A critical analysis of how the concept of Peace has evolved in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

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Introduction:
In the wake of the horrific events of the Second World War the United Nations rose from the ashes of the total failure of the League of Nations to become the new world body to bring international peace and security. The resolve of this new organization was enshrined in its Charter and the language of the preamble clauses was very much charged with the sentiment of the time. ‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind’ (Charter of the United Nations, preamble). Although this sentiment is nearly 70 years old it still is the driving force in the organization for maintaining international peace and security. In the UN’s quest to live up to the spirit of its mandate many mechanisms of conflict resolution, prevention and mitigation have been implemented to help resolve disputes and situations that could lead to an escalation of serious armed conflict. The most visible of all these mechanisms, certainly the most recognisable, is that of UN peacekeeping with their distinctive ‘blue helmets’ they have come to be a symbol of the organisation in their own right. UN peacekeeping has undergone an extraordinary transition since its conception and much has been written on the subject, particularly how peacekeeping changed in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar world order that was characteristic of the Cold War.

The most crucial factor that has determined UN peacekeeping has been the concept of peace within the organisation, what it means and how the organisations activities are to provide for the concept. The changing challenges in international peace and security have meant that the concept of peace at the organisation has adapted to meet these challenges. The change in the concept of peace has altered how the UN conducts its peacekeeping activities and these activities can and has also impacted upon the concept itself. This is what this project wishes to analyse; how has this concept evolved in UN peacekeeping operations and how on a much broader level has UN peacekeeping altered in its history?

A crucial thing to address at this stage is how UN peacekeeping is viewed in its present context. The categorization of UN peacekeeping can initially cause some confusion. The most common form of categorization has been into ‘generations’ by these being
‘traditional peacekeeping’ or ‘first generation peacekeeping’, ‘peace building’ or ‘second generation peacekeeping’, ‘peace enforcement’ or ‘third generation peacekeeping’. This is the standard when analysing UN peacekeeping and is flawed because this model perceives peacekeeping as a natural progression and many have pointed out that this is not true. As Jussi M. Hanhimäki points out about peace enforcement in his very short introduction to the United Nations ‘The problem with the use of the term “generation” is particularly evident here: the Congo mission in the early 1960’s was essentially the first example of peace enforcement, third generation peacekeeping actually predated the second generation ones’ (Hanhimäki, 2008, p77). The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960-1964 was a peace enforcement operation by the UN and therefore is one clear example of how the ‘generations’ definition is wrong. The ‘generation’s’ argument describing peacekeeping as ‘generational’ also does not adequately account for the fact that Chapter VI operations continue to be sanctioned along with enforcement measures under Chapter VII. ‘Generation’ determines that there is a progression or an evolution but the fact remains that all forms remain in use and available whatever the context of the conflict.

Attempts have been made to further clarify on peacekeeping and its progression one such example was in ‘An Agenda for Peace’ by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. ‘The Secretary General argued that peacekeeping was one of four tools that the UN could use to prevent and resolve conflict around the world’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p17). He further identified other methods such as peacemaking and peace building. However this method, whilst being more specific in nature by breaking down operations in terms of its activities, does not fully explain the transition. All these activities including peace building and peace enforcement all still come under UN peacekeeping and are listed as peacekeeping operations. However it should be noted at this point that the task of defining and categorizing peacekeeping is a very difficult one. In their book Bellamy and Williams explain that ‘So politically charged is the question of defining peace operations that the UN has still not clearly stipulated what it means by the term’(Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p14). This debate is a crucial one however to delve into this debate at great length would divert the focus of this thesis. Therefore to avoid
this and to deliberately simplify this term this argument shall do exactly what Bellamy and Williams did in their extensive study on peacekeeping, and that is to use peacekeeping ‘as an umbrella label’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p42). This way the term can encompass more comprehensively the myriad of different aspects peacekeeping involves without the danger of excluding a vital part.

This thesis, although pointing out this debate, will not seek to create a new method of categorization for reasons of limited time and length; although this would certainly be an interesting avenue of further research. However in order to discover the transition of the concept of peace this argument puts forward a different method. To make a greater mapping of the evolution of this concept this thesis has been divided into three categories in an effort to simplify the distinctions of operations. Firstly each chapter will address the three major Chapters of the UN Charter. Chapter 1 will analyse Chapter VI of the Charter, chapter 2 will look at Chapter VII and the final Chapter will regard Chapter IX. Each Chapter of the Charter has been allocated an overarching norm that defines other sub-norms and operations; Chapter VI this is ‘prevention’, Chapter VII is ‘intervention’ and Chapter IX is ‘development’. Each respective section of the Charter will be scrutinised to identify the norms and themes that emerge through each chapter. Once identified the operations that demonstrate these norms shall be placed on a timeline showing where and when they emerged. To identify every single operation and every single mention of the respective identified norms in the organizations history would be too great a project for the purpose of this thesis. In light of this, a legitimate and necessary short cut is to identify only specific moments in the UN timeline in terms of peacekeeping operations. Once a timeline showing the relevant norms from that chapter and the key operations concerned has been established the identified operations and norms shall be subjected to the triangle identified in diagram 1.1 below. This diagram illustrates the three spheres of influence for peacekeeping operations and in turn the concept of peace at an organisational level.
An analysis chapter will then regard each chapter and shall show how the concept of peace has evolved by analysing the transition of peacekeeping operations in the timeline and through the illustration above how the three key factors influenced and changed the concept. At the end of the analysis chapter a comprehensive timeline will show when all these three chapters emerged in UN peacekeeping. From this final conclusions can be reached. The conclusion shall also address further interesting avenues of research. A necessary question that has to be answered at this point has to be why is analysing the evolution of the concept of peace in UN peacekeeping operations important? Peace, especially its protection, is the founding principle of the UN and how this concept alters affects its peacekeeping operations and vice versa. Therefore to understand how the concept has and is evolving can firstly help to improve UN operations and will help further understand how the UN and the international community understand what peace means in the modern context.
Chapter One: Chapter VI (Prevention):
The severity of the destruction that had resulted from the Second World War had deeply scared the world and as a consequence a sentiment of prevention of similar conflicts emerged in international relations. This sentiment of the need to prevent conflict resonated in the drafting of the UN Charter and its ratification. Peaceful resolution to conflict was of paramount importance and this was the post war conceptualisation of peace. Nowhere is the emphasis on peaceful resolution more apparent than in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Chapter VI of the UN’s Charter is unquestionably one of the most important sections of this global covenant as it deals with the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI); as indicated by the chapters title it deals with how the membership of states is to resolve any dispute between any of the UN’s members. More specifically it outlines the mechanisms to be used in the ‘peaceful’ resolution of international disputes. These peaceful methods outline the belief of the organisation to first use diplomacy and negotiation to resolve international disputes before resorting to actions of sanctions, enforcement or collective security. Laid down in Article 33 of Chapter VI it states that,

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means. (Charter of the United Nations, Article 33)

Chapter VI outlines the process of resolving international disputes by involving the Security Council in making recommendations if either side in any dispute is unable to reach a consensus on an appropriate solution. Chapter VI was designed to be the first line of defence in mitigating global disputes that could threaten the balance of international peace and security.
The Charter was very much a document that carried with it the sentiment of the time. When it comes to the use of peacekeeping missions in the prevention of armed conflict for the first eleven years the United Nations was restricted to a role of monitoring and investigation. The UN peacekeeping website identifies the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)¹ as the very first UN peacekeeping mission. Established in May 1948 to oversee the various truces that came in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War this mission was mandated ‘to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in Supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine’. (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/mandate.shtml)

UN peacekeeping as we know it in its present form was never envisioned at the singing of the Charter and this is subsequently why the term ‘peacekeeping’ does not appear anywhere in the Charter. The very first form of UN peacekeeping known under the generational definition as ‘Traditional’ or ‘First Generation Peacekeeping’ was designed to strengthen the conflict resolution abilities of the UN during the Cold War era. Cold War politics meant that agreement in the Security Council in this period was rare when it came to measures for the provision of international peace and security that were laid out in the Charter. ‘Until the end of the Cold War, the frequent lack of unanimity among them (The five permanent members of the Security Council which include USA, UK, France, Russia and China) meant that these provisions were never fully given effect. The Council therefore resorted to other measures to promote and preserve peace, such as the good offices of the Secretary-General, conciliation, mediation – and peace-keeping’ (UN, 1996, p4). The use of traditional peacekeeping was specifically designed ‘to facilitate conditions for a more comprehensive peace agreement’ (UN, 1996, p4) and in regard to peacekeeping with a Chapter VI basis the tasks ‘range from monitoring cease-fire arrangements while peace agreements were being hammered out, to assisting troop withdrawals, providing buffer zones between opposing forces and helping implement final settlements to conflicts’ (UN, 1996, p3).

¹ Full background on the UNTSO operation can be found at the mission’s website. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/
At this stage it is necessary to go into some detail concerning the background of UN operations before the first major evolution resulting from the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 and how UN operations were to aid in the resolution of armed conflict within the first decade of the organizations existence. The specific case of the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 will be dealt with at later stage as it was a major turning point in UN history and also because it was the first UN peacekeeping mission as we know it in its present form with the use of troops as a buffer zone that would ‘secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities’ (UN GA Resolution 998 [A/3276], 4th November 1956, (ES-1))

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was one of the first to define peacekeeping under what is called ‘preventative diplomacy’; ‘preventive diplomacy’, the Secretary General meant something more specific than simply the use of diplomacy for peacemaking between warring parties. Instead, he saw the UN’s primary role as intervening in order to prevent the escalation of local conflicts into regional or global wars involving the superpowers.’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p84). The scope of ‘preventative diplomacy' and its abilities included prior to 1956 military observers and investigative commissions. The UN’s activities prior to 1956 consisted of military observation missions and commissions to investigate potential threats to international peace and security. These UN Observer Missions included the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)3, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)4 operating in the Middle East and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)5.

These observation missions were largely restricted to the monitoring of ceasefires and investigating potential threats to international peace or any other matter of friction as

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2 For the full text see General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-1) [Document is labeled as A/3276 under the UN filing system in 1956] at the 563rd plenary meeting of the GA on 4th November 1956.
3 A full background on the UNSCOB mission can be found at the website of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. http://www.defensie.nl/english/nimh/history/international_operations/mission_overview/48168698/united_nations_special_committee_on_the_balkans_(unscob)/
4 Full background on the UNTSO operation can be found at the mission’s website. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/
5 Full background of UNMOGIP can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/
stated under Article 35 of the Charter. The most important clause in Article 35 is clause one which states that ‘Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly’ (Charter of the United Nations, Article 35, clause 1)\textsuperscript{6}. One previously highlighted mission UNSCOB which can be defined as ‘the forerunner to traditional peacekeeping’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p175) was initiated after the Greek government brought up allegations of outside interference from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{7}. The UNSCOB mission however was not a UN peacekeeping operation and is not listed as one by the Department of Peacekeeping operations. The other two missions of UNTSO and UNMOGIP, which are peacekeeping operations, were implemented to monitor the cessation of hostilities between the warring sides and report to the Secretary-General on the status of the ceasefires. At this point, this was the limit of the UN’s abilities in regard to peace operations because of Cold War Security Council politics.

It seemed that monitoring missions would largely be the core activity of the UN when it came to peace operations and for the first 11 years of the UN’s history this was indeed the case. However the eruption of the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 and the outbreak of conflict required a more substantial stance from the UN to mitigate a serious regional war. The Egyptian government’s decision to nationalise the Suez Canal caused the matter to be brought before the Security Council\textsuperscript{8}. With no diplomatic solution available immediately to alleviate tensions British, French and Israeli armed forces initiated an intervention to secure the Canal. ‘The Security Council held a meeting on 30 October at the request of the United States, which submitted a draft resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines. It was

\textsuperscript{6} Article 34 provides the Security Council with the authority to investigate any dispute which could lead to armed conflict. See the UN Charter for the exact wording.

\textsuperscript{7} A full background on the UNSCOB mission can be found at the website of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. http://www.defensie.nl/english/nimh/history/international_operations/mission_overview/48168698/united_nations_special_committee_on_the_balkans_(unscob)/

\textsuperscript{8} For a full background on the situation which led up to UNEF 1’s deployment see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html
not adopted because of British and French vetoes. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also rejected’ (UN, 1996, p36). This political deadlock at the Security Council resulted in the issue being transferred to the General Assembly ‘on a proposal by Yugoslavia, in accordance with the procedure provided by Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950 entitled “Uniting for Peace”’ (UN, 1996, p36). At this stage it is prudent to briefly elaborate on the significance of the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution as it was and is a very significant document. The provisions set out in GA Resolution 377 (V) Article 1 where drawn up in the event of paralysis at the Security Council in a matter which could threaten international peace and security. Article 1 states that,

Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, Fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations; (UN GA Resolution 377 (v), 3rd November 1950).

The key to this was that this procedure to transfer the debate cannot be vetoed because ‘the transfer of an issue from the Council to the Assembly is considered a procedural issue and therefore not subject to the veto.’(Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p222). It was

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9 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (v), ‘Uniting for Peace’ is also referred to as the ‘Acheson Plan’.
this that allowed for the General Assembly to discuss the crisis and formulate an effective international response in regard to the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956.

With Resolution 377 (v) invoked the General Assembly meet at its first ever ‘Emergency Session’. It was during this session that a major land mark in the UN’s history happened and it came from the Canadian representative to the UN, the Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson. His proposal adopted at the General Assembly at the First Emergency Special Session on 4th November 1956 marked one of the most important landmarks in UN history. Pearson proposed to the General Assembly that the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld submit ‘a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities’. (UN GA Resolution 998 [A/3276], 4th November 1956). This proposal would mark one of the single most important turning points in the history of the organization and see Lester Pearson become the founding father of modern peacekeeping. The General Assembly approved resolution 998 and the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) was approved and deployed.

In order to understand the UNEF1 operation better and the first emergence of peacekeeping it is necessary to examine in closer detail the content of the Secretary General’s report that laid down the principles of UNEF 1 as it represented a landmark document in the formation of peacekeeping. Firstly as stated in paragraph 8 of the report ‘the Force should be of a temporary nature’ (Hammarskjöld, 1956, p4). This was to keep the force based on the description in Resolution 998. Arguably one of the most important statements in the report was that ‘there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict’ (Hammarskjöld, 1956, p4, paragraph 8). This statement is basically one of reassurance on the part of the Secretary-General to the parties involved in the conflict that the international force would be neutral and would not try to influence the conflict. Based on that similar trail of thought paragraph 9 elaborates that the force cannot be based in the territory of the member states in question ‘without the consent of the Government of that country’ (Hammarskjöld, 1956, p4). Consent is
arguably the single most important requirement of ‘traditional peacekeeping’ and in the case of UNEF 1 it was absolutely crucial in order for the force to be deployed successfully. The report further reassures the member states that the forces functions would be limited to what the General Assembly had agreed and that ‘although Paramilitary in nature, not a force with military objectives’ (Hammarskjöld, 1956, p5). The emphasis on the force not exceeding its mandate was very strong in the report and further elaborated that ‘the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in its resolution of 2 November 1956’ (Hammarskjöld, 1956, p4). The final major principle for this operation would be that this ‘Force should not be guided by the needs which would have existed had the measure been considered as part of an enforcement action directed against a Member country’ (Hammarskjöld, 1956, p4, paragraph 10). Again this was to further state how the mission would come under Chapter VI of the Charter and not Chapter VII which meant the force was only there to facilitate negotiations and not come under Article 42.

With the passing of General Assembly resolutions 997 to 1003 and the recommendations laid out by the Secretary-General in his Second and final report the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) was deployed in November 1956 and was maintained until June 1967. The success of this operation and the successful mitigation of further conflict in the region showed the UN could successfully deal with threats to international peace and security, and by doing so demonstrated that the new radical method of UN peacekeeping was an effective method in preventing conflict. UNEF 1 set a precedent for Chapter VI peacekeeping because ‘for more than 10 years, it effectively maintained peace in one of the most sensitive areas of the Middle East’ (UN, 1996, p55). The UNEF1 operation laid down the foundations for what would become the three core principles of UN peacekeeping. These are ‘Consent of the parties, Impartiality and Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml).

10 Further information on the guiding principles of UN peacekeeping can be found at the peacekeeping website at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml
With UNEF 1 establishing the first step of Chapter VI peacekeeping other operations sanctioned under this Chapter were authorised to help resolve conflict in multiply locations across the globe. This study will focus specifically on two of these classic UN peacekeeping operations that took place during the Cold War. These are the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)\textsuperscript{11} and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)\textsuperscript{12}

In the case of Lebanon the rising tensions between this state and Israel have resulted in the sanctioning of multilevel complex peacekeeping operations to assist the peace process and prevent further out breaks of armed conflict. 1958 saw the creation of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)\textsuperscript{13} as a result of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon. This operation was sanctioned by Security Council Resolution 128 on 11\textsuperscript{th} June 1958 ‘to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across Lebanese borders’ (United Nations Security Council Resolution 128, 1958, Article 1)\textsuperscript{14}. However the conflict that erupted in 1978 showed that a stronger method of prevention was required in order to try to resolve the conflict. Bearing in mind that an escalation of conflict in this region could have serious ramifications the Security Council established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Like in 1956 and UNEF 1 this conflict required the physical buffer to prevent the conflict and the UNIFIL mission is still currently operational owing to unresolved differences.

In the case of Cyprus, the unique situation of the island regarding its ethnic mixture meant that conflict erupting here presented a very grave threat to regional security. The conflict erupted between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities ‘with the outbreak of violent disturbances between them… on 21 December 1963’(UN, 1996, 115).

\textsuperscript{11} Full information on UNIFIL can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/
\textsuperscript{12} Full information on UNFICYP can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/
\textsuperscript{13} Information on this operation can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unogil.htm
\textsuperscript{14} Security Council Resolution 128 can be found at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/132/58/IMG/NR013258.pdf?OpenElement
As this conflict was and is predominantly an ethnic one and that this was such a deeply entrenched conflict there would be no expedient resolution. Therefore because of the nature of the conflict and that both sides have advanced military capabilities a much stronger method of prevention was needed to mitigate a conflict which could have erupted into a serious regional armed conflict. To do this the Security Council sanctioned the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to avert this conflict. Security Council resolution 186 (1964) laid down the basic duty of the force ‘to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting’. (UN Security Council Resolution 186, Article 5, page 3). As there is no political settlement yet to the crisis ‘UNFICYP has remained on the island to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone, undertake humanitarian activities and support the good offices mission of the Secretary-General’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/). As with the situation in Lebanon the lack of a political settlement coupled with a need to prevent and contain conflict and prevent escalation has resulted in this operation continuing its deployment.

UN peacekeeping operations we limited in number during the Cold War period owing to the West versus East political tensions. After the Cold War era UN peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the Charter have continued to be sanctioned showing the usefulness and relevance of Chapter VI peacekeeping. Missions in the Post-Cold War period have included missions such as the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) in 1996\(^\text{16}\), the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in 1993\(^\text{17}\) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in 1998\(^\text{18}\). While there have been many Chapter VI operations such as these this thesis will restrict itself to the key examples of the first two monitoring missions of UNTSO and UNMOGIP and UNEF 1, UNIFIL and UNFICYP for Chapter VI missions. The reasons behind this are that most of these operations are still deployed and are good

\(^{15}\) Further background on the origins of the Cyprus conflict can be found at the operations website at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/background.shtml

\(^{16}\) For further information regarding UNMOP see UN peacekeeping website at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmop/index.html

\(^{17}\) Further information on UNOMIG can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomig/

\(^{18}\) Further information for UNOMSIL can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomsil/Unomsil.htm
examples of Chapter VI missions being inherently useful. The other reason is that for reasons of time and length it is not possible to look at every single Chapter VI mission that has ever existed for dissection and scrutiny. This of course does mean that the argument is weakened, a flaw which must be acknowledged at this point, however this action is regrettably necessary. However a much more in depth look into all Chapter VI missions could be an avenue for future research; for now however this thesis shall restrict itself to these highlighted cases.

With a historical overlook of the key Chapter VI UN peacekeeping operations identified this thesis shall now proceed to highlighting the key norms of Chapter VI operations which will be crucial to the in depth analysis later on in Chapter Four. The first identifiable theme which runs through Chapter VI and is core to all UN operations sanctioned under this chapter can be broadly defined as the norm of ‘prevention’. This need for prevention emerged right from the start of the UN’s existence as highlighted by the language of Chapter VI. In the context of peacekeeping operations this was addressed by establishing the two core elements of UN traditional operations; namely ‘monitoring’ and ‘first generation peacekeeping’ as defined by the generation’s categorization. These two elements were the core foundations of preventative measures and can be regarded in their own right as norms that emerged under Chapter VI; for this reason both ‘traditional peacekeeping’ and monitoring will be addressed as separate norms and as subcategories of the norm of ‘prevention’.

The second norm that emerges from this chapter can be broadly defined as ‘the fear over sovereignty’. This does not mean the protection or sacristy of state sovereignty which is enshrined in the Charter, rather this means the fears of how UN peacekeeping would impact upon the states right to self defence and the issue of having such a force on its territory. This is why peacekeeping was initially placed under Chapter VI to allay these fears. These concerns of sovereignty regarding peacekeeping operations can be subcategorised into two other key themes that transpired from the first inception of peacekeeping operations. Bellamy and Williams refer to these two sub categories in their ‘holy trinity’ of Traditional Peacekeeping as the need for ‘consent’ and the ‘minimum use
of force’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p174, diagram 7.1) and this study regards these two factors as subcategories of the norm of sovereignty.

These identified norms and their subcategories have been crucial in the formation of UN operations under Chapter VI of the Charter. In regard to the construction of this argument the purpose of this first chapter is to establish the historical context of Chapter VI operations and highlight the norms that are intrinsically important in the formulation of these operations. A greater in depth analysis of how these norms interact to formulate Chapter VI operations will be discussed in the analysis chapter in chapter four. At this stage a timeline has been established so far showing the emergence of the identified Chapter VI operations which relate with the norms that have been highlighted. This timeline can be seen in the diagram below.

Diagram 1.2

1. **24th October 1945**: UN Charter comes into force
2. **21st October 1947-31st July 1951**: United Nation Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)
3. **MAY 1948**: United Nation Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
4. **3rd November 1950**: General Assembly Resolution 377 (v) ‘Uniting for Peace’
5. **(1956): Suez Canal Crisis**
6. **30th October 1956**: Security Council Meets regarding the Suez Crisis
7. **1-10th November 1956**: First Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly
8. **4th November 1956**: Lester Pearson proposes Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to submit a plan for the creation of the emergency United Nations force. UN General Assembly Resolution 998 [A/3276].
10. **November 1956**: First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) was deployed
11. **March 1964**: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
12. **March 1978**: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
13. **1991**: Collapse of the Soviet Union (End of the Cold War)

Now the next stage is to identify the key historical cases in UN history where Chapter VII of the Charter was used to form peacekeeping operations and identify the subsequent norms that accompany these types of operation.
Chapter Two: Chapter VII (Intervention):

While the UN, as do many others, hope that international disputes can be resolved through diplomacy and reconciliation unfortunately the reality can transpire to be something different. Despite the sentiment of hope at the time, the authors of the UN Charter knew that there would be occasions when negotiation would be insufficient. Thus Chapter VII of the Charter was laid down to provide stronger measures in the event of a severe threat to international stability; this included when the UN could use force if the occasion arose.

Chapter VII is arguably the most important, if not the most frequently cited section of the UN Charter. It was drafted to outline how the organization was to mitigate and resolve disputes which threatened international peace and security. This section of the Charter outlines the UN’s ability to sanction enforcement action to safeguard international peace and security. Arguably the most well known Article of this Chapter is Article 42 which states,

**Article 42**

*Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.* (Charter of the United Nations, Article 42)

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bi-polar world order had meant a break in the political deadlock at the Security Council and ‘as the UN emerged from the stifling ideological glacis of the Cold War, its involvement in global security issues increased exponentially’ (Mack and Furlong, 2004, p60). With the Soviet Union no longer the main opposition at the Security Council the organization was able to take on a more active role in guarding international peace and security. The 1990’s witnessed what can only be described as an explosion in UN peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping missions that were sanctioned in the Cold War (1948-1989) amounted to eighteen in total; the 1990’s alone by contrast saw the sanctioning of thirty five missions in multiply
locations across the world\textsuperscript{19}. However an expansion of UN peacekeeping was not only visible in the number of missions but also in the scope and manoeuvrability of their mandates and not solely restricted to Chapter VI. Chapter VII is concerned with sanctioning the use of enforcement methods if all other measures have failed or would be incapable of resolving a dispute or conflict. It was included in the Charter to be a method in which the international community could take collective security action to avert major conflicts. The post Cold War era has seen an unprecedented use of Chapter VII of the Charter. However it is not straightforward to say that the Security Council only sanctioned Chapter VII missions after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Korean War which took place between 1950 and 1953 took place in order to repel a North Korean attack. The action authorised by the Security Council in Resolutions 83 and 84 was ‘the first notable case to be conducted with a Chapter VII mandate’ (Pugh, 2008, p372) and led to the creation of a unified armed force under the command of the U.S. to repel the North Korean attack. Indeed this U.S. led force fought under the flag the United Nations as decided in Article 5 of UNSCR 84 (1950).

‘Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.’ (UN Security Council Resolution 84, 1950, Article 5, p6)

Although this was sanctioned by the Security Council this operation was not a peacekeeping mission but a collective security counter measure and ‘the UN exercised no operational control’ (Pugh, 2008, p372). It was also sanctioned in the first place ‘by the Soviet Unions absence from the Security Council, which left it unable to use its veto power’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p83). It is therefore an exception to the rule during the Cold War regarding enforcement action under Chapter VII; however this operation was not a peacekeeping operation and is not listed as one by the UN. However while the Korean conflict is not a peacekeeping operation it does demonstrate the first instance of

\textsuperscript{19} For a full list of all UN peacekeeping operations see the UN peacekeeping website at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf
peace enforcement by the UN. It also shows that enforcement action was possible, something that can be overlooked by the advocates of the ‘generations’ argument in peacekeeping.

However there was a peace enforcement mission that was a UN peacekeeping operation during the Cold War and that can be addressed here is the United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo) or ONUC\textsuperscript{20} in 1960. Unlike action taken in Korea, this operation was a peacekeeping mission and was sanctioned under Chapter VII. This mission was in response to a Belgium intervention which intervened under the premise of ‘restoring law and order and protecting Belgium nationals’ (UN, 1996, p177). They did so without prior agreement from the newly independent government and state of the Congo. The decision of the Security Council under resolution 143 (1960) called upon the government of Belgium to remove its armed forces from the Congo and to give the government military assistance to restore law and order (UN Security Council Resolution 143, Articles 1 and 2, p5). This operation became even more controversial with the adoption of resolutions 161 (1961) and 169 (1961). Article 1 of resolution 161 authorized the UN mission to use force if necessary and resolution 169 authorized the UN Secretary General ‘to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary.’ (UN Security Council Resolution 169, Article 4, p4). This operation was a landmark in UN operations and was the first insistence of a UN peace enforcement mission. What this also apparently demonstrates is that peace enforcement in UN peacekeeping was possible.

It was with the end of the Cold War that the UN was finely able to have freedom in safeguarding international peace and security. After this the Security Council started sanctioning more missions under Chapter VII of the Charter. UN operations such as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)\textsuperscript{21} in 1992 and United Nations Operation

\textsuperscript{20}Full background on ONUC can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onuc.htm
\textsuperscript{21}Full information on UNPROFOR can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprofor.htm
in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)\(^{22}\) in 1992 represented a reinforcement of the conflict prevention and resolution abilities in UN operations. UNPROFOR was charged with ensuring the demilitarization of specified locations, the monitoring of no fly zones and to support the delivery of humanitarian relief in Croatia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina and then in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm). ONUMOZ was charged to assist in providing security in Mozambique to allow humanitarian relief, rebuilding the states security and the implementation of the ceasefire agreements reached (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozM.htm).

There can be no doubt that the end of the Cold War signalled a new sense of operational liberation at the Security Council and it was a landmark event in UN history because of its new found freedom in sanctioning Chapter VII operations. Then in 1993 came the UN’s first major peace enforcement mission in the post Cold War era; the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)\(^{23}\). UNSOM II was established in March 1993 to replace the first operation in Somalia UNOSOM I\(^{24}\) which was concerned with monitoring ceasefires and protecting UN personnel\(^{25}\). As a result of the deteriorating situation in Somalia the Security Council authorized under Chapter VII the creation of UNOSOM II under resolution 814 (1993). This new operation took over the role of UNSOM I and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to bring stability to Somalia. UNOSOM II acted upon the same jurisdiction granted to UNITAF which under UN Security Council Resolution 794 (1992). It was specifically article 10 of the resolution which was the clause necessary for the use of force and enforcement measures. It stated that,

\(^{22}\) Further information on the ONUMOZ operation can be found at the UN peacekeeping website. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm

\(^{23}\) Further information on UNOSOM II see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm

\(^{24}\) Further information on UNOSOM I see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosomi.htm

'Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;' (UN Security Council Resolution, 794, 1992, p3)

This clause authorised the UNOSOM II mission which was established in March 1993 to act under the same premise granted to UNITAF by this resolution. However UNOSOM II was withdrawn from Somalia in March 1995 after troop withdrawals earlier in 1993 meant its current mandate was unrealistic for the tasks assigned to it. The lack of progress in reconciliation and state unification talks the mission was withdrawn in March 1995. For this reason many regard the UN operations in Somalia as ultimately a failure. However there is one case that is synonymous with the failings of the international community in protecting innocent civilians from gross violations of human rights. That case is the operations that took place during the genocide in the Republic of Rwanda.

Rwanda has become associated with the failure of the international community to prevent the horrific genocide that took place in 1994. The sudden violence coupled with the withdrawal of Belgian forces and subsequent inaction by the members of the Security Council on how to tackle the situation resulted in the deaths of ‘between 500,000 and one million victims’ (UN, 1996, p346). After the failure of the UNAMIR mission under its initial mandate the Security Council updated UNAMIR’s mandate to try to deal with the escalating violence. The Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter altered UNAMIR’s mandate to include the ‘protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas’ (UN Security Council Resolution 918, Article 3 (a), p3). The new mandate also included an expansion of the force and the enforcement of sanctions such as a ban on arms embargoes. However disputes about financing the operation caused a delayed deployment and so the Security Council authorized a French led operation to ‘be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength’(UN Security Council Resolution 929, Article 1,
The need for strong intervention was apparent here that it was recognised that an immediate intervention must happen. It is here in these resolutions that the priority to protect civilians becomes absolutely paramount.

The break up of the Former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s and the armed conflicts which followed presented another challenge for the UN when it came to the use of Chapter VII. The break up of the Former Yugoslavia was precipitated by the declared independence of Croatia and the escalation of armed conflict. There were numerous UN peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990’s linked to the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia. The most important mission was the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which is still in operation concerns itself with security but it is a development mission aimed at building the state of Kosovo and as a result it will not be dealt with here but in Chapter three. UNPROFOR was an interesting case because it mandates evolved as it was confronted by an escalating situation. When the armed conflict escalated UNPROFOR was mandated to use force to protect the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) and,

‘UNPROFOR was authorized to use force in self-defence in reply to attacks against these areas, and to coordinate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the use of air power in support of its activities.’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm).

This was a clear demonstration of an occasion when Chapter VIII of the UN Charter was invoked to assist UN peacekeeping operations. This Chapter specifically deals with the use of regional organisations to assist the UN, with Security Council authorization, in enforcement actions. It was agreed in deploying UNPROFOR that the mission should be able to prevent an escalation of armed conflict. However as the situation escalated it became apparent that UNPROFOR needed a much stronger mandate to deal more effectively with the conflict. The original mandate under Resolution 743 contained within

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26 Full background on the initial break up of the former Yugoslavia and of the UNPROFOR operation can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_b.htm
it an article designed to help the operation in this goal. This was article 5 of Resolution 743 which stated,

‘Recalls that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of the United Nations peace-keeping plan, the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.’ (UN Security Council Resolution 743, Article 5)

The mandate ‘saw UNPROFOR carrying out a more traditional peacekeeping role despite the reference to Chapter VII’ (Economides and Taylor, 2007, p71). As the violence escalated it was deemed fundamental to have a much stronger mandate. One of the key developments came with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 770 (1992) which specifically invoked the use of Chapter VII and specifically included the need use Chapter VII to deliver humanitarian assistance. Article 2 of the Resolution stated that the Security Council,

‘Calls upon States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina’

(UN Security Council Resolution 770, Article 2).

The operations that took place in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and their failures have become some of the most notorious operations in UN history. It was the failings in these theatres of operations that prompted a need to rethink how UN peacekeeping operations could and should be used. The post Cold War era prompted for the first time since 1956 and UNEF 1 a new opportunity to analyse how UN peacekeeping should best be used. The challenges that were encountered in UN operations in Somalia, Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia highlighted some of the weaknesses within UN peacekeeping. Out of the challenges faced in these operations came some of the most significant UN reports and recommendations for the advancement
of UN peacekeeping operations and how they can better protect international peace and security. There were two in particular that are very prominent and it was these reports that have now formed the basis for improving UN operations. These were ‘An Agenda for Peace’. Preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping’ which was a report issued by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 31\textsuperscript{st} January 1992; and ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ commonly known as the ‘Brahimi Report’ released in 2000.

‘An Agenda for Peace’ which was written by Boutros Boutros-Ghali is an attempt to comprehensively look at how UN peacekeeping can play a much more prominent role in the post Cold War period. Boutros-Ghali divides UN operations in to four distinct areas. These are Preventative diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peace-keeping and Post-conflict peace-building\textsuperscript{27}. The purpose of this document was to discover how UN peacekeeping operations could be improved to help guarantee international peace and security given that intra-state conflict was becoming a much more prominent factor than was inter-state conflict. The Secretary General addressed a number of key issues in the report including improved early warning systems to the right to the use of force enshrined in the Charter\textsuperscript{28}.

The other document that is considered one of the most crucial in UN peacekeeping is the aforementioned Brahimi report released in 2000. This report was designed to be critical of UN operations in the 1990s and to make recommendations for the UN to improve its abilities to mitigate and resolve conflict, ‘the panel advocated “robust doctrines” and “realistic mandates” together with improved capacities for headquarters management and rapid deployment’ (Doyle and Sambanis, 2008, p334). As a result the Brahimi report makes twenty recommendations to improve the UN peace operations; it addresses

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} The full text of ‘An Agenda for Peace’ can be found online at the United Nations Rule of Law website at \url{http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=A_47_277.pdf} ‘An Agenda for Peace’ document number is A/47/277 – S/24111
\item \textsuperscript{28} The full text of ‘An Agenda for Peace’ can be found online at the United Nations Rule of Law website at \url{http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=A_47_277.pdf} ‘An Agenda for Peace’ document number is A/47/277 – S/24111
\end{itemize}
multiple aspects from initial authorization of the mandate to how the operation should be financed.\(^29\)

Both the Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi report represented a learning curve for UN peacekeeping. The reports demonstrated that Chapter VII missions and intervention must be accompanied by multilateral missions which engage with all different aspects. This can be seen with reference to three specific cases where in all three cases a UN operation has been placed deployed but has then required a much stronger mandate under Chapter VII to deal with the situation. These examples are UN operations in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and in Liberia.

The UN has been involved in Haiti for a very long time with multiply UN peacekeeping missions being deployed to deal with the changing situation. The current mission in operation is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and has been deployed since June 2004.\(^30\) The mission’s priority is to create a stable security situation in Haiti. The UN have been in Haiti since the deployment of its first operation in 1993 with the Untied Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)\(^31\) however an escalating internal situation and the ‘non-cooperation of the Haitian military authorities, UNMIH could not be fully deployed at that time and carry out its mandate’ ([http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml)). It was then in July 1994 that the situation developed in an interesting way in terms of UN peacekeeping. The Security Council abundantly tired of the military leadership in Haiti passed Resolution 940 (1994). This was a dramatic event as the resolution ‘authorized the deployment of a 20,000 strong multinational force to facilitate a prompt return of the legitimate Haitian authorities’ ([http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml)). Specifically the resolution invoked Chapter VII and stated in operative clause 4 that the force was


authorized ‘to use all necessary mean to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership’ (UN Security Council Resolution 940, Article 4).

Liberia proved to be another example of an enforcement action under Chapter VII with a broad mandate. The UN had been in Liberia before under a Chapter VI operation the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) between 1993 and 1997 to observe the ceasefire (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomil.htm). However when civil war broke out again in 2003 the norm of intervention had great political support at the Security Council. Guided by the strength of this norm and the seriousness of the situation in Liberia, ‘On 1 August 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1497 (2003), authorizing the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia and declaring readiness to establish a follow-on United Nations stabilization force to be deployed no later than 1 October 2003’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml). This force was then deployed as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 32.

The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) has been in place since 2004 33. The operation was deployed to end the civil war and stop a potential destabilisation of the entire region. Since then UNOCI has been working in many areas to improve Côte d’Ivoire’s security and providing humanitarian assistance. After the civil war that followed the 2010 elections and the return of stability UNOCI has remained in the state since then to support the delicate situation.

With an overview of UN peacekeeping missions sanctioned under Chapter VII established it is now necessary at this juncture to identify the key concepts or norms that are present in Chapter VII operations and that will be analysed in the fourth chapter closely. Looking at the language of the key articles of Chapter VII it is abundantly clear that the norm is that of intervening in conflicts or international disputes to prevent escalation of armed conflict. Therefore the overarching norm that emerges from Chapter

32 Further information on UNMIL can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/
VII is that of ‘intervention’. The need to intervene in conflict to prevent escalation was already envisioned back in 1945 at the signing of the Charter, although how this was to be had not yet been foreseen. The Cold War era had meant acting upon this norm was rare and largely impossible as a result of the political deadlock caused by the bi-polar world order in the Security Council. With the end of this deadlock the Security Council was able to sanction more missions under the Chapter VII doctrine.

Out of the norm of intervention two further concepts have been intrinsically important in illustrating how UN peace operations functioning under Chapter VII have operated. These norms have arisen because of the post Cold War freedom that has been afforded to the organization at the start of the 1990’s. Firstly the norm of ‘peace enforcement’ has made a prominent emergence since the operations in Somalia. Although this method is highly contested by international legal experts regarding the issue of state sovereignty, peace enforcement has become a much more widely accepted method of peacekeeping operation. The other norm that has emerged is that of the ‘protection of civilians’. I use the phrase ‘protecting civilians’ here because whilst the R2P concept was adopted in 2005 at the World Summit, however how this principle is to be institutionalised remains to be decided and as a result it can not be called an established norm. While acknowledging the Responsibility to Protect I shall refer to the norm in this context as the desire to protect civilians or the individual form violations of human rights. Given that the norms of intervention, peace enforcement and the protection of civilians are crucial in peacekeeping missions under Chapter VII identifying where exactly these norms emerged into the United Nations timeline is a crucial exercise. Below in diagram 1.3 is a representation of the timeline of Chapter VII operations so far and the key documents.
How these norms have impacted and evolved the concept of peace will be analysed closely in the fourth Chapter.
Chapter Three: Chapter IX (Development):
Unlike Chapter VI and VII of the Charter Chapter IX does not specifically deal with actions that constitute a threat to international peace and security, however it is concerned, as Article 55 states, with ‘the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations’ (Charter of the United Nations, Article 55). To do this the Chapter focuses on economic and societal advancement. Many peacekeeping operations now have a strong focus on development as a method to advance to peace; this Chapter therefore can now be regarded in a security as well as a peace context. Lessons of the 1990’s demonstrated that comprehensive operations with a focus on development were needed; especially in the context of post conflict societies in preventing destabilisation and a regression back into armed conflict.
The recognition of developments ability to provide peace and stability is enshrined in the UN Charter under Chapter IX. This Chapter entitled ‘International Economic and Social co-operation’ outlines the United Nations responsibilities in the promotion of development on all its levels. The main article that illustrates these responsibilities is Article 55.

‘Article 55:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’ (Charter of the United Nations, Article 55).
Guided by these principles modern UN peacekeeping operations contain in their mandates tasks and provisions to help reconstruct war torn societies. As a result of the lessons of the 1990’s ‘the UN began to develop a new generation of peace support activities … In effect, the UN became engaged in building peace in war-torn societies’ (Sens, 2004, p141). Modern peacekeeping operations have much more comprehensive mandates compared to during the Cold War. The reason behind this was because peacekeeping in its traditional form although revolutionary in design was strictly limited by the politics of the Security Council and the Cold War. Its primary focus in the Cold War context was to act as a buffer to allow for negotiation; the notion of peacekeeping being involved in development had not been considered. This is not to say there were no development missions during the Cold War however they were not part of the peacekeeping missions mandate during this period. It was only after the end of the Cold War that development started to play a much stronger part in UN peacekeeping. Since the end of the Cold War many operations now also focus on the distribution of humanitarian aid, monitoring elections and observing compliance with international human rights law. ‘at the end of the Cold War the UN began to launch ambitious new missions, including some that aimed to help reconstruct the political, economic, and social foundations of countries that were just emerging from civil wars – a much more intrusive role than traditional peacekeeping’ (Paris, 2008, p405). However the greatest challenges for the UN was when its peacekeeping operations were called upon not just to provide security and aid in development. The greatest challenges in terms of development came when the UN was called upon to govern newly emerging states in order to aid the transition to independence. Aiding governments and transitional governments to develop state mechanisms to be stable members of the international community was one thing, however the 1990’s saw the UN being called upon to build and govern new emergent states, a task the UN was never originally intended for and why provision was not made in the Charter. It has provoked debate over the legitimacy of the organization to do this however this is not a subject that will be addressed here in this project.

When it came to peacekeeping operations the first major challenge the UN was faced with in the post Cold War era was in Cambodia when in February 1992 the UN Security
Council authorised the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This operation was tasked to aid the Supreme National Council in Cambodia (SNC) in rebuilding the state. The task to rebuild the state was delegated to UNTAC under resolution 745 (1992) in which UNTAC would have the means to tackle the rebuilding of the state and to be responsible for civil administration (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacmandate.html)\(^34\).

In the late 90’s came two of the most significant challenges for UN peacekeeping. Both in 1999 two peacekeeping operations were organised that would represent the greatest and most ambitious challenges of the organisation to date. The unrest and conflict in Kosovo and in East Timor meant a much stronger method of peacekeeping was needed to allow these two emergent states to become full sovereign members of the international community and to prevent these regions from slipping back into armed conflict. What these situations required was the UN to be the government until one could be formed. These two missions were the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)\(^35\) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)\(^36\). These three missions were radical examples of how peacekeeping became concerned with the issue of development and these three cases shall be a central focus of this chapter whilst also taking into account the increased role of development in other UN operations.

Although development in peacekeeping operations is very much a feature of the post Cold War era the first mission that initiated a direct focus on an aspect of development was in fact in Namibia in 1989. The first time the use of development we can see is in Namibia with the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) (April 1989-March 1990) where this mission apart form over viewing the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia was also charged under its mandate to,

\(^34\) Further information on the UNTAC operation can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacmandate.html
\(^35\) All information of UNMIK can be found on the operations website at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/
\(^36\) Information regarding the UNTAET operation can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm
‘ensure conditions in Namibia which will allow the Namibian people to participate freely and without intimidation in the electoral process under the supervision and control of the United Nations leading to early independence of the Territory’. (UN Security Council Resolution 632, Article 2).

In the wake of the end of the Cold War democracy and its promotion has have become strongly linked to stability and security. ‘one of the most interesting features of all the post-Cold War peacebuilding operations is that most international actors have subscribed to the strategy of promoting peace through democratization and marketization. There are good reasons for doing so: well-established democracies tend to be more peaceful both internally and in their relations with other states than non-democracies’ (Paris, 2008, p418). For this reason democracy has become an important part of development; the fact that the UNTAG operation took place in the Cold War showed the new direction the UN was taking. Although this mission was to be the start of a new trend for UN operations it was not until the early 1990’s that the UN could focus more on development in its operations.

In 1991 as a result of the instability in the region the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nation Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)\(^3\). This mission represented a new step in UN peacekeeping; this was to help a population to decide its own future free from outside interference. Under resolution 690 (1991) MINURSO was mandated, like with UNTAG, to assist in the electoral process. However this case is particularly unique in that it is the UN mission itself which is organizing the referendum and declare the result. The referendum is to allow the population to decide whether it wishes to become an independent state or if it wishes to integrate with Morocco (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/). Due to disagreements the referendum has not taken place yet, however the operation is still deployed to this day.

\(^3\) The operations website can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/
In 1992 the situation in Mozambique required a deployment of UN peacekeepers to oversee the peace agreements that ended the civil war that had been raging in the state. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)\textsuperscript{38} had developmental aspects to it including the provision of ‘technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process’ and ‘to coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozM.htm). This operation was one of the first inclinations that humanitarian assistance was necessary in peacekeeping operations; and its multi-layered approach proved to be successful. This multi-dimensional approach proved very successful for the UN operation and for Mozambique. The ‘Humanitarian relief was delivered, averting otherwise potentially devastating consequences’ (Howard, 2008, p222). The development of democracy in Mozambique meant that ‘freely contested elections were held in which almost 90 percent of the electorate voted, thousands of Mozambican electoral officials were trained, and technical and political mechanisms were established to ensure the future of regular national elections’ (Howard, 2008, p222). This operation proved to be a success and paved the way for more comprehensive peacekeeping operations that also dealt with greater development issues.

These were some of the first uses of development in peacekeeping operations. However the greatest challenge would come with the first of the much more comprehensive missions of the 1990’s in Cambodia. Civil War in the state of Cambodia had drawn the interest of all permanent five members of the Security Council. ‘More specifically, during the war, China and the USSR were direct suppliers of weapons and political support to competing factions; moreover, the US military fought directly in Cambodia. In addition, France had been the former colonial power not only in Cambodia, but also in neighbouring states’ (Howard, 2008, p139). This interest is what drew the Security Council to agree that the internal situation in Cambodia must be resolved. The permanent five members formulated a plan to resolve the situation via the UN. ‘The plan called for

\textsuperscript{38} Further information can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm
the control and/or supervision by the United Nations of the country’s administrative structures, followed by United Nations – supervised elections. The plan was accepted by all Cambodian parties and by Viet Nam, and was endorsed in September by the Security Council.’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr1.html). With this act the Security Council sanctioned and deployed the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAG)\(^3\) in February 1992. This operation was one of the most ambitious at this point in the organisation’s history as the UN was placed in charge of developing an entire state. The sheer magnitude of the operation and its ambition was revolutionary considering the Cold War had literally just ended. The mission assumed control and responsibility for the states administration ‘in order to build a stable environment conducive to national elections’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr1.html).

Cambodia was the first great test for the UN to use development in its peacekeeping; however in 1999 there were two missions which would prove to be the most ambitious projects of the UN in its existence to date. The unrest that ensued from the continually deteriorating situation in both Kosovo and East Timor required a unique response to deal with the escalating situation in two territories that wished independence but did not have any infrastructure or organization whatsoever. In both or these territories the Security Council authorised the two most significant operations in UN history. These were the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). There is no real necessity to delve into the specific details of what each operation did because both were charged with the same purpose; state building! As there was no legitimate transitional authority for the UN to work with on the ground the Security Council sanctioned that the UN was to be the transitional government. This was something unprecedented in the UN’s history. Both territories were put under control of the UN with the special representative of the Secretary General becoming the de facto ruler of that territory until a government could be formed.

\(^3\) More information see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untac.htm
The UNMIK mission in Kosovo is still operational because of the many issues that require resolving, however Kosovo does have an elected assembly and president and is no longer required to be governed by the Special Representative. UNMIK was deployed in June 1999 to initially govern Kosovo and prepare it for independence by building state institutions. Specifically resolution 1244 (1999) that authorised the operation states that the missions mandate was charged with,

‘Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered’ (UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Article 9 clause (c)).

Since the initial authorisation UNMIK continues to operate in Kosovo to aid in the security and stabilisation of the state. It is worth noting at this point that this mission was initiated under Chapter VI of the Charter. Many of the missions that have development objectives in their mandates are initiated under Chapter VII of the Charter because of the sited need to protect international peace and security. This was also the case with the mission authorised in East Timor. A peacekeeping mission cannot be sanctioned under Chapter IX of the Charter because that is not the Chapter which concentrates on matters of international peace and security and therefore any action which includes elements of Chapter IX have to be sanctioned sited Chapter VI or VII of the Charter.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was authorised to prepare the state for independence and to develop state mechanisms. The operation was mandated ‘to establish an effective administration and to support capacity-building for self government’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetM.htm) amongst other state building tasks. East Timor became the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste upon its independence in 2002. However resurgence in violence meant the UN continues to be present in Timor-Leste under the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
which is charged with aiding in the development of the society by ‘consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders’ (UN Security Council Resolution 1704, 2006, Article 4 clause a.). This operation is still deployed to this day.

These two initial missions in Kosovo and East Timor demonstrated how intrinsically linked development is with security. What these missions also showed is that comprehensive missions which include development prove to be the most successful formula in preventing state regressing back into armed conflict. This is why many peacekeeping missions now have comprehensive mandates which include development issues. For example the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) has as part of its extensive mandate to provide ‘support for humanitarian assistance’ and ‘support for the redeployment of state administration’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/mandate.shtml).

As with the other chapters it is necessary at this juncture to identify the key norms that arise from Chapter IX operations. The key themes and norms which emerge from this unique phase in UN peacekeeping clearly centred on developmental issues. ‘Development’ is the focal norm and its affects on peacekeeping will be scrutinised further in the analysis chapter in chapter four. Other norms and themes which derive from development are ‘state building’ and the need for ‘comprehensive peacekeeping operations’. These two derivatives are also the main driving forces in the norm of development and shall be analysed in depth later on. At this juncture a basic timeline has been drawn up looking at the peacekeeping operations that have concerned themselves with development. This time line is illustrated in diagram 1.4 below.

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Diagram 1.4:

1. **24th October 1945**: UN Charter comes into force
2. **April 1989**: United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)
3. **1991**: Collapse of the Soviet Union (End of the Cold War)
5. **February 1992**: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
7. **June 1999**: United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)
8. **August 1999**: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)

With all three Chapters of UN peacekeeping operations established and with the key operations and moments in the timeline highlighted it is now appropriate at this point to move on to a much deeper analysis of all three chapters and their missions and norms. For this to be successfully done all three chapters will be analysed in the analysis chapter in chapter four. This is both to build a much more comprehensive and critical appreciation of all the operations that have been covered and also to refer to the analysis back to the original question. How has the concept of peace evolved in United Nations peacekeeping operations?
Chapter Four: Analysis Chapter:
With the timelines established it is now necessary to analyse these timelines in relation to the identified norm and to use the triangle in diagram 1.1 to determine how the three factors of norms, political and operational influenced each other to form those operations. This in turn will also allow to analyse closely the concept of peace and observe it transition.

Analysis of Chapter 1: (Chapter VI operations):
The idea of using an armed force to create a physical ‘buffer’ between two opposing factions was a new and radical concept in the field of conflict prevention and for this reason the permanent five members were originally not allowed to deploy troops ‘in order to quiet fears of superpower intervention’ (Doyle and Sambanis, 2008, p325) nor was this form of peacekeeping to be ‘considered as part of an enforcement action directed against a Member country’ (Hammarskjöld, 1956, p4).42 For these reasons, this meant that what is defined as ‘traditional peacekeeping’ could firmly place itself within the context of Chapter VI of the Charter. One of the main reasons this form of peacekeeping could be placed under this particular Chapter and not under Chapter VII is because it requires the consent of parties involved; this above all was one of the main obligatory requirements not only for deployment of Chapter VI operations but also for peacekeeping to be brought into existence during the Cold War era. Its non confrontational nature also suited the concept of peace at the time. As this consent was an obligatory pre-requisite it meant that this first excursion into peacekeeping could be deemed as a practical application of the provisions set out in Article 33 and also comes under articles 36 and 38 in regard to the Security Council making recommendations for the settlement of disputes and relying upon the consent of the parties involved.

42 This provision comes from Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold’s report on the setting up of UNEF 1 in 1956 which is considered to be the founding operation of ‘traditional peacekeeping’ which provided a ‘buffer zone’ for resolving conflict in the inter-state context.
Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute. (Charter of the United Nations, Article 38)

The first manifestations of UN peacekeeping were deliberately placed under this chapter and inline with these specific articles in order to aid in the resolution of conflicts in the Cold War which had to bear in mind the geo political situation. This was in deed the case with all the identified operations during the Cold War period. The significance however of the UNEF 1 operation represented a strengthening of the need to prevent.

Previous peace operations which had been authorized had only involved military observers and investigative committee’s. In the context of the question of this study UNEF 1 marked a shift in the concept of peace at the General Assembly. Previous UN operations which had been authorized consisted of limited mandates which permitted the UN only observation and monitoring roles, as with UNTSO and UNMOGIP. It is apparent that the concept of peace before the 1956 crisis was primarily concerned with observation and investigation; monitoring the peace and the observation of good will of international agreements. This shows that the concept of peace in UN operations was precisely that, international peace. In the absence of political unity, a resultant effect of the emerging Cold War, the drive of the original UN vision had been stumped by this sudden freeze, and the UN’s concept of peace had to for now resign itself to observing and where permitted making recommendations on the best course towards peace. Thus the concept of peace in the UN was that of promoting peace through an active presence in pre or post conflict situations.

However the Suez Crisis of 1956 required more than an observation role as the crisis threatened to erupt into a much broader regional conflict. With the adoption of Resolution 998 and the creation of the First United Nations International Force (UNEF1) the UN had taken firm action in taking a positive step toward preventing the spread of the conflict or an escalation. It was with the passing of the resolutions at the General Assembly’s First
Emergency Session from the 1st to the 10th of November signalled a transition in the concept of peace at the UN. It was at this point the organization transformed from being an observer and a monitor of peace, to being an active force in guaranteeing international security.

As has been stated in chapter one the situation in the Suez Canal was transferred to the General Assembly via the provisions laid down in General Assembly Resolution 377 (v), the so called ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution. Resolution 377 is a manifestation of the Cold War difficulties. It was sanctioned to try and mitigate Cold War politics influencing action to prevent conflict. Its name, ‘Uniting for Peace’, is a sign of a strengthening of the concept of peace and a sign of it becoming a concept of strong solidarity. It indicates peace should be a much stronger concept. The fact that this resolution was passed in 1950 demonstrates that the UN new the Cold War era was going to make the UN role in international peace and security issues difficult.

The ‘Second and final report of the Secretary General’ which established UNEF 1 was another significant step in formulating Chapter VI operations. The Secretary-General’s report on how the force should be set up in his second and final report laid down the guiding principles on how the force should be constituted. Dag Hammarskjöld’s plan had to provide a concrete basis that would work in solving the current crisis but also had to take into account the restrictive environment. Hammarskjöld had to take into account the present conceptualisation of peace. With these boundaries in mind the Secretary-General established the basic principles of the UN force in his report. These principles for UNEF 1 as stated in chapter one set down the basic operational principles for future peacekeeping operations sanctioned under Chapter VI; principles which are defined in Bellamy and Williams’ book as the “holy trinity” of traditional peacekeeping’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p174, diagram 7.1). These are ‘Consent’, ‘Impartiality’ and ‘minimum use of force’. The condition of the minimum use of force is one of the key parts of traditional peacekeeping and one of the most crucial elements. The minimum use of force refers to the use of self defence while the force is deployed. This was a measure to ensure to the parties involved in any given conflict that a peacekeeping mission which
was deployed on their territory would not be there for enforcement purposes and remain under the provisions of Chapter VI.

At this stage the analysis will locate where in the UN timeline the norms highlighted in Chapter one emerged and how they evolved the concept of peace at the UN. This is key in order to understand how exactly peacekeeping has developed and illustrate how these norms engaged with the political and operational influences. The first identified norm of ‘prevention’ was enshrined and envisioned in the charter since the organisation came into existence; however the need for prevention only became much stronger after the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis. Effective methods for the prevention of conflict from escalating or reoccurring had to be developed and this was what gave rise to the UNEFI operation. The second norm of ‘fears regarding sovereignty’ came as a result of assurance to the member states that this new concept of peacekeeping would not violate the terms of the Charter regarding the sovereignty of the member states. These norms of prevention and sovereignty and their subcategories are crucial to the concept of peace under Chapter VI. It is these concepts that have moulded the concept of peace for peacekeeping under Chapter VI and that would define the concept during the Cold War era. These norms provided the parameters for UN operations sanctioned under this Chapter and these still provide the formation of the concept today for operations sanctioned under this Chapter.

The first place in the timeline to establish the emergence of the norm of ‘prevention’ is the 24th October 1945; the coming into force of the UN Charter. The language of the Chapter and its insistence of non confrontational methods to resolve disputes demonstrate the emergence of this norm right from the start of the organisations existence. The first observer mission of UNTSO demonstrates the need of prevention. In resolution 50 (1948) which established the mission the emphasis on the prevention of a further outbreak of conflict is strongly reinforced in the document especially the weight carried in article six which calls for a ‘sufficient number of military observers’ (UN Security Council Resolution 50 (1948), Article 6, p20) to be placed at the disposal of the UN mediator. This shows the norm of prevention in action as solidified norm and this action is what has given rise to the requirements laid out in this mandate.
Such monitoring operations demonstrated the prevention norm to be firmly routed within the actions of the United Nations. With the creation of UNTSO and UNMOGIP the prevention norm had been firmly established. However the singular most profound moment that was to set the norm of prevention was to come in the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. This crisis did more than just establish the first UN peacekeeping mission with military personnel as a buffer; this moment changed the United Nations from being an organization of promoting peace to one of actively engaging in safeguarding international security; in reference to the transition of the concept of peace at the UN the concept of peace now became synonymous with the concept of security and made the organization a credible security organization. The other important influence this operation had was to solidify the prevention norm. The crisis and its resolution through UNEF 1 fixed permanently that it was the UN’s mandated duty to be the force to prevent global conflict and thereby fixed the norm forever as a cornerstone of the organization. After the success of UNEF 1 the Cold War era was dominated by peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the Charter. This form of peacekeeping commonly defined as ‘traditional Peacekeeping’ has been a success in ensuring the norm of prevention; in fact ‘traditional peacekeeping’ has been seen as absolutely crucial for preventing conflict and many of the operations that were sanctioned in the Cold War are still in operation. UNTSO, UNMOGIP and UNEF 1 were inarguably the pioneering operations that first established and demonstrated the effectiveness of peacekeeping, an effectiveness further demonstrated with the deployment of similar prevention missions issued under Chapter VI such as in Lebanon and Cyprus. Although operations in these areas were not as revolutionary as the first monitoring missions or UNEF 1 these operations reinforced the effectiveness of traditional peacekeeping, reinforced the norm of prevention and reinforced the concept of peace being one of security in particular inter state and regional security.

Regarding the conflict in Lebanon and the subsequent need for a UN operation, this conflict brought forward the norm of prevention, and subsequent opinions in the Security Council reinforced this norm and that UN peacekeeping was the most effective way to deal with it. The conflict which erupted in 1978 changed the demands for prevention in
this particular conflict and demanded the need for the ‘buffer’ to alleviate rising tensions. So crucial has this need for prevention been apparent in this conflict that the norm has resulted in the Security Council renewing the mandate of the force and as a result the UNIFIL mission is still in operation. UNIFIL is an apparent example of how useful Chapter VI operations are in limiting an escalation of conflict; for this reason ‘the Security Council has repeatedly extended the mandate of the Force at the request of the Government of Lebanon and on the recommendation of the Secretary General’ (UN, 1996, P112). It appears therefore that UNIFIL is an example of how the norm of prevention coupled with the effectiveness of Chapter VI operations have resulted in a process of continuation that not only reinforces peacekeeping but is also perpetually reinforces the norm of prevention at the UN. This can only be described as an oroborus cycle that is continually creating and strengthening peacekeeping by constantly reinforcing itself. The operation in Cyprus UNFICYP has also successfully perpetuated the norm of prevention in an oroborus style cycle feeding of its own influence and energy and apparently strengthening the need for the UN operation to remain.

The use of language in Security Council mandates can also demonstrate the evolution of the concept of peace. If one scrutinises the names carefully we see the clear transition of the concept of peace. The first peacekeeping mission were that of observation and the language is insistent that although there are ‘military personnel’ that have been deployed they are not there in a military, offensive or even enforcement capacity. With the development of the Suez Crisis and the deployment of UNEF 1 was the first demonstration of this. The words ‘Emergency Force’ indicates the initial caution of using armed forces for peacekeeping, by placing the word ‘Emergency’ in front of the word ‘force’ it demonstrates the caution of the Security Council. After the success of UNEF 1 however the word ‘Force’ started to become used with a new sense of boldness. This boldness can be seen later with the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)\textsuperscript{43} in 1962. Here the word ‘force’ is being actively associated with its capacity to provide security. In the example of Cyprus previously mentioned it is the first time in the mission’s acronym that the mission is called a ‘Peacekeeping Force’. This may appear to

\textsuperscript{43} For more information on the UNSF operation see the operation website at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsf.htm
be a subtle case of semantics; however this clearly demonstrates how the norm of prevention was being much more intrinsically associated with use of armed force and thereby evolving the concept of peace to mean the active safeguarding of security and evolving UN peacekeeping along these lines.

As has been seen the concept of peace in these peacekeeping operations have evolved in relation to the changing need to prevent conflict. The need for prevention in the Suez Canal Crisis forced the UN to have a much stronger method of prevention and that was a need to guarantee security. Thus at this stage the concept of peace was forced to adapt to this new demand and focus on security. What transpires is a securitisation of the concept of peace in providing international peace and security.

In regard to the diagram highlighted in 1.1 it is clear to establish at this point that the construction of the norms came first with the establishment and ratification of the UN Charter and its founding principles. ‘Prevention’ and ‘the fear over sovereignty’ are fundamental to the UN Charter and of the world order that emerged in the wake of the Second World War. These two norms were firmly routed in the organization and how the UN should go about preventing outbreaks of international armed conflict and ensuring respect for sovereignty helped to forge the foundations of UN Peacekeeping.

The first missions of UNTSO and UNMOGIP were successfully established by the norm of prevention and the initial outbreak of armed conflict in these cases was severe and the repercussions of a continuation of the conflict meant that it was necessary to oversee and monitor the ceasefire arrangements. The norm of prevention influenced the need for monitoring; to closely watch the situation and react accordingly. However the political factors restricted the UN mandate to be anything more than an observation mission. Any other form of intervention at this point in the UN’s history other than observers was unlikely given the states involved; this was apparently so in the case of UNTSO and its establishment in the wake of the First Arab-Israeli War.

The established norm of prevention gave rise for the need to prevent the conflict in the Middle-East with the establishment of the Truce Commission. However the deteriorating
situation meant there was a need for military observers. This gave rise to the creation of UNTSO in 1948. What transpires here is that the operational factors were influencing the political and this action in turn was strengthening the norm of the need for prevention and that monitoring in this case was the most effective way to achieve this. The influence from the political factor to authorize UNTSO influenced the operation on the ground and strengthened it by sending military observers. A metaphorical game of tennis is enacted between the political and the operational factors in which one influences the other. The success or rather the necessity for the operation to remain in place has influenced the political decision at the Security Council to perpetually renew its mandate. This in turn has influenced the norm that this method of prevention is effective at mitigating a serious armed conflict. What then transpires is an oroborus effect or even a three way cycle of influence in which one factor directly influences the other two. This cycle reinforces all three factors which is why the mission has been going since 1948 and is still operational. In the absence of a much more solid solution to the relevant disputes this peacekeeping operation has continued to exist provided that the three factors continue to influence each other.

A similar situation has continued to exist regarding India and Pakistan with UNMOGIP. The lack of a total diplomatic agreement over the disputed territory has resulted in a continuing need for UN military observers since 1949. What makes UNMOGIP interesting from an individual mission perspective is that both sides can not agree on the purpose and capabilities of the operation itself. As a result of this UNMOGIP is rather unique from a Chapter VI operations perspective in that,

*Given the disagreement between India and Pakistan about UNMOGIP’s mandate and functions, the Secretary-General’s position has been that UNMOGIP can only be terminated by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such a decision, UNMOGIP has been maintained with those same arrangements since then.*

With the lack of a suitable diplomatic agreement to end the dispute the Security Council will continue to renew the mandate of the operation provided that it continues to provide for the cessation of hostilities in the Jammu and Kashmir. This again is a cycle that is perpetually reinforcing the norm of prevention and the usefulness of UN peacekeeping.

The emergence of the 1956 Suez Crisis and the creation of UNEF 1 however represented a landmark change in UN peacekeeping, the norm of prevention and with it a change in the concept of peace at the organizational level. Whereas with the success of UNTSO and UNMOGIP influencing the political factor and then in turn reinforcing the norm; with UNEF 1 the success of this mission to overt a serious armed conflict directly influenced and changed the norm. UNEF 1’s success facilitated the change of the norm of prevention to include peacekeeping forces other than just military observers. It meant the norm of prevention changed to allow for the UN to use armed forces to prevent inter-state warfare; with this came about a change in the concept of peace at the UN. Now the concept of peace had changed to mean actively safeguarding international security and not just simply observing ceasefires. This dramatic impact influenced the Security Council, the General Assembly and the entire membership of the UN to recognize the intrinsic value of peacekeeping forces. It can be argued as a side note that the initial success of UNEF 1 and the subsequent value placed on UN Peacekeeping reinforced and has continued to reignite the debate about permanent standing UN forces. Had UNEF 1 been a total failure or had not even come into existence it is unlikely that the UN would have been taken seriously in safeguarding international peace and security at all given the serious situation in 1956.

The success of UNEF 1 had ignited the fires of potential possibilities for the organization. Although hampered by the political deadlock in the Security Council, which was sadly an endemic feature of the Cold War era, UNEF 1’s success had given the UN a mandate and a basis for the use of UN forces in similar circumstances; and to have a limited role in international peace and security at this time. Similar missions under Chapter VI of the Charter such UNFIL and the UNFICYP have facilitated the normalization of UN peacekeeping operations. These two specific missions are classic examples of the Chapter
VI missions sanctioned in the Cold War. They are also examples of how UN Chapter VI peacekeeping have been deployed in complex situations and have halted an escalation of armed conflict. Again the complex nature of a diplomatic solution has meant prolonged intense negotiation; this has perpetuated the need for the UN forces to remain stationed where they are. This as has been seen in turn reinforces the need to UN peacekeeping and the norm of prevention. With a diplomatic settlement apparently still waiting in the wings the need to avert a serious armed conflict reinforces the need and usefulness of Chapter VI peacekeeping.

From the first missions of UNTSO and UNMOGIP to the continuation of missions such as UNIFIL and the UNFICYP Chapter VI missions have been about prevention of interstate conflict and an insistence of the sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty. As a result these two norms shaped the transition of UN missions operating under a Chapter VI mandate. As can be illustrated by the triangle of influences in diagram 1.1 the evolution of UN operations operating under this part of the Charter had initially been one of the norms influencing the other two factors. However with the success of the UNEF 1 operation the direct influence on the norm had the effect of an oroborus cycle in which norms, missions and mandates were being perpetually fuelled by this process. This effect has in the long term had the significant impact of influencing the concept of peace at the organization. The concepts origins carried the sentiment of prevention but with a greater concentration of peace, as any use of force to a war weary global populace seemed intolerable in 1945. This firmly set the concept as focusing on negotiation and observation for the first decade of its existence. This concept is still present in the UN system and is still regarded as a corner stone; however the concept advanced with the authorisation of UNEF 1. The success of UNEF 1 altered the outlook of the organization from being one of solely resolving disputes through the medium of negotiation, to being actively engaged in the provision of security. This concept still operated under the purview of Chapter VI and was limited; however it represented a transition of the concept of peace to mean an active provision of security and this in turn transformed the organization to being a security organization under the restrained context of the Cold War and a lack of resources. UNEF 1’s success reinforced and gave credit to the alteration of
this concept and the result of this was the authorisation of other UN operations under Chapter VI along similar mandates. The successful deployments of these operations and their realistic mandates gave UN peacekeeping a credible boost that continued this concept of peace. As these missions have proved to be successful in mitigating serious armed conflict has resulted in many of the operations continue to be in place because of this usefulness. The subsequent need to keep many missions in place has resulted in the concept of peace being redefined as protecting security especially in the context of Chapter VI inter-state security. This securitisation of the concept of peace has provided for a transition in the organisation to providing greater abilities for the UN and its peacekeeping missions. This was the first major shift in the conceptualisation of peace that has also redefined the UN role in international peace and security. However the end of the Cold War and the greater use of intervention under Chapter VII would prove to be the next leap for the organisation.

Analysis of Chapter 2: (Chapter VII operations):
It was clear to see that a greater use of Chapter VII has emerged since the end of the Cold War if one takes a look at the operations sanctioned in the post Cold War era. Chapter VI missions were stereotypical of the Cold War era, but now with a new sense of liberty the Security Council sanctioned more Chapter VII missions than had ever been previously authorised before the 1990’s. This is a representation of how the concept of peace had altered to mean that of enforcement rather than just wilful compliance of the parties in a dispute.

As already stated in Chapter two the two cases of enforcement action during the Cold War prove to be interesting points in the UN timeline. The enforcement action taken against Korea in the 1950’s is particularly interesting. Although this was sanctioned by the Security Council this operation was not a peacekeeping mission but a collective security counter measure and ‘the UN exercised no operational control’ (Pugh, 2008, p372). It was also sanctioned in the first place ‘by the Soviet Unions absence from the Security Council, which left it unable to use its veto power’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p83). Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams show that ‘the peculiar circumstances in
which the intervention was authorized meant that it turned out to be the exception rather
that the rule for UN operations during the Cold War’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p83).
It is an exception during the Cold War era; however what it demonstrates is the first
practical emergence of the norm of intervention. However this operation was not a
peacekeeping operation and is not listed as one by the UN. Therefore the Korean conflict
will not be addressed any further.

The first use of Chapter VII in terms of peacekeeping operations was in 1960 in the
Congo with the ONUC operation. The violence that had emerged in the recently
independent state of Congo threatened to destabilise the region. The escalating violence
was followed by an intervention by Belgian armed forces which entered ‘without the
agreement of the Congolese Government’ (United Nations, 1996, p177), which created a
very serious diplomatic situation. An enforcement action was sanctioned by the UN
Security Council under resolution 143 (1960). Although this is regarded by many as an
anomaly it did however highlight how the UN could use peace enforcement as a viable
tool of conflict resolution. Although this operation cannot be regarded as the norm it
never the less shows that the norm of intervention and Chapter VII operations were
capable of being deployed something which the generation’s argument ignores. In fact
‘third generation peacekeeping actually predated the second generation’. (Hanhimäki,
2008, p77)

It is at this point that it is necessary to elaborate further on the problems with defining
peacekeeping in generations. Full engagement with this debate is unnecessary for the
question over the evolution of the conceptualisation of peace; however it would be a
mistake not to acknowledge the issue at this juncture. The acknowledgement that this
concept is flawed is a reoccurring argument that seems to go unhindered. Alex Bellamy
and Paul Williams’ extensive study into UN peacekeeping also highlights this debate
very well. In their book ‘Understanding Peacekeeping’ they show that ‘it makes little
sense to categorize peace operations chronologically’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p17)
because despite the sweeping generalisation about Cold War operations there are
exceptions in the Cold War, just as there are Chapter VI operations being sanctioned now
in the post Cold War era. Bellamy and Williams rightly state that ‘defining peace operations this way obscures more than it illuminates, because there have always been different type’s peace operation and their development cannot be easily broken down into chronological eras’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p17). However most overlook these anomalies and accept the general trend of transition. Sweeping the Congo mission and other anomalies under the proverbial carpet does not account for how some peace enforcement action was taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly in an era that was stereotypically dominated by total paralysis in matters of international peace and security. What it in fact demonstrates is that rather than describing peacekeeping as a generational evolution, which is both inaccurate and misleading, these ‘generations’ of peacekeeping where always available and there provision made for in the Charter. However it is not for this project to come up with a brand new way of how we define peacekeeping operations. This is something that would taken an extensive amount of research and a lot of space, space which is sadly not available in this project and would draw the focus of this project off at a tangent. It is important to engage with this as clarity in defining peacekeeping helps us to see how the concept of peace has evolved. With the ‘generations’ definition refuted by many what apparently comes to light is that the concept of peace was always broad in nature, but suppressed and therefore to categorize peacekeeping in generations is illogical and misleading.

As demonstrated in chapter two one of the most profound changes towards Chapter VII operations was the UNOSOM II operation in 1993. For this operation it was Security Council Resolution 794 that authorized this operation and in particular article 10 of the resolution crucial.

‘Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.’ (UN Security Council Resolution, 794, 1992, p3)
This single clause was a landmark change in UN operations and heralded a true shift towards Chapter VII. The impact of this clause is elaborated further by academics such as Ioan Lewis and James Mayall in their observations on the operations in Somalia. They illustrate that resolution 794 ‘was not only the first to establish an humanitarian operation under Chapter VII of the Charter, and without the explicit invitation from the parties to the conflict, but it also gained the unanimous support of the Council’ (Lewis and Mayall, 2007, p124). Here the significance of this resolution and UNOSOM II comes into sharp focus. It was authorized without the permission of the factions involved in the armed conflict. Even the first UN peacekeeping enforcement operation of ONUC had been authorized by the request of the Republic of the Congo to have such an operation on its soil. Now this operation would set the precedent that UN intervention could be authorized without the consent of the states and actors involved. In terms of the identified norms it marked a strengthening of the norm of intervention and detached from the traditionalist notions of state sovereignty and advocacy of the norm of peace enforcement. In regard to the identified norm of the need for the protection of civilians; although the resolutions do not specifically call for the protection of civilians the nature of the operation to provide humanitarian assistance and to improve the quality of life for Somalia’s citizens demonstrates a shift toward the securing of the individual. The insistence of the importance of humanitarian aid in the resolutions give significant weight to this point of view such as in the aforementioned article 10 of resolution 794 (1992). The UNOSOM II was successful in initiating the first UN peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII that was authorized without the consent of the state in question.

In referring back to the original question what we see here with the authorization of UNOSOM II is an alteration in the concept of peace. During the Cold War the emphasis on UN operations centred on the premise of Chapter VI missions which were there with consent by the states involved in the armed dispute and that it would not constitute an enforcement action. UNOSOM I and II represented the first instance of initiating enforcement action without the consent of the parties concerned. One might argue that this demonstrates a shift in the practices of state sovereignty and that the notion of sovereignty has been devalued. However academics such as Ramesh Thakur who have
written extensively in regard to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement regarding the sanctity of sovereignty, argue that the case of Somalia did not violate sovereignty. Thakur argues that in Somalia ‘the collapse of state authority means there is no functioning government to fulfil an essential condition of sovereignty’ (Thakur, 2008, p390). Thakur basically puts forward the argument that there was no violation of the right of sovereignty because there was no sovereignty to violate, a condition that it itself threatened regional peace and security; an opinion shared by Lewis and Mayall when they illustrate that ‘For the first time, statelessness was acknowledged to be a threat to an international society composed of sovereign states’ (Lewis and Mayall, 2007, p108). However Thakur takes the issue of the absolutes of sovereignty even further by stating that since the coming into force of the Charter sovereignty is not absolute. He highlights this by stating ‘Yet by singing the Charter a country accepts collective obligations and international security. The restrictions of Article 2 (7) can be set aside when the Security Council decides to act under the collective enforcement Chapter VII.’ (Thakur, 2008, p390). On a broader level UNOSOM II represented the start of a shift towards practices of Human Security. There were other insistences in which there was a direct overriding of sovereignty later on in the UN timeline and these events will be dealt with later in this Chapter. The concept of peace therefore at this juncture is now focussing on protecting the people; not yet in the context of R2P, but in so far as saying that humanitarian aid and a stable environment to distribute aid protects a populace and that Human Security concerns are vital to stabilisation.

The tragic events that unfolded in Rwanda in the 1990’s signalled a turning point in the UN history. It was recognised that the international community had failed to protect civilians from acts of violence and persecution. The failure to protect civilians sparked a debate about establishing adequate measures and creating ways to better guarantee the protection of civilians. The genocide in Rwanda triggered the norm of the need to protect civilians to be dealt with more seriously by the international community as an urgent priority. It has caused the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect or R2P.

For more on Human Security in the UN context see the works by S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Human Security and the UN, A Critical History’.
It was the failures in Rwanda and Somalia that caused the demands for major improvements to be made in United Nations peacekeeping and in its conflict resolution abilities. The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect or R2P was as a result of the failures in Rwanda to protect civilians and the need to establish better mechanisms that can protect civilians from gross violations of human rights. ‘The decade of the 1990’s was the watershed; the report of the International Commission on State Sovereignty in 2001, coming up with the new concept of “the responsibility to protect”, was the immediate catalyst’ (Evans, 2008, p3).

Reflecting momentarily upon the conceptualisation of peace at the UN it appears that this concept underwent the same uneasy transition in Chapter VII operations as it did under Chapter VI. However once a precedent had been established a cycle took over in which the use of Chapter VII was reinforced and the norm of intervention became an established part of the concept of peace. This transition was not a smooth one and the events in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have demonstrated this clearly. However the failings and limitations of these three cases whilst initially damaging the organisation in fact provided a ground of experience in which the organisation could improve it operations to try and prevent similar situations from occurring again.

The failures of the 1990’s required the UN to review its peacekeeping operations and did so with the introduction of ‘An Agenda for Peace’ and the ‘Brahimi Report’. ‘An Agenda for Peace’ was a landmark document for UN peacekeeping. The mere fact that this report was written as a request by the Security Council demonstrates how the post Cold War situation coupled with the increasing use of the norm of intervention and the rise of intrastate conflict was making the Security Council seriously consider who the UN can play a much greater roll in issues of international peace and security. The norms that drove UN peacekeeping operations were now altering so much in the wake of the collapse of the bi-polar world order. The Brahimi Report has also played a significant role in helping to create better UN operations. What this shows is another turn in UN peacekeeping. As the norm of intervention has gathered strength it had been recognised
that the UN needed a comprehensive strategy in its operations to ensure a successful intervention if necessary and to ensure the conflict does not reoccur. The emergence of these key documents have been key documents in outlining how and where UN peacekeeping can and needs to be improved. Many of these concerns have been addressed and as a result more peacekeeping missions have a multidimensional approach whilst focusing on ensuring security such as the missions in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia.

The operation in Haiti was another significant operation especially regarding UN Security Council Resolution 940 which authorised intervention in Haiti to remove the military rule. This was a dramatic use of the norm of intervention and a strong use of an enforcement action under Chapter VII. What this shows is that the norm of intervention was now strongly reinforced at the Security Council and that the Council’s ability in the post Cold War era to utilise it invoked a strong enough fear from the actor the enforcement action was aimed at.

The UN intervention in Liberia in 2003 was another demonstration of how strong the norm and practice of intervention is at the Security Council. It is apparent that like in Haiti the strength of the norm of intervention at the UN was so strong that it forced the factions in Liberia to sign a ceasefire and a peace agreement. ‘By that Agreement, the parties requested the United Nations to deploy a force to Liberia under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’ (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml). It was clear that enforcement action was going to be initiated by the Council. This demonstrates just how the norm of intervention was and still is very strong at the Security Council. Unlike during the Cold War the use of intervention by the UN is now no longer a taboo subject. The pursuit of strong intervention and enforcement action has demonstrated how the concept of peace at the organization continues to be more associated with that of guaranteeing international security. The result of this was the deployment of UNMIL and its continued presence.
The final case in Côte d’Ivoire illustrates how the need to enforce a peace agreement to end the civil war and ensure the sovereignty of Côte d’Ivoire and its neighbours was firmly driven by the norm of intervention. As a general rule it appears the concept of peace has increasingly become about securing international security through much stronger methods of interventionism including peace enforcement and an increasing focus on Human Security. Unlike in the Cold War era intervention was a very taboo subject, now with mission mandates addressing a greater range of issues to secure stability intervention under Chapter VII is becoming more justifiable under this concept of peace at the UN.

Having established the key cases in the timeline and the norms of Chapter VII operations regarding the evolution of the concept of peace at the UN it is now possible to subject these norms to the diagram illustrated in diagram 1.1. It is clear to see that post Cold War era had an enormous effect on the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. The end of the political deadlock in the Security Council allowed the council to actively deal with the issue of protecting international security via methods under Chapter VII. From the UN timeline it can be shown how the norm of intervention was allowed to play a key role in the formation of UN operations. As we see in the early 1990’s with operations such as UNOSOM II the norm of intervention had emerged as a method of peacekeeping which could now be used. The strong emergence of the norm of intervention coupled with a Security Council that was free from deadlock meant the operation sanctioned had a much more powerful mandate as demonstrated by UNOSOM II’s mandate. While the operation was successful initially the pioneering nature of this operation made it susceptible to strong criticism and any failure would be magnified ten fold. In the case of the operation in Somalia regrettably this is exactly what happened. This failure affected the norm of intervention bringing it into question and more significantly the failure affected the political factor of the Security Council which in turn resulted in the sanctioning of a weaker mission severely restricted to trying to encourage compliance. The situation however meant that this was highly unlikely; this resulted in the operation being withdrawn altogether. This event brought the norm of intervention into question. What also is observed through this operation is that like with Chapter VI operations a cycle of
reinforcement strengthens all the other components in the triangle; however in the case of the UNOSOM II a failure on the ground had severe repercussions for the entire mission that reverberated through the political and the normative as well. The failures to adapt quickly to the escalating situations on the ground in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia produced a similar reaction damaging the norm of intervention. However in these two cases the horrific events and the violence that ensued produced a stronger response. From the Security Council issuing tougher responses of enforcement action such as the French led operation in Rwanda and the NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia. These enforcement measures were put in place until the UN could successfully deploy a much stronger peacekeeping mission.

These three missions severely damaged the reputation of all three factors; the operational, the political and the normative factors, all were affected by these operations and in turn damaged the entire organisation and its reputation. In terms of the concept of peace in UN peacekeeping these missions and the damage they caused threatened to make UN peacekeeping redundant in favour of other actors. However the past reputation of the usefulness of UN peacekeeping aided in its revival and the norm of the use of intervention did not die out with these operations. The strong action taken by the Security Council in regard to the missions in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia has proved the usefulness of UN peacekeeping. Missions such as these three which act under Chapter VII have proved to be successful. These successes on the ground have once again reinforced the norms of intervention, peace enforcement and the need to protect civilians and also reinforced the political factor to renew missions and to use UN peacekeeping in further situations. The emergence of key documents such as ‘An Agenda for Peace’ and ‘the Brahimi report’ while not having all recommendations implemented has seen an improvement in the conduct of UN operations. Like in Chapter VI operations Chapter VII missions have proved their usefulness and the resultant effect is that all three factor feed of each other in an oroborus style cycle seen in Chapter VI. The continued proved success of comprehensive Chapter VII missions have meant these missions will continue to be deployed.
From this we can see how in regard to Chapter VII peacekeeping operations how the concept of peace has evolved. The use of peace enforcement in peacekeeping operations has meant that peace increasingly is linked to the need for security especially Human Security. Peace as a concept in UN peacekeeping it can be argued has meant a form of policing in the international community that has perpetuated the need for UN intervention. UN peace enforcement and intervention have proved to be land mark phases in the history of UN peacekeeping. However another leap was to come when it came to the development of entire new states in which the UN itself was placed in charge to govern the state.

Analysis of Chapter 3: (Chapter IX operations):

The use of development in peacekeeping operations has not only brought about the prominence and the intrinsic need for development in post conflict societies it also advanced the concept of peace at the organization by not merely focusing on security issues. The recognition of development as an inescapable part in peace building and post conflict reconstruction has meant peacekeeping operations have become much more effective and can potentially reduce the re-emergence of conflict. The success of using development in peacekeeping has meant a broadening of the concept of peace because of the recognition that development brings security. In Chapter three the norms that emerge from Chapter IX operations were ‘development’ as the overarching norm and ‘state building’ and ‘comprehensive peacekeeping operations’ as subcategories to the original norm. Placing development issues within the context of peacekeeping operations has not only aided in the creation of more effective missions it has also advanced the concept of development as an essential norm of peacekeeping operations. In regard to the concept of peace, the inclusion of development as an essential norm has broadened peace and security concerns to include this element. In other words the concept of peace has evolved to mean development as a method of security.

Despite the Cold War restrictions what comes to light is that the operation in Namibia helped to show the way for a much broader kind of peacekeeping operation. As stated before the only development aspect within UNTAG’s mandate was that of monitoring
elections. Although the development aspect of this mandate is very limited it never the less shows the beginning of a trend in UN peacekeeping. Assistance in the electoral process is viewed as an intrinsic part of the path of development of post conflict societies. UNTAG as has been highlighted before was an exception in the Cold War period, because although this mission was strictly speaking during the Cold War it was very much in the post-Glasnost era; a time when Soviet influence was beginning to wane. This explains how the mission was able to be deployed with its sighted mandate in 1989. What UNTAG does represent on the other hand is the first emergence of the norm of development and its intrinsic importance in the stabilisation of post-conflict societies. UNTAG’s exception is noted.

MINURSO was the first real development mission in the post Cold War era. Its purpose of organising a referendum has continued due to operational difficulties however the operation remains to implement its assigned task. The development aspect here is self evident, when the referendum takes place it could potentially give birth to a new sovereign state and this mission is preparing a region for what ever future its populace decides. As its assigned function has yet to be performed there is nothing further to discuss in regard to the concept of peace. Despite the MINURSO’s limited achievements concerning its mandate it was the mission in Mozambique that start an emergence of the development norm in UN operations.

What really strengthened the norm of development in UN peacekeeping and also strengthened the usefulness of comprehensive operations was the mission in Mozambique ONUMOZ. The operation in Mozambique is hailed as one of the great success stories of the UN and its peacekeeping efforts. This mission was focused strongly on development and it ‘was one of the largest and most ambitious multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Africa of its time’ (Howard, 2008, p179). The ONUMOZ operation really strengthened the norm of development in UN peacekeeping and also strengthened the usefulness of comprehensive operations by it success. Looking at the operations which have concerned themselves with development after the mission in Mozambique it is apparent that the norm of development in peacekeeping operations has become a much
more deeply rooted concept. With success in operations such as in Mozambique using development to help provide security has become a much more widely accepted and deemed to be necessary. This also became apparent when the UN faced its greatest challenges and its most ambitious missions to date namely in Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo.

UN action in Cambodia was the most ambitious operation at the time and its focus on aiding state administration would set a precedent for similar operations. The operations in Kosovo and East Timor represented the most ambitious operations to date and initially saw the UN governing these territories as part of the process to become full fledged sovereign states. As there was no legitimate transitional authority for the UN to work with on the ground the Security Council sanctioned that the UN was to be the transitional government. Regarding the concept of peace, this action is the ultimate example of interventionism on the UN’s part but it also showed how important development was to peace and security. Both the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)\(^45\) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)\(^46\) have proved the greatest challenges of the UN and are the ultimate examples of how the UN have used comprehensive peacekeeping missions to bring stability. What these missions also showed is that comprehensive missions, which include development prove to be the most successful formula in preventing state regressing back into armed conflict. This is why many peacekeeping missions now have comprehensive mandates which include development issues.

In the context of the relationship between the normative, political and operational factors what transpires is that like the norm of intervention successful practice has perpetually reinforced the norm itself. Like with most norms and practices in peacekeeping the Cold War severely restricted the ability of the Security Council to implement operations that would have included development issues. UNTAG’s success in brining democracy to

\(^{45}\) All information of UNMIK can be found on the operations website at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/
\(^{46}\) Information regarding the UNTAET operation can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm
Namibia and giving it independence is the first illustration of development in a peacekeeping mission. This success reinforced the norm that development was essential in UN peacekeeping. The success of this had an impact on the political dimension, meaning the Security Council was more likely than not to use development or at least electoral assistance in future operations.

It was because of the success of this mission that all three norms were strengthened. The success of such a large and complex operation set in motion a cycle which continued to strengthen all three norms and the application in the political and operational. The UNTAC operation in Cambodia was one of the most comprehensive missions at the time because of its level of sophistication. It did not go as far as becoming the transitional government itself as with the operations in Kosovo and East Timor, but it was given an enormous amount of authority to rebuild the war torn state. The successful implementation of the UNTAC mission and the success of it fulfilling its mandate showed that the organization could implement large peacekeeping operations that had a strong emphasis on development. In regard to the triangular relationship that evolves the concept of peace in diagram 1.1 having development issues within UN peacekeeping operations has proved to be incredibly effective and its usefulness has resulted in a strong reinforcement of all the three factors that influence these operations.

What proved to be the ultimate strengthening of the norm of development in peacekeeping were the missions that were authorized in East Timor and Kosovo. UNTAET, which successfully brought about the independence of Timor-Leste not only reinforced the norm of development and comprehensive missions, it also reinforced the norm that the UN could successfully engage in state building activities; something that was never originally envisioned with the creation of the Charter. The implementation of this mission and its initial success has secured the norm of development in peacekeeping operations. Likewise the UNMIK operation in Kosovo although much slower in bearing fruit has never the less proved the UN’s state building capacity and that development is an essential part of the peacekeeping operations. Upon reflection the impact of these operations is very important. What UNTAET and UNMIK have done is advanced UN
peacekeeping to an unprecedented point in which peacekeeping can intervene and rebuild entire states, even govern them if the occasion arises. What is apparent is that the success of the operations or at least the success so far has reinforced the other two factors to create a perpetual state of renewal. The missions have reinforced all three norms and strengthened UN operations. In regard to the concept of peace, the focus of this thesis, the advancement of UN peacekeeping to focus on development has meant that the concept of peace has altered to accommodate these new factors. The link between development and security has meant that once more the concept of peace has evolved from a concentration on security to security and using development as a method of security. Providing the means for stability provides security and the UN philosophy and their peacekeeping missions have adapted in recognition of this intrinsic link. The recognition for the need for more comprehensive mandates has included the issue of development in peacekeeping missions. Development has become seen as a security issue thus further expanding the concept of peace at the UN.

Having analysed all three Chapters we can now transpose all three chapters onto one single timeline below in diagram 1.5.

Diagram 1.5:

1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union (End of the Cold War)

Chapter VI = BLUE
1. **21st October 1947-31st July 1951:** United Nation Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)
2. **May 1948:** United Nation Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
3. **3rd November 1950:** General Assembly Resolution 377 (v) ‘Uniting for Peace’
4. **(1956):** Suez Canal Crisis
5. **30th October 1956:** Security Council Meets regarding the Suez Crisis
6. **1-10th November 1956:** First Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly
7. **4th November 1956:** Lester Pearson proposes Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to submit a plan for the creation of the emergency United Nations force. UN General Assembly Resolution 998 [A/3276].
8. **6th November 1956:** Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld submits his Second and Final Report with recommendations on the creation of an emergency international United Nations Force.
9. **November 1956:** First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) was deployed
10. **March 1964:** United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
11. **March 1978:** United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
12. **August 1993:** United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

**Chapter VII = RED**

15. **1950-1953:** Korean War
17. **31st January 1992:** ‘An Agenda for Peace’
18. **February 1992:** United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
19. **April 1992:** United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)
20. **December 1992:** United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)
21. **March 1993:** United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)
22. **October 1993:** United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
23. **April-June 1994:** Rwandan Genocide
25. **September 2003:** United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
26. **February 2004:** United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)
27. **June 2004:** United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

**Chapter IX = GREEN**

28. **April 1989:** United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)

What this timeline demonstrates is what is shown in the conclusion. That the concept of peace has evolved to be more inclusive and have a combination of development and security issues. What it also shows is that there are not generations of ‘peacekeeping’ rather the capability has always been there but has depended on the circumstance.
Conclusion:
This thesis set out to ascertain how the concept of peace has evolved in United Nations peacekeeping operations and critically look at how this has happened in the organisations nearly 70 year history. This analysis has looked at the key events throughout the entire history of the UN and ascertained the key norms that have emerged in that history.

The first chapter dealt with Chapter VI of the Charter and the issue of prevention. This need was a sentiment of the post War period and had a profound impact on the Charter. The key transition from monitoring and investigation to the deployment of a peacekeeping force in 1956 at the outset of the Suez Canal Crisis profoundly changed the organization. This moment changed the organizations concept of peace from being solely of observation to being actively engaged by having an actual force positioned between the two parties. As the Cold War period advanced on Chapter VI operations were destined to be the main function of the UN peace and security activities. This was seen with operations such as in Lebanon and Cyprus. It was not until after the Cold War that the UN was able to implement missions under other sections of the Charter. Chapter VI operations still continue to be sanctioned and their usefulness in preventing serious armed conflict is apparent with the continuation of operations such as UNTSO and UNFICYP. The norm of prevention was the overarching factor that influenced these operations and the UN’s early history. They were also influenced by the norm of the concern over sovereignty and how these operations would affect that right. These norms and the historical circumstance of the Cold War meant that while UN operations were limited they did engage with the need to protect international peace and security. Thus from an early stage the concept of peace had come to mean the prevention of armed conflict by focussing on providing security so that the parties involved could negotiate a settlement.

Chapter VII operations were a characterisation of the post Cold War period and from its earliest to its most recent uses Chapter VII operations have been influenced by the norms of peace enforcement and the need to protect civilians. The transition of UN operations under this Chapter has been much more controversial than under Chapter VI because of its pioneering attitude and the initial failures Chapter VII operations suffered in Somalia,
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. However with the Security Council adapting to the changing circumstances of conflict Chapter VII missions have been given much stronger mandates and as a result Chapter VII missions currently in operation have shown greater ability in providing security. As a result of greater freedom instigated by the end of the Cold War and new norms of peace enforcement and protecting civilians has meant the concept of peace has continued to be one that focused on security but focused on the individual rather than the state and the UN has focussed on dealing with Civil War rather than inter state confrontation.

Chapter IX operations are not strictly sanctioned under this Chapter however there have been increased elements of this Chapter in other missions. The issue of development has become one of intrinsic vital importance in modern UN peacekeeping operations. The normative influences of state building and comprehensive operations has once again evolved the concept of peace to one which focuses on security and focusing on development to provide for that stability, including the monitoring of elections and encouraging democracy. From the state building missions of Timor-Leste and Kosovo to other missions such as Haiti which include development priorities the concept of peace has come to strongly focus on development; and this has become a firmly routed norm in the context of UN operations.

In concluding is clear to see that the concept of peace has undergone an extraordinary transition. Almost immediately the concept altered to mean one of security influenced no doubt by the still fresh and painful memories of the Second World War. Since that first step in 1956 the concept of peace has continued to focus on the practical need to provide security however changing to focussing on the individual and through peace enforcement under Chapter VII; and through development under Chapter IX to provide stability including state building activities. The overall transition of the concept of peace has meant that UN peacekeeping operations have become more comprehensive with continued interest focused on human rights and development issues. As new conflicts and circumstances influence the concept of peace at the UN it is likely that the organisation will continue on a path of comprehensive operations; although the circumstances may
mean that a strong comprehensive operation is not possible, for example with the UN mission in Syria. Although a general trend towards comprehensive missions seems to be increasing different circumstances will require different types of operations. It is prudent to conclude therefore that all the different varieties of UN operation will be and must be available to meet the demands of the relevant conflict concerned. The concept of peace has continued to be about addressing all areas that cause conflict and it is likely that the concept will adapt again to meet the demands of new conflicts, of which we hope there will be few. This thesis has very much focused on the transition of UN operations throughout its history; however how UN operations will develop would make for an interesting point of further research. Also how UN operations could be improved in both a hypothetical and a realistic practical way would undoubtedly provide for a fascinating to least to say vitally important avenue of further research. UN peacekeeping operations are part of the key to seriously resolving, perhaps even preventing, serious armed conflict whether it is interstate or intrastate and its importance cannot be underestimated.
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