reforms such as dialogues on employment and social issues and strengthen social safety nets.

For the improvement of the subtheme ‘Agriculture’ the following objectives of actions are defined: measures to ease access to export markets, encourage diversification of activity and the creation of new sustainable trade flows, encourage private investment, improve the functioning of the land cadastre, compliance to international product standards, promote the exchange of information on agricultural policies and promote research and modern technology in the sector. The fifth subtheme ‘Fisheries’ describes the reinforcement of international standards, the promotion of international cooperation and sustainable practices, the increase of the scientific and technical capacity of the sector and the undertaking of the necessary market infrastructure. The sixth subtheme ‘Regional development’ aims at strengthening the socio-economic cohesion of Lebanon’s regions and finally, the seventh subtheme ‘sustainable development’ emphasises the importance of the integration of sustainable development in sectorial policies (Action Plan, 2007).

Due to the crisis the growth of the Lebanese economy in 2008 was less than expected, but understandable. However, the political deadlock of the first half of 2008, resulted in little progress in the field of fiscal consolidation, social reforms and privatisation. Besides, the draft laws in the context of the accession to the WTO were not implemented in
2008. The inflation rates were high, together with the high national debt, this made the Lebanese economy vulnerable. A positive development was that a debt management department was created by the Lebanese government. The EU emphasises the importance of meeting the conditionalities of the IMF and the EU in the managing of the national debt. The management of the public budget also improved. Regarding employment and social policies many of the foreseen reforms have been delayed and the socio-economic situation even worsened, which led to demonstrations in Lebanon. The government eventually made a gesture to the population by increasing the minimum wage. No progress was reported in the fields of the social security system, agriculture and fisheries. Little progress was made in fighting poverty and sustainable development (SEC (2009) 518).

In 2011, Lebanon was severely affected by the tensions in the region related to the Arab Spring. The effect was a worsening of inflation rates and the growth of the GDP. Improving the public financial management and the privatisation of the water, energy and telecommunications sectors remain key elements of the EU’s reform agenda in Lebanon. In the field of Fisheries no improvements were reported. Positive developments in the economic and social reform in 2011 were the fact that the Prime Minister’s office worked on an Economic and Social Action Plan which was yet to be accepted by the Council of Ministers, also draft legislation to enhance social security was in de making. A specific programme to combat poverty was launched in 2011 and social dialogues improved (SWD (2012) 117 final). Concluding, Lebanon made little progress on the economic reforms, partly due to the economic crisis, the political deadlock of 2008 and the turmoil in the region in 2011. In the area of social reforms sufficient progress was made.

4.2.3 TRADE RELATED ISSUES, MARKET AND REGULATORY REFORM

The objectives of actions regarding trade, market and regulatory reforms in the Action Plan concerned five subthemes: ‘Movement of goods’, ‘Right of establishment, Company law and services’, ‘Movement of capital and current payments’, ‘Regional cooperation’ and ‘Other key areas’. The movement of goods is encouraged by actions of liberalization of trade, where the accession to the WTO and the convergence with EU legislations are important objectives. In the subtheme ‘Right of establishment, company law and services’ the objective of actions are strengthen corporate governance, new legislation for companies in line with international standards, pursue bilateral negotiations on services and the training of
authorities of the financial sector. To improve the ‘Movement of capital and current payments’ the national regime for capital movements has to be improved and there have to be exchanges of views to liberalize and protect capital movement. For ‘regional cooperation’ trade and investment with regional partners is promoted. In the section ‘Other key areas’ objectives of action are described for the improvement of taxation laws, the competition policy, public procurement, enterprise policy and combatting corruption (Action Plan, 2007).

In 2008 bilateral trade between the EU and Lebanon had increased and a Trade Needs Assessment has been done by financial support of the EU. Besides, there was sufficient progress in legislation for bilateral trade. However, the progress to comply with the accession conditions of the WTO did not develop sufficiently. The EU organized an inter-Lebanese forum to emphasize the importance of small- and medium enterprises. There was insufficient progress in the area of customs legislation, the business climate and in combatting corruption. Slow progress was made on free movement and technical regulations, company law, the right of establishment, competition law, public procurement and intellectual property rights (SEC (2009) 518).

In 2011 still no progress was made regarding the WTO accession, the EU continued to provide assistance for Lebanon’s accession and states that this is a precondition for the deepening of the EU-Lebanese trade relations. As regards to the free movement of goods and technical legislation the legal framework of Lebanon was not yet in line with the ‘acquis communitaire’. The business climate even worsened due to the Arab Spring and there was no reform in the area of company law and in combatting corruption. Slow progress was made in the areas of competition law, public procurement and intellectual property. There was sufficient progress regarding customs legislation, financial services, taxation (SWD (2012) 117 final). Summarizing, regarding trade, market and regulatory issues, little progress have been made during the five years of the EU-Lebanon Action Plan. The EU addresses certain areas of difficulties with extended exchange of ideas or financial support. Other areas just ‘remain an area of interest’. Strong focus lies in the Action Plan and the progress reports on compliance to international conventions and standards.
4.2.4 Cooperation on Justice, Freedom and Security

As regards to the cooperation on Justice, Freedom and Security seven subthemes are distinguished in the Action Plan: ‘Migration issues’, ‘Border Management’, ‘Fight against organized crime’, ‘Fight against drugs’, ‘Fight against money laundering’, ‘Combating terrorism’ and ‘Judicial cooperation’. The ‘migration issues’ are addressed by political dialogue, a new legal framework for migration issues and the prevention and control of illegal migration. Regarding ‘border management’ the following objectives of actions are defined in the Action Plan: enhancement of cooperation with neighbour states of Lebanon and the EU and education and training of Lebanese officials. For the subtheme ‘fight against organized crime’ international cooperation, education and exchanges of practices, combatting of cybercrime and the fight against human trafficking are emphasized. Relating to the ‘fight against drugs’ the Action Plans describes international cooperation as the main objective of action. The ‘fight against money laundering’ requires the exchange of information, the improvement of legislation on this subject and international cooperation. Finally, in the field of ‘judicial cooperation’ the objectives of actions are the exchange of information and cooperation between European and Lebanese courts (Action plan, 2007).

In the Progress report on 2008 the EC concluded that there had been progress in the field of border control. The Lebanese ministers of Defence, Transport and Foreign Affairs had decided to expand the work of the Border Force to another 70 kilometres of border. No progress had been made in 2008 on migration issues, in particular the respect for human rights of migration workers did not improve. No developments took place to adhere to international legislation on transnational organized crime prevention. Lebanon did participate actively in preventing drug trafficking by cooperating with Syria and the EU and with police cooperation with the EU. In the prevention of money laundering and terrorism, Lebanon had also made some promising steps in 2008 (SEC (2009) 518).

Despite the progress made in 2008, in 2011 Syrian forces were able to enter Lebanon due to lacks of border control. The EU stated in the 2011 progress report that it was to provide Lebanon with assistance for its border control. There was no progress registered in the field of asylum law and judicial and law-enforcement cooperation since 2008. Substantial progress have been made in the fields of preventing human trafficking, the fight against drugs and laws on money laundering (SWD (2012) 117 final).
4.2.5 Transport, Energy, Environment and Research

This fifth theme is also divided in several subthemes: ‘Transport’, ‘Energy and Environment’, and ‘Science and technology’. For the transport sector the Action Plan prescribes actions such as an improved infrastructure, better administration and legislation, participation in transnational networks and reorganization of the rail transport, maritime and aviation sector. For the subtheme ‘Energy’ the following objectives of actions are distinguished: the development of a long-term strategy based on the EU energy policy objectives, convergence to the principles of the EU gas and electricity market, reform of the oil sector, further developing energy networks, progress on energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy forces, regional cooperation, good environmental governance, water resources management and more international cooperation on environment issues. As regards to ‘Science and technology’ the Action Plan focused on progress in the areas of electronic communications policy and regulation, scientific cooperation and advance infrastructure, audiovisual regulation, developing Lebanon’s capacity in research and preparing Lebanon’s integration into the European Research Area (Action Plan, 2007).

In 2008 the development of a transport policy suffered a delay on certain aspects; other plans were developed in time. Reforms in the public transport were not possible due to overlapping jurisdictions. The aviation sector had developed well in 2008, however the port sector was still performing poorly. Regarding the subject ‘energy’, Lebanon still had to import most of its energy from abroad, which was expensive. Lebanon was in 2008 still in the development of an energy plan and developed electricity networks and it had taken considerable steps in regional cooperation regarding electricity. There was no progress regarding sustainable energy. Lebanon did launch the preparation of a regional water strategy. As regards to ‘science and technology’ the mobile communications sector was not yet privatized due to the financial crisis, however, a broad e-governance strategy was implemented. International cooperation in the field of research still lagged behind in 2008 (SEC (2009) 518).

In 2011 a transport strategy was presented, including a statement for driver licenses, to the Lebanese council of ministers in 2011 The strategy was theoretically implemented, however the enforcement was still unclear at the end of 2011. The reforms on public transport were stalled during 2011. Regarding the energy reforms the Lebanese parliament
agreed on an energy-strategy in 2010, which was to start in April 2012, to ensure 24 hours of energy every day in the whole country. The strategy provided for extra power plants and electricity networks. In 2011 an energy efficiency plan was launched, which called for renewable energy sources. There was no progress in the area of carbon market reforms. Significant progress was made in the field of natural marine reserves and waste management. The telecommunication were still not privatized in 2011 and remained an important source of income for the Lebanese government, liberalisation is described as unlikely. However, the EU states that it will remain supporting the independence of the sector and its attractiveness for private investment. In the area of research coordination remains a challenge and participation in international founding programmes remained limited (SWD (2012) 117 final). A remarkable aspect in this theme is the statement of the EU that liberalisation of the telecommunication market. Although it is has been stated likely that this sector will not be liberated, the EU continues to support this goal.

4.2.6 People-to-people-contacts, Education and Health

The last theme ‘People-to-people-contacts, education and health’ is divided the following subthemes: ‘Education, training and youth’, ‘Culture’, ‘Civil Society cooperation’ and ‘Public Health’. In the area of education and culture the focus lies on enhancing Lebanese competitiveness, employability, mobility, international cooperation and dialogue. Relating to civil society the EU aims to further improve the legal framework for civil society organizations and to ensure that Lebanese NGOs contribute to the economic, political and social development of the country. The public health sector is addressed by policy reforms, health security, information and knowledge (Action Plan, 2007).

Small steps were made on education issues in 2008, on university level the country did participate in the Erasmus Mundus programme, vocational training reforms completely stagnated completely. Cultural exchange with other countries developed to a certain extent, but remained limited. A new law that would have protected NGOs and other CSOs was not yet implemented in 2008. The reform of the health sector did not receive sufficient funding and the objectives in this field were not met (SEC (2009) 518).

The education agenda stagnated due to the political unrest in the area, but some initial steps to better quality of the higher education law has been made by the
establishment of agencies. In the field of general education, Lebanon identified certain actions to be implemented to ensure good education for all its citizens, these actions will be supported by programs of the EU. Exchange programs between the EU were further developed. A strategic framework for vocational education and training was not published in 2011 and the EU continued to support the Ministry of Education for this purpose. In the area of culture Lebanon had participated in certain heritage projects together with the EU, but failed to ratify other international conventions on cultural preservation. In the area of health progress was made in informing citizens on health issues and banning tobacco advertisements. The EU further supported projects aimed at health security in the whole region (SWD (2012) 117 final).

The focus of the EU on health, education and civil society in the case of Lebanon illustrates that the Neighbourhood policy does not address just security issues. This is in line with the governmental technologies and rationalities of governmentalities according to Foucault.

4.2.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT

In the progress report of 2009 over the year 2008, the overall judgement of the progress made in Lebanon in the period 2007-2008 is not positive. It is stated that the implementation of human rights, social sector reform, judicial reform and regulatory and administrative reform in Lebanon was slowed down due to the political situation throughout 2008. Due to a legislative deadlock in 2008, laws were adopted by the Government without debates in the Parliament. The political difficulties also hindered the dialogue between the EU and Lebanon (SEC (2009) 518/2). However in 2008, the European Commission continued to facilitate platforms for dialogue between the EU and political parties and civil society (SEC (2009) 518/2).

The progress report of 2012 over the year 2011 is the last Progress report on the 2007 Action Plan. In January, 2011 the national unity government in Lebanon fell, which led to stagnation of the implementation of the Action Plan. This stagnation had an impact on the political, economic and social situation in Lebanon. From July the process of implementation resumed. The EU states that Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are ‘generally respected’ in Lebanon and freedom of expression, association and religion can be exercised
in a liberal environment (SWD (2012) 117 final). However, the EU distinguishes certain remaining challenges for the political reforms. The lack of electoral reforms and cutting corruption are the most problematic issues. The political deadlock of 2011 had the most impact on the economic reforms of Lebanon, which do not com (SWD (2012) 117 final).

In the progress report over 2011 the EU, with a view on the new Action Plan, invites Lebanon to a number of concrete actions. First of all, to adopt a new electoral law before the elections in 2013, other invitations focus on the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary, the role of women in both the public as economy sector, new legislation in the social and economic areas, better guarantee of human rights for refugees, improvement of the management of public finances, advance accession to the WTO and adapt new laws which will make this possible, structural measures in the energy and telecommunication sectors and finally, re-launch social dialogue in order to adapt a strategic framework for education and job creation. These invites for Lebanon lead to two conclusions. First, the themes of the invites are points where Lebanon has made insufficient progress in the five years since the entry into force of the Action Plan. Second, the rationalities and techniques, and therefore the objectives, of the EU have not changed over the five years. Even though the progress stagnated on certain points, the EU blamed that mainly on political dead locks and keeps using the same approach during the period 2007-201, which forms the basis of the new Action Plan that is still in the making.

A noteworthy remark relating to the reports of progress of 2008 and 2011 is that the EU does not mention points for improvement for itself. When faced with insufficient progress the strategy is to keep using the original techniques or to enhance these techniques. The approach of the EU to stagnation of the objectives is thus ´more of the same´ instead of The EU is currently developing a new Action Plan for Lebanon based on the ´more for more´ principle based on its last review of the ENP as a whole in 2011. This principle means there will be stronger partnerships and greater incentives for countries that make more progress to democratic reform (ENP website, 2013). The enhanced emphasis on democratic reform and the unchanged focus on economic and judicial aspects illustrate that the rationalities behind the ENP have not changed and neither have the techniques. The general ´more for more´ principle can be seen as an enhancement of old techniques of the ENP, such as the conditionality principle and the differentiation principle.
CONCLUSION

Lebanon has failed to comply with the objectives of the Action Plan, especially as regards to electoral reforms, respecting human rights, economic reforms and trade and market related reforms. In general, the EU responds to stagnation and deterioration of the objectives in two manners. The first manner of response is to offer more support on the subject, either financial, by dialogues or by offering trainings. The second manner of response is to acknowledge the problem, categorizing the objective as a ‘remaining challenge’ for the Action Plan of 2012, without providing a concrete strategy to tackle it. From a governmentality perspective there have been clear monitoring by the EU, but little techniques of ‘punishment’ were applied. Lebanon even received more support for certain areas of stagnations. The only negative measure taken was to withhold Lebanon of further integration with the European market.

The EU rhetoric in the documents and the way in which the EU changes its policy as a response to stagnation implies that the organization sees the objectives as a project that is yet to be completed. The EU clings to its original objectives and designates the financial crisis and the turmoil in the region due to the Arab Spring as the causes of stagnation. However, the lack of progress on several areas could also imply a lack of commitment of the local governmental actors or the inefficiency of the EU strategies. However, in the whole text there is no reference made to the role of the EU in the progress of the reforms. Neither is the practicability of the objectives questioned. Instead, the EU sticks to the original objectives of action. The only change of the approach of the EU in response to the stagnation of objectives in Lebanon, is to offer more of the same measures. That is to say, to offer more financial aid, more dialogue and more training, without adjusting the objectives.
CONCLUSION

The research question of this thesis was how the concept of governmentality can explain the evaluation and response of the EU to obstacles of the implementation of the ENP Action Plan in Lebanon.

Governmentality is defined in this paper as a form of government which is based on the idea of the political economy, which aims to form its subjects into free and responsible actors. A governmentality approach beyond state borders is legitimized by Foucault’s emphasis on different forms of government. Governmentality can explain the EU as an actor within a global governmentality. The EU is constraint in its thoughts and practices by the neoliberal rationalities of this global governmentality. Other actors that constitute the global context in which the EU acts, are IGOs such as the UN and the WTO. Organizations within a global governmentality aim to steer the conduct of their member states by using governmentality techniques to the governments of states instead of to their populations.

The references the EU makes to international organisations, conventions and multilateralism show that the EU can be perceived, and perceives itself, as an actor in a global society. The rationalities of the EU are based upon and enhanced by global neoliberal rationalities. The defined rationalities of the DP activities of the EU are democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the principles of the open market, security and inclusion. Practicing principles make the rationalities practical and form the bridge between the rationalities of government and the actual techniques. The practicing principles of the ENP are conditionality, progressivity, partnership, differentiation and security. Despite the emphasis on country specific approaches and the ´partnership´ principle, the EU is not really flexible in its practices. The set end-goal as regards to political, economic and judicial issues and the principles of ´conditionality´ by benchmarking and ´progressivity´ limit the flexibility of ENP Action Plans.

The governmental techniques of the ENP include ´soft governance´ techniques such as education, training, dialogue and exchanges of views. Other government techniques of the ENP facilitate trade and an open market to improve the competitiveness of the subject states. These techniques are based upon neoliberal rationalities and contribute to the creation of responsible subjects that self-regulate their behaviour to what is perceived as
'normal’. The EU monitors the behaviour of the subject state by progress reports and committees. Progress leads to greater incentives, stagnation leads to lesser possibilities for the subject state.

In the practices of the ENP the EU applies neoliberal techniques to countries in development. The practicing principles of the ENP are conditionality, progressivity, partnership and differentiation. These practicing principles lead to both disciplinary techniques, such as monitoring, surveillance and punishments and soft socialization techniques, such as training, dialogue and material inducements within the ENP. When faced with insufficient progress, the EU adjusts its goals only within the framework of the neoliberal standards of governance, not by adapting the end-goals to specific rationalities in the partner state. Furthermore, techniques such as educating, training and evaluation imply the assumption that the partner states do not know what is good for them. By which the unequal power relation within the ENP is legitimized for the partner states and the EU.

In the specific case of Lebanon the objectives of the Action Plan have not been reached. Especially as regards to electoral reforms, respecting human rights, economic reforms and trade and market related reforms The EU responds to stagnation or deterioration in two ways. First, The EU offers more support on the subject, either financial, by dialogues or by offering trainings. Second, the EU acknowledges the problem and categorizes the objective as a ‘remaining challenge’ for the Action Plan of 2012. There is no concrete strategy described to tackle the remaining challenge. In other words, the EU only responds to stagnation of objectives by offering more of the existing measures.

The answer to the research question is thus: governmentality can explain the EU’s response in ENP practices in Lebanon when little or no progress is made, in the following way. The ENP establishes a relation of power that can be perceived as a governmentality. The techniques deployed by the EU within the ENP framework in Lebanon are governmentality techniques because they aim to socialize and normalize the subject state and transform it into a responsible subject, which is able and capable to self-regulate. The reluctance of the EU to adapt its techniques when faced with stagnation or deterioration of the implementation of the ENP Action Plan can be explained by the governmentality theory.
When faced with insufficient progress, the EU can only think of solutions which fit in its own rationalities and governmental techniques.

This paper does not offer any answers on how the EU could better respond to undesired outcomes of ENP Action Plans, this can be food for thought for future researches. Furthermore, the use of governmentality in IR studies can be subject to further investigation. The methodological choices which had to be made in this research, are not per se the only way in which governmentality can be deployed to IR studies. A final remark is that I myself cannot claim I am without boundaries of thought of my own, while investigating the rationalities and the limits those impose on EU actions. However, in my opinion this should not withhold researchers to try to illuminate underlying frameworks of thoughts of policy makers.
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