Haiti
Assessing the correlation between images, notions and UN policy

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Introduction

In the last decennium of the previous century, certain countries obtained the label ‘failed state.’ The common image of a failed state is a country in which law and order have broken down. Violence prevails, with large refugee flows as a consequence. When the term was introduced in the early 1990s, it designated amongst others Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia and Haiti. Around the same time, the UN deployed peacekeeping missions to several of these countries. It was hoped that with help from the international community, failed states would be ‘fixed.’ In the former Yugoslavia and Liberia, state failure seems to be reversed: they are no longer conflict zones, and a certain level of law and order has returned. However, for Somalia and Haiti, the situation is different. In Somalia, the peacekeeping mission in the early 1990s ended prematurely because the fighting parties refused to observe the peace treaty conditions. The country has been the scene of conflict ever since. In Haiti, the international community is actively involved for an exceptionally long time: UN missions were deployed from 1994 till 2000 and again from 2004 till today. Also, numerous NGO’s are active in Haiti for even a longer period. Despite this involvement, Haiti still is the only failed state in the Western Hemisphere. Improvement in its situation is barely visible; it is one of the poorest countries in the world where living conditions are exceptionally dire. Therefore, Haiti is an interesting case in assessing international policy, in particular UN policy, towards failed states. It is remarkable that despite all these years of involvement, despite millions of dollars spend to address violence and poverty, no real change is achieved in Haiti. This thesis aims to give insight in how the problems in Haiti are addressed by the UN through the years. This is done by analysing the correlation between images, notions and UN policy.

Presupposed is that images and notions, or perceptions, influence policy. Two kinds of images and notions are analysed: those created by academics and those created by the UN. The reason is a presupposed correlation between the academic world and the UN: academic images and notions influence those of the UN and vice versa, since academics analyse UN policy and UN policymakers use academic research to formulate policies. This is called a ‘learning cycle.’ Following these assumptions, the research question of this thesis is: To what extent is there a correlation between the learning cycle of images, notions and policy and the effects of UN policy in Haiti?
To answer this question, two processes are studied: academic literature on Haiti and UN resolutions and reports. For reasons of time and space, discourse from other organizations including non-governmental organizations, is not part of this research. Moreover, the UN is the central authority when the international community intervenes in a failed state, and therefore regarded as the most important organ.

From this follows the question of why the analysing of these texts is central. This thesis aims to uncover the influence of academic images and notions on UN policy and ultimately on the policy effects. This applies in particular to the post-Cold War period, when the image and notion of the ‘failed state’ was created and the international order tremendously changed. The core argument of this thesis is that in this period, a ‘learning cycle’ between academics and the UN became visible: the UN incorporated criticism and recommendations from academics in their images, notions and policy. This learning cycle looks as follows:

![Learning Cycle Diagram](image)

*Figure 1.1. The learning cycle between academics, the UN and UN policy effects.*

In the cycle, the arrows represent feedback: academic perceptions influence those of the UN, which influences policy and creates certain effects. Academics analyse the effects and form perceptions about it, which flows back to the UN as feedback. Also, effects of policy flow back to the UN on its own in the form of feedback. Then new policy is formed, based on academic perceptions and so on. Moreover, the perceptions of academics and the UN influence each other. In the case of Haiti, this cycle became visible after the Cold War ended and since then, new cycles were formed over and over again. This is what the thesis aims to show, to understand why real change is not achieved in Haiti.
Moreover, with this thesis an overview of a long period of images and notions on Haiti is created, which can help both academics and policy makers in analysing developments and policies of the last years. This can be helpful in determining policy today.

The thesis is constructed in three chapters. The first discusses the theoretical basis, which is formed of a social constructivist perspective and a framework of the term ‘failed state.’ Different approaches towards the concept failed state are categorized. These categories are part of academic images and notions on failed states, and are used in the analysis of the academic and UN texts in the following chapters.

The second chapter analyses the images and notions towards Haiti of academics and the UN from 1980 on, six years before dictator Jean-Clade Duvalier was ousted by popular uprising and twelve years before the concept failed state was introduced. This is the starting point to analyse images and notions before the term failed state existed. The end point of this chapter is the year 2000, when the UN left Haiti after six years of involvement. The main question is what were the images and notions on Haiti between 1980 and 2000, and what were the consequences for Haiti? Prior to the analysis, a short historical overview of Haiti until 1980 is given, to be able to put the images and notions from after 1980 in perspective.

The last chapter addresses the academic and the UN discourse on Haiti between 2000 and today. Here, the question logically is what were images and notions on Haiti from 2000 till 2013, and what were the consequences? This period will highlight in particular how perceptions of the failed state influenced academic and UN images and notions, and ultimately policy.

In the conclusion, all information from the previous chapters is summarised to provide a comprehensive answer to the question to what extent images and notions influenced policy effects. In assessing this correlation, a development in UN policy regarding Haiti is visible, which helps understand why no substantive change is achieved after almost ten years non-stop involvement. Therefore, the findings of this thesis are relevant for both academics and policy makers.

To answer the questions posed in the thesis, information was gathered through desk-top research. The primary sources used are academic books and articles, news reports, articles from non-academic magazines and UN documents such as resolutions, reports and press releases.
Chapter 1
Social Constructivism and the concept of failed state

This first chapter elaborates on the theoretical framework of the thesis: social constructivism and the concept of failed state. In particular, the fact that in International Relations, interests are not fixed and actors have the power to bring change, is emphasized. Then the concept ‘failed state’ is discussed to provide a framework for the following chapters. In this framework, different approaches towards the concept of failed state are categorized. Because the annually published Failed States Index made the concept more well-known, this is discussed first. After that, the origin, different definitions and the definition of ‘failed state’ which is applied in this thesis are presented. To conclude, possible solutions for failed states and criticism on the concept are analysed.

Remarks regarding the use of terms
To avoid misunderstandings, some terms used in the chapter are clarified. First of all, in the literature ‘constructivism’ both with and without the addition ‘social’ is used. In this thesis the formula including ‘social’ is applied, to stress the fact that the theory implies that reality is socially constructed.

Secondly, the terms ‘agents’ and ‘structures’ are frequently used in literature on social constructivism. The term ‘agent’ can however be replaced by ‘actor,’ to refer to persons or entities who participate in international relations. In this thesis, the term ‘actor’ is used in favour of ‘agent,’ because it is a more common term. The actors discussed in this thesis are on the one hand academics and on the other hand the UN.

Structures, in short, can be described as the environment in which actors operate. In literature, structures are often referred to as norms and institutions. However, it seems more accurate, certainly while discussing social constructivism, to consider structures more broadly and to distinguish two kinds: material and ideational or normative structures. This is a distinction often made in literature as well. The first kind is formed of material objects such as rocks, buildings, cars or weapons. The second kind is non-material, such as sovereignty and human

3 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Constructivism’ in Burchill et al., Theories of international relations (Hampshire and New York 2009), 220.
Images and notions of a certain country, such as the perception that a country is a failed state, are also normative structures. In short, structures are material or non-material facts with which actors deal in international relations. The non-material, normative structures such as sovereignty or failed state, are created by actors themselves since they only exist because of the shared understanding about their definitions.

1.1 Social constructivism

Social constructivism is concerned with understanding how actors operate instead of with making concrete claims or hypotheses about world politics. It is chosen for this thesis since it claims that reality is not an independent, pre-given environment, and interests are subject to change. The learning cycle which this thesis aims to uncover, shows this changing nature of interests and reality. This claim is contrary to traditional, rationalist theories of International Relations.

Also, social constructivists find it impossible to uncover who is right or what is the truth, since opinions are formed through normative structures: the truth only exists in how reality is perceived. For social constructivists it is more interesting to study processes of how normative structures influence perceptions of the truth than to try to find the truth itself. It is therefore that they prefer to call social constructivism an analytical framework, and not a theory. This thesis also aims to uncover how perceptions influenced ‘the truth’ by investigating how two actors, academics and the UN, created images and notions (normative structures) of Haiti and what the consequences were for Haiti.

1.2 The concept of ‘failed state’

In 1992, Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner published the article Saving failed states in Foreign Policy, introducing the concept in International Relations. They described failed states as countries that are no longer able to sustain themselves as a member of the international community. They have common characteristics such as civil strife, government breakdown,

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5 Idem, 162.
6 Reus-Smit, ‘Constructivism,’ 226.
7 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States’, Foreign Policy (89), 1992, 3-20.
8 Idem, 3.
economic privation, and refugee flows. The countries they considered to be failed states at that time were: Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia and Cambodia.\(^9\)

Not long after that first publication, the concept was picked up by William Zartman and Jean-Germain Gros (although Zartman preferred the term ‘collapsed state’).\(^10\) It took a while before it became more widely known and accepted, both in the academic world and with policy makers. Nevertheless, already in 1994 the ‘State Failure Task Force’ (now called the ‘Political Instability Task Force’) was set up by the US government to investigate the vulnerability of states to state failure.\(^11\)

After 9/11, interest in states with little control over their territory increased, since they possibly provide accommodation for terrorists. Failed states then became popular with both policy makers and academics.\(^12\) Rotberg and Kreijen published substantial works on the concept in 2003 and 2004.\(^13\) Since the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy have published the annual Failed States Index, starting in 2005, the term has become more prevalent, not only in academic literature but also in the non-academic press. It is important to note that the concept really started to receive attention at this point: in the first years of the new millennium. This means that in the 1990s, images and notions on Haiti, which will be analysed in the next chapter, approaches towards failed states probably did not yet have a big impact.

Also, since the concept became more well-known, it has become the subject of criticism, like the Index. Because the Index is the source from which most people today know the term failed state, this is analysed first. It gives insight in how the world can be divided in failed, weak, quite stable and very stable states.

\(^9\) Ibidem.
1.2.1 The Failed States Index (FSI)

In the index, states are ranked according to their level of stability. The weakest states are on top, the strongest states are on the bottom.\textsuperscript{14} The ranking is based on different criteria or indicators: social, economic, and political and military.\textsuperscript{15} For example, social indicators are demographic pressures, discrimination or ethnic violence. Economic indicators are amongst others income share, slum populations, government debt, and unemployment rates.\textsuperscript{16} Political and military indicators, to conclude, are for example electoral processes, levels of corruption, functioning of the police and the army, and the compliance with human rights such as press freedom and civil liberties.\textsuperscript{17} States receive points for each indicator: the weaker their performance, the more points they get and the higher they end up on the list.\textsuperscript{18} Consequently, the states with the worst performance overall are on top of the list and the states which perform best are on the bottom. With the index comes a world map, on which the states are marked by different colours.\textsuperscript{19} That map is found in figure 1.1. The Fund for Peace, creator of the FSI, explains the meaning of the colours on its website; however these colours do not match with the map they published. The colours match with the map published by Foreign Policy. Therefore, that map is shown here and used for the following analysis.

Figure 1.2. The interactive map of failed states 2012 ©Foreign Policy.

\textsuperscript{15} The Fund for Peace: indicators of state failure, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=indicators, visited on 5-11-2012.
\textsuperscript{16} Idem.
\textsuperscript{17} Idem.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{19} The Fund for Peace, Colors on index and map (faq), http://ffp.statesindex.org/faq#4, viewed on 20-03-2013.
In the 2012 index, 177 states are included on the list. The first 125 belong to the categories critical (red), in danger (orange) or borderline (yellow) – they have scores of 60 points or more.\textsuperscript{20} Countries that score less than 60 and more than 30 are light green, which means stable. 39 countries are stable in 2012. Countries with 30 points or less, 13 in total, are dark green, which means most stable.\textsuperscript{21}

Looking at the map and the index, it becomes clear that according to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, critical states have in common that they are very poor. Most of them are also subject to conflict, civil strife, high criminality rates, or all. The most stable states on the contrary are very wealthy, have not been subject to conflict for at least several decades and have low criminality rates. It is striking that three states which were labelled as ‘failed’ for the first time by Helman and Ratner in 1992, are in the top ten of the index twenty years later: Somalia, Haiti and Sudan.

The map thus gives an oversight of stable, less stable and unstable countries. However, 33 countries are marked ‘critical,’ which suggests these countries have the same levels of poverty, violence and oppression. This is not the case, which becomes clearer if you look at the index: the fact that Somalia is ranked highest means its situation is worse than Sierra Leone, which is on 31, at the bottom of the category critical. In contrast, in 2005 Sierra Leone was ranked 6\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{22} This shows that, although countries can make significant progress, they can remain in the same category. The same goes for the stable countries: the US and Poland are both in the stable category, but the US is ranked higher in the index (159) than Poland (148), therefore the US is considered to be more stable. From the Foreign Policy map, this is not immediately clear.

Consequently, the Foreign Policy map can give a biased view, suggesting countries with the same colour have the same levels of stability, while within the categories differences do exist. Also, the Foreign Policy map seems to suggest that all red countries are failed states. After all, the map is based on the Failed States Index. As will become clear in the following paragraphs however, only a handful of states in the world can be designated as truly failed. Others may be failing or weak. Therefore, the next question is what exactly the criteria are for a state to be labelled failed.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibidem.
1.2.2 Definitions: the opposite of a ‘successful state’

The Fund for Peace, creator of the FSI, defines state failure in short as follows: ‘the most common attribute of a failing state is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes include the erosion of legitimate authority, the inability to provide reasonable public services and the inability to interact with other states as a member of the international community. States can fail at varying rates over different time periods.’

This is a very broad definition, with many characteristics. It is not clear whether a state must meet all these criteria to be labelled failed or just one. Moreover, the different terms ‘failed state,’ ‘state failure’ and ‘failing state’ are used interchangeable.

‘Failure’ itself implies that something goes wrong: a certain process or task is not completed, or a certain goal is not achieved. Looking at the index, it is clear that a lot goes or has gone wrong in the highest-rated countries – as opposed to the lowest-rated countries where life generally is good. Clearly, failed state then must mean the opposite of a state in which society functions well. In fact, according to some authors, failed states no longer meet the criteria to be a state or never did. This seems strange, because after all failed states still are called ‘states.’ Therefore, here the term ‘successful state’ will be used as the opposite of a failed state. This is borrowed from Rosa Brooks, who does the same. To find out what a failed state is, first must be established how a successful state is defined.

Some authors, such as Kreijen, refer to the classical criteria of statehood as defined in the Montevideo Convention: a population, a territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Others, such as Rotberg and Zartman, describe certain functions a state has to fulfil or political goods it has to provide. These are, in general: security, the rule of law, the insurance of participation in politics of the population, and public goods (infrastructure, health care, education). These are comparable to the indicators on which the FSI is based; however that list is much more detailed. Although most authors chose one of those two groups of

23 Rotberg, State failure and state weakness, 6 and Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, ‘Failed states, or the state as failure?’, The University of Chicago Law Review (72-4), 2005, 1167.
24 Brooks, ‘Failed states, or the state as failure?’, 1160.
25 Kreijen, State failure, 18.
26 Rotberg, State failure and state weakness, 3 and Zartman, Collapsed states, 5.
criteria, some also use both to define a successful state: it needs to meet the classical criteria and must fulfil certain functions.28

The difference between these approaches is that by referring to the classical criteria, it is merely described what a state looks like, and not what tasks it performs as an institution. While providing security is generally viewed as the most basic function of the state, contemporary authors argue that the participation of citizens in politics and public goods such as health care are today also required for states to provide.29

Therefore, it is clear that the definition of a successful state today is best met by the Western welfare state. This is confirmed by the FSI, which ranks those states as the most stable. However, it seems that authors generally want to avoid the conclusion that Western welfare states are the most perfect states – implying that the rest of the world (which forms a majority) does it all wrong – by concluding that the criteria of security and the rule of law are the most important.30 From this follows a more ‘Weberian’ definition of the state: the state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.31

1.2.3 Definition: a state which is unable to provide security to the population

So, authors present their definition of a failed state as a state which lacks capacity or power (Kreijen), a state in which authority has fallen apart (Zartman), a state which is unable to establish an atmosphere of security nation-wide (Rotberg), or an overall breakdown of formal and informal rules governing society, accompanied by the disappearance of formal authority or its emaciation (Gros).32 Giorgetti, finally, describes state failure as follows: it includes not only ineffective government, but affects the bases and entire structure of the state, including its population, territory and capacity to perform international and internal obligations.33

From this can be concluded that according to literature, a failed state is a state in which authorities are unable to provide security to the population or in which no authority exists to do so. The population is basically left to its own devices, since it cannot rely on any government to

30 Rotberg, State failure and state weakness, 3.
32 Kreijen, State failure, 63, Zartman, Collapsed states, 1, Rotberg, State failure and state weakness, 4-5, Gros, ‘Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States’, 457.
33 Giorgetti, A principled approach to state failure, 43-44.
provide security, food, water and health care facilities. In this context, security has to be defined broadly: it does not only mean being free from physical violence, it also means being free from hunger, disease, poverty and oppression. This can also be summarized as the concept of ‘human security’ which was defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994.\(^{34}\) This encompasses security in seven areas: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political.\(^{35}\) Of course, critics argue that this definition is too broad, but looking at how authors and the FSI define successful states versus failed states, all these issues matter in defining how successful a state is.

The fact that the state is responsible to provide human security to its population was formally accepted a little more than a decade ago by the famous ‘responsibility to protect’ principle: when a state can no longer protect its population, the international community (generally in the form of a UN mission) has the right to intervene.\(^{36}\) However, in practice the principle is used very rarely. Also, it does not mean that a state stops being a state. Although the official criteria in international law for statehood are laid down in the Montevideo Convention, according to Kreijen states do not lose their statehood even when they no longer meet those criteria.\(^{37}\) Some failed states do not meet the criteria of government or a permanent population, but do not stop being states for international law.\(^{38}\) This is because once states are created, they cannot be simply uncreated. Moreover, there is no alternative. There are no rules in international law determining what a state becomes when it is no longer a state. According to many authors, this is a major obstacle in solving the problems of failed states, which is explained below.

1.2.4 Failed states never were successful states in the first place

Both Brooks and Kreijen claim that states which are labelled as ‘failed’ have never been successful states in the first place.\(^{39}\) According to Kreijen, referring to the Sub-Saharan countries, this follows from the decolonization process these countries went through. During this process, the main criterion for the new states was not ‘effectiveness,’ to ensure effective government, but

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35 Idem, 24-25.
38 Ibidem.
‘legality:’ to ensure the legal existence of the state.\textsuperscript{40} As a consequence, states were created without capacity or power, which is the essence of state failure according to Kreijen.\textsuperscript{41}

From the above analysis follows that in general, all authors agree that states have to meet certain criteria to be labelled ‘successful.’ Failed states do not meet those criteria. However, there is a difference between authors who use the classical Montevideo criteria, use functions or political goods as criteria, or use both. Also, there are differences between authors who argue that failed states \textit{no longer} meet those criteria and those who state that they \textit{never} were successful states in the first place.

\textit{1.2.5 Failure as a process: levels of failure}

Authors who look at what functions the state fulfils or which political goods it provides, generally use a classification system to categorize states according to their level of failure. They do this because no state is the same in ‘how it fails.’ Also, the state may fail to a small extent at first, but may become more and more failed over time. This is what the Fund for Peace means with ‘states can fail at varying rates over different time periods.’ However, this presents the problem of labelling different countries as ‘failed’ while the circumstances in those countries differ a lot.

One of the first authors who made a classification system was Gros in 1996. In this system, only failed states are represented, not successful ones.\textsuperscript{42} In his 1996 system, he ranges countries from Anarchic, in which no authority is present whatsoever, to Aborted, in which the state failed before the process of state formation was completed. In the categories in between, some authority is present in the state, but it is unable to control the whole territory and to provide political goods for the whole population.\textsuperscript{43}

Recently, Gros made adjustments to this system.\textsuperscript{44} While remaining loyal to his earlier definitions, he now defines four types of failed states and distinguishes two primary state functions: keep internal order and protect the territory from external aggression.\textsuperscript{45} Type 1 equals a collapsed state (the former ‘Anarchic’) and cannot fulfil either of the functions. The only

\textsuperscript{40} Kreijen, \textit{State failure}, 7.

\textsuperscript{41} Idem.

\textsuperscript{42} Gros, ‘Towards a Taxonomy of Failed states’, 458-461.

\textsuperscript{43} Idem.

\textsuperscript{44} Jean-Germain Gros, \textit{State failure, underdevelopment and foreign intervention in Haiti} (New York 2012), 19.

\textsuperscript{45} Idem.
example at the time of writing, in 2012 was Somalia. Type 2 does not protect against internal disorder, but does protect against external aggression. North Korea falls in this category, as did the former Soviet Union in the last ten years of its existence. Type 3 does not protect against external aggression but does protect against internal unrest. The true ‘raison d’être’ of the army in these states is repression of the population. Haiti during the Duvalier regime (1957-1986) is an example. The last type 4, is a ‘flowing’ type of failure: the state cannot protect against external aggression or against internal unrest, but this is not complete or permanent. The level of failure also differs physically: typically, states have more power in the centre of the country than in the periphery. According to Gros, most failed states fall in this last category: they cannot fulfil all functions and have lost control in parts of the territory, but maintain it in some areas.

Rotberg also categorized states to their level of failure, or their level of stability; since states that are considered successful are also included, just like in the FSI. The first category is composed of ‘strong states,’ which fulfil all political functions: the provision of security, the rule of law, participation in politics, and the provision of public goods. The second category are ‘weak states’, which fulfil some of the functions, but not all. Failed states are the third category; they fulfil none of the functions. Rotberg’s fourth category, the most extreme form of a failed state, is similar to Gros’ system: the collapsed state, where a total vacuum of authority exists.

1.3 Solutions for failed states

Ultimately all authors end up with the question: how to ‘fix’ failed states? How to make them successful (again)? Most countries labelled as failed, such as Somalia, Congo and Haiti, have known problems for a long time or even throughout their whole history. Kreijen and Brooks argue that they essentially always were failed states. In answering the question how to make failed states successful, the problem is again that no two states are the same, and that a solution therefore depends on a country’s specific problems. In the last twenty years, the first response from the international community to imminent crises in failed states was to provide humanitarian aid to refugees. This is done both by governmental and non-governmental organizations. At the
same time, negotiations at the political level are started to find a solution to the conflict or political impasse. Once a peace agreement is reached, in more and more cases the UN send a mission to help guard the stability in the country. States, the UN, the EU, NATO and countless non-governmental organizations invest in security and development projects to try to get society functioning again. However, change is always slow and real success is rare. Post-conflict societies are highly vulnerable to fall back into conflict.\textsuperscript{53} Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Congo and Haiti all are examples. At this moment, some optimism is in place for Liberia and Sierra Leone: today they are ranked 25\textsuperscript{th} and 31\textsuperscript{st} in the FSI, therefore they remain critical, but in 2005 they were both ranked in the top ten.\textsuperscript{54} After years of devastating conflict with no government able to control the territory, both states now have governments, and conflict has not re-occurred since peace was achieved. They still have a long way to go, but they might become two success stories of failed states which managed to become successful.

Unfortunately, many countries do fall back after periods of relative stability and do not seem able to break the cycle of underdevelopment, misgovernment, poverty and violence. Not even with assistance from the international community. Somalia, Haiti, Congo and Sudan all are examples.

Looking at the literature, authors are generally quite sceptical about finding a lasting solution for failed states, since the track record is so poor. They have their own ideas of what should be done which are now presented and discussed.

1.3.1 UN conservator- or trusteeship

The first and most discussed strategy is intervention, military if necessary, to stop conflicts and restore stability, after which the country is placed under \textit{UN conservator- or trusteeship}. This means that it temporarily hands over its sovereignty, either partial or completely, and is governed by the UN until it is able to govern itself again. Helman and Ratner already proposed this in 1992 when they introduced the concept of failed states, comparing failed states with companies that go bankrupt, financially broken families or mentally or physically ill persons.\textsuperscript{55} In those cases, a

\textsuperscript{55} Helman and Ratner, ‘Saving failed states’, 12.
guardian is appointed to look out for the best interests of the person or entity. They suggested the same should be done for states who are no longer able to govern themselves.\textsuperscript{56}

Rotberg proposes a similar construction, but calls it \textit{international interim administration}. He praises the efforts made to rebuild Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo and argues that they are proof that with sufficient political will and targeted external assistance, failed states can be saved.\textsuperscript{57} However, in these cases the international community was too eager to leave too soon, so the attempts were only partially successful. Therefore he pleads for a more long-term commitment.\textsuperscript{58}

Kreijen, although sceptical whether this eventually will succeed, also thinks trusteeship is the best option failed states have.\textsuperscript{59} He argues that humanitarian intervention is no viable option since it does not address the root cause of state failure: a lack of capacity.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, other options such as allowing secession or just letting the conflict rage out will work out badly for neighbouring countries and will only create more chaos.\textsuperscript{61}

Therefore, for Kreijen reviving the UN trusteeship system for failed states remains as the only possible solution, if it would be legitimately established.\textsuperscript{62} Nevertheless, he still is not convinced that it would work: problems first faced by colonizers and after decolonization by development assistants, will not have disappeared.\textsuperscript{63} Apart from this, it must be established who should decide when a state is failed and thus should be placed under trusteeship. Similarly, someone should decide when a state is ready for independence again.\textsuperscript{64} Furthermore, there are several legal obstacles to a trusteeship as well, primarily the fact that under current international law, the consent of a state is required.\textsuperscript{65} In practice, it is not possible to get consent from a state that has no functioning government. Kreijen therefore suggests that the possibility to withdraw the recognition of a state (thus rendering it of its statehood), would be a solution that should be considered.\textsuperscript{66} In short, the principle of sovereignty as it is currently accepted, stands in the way

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Idem.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Rotberg, ‘Failed states in a time of terror’, 137.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Idem.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Kreijen, \textit{State failure}, 287-288.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Idem, 294-300.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Idem.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Idem, 302.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Idem, 317-318.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Idem, 318.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Idem, 319.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibidem, 322-324.
\end{itemize}
of applying trusteeships. Kreijen makes a good case for changing this principle so that state failure can be better addressed. In the near future however, it is very unlikely that this will be accepted in international law. Also, questions regarding who decides to render a state from its statehood and to return it, remain. This also goes for the strategies Helman and Ratner and Rotberg propose. Moreover, it is very likely that this will lead to unrest in discussions about borders and independence or self-determination of certain people such as the Kurds or the Basks. Once certain states are temporarily stripped from their sovereignty, the whole international system as we know it will come under dispute.

Giorgetti, then, also proposes a form of UN assistance if a state is no longer able to perform its functions. First she argues that the international community has acted on behalf of states before (protectorates, occupied territories, mandates and interim administrations), therefore a framework exists for dealing with obligations that cannot be performed by a state because of turmoil or other crises. However, she fails to explain her solution beyond the intervention, which is the most important phase for a failed state. Questions regarding what should happen when the immediate emergency is addressed are not answered.

1.3.2 Local ownership

Another, relatively new strategy in (re)building states is called local ownership. With this strategy it becomes clearer of how to transfer words into action. It focuses on how to implement policies that will be sustained. The key is formed by local actors: they have to be at the core of the policy. As Nathan, who wrote about local ownership in the security sector, puts it: ‘reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained.’ The complete definition she employs is that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local rather than external actors. Of course, this also applies to other sectors than only security. In practice, local ownership requires a mind shift from donor organizations or countries. Instead of thinking how to implement certain strategies in a certain country, they should think how they

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67 Giorgetti, A principled approach to state failure, 8.
68 Laurie Nathan, No ownership, no commitment: a guide to local ownership of security sector reform (Birmingham 2007), 3.
69 Idem, 4.
can support local actors who want to implement those strategies in that country. At the same time, even when applying local ownership, difficulties such as the complexity of reform, a lack of capacity in the country as well as resistance to change, instability and insecurity all have to be overcome.

From the work of Nathan, it can be concluded that after intervention, donors have to actively involve local communities in their projects. This is both for efficacy and legitimacy reasons. People who bring about change themselves, are more willing to invest in it then when they have to wait for others to bring the change. The reforms also are more legitimate in the eyes of the population when they are made by local actors instead of strangers. From a number of case studies in Nathan’s work, it becomes clear that this strategy seems to work. However, on a large scale, the international community still prefers the ‘liberal peace’ model in which policy is imposed upon countries from outside. This is both easier and more effective in the short term: in a country shattered by enduring conflict and with almost no human and financial capital, it is difficult to find local actors who are capable of performing state building tasks in a responsible way. The delicate balance between actors from outside who bring change and local actors who have to get involved, will therefore always remain a challenge.

1.3.3 Institution building
Ghani and Lockhart present in their work ‘a framework for rebuilding a fractured world.’ Their core argument is that rebuilding strong states that can perform the essential functions such as the rule of law, monopoly on violence, sound management of finances, social policies and providing infrastructure must be the ultimate goal to create stability and peace worldwide. In post-conflict countries, the intention to (re)build all these things is present in initial peace agreements. However, implementation almost always fails because policies are designed to fast solutions, instead of addressing the fundamental problems which requires a more long term approach. Ghani and Lockhart therefore propose to focus on state institution building, a so-called ‘sovereignty strategy.’ A referee, formed by the UN, must oversee this long-term process. They

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70 Idem.
71 Ibidem, 34-36.
74 Idem, 105.
75 Idem, 169-171.
suggest that the EU accession process, in which intensive monitoring missions take place to assess progress in the adoption and implementation of new rules, forms a good example of how to operate as referee.\textsuperscript{76} In their text they use a lot of terms such as sovereignty strategy, national programme, rules of the game, critical tasks and sound management systems, but it does not become clear what this strategy entails in practice. It is not clear how their strategy can be realized in a country with a shattered economy, a tired and impatient population and no financial or human capital. These difficulties can be addressed by applying the local ownership approach, to give the local population the sense that they are in control of rebuilding their country. However, it is not guaranteed that this will have positive outcomes, certainly not immediately, as was explained in the previous paragraph.

Jean Germain-Gros basically favours a combination of institutional reform and local ownership.\textsuperscript{77} He says that the international community cannot remake failed states in their entirety, but it can help build institutional capacity in some areas crucial to development. Institutions that can be most easily transferred should be addressed first.\textsuperscript{78} Then, confidence rises that reforming other, more difficult institutions is also possible. He refers to the four areas of institutional capacity identified by Francis Fukuyama: organizational design and management, institutional design, basis of legitimation, and social and cultural factors.\textsuperscript{79} These are lined up along a continuum ranging from high to low transferability. The more technical the tasks that need to be performed in an area, the easier they are transferred.\textsuperscript{80} In the area of organizational design, tasks are highly technical, for example in sanitation, electricity, roads, taxation, policing, banks and justice. The next category is less technical; institutional design entails constitutions, politics and governance.\textsuperscript{81} These can be designed with the help of external actors, but cannot be sustained without local ownership; therefore the active involvement of local actors is crucial.\textsuperscript{82} Legitimacy, then, has medium to low transferability since it is highly contextual: legitimacy has to be formed by habits and mores. It entails bureaucracy, tradition, market, democracy, economy.\textsuperscript{83} This cannot be implemented from outside: it comes from the people who live with it.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibidem, 183.
\textsuperscript{77} Gros, \textit{State failure}, 188.
\textsuperscript{78} Idem.
\textsuperscript{79} Idem, 188-189.
\textsuperscript{80} Idem, 189-190.
\textsuperscript{81} Idem.
\textsuperscript{82} Idem, 190.
\textsuperscript{83} Idem, 189-191.
However, external actors can help in evaluating models and demonstrate the consequences of political choices.\footnote{Idem.} To conclude, social and cultural factors have a low transferability: they include norms, values and mores and are impossible to be imposed from the outside. Moreover, external actors lack the knowledge and the patience to affect institutional change at this level.\footnote{Idem, 189 and 191-192.} Often in failed states, this is the biggest problem: local actors have to take the lead in the reforms on this level, but they, especially elites, are often reluctant because they benefit from the status quo.\footnote{Ibidem, 192.}

1.4.5 Alternatives to (re)building the state

All previous discussed strategies have the ultimate goal of (re)building the independent nation-state. According to Brooks, it might be necessary to consider other alternatives, simply because the state as a form of social organization is no longer adaptive for these countries, or it never was.\footnote{Brooks, ‘Failed states, or the state as failure?’, 1184.} In that case, it does not make sense to try to bring something back to a situation that did not work in the first place. Brooks argues that not every society needs to be part of a sovereign state. Other governance structures might work too, and possibly even better. Moreover, the current strategy of quick intervening and rebuilding (she wrote in 2005) only creates pseudo states, after which legal sovereignty is handed over as quickly as possible. This might do more harm than developing alternatives to statehood.\footnote{Ibidem, 1185.} She proposes different alternatives. The first is permanent UN administration, which is quite radical and would mean that a country would remain governed by an external institution forever. Affiliation with a willing third party state is second, which seems more feasible, but still entails practical and legal obstacles. The third is special status within a regional organization, which does not seem practical as it might lead to problems in terms of equality with other members of the organization. It is unclear which rights a non-state will possess vis-à-vis members that are states. Brook’s intention to think outside the box is good. From a social constructivist perspective, one can agree that one day it might be possible that other forms of social organizations besides states will be employed. Again, however, in the near future this is not likely. Today, it is hard to imagine that a society is willing...
to operate under another form than the nation-state, as well whether this is performable in practice considering legal obstacles.

1.5 Criticism

Although the concept of failed state is now widely used in international relations and discussions about solutions are among the most imminent questions of our time, there is also criticism on the concept and on the FSI.

1.5.1 Criticism on the concept itself

Criticism on the concept is mainly about the meaning of ‘failed.’ It does imply a certain finality: failed means a completed process. However, as stated above, the degree or level of failure is very different among countries and differs over time. Haiti for example was another kind of failed state during the Duvalier dictatorship than it is now.\(^8^9\) This will be explained in more detail in the next chapter. Also, the term raises questions like whether ‘failed’ implies that there is a possibility for recovery, or not. Clare Leigh thinks it does not: “‘failed’ means a binary division between those countries that are salvageable and those beyond redemption. It is a word reserved for marriages and exams. It does not belong in a pragmatic debate.”\(^9^0\)

Therefore, Leigh instead advocates the term ‘state fragility’ and an approach that focuses on policy solutions rather than problems.\(^9^1\) In that approach, a country’s current and past performance would be compared, to be able to see progress or deterioration. That way, she hopes, states can act on challenges which are specific to their context.\(^9^2\)

Beehner and Young also argue that the division between failed and not failed is a false one since states are more complex than that. They suggest that ‘state capabilities continuum’ would therefore be a better name.\(^9^3\)

All of the above criticism is legitimate. The biggest problem of the concept failed state itself is the fact that it is one term that designates a lot of different countries with different problems, populations and histories. They share characteristics, yet are not the same. It is very

\(^8^9\) Gros, State failure, 20.
\(^9^1\) Idem.
\(^9^2\) Ibidem.
\(^9^3\) Beehner and Young, The Failure of the Failed States Index, Blog in World Policy.
difficult to establish when a state can truly be designated as ‘failed,’ ‘failing’ or when ‘failed’ is too strong and ‘weak,’ ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘politically unstable’ are more accurate descriptions. For this thesis, the criterion of a government which is able to provide its population with human security, is the most important. A state’s population must be able to rely on its government for physical security, housing, food, water and access to health care. If a state is not able to deliver this to its population in a large scale, the state is considered failed. The ability to deliver the services varies over time and space. In states that are considered failed, the government generally has a stronger presence in the centre of the country than in the periphery.

1.5.2 Criticism on the Failed States Index
The FSI, then, only designates which countries perform well or badly, and offers no solutions. Progress or deterioration are not visible. Claire Leigh therefore finds it useless.\(^{94}\) While it is true that in the FSI itself, progress or deterioration are not displayed, you can compare FSI’s from several years. Moreover, the Fund for Peace always highlights the most-improved country and the most-worsened country. It also published an article with trends between 2005 and 2012 with the last FSI. So, although it is true that the FSI only highlights problems and not solutions, it is not true that it does not show development. Leigh also states that the annual publishing of the index does not help improving the situation in the high-rated countries, since the negative message scares off would-be investors and tourists – not to mention undermines confidence of citizens in their country’s ability to transform itself.\(^ {95}\) Although this argument holds, the question remains whether the FSI should not be published for that reason, since it also has an informative and instructive role. As argued below, the index does provide a lot of useful information.

Other criticism is aimed at the fact that the Index is based on a lot of indicators: twelve in total, with several sub-indicators. This raises questions like whether it is necessary to look at group grievance or electoral processes to determine whether a state is failed. Electoral processes say something about the level of democracy in a country, not whether the government delivers the basic functions – unless participation in politics by the population is considered a basic function, like some authors do. Eventually, it all comes down to defining what a state must do to

\(^{94}\)Idem.
\(^{95}\)Ibidem.
be successful. As showed above, the more criteria are added to this list, the bigger the list of failed states gets.

According to Gros, who looked at the 2009 index, there are patterns to be discovered in the index which are interesting for policy makers and academics. The first is that all countries in the red zone are in Africa or Asia, Haiti being the only exception.\footnote{Gros, State failure, 34.} So, failed states are highly concentrated geographically. Also, almost every country in the red zone was a colony of Europe and acquired independence in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\footnote{Idem.} The only exceptions are again Haiti, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and former Soviet states such as Uzbekistan. Thirdly, twenty-five of these countries implemented structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s, which according to Gros did more harm than good to their economies.\footnote{Ibidem.} So, the index is not useless to draw conclusions from, and can be helpful in thinking about policies towards these states.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the different approaches towards failed states and discussed the history of the concept. It was concluded that a failed state is the opposite of a successful state, which is defined in different ways by authors. From this, a definition of a failed state was derived: a state that is unable to provide security to its population. However, it became clear that state failure is not a fixed or permanent situation, it occurs on different levels and differs over time and space. Now, a framework can be formed of the different approaches towards failed states and the different approaches towards solutions for failed states.

Based on the literature, three distinctions in approaches towards failed states can be made:

- a. To define a successful state: classical criteria \textit{versus} functions or political goods, or both
- b. To define a failed state: it is no longer successful \textit{versus} it never was successful

\footnote{Gros, State failure, 34.} \footnote{Idem.} \footnote{Ibidem.}
c. To define levels of state failure: categorizing states that are not considered successful versus categorizing all states, including the ones that are considered successful

Similarly, four distinctions can be made in approaches towards solutions. All approaches have in common that they advocate some form of intervention of the international community in the failed state. They differ in what should happen after the intervention.

i. The state should come under conservator- or trusteeship or an international interim administration, and relinquish, either partially or totally, its sovereignty

ii. Donors, i.e. states and organizations, should help rebuilding the state with a local ownership approach; which means supporting local actors who design and implement rebuilding strategies, as opposed to an approach in which external actors do the design and implementation

iii. After intervention, emphasis must be put on institution building which entails amongst others the rule of law, monopoly on violence and sound management of finance

iv. Alternatives to (re)building a sovereign state should be considered, such as permanent UN administration, affiliation with a willing third party state or special status within a regional organization

These different approaches are images and notions of the definition of a failed state and of solutions for failed states. In short, they are normative structures, just like sovereignty or human rights, as explained in the first part of this chapter. Therefore, these approaches are part of the ‘learning cycle’ which was presented in the introduction of this thesis. This learning cycle presupposes a correlation between academics, UN and the effects of UN policy. Since the main question of this thesis is to what extent images and notions influenced UN policy effects, images and notions on solutions have to be incorporated. All put together, the learning cycle looks as follows:
The blue arrows represent the feedback that flows back to both the UN and to academics once policy is carried out and effects are visible. In the next chapters, it is analysed how this learning cycle was visible in the case of Haiti and to what extent a correlation exists with policy effects. The analysis starts in 1980, to be able to analyse the UN policy before the term ‘failed state’ existed. However, since the term did not exist yet, academic images and notions in the early period may not match entirely with the different categories of failed states (a,b,c) and of solutions (i, ii, iii, iv) as presented above. Therefore it is interesting what images and notions did exist of Haiti at the time; since it already was a failed state according to the definition.
Chapter 2
Images and notions on Haiti, 1980-2000

Haiti, the tiny Caribbean nation that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic is a unique case: not only is it the only state considered failed in the Western Hemisphere, it was one of the first colonized countries to acquire independence in 1804 after slave rebellion, becoming the first free black republic. Also, few states have known as many UN missions as Haiti: the UN deployed different missions from 1994 till 2000, and again from 2004 until today.

In this chapter, the question *what were the images and notions on Haiti from 1980 to 2000, and what were the consequences?* is central. By analysing texts on Haiti of academic writers and the UN it shows how images and notions have developed over the years. The learning cycle became visible after the end of the Cold War. Also, approaches towards Haiti are compared with approaches towards failed states as discussed in the previous chapter. To be able to place the events from 1980 on in perspective, a short historical overview of Haiti is given first.

2.1 Haiti’s history sowed the seeds for its current misery

Haiti has a remarkable, turbulent and above all, very sad history. Since its independence it is entrapped in a cycle of poverty and misgovernment. According to Jean-Germain Gros, who is from Haitian descent, the causes for Haiti’s state failure lie in its colonial history, its geography and the rapid population growth it experienced from the 19th century on. The colonial history influenced multiple facets: the way the Haitian state was and is organized, the composition of its population and the (dis)functioning of society. For a detailed account of Haiti’s history is referred to Gros’ most recent work: *State failure, underdevelopment and foreign intervention in Haiti (2012)*. Here, a summary is given. Historical facts in section 2.1 come from this work unless otherwise indicated.

First of all, the Haitian state never developed as a single political unit since it was divided in three regions which were ruled as separate parts during the colonial time. Society was made up of plantations in which slaves were tied to their masters – resembling the relationship between serfs en lords in medieval Europe. Integration between the parts did not take place, since steep mountains increased the costs of infrastructure.

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99 Keith Crane et al., *Building a more resilient Haitian state* (Santa Monica 2010), 9.
100 Gros, *State failure*, xiv.
Secondly, Haiti does not have a homogenous population since slave owners preferred slaves who could not communicate with each other, and therefore brought slaves from different parts of Africa to Haiti. Most of Haiti’s population descends from those slaves. A small part was born outside of Africa; Creoles, an influential population of free blacks in the north who felt superior over the slaves.

Thirdly, elite division is characteristic to Haiti’s society, also inherited from the colonial era. There was division among whites (plantation owners, merchants, crown bureaucrats), whites and ‘mulatto’s’ (people born from a black and a white parent) and black people (slaves and Creoles). This made colonial Haiti a highly polarized society. According to Gros, a society is characterised by common values, norms and believes and has an elite which is, although self-interested, committed to the advancement of the commonwealth. This was not present in Haiti and did not develop since it was a commercial, and not a settler colony. The goal was fast and easy trade, not the creation of a new society.

2.1.1 From independence to predatory state
Once independent in 1804, after a bloody slave rebellion, Haiti’s economy was shattered as it had to pay compensations to France for lost properties during the conflict. Also, the newly independent state became isolated: since the French, British and the Americans wanted to protect slavery, either at home or in their colonies. Without any contact with modern states, the pre-modern institutions in Haiti were consolidated and the country remained poor. Politics was about the pursuit of power, not about the development of society and became exclusive for the Creole elite. In the 19th century, rapid population growth in combination with slow economic growth caused social strains, which lead to political instability.

In the following period, Haiti was occupied by the United States from 1915 to 1934 to prevent European powers from gaining influence in the area. This intervention changed nothing in Haiti’s social or political culture. After a turbulent period in which several governments succeeded each other in a short time, flawed elections produced a new president in 1957: François Duvalier, nicknamed ‘Papa Doc.’ A few years later he declared himself ‘president-for-life’ and established a hereditary dictatorship for his family. He also set up a brutal paramilitary force, called the ‘Tontons Macoutes’ (Creole for ‘bogeymen’). Duvaliers system of terror is

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101 Crane et al., Building a more resilient Haitian state, 9.
therefore also known as *Macoutisme*.\textsuperscript{102} When he died in 1971, he was succeeded by his son Jean-Claude (‘Baby Doc’).

In the Duvalier period, Haiti is commonly marked as a ‘predatory state:’ a despotic structure of power that preys on its citizens without giving much in return; which has a total lack of accountability that suppresses even the murmurs of democracy.\textsuperscript{103} In practice this meant that the ruling elite of *Duvalierists* violently oppressed the population which lived in abject poverty.

History shows, therefore, that the Haitian population never knew a state that provided them with human security. Nor did they ever know democracy, a just police and judiciary system or institutions that protect citizen's rights. It can therefore be concluded that after independence, Haiti never was a successful state, corresponding to the definitions of failed states of Brooks and Kreijen.

By 1980, Haiti possessed many characteristics of what from the 1990s on would determine the image of failed states: high levels of poverty, violence and large refugee flows. Over 20,000 refugees were intercepted from the sea by the United States and repatriated without screening between 1981 and 1989, due to an agreement between the US and the Duvaliers because of their pretended anti-communist stand.\textsuperscript{104}

2.2 Images and notions 1980-1994

Now, images and notions on Haiti created by both academic writers and the UN are examined. Starting point is 1980, to discover images and notions in the period leading up to the moment that Baby Doc was ousted in 1986. Since the UN Security Council did not publish any resolution on Haiti in this period, General Assembly resolutions are used.

2.2.1 Images and notions between 1980 and 1986

Academic writers described the situation in Haiti in the early 1980's as follows: ‘intolerable political repression and poverty,’ ‘miserable both politically and economically,’ ‘one of the poorest nations in the world. Most public utilities are absent for all but a very small segment of

\textsuperscript{102} Robert Fatton Jr., *Haiti’s predatory republic: the unending transition to democracy* (Colorado and London 2002), 45.

\textsuperscript{103} Idem. 27.

\textsuperscript{104} Kate Doyle, ‘Hollow diplomacy in Haiti’, *World Policy Journal* (11-1), 1994, 50.
the population.' The image of Haiti thus was a malfunctioning economy (poverty) and a malicious and anti-social state (repression, absence of public utilities) as a result of which the population suffered. In other words, there was criticism on and concern about both the economic and the political situation.

The United Nations General Assembly announced in 1981 that Haiti would be part of a New Programme for the Least Developed Countries, and in 1984 that Haiti would receive more economic assistance because of its economic and financial difficulties. In the resolutions, nothing was written about the political or human rights situation in Haiti. Therefore, the image of Haiti in these resolutions was a country with a malfunctioning economy (least developed country, economic and financial difficulties) as a result of which the population suffered.

So, in this period the academic and the UN images were very different; the academic authors expressed concern on both the political and economic situation, while the UN only focused on the economic situation. The UN policy towards Haiti was also solely economic, in the form of financial assistance. In this period, Haiti became part of the IMF's and World Bank's structural adjustment programme, meant to help poor countries to attain economic growth. However, funds that could have helped Haiti's economy to advance, was used to enrich the Duvalierist elite. Haiti's economic situation during the 1980s even worsened as it fell further behind other low income countries in Asia and Africa. A large part of the population depended on non-governmental organizations which had implemented feeding stations throughout the country. Clearly, UN policies did not have the desired effects. According to the learning cycle model, the cycle was not completed since academic images and notions on the political situation in Haiti were not incorporated in the UN’s images and notions.

In 1986, unrest and demonstrations spread; the army no longer supported Baby Doc and saw opportunities to control politics without him. Eventually, the president-for-life had to flee

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108 Idem.


110 Fatton Jr., Haiti's predatory republic, 61-63
and went into exile in France.\(^{111}\) In the winter of 1986-1987, Maingot describes Haiti as a ‘soft state,’ which has a ‘generalized natural condition of corruption and indiscipline’ and in which ‘the very fibre of the society is corroded.’\(^{112}\) The academic image of Haiti now changed to a country in which *something fundamental was wrong with both state and society*.

The UN General Assembly, however, adopted another resolution in December 1986 calling on assistance to Haiti because of its ‘special economic and financial difficulties.’\(^{113}\) Again, there was no word about human rights violations or unrest in the country, although Baby Doc had already fled the country in February of the same year.\(^{114}\) Haiti still was portrayed by the UN resolution as a very poor country that needed financial help, without mentioning the political situation – although this situation had changed dramatically and was very volatile. Also, despite the fact that UN financial and economic policy did not have the desired effects, this was maintained. So, it can be concluded that both academic notions and feedback from policy effects were not incorporated in the UN’s images and notions, therefore the learning cycle was not visible.

### 2.2.2 Images and notions between 1987 and 1992

After Duvalier’s departure, a military junta (which existed of *Duvalierists*) became Haiti’s transitional government. It organised election, but brutally disrupted them together with Tonton Macoutes by shooting defenceless citizens who had lined up to cast their vote.\(^{115}\) The elections were aborted, after which army general Namphy (re)gained power. The UN did not issue any resolution after this bloody event.

By this time, Rotberg wrote that Haiti was ‘the sick man of the hemisphere’ without ‘a viable political culture’ in which ‘misery, misgovernment and bankruptcy’ prevailed. He argued that Haiti needed help, in the first place from the United States and its allies.\(^{116}\) Charles and Low wrote that the country was in a state of conflict since February 1986.\(^{117}\) Lundahl, in 1989, wrote

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\(^{111}\) Idem, 64.


\(^{114}\) Fatton Jr., *Haiti’s predatory republic*, 64.

\(^{115}\) Idem, 66-68.


\(^{117}\) Gérard Pierre Charles and Margaret Low, ‘The democratic revolution in Haiti’, *Latin American Perspectives* (15-3), 1988, 64.

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that Haiti had an autocratic equilibrium with hysteresis-like characteristics – which means that this equilibrium is self-preserving.\textsuperscript{118} Finally, Armand wrote that political institutions in Haiti were non-existent.\textsuperscript{119} Academics in this period thus described Haiti more and more in terms of what would become known as a failed state, while the UN did not issue any resolution. The discrepancy still was very big.

General Namphy used very violent repression, in fact so violent that even the army did not tolerate this for long.\textsuperscript{120} After the resignation of another general, political organizations eventually chose a female judge to be provisional president until new elections were held.\textsuperscript{121} In 1990 for the first time a president was elected democratically: the former Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide.\textsuperscript{122} His calls for sharing wealth and opportunities more equally made him loved by the poor majority but hated by the elite. The poor masses were unorganized and could not prevent that in September 1991, Aristide was overthrown in a coup led by army general Raoul Cédras, and forced into exile.\textsuperscript{123} This caused a big increase in the number of refugees. The US repatriation policy, halted after the coup, quickly resumed in November 1991 when tens of thousands Haitians fled to the US.\textsuperscript{124}

After this coup, the United Nations approach changed radically. Instead of remaining silent, it adopted resolutions in which it condemned the coup and the human rights violations, and demanded the restoration of the legitimate government.\textsuperscript{125} The General Assembly described the events in Haiti as “grave,” expressed concern about the “mass exodus” of Haitian nationals, “strongly condemned” the overthrow of the elected president and the “flagrant human rights violations” committed under the “illegal government.”\textsuperscript{126} For the first time, the human rights situation and the political situation were included by the UN. At the same time, academics in

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Lundahl} Mats Lundahl, ‘History as an obstacle to change: the case of Haiti’, \textit{The Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs} (31-1/2), 1989, 16.
\bibitem{Fatton} Fatton Jr., \textit{Haiti’s predatory republic}, 69.
\bibitem{Idem} Idem.
\bibitem{Gros} Gros, \textit{State failure}, 142.
\bibitem{Fatton2} Fatton Jr., \textit{Haiti’s predatory republic}, 83-89.
\bibitem{Doyle} Doyle, ‘Hollow Diplomacy in Haiti’, 50.
\bibitem{HumanRights} United Nations, \textit{General Assembly Resolution 46/138}.
\end{thebibliography}
1992 described the situation in Haiti as “political chaos, socioeconomic dislocation, violent reprisal and mass exodus.” Therefore, for the first time the images of academics and of the UN were similar. Part of the learning cycle thus became visible.

It is remarkable that the UN condemned this coup very firmly, while it remained silent about the fact that the country was ruled by a non-elected leader for decades, and about all the other coups that took place in the years before 1990. As stated before, this must be related to the end of the Cold War, which took place exactly around the same time. The UN no longer was restrained by the power division between East and West. Moreover, the end of the Cold War was accompanied by a sense of victory over undemocratic regimes. A democratically elected president was overthrown in Haiti, and in the context of the ending Cold War, the international community could not remain silent. A similar development was visible in Somalia, where in the late 1980s the dictator was ousted after which the UN intervened. Thus, the end of the Cold War had several effects. The international community suddenly responded more firmly to atrocities committed in poor countries, on the one hand because the division between East and West no longer was relevant, on the other hand because of a new notion that democracy would triumph in the end. However, it was precisely the end of the Cold War that caused the acceleration of the falling into anarchy of countries like Somalia and Haiti, since they were kept intact during the Cold War by the superpowers. Although the international community in the early 1990s felt that with active involvement and even military intervention, these countries could be helped, Kaplan already warned that “military intervention can do little to heal the body politic of a land that lacks the basis of a modern political culture.”

Images and notions of academics and UN thus became more similar. At the same time, academics begin to form new criticism on UN policy by warning that military intervention may not bring a lasting solution. That is the beginning of a new learning cycle. On the other hand, it is known that other academics did plead for intervention, as was established in the previous chapter.

Regarding Haiti, the UN was not only firm in words. It also immediately undertook some efforts to end the crisis by appointing a special envoy for Haiti, who would help to find a

129 Idem.
political solution in cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS had already adopted some sanctions against the regime and dispatched a mission to Haiti to negotiate with the armed forces.

2.2.3 1993: sanctions and failed deployment of a peacekeeping mission

In cooperation with the OAS, the UN deployed a civilian mission to Haiti to monitor the human rights situation. But the negotiations about a political solution were unsuccessful, therefore Aristide requested the Security Council to adopt sanctions against the de facto authorities. His call was answered: in June 1993 a resolution was adopted which stated that the situation in Haiti constituted a threat to international peace and security, mainly because of the increasing numbers of Haitians who fled to neighbouring states. It also expressed concern about the humanitarian crisis, the climate of fear of persecution and economic dislocation. Therefore, an arms embargo was established, and all government funds abroad were frozen. These measures would be suspended if the de facto authorities would agree to reinstate the legitimate government.

The language of this resolution was uncommonly firm. It now focused on humanitarian crises, increasing numbers of refugees and the need to restore the legitimate government.

After the implementation of the sanctions, it did not take long before the de facto authorities signed an agreement to resolve the crisis, called the Governors Island Agreement. Shortly after, the Security Council decided to provide assistance to Haiti with a mission: UNMIH (UN Mission in Haiti). Its mandate was to modernize Haiti’s armed forces and to establish, guide and train a new Haitian police force. It would therefore consist of both military and police personnel. Although Haiti’s constitution provides for a police force separate from the army, in practice the army performed both military and police functions. The Security Council

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131 Idem, 1-2.
132 Idem, 3.
134 Idem.
135 Ibidem.
138 Idem.
was concerned about ‘the escalation of politically motivated violence (…) at this time of critical political transition,’ and considered that there was ‘an urgent need to ensure conditions for the full implementation of the Governors Island Agreement.’\textsuperscript{139} Clearly, \textit{promoting the return of peace and stability and restoration of democracy} were now prominent. This corresponds to the general sentiment that undemocratic regimes should be brought down. However, it is remarkable that the UN spoke of ‘the restoration of democracy’ while Haiti has never known democracy in its whole history. In this case, with the restoration of democracy was meant the restoration of the elected government. This shows that Haiti’s problems according to the UN were formed of a political crisis; once the legitimate government was restored, the problem would be solved. In contrast, academics in this period more and more began to highlight that Haiti’s problems were much more complex: they started to deploy the failed state image. Images and notions thus became different again.

Once the prime minister had resumed office, the Security Council lifted the embargo and released the funds, but emphasized that the measures would be re-implemented if the Agreement was violated.\textsuperscript{140}

By intervening, the UN did what most academics consider necessary for failed states. However, it did not adopt any of the solutions from the framework presented in the previous chapter, since it only offered assistance in security and to the police. It must be remembered that the solutions of local ownership and institution building were not yet formulated in the early 1990s. However, conservator- or trusteeships were known and were proposed by some authors, but were not applied. This was probably because of the difficulties regarding sovereignty, as explained in the first chapter. Also, from the beginning it was clear that the United States was not interested in a long-term involvement. This means that the learning cycle was only partially completed. In the early 1990s, academic notions and images were incorporated in UN images and notions. This ultimately lead to a change of policy: intervention, as advocated by most academics, but not in the form they had proposed.

But the mission did not start as expected. An advance team of around 100 persons was deployed in Port-au-Prince in September-October, but the arrival of 220 US military personnel on 11

\textsuperscript{139} Ibidem.
October was prevented by armed civilians who created disturbance at the seaport.\textsuperscript{141} Although they were no match for the armed forces, the Americans did not want to risk the lives of their troops, after the death of seventeen marines in Somalia not long before, which had led to an early exit from that country. The ship was ordered to return.\textsuperscript{142}

Consequently, the arms embargo and freezing of government funds were re-implemented by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{143} This time however, it did not have any effect. Three days later, the assassination of government officials was reported.\textsuperscript{144} Following these events, the majority of personnel of the civilian mission and other international agencies left Haiti. Foreign nationals did the same, while Haitians living in the capital tried to flee to the countryside.\textsuperscript{145} Haiti was back in chaos. The General Assembly reported in December the persistence and worsening of flagrant human rights violations including extrajudicial executions, abductions, enforced disappearances and politically motivated rapes.\textsuperscript{146}

\textbf{2.2.4 1994: intervention, with permission}

In March 1994, the Security Council extended UNMIH until the end of June, although it had not started.\textsuperscript{147} In May, it implemented another sanction: members of the military, participants of the 1991 coup and illegal governments as well as their families, were denied access to other states. Also, a partial trade embargo was established.\textsuperscript{148} The international community thus remained active regarding Haiti. However, the Governors Island Agreement was criticized: according to Doyle it was ‘profoundly flawed and inconclusive, particularly by putting misplaced faith in the military.’ She called it a ‘foreign policy fiasco’ for the US, just like Bosnia and Somalia.\textsuperscript{149} Also, later the sanctions imposed were criticized since they were damaging to Haiti’s already

\textsuperscript{141} United Nations, \textit{The United Nations and the situation in Haiti}, 8.
\textsuperscript{142} Gros, \textit{State failure}, 156.
\textsuperscript{145} Gro, \textit{State failure}, 156.
\textsuperscript{148} United Nations, The United Nations and Haiti, 8.
\textsuperscript{149} Doyle, \textit{Hollow diplomacy in Haiti}, 53.
miserable economy and affected mainly the impoverished population. Not only was now the image of failed states created, the prevailing image of the international community and in particular the United States, was that they were incapable of addressing failed states adequately. Pressure on the US government also increased from lobbying organizations, public opinion and President Aristide, who refused to renew the agreement with the US about repatriating Haitian refugees. Although US policy is not the subject of this thesis, in the case of Haiti it is necessary to discuss it, since eventually the US decided to intervene militarily, backed by a UN Security Council resolution adopted in July 1994. This resolution authorized the use of all necessary means to bring down the junta and restore Aristide to presidency.

Some authors argue that the domestic pressure eventually pushed President Clinton over the edge to intervene. However, according to Fatton Jr., despite widespread discontent about the policy towards Haiti until that moment, more than two-thirds of the Americans opposed any military intervention and the administration had little to gain from an invasion, risking the loss of lives of their nationals. Therefore, he argues that the new post-Cold War international order had more to do with it. The United Stated had to prove its credibility as the only remaining superpower. Since the Somalia fiasco and the incident with the retreat of the marine ship of Haiti’s coast, the US was in danger to be portrayed as a ‘toothless tiger.’

Judging from literature, it is impossible to state that one factor ultimately led to the US decision to intervene. Most likely, it was a combination of pressure from the African-American US population (an important part of Clinton’s electorate), the fact that Clinton had promised earlier to end the repatriation without screening of Haitian refugees – a promise he breached – a new international climate in which the right to democratic governance began to outweigh national sovereignty, and the need of the US government to demonstrate that, as Fatton Jr. put it: ‘armed intervention and high moral principles could be mutually supportive.’

Therefore, Clinton finally announced in September 1994 that he was prepared to intervene militarily if necessary, “to protect our interests, to stop the brutal atrocities (…), to

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151 Gros, State failure, 156.
152 Fatton Jr., Haiti’s predatory republic, 90.
154 Fatton Jr., Haiti’s predatory republic, 92-94.
155 Idem, 94.
secure our borders and to preserve stability and democracy in our hemisphere.”

Three days later, a team led by former president Jimmy Carter went to Haiti to negotiate with the de facto authorities. At the same time, US troops and planes were sent to Haiti. Facing an invasion in any case, the junta leaders had little choice than to sign the so-called Port-au-Prince Agreement, which allowed the peaceful entry of US troops.

So, finally, in September 1994, UNMIH started. This was exactly a year later than it was meant to. President Aristide returned. The General Assembly welcomed significant progress in implementing the agreements and UN objectives in December. The Secretary General reported in early 1995 that the human rights situation improved after the arrival of the multinational force. Apart from individual cases, violence had decreased. There was ‘a feeling of liberty and a sense of security that did not exist previously.’ However, he also stressed that the relative security remained fragile, and that still many factors were present in the political and social environment that could lead to instability, such as former rebel group members, the availability of arms, rising frustration at the inability of the justice system to address past human rights violations and current criminality, the delay in concrete improvements in the daily life of the impoverished majority of the population, and additional tension that may be generated by forthcoming elections.

2.2.5 Conclusion on the 1980-1994 period
From comparing academic literature with UN resolutions, it seems as if the UN was lagging behind until 1992. Of course, there were many reasons why the UN did not or could not discuss the situation in Haiti in more detail. The Cold War was the biggest obstruction. Many of the states that the international community tried to ‘rescue’ in the early nineties, were backed by one

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158 Fatton Jr., Haiti’s predatory republic, 95.
162 Idem, 3.
163 Idem, 4.
of the superpowers during the Cold War. Therefore, once the Cold War was over, both the firm condemnations of crises such as the one in Haiti and the deployment of UN missions increased.

So, in this first period the UN caught up with academics after the Cold War ended. Only then a learning cycle became partially visible. Around the same time the UN discourse became more firm, UN policy shifted from relative passivity to active intervention. However, images and notions of academics and the UN differed since academics began to deploy the failed state image while the UN regarded Haiti as a country with a political crisis that needed assistance in resolving the crisis.

2.3 Images and notions 1995–2000

Academic authors were not optimistic at all about Haiti’s future. Mintz foresaw that to realize lasting change, a very long-term commitment would be necessary that both a tired Haitian public and a restless US electorate would lack. For him, the real solution would be resolving the asymmetry in economic power in Haiti.164

Indeed, it did not take long before the US decided to reduce the number of troops present in Haiti. Rotberg criticized this decision in 1996, stating that the new police force was not ready to keep the peace.165 Sweeney wrote that the US now had created a politically unstable welfare state totally dependent on foreign aid for survival, and even questioned if intervening had been the right thing to do.166 The policy regarding Haiti thus was the subject of criticism. The lack of a long-term involvement was the main point.

Meanwhile, the Secretary General reported increasing unrest and demonstrations among the Haitian population, because of dissatisfaction with the lack of schools, roads, electricity and employment.167 Common crime was on the rise. In November, seven people were killed in violent demonstrations. The new police force was established and functioning, but lacked experience, proper infrastructure and equipment, and competent senior officers.168 The prevailing image the UN had of Haiti was that small improvements were made, but assistance remained necessary. The increasing unrest shows that the UN did not achieve the desired effects of their

165 Robert Rotberg, ‘Clinton was right’, Foreign Policy (102), 1996, 136.
166 John Sweeney, ‘Stuck in Haiti’, Foreign Policy (102), 1996, 149.
168 Idem, 3-5.
intervention. Academics were already aware of this and criticized the UN policy, but the UN did not incorporate this.

2.3.1 A violent society without a capable police force and judiciary system
Stotzky, who published an essay on Haiti in 1998, was not optimistic either. He criticized the UN for not undertaking serious efforts to disarm paramilitary groups, although this was part of their mandate.\textsuperscript{169} ‘The failure to search for the estimated 250,000 automatic weapons, hidden in caches all over the country, has led to violence against the democratic government and poses a continuing threat to its very survival.’\textsuperscript{170} Also, it was decided to integrate former members of the armed forces (Forces Armées d’Haiti, FAD’H) in the new police force, which did not work out well: ‘FAD’H members proved to have no professional competence and little interest in obtaining such skills.’\textsuperscript{171} Also, they have ‘been involved in a long series of serious destabilizing, violent acts, including attacks on the main Haitian National Police headquarters and Parliament, assassinations of police officers, murders of two pro-Aristide congressmen, and conspiracies to assassinate Aristide and Préval (the then prime minister, red.).’\textsuperscript{172} Moreover, they ‘formed criminal gangs, kidnapped several wealthy people and held them for ransom, and committed armed robberies.’\textsuperscript{173}

Martin also states in 1999 that the stability remained uncertain and was only maintained by international presence.\textsuperscript{174} According to him, stability was threatened especially by the dire economic situation of the country, the disagreements about how this should be solved, and the inability of the police and justice system system to combat criminal violence.\textsuperscript{175} The academic world thus was very doubtful whether the UN missions would bring any lasting change.

2.3.2 The UN becomes doubtful as well
The UN mission was extended several times, or renewed under a new name, since leaving Haiti would almost certainly mean new upheaval. Its mandate remained virtually unchanged: train the

\textsuperscript{169} Irwin P. Stotzky, ‘On the promise and perils of democracy in Haiti’, \textit{The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review} (29-1/2), 1997, 3 and 7.
\textsuperscript{170} Idem, 7.
\textsuperscript{171} Idem, 10.
\textsuperscript{172} Idem.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{174} Martin, \textit{Haiti: international force or national compromise?}, 730.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibidem.
new police force and keep the peace.\footnote{176} From 1993 to 2000, as many as six missions were deployed in Haiti.\footnote{177} In this time, UN resolutions and Secretary General reports did not change much; they focused primarily on the small improvements made by the mission while stressing at the same time that assistance remained necessary.\footnote{178} In the second half of the 1990s, worries about Haiti increased and even the Secretary General admitted in a report that Haiti’s problems could not be solved in the short lifespan of a peacekeeping mission.\footnote{179} Although this admission did not have any immediate consequences regarding the UN policy, it does show that the UN like academic authors, was unsure whether the international community eventually would succeed in restoring stability. Therefore, here it is visible that the UN responded to images created by the academic world and to the feedback from policy effects.

In the summer of 1997, Haiti’s government resigned after disagreement over the validity of elections between different political organizations.\footnote{180} This further eroded the population’s confidence in authorities.\footnote{181} In August 1999, an increase in insecurity was reported by the Secretary General. Haiti still had no functioning government because of the political impasse, but it was agreed to organize elections in December.\footnote{182} Ultimately, these were held in May 2000. There were many doubts about its legitimacy, but the electoral commission declared Aristide’s party, Lavalas, the winner.\footnote{183} Giving the fragility of the security situation, the Secretary General advised at the end of 1999 to establish a new peace building mission once the then Civilian Police Mission (MINOPUH) ended.\footnote{184} It was decided to establish an International Civilian

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\footnote{177}{Gros, State failure, 159.}
\footnote{180}{Fatton Jr., Haiti’s predatory republic, 114.}
\footnote{183}{Fatton Jr., Haiti’s predatory republic, 115-116.}
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Support Mission with a mandate till February 2000.\textsuperscript{185} It was the last UN mission for that moment. When the UN left, desired policy effects were not achieved since insecurity had increased instead of decreased. Moreover, the country was politically in an impasse.

Conclusion
In the 1980s, academics went much further to highlight Haiti’s problems than the UN, which wrote about Haiti as if it was any other less developed country: it only emphasized its economic situation. Although the term failed state did not yet exits, academic authors stressed that Haiti was a special case given its turbulent past and repressive regime.

In this period therefore, no learning cycle between academic images and notions, UN images and notions and UN policy was visible. Eventually, with the end of the Cold War this changed: the need to help countries in crisis was recognised and the decision was made to intervene. The political situation now also was incorporated by the UN. Most academics agreed with intervention, although they also criticized the way it was done. Most authors did not have faith in the mission that followed, since academics began to designate Haiti as a failed state – for which a peacekeeping mission would be insufficient to solve its problems. The UN regarded Haiti’s problems merely as a political crisis and estimated that restoring the government and maintaining stability would be sufficient. However, academics argued that the missions did not target the root-causes of Haiti’s state failure; poverty and the big inequality between traditional elite and poor masses. Here, new images and notions were formed and a new learning cycle developed. It turned out that the UN policy did not have the desired effects since in the end, insecurity increased and the political climate was very unstable by the time the UN left.

The obvious reason for the failure of the UN to target Haiti’s problems more successfully was the lack of political will to address the root causes of state failure, for which a long term involvement would be necessary. This realization came in 1997 when the Secretary General admitted that a peacekeeping mission might not be sufficient to address Haiti’s problems. So, part of the learning cycle was completed, but it was not translated into policy. As a consequence, the situation in Haiti remained very volatile and only small changes were achieved. After six years of UN involvement, there was no essential progress visible and the country was politically more divided than ever.

Chapter 3
Images and notions on Haiti 2000-2012

This chapter answers the question what were images and notions on Haiti from 2000 till 2013 and what were the consequences? Again, they are compared. The development in UN policy towards Haiti and the criticism of the academic world regarding this policy is the focal point of the chapter. For this period, General Assembly resolutions are not included for reasons of time and space, and because there are enough resolutions from the UN Security Council available.

3.1 Images and notions between 2000 and 2004

In 2000, the last UN mission MINOPUH ended. As expected by academics, Haiti only got deeper in trouble. As a result of flawed elections, foreign aid to the government was drastically cut.\textsuperscript{186} This further impoverished the already miserable population. Although academic articles from this period are scarce, from news reports it can be concluded that Haiti was sliding into chaos further and further: a coup against Aristide was thwarted, around 160 prisoners were freed by armed men, which caused chaos, anti-government protests increased and were countered by protests from Aristide supporters. Haiti’s prime minister said he feared a civil war.\textsuperscript{187}

The incapability of the authorities to deal with the problems became all the more clear in 2003, when the chief of police resigned, declaring that he had no choice but to become corrupt or subservient if he would continue his job.\textsuperscript{188} Authorities were clearly losing control; state failure thus worsened. With the UN mission, external aggression was ruled out and internal unrest was controlled to some degree. Haiti still was a failed state since large parts of the population did not have access to basic facilities. However, after the mission left, the level of lawlessness increased. Faced with worsening poverty levels, both the US government and the Inter-American Development Bank renewed aid programs for Haiti.\textsuperscript{189} There remained, however, as Erikson put it in December 2003, ‘a yawning gap between Haiti’s needs and what the US is willing or able to provide.’\textsuperscript{190}

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\textsuperscript{190} Erikson, ‘The Haiti dilemma’, 286.
3.1.1 New intervention

Clashes between government and opposition supporters ultimately led to Aristide’s resign at the end of February 2004. He claimed that US forces had compelled him to step down, the US denied this.\textsuperscript{191} On the same day, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution which stated that the situation in Haiti once again constituted a threat to peace, security and stability in the region.\textsuperscript{192} An international force was deployed, to stabilize the climate and to facilitate humanitarian assistance. According to Country Watch, the international troops faced lawlessness upon arrival, particularly in the form of numerous revenge killings.\textsuperscript{193} The UN Security Council called upon the international community to work with the people of Haiti in a long-term effort to ‘promote the rebuilding of democratic institutions and to assist in the development of a strategy to promote social and economic development and to combat poverty.’\textsuperscript{194} The inclusion of these elements made this resolution very different from the one that authorized intervention in 1994. The main criticism of the 1990s, lack of long-term involvement, was now literally incorporated. Also, for the first time one of the solutions from the failed states framework was included: institution building. At this time, the concept of failed states, and approaches towards solutions, were far more established in International Relations than in the early 1990s, when it was very new. This undoubtedly influenced the way the UN approached failed states like Haiti. Also, feedback from the previous involvement lead to this new approach.

Not only the Security Council resolutions made clear that the UN had now different images and notions than ten years earlier. The Secretary General admitted openly in his first report after the intervention that ‘the setbacks during the previous UN involvement were partially due to shortcomings in the approach of the international community. (…) It failed to develop necessary and sustainable partnerships with Haitian society at all levels. Haitian people were insufficiently involved. Financial aid was ill-targeted and did not take into account the deficiencies in local absorptive capacity.’\textsuperscript{195}

At the end of April 2004, the Security Council established MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, which is still present today. Its mandate was broader than

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those of its predecessors: it included to assist with DDR programmes for all armed groups, assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and order, assist in the constitutional and political process, national reconciliation, organization of elections and good governance, assist in the promotion and protection of human rights, assist in the investigations of human rights violations and of violations of international humanitarian law, and assist in the development of reforms of the judiciary.\footnote{United Nations, \textit{Security Council Resolution 1542} (2004), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1542(2004), 2-4, visited on 13-03-2013.} The inclusion of all these areas signifies once again that the UN planned to implement reforms on a broader level. No complete conservatorship or interim administration was established, but the model of institution building was definitely applied by emphasizing the rule of law. Even though the term ‘failed state’ never appeared in resolutions or reports, it was clear that the UN had now incorporated the failed state image in its notions towards Haiti: the new policy priorities showed that they wanted to assist the country with performing the basic functions a successful state is supposed to perform.

3.2 Images and notions between 2004 and 2008

In his first report, the Secretary General wrote that the security situation had gradually improved since the mission’s arrival, although acts of violence continued to occur and tensions persisted.\footnote{United Nations, \textit{Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti} (S/2004/698) (2004), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s%2F2004%2F698&Submit=Search&Lang=E, 3-5, visited on 15-03-2013.} The main challenge existed of armed groups that had to be disarmed, estimated at 25,000 individuals. However, disarmament, disintegration and rehabilitation (DDR) turned out to be a big problem, since the implementation of the programme continued to be delayed. By 2006, it still was not set up.\footnote{United Nations, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti} (S/2006/60) (2006), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s%2F2006%2F60&Submit=Search&Lang=E, 7, visited on 15-03-2013.} Fatton Jr. called MINUSTAH an understaffed and weak peacekeeping force. According to him, a new cycle of violence and repression was likely to break out once the peacekeepers would leave.\footnote{Robert Fatton Jr., ‘Haiti: The Saturnalia of Emancipation and the Vicissitudes of Predatory Rule’, \textit{Third World Quarterly} (27-1), 2006, 127.} In short, the prevailing image was that this UN mission would like its predecessors not bring lasting change.

The Secretary General reported that conditions for DDR were very elusive, given the lack of national support for reconciliation, limited progress in reforming the security sector, lack of
clarity about the future of former combatants and the large number of weapons that remained in circulation.\textsuperscript{200} It is strange that the UN did not undertake more efforts to implement a DDR programme. It seemed that the UN waited for the Transitional Government to provide a programme instead of implementing it itself.\textsuperscript{201} This was a repetition of the mistake from the previous UN involvement. So, although DDR was part of the new mandate, in practice it was not implemented. The learning cycle was visible on paper, but not on the ground regarding DDR.

On the other hand, the mission established a quick impact project review to support civil society initiatives and public institutions. 27 projects had been approved, such as small income-generating projects for women, youth and farmers, sewage system reparation, garbage collection, drinking water improvement, electricity, hospitals, child protection, and HIV/AIDS programmes.\textsuperscript{202} The implementation of these projects shows that the intention of combating poverty was carried out in practice. Also, since these projects were initiatives from Haiti society itself, this clearly matches with the local governance approach.

\textbf{3.2.1 The UN: pressing for elections, addressing violence in the slums}

Without an effective DDR programme, the security situation in Haiti remained very fragile, especially in the slums of Port-au-Prince. From time to time, it seriously deteriorated when violent uprisings broke out. Kidnappings for ransom by armed groups were a big concern.\textsuperscript{203} Despite this continuing unrest, the Security Council stated in 2005 that elections should take place that year, to replace the Transitional Government in early 2006.\textsuperscript{204} With the installation of new authorities who were elected democratically, the UN hoped that the Haitian population would have more faith in their government.

A year later, elections had taken place and new authorities were installed. The Security Council concluded that conditions for conventional DDR did not exist in Haiti, and therefore alternative programmes were required.\textsuperscript{205} Also, it again stressed the need for quick labour intensive projects that help to create jobs and deliver social services, and to maximize

\textsuperscript{200} Idem.
\textsuperscript{202} Idem.
\textsuperscript{203} United Nations,\textit{ Report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/60), }4-5.
MINUSTAH’s crime prevention role.\textsuperscript{206} Basically, the resolutions had the same message as in the beginning of the mission: DDR was not carried out, therefore security remained fragile, and projects aimed at economic development remained highly necessary.

The UN put a lot of emphasis on the reduction of criminality and also implemented it in practice. MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police conducted about 20 operations in the slums Cité Soleil and Martissant, in the summer of 2007. They dislodged the main gang leaders and, together with other operations throughout the country, arrested some 850 suspected gang members by the end of July.\textsuperscript{207} This led to visible improvement in the slums, although relatively few weapons were confiscated.\textsuperscript{208} A new approach to disarmament then was launched: labour intensive projects to provide an alternative for criminality. Those projects were aimed at the return of former gang members to their communities, reinforcing the capacity of local communities to resolve conflicts peacefully, promoting a culture of peace, assisting victims of violence and supporting the creation of temporary employment.\textsuperscript{209} So, the UN was tackling problems on a local level directly with high-risk groups, with success. It was conscious about the fact that unless criminality and poverty were addressed, stability could not be achieved. Therefore, it can be concluded from the first phase of the new intervention, that \textit{the UN had included suggestions made by academic authors in the previous years} and tried not to repeat earlier missteps. Again, the correlation between academic literature and UN policy is visible. The implication for Haiti was that small improvements in living conditions were made.

However, in 2007 the UN was embarrassed by a big scandal: over a hundred peacekeeping soldiers from Sri Lanka were sent home after allegations of sexual abuse of under aged Haitian girls.\textsuperscript{210} This was not the first time UN soldiers were accused of such misbehaviour, it had occurred before in missions in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN asked Sri Lanka to prosecute the soldiers in their own country.\textsuperscript{211} Of course, this was exceedingly detrimental to both the credibility and popularity of MINUSTAH in Haiti.

\textsuperscript{206} Idem.
\textsuperscript{208} Idem.
\textsuperscript{209} Idem.
\textsuperscript{211} Idem.
3.2.3 Academics: the international community is repeating mistakes from the past

Although the UN’s approach was very different from the previous involvement, with more emphasis on institution building, local governance and living conditions, academics remained critical.

Fatton Jr. wrote in 2006 that the previous UN missions protected the old balance of class power and set constraining parameters for economic transformation. He did not think that the new mission would do it better. Other authors, assessing the approach towards poverty reduction and economic development, came to the same conclusion. In other words, academics argued that the UN relied too much on the liberal peace model, whereby change is imposed by external actors, instead of empowering the local population.

In 2008 for example, Winters assessed the Interim Cooperation Framework which proposed measures to improve both the Haitian economy and society after the 2004 crisis. This framework was established by several international organizations including the UN. According to Winters, the Framework was largely formed according to the World Bank’s ‘new institutionalist approach,’ which means that by establishing institutions of governance, the market, quasi-market and civil service bureaucracy would serve as tools to stimulate economic activity. Winters’ argument focuses around three main issues. The first is that this ‘institutional’ approach, given Haiti’s history, will not work since fundamental cultural changes in politics and society must take place before the establishment of basic institutions can heal the nation’s poverty and inequality. Secondly, she argues that the ICF only includes the middle class and the traditional political elite in its strategy for development. Without including the poor majority, the true polarization that has been recognized as the fundamental obstacle to Haiti’s progress is ignored. Thirdly, the overwhelming presence of NGO’s in Haiti impedes the development of a healthy state apparatus, since these NGO’s have too much interest in continued access to Haiti’s resources.

In short, once again academics did not think that the current approach of the international community would work for Haiti. Moreover, Winters was even arguing that institution building would not work for Haiti since it lacks the right political culture. Like Fatton

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212 Fatton Jr., ‘Haiti,’ 123-124.
Jr., she also argued that *old balances of power were protected* by not including the poor majority. The same message was carried out by Shamsie in the same year. She stated that the priorities of the post-1994 programme were unchanged in the new policy: a strong focus on macro-economic stability, an absolute reliance on private sector-led growth; and insufficient attention to the agricultural sector, more specifically to food security. She called this ‘the orthodoxy of the Bretton Woods institutions.’ Since agriculture is the main source of income for two-thirds of the population, of which 80 per cent lives below the poverty line, it is crucial for Haiti’s development. Moreover, because of the poor living conditions in rural areas, many people have moved to the cities, creating the slums where the problems of insecurity are the most prevalent. In short, it is clear that targeting the large number of Haitians who live in rural areas should be a priority. From UN reports, it does seem like the poor population was increasingly targeted, however the focus was mainly on vulnerable groups in urban areas, and less in the rural communities. Shamsie argues that the UN’s greater emphasis on social protection by investing in education, health care and social policy, is an improvement compared to the post-1994 programme. However, an emphasis on reducing inequality is clearly missing. Instead, the underlying premise is that trade liberalization will generate social benefits, although this strategy in the 1980s and 1990s turned out to be disastrous for small producers, worsening poverty and inequality.

To conclude, not only was the international community’s approach criticized, the authors also stated that *previous mistakes from the past were repeated, which was counterproductive with regard to the improvement of Haiti’s situation*. A new image was now developing: Haiti held hostage by the ineffective policies from the international community.

The UN itself was worried too, since it signalled a lot of difficulties. Security continued to be fragile and progress in training the Haitian police very slow. Also, continuing struggle between political groups caused delays in the implementation of necessary measures such as a comprehensive DDR programme. So, a new learning cycle was developing at this point: while the UN was implementing feedback and recommendations based on the previous involvement, academics already formulated new criticism and recommendations.

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215 Idem, 422.
216 Idem.
3.3 Images and notions between 2009 and present

After unrest in 2008 over rising food prices, 2009 had an optimistic start: the situation in Haiti was fragile, but generally calm. The UN Secretary General signalled a new readiness among political leaders to work together, which led to progress in several area’s such as the holding of senatorial elections, the adoption of key legislation and the pursuit of an inclusive dialogue on a number of major issues. However, the collaboration remained fragile and the potential for renewed tensions and conflict among and within the governing institutions remained present. Also, the Secretary General warned of a readiness on the part of influential forces within the country to inflame public tensions to further their own interests.

Meanwhile, the mission continued to set up labour-intensive projects, basic public services and income-generating activities such as fruit and vegetable production and livestock breeding. The agricultural sector, therefore, was not ignored completely. Also, 43 projects targeting community violence were completed, which generated one month of employment for 13,704 workers, including 4,955 women, and professional and educational training opportunities for 1,156 youth at risk, prison inmates and children affected by armed violence. In addition, medical and social support to 1,500 street children was provided. These projects were accompanied by social outreach activities, involving over 60,000 participants, aimed at fostering a culture of peace. Moreover, multilateral debt cancellation was expected to release $40 million annually for the budget until 2015, which should be spent on poverty reduction. All these policy initiatives show that the criticism of academics was incorporated not only in UN images and notions, but also in its policy; completing a learning cycle. The Secretary General concluded in September 2009 that ‘five years into the stabilization process, there is substantial reason to believe that Haiti is moving away from a past of conflict, towards a brighter future of peaceful development.’ For the first time, real optimism was visible. However, he also stated that the progress remained extremely fragile, and that setbacks or reversal therefore remained

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219 Idem. 7.
220 Idem.
221 Idem.
222 Idem.
223 Idem, 17.
possible. It can be concluded that desired policy effects were partially achieved, since the situation was relatively stable and efforts to address poverty and violence began to pay off.

3.3.1 Academics remain critical
On the other hand, academics still were not optimistic and now began to target non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) apart from the UN in analysing the situation in Haiti. They were increasingly critical of the high number of NGO’s present in Haiti and the effects this had on the country’s development. In the previous paragraph this was already mentioned. However, only UN policy is part of the research for this paper, so for a further elaboration on the critique of the number of NGO’s and the way they carry out policy in Haiti, is referred to the literature. In short, authors established that NGO’s impede the Haitian state from developing since they have taken over the delivery of social services. Also, some authors argue that NGO’s deliberately work to keep the status quo, since that is in their interest.

Zanotti wrote in 2010 that the UN has recognised this major flaw in how the international community addresses Haiti’s problems, but that it does not seem able to change it. Academics now had established the image of Haiti being unable to overcome its problems; partly because of the complexity of its problems and partly because of international policy instead of in spite of.

3.3.2 The earthquake
The year 2009 ended with the Secretary General expressing hope for Haiti in a most carefully-worded statement. This hope vanished at once when on the 12th of January 2010, disaster struck Haiti with a force of 7.0 on the Richter scale. The epicentre was only 25 kilometres from Port-au-Prince, the largest and most densely populated city. The result was around 300,000 casualties, another 300,000 injured, 1.5 million homeless and the virtually complete destruction of the country’s already poor infrastructure, including most government buildings and MINUSTAH’s headquarters. In other words, one can only wonder: could it have been worse?

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225 Zanotti, ‘Cacophonies of Aid,’ 760.
Force levels of MINUSTAH were increased to support relief and recovery work.\textsuperscript{227} However, because of the immense devastation, this was difficult to carry out. The thousands of NGO’s suffered losses as well, and the United Nations lost over a hundred of its personnel. Gros states that failures in delivering emergency aid adequately cannot be blamed on the exceptionally heavy earthquake alone; they were a direct consequence of Haiti’s state failure. Coordination among NGO’s and the government did not exist.\textsuperscript{228} They were not used to working with each other. Although numerous airplanes filled with water, food, and medicines arrived within hours of the earthquake, there was no plan to distribute these products quickly and effectively.\textsuperscript{229} Some planes remained parked filled with relief products for days on the airport, while people were dying from lack of first-aid only a few miles away. Some convoys with aid that did arrive at refugee camps had to turn back because distributing water and food was too dangerous without MINUSTAH or police presence.\textsuperscript{230}

As a result, the humanitarian crisis following the earthquake lasted longer than it probably would have in another developing country. In the beginning of April, the former prime minister said in an interview: “A country that has been hit by an earthquake is after two months usually in the phase of recovery. We are still in the phase of a relief effort: providing food, water, and medicine. We are not even in the phase where we can get temporary housing for the people who are in the streets or in the camps.”\textsuperscript{231} This confirmed on the one hand Haiti’s state failure and on the other hand the fact that the thousands of NGO’s and millions of dollars donated for relief were unable to address the emergency effectively.

More than three years later, the problem of displaced persons is still enormous: approximately 360,000 persons live in tent camps.\textsuperscript{232} Food shortage and the lack of access to clean drinking water and sanitation facilities make daily life a struggle for these camp residents.

\textsuperscript{228} Gros, \textit{State failure}, 184-185.
\textsuperscript{229} Idem.
\textsuperscript{230} Idem, 185.
Moreover, sexual violence against women and girls in the camps is widespread.\textsuperscript{233} Apart from this, tropical storms and hurricanes are common in Haiti. Several times a year, they hit the island. Last year, tropical storm Isaac and hurricane Sandy caused floods, mudslides and casualties.\textsuperscript{234} Moreover, another earthquake in the near future is not unlikely: Haiti is situated on several faults, two of which have not been active for a long time.\textsuperscript{235}

3.3.3 The UN mission becomes increasingly controversial

Since the response to the earthquake was flawed, the UN mission has become unpopular with the local population. Criticism from academics also became more firm. In late 2010 Panchang called the UN mission ‘a political tool’ meant to oppress social and political movements in Haiti. Meanwhile, according to her the US benefits from the occupation, using Haiti for its export and manufacturing interests.\textsuperscript{236} She heavily criticized the UN force for not protecting the vulnerable groups in the camps from rape and assault, and not addressing violence at demonstrations effectively. Moreover, she even calls the UN mission ‘militarization masked as aid’ and calls for a stop of tax money fuelling it.\textsuperscript{237} Finally, she says that Haitians have much to say about their development and about the ‘peacekeeping’ they do not need, but that they are not heard.\textsuperscript{238} The UN was thus increasingly seen as \textit{contributor to Haiti’s problems} instead of the possible solution.

To make matters worse, in October 2010 cholera broke out in Haiti. Within a month, 1,000 people had died from the disease.\textsuperscript{239} Since cholera had not occurred on the island for over a hundred years, it was suggested that it was brought in by newly arrived peacekeepers, which sparked riots against the UN and the Haitian government.\textsuperscript{240} After several investigations, it turned out to be very likely that peacekeepers from Nepal brought the strain with them, spreading

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} Gros, \textit{State failure}, 187.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Deepa Panchang, ‘Haiti: contesting the UN occupation,’ \textit{NACLA report on the America’s} (43-6), 2010, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Idem, 5-6.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Idem, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{240} Idem.
\end{itemize}
it via poor sanitation systems.\textsuperscript{241} The UN was reserved about the research results and never admitted responsibility, even after UN Special Representative and former US President Clinton admitted that UN soldiers were the source of the outbreak.\textsuperscript{242} In November 2011, victims filed a claim for damages with the UN, arguing the organization had failed to screen its soldiers adequately. The UN rejected the claim, citing diplomatic immunity.\textsuperscript{243} Also, new allegations against peacekeepers regarding the sexual abuse of Haitians further damaged the UN’s reputation.\textsuperscript{244}

From UN reports and resolutions from after the earthquake, it is clear that the UN was fully aware of the difficulties presented to MINUSTAH after the earthquake. Already in June 2010, the Security Council recognized the role of MINUSTAH in \textit{protecting the vulnerable in the camps}, and the Secretary General reported that resources and efforts were put in to realize this.\textsuperscript{245} At the same time, the Council argued that elections in Haiti should be held ‘in a timely manner,’ namely in November of the same year.\textsuperscript{246} The Secretary General stated that the fragile security situation could be worsened by tensions in the electoral period, but he argued that elections would be crucial for Haiti, because the population would have more faith in a newly elected government. He called the holding of credible elections in 2010 and the installation of a new president in 2011 key milestones and the most immediate challenge for the Haitian people besides reconstruction.\textsuperscript{247} However, according to academics there were many reasons to expect that the elections would hardly be a legitimate exercise in democracy already prior to the elections. Indeed it turned out that there was fraud, manipulation, disenfranchisement and the choice of candidates was arbitrarily limited by the Electoral Council. The Security Council

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{244} Craig D. Frazier., \textit{‘Peacekeepers accused of rape in Haiti}, \textit{‘ New York Amsterdam News} (102-40), October 2011, 2.
\end{thebibliography}
ignored this and pressed ahead.\textsuperscript{248} This shows that the gap between the images and notions from UN and academics was widening.

The Secretary General also reported that the immediate humanitarian needs of the displaced largely were addressed in the beginning of September.\textsuperscript{249} This is contradicted by Panchang, who published her article two months later and stated that to say ‘that conditions have improved and the relief stage is over is an insult to the daily struggle of Haiti’s some 1.5 million displaced people.’\textsuperscript{250}

Despite the difficulties, the situation in Haiti did not escalate and elections were held as planned in November 2010. The new and current president is former pop-star and right-wing politician Michel Martelly. The Secretary General reported after his inauguration that, although it was a huge victory for Haiti to have a peaceful transfer from one democratically elected president to another from the opposition, a ‘political stalemate between the President and Parliament risks undermining political progress and exacerbating the security situation, and has posed a major obstacle to the attainment of the mandated objectives of MINUSTAH.’\textsuperscript{251} In short, the newly elected president had not started the job yet, or divisions between parties were again impeding progress in the political arena.

Both in 2011 and 2012, increasing criminality rates were of major concern for Haiti.\textsuperscript{252} Some criminal gangs were linked to political parties or drug traffickers.\textsuperscript{253} On the other hand, as a result of a greater police presence, crime reporting also increased. The humanitarian challenges remained enormous with still around 600,000 internally displaced people in 2011, depending on aid for basic survival, and the cholera epidemic still ongoing.\textsuperscript{254} Another concern was that some major NGO’s were leaving Haiti because of reduced donor funding, which led to a deterioration of living conditions in the camps.\textsuperscript{255} As stated above, reducing the number of NGO’s would in

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{249} Idem.
\textsuperscript{250} Panchang, ‘Haiti: contesting the UN occupation,’ 6.
\textsuperscript{254} Idem.
\end{flushleft}
theory be beneficial for the country, since ultimately the state should provide basic facilities for the population, not non-state actors. However, even after two years after the earthquake, NGO’s were unfortunately indispensable for providing basic surviving facilities.

The Secretary General was concerned about the lack of progress in forming a government since the election of the new President. Also, the constitution should be reformed, but the status of this process remained unclear.256 This situation highlighted the difficulty in changing a political culture in which a stubborn elite is powerful. The Secretary General put it as follows: ‘At a time when Haiti so desperately needs a committed leadership with a common set of priorities, antagonisms between opposing political forces are casting a shadow on the country’s recent democratic success and threatening its progress towards lasting stability. (…) ‘There can be little progress unless the Haitian leadership and other key stakeholders are willing to make the compromises needed to reach an agreement.’257 This is in accordance with Winters’ argument that institution building does not work when the political culture is insufficiently developed.

However, the biggest immediate problem for Haiti is formed by the hundreds of thousands internally displaced persons. Apart from their dire living conditions, land owners now want to reclaim the grounds on which the refugee camps are located; more than 65,000 people were evicted from the camps since July 2010.258 These evictions are often violent and leave the residents of the camps homeless, with no other choice than to live on the street.259 Although the Haitian government presented plans in August 2011 and April 2012 on National Housing and on relocation, these plans are aimed at the construction of houses, and do not address the forced evictions. Moreover, families remain responsible themselves for finding their own home.260 The Secretary General also reported that most of the camps are not covered by the programme, therefore many residents are left without a plan to provide durable housing for them.261

In his, until now, last report, the Secretary General concluded that there are positive developments in Haiti: the new government has taken steps to attract foreign investment, combat corruption and smuggling and promote industrial projects aimed at creating jobs. Also, actions

257 Idem
258 Idem, 4.
260 Idem.
were undertaken against members of the former armed forces who were illegally occupying sites throughout the country.\textsuperscript{262} However, \textit{the political process remains vulnerable} to setbacks linked to political instability, lack of respect for the rule of law and unmet social grievances. Moreover, the human rights issues related to crimes, disease, housing and living conditions urgently need to be addressed.\textsuperscript{263} Despite these challenges, the Secretary General was optimistic that Haiti’s current leaders ‘have an opportunity to make genuine progress in rebuilding the nation, strengthening institutions, attracting investment, promoting sustainable development and entrenching respect for the rule of law and human rights.’\textsuperscript{264}

Academics on the other hand do not share this optimism since they see that only little progress is made against the ‘seemingly intractable poverty.’\textsuperscript{265} The government is described as ‘barely functioning’ and prone to frequent upheavals. The development of the local economy, jobs for the chronically underemployed population and the strengthening of government and civil institutions should be a priority, but despite the large amounts of aid money, almost no progress in these areas is visible.\textsuperscript{266} Therefore the conclusion of recent articles is that \textit{past aid solutions have not worked}. The country is now so dependent on foreign aid, that this hampers the development of its own economy.\textsuperscript{267} Again, the excessive presence of NGO’s is criticized and a call for the reversal of this situation is made.\textsuperscript{268} The same goes for an article titled ‘The NGO republic of Haiti.’ A technical coordinator of the Municipal Civil Protection Committee in Haiti, interviewed in this article, stated that the gap between what NGO’s provide and what the Haitian population really needs, remains enormous.\textsuperscript{269} ‘Our priorities are not the same as theirs (the NGO’s), but theirs are executed. In theory, NGO’s come with something, but not with what the population needs. We have no choice but to accept what they bring us. But then, when it doesn’t work and it’s not what we need, the state is blamed, not the NGOs.’\textsuperscript{270}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{262}{Idem, 16.} \\
\footnote{263}{Idem, 16-17.} \\
\footnote{264}{Idem,17.} \\
\footnote{265}{Carol Adelman, ‘Haiti: testing the limits of government aid and philanthropy,’ \textit{Brown Journal of World Affairs} (17-2), 2011, 91.} \\
\footnote{266}{Idem, 91-92.} \\
\footnote{267}{Idem, 92.} \\
\footnote{268}{Idem, 93.} \\
\footnote{269}{Katie Klarreich, ‘The NGO republic of Haiti,’ \textit{Nation} (295-21), 2012, 14.} \\
\footnote{270}{Idem.}}
Conclusion

In the first phase of the new UN involvement, the learning cycle was visible as the UN incorporated the criticism and recommendations made by academics in both images and in policy. Contrary to the first UN involvement, it was now clear that the UN had adopted approaches towards failed states in their policy. Commitment for a long-term involvement was included in the mission’s mandate, as well as the intention to target the root causes of Haiti’s state failure with institution building and local governance. However, improvements remained very small.

According to academics, this was mainly because the poor masses still were insufficiently empowered. As a consequence, real change did not take place. In other words, the UN tried to address the root causes of Haiti’s state failure by applying a local governance approach, but it did not work out since it failed to reach the poor majority. Essentially, this is the same problem as with the first UN involvement. The difference is, however, that in the second involvement targeting the poor population was part of the UN mandate while this was not the case in the 1990s. Moreover, the failure to carry out DDR impeded improvements in the security situation. From the beginning therefore, academics were pessimistic. From 2008 on, they became increasingly critical on the whole international community, stating that the approach was in many ways not very different from the previous involvement, and actually doing more harm than good.

The UN was struggling, especially after the earthquake, to maintain order in Haiti and to keep up the progress. This was partly due to scandals regarding misbehaving peace keepers and the 2010 cholera epidemic. The UN emphasized elections, although academics argued they were not democratic. The UN, US and international community in recent years are even accused of deliberately obstructing Haiti’s development since they benefit from the status quo. So, although part of academic images were incorporated in the UN images and policy during the first years of the mission, recently the gap between academics and UN has widened again as the mission became increasingly controversial.
Conclusion

The core question of this thesis is to what extent is there a correlation between the learning cycle of images, notions and policy and the effects of UN policy in Haiti? This question was addressed by analysing images and notions of academics and the UN. In the first chapter, it was argued that this way of analysing fits within social constructivism, since it highlights the changing nature of world politics and seeks to analyse processes instead of finding the truth. Also, a framework on failed states was presented from which became clear that a failed state is no longer able to provide security for its population, that state failure differs over time and place, and that academics think different in how state failure should be addressed. Also, authors differ in claiming that failed states are no longer successful states or never were successful states. Successful states are defined by classical criteria, political functions or both.

From the second chapter, it became clear that the root cause for Haiti’s state failure is the fact that it never developed a modern political culture. To develop this, empowerment and development of the poor masses would be necessary. The traditional elite, however, was always successful to prevent this. When the international community intervened in the early 1990s, the goal was to restore stability and improve the lives of Haiti’s population. The UN incorporated images and notions on Haiti already formed by academics in the 1980s: it recognized that Haiti had problems on the political level, not just economically, and intervened according to the wish of most academics. So far, the learning cycle was completed. However, around the same time academics started to deploy the ‘failed state image’ for Haiti, which implies that its problems go further than a political crisis: the state is not able to fulfil its functions. On the contrary, the UN treated Haiti merely as a country with a political crisis and considered assistance with security maintenance sufficient. This was also due to a lack of political will for further involvement. Clearly, the learning cycle thus was not completed here: academic images and notions of Haiti were different from those of the UN. Criticism and feedback were not incorporated by the UN, therefore policy did not change and the effects remained the same: after six years of UN presence, no fundamental change was made and the country was politically divided. Thus, although the goal was to bring stability and improvement in the population’s situation, the UN did not succeed. The correlation with the learning cycle is visible in the fact that academic images and notions were not incorporated, and policy effects were also not included as feedback.
Policy remained aimed at security maintenance, leaving the fundamental problems on the political level untouched. Therefore, there is a correlation between the fact that the learning cycle was not completed and policy did not achieve the desired effects.

By the time the second intervention was necessary, the UN recognized that its previous involvement was flawed. Therefore it deployed a very different strategy in 2004, incorporating feedback from academics and from the policy effects of the first involvement. The learning cycle now was completed and small improvements took place. However, despite these changes, academics remained critical. In the beginning of MINUSTAH, the main criticism was focused on the fact that in practice, the mission was not very different from the previous involvement: the poor masses still were not reached and DDR was not carried out. However, since 2008 and especially after the earthquake, the UN and other international organizations are increasingly portrayed as part of the problems in Haiti instead as the ones that offer solutions. Images and notions of academics and the UN differ when it comes to the need to organize elections or whether the humanitarian crisis after the earthquake is over or not. Criticism of academics and feedback from policy have not lead to change in policy, leaving the situation the same.

This conclusion can be translated to the scheme of the learning cycle. The crosses indicate that these parts of the cycle do not take place, which leads to unchanged policy and thus unchanged effects. This was the case throughout the UN’s involvement in Haiti since 1994, as explained above. Academic images and notions were not incorporated, and feedback from policy effects neither. This correlation therefore helps understanding why no fundamental change is achieved after all these years.
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