The Copenhagen School and Conflict Resolution Theory:

Constructing Solutions

By

Deconstructing Structures

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Introduction

Conflict resolution has been founded as an academic field during the 1950s and has been developing since then. Since the late 1990s a cosmopolitan conflict resolution discourse is prevailing among scholars and it is the aim of conflict resolution to create a universal conflict resolution approach.\(^1\) The idea is that conflict resolution should serve the interests of humanity in general. However, conflict resolution has been criticized for several reasons. One of these criticisms has to do with the influence of culture on conflict resolution. For instance, scholars like Paul Salem have criticized the current conflict resolution discourse as being too Western and not being universally applicable.\(^2\) With regard to this, it can be doubted if a universal conflict resolution approach is possible. Another point of critique regards the positivistic character of conflict resolution theory. It is questioned to what extent it is possible to analyze conflicts objectively. To make the development of conflict resolution theory possible, the criticism should be dealt with. This observation gave rise to the idea that conflict resolution theory could and should be improved and this gave reason to review conflict resolution more extensively and to see how it could be improved.

With regard to the question how conflict resolution theory could be improved, there is search for a theory which could contribute to conflict resolution. A theory within security studies has potential with reference to conflict resolution theory, namely (de-)securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. According to securitization theory, it is the utterance of security and the presentation of something as an existential threat that makes something a security issue.\(^3\) Within this utterance emergency measures are called for to address the threat. Securitization is about the mobilization of a threat. Also in case of a conflict, a threat is mobilized. An issue is seen as an existential threat to the referent object and therefore, emergency measures are called for. Emergency measures can be all kind of measures which are taken to deal with the threat. In case of a conflict this can be violence. In addition, a third party can perceive a conflict or a situation as a threat as well for itself or (one of) the conflict parties and decide to call for emergency measures. Contrary to conflict resolution theory, which has a positivistic character and assumes that conflicts and threats can be defined

objectively, securitization theory claims that threats are socially constructed. Desecuritization is described by the Copenhagen School as the opposite direction of securitization. It implies the returning of issues out of the security realm into the political realm. In a case of desecuritization an issue is not seen anymore as an existential threat and emergency measures will not be required anymore. As such, desecuritization seems useful for conflict resolution, which aims at resolving conflicts. Although the Copenhagen School provides a model for analysis, it has not been put into practice very often and especially, desecuritization theory is under theorized. Therefore, there is still a lot of potential which can be explored. Moreover, the Copenhagen School seems useful for conflict resolution theory.

Although there is potential in linking conflict resolution theory and the Copenhagen School, there is an important note which has to be made. Both approaches have a different background which will influence this study. Conflict resolution theory fits an action-orientated discourse whereas the Copenhagen School fits an analytical discourse. Therefore, the two discourses are not combined easily, which gives this study an experimental character. Consequently, difficulties have arisen during this study with the integration of the two discourses. Furthermore, the study started from an abstract level. Before the study was started it was not clear if the linking would be possible and during the study different options have been explored. Several possibilities for studying the link between the two discourses have been found. Because these could not all be studied in this research, there will be recommendations for future research and this study will provide a starting point.

Several possibilities have been detected of how the two approaches can be combined. Shortly, securitization theory is especially interesting as a framework for analysis to analyze conflicts themselves but also to analyze the labeling of conflicts by third parties and analysts. Securitization theory provides a framework to analyze how something becomes a security issue and if an issue is defined as a threat. Therefore, it can be used to analyze how conflicts started and what issues are involved. But it can also be used to analyze how and if third parties perceive a conflict as a threat which should be dealt with or not. The desecuritization process is especially interesting with regard to the conflict resolution process. In this study, the focus lies on third party conflict resolution. The Copenhagen School and conflict resolution theory are integrated to increase the understanding of third party intervention. Two aspects are of importance. Firstly, the labeling of conflicts by third parties, and secondly, the consequences of this labeling – referring to the accompanying third party intervention.

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The aim of this study is to integrate conflict resolution theory and the Copenhagen School in a model which can be used to analyze third party conflict labeling and third party intervention. This model will give more insight in conflict resolution and as such it might be able to improve it. Furthermore, the Copenhagen School might provide a new set of instruments for conflict resolution. It will be interesting to see what happens if the two approaches are combined and as desecuritization is theoretically underdeveloped this study will contribute to the development of the theory. Overall, the central question of this study is: How to operationalize (de-)securitization theory as a framework for conflict resolution?

In the first chapter, the state of the art of conflict resolution theory will be reviewed. In this chapter, conflict resolution will be described but also criticism on the theory will be discussed to make clear on which points the theory could be improved. In the second chapter, the Copenhagen School will be discussed. In particular, securitization and desecuritization theory will be reviewed and the first links to conflict resolution will be explored. In the third chapter, the Copenhagen School and conflict resolution theory will be integrated into comprehensive models. The focus in this chapter will lie on the analysis of conflicts by third parties and the consequences of the analysis. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn and the main question will be answered. Within this study there are no in-depth case studies. This has to do with the experimental character of this study. During the study several theoretical issues came up which needed to be explored. Some of those are dealt with in this study but some are still open-ended. Besides, this study is part of a larger project. As there are still parts to be explored and because of the limited time and space for this study, there is chosen to provide the study with several examples but to leave out an in-depth case study. However, for future research it is recommended that the theories will be developed further and that in-depth case studies will be done.

For this study several books and articles have been used. For conflict resolution, mainly a handbook has been used and literature from critics. The literature which has been used with regard to the Copenhagen School consists mainly of primary resources of the members of the Copenhagen School and moreover, books and articles of the main critics have been used. The several examples of conflicts are derived from articles from news papers, the Uppsala Conflict Database and resolutions and statements of international organizations.
Chapter 1 – Conflict Resolution Theory

In this chapter conflict resolution theory will be reviewed. First of all, the meaning and the development of conflict resolution theory will be described. Secondly, the most important concepts and models of conflict resolution will be reviewed and the theoretical foundations of conflict resolution will be discussed. In this section also the role of third parties in conflict resolution will be reviewed. Thirdly, conflict analysis will be discussed as it is an essential prerequisite for conflict resolution. Fourthly, current challenges and critical remarks of conflict resolution will be discussed and points of improvement will be identified.

For this chapter mainly the work *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* from Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall has been used. This work can be seen as the ‘textbook’ for conflict resolution as it provides a detailed oversight of the development of conflict resolution theory. Literature from critics and other conflict resolution scholars has been used to review conflict resolution theory and to place this book into perspective.

1.1 Meaning, founding and development

In *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* the aim of conflict resolution is described as ‘to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change’.\(^5\) The idea behind conflict resolution is that conflict is an inevitable aspect human society. Conflict is seen as an inherent feature of social change. However, it is also stated that violence is not inevitable. People can choose how they handle conflicts. This means that violent conflict can be prevented but also that conflicts can be resolved.

Conflict is described in *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* as having ‘its origins in economic differentiation, social change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organization and becomes overt through the formation of conflict parties, which come to have or perceive to have, mutually incompatible goals.’\(^6\) Peter Wallensteen has endorsed that incompatibilities are an important part of conflicts. He has defined conflict as ‘a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources’\(^7\).

\(^5\) Ramsbotham, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 32.
\(^6\) Ibid, 7.
The goal of conflict resolution is to bring the conflict parties together and to try to turn the idea of incompatible goals into a situation in which cooperation is possible. With regard to this, it is important to discover what the positions and interests are of the conflict parties. The idea of conflict resolution is then to create mutual understanding and to merge interests. Conflict resolution believes that a positive-sum-game is possible. A problem with this idea of conflict resolution is that it assumes that conflicts are usually symmetrical. However, conflicts are often asymmetrical and that will make the - already difficult - bringing together of conflict parties even more difficult. First of all, the recognition by the stronger party of the underdog as an entity with who should be negotiated is already a problem. By recognizing the other and negotiating with them, the stronger party acknowledges that they have a point and loses some of its power. Secondly, in the case of negotiations the stronger party will always lose something when the interests of the two parties are converged. More about this and about the concepts and models of conflict resolution in general, will follow in section 1.2.

Some scholars use different terms for different dimensions of conflict resolution. Other scholars use conflict resolution as a term in the broad sense. Reasons for this are that it is a comprehensive term which covers all forms conflict resolution and that is a broadly accepted term. In this study, the term conflict resolution will also be used in the broad sense. Now the development of conflict resolution theory will be described because the original concepts are still influential and present in current conflict resolution theory.

Conflict resolution started as an academic field of study in the 1950s and the 1960s in Europe and North America. However, already before this period there have been several developments which provided the preamble to the start. In *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* the development of conflict resolution is distinguished in different periods. This distinction will be used here as well as it will give a good oversight of the development of current conflict resolution. However, these periods cannot always be completely separated from each other and ideas out of earlier periods are usually still present in later periods.

The first category covers the period between 1918 and 1945 and consists of the precursors. In the beginning of this period researchers were motivated to study conflict and peace as the existing order had not been able to prevent the outbreak of the First World War. So they wanted to study how future wars could be prevented. Peace studies can be seen as the first utterance of conflict resolution theory but it did not become institutionalized immediately. Other influential studies considered conflict resolution between labor and

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9 Ibid, 35.
management. An important institutional development which was going to influence conflict resolution theory development was the founding of the United Nations was founded.

The second period covers the years between 1945 and 1965 and can be defined as the period of the founders. In these years conflict resolution became an academic field of study and it became institutionalized on a larger scale. The Cold War and all the attendant developments emphasized the usefulness of studying conflict and peace, which started in the previous period. Moreover, the threat of nuclear weapons has stressed this usefulness. People discovered the value of applying conflict studies in industrial relations and community mediation, which was studied already in the period of the precursors, to conflict in general. The focus of conflict resolution was lying on non-violent conflict resolution. The fact that conflict resolution started with peace studies can inter alia explain this trend. Kenneth Boulding, Johan Galtung and John Burton are named as important founders.10

The third period can be defined as the consolidation phase and consists of the years from 1965 to 1985. In this period the original concepts of conflict resolution were still used but those were refined and conflict resolution was spread to more countries. Attempts were made to apply conflict resolution theory to real conflicts and efforts have been made to improve the analysis of intervention with a special focus on mediation and negotiation processes.

The fourth period covers the years between 1985 and 2005 and can be defined as the period of the reconstructors. This period is characterized by the end of the Cold War which was accompanied by major changes. During this period, conflict resolution was refined further and it addressed challenges by making use of the principles of complementarity and contingency. Furthermore, scholars discerned the complexity of conflicts and adapted their research to this characteristic.

The fifth and current period is titled cosmopolitan. The concepts which have been developed in the past periods are still present but this period is dealing with current challenges. On this moment, conflicts do not only manifest themselves interstate or intrastate but also transnational and conflicts can manifest themselves at different levels at the same time. So local conflicts can have global impact and global conflicts can have local impact. In response to these developments, conflict resolution is in search of an approach which can address conflict through all levels. According to Ramsbotham and his colleagues, conflict resolution has to focus on humanity and is striving for a universal conflict resolution

10 Ibid, 42.
approach. This does not mean that conflict resolution should be universal and similar around the world but that there will be a universal approach. An example is the acknowledgement of state sovereignty. States have agreed that borders should be respected and nowadays invasions are not common anymore. Another example is the idea of universal human rights which everyone should obey. The ultimate idea of cosmopolitan conflict resolution is that in the future there will be ‘awareness of shared humanity’\(^\text{11}\) and that a world community will exist. In such a world cosmopolitan values will be leading and international justice will be strived after. However, this is a very idealistic objective and it is questionable to what extent this will be possible and desirable. Criticism on this objective will follow in the coming sections.

1.2 Concepts and models

In the previous section conflict resolution has been shortly introduced by an outline of the meaning and the development of the theory. In this section the most important concepts and models of conflict resolution theory will be reviewed.

An influential model has been developed by peace researcher, Johan Galtung. Galtung has also been named as one of the founders of the academic field of conflict resolution theory. Galtung has designed a conflict triangle with the angles symbolizing contradiction, attitude and behavior.\(^\text{12}\) Contradiction stands for the underlying conflict situation. This refers to the incompatibility of goals between conflict parties. Attitude refers to the (mis-)perceptions which conflict parties have about the other and themselves. The last element refers to the behavior which parties show in a conflict. According to Galtung, all three components are present in a conflict.\(^\text{13}\) They all influence each other and can lead to heavy conflict. To resolve a conflict changes should take place with regard to the three components as well. First of all, conflict behavior should be de-escalated. This can be seen as peacekeeping. Furthermore, the attitudes of conflict parties should be changed. This transformation can also be seen as a part of peacemaking. Finally, the deadlock should be broken through with regard to the incompatible goals. In other words, the conflict structure should be changed. This corresponds with peacebuilding.

Another important model concerns the escalation and de-escalation of conflicts. Several scholars have made and used escalation and de-escalation models but the one which is

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\(^{11}\) Ibid, 426.  
\(^{13}\) Ibid, 11.
used in this study is from the authors of *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. The aim of the model is to give an abstract insight in the usually complex processes of escalation and de-escalation. According to this model, conflict escalation exists of the following phases: difference, contradiction, polarization, violence and finally, war. Conflict de-escalation starts with a ceasefire and moves on through an agreement, normalization and reconciliation. This model is inter alia used by scholars to define in which phase a conflict is and to analyze the development of a conflict. In addition, it is used to match it with the most useful responses.

The two aforementioned models are combined by Ramsbotham and his colleagues in the so-called hourglass model (see figure 1). This model will provide a guideline for the rest of this section as it gives a clear overview of the different phases of conflicts and the accompanying possible forms of conflict resolution. Furthermore, this model will be used in the next chapters for the integration of conflict resolution theory and the Copenhagen School theories. As described in *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* ‘the hourglass represents the narrowing of political space that characterizes conflict escalation and the widening of political space that characterizes conflict de-escalation’. The upper half of the hourglass is the escalation phase and the lower half of the hourglass is the de-escalation phase. Political space is an important factor in conflicts and for conflict resolution. The bigger the political space is – the wider the hourglass is – conflicts can be dealt with politically while this will become harder when the political space is small. As such political space is coupled in this model to the phase in which a conflict finds itself and to the possible forms of conflict resolution.

Within the model conflicts or conflict situations are categorized into the different phases of escalation and de-escalation. Although this categorization seems useful, it is questionable to what extent it is possible to define conflicts with such an empirical precision. Within conflict resolution, it is assumed that conflicts can be observed and defined objectively. Conflict resolution theory is positivistic. It is assumed that conflicts can be observed and subsequently, be placed objectively in a certain phase within the hourglass. However, this idea can be criticized as the person who analyzes the conflict will always be biased. It can be argued that it depends on the interpretation of the analyst where s/he places the conflict in the hourglass. Consequently, the empirical precision which is claimed by

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15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, 14.
18 Ibid, 13.
conflict resolution theory is challenged. This makes it interesting to analyze how conflicts are placed in the hourglass by analysts. This study argues that the Copenhagen School can be useful to deal with this. More about this will follow in chapter 3.

The placement of a situation/conflict in the hourglass model is coupled to a form of conflict resolution. The accompanying form of conflict resolution is meant to be the option with the biggest chance of success. The different options – war limitation, peacekeeping, peacemaking, structural peacebuilding and cultural peacebuilding – can be fulfilled in different ways. For instance, war limitation can compromise peace enforcement or peace support.\(^{19}\) The coupling of the phase in which a conflict is placed and the accompanying form of conflict resolution is especially interesting if it is a third party which analyzes a conflict. Dependent on the placement of a situation in the hourglass, this can lead to third party actions and possible interventions. Therefore, it is especially useful to analyze how third parties define conflicts. It is argued that the Copenhagen School is useful for this analysis as well and more about this will follow in chapter 3.

The forms of intervention which are described in the hourglass model have similar names in the two halves of the hourglass. However, two distinctions are made. First of all, the fulfillment of the forms of conflict resolution can differ in the escalation and the de-escalation half of the hourglass. An example is peacekeeping. Peacekeeping can consist of crisis management in the escalation half of the hourglass whereas it can consist of disarmament in the de-escalation phase. The second distinction which is made is that the responses in the escalation half of the hourglass are seen as conflict prevention. The responses in the de-escalation half of the hourglass are defined as conflict resolution. However, what has not been made clear by Ramsbotham and his colleagues is if conflict resolution can only develop towards one side of the hourglass, meaning that it can only go up in the upper half and down in the lower half. The reason for raising this issue is that it is plausible that in some cases an intensification of a conflict is necessary to resolve it. When a third party decides to intervene coercively in a conflict this can worsen the situation at first while it resolves the conflict in the end. An example is the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. NATO members supported the Libyan rebels to win over the regime of Gaddafi.\(^ {20}\) At first the conflict was intensified but eventually, the rebels won over the regime.\(^ {21}\) This kind of intervention is especially rational in

\(^{19}\) Ibid, 16.


asymmetric conflict. If a conflict is asymmetric one party will usually overrule the situation. If a third party wants to solve the problem and does not see it as a solution to let the stronger party win, intervention is likely.

With regard to asymmetric conflicts, it could also be argued that, in addition to the current hourglass model, the centre of the hourglass which is defined as war could also consist of repression. In case of repression there can be violence but it is possible that the oppressed party is not able to fight the stronger power. So there is a conflict situation but not a full war. When there is seen no possibility for political solutions – the political space is narrow – a situation can then be placed in the centre of the hourglass. A third party can then decide to intervene and make it a war to stop the repression. Concluding, repression should be added to the centre of the hourglass.

The different conflict resolution approaches will be discussed in section 1.4. First some classical ideas behind conflict resolution will be reviewed.

**Figure 1: The hourglass model.**


Conflict resolution has to deal with the incompatible goals which conflict parties are striving after. Although there exists a conflict situation, conflict resolution claims that parties
can choose how they deal with a conflict. Therefore, the approaches of conflict parties to a conflict can differ. How a conflict party approaches a conflict depends on its concern for the self and the other. For instance, a great concern for both the self and the other will make a problem-solving approach possible. With regard to this, the intersection of the approaches of both conflict parties has been studied. The idea of conflict resolution is that conflict parties should come to realize that an outcome does not necessarily need to be zero-sum but that it can also turn to a non-zero-sum game, to a win-win situation. A third party can be involved in this process. A third party can help the conflict parties to perceive the situation as a non-zero-sum situation.

Related to this theory is the so-called prisoner’s dilemma. According to the prisoner’s dilemma, in first instance it will always be a more logical choice for a conflict party not to cooperate. A conflict party has more to lose when it cooperates and the other party defects and a conflict party has more to win when it defects and the other party cooperates. If this logic is followed, both conflict parties will defect and not come to an optimal outcome which would be that both parties cooperate. However, it is believed that conflict parties can come to this insight. So this is a point which should be reached in conflict resolution, namely that conflict parties start to realize that cooperation can lead to a win-win situation and that they commit themselves to cooperation.

Overall, the original idea of conflict resolution is to look for the positions and interests of the conflict parties and to see how they can be brought together. In a conflict situation the position of the parties will usually be incompatible and therefore, they need to be converged to come to a solution. With regard to this, it is important that there can be a difference between the position of a conflict party and its actual interests. By discovering the underlying interests an intervener can detect possibilities for convergence and use them to work towards a resolution. However, it is that it is doubtful to what extent interests and positions can be defined objectively. This discussion is somehow similar as the one with regard to the placement of a conflict in the hourglass model. A third party will always be biased and will interpret a situation in a certain way. As such it can be questioned if it will be possible to define the interests and positions of conflict parties objectively through observation. It is also not clear if a third party will be able to detect to what are really the underlying causes. Furthermore, in some conflicts there might not be any possibility for convergence when inviolable issues are at stake. Ramsbotham and his colleagues also state that conflict
resolution will be more difficult when relationships or values are at stake. Some researchers even refer to needs as the underlying causes of conflicts. According to them, needs should be fulfilled to come to a resolution.

With reference to these basic ideas of conflict resolution theory, the difference between symmetric and asymmetric conflicts is important. The ideas about convergence of interests and positions and the possibility of bringing conflict parties together assumes that a conflict is symmetric and that the conflict parties are having equal positions. However, conflicts are often not symmetric. In many conflict one of the parties is the strongest and has the power while another party is oppressed or marginalized. In an asymmetric conflict the causes of the conflict often do not lie in incompatible interests but they are dealing with the underlying structure of the relationship between the conflict parties. A conflict will sometimes even be inevitable to change the relationship. Usually it would be the goal of conflict resolution to come to a win-win situation. However, as the more powerful conflict party will then need to give in, a win-win situation will not be possible. The more powerful party will already lose when it accepts to negotiate with the other party and during negotiations the stronger party will always lose more than the weaker party. So a transformation of the structure needs to take place to create a solution. It could be a task of a third party to assist with this and to force a transformation. In case of repression it can even be the case that the third party intervenes with coercion to assist the weaker party to win over the stronger party. Because of the importance of the difference between symmetric and asymmetric wars, it can be argued that conflict resolution should pay more attention to this distinction. The original ideas of conflict resolution are based on symmetric conflicts and therefore, a continuous awareness and an adaption of the theory to asymmetric conflicts is necessary.

Changes in the structure as part of conflict resolution is also something which critical theory sees as an important part of conflict resolution. According to critical theory, conflict emerges as there are failures in a community which should be changed. Change is seen as the desired outcome of conflicts. Critical theory criticizes conflict resolution theory for preserving the old power structure instead of changing it. In Contemporary Conflict Resolution this is partly admitted with regard to asymmetric conflicts. However, in the practice of conflict resolution it is often not the case that structural changes are made. For instance, it can be

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22 Ramsbotham, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 21.
23 Ibid, 401.
discussed to what extent the underlying structures have been changed in Afghanistan since the intervention in 2001.

As has been said, third parties are often involved in conflict resolution processes. It has already been pointed out that third parties can inter alia stimulate the transformation of conflicts, guide conflict parties to perceive a situation as non-zero-sum and intervene coercively in asymmetric conflicts. However, there are more forms of intervention possible. First of all, the roles of third parties can be distinguished as that of an arbiter, with or without the permission from the conflict parties, and as a mediator or facilitator for negotiations. A third party can act coercively and non-coercively as a mediator or facilitator. With regard to this distinction, two forms of power can be distinguished, namely hard and soft power. Hard power can be used by so-called ‘mediators with muscle’, which often use both communication and coercion as a means to solve a conflict. The fact that coercion and maybe even violence will be used in conflict resolution is interesting because the roots of conflict resolution lie in peace studies. Peace studies focused on pacifist conflict resolution and in the first years this also was the case in conflict resolution theory. However, this has changed during the years as third parties also started to use violence to resolve conflicts. Third parties which are ‘mediators with muscles’ may come from ‘track I diplomacy’. Track I diplomacy consists of official governmental and intergovernmental third parties. Soft power refers more to communication alone and the facilitation of negotiations. The use of soft power may be often visible in ‘track II diplomacy’. Track II diplomacy consists of unofficial mediators. Those mostly cannot make use of coercion.

Third party involvement will most of the time change the structure of a conflict. This can be a positive change as for instance, a third party can create a positive dialogue between conflict parties. However, it can also have a negative influence. Per example, when a third party wants to create a solution in an asymmetric conflict, this can be seen as threatening by the more powerful. Moreover, third party involvement with the use of violence will intensify the conflict before resolving it. So the influence of a third party should be considered extensively.

Another important question, which was partly addressed earlier in this section, regards the extent to which a third party can really be seen as neutral and objective. First of all, the third party will have its own perception of the conflict and how it should be resolved. As such

25 Ibid, 23.
26 It would be interesting to study how conflict resolution theory changed and developed from a pacifist ideal to a practice in which violence is sometimes allowed. The use of violence to end violence is somehow paradoxical.
it will never be objective. As a third party becomes involved in a conflict, it is also questionable to what extent it remains an ‘outside’ party. A third party is usually assumed to be a party that is not part of the conflict, that is not directly involved. It is arguable that a third party becomes a party in the conflict itself from the moment that it steps into the conflict resolution process. A third party will influence the conflict and by doing so, it will become a party. Moreover, if a third party decides to intervene or to support one of the conflict parties, it becomes a conflict party without a doubt. The decision of a third party to support one of the conflict parties points at the distinction of a third party as an arbiter or as a party that takes sides. In traditional conflict resolution it is argued that the third party should be neutral but in practice this varies. For instance, the support of the NATO to the Libyan rebels during the Arabian Spring is an example of a situation in which a third party has chosen to support one of the conflict parties.\(^\text{27}\) Contrary to the situation in Libya, the United Nations Security Council did not – at least until the first half of March – take sides with regard to the since 2011 ongoing uprising in Syria.\(^\text{28}\)

Conflict resolution theory was developed through the time as a result of the new pattern of conflicts since the 1990s. Most conflicts became intrastate and there were often linked to social changes. In reaction to these developments a more nuanced conflict resolution model has emerged. According to this model, conflicts will usually follow the path: social change, conflict formation, violent conflict, conflict transformation, social change.\(^\text{29}\) However, it is also possible that a step is left out. Also third-party intervention was adapted to these new developments. Third-party intervention became multilevel and multitrack. Indigenous parties became involved in the conflict resolution process and bottom-up conflict resolution came up.\(^\text{30}\) Next to track I and II diplomacy, track III diplomacy was introduced. Track III diplomacy refers to intervention at grassroots-level. Furthermore, different levels were distinguished, namely: international, regional, state and society. It is stated that conflicts can be influenced by developments in all levels and therefore, it is necessary to take into account all levels for conflict resolution. It is also part of the idea of cosmopolitan conflict resolution that conflict resolution will have to take place on all levels simultaneously.\(^\text{31}\) Besides, third parties could have different levels of engagement in a conflict.

\(^{27}\) NATO Secretary General, “NATO’s Secretary General Statement on Libya No-fly Zone.


\(^{29}\) Ramsbotham, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 26.

\(^{30}\) Ibid, 28.

\(^{31}\) Ibid, 30.
1.3 Conflict analysis

An important part of conflict resolution theory is conflict analysis. To put conflict resolution into practice, it is necessary to understand conflicts. Insights in the causes of conflicts and the interests and positions of conflict parties are assumed to be essential for conflict resolution. Moreover, conflict analysis is used to define in which phase a conflict finds itself (in the hourglass). This section will focus on the analysis of conflicts by discussing how conflicts are analyzed, different types of conflicts and what causes of conflicts are distinguished.

According to conflict resolution, it is possible to analyze conflicts objectively. The method which conflict resolution is using is positivistic. Most of the time ‘objective’ criteria are used to define the phase in which conflicts find themselves. A criterion which often is used is the number of fatalities. For instance, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines conflicts and its intensity on the basis of battle-related deaths.\(^{32}\) However, it can be questioned if it is indeed possible to analyze a conflict objectively. A question with regard to battle-related deaths if for instance, when a fatality will be counted as such. For instance, when someone shoots someone else during a conflict this can be counted or a fatality or not. It depends on the criteria. It could be that the shooting is part of the conflict but it could also be part of organized crime. This also depends on the way the analyst perceives it. The phase in which an analysts places a conflict has influence on the actions of third parties. This is one of the points which makes conflict analysis very important.

It is also assumed in conflict resolution that the interests and underlying motivations of conflict parties can be defined objectively. Because it is the goal of conflict resolution to bring parties together, it is important to know what the positions and interests of conflict parties. Therefore, these need to be studied in conflict analysis. These are often closely linked to the causes of a conflict. So it is useful to study the causes of conflicts. However, there are several theories about this. Roughly these theories of conflict can be distinguished as internal, relational and contextual.\(^{33}\) This distinction refers to the places where theorists look for explanations. Internal theories see the sources of conflicts mainly in the nature of the conflict actors. Relational theories see the sources of conflicts in the relationships between conflict parties. Contextual theories look for the sources of conflicts in the context which forms the structure in which the conflict takes place.

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\(^{33}\) Ramsbotham, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 94.
The interpretations of conflicts will also depend on the actor who is observing the conflict. So the perceptions of the conflict parties and third parties can differ from each other. For instance, explanations can be politically colored. This is also a point of critique on conflict resolution theory. However, as interpretations are subjective, this can be a pitfall for conflict resolution. This would especially count for third party involvement as third parties will try to bring the conflict parties together.

With regard to the question how a conflict can be analyzed, conflict mapping is of importance. A conflict map can function as a starting point on which intervention can be based. With regard to the question of how to map a conflict, Paul Wehr has developed a framework. According to him, it is important to describe inter alia the background of a conflict, the conflict parties and issues and the global, regional and state context.

Concerning the typology of conflicts, researchers make use of different criteria. For instance, distinctions are made on basis of the nature of the conflict parties or on basis of the causes of the conflict. However, researchers agree to a certain extent that conflicts can be divided between interstate and intrastate conflicts and that there are different types of intrastate conflicts. Intrastate conflicts can be divided in revolution/ideology conflict, identity/secession conflict and factional conflict. Revolution/ideology conflict deals with incompatible ideas about the nature of the government. Per example, this kind of conflict can be about different ideas of how the political system should be modeled. Identity/secession conflict has to do with the position of a certain group in a state. For instance, an identity group can strive after secession or access to services. Factional conflict is about power and the control over (a part of) the state.

A theory which has been influential in conflict analysis is Edward Azar’s theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC). Azar was one of the first researchers which focused on intrastate wars. He has studied these since the 1970s. According to Azar, PSC ‘represents the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation’. Special about this theory is that it provides a comprehensive framework. Azar makes use of

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35 Ibid.
36 Ramsbotham, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 75.
37 Ibid, 76.
38 Ibid, 99.
both internal and external dimensions of conflict, which till then were mostly seen as two separate dimensions. In addition, PSC theory covers different levels of analysis and sees several causes and influential factors. PSC theory also pays attention to both violent and latent or non-violent conflicts.

Azar points out four clusters of variables which have influence on the outbreak of conflicts, namely: communal content, deprivation of human needs, the role of the state and international linkages.\textsuperscript{40} To what extent these variables will indeed lead to conflict depends on three forms of action, namely: ‘communal actions and strategies, state actions and strategies and built-in mechanisms of conflict’.\textsuperscript{41} ‘Communal actions and strategies’ refer to inter alia the formation and mobilization of identity groups and the choice of their goals. ‘State actions and strategies’ include political decisions which a government will make which for instance will repress the identity group. ‘Built-in mechanisms of conflict’ refer to the events which may take place once the malign spiral of conflict is activated. Group history myths which exclude certain groups and other sources will be used to legitimate certain policies. This can lead to a security dilemma in which all actions of one identity group will be seen as threatening by the other identity group. In such a way a conflict can be intensified.

An important challenge to the PSC theory is the greed versus grievances debate.\textsuperscript{42} PSC theory mainly focuses on grievances and the deprivation of needs. However, other researchers have claimed that greed causes conflicts. They state that economic incentives are important in the analysis of conflict. For instance, Collier has done a lot of research which links economic indicators to conflict. Although the two theories are somehow contradictory, Collier and Azar have described comparable policy recommendations. Per example, they both have recommended the prevention of economic decline to prevent conflicts.\textsuperscript{43}

Building on the PSC theory of Azar, the authors of \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution} have created a levels-of-analysis model which is ‘a model for locating the chief sources of contemporary conflict’.\textsuperscript{44} This model includes five levels, namely: global, regional, state, conflict party and elite/individual. It is linked to the theory of Azar as the four clusters of variables which influence the outbreak of conflict are present in the model. International linkages can be found in the international levels and communal content, deprivation of human needs and the role of the state can be found at the state level. This model also covers a broad

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 100.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, 102.
\textsuperscript{42} Ramsbotham, \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution}, 108.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid , 109.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 122.
range of sources of contemporary conflict. For instance, the theory of Azar did not cover the environment as a source of conflict but this is added in this model. Overall, the necessity of conflict analysis for conflict resolution and the consequences of conflict analysis for third party intervention endorse the usefulness of more insight in these processes.

1.4 Conflict resolution

In this chapter the conflict resolution responses which are present in the hourglass model will be discussed. The hourglass model refers to the different phases in a conflict and the accompanying possibilities for conflict resolution. These possibilities will be discussed here to give insight in the practice of conflict resolution and the consequences which the placement of a conflict within a certain phase in the hourglass can have. These possibilities are seen as possible successful forms of third party involvement. An important note with regard to the possibilities for conflict resolution is that the conflict resolution tasks are nested and can be started at the same time. However, this brings about some problems with regard to the empirical precision of conflict resolution theory. On the one hand, conflict resolution makes use of a very explicit empirical precision and it has defined all the concepts but on the other hand, it is not clear what the exact relation is between the different phases of conflict resolution. This causes that the concepts partly become blurred. This can make the use of the theory more difficult. Besides, it has to be mentioned that the different forms of conflict resolution will sometimes be described as how they idealistically should be. This does not mean that they are always put in practice this way, maybe even more often not.

As a violent conflict has already manifested itself, peacekeeping can be seen as the first task of conflict resolution. Peacekeeping refers to conflict resolution in ongoing conflicts. In this period intervention can take place in the form of peace keeping missions. Throughout history there have been different generations of peacekeeping missions. During the Cold War thirteen so-called ‘first-generation-peacekeeping’ missions were fulfilled. These missions existed mostly of lightly armed troops from small and neutral member states of the United Nations. Often the task of these missions was to monitor boundaries and to create a buffer zone after a ceasefire has been proclaimed. From the end of the 1980s, peacekeeping has developed to ‘second-generation-peacekeeping’. The complexity of conflicts asked for a different approach. Peacekeeping missions were extended with more tasks in several fields, like security, humanitarian and political. Peacekeepers were having different backgrounds.

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46 Ibid.
regarding their profession, nationality and culture. In this period the amount of peacekeeping missions increased extensively. However, during the 1990s ‘second-generation-peacekeeping’ missions became criticized.\(^{47}\) It was doubted to what extent the peacekeeping missions were effective. Moreover, peacekeeping missions were associated with the Western world and the imposing of Western liberal and democratic systems. Following these points of critique, third-generation-peacekeeping was developed. This new peacekeeping missions were also named ‘peace support operations’ and these combined ‘greater military robustness with commitment to genuine international norms’.\(^{48}\) Other aspects were the involvement of civilian peacekeepers and more sensitivity for the cultural context. This third-generation-peacekeeping relates to a new security discourse, namely human security. According to human security, people should be able to live in freedom from fear and peacekeeping should contribute to this goal.\(^{49}\)

According to the hourglass model, the second phase of intervention is peacemaking. Peacemaking is the form of conflict resolution which has as aim to end the conflict. A conflict can end through a peace agreement but that is not the usual way. The end of a conflict does not always mean that the underlying conflict is solved. Per example, conflicts can become overt again after an agreement. Overall, it is unclear when a conflict is actually ended. The ending of a conflict is a process and it does not happen on a specific moment. A violent conflict can be over when there is a new political dispensation, a case of reconciliation or the emergence a new conflict. Generally there are a lot of obstacles to the ending of a conflict. Väyrynen states that conflicts are dynamic and that conflict resolution has to deal with a complex of changing relationships.\(^{50}\) Väyrynen criticizes conflict resolution theory as it often considers conflict issues, conflict parties and interests as a given.\(^{51}\) According to Väyrynen, these elements can change and this should be taken into consideration in conflict resolution.\(^{52}\) Transformation of the elements is necessary to end a conflict. In Contemporary Conflict Resolution five transformers are distinguished which can contribute to conflict resolution.\(^{53}\) First of all, context transformation is important for conflict resolution. Changes in the global, regional, national and social context can influence a conflict. For instance, global events can influence local conflicts and the global structure needs then to be changed to

\(^{47}\) Ibid, 150.
\(^{48}\) Ibid, 155.
\(^{49}\) Ibid, 163.
\(^{51}\) Ibid.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
\(^{53}\) Ramsbotham, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 175.
make the ending of a conflict possible. Secondly, the conflict structure should be transformed. The structure refers to the conflict parties and their relationships and the incompatible goals involved. If the problem has its foundations in the relationship between the conflict parties, the structure of the relationship has to change to make the ending of the conflict possible. Thirdly, actors might need to be transformed. It can be necessary for the ending of a conflict that conflict parties change their goals and their perceptions. Fourthly, a transformation of the conflict issues can be necessary. This has to do with a transformation of the positions of the conflict parties. Fifthly, personal and group transformation might be necessary. This refers to the acceptance of the former conflict parties into the society.

Following these transformations which can be necessary to solve a conflict, it becomes clear that conflict resolution is more than just bringing conflicting parties together through the convergence of their incompatible goals. Interveners should also look at the transformations which have to take place to end a conflict. The general view is that third party intervention is important for peacemaking. Especially in the transformation of the conflict issues, a third party is seen as necessary.

Within a peace process there are also several dynamics which influence the outcome. First of all, turning points are very important. These are moments in the peace process during which the conflict parties believe in the process and see possibilities. Contrary, it is also possible that there will be sticking points. Sticking points are moments on which a conflict party or both conflict parties turn(s) against the peace process. When a peace process comes close to an agreement there are two groups important. First of all, the skeptics can influence the last phase of the peace process by rejecting the proposed agreement but by supporting the idea of an agreement. Secondly, spoilers can influence the final phase of the peace process by rejecting the agreement completely. So a peace process can be dynamic until the end.

The next phase which can be described is postwar reconstruction and this is a part of peacebuilding. Reconstruction takes place after a conflict is over but when the causes of the conflict can still be present and when it is possible that the conflict will start again. There are several kinds of peacebuilding missions. However, idealistically most missions consist of three elements: intervention, reconstruction and withdrawal (IRW). Therefore, peacebuilding missions are also called IRW operations. Within the IRW operations there can be distinguished three phases: intervention (this corresponds with peacekeeping and peacemaking), stabilization (corresponds with structural peacebuilding) and normalization (corresponds with cultural peacebuilding).
Generally, peacebuilding is a long term project. It is hard to change violent cultures and war economies. To make this happen, it is necessary that peacebuilding comes from below and from the elite. Everyone has to accept the outcome of a conflict. Third parties can help to solve this problem but in the end the solution has to come from the people themselves.

After normalization, which is the last phase of IRW operations, comes reconciliation. Reconciliation concerns the reparation of broken relationships and the creating of a society in which people live in non-violent way with different identity groups. Reconciliation has also been mentioned as the ultimate goal of conflict resolution. When reconciliation has taken place, the conflict will most likely be transformed successfully. It is also the last phase of the hourglass model.

Throughout this section, the role of third parties has often been mentioned. It can be concluded that third parties play a big role in conflict resolution. However, a question which has not yet been answered is how and why a third party decides to intervene in a conflict. It has only been argued that it depends on the conflict analysis if and how a third party will intervene. Obviously, there are a lot of factors involved in such decision-making processes. These will not all be discussed here but the main principles of intervention will be described and shortly reviewed. First of all, there are criteria for just intervention, namely just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, prospect of success at acceptable cost and last resort. Ethically, these criteria should be fulfilled before a third party intervenes. In addition, an intervener officially needs permission of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Since 2005 the international community has even described a responsibility to intervene when a government is not able anymore to protect its own citizens. In spite of the commitments and ethic principles, in practice interventions often depend on the interest of the third party itself.

1.5 Challenges, criticism and points of improvement

The world is continuously moving. The contexts in which conflicts appear are changing and new developments can be expected. This brings challenges with it for contemporary conflict resolution. Moreover, criticism will and has pointed out that there are still points of improvement for conflict resolution. These will be addressed in this section.

Ramsbotham and his colleagues have defined themselves some challenges which they expect conflict resolution has to deal with in the near future. They expect that intrastate conflicts will continue to emerge and that most likely ethno nationalist conflict as well as

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54 Ibid, 329.
55 Ibid, 415.
ideological-government conflict will remain present. However, they are not sure through which ideologies future conflicts will be manifested. A potential source of ideological conflict which is expected to remain for the near future is the existence of hierarchical-imperial structures. These have already led to ideological violence like Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.

In addition to the prospected types of conflict, in *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* some future sources of conflicts are distinguished. An important one which has gained attention during the last years is the environment. For instance, climate change and natural resources depletion are already debated issues and they might gain interest in the future. Another potential future source of conflict is the changing world order. The Western world is losing its hegemonic status and so-called new powers like China are gaining influence. As economic wealth remains unequally divided around the world, economic inequality is a source which is expected to stay important. Another development which can influence conflict is the spread of weapons and the new techniques which are available. Eventually, it is argued that conflict resolution will continue to face challenges in the future and that it needs to adapt to new developments.

Logically, Ramsbotham and his colleagues look at current trends to define future challenges and future sources of conflict but it is interesting that they follow popular ideas. For instance, there is a trend in this period to define conflicts in line with identity and ideologies. Ramsbotham and his colleagues follow this trend. However, it could be questioned if this trend is also reality or that other types of conflicts are still present but just defined differently. For instance, it can be interesting to study if conflicts indeed become overt more often along identity lines or that there are other causes and it is just the trend to point at differences in identity.

According to Ramsbotham, conflict resolution theory tries to address future challenges like the continuing emergence of intrastate conflicts by developing a cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach. However, cosmopolitan conflict resolution faces some challenges itself. First of all, it is not clear if cosmopolitan conflict resolution will indeed be able to address the new challenges for conflict resolution. The cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach still needs to be developed further and until this has been done it remains unsure if it has the potential to address future challenges. Secondly, it is doubted if a cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach will be acceptable and possible at all. Cosmopolitans strive for a

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56 Ibid, 418.
57 Ibid, 423.
universal conflict resolution approach. However, it is questioned if universal conflict resolution is possible. People and states can agree on certain values and these can become universal but in practice these values can be implemented differently. The question is who is going to interpret these universal values. If states are going to interpret cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach differently this can make the use of the approach impossible.

Post-structural critique addresses this point. According to post-structural theory, there are no objective truths but issues are given meaning through language. Every human has its own discourse which provides a version of reality. As a consequence post-structuralism claims that there is no universal reality. Universal peace is also not possible even as universal conflict resolution. For that reason, post-structuralism rejects the idea of cosmopolitan conflict resolution. Instead differences in discourses should be accepted to come to peace. Conversely, post-structuralism has been criticized for being too relativistic.

Another point of critique comes from realism. Out of a realist view the idea of cosmopolitan conflict resolution is too idealistic. It is seen as an idea that does not congruent with current developments. Realism also doubts if cosmopolitan conflict resolution will be able to address current challenges. An example that is given is that conflict resolution often assumes that grievances are the sources of conflict while such an approach would not work when greed is the source of a conflict.

Another important challenge has to do with the role of cultural differences in conflict resolution. Cosmopolitan conflict resolution strives after cross-cultural applicability. However, current conflict resolution theory is criticized out of a non-Western perspective. Conflict resolution is criticized of being based on Western assumptions which are not applicable to all other parts of the world. For instance, Paul Salem has reviewed conflict resolution out of an Arab perspective. By doing so Salem identified several Western assumptions. Per example, Salem states that Western conflict resolution is based on the idea that peace is positive. Peace will often mean that a certain status quo will be maintained and as such ruling powers will profit from peace. So peace can be seen as less positive in other parts of the world. This endorses the importance of a transformation of the structure as has been pointed out with regard to asymmetric conflicts.

Also conflict resolution and especially third party involvement is sometimes seen as Western imperialism. It can also be questioned if the development of cosmopolitan conflict resolution will not lead to conflicts itself. Interestingly, Morgan Brigg states that

58 Salem, Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays, 12.
59 Ibid.
cosmopolitan conflict resolution is still based on Western assumptions. The idea of a world community has its roots in Western theories and this could be an obstacle.

Interestingly, it has to be concluded that there is not very much theoretical critique to conflict resolution. Most criticism is directed to the practice of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution is also an action-orientated theory. This is related to the positivistic background of the theory and the empirical precision with which conflict resolution claims to be able to define conflicts and conflict resolution. On the one hand, the positivistic background makes it possible to couple actions to the findings. On the other hand, the action-orientated approach can explain the positivistic background of the theory as it is necessary to have information about conflicts to undertake action. The positivistic background of conflict resolution theory and the claimed empirical precision are criticized as it is questionable if it is possible to define a conflict objectively. Analysts and third parties are biased and it is argued that it depends on their interpretation how a conflict is defined and in which phase it is of the hourglass model. This has consequences for the form of conflict resolution which will be used or not. The Copenhagen School might be able to provide insights in the way how conflicts are defined by analysts and third parties and this might contribute to conflict resolution theory. Besides, it will give more insight in conflict resolution as this is coupled to conflict analysis. The Copenhagen School might provide a framework to analyze conflicts and a set of instruments of how to resolve conflicts. This will be studied in the following chapters.

\footnote{Ibid.}
Chapter 2 – Copenhagen School: (De-)securitization Theory

In this chapter the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School will be reviewed. This theory will provide a theoretical starting point from which the possibilities of (de-)securitization theory as a conflict resolution framework can be explored and from which the sub question can be answered: Does (de-)securitization provide a framework for conflict resolution?

First of all, the Copenhagen School will be introduced. Secondly, the concepts, assumptions and development of securitization theory will be described. Thirdly, desecuritization theory will be reviewed. The meaning, elements and types of desecuritization theory will be discussed. Fourthly, the relationship between securitization and desecuritization will be described. Fifthly, the link between (de-)securitization theory and conflict resolution will shortly be described. For this chapter mainly literature from scholars of the Copenhagen School has been used besides books and articles from the main critics.

2.1 The Copenhagen School

The starting point of the Copenhagen School was the publication of the work of Barry Buzan People, States and Fear: the National Security Problem in International Relations. Following this publication about the security problem, more research was done at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. After several publications Bill McSweeney appointed the group of researchers the Copenhagen School. The most important members of the Copenhagen School are Barry Buzan and Ole Waever.

The Copenhagen School has contributed to the debate about security studies which arose after the end of the Cold War, namely the one between the so-called ‘wideners’ and the traditionalist with a more ‘narrow’ perspective. During the Cold War security studies had become mainly focused on military security. Traditionalists claimed that this was still the case while wideners argued for an expansion of security studies. An argument for widening has been found in upcoming issues on the international agenda, like the economy and the environment. Not only do wideners claim that security is linked to several sectors, they also

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61 Coskun, Analysing Desecuritisations, 7.
63 Buzan, Security, 4.
argue that the state is not anymore without question the main referent object of security studies.\textsuperscript{64}

In this context new security theories have been developed. An important contribution to the theorization of a wider security agenda has been made by the Copenhagen School. The scholars of the Copenhagen School have tried to incorporate the wider security agenda while trying to keep security coherent as a field of study as well.\textsuperscript{65} In this regard they developed three concepts. Firstly, they distinguished new security sectors. The Copenhagen School added the societal, political, economic and environmental sectors to the existing military sector. Secondly, the concept of regional security complexes has been introduced. Thirdly, securitization theory has been incorporated to the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework. Securitization theory can be divided into the concepts of securitization and desecuritization and both concepts will be discussed in the following sections.

2.2 Securitization theory

Securitization theory has originally been developed by Ole Waever and in ‘Security: a new framework for analysis’ the Copenhagen School has incorporated this concept in a comprehensive framework for analysis.\textsuperscript{66} Meanwhile securitization theory has proved itself an influential contribution to security studies and it has been developed further.\textsuperscript{67}

According to Waever, ‘the aim of securitization theory is to construct a neo-conventional security analysis (which) sticks to the traditional core of the concept security (existential threats, survival), but is undogmatic as to both sectors (not only military) and referent objects (not only states).’\textsuperscript{68} The main question which can be studied through security analysis is ‘who can ‘do’ security in the name of what?’\textsuperscript{69} According to securitization theory, an issue does not become a security issue because it is an objective threat against e.g. the state. Instead something becomes a security issue because a securitizing actor presents an issue as an existential threat to a particular referent object which requires emergency measures. However, only the presentation of something as a threat is not sufficient. It is solely a securitizing move. The securitization of an issue takes place when an audience accepts the

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, VII.
\textsuperscript{69} Buzan, \textit{Security}, 45.
claim of the securitizing actor and thereby, approves the use of emergency measures.\textsuperscript{70} In the case of securitization the issue has moved from normal politics\textsuperscript{71} to a status of emergency. Securitization has also been described as a ‘more extreme version of politicization’.\textsuperscript{72}

The securitization process transfers an issue from normal politics to emergency politics and it thereby legitimizes the use of emergency measures. In other words securitization ‘legitimizes the exercise of power’.\textsuperscript{73} As securitizing actors are often governments or political elites – more about securitizing actors will follow in this section – they can use the securitization of an issue as a policy tool to make it possible to take certain measures (for instance, to deploy the secret services). However, this is not the only outcome of securitization. As in a securitizing move approval is asked to address a certain threat with exceptional measures, it inherently is a promise to indeed address the threat and to work for a solution. So the securitization of an issue also brings with it a responsibility for the securitizing actor.\textsuperscript{74}

In the case of securitization something does not become a security issue because it is an objective threat. Instead something becomes a security issue because a securitizing actor presents an issue as a threat which requires exceptional measures and the audience accepts it as such. Therefore, security is intersubjective. It is socially constructed.\textsuperscript{75} Something becomes a threat if people perceive it as such. It can also differ between people if something is perceived as a threat. However, it is not enough if just an individual perceives an issue as a threat. An issue can only become a security issue if the audience accepts it as such. As described in \textit{Security: a New Framework for Analysis} ‘security ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but \textit{among} the subjects’.\textsuperscript{76} According to the Copenhagen School, there are no objective threats. Moreover, it will not be possible to define situations objectively as a threat or not. This will always depend on the interpretation of the analyst and more specifically, in the case of securitization it depends on the securitizing actor and the audience.

As Waever makes clear in his statement about the aim of securitization theory, the Copenhagen School makes use of two traditional concepts of security: survival and existential

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, 25.
\textsuperscript{71} Normal politics is relative with regard to emergency politics. It is not easily definable theoretically but empirically it is. However, for this theoretical chapter the definition of normal politics as being relative with respect to emergency politics will suffice.
\textsuperscript{72} Buzan, \textit{Security}, 23.
\textsuperscript{73} Lene Hansen, \textit{Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War} (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 35.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Buzan, \textit{Security}, 31.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
threat. In the traditional security approach security has to do with survival.\textsuperscript{77} This statement is founded on the claim that all states have the desire to survive.\textsuperscript{78} The survival is about existential threats which need to be handled with.\textsuperscript{79} However, with regard to the security sectors and the referent objects the Copenhagen School breaks with the traditional concepts and adapts to a wider security agenda. Securitization can take place in all the five sectors which the Copenhagen School has distinguished: military, economic, societal, political and environmental. Security in international relations does not always deal with military security. Moreover the state, which has traditionally been the referent object for security, is not necessarily the referent object in securitization theory. Referent objects are the objects to which can be referred to as being existentially threatened and which need to survive. The fact that the referent object is being threatened calls for emergency measures. According to the Copenhagen School, a securitizing actor can try to construct anything as a referent object.\textsuperscript{80} However, an extension of the possible referent objects does not mean that the use of every referent object will be successful. Referent objects can differ in the several security sectors and some referent objects will be more likely to lead to successful securitization than others.

The Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as presented in \textit{Security: a New Framework for Analysis} rests on two concepts. First, it rests on three elements of securitization: the speech act, the securitizing actor and the audience. Second, securitization theory rests on three facilitating conditions which influence the success of a securitizing move.\textsuperscript{81} These concepts will be reviewed in the following section.

The Copenhagen School has defined the process of securitization as a speech act. It is the utterance of security which makes something a security issue. Ole Waever explains this as follows: ‘the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done. By uttering ‘security,’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.’\textsuperscript{82} The speech act as described by Waever has been derived from the concept of John L. Austin: performative speech acts or performative utterances.\textsuperscript{83} It means that the speech act is used to perform an action. The

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{77} Ibid,21
\bibitem{78} Coskun, \textit{Analysing Desecuritisations}, 9.
\bibitem{79} Ibid.
\bibitem{80} Buzan, \textit{Security}, 36.
\bibitem{81} Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond.” \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 13, no. 3 (2007): 358.
\end{thebibliography}
speech act does not just say something about an issue but it also means an action. In the case of securitization the speech act moves an issue in the security realm and claims the use of emergency measures. In addition to this Waever has used the philosophy of Jacques Derrida. In contrast to Austin, Derrida claims that context is not a fixed given. For securitization theory this implies that a certain speech act will not always succeed or fail and that it does not necessarily succeed with certain actors. This also makes it impossible to count on experiences. Another important point is Derrida’s claim that ‘there is no meaning outside of the text itself’. This implies that, according to Derrida, context should be studied by analyzing narrative. Discourse analysis can be used for this purpose and this is also the analytical tool which securitization theory makes use of. Hansen has operationalized discourse analysis. According to Hansen, these speech acts can be found in different sources, namely in key texts and general material. Moreover, speech acts can be found in different intertextual models. Examples are official discourses and the wider political debate.

There has also been critique on the speech act. Claire Wilkinson doubts the fact that speech is chosen above other ways of expression. According to her, it will not be possible in every country to make use of the speech act as in non-Western countries principles of free speech and democracy often are not present. In addition, the Copenhagen School has been criticized because the use of speech act is too much focused on the act itself instead of the context. This will be discussed later in this section.

The fact that the Copenhagen School has defined the process of securitization as a speech act makes it necessary to look at other components as well. The speech act as used in securitization theory is intersubjective and therefore, it consists of at least two sides, namely the securitizing actor and the audience. Firstly, the securitizing actor articulates the speech act. It is the actor who expresses the existential threat and the need for emergency measures. The securitizing actor can be an individual or a group. Frequently, securitizing actors are governments, political leaders, bureaucracies and others elites. To make a securitizing move successful a securitizing actor needs to be able to convince the audience and to do so the actor

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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid, 14.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Coskun, Analysing Desecuritisations, 14.
92 Hansen, Security As Practice, 83
93 Ibid, 81.
94 Ibid.
95 Buzan, Security, 40.
will need to have a certain status of authority. More about this will be explained in the paragraph about the facilitating conditions.

Secondly, the audience is the actor which the securitizing actor is seeking to convince that a particular issue is an existential threat and that measures need to be taken. The securitizing actor needs the support from the audience to legitimize exceptional measures. So the support from the audience is necessary for a successful securitization. Although the audience fulfills this important role in the securitization process, there is the danger and the tendency to marginalize this role. According to Holger Stritzel, the Copenhagen School has not made the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience clear enough.\footnote{Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization”, 362.} Thierry Balzacq has also stressed the importance of the audience.\footnote{Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context.” \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 11, no.2 (2005): 181.} According to Balzacq, the securitizing actor can obtain two kinds of support, namely formal and moral.\footnote{Ibid.} The better the congruency between these two forms of support is, the more likely the success of the securitization move will be. In general securitizing actors will seek both kinds of support. The securitizing actor will attempt to get moral support from the group which will form the public opinion. If desired the actor will try to get the moral support from the institutional body concerned as well. An example, in which the securitizing actor will likely do so, is in a securitization move which calls for waging a war. However, moral support will, although it often is necessary, not be sufficient to make the securitization move successful. So the securitizing actor will also seek for the formal support which can often be obtained through a formal decision of the authority concerned. For instance, in case of waging a war it can be necessary to obtain a mandate of the UNSC. As the securitizing actors needs these kinds of support of the audience, the extent to which the securitizing actor can identify itself with the interests, feelings and needs of the audience will influence the success of a speech act.\footnote{Ibid.}

Next the second concept, on which the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory rests, will be discussed: the three facilitating conditions. Facilitating conditions can be described as ‘the conditions under which the speech act works’.\footnote{Buzan, Security, 32.} These conditions can be divided into two categories, namely: internal, linguistic-grammatical and the external, contextual and social. The most important internal condition is to follow the grammar of security. This means that a speech act should ‘construct a plot that includes existential threat,
point of no return, and a possible way out’.  

There are two important external facilitating conditions. First of all, the social capital of the securitizing actor influences the success of the securitizing move. The securitizing actor should have a position of authority. This does not have to be official authority. It refers to the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience and the probability that the audience will accept the claim of the speaker. The second external facilitating condition refers to the threat. If a securitizing actor can refer to features of a threat that are generally seen as threatening (for instance tanks), the success of a securitizing move is more likely.

So if these facilitating conditions are met, a speech act can be successful.

Following the Copenhagen School’s more comprehensive securitization theory, Stritzel and Balzacq have developed the theory further. With regard to securitization theory Stritzel has identified two centers of gravity of securitization theory. The first is an internalist understanding of securitization. This understanding has its focus on the speech act and deals with the concept of performativity. This view can be seen as a more poststructuralist/postmodern interpretation of securitization. Such an internalist understanding of securitization can be found in Waever’s reading of the speech act. The Copenhagen School’s more comprehensive work can be seen as less internalist. The second is an externalist reading of securitization. This understanding focuses on the process of securitization and it is grounded on an idea of embeddedness. This view is typified by Stritzel as a more constructivist reading. By adding the facilitating conditions to the securitization theory, the Copenhagen School has added externalist elements in the theory. However, Stritzel argues that securitization theory should be developed more towards an externalist understanding. Stritzel claims that ‘security articulations need to be related to their broader discursive contexts from which both the securitizing actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/text gain their power’. Stritzel states that to be effective a speech act and a securitizing actor both need a situation that makes them significant. According to him, ‘it is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes them’.

99 Ibid, 33.
101 Buzan, Security, 33.
102 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid, 360.
106 Ibid, 367.
Balzacq has also stated that Copenhagen School’s securitization theory should be understood within its context and that such a dimension should be added to the theory. Balzacq argues that securitization theory should be seen ‘as a strategic practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction’.\(^{107}\) Balzacq calls this approach also the ‘sociological’ understanding. This approach differs from the approach in which the Copenhagen School has its foundations. This last-mentioned approach is referred to as ‘philosophical’ and it is based on the assumption that security is a performative speech act. Balzacq argues that this approach makes security a ‘conventional procedure’.\(^ {108}\) Balzacq presents three assumptions with regard to a sociological approach to securitization theory: effective securitization is audience-centered, securitization is dependent on the context and an effective securitization is power-laden.\(^ {109}\)

So according to Stritzel and Balzacq, the focus on the relation between the securitizing process and the context should be extended and incorporated in the theory. For this study the role of the speech act will stay intact, but the importance of the facilitating conditions and the relation to the context will be underlined. The originally internalist view of the Copenhagen School is less useful as a framework for analysis whereas changes in the situation will be able to change speech acts. So in the further analysis it will be presupposed that securitization theory must be seen in relation to the context.

Another issue which is important for understanding the process of securitization has to do with the threats which are addressed in securitizing moves. There can be several threats at the same time. The question is how those threats relate to each other. Initiating a securitizing move with reference to a certain threat can be at the expense of another threat. An example is that Iran sees Israel as a threat and therefore, it needs to have weapons to protect itself. However, the European Union will impose a boycott on Iran as it does not stop producing weapons. Such a boycott can also be seen as a threat. So Iran has to chose in this case which threat it will address. Iran can go on with the production of weapons and accept the boycott of the European Union or it can stop producing weapons and face Israel as a threat.

Another possibility is that securitizing moves are competing with each other. Different securitizing actors can try to convince the same audience of the threat they perceive. These can be completely opposite threats. An example is the revolt which took place in Libya in the


\(^{108}\) Ibid.

beginning of 2011. The rebels and later on, the NATO intervention tried to securitize the regime of Gaddafi as being a threat to the Libyan people. However, Gaddafi tried to securitize the rebels and the NATO interveners by presenting them as a threat.\textsuperscript{110} Both were addressing the Libyan people as the audience. So these were competing securitizing moves. In this case, the rebels and the NATO intervention have reached the biggest audience but Gaddafi also kept support.

### 2.3 Desecuritization theory

As an issue can become a security issue through the securitization process, an issue can also move out of the security sphere through a similar process. This is the so-called desecuritization process. In contrast to securitization, desecuritization has not been worked out extensively and it has not been applied very often. Therefore, it is assumed that desecuritization theory can be developed further and that there is still potential to be discovered.

Desecuritization works in the opposite direction of securitization. It is ‘the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere’.\textsuperscript{111} It is also described as the process in which an issue is not considered as an existential threat anymore and that it does not longer require emergency measures.\textsuperscript{112} The issue will be removed from the security agenda and will be dealt with (again) in normal politics. As desecuritization means that an issue is not been seen anymore as an existential threat it makes desecuritization an interesting tool for conflict resolution. However, before the potential of desecuritization with regard to conflict resolution will be explored (this will happen in chapter 3), desecuritization theory will be reviewed.

First of all, it is important to notice that, although desecuritization works in the opposite direction of securitization, it is not possible to mirror the two processes. When a successful case of securitization has taken place, it will never become completely the situation will never be the same again. So when an issue will be dealt with again in normal politics this does not mean that the situation is the same as before the securitization took place. Besides, it is not possible to turn a securitization through exactly the same means. However, the main lines can be considered to be similar. More about the process of desecuritization will become clear in the following paragraphs of this section.


\textsuperscript{112} Coskun, \textit{Analysing Desecuritisations}, 18.
Ole Waever implicitly points out three ways of how to desecuritize issues. The first option is to keep issues out of the realm of security at all. The second option is that, when an issue has been securitized ‘keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas and other vicious cycles’ and the third option is to move securitized issues back into ‘normal politics’. It is arguable if the first option is actually a form of desecuritization as there would not be a case of securitization in the first place and that would make it impossible to move an issue from ‘emergency politics’ to ‘normal politics’. The second option can be described as the management of securitized issues. In this case desecuritization could be interpreted as a kind of normalization of the situation. The third option provides a transformation of the situation. In this form desecuritization will lead to the shifting of an issue out of the security into the political realm.

However, not all options of desecuritization will always be feasible. Per example, the option to make sure that the responses to the securitizing of an issue do not lead to security dilemmas is less feasible when a security issue has the inclination to lead to a security dilemma. For instance, this can be the case with securitizations in the societal sector. Securitizations in the societal sector have a strong self-reinforcing character. Security actions to defend a certain identity can lead to negative effects with regard to actors of another identity and can consequently cause security dilemmas. Furthermore, this can lead to a declining feeling of security for both the referent object and the defended actors. When security dilemmas are already present the first and the second options for desecuritization are no longer valid. Only the third option will be possible, while at the same time this will be the most difficult option when a securitization is self-reinforcing.

Asecurity has been defined by Ole Waever as the ultimate goal of desecuritization. Asecurity is related to the concepts of insecurity and security. Asecurity implies a situation in which a certain issue is no longer seen as threatening and is not anymore considered to be a security issue. When the situation has been moved out of the realm of security it becomes a situation of asecurity. According to the Copenhagen School, in the ideal situation the issue will then be dealt with in normal politics again. In a situation which is described as one of insecurity or security, a threat has been defined and something is being seen as a security

114 Coskun, Analysing Desecuritisations, 19.
issue. The difference between those two is about the countermeasures. In a situation of insecurity there is a feeling of a lack of defense. Whereas in a situation of security there are considered to be sufficient countermeasures.\footnote{Ibid.}

Whereas Ole Waever has not been explicit about the different options for desecuritization, De Wilde has been more specific about the types of desecuritization. De Wilde has identified four types (of outcomes) of desecuritization.\footnote{Jaap De Wilde, “Environmental Security Deconstructed.” In \textit{Globalization and Environmental Challenges}, ed. Hans Günter Brauch (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2008), 597.} The starting point of the first type of desecuritization is that successful securitizations will lead to emergency measures and/or security policies. Through those the securitizing actor will try to eliminate the existential threat to which the securitizing move has referred. Because of the fact that a securitizing move asks for such emergency measures to address a threat, desecuritization is already inherent to the securitizing move. The ultimate outcome is therefore that the problem is solved. This is also the first type of desecuritization, the problem is solved and the situation can become normal again. Most likely the issue will be dealt with again in ‘normal politics’. The second type of desecuritization concerns the institutional adaptation to the situation. The presence of a certain threat and means to counter this threat become part of the structure and governments and societies learn to live with it. In this case it can also be that certain security policies take place in the realm of ‘normal politics’ rather than ‘emergency politics’. The third type of desecuritization is a change of discourse. Although a threat remains present, priorities can change and a security discourse can shift. Other securitizations can become priority and make a certain threat less of a concern. In this way desecuritization can also take place separately from security policy and emergency measures. Also change of discourse can be an option when a security issue cannot be handled through security policy and emergency measures. Then it is a possibility to make sure that the threat does not matter anymore. The fourth type of desecuritization is that the case is lost. The values and/or the referent objects which were to be defended are lost. The structure has been changed.\footnote{Ibid.}

Although the specification of the types of desecuritization provides an oversight of the possibilities for desecuritization, the Copenhagen School has not explicitly defined a framework for analysis for the desecuritization process. Some scholars have tried to do so. For instance, Andrea Oelsner has also explored desecuritization theory. She has operationalized desecuritization theory and provides a framework to analyze the process of
Oelsner builds her findings on the explanation of desecuritization by the Copenhagen School as a situation in which an issue is no longer been seen as a threat and in which the issue is no longer part of the realm of security. Based on this definition Oelsner identifies two ways in which desecuritization can take place. First, the securitizing actor and the audience stop seeing the issue as being a threat because they perceive a change in the nature of the threat. Next the securitizing actor and the audience perceive a qualitative change in the relationship between them and the threat. They start to trust that the threat is not a threat anymore. The first implies a passive process as the audience and the securitizing actor are not actively involved in the changing of the nature of the threat. However, it can be an active process in the sense that the audience and the securitizing actor have to perceive this change as a diminishing of the threat. The second mechanism is an active one as a redefinition of the relationship is necessary to establish a qualitative change. The audience and the securitizing actor come to trust the former threat as a result of a reassessment of the relationship between the self and the other. In this process of desecuritization Oelsner defines two phases. The first phase is the initiation of the desecuritization process. It is the first change of direction and the moment on which desecuritization becomes an acceptable policy. In the next stage the process of desecuritization will develop further and the first signs of mutual trust will appear and grow. Ultimately it will lead to a perceived situation of a security.

As the two processes which Oelsner points out both refer to a change of discourse (a loss of interest), these findings could be seen as an addition to the options which are described by De Wilde. The two mechanisms of Oelsner might be seen as possible ways of desecuritization under the type of desecuritization which is described by De Wilde as a change of discourse. Besides, the framework which Oelsner creates will make it possible to study these forms.

Regarding to the process of desecuritization the elements are important as well. However, the Copenhagen School has not clearly defined which elements are involved in the desecuritization process. On this point the theory could be improved. As desecuritization works in the opposite of securitization, it could be that desecuritization consists of the same components as securitization but this is not necessarily the case as the two processes cannot

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121 Ibid.
122 Ibid, 5.
123 Ibid, 11.
be mirrored. However, it might be possible that the same elements are present but that they work differently. The elements of the process of desecuritization will now be reviewed.

According to De Wilde, the elements of securitization are present in the process of desecuritization as well. He points out that inter alia the desecuritizing actor, the speech act and the audience are elements of the desecuritization process. However, he does not claim that the process is similar to the process of securitization and that the elements have exactly the same function. For instance, he states that there are different values at stake in both processes and that the securitizing and desecuritizing actor can be different actors. According to Coskun, the desecuritization process consists of desecuritizing language (his variant of the speech act), a desecuritizing actor and an audience. In addition, he has described three facilitating conditions for the desecuritization process, namely: a change in the language which was used for the securitization of an issue, the position of authority of the desecuritizing actor and features which facilitate desecuritization. With regard to the sectors in which the process can take place, desecuritization theoretically can take place in the same sectors as securitization: military, political, societal, environmental and economic. The desecuritizing actor can also construct anything as a referent object. As it is questionable what elements are part of the desecuritization process and in which form, the speech act, the desecuritizing actor, the audience and the facilitating conditions will be reviewed in the following paragraphs.

The speech act is an important concept with regard to securitization theory. However, it is questioned if desecuritization is indeed the outcome of a speech act. For instance, Kristian Atland claims that this does not always have to be the case. Atland argues that it depends on the type of desecuritization if the speech act is involved. Per example, when desecuritization takes place because an issue loses its status as an existential threat because it is overruled by another threat, it is not a ‘desecuritization speech act’ which leads to the outcome. There is a speech act involved with the other securitization but not in the desecuritization of the former threat. However, it is supposed that this will seldom happen. There are also more options possible. It is possible that the change of discourse will be uttered through a speech act or that people do not talk about a certain issue anymore at all. Then it will be the lack of speech that is part of the desecuritization process. Coskun presents another

125 Coskun, Analysing Desecuritisations, 21.
127 Ibid.
view on the speech act. According to him, it are the differences in the language which should be analyzed to detect desecuritization. However, to keep consistency in the theory it will be presupposed that in most cases of desecuritization a speech act, or a change of the speech act, will be involved.

As it is presupposed that there is a speech act involved, it is assumed that the process of desecuritization also consists of a desecuritizing actor and an audience. However, the Copenhagen School has not been clear about who these could be. Similar to the securitizing actor it is presupposed that the desecuritizing actor can be an individual or a group and that the desecuritizing actor generally will have a formal or informal position of authority so the actor can convince the audience of its case. A specific question which has been raised is if the desecuritizing actor can be the same actor as the securitizing actor or not. Scholars differ in their answers to this question. Oelsner states that policy-makers and other political, economic and intellectual elites can be desecuritizing actors as they try to convince the public of their reinterpretation perception of the situation. In that way the securitizing actor could also be the desecuritizing actor but this is not necessarily the case. In contrast to this, Claudia Aradau states that the desecuritizing actor should be another actor than the securitizing actor. According to her the desecuritizing actor has to come from the ‘silenced other’. However, this can be regarded as a normative statement. De Wilde points at another possible desecuritizing actor, namely the ‘functional actor’. ‘Functional actors’ are actors that influence securitizations because of their background. For instance, they have expertise and authority in a certain field. They are not the securitizing actors but they can be desecuritization actors if they inter alia evade or oppose securitizing moves. Overall, there are different desecuritizing actors possible. The desecuritizing actor can be the same as the securitizing actor but this is not necessarily the case.

The audience is the second component involved. The audience needs to be convinced that a certain issue does not require emergency measures anymore and that it can be dealt with again in normal politics. Similar as in the process of securitization the desecuritizing actor can get formal and moral support from the audience. It is arguable that often the aim of securitization was to do something about an existential threat and that would imply that a desecuritization move – in the sense that it means that the threat has been taken care of – will often be approved by the audience. However, this is not necessarily the case as an audience

128 Oelsner, “(De)securitization Theory and Regional Peace,” 15.
129 Coskun, Analysing Desecuritisations, 20.
needs to believe the threat has been taken care of or that the threat is not such an essential problem anymore. For instance, the Oslo peace process can be seen as a desecuritizing move but as it was not accepted by another audience the move did not become successful. In conclusion, audience plays an important role in both the securitization and the desecuritization process.

Also the facilitating conditions as described in the previous section can be applied to the desecuritization process. First, the grammar of asecurity has to be used. The speech act should include ‘the change in the language used to define the previously securitized issue’. Second, the social capital of the desecuritizing actor influences the success of the desecuritizing move. The actor should have a formal or informal position of authority. Third, the desecuritizing actor should be able to point out that it would be better to get an issue out of the security realm. This will be easier if the desecuritizing actor can refer to certain objects that can be identified with the fading away of a threat. If these facilitating conditions are met, the desecuritizing move will be more likely to succeed.

The contributions of Holger Stritzel and Thierry Balzacq to securitization theory regarding the importance of the context are also applicable to desecuritization theory. So in the further use of desecuritization theory the importance of the facilitating conditions and the social context will be taken into account. With regard to the influence of the context, Oelsner points out that, although desecuritization ultimately is a domestic process, both regional and global transformations and domestic processes can influence the desecuritization process. With reference to this Coskun argues that desecuritization processes can be initiated bottom-up and top-down. So both developments on a bigger scale (for instance, global developments) as on a smaller scale (pressure from interest groups and grass-roots initiatives) can start and influence desecuritization processes.

With regard to the ultimate goal of desecuritization – asecurity and the shifting of an issue back into ‘normal’ politics – it is questionable if (re-)politicization is always preferable. An argument for this could be that when an issue is securitized, it deserves extra attention and special measures are taken to address the threat. When the issue is removed out of the security sphere and brought back into the sphere of ‘normal’ politics – it is re-politicized – it loses this special status and might not be addressed anymore. For instance, Paul Roe has brought up such an issue considering minority rights. Roe states that ultimate desecuritization will not be

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131 Coskun, Analysing Desecuritisations, 21.
132 Oelsner, 5.
133 Coskun, Analysing Desecuritisations, 22.
possible in the case of minorities as minorities will then lose their status as a minority. Instead Roe claims that it would be better to institutionalize the issue of minorities and to strive after a situation of security instead of asecurity.\textsuperscript{134} So it might differ per issue if ‘ultimate’ desecuritization is the best outcome.

With regard to the meaning of desecuritization Rita Floyd points at a moral dimension of (de-)securitization theory. Floyd claims that the Copenhagen School considers securitizations to be morally wrong and desecuritizations to be morally right.\textsuperscript{135} As such desecuritization would be the normative goal of securitization. De Wilde has reacted to Floyd’s view and he claims that it is a misinterpretation of the (de-)securitization theory that desecuritization is the normative goal of securitization.\textsuperscript{136} According to De Wilde, desecuritizations are not seen as morally right but they are inherent to processes of securitization.\textsuperscript{137} Within a securitization move something is presented as a threat which requires exceptional measures. The exceptional measures are asked for to address the threat and inherently the optimal outcome would be to solve the problem – or in other words desecuritization. However, this is not the normative goal of securitization. De Wilde concludes that ‘desecuritization is not right or wrong, it simply happens or not’.\textsuperscript{138} Apart from the question if desecuritization is morally right, it can be concluded that desecuritization is in a way inherent to securitization and that desecuritization often – but not always – is implicitly seen as the preferred outcome.

As desecuritization might be the preferred outcome, it is interesting if desecuritization could be used as a policy tool by third parties to remove an issue out of the security realm. Considering that desecuritization can occur as inter alia governments and policy makers try to convince the audience of their changed perception of a situation, it is arguable that it could be a policy tool. Another interesting question – which is still unanswered – is to what extent it would be possible for third parties to use desecuritization as a policy tool.

2.4 Relationship between securitization and desecuritization

An important question which can be useful for the application of securitization theory to conflict resolution concerns the role of the accompanying securitization in the desecuritization

\textsuperscript{135} Floyd, \textit{Security and the Environment}, 56.
\textsuperscript{136} De Wilde, ‘Security and the Environment,’ 1.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
process. Logically a case of successful securitization has always taken place prior to a case of desecuritization. Only when an issue has become a security issue it can also be desecuritized. Moreover, as has been argued in the previous section, desecuritization is inherent to securitization. So the securitization of an issue will inherently mean that desecuritization will be strived after as it is seen as the outcome.

However, what exactly is the relationship between securitization and desecuritization is unclear. It is also uncertain if and what the effect is of former securitizations for the desecuritization process. It is logical that a case of desecuritization is related to the former securitization. For instance, if the outcome is that the problem is solved and everything has to go back to normal, it is necessary that former threats are dealt with in the desecuritization process. Nonetheless the former securitization does not necessarily have influence on the desecuritization process. Per example, in case that desecuritization takes place because another securitization is overriding the securitization at stake, it is not necessary to address the former securitization. The difference between the mentioned examples is that the desecuritization process does not always deal directly with the issue which has been securitized. Desecuritization can also occur while there is an indirect link with the securitized issue.

It is thinkable that the former securitization can also have influence on the type and the success of desecuritization. With regard to the influence of securitization on the type of desecuritization the Arab – Israel war provides a case. There are some unassailable issues (per example, Jerusalem) in this conflict. This will (together with the fact that conflicts in the societal sectors are often hard to dissolve) make the type of desecuritization ‘problem solved’ less likely to occur than for instance, ‘a change of discourse’ or ‘institutionalization’. Following up this argument, securitization can also influence the possible success of a desecuritization. If in the case of the Arab – Israel war a desecuritization move will me made corresponding with the type ‘problem solved’ it will less likely be successful.

With regard to the fact that desecuritization is inherent to securitization, these concepts can also be linked to the involvement of a third party in a certain situation. When an outside party, which initially did not have anything to do with a threat, starts to consider something as a threat and securitizes the issue, this will have the consequence that the external party will get involved as it will try to desecuritize the issue. This link is important with reference to conflict resolution and will inter alia be studied in the next chapter.

Overall, securitization and desecuritization are linked in several ways. Desecuritization is inherent to securitization and this makes the link between the two concepts...
very strong. With regard to the link between the desecuritization process and the former securitization process, this one can be strong but this is not necessarily so. Furthermore, securitization can influence the type and success of desecuritization. However, it has to be noted that it is always important to know what the securitization was for desecuritization, because otherwise you cannot see if there is a case of desecuritization and if anything has changed in the situation. Moreover, analyzing the former securitization can give insight in the background of a particular situation.

2.5 (De-)securitization theory and conflict resolution

In this chapter the (de-)securitization theory of the Copenhagen School has been explored. According to securitization theory, an issue needs to be presented as an existential threat to become a security issue.\textsuperscript{139} When the issue is then accepted by the audience as an existential threat which requires extreme measures, the issue has moved from normal politics to a status of emergency and there is a case of securitization.\textsuperscript{140} Desecuritization theory works in the opposite direction of securitization. It means that a certain issue will be removed from the security realm and will be dealt with again in `normal politics’. The ultimate outcome of the desecuritization process is a situation of asecurity. In that case an issue is not a security issue anymore at all.

Conflict can be linked to securitization as securitization is about the mobilization of a threat. In case of a conflict, it can be said that a threat is mobilized. The other party can be seen as a threat or a particular event can be perceived as a threat which should be dealt with. Different object can be perceived to be threatened. Per example, the existence of an identity group, territory or existential values can be threatened. When the threat is mobilized and emergency measures are called for, a conflict can become overt. It can be questioned if a threat is mobilized in all conflicts. Often this is likely but if the use of violence and the start of a conflict is about revenge this can be doubted. However, when a conflict is overt the parties are a threat to each other. When a party uses violence, the other party is threatened. If it does nothing it will be killed so logically this threat will be mobilized and emergency measures will be called for. The party can stop the threat in two ways. It can kill the other party or disarm the other party. The emergency measures can then exist of the use of violence. The aim of conflict resolution has been described as to transform conflicts into non-violent peace

\textsuperscript{139} Buzan, \textit{Security}, 24.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
processes which will lead to social and political change. As desecuritization means that an issue is removed out of the security realm, it is useable as an instrument for conflict resolution.

Conflict analysis is an important part of conflict resolution as it is necessary to understand a conflict to solve it. Securitization theory provides a framework for analysis which could be used to analyze conflicts. Furthermore, securitization theory will provide a framework to analyze how conflict analysts and third parties define a conflict situation. Third parties can define the situation or the conflict as a threat or not. They can perceive the situation as a threat to themselves or to the conflict parties involved. Both a situation and a conflict are mentioned to refer to the options in the hourglass, namely war and repression. In case of a war, a third party can define an overt conflict as a threat whereas in a case of repression the third party can see a situation which is not necessarily a war as threatening. The definition of a situation/conflict as a threat by third parties also has consequences. If a third party securitizes a situation/conflict the use of emergency measures is legitimized and desecuritization will be strived after (as desecuritization is inherent to securitization). Here the link between desecuritization and conflict resolution appears again. It can be interesting to see how desecuritization and as such conflict resolution takes place.

The framework of analysis of the Copenhagen School which has been reviewed in this chapter will be adapted to conflict resolution in the next chapter. There it will be explored if and how (de-)securitization theory provides a framework for conflict resolution and how these theories can be integrated.

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141 Ramsbotham, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 32.
Chapter 3 – (De-)securitization theory and conflict resolution

In the first chapter it has become clear that conflict resolution theory still can be improved and that there are relevant critical remarks to the theory. As has become clear in the second chapter, the Copenhagen School provides a framework for analysis for conflict resolution. With regard to this link between conflict resolution theory and the Copenhagen School, three under theorized possibilities for research have been detected. It is possible to compare the two theories, to see where they can replenish each other and to integrate the theories.

In this chapter the theories of the Copenhagen School and conflict resolution theory will be integrated into comprehensive models which can contribute to conflict resolution. There are several possibilities for integrating the two theories but in this study the focus lies on the way how conflicts are labeled by analysts and third parties and what the consequences of this labeling are. These two components will be visualized in comprehensive models. Because the two theories have a different focus – the Copenhagen School focuses on analysis whereas conflict resolution is action-orientated – the research has an experimental character. The combination of the two approaches leads to interesting and surprising results but also brings difficulties with it.

This chapter is structured as follows. First of all, the link between the Copenhagen School and conflict resolution will be reviewed. As an introduction securitization and desecuritization theory will be coupled to the hourglass model of conflict resolution theory. In the second section, the focus will lie on understanding how third parties and conflict analysts perceive and label conflicts. It will be reviewed to what extent the Copenhagen School can provide insights in this process. Thirdly, it will be reviewed what consequences the labeling of a situation as a crisis has. It will be explored to what extent (de-)securitization theory can give insights in the way which third parties deal with conflicts. Moreover, (de-)securitization theory and conflict resolution will be integrated into a model which can be used to analyze conflict resolution. Furthermore, it will be briefly discussed to what extent (de-)securitization theory provides instruments for conflict resolution and if desecuritization can be used as a (policy) tool to de-escalate conflicts. Finally, conclusions will be drawn. This chapter is mainly based on the literature which has been used in chapter 1 and 2. For the examples inter alia the correspondence of the United Nations’ Security Council (UNSC), conflict descriptions of the Uppsala Conflict Database and news articles will be used.
3.1 The Copenhagen School and conflict resolution theory

In this section (de-)securitization theory will be linked to (the hourglass model of) conflict resolution theory. Securitization theory provides a framework for analysis to understand how issues become security issues. More in detail, it ‘focuses on the questions of when and under what conditions who securitizes what issue’.\footnote{Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, \textit{Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) as cited in Coskun, \textit{Analysing Desecuritisations}, 10.} According to securitization theory, something becomes a security issue when a securitizing actor presents it as a threat which requires emergency measures and an audience accepts this and approves the implementation of the emergency measures. The issue has then been moved from the political realm into the security realm and the use of emergency measures becomes legitimized. These measures might include violence. In this way securitization can be compared to the first part of the hourglass model of conflict resolution theory, namely the escalation of a situation into a (violent) conflict. Ramsbotham and his colleagues have defined the first half of the hourglass as the part in which the political space is getting limited.\footnote{Ramsbotham, \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution}, 13.} A situation in which there is a difference can escalate and finally, it can become a war.

There are roughly two possibilities. First of all, there can be two parties who perceive some of their goals as incompatible. As both parties strive after something, the other party can become a threat and an enemy. If the threat is big enough, a situation can escalate and become a violent conflict. Secondly, there can be a situation of inequality which can escalate and eventually, become a situation of repression. This could also be seen as a conflict in which there is no political space to change the situation. So this process of escalation could be analyzed by the use of securitization theory. Securitization theory can give an explanation of the observed escalation. In case of a successful securitization (violent) emergency measures are legitimized and that could explain the process towards violence and ultimately, war.

The process of desecuritization works in the opposite direction of securitization. In a case of desecuritization an issue is removed from the security realm and back into the political realm. A situation or an issue is not seen as a threat anymore and emergency measures – like violence – are not needed anymore. The aim of conflict resolution is to change situations of conflict into peaceful processes which will eventually result into social and political change.\footnote{Ibid, 32.} As such, desecuritization can be useful to analyze and explain conflict.

\footnote{143 Ramsbotham, \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution}, 13.}
\footnote{144 Ibid, 32.}
As desecuritization concerns that an issue is removed out of the security realm and that the necessity for emergency measures will fade away, desecuritization can be coupled to the de-escalation of conflict. The de-escalation of conflicts is represented in the second half of the hourglass model (see figure 1). The second half of the model stands for the phases in which a conflict is resolved. In the process of de-escalation the political space is opening up. This can be compared to the movement of an issue out of the security realm into the political realm which is part of desecuritization. Desecuritization theory can give an explanation of the observed de-escalation. The difference between desecuritization and de-escalation and between securitization and escalation is that escalation and de-escalation are descriptions of a situation and these can be analyzed through securitization and desecuritization. More about this will follow in the next sections.

3.2 (De-)securitization theory: understanding conflict analysis

An important link between securitization theory and conflict resolution theory has to do with conflict analysis. Securitization theory provides a framework for analyzing the process in which something becomes a security issue. As such securitization theory is useful for conflict analysis in two ways. First of all, it can be used to analyze how conflicts are defined and perceived by analysts and third parties. It can be studied how third parties label situations/conflicts and where they place them in the hourglass. The labeling of a situation as a conflict and defining it as a threat will have consequences for the response of the third party and therefore, insight in this labeling of conflicts is desirable. Secondly, it can be used by conflict analysts and third parties to analyze and understand the evolvement and dynamics of a conflict. Conflict analysis in this form is an essential part of conflict resolution as it is necessary to understand conflicts to resolve them and securitization theory might be useful as a tool for this. In this section the focus will lie on the first application but future research on the second application is recommended.

With regard to conflict analysis, there is an important difference between conflict resolution and the Copenhagen School. Within conflict resolution it is assumed that conflicts can be analyzed objectively and as such that it can be analyzed in what phase of the hourglass a conflict is situated. According to the Copenhagen School, it is not possible to define threats

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145 It is questionable when a situation can be defined as peace and moreover, it is a question if there will always be a case of desecuritization when a conflict ends. Furthermore, a case of desecuritization is not necessarily a situation which will be defined as ‘peace’ by conflict analysts. It could be interesting to study these definitions.
Therefore, it can be argued that the analyst will also not be able to define threats objectively and that it is the perception of the analyst how s/he perceives a threat. However, within conflict resolution it are the analysts and third parties that interpret a conflict/situation and place it somewhere in the hourglass. This is not done by the conflict parties themselves. Analysts and third parties label certain situations. However, an analyst is biased and it depends on its interpretation of a situation if it is a conflict or not and in which phase of the hourglass it places the situation. As such the analyst can be defined as a (de-)securitizing actor itself. By placing a situation or a conflict in the hourglass model, an analyst/third party labels it as a threat or not.

An analyst can see a situation or an event as part of something bigger and define the situation as threatening. In the case of conflict resolution, an event can for instance be seen as part of a conflict. However, an analyst could also decide that the event stands on itself and has nothing to do with a bigger threat. The problem with the classification of violence, which has been described in section 1.3, is also valid here, namely that it depends on the analyst if the use of violence is seen as part of a conflict or not. It is also possible that the labeling of a situation differs over time. Something can become seen as threat – it can become securitized – which not has been seen as a threat before. Another option is that something was seen as a threat, next the threat was perceived to have faded away and then it can become securitized again. Another possibility is that something which has been seen as a threat – and was defined as a conflict – for a long time will not be labeled as a threat anymore while this might still be present.

An example in which different interpretations are possible, are cattle raids which are taking place in South Sudan. Communities are stealing each other’s cattle and they use a lot of violence during the raids. These raids could be seen as ‘just an event’: ‘It is just a part of the tradition of rivalry between communities, there has been some shooting but there is no bigger problem’. As such it could for instance be placed in the hourglass as a difference. The event can also be interpreted as part of something bigger. For instance, it could be marked as a civil war which is going on in South Sudan and as such it can be placed somewhere else in the hourglass, like violence or war. So the interpretation of the analyst is important for the placement of the situation in the hourglass.

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146 Buzan, Security, 31.
147 As an analyst is biased, the same goes for the person who analyzes the analyst. The author of the research is aware of the fact that this is the case.
Because conflict resolution theory often makes use of the amount of fatalities to define a war, it might seem that it is indeed possible to define conflicts objectively.\(^\text{149}\) It could be argued that an issue or a situation will sooner be perceived as a threat which has to be dealt with when the amount of victims is higher. However, this is not necessarily the case as it depends on the value the analyst adds to the situation if it indeed will be seen as a threat. De Wilde and Zwitter have captured this in the comparison between traffic incidents and terrorist attacks.\(^\text{150}\) In 2005 there were 41,600 fatalities in traffic incidents in the European Union and there were 56 fatalities from terrorist attacks in Western Europe.\(^\text{151}\) Although the amount of victims in traffic incidents is way higher than the amount of victims from terrorist attacks, terrorism is seen as a threat to security whereas road security has not been defined as an overall threat to society.\(^\text{152}\) Another problem with the use of the amount of fatalities as an objective criterion to define conflict is the question when a fatality will be counted. This also depends on the perception of the analyst.

It is argued that (de-)securitization theory can be used to analyze how a third party places a situation in the hourglass (see figure 2).\(^\text{153}\) The conflict parties are behaving in a certain way and they find themselves somewhere in the hourglass. They are escalating or de-escalating. The place where they find themselves is dynamic and can be changed.\(^\text{154}\) However, it depends on the interpretation of the third party where the third party perceives that the conflict parties are finding themselves and where the conflict should be placed. This labeling will be done at a certain moment. The hourglass model in figure 2 is static as it explains where a third party places a conflict on this specific moment. The third party has two options (see figure 2) when it places a situation in the hourglass. If a third party defines a situation as a threat, it can be seen as a case of securitization. The third party can perceive the situation as a threat for itself but also as a threat for the conflict parties. The third party can define the situation as escalating and a crisis which should be dealt with. It is also possible that securitizing moves can be detected but that there will not be a successful securitization if for instance, there is no consensus within the audience. A situation can then be placed in the

\(^{149}\) An example is the Uppsala Conflict Database which defines conflicts based on the amount of battle-related fatalities.

\(^{150}\) Andrej Zwitter and Jaap De Wilde, ‘Prismatic Security: Expanding the Copenhagen School to the Local Level.’ Forthcoming: 8.

\(^{151}\) Ibid.

\(^{152}\) Ibid.

\(^{153}\) The analyst is not necessarily a third party but as this study focuses on the labeling of conflicts by third parties in the following paragraphs and sections only the third party will be mentioned.

\(^{154}\) It is also possible that conflict parties went through the complete hourglass – from escalation to de-escalation – and that they in the end up in a new conflict and a new ‘hourglass’. The hourglass models can then be placed under each other.
escalation phase of the conflict but is not seen as such a big threat that emergency measures should be taken. The other option is desecuritization. A third party can decide not to present an issue of a situation as a threat and not to add urgency to the situation. The consequence will be that nothing will be done outside the political realm.\textsuperscript{155} The desecuritization of an issue can take place in the beginning. In that case it can be seen as the option for desecuritization which Waever describes as ‘keeping an issue out of the security realm’.\textsuperscript{156} An example of this is the uprisings in Syria which have taken place since 2011. At least until the first half of March, there has not been a case of securitization by third parties. However, desecuritization can also take place after a while. It is possible that an issue first has been securitized and that later on an event or situation occurs which could be seen as part of the issue which has first been defined as a security issue but the analyst can also decide to define it as an event which stands on itself and has nothing to do with the former threat. As such the third party does not oblige itself to use emergency measures and to intervene to address the threat (again), regardless of the fact if the former threat has earlier been addressed properly or not.

Important is that (de-)securitization theory itself does not place a situation in the hourglass but it provides a framework to analyze how third parties perceive a situation and how they place a situation in the hourglass. (De-)securitization theory does not study the situation – the issue which is observed – but the observations of third parties. Therefore, a case of securitization or desecuritization is not similar to a certain phase in the hourglass. However, when there is a case of securitization, a situation will often be placed in the hourglass by the third party on a point in which a situation is escalating. When there is a case of desecuritization, a situation will often be placed by an analyst in a wider part of the hourglass. Moreover, a case of securitization can, in principal, been seen as an escalation of an issue because in most cases the third party will become involved in the conflict and as such escalate it. This will be discussed with regard to the consequences of the labeling. A case of desecuritization can be seen as a de-escalation of the situation. So it is clear that a third party can choose to securitize or desecuritize a situation. Consequently, the third party labels the situation/issue and places it somewhere in the hourglass model.

\textsuperscript{155} If the situation will be dealt with in the political realm is another question which will not be answered here as it is not necessary to know for the research.

\textsuperscript{156} Waever, “The EU as a Security Actor,” 253.
The way in which the third party labels a situation will also have consequences. As has been argued in chapter 2.3, desecuritization is inherent to the process of securitization.\textsuperscript{157} Therefore, if a third party securitizes an issue, desecuritization will be inherent (see figure 2).

Within the process of securitization a securitizing actor will utter the need for emergency measures to address the exceptional threat. With these measures the securitizing actor wants to address the threat and solve the problem. The emergency measures also point at a solution for the threat, a way in which the threat can be dealt with. So inherently in the process of securitization it is argued that something should and – if the securitizing move is accepted by the audience – will be done to address the threat. As a result, it can be seen as a consequence of a securitization that measures will be taken and that a securitizing actor will try to get rid of the threat. In the case of a third party, the party could decide to get actively involved in the conflict. The emergency measures which will be taken, can take any form of third party intervention. More about the consequences of the labeling of a situation and about this relationship will follow in the next section.

An interesting question concerns the reason why third parties label some situations as a threat and others not. The fact that desecuritization and thereby the promise of a solution are inherent to securitization, can be seen as a criterion. As this is the case, it will only make sense to securitize an issue if a solution is seen for the problem and there is no point in

\textsuperscript{157} De Wilde, ‘Security and the Environment,’ 1.
defining something as a threat if nothing can be done about it. The existence of a possible solution can be seen as a criterion for securitization. However, it can be argued that it is not only the existence of a solution. The securitizing actor also needs to prioritize the issue and want to do something about it. For several reasons, a securitizing actor can decide to prioritize some threat over another. In the case of an American President it could be argued that the President can decide to intervene in a conflict but then the chance is high that its position will be lost in the next elections. This could also be seen as a threat so then it depends on which one has priority over another. The issues are competing with each other. More about this can be found in chapter 2.3. Overall, in this section it is argued that (de-)securitization theory can be integrated in the hourglass model and that this integration will make it possible to get more insight in how third parties label situation/conflicts. Subsequently, it is interesting how this model (figure 2) can be applied to case studies. Therefore, a framework for analysis will be given.

It has been argued that the labeling of conflicts can be studied through (de-)securitization theory. For the analysis of third party observations and labeling, especially securitization theory is useful because the question is when third parties label a situation as a crisis – or not. This corresponds with the phases in the escalation phase. It is also possible that something becomes a crisis again after it has already been labeled as being in the de-escalation phase before. However, this analysis focuses on the labeling of something as a threat – or not. So the question is if a situation will be defined by a third party as a crisis which has to be dealt with. Roughly, there are three options possible. Firstly, there can be a case of securitization: a situation will be defined as a threat which has to be dealt with. Secondly, there can be securitizing moves but no successful securitization: there will be attempts to define the situation as a threat but there is no support from the audience. Thirdly, the situation is not defined as a threat and there will be a case of desecuritization. This is also the only option of desecuritization which is possible here – to keep an issue out of the security realm. So there is no securitization at all. The other options of desecuritization – which will be discussed in the next section – will not be possible here because those are only possible after a case of successful securitization.

The process of securitization is also defined as a speech act and therefore, securitizations can be studied through discourse analysis. In a process of securitization there are some elements expected to be present: the securitizing actor (who in this case will be the third party), an audience and the speech act. Besides, the facilitating conditions are important for the success of a speech act. Furthermore, it is argued, in line with Balzacq and Stritzel,
that the context influences securitization. In the next paragraphs it will be reviewed which elements are part of the analysis of third party labeling.

First of all, the speech act is an important element out of which it will become clear if the third party sees the situation/conflict as a threat/crisis. The speech act can be utterances by securitizing actors (for instance, speeches or policy statements) but the speech act can also be present in official documents (for instance, in resolutions or official policy documents). It is expected that it will become clear out of the speech act what issue is at stake – which in this case will be a (conflict) situation. Furthermore, it will become clear if the issue is defined as a threat. The situation can literally be called a threat or a crisis but there can also be other descriptions. However, it depends on the urgency which is given to the situation and the call for emergency measures or not if the securitization move will be complete. This is also the first facilitating condition. A securitizing actor can define a situation as a threat but if it does not add urgency and as it does not call for action, the situation is not defined as a crisis in which the third party should intervene. Another possibility is that the third party says that the situation is not a crisis at all or not such a big crisis as others claim it is. The speech act will also provide information about the question where the third party places the situation in the hourglass. It is expected that a third party will place a situation in a phase in the hourglass with a wider political space when the third party does not define the situation as a crisis and that it will place the situation in the more narrow part of the hourglass when the situation is defined as a threat. The phases which are described in the hourglass can be seen as possible descriptions by third parties. Furthermore, the speech act will give insight in the solution which the third party sees for the conflict – to remove the threat – in the form of the emergency measures which are defined.

Secondly, the securitizing actor is an important element as this is the actor which utters the speech act. In this analysis the third party will be the securitizing actor. Depending on the level of analysis this can be several actors. It is assumed that it will be an actor which has authority (this is also the second facilitating condition) and is in the position to possibly decide over the third party involvement. For instance, this can be grassroots leaders which securitize a local conflict and intervene but this can also be state representatives in the United Nations Security Council who decide over a possible intervention. However, grassroots leaders can also be conflict parties instead of third parties. In this study the focus lies on initially external third parties. Overall, it is assumed that the third party involvement will be in the form of a state actor or an institution which could influence a decision to intervene in a conflict or not (regardless of the kind of intervention). The securitizing actor will often be an
elite which has the possibility as well to take action against the perceived threat. Examples of possible securitizing actors are state representatives in international institutions like the United Nations (UN) and especially in the UNSC. Also the UNSC itself can be seen as a securitizing actor. Another institution is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Thirdly, an audience needs to accept the claim of the securitizing actor that something is an existential threat which demands emergency measures. Of whom the audience consists depends on whose approval the securitizing actor needs. This will be different in the levels of analysis. For instance, in the UNSC it can be that one member state (could be the temporary president) tries to convince the other member states. Another example is that a state representative tries to convince the national parliament. It could also be that the citizens of a country are addressed. In case of a military intervention the impact on the country will be bigger because soldiers will be sent to a country. In that case public opinion can play a role and the people can be an audience as well. The audience has a big influence on the definition of a situation as a lack of consensus – a lack of support of the audience – could lead to an impasse in the labeling of a situation and as such there will be no possibility for joint (legitimized) action. In case of an impasse in for instance the UNSC, a member state could also try to get the support of its national audience and maybe some partners and to intervene without the legitimization of the UNSC. However, most of the time approval of the UNSC will be strived after.

Fourthly, three facilitating conditions need to be fulfilled. The first and second have already been mentioned with regard to the speech act (the elements of it) and the securitizing actor (position of authority. The third facilitating conditions consists of the influence on the success factor of the securitization of the existence of features which are in general seen as threatening by an audience. Within conflict resolution this could be everything. For instance, certain issues can be seen as threatening over borders. Currently, the spread and possible increase of terrorism is a popular feature which is seen as threatening.

The context also has influence on the process of securitization. Several interests can influence the labeling of a situation by a third party. On different levels issues can be involved which will lead or will not lead to securitization of the ‘conflict’. It is possible – and even likely – that there are competing threats. The securitizing actor should than prioritize which issue is most important. These competing issues can exist on several levels and the dynamics on this levels will influence the process of securitization. Possible levels are: local issues, intrastate situation, regime, regional dynamics, and world politics. So the dynamics in all levels can influence the labeling by third parties.
Two examples of case studies can be given which have had a different outcome. These are the uprisings in Libya and Syria which started in 2011 and have been seen as a part of the Arabian Spring. First of all, the uprisings in Libya have been discussed in the UNSC and in North Atlantic Council of the NATO. In the UNSC consensus has been reached by the member about the labeling of the situation in Libya. In UNSC Resolution 1973 the situation in Libya has been defined as a crisis and it is called for emergency measures like the establishment of a no fly zone. So the uprisings in Libya have been labeled as a crisis and a threat and there has been a case of securitization. The securitization and the execution of emergency measures in the form of air support to the Libyan rebels has been confirmed by the NATO in a statements of the NATO Secretary General.

Secondly, the uprisings in Syria have also been discussed in the UNSC. However, the situation is different than in the case of Libya. At least until the first half of March the member state have not been able to reach an understanding of the labeling of the situation. Especially, Russia and China have rejected the labeling of the situation in Syria as a crisis and as a threat which has to be dealt with through emergency measures. It could be said that there is an impasse which obstructs the labeling of the situation and consequently, possible measures. However, measures within the political realm have been taken. For instance, former Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan went to Syria to talk with the Syrian regime. With regard to the options for labeling a situation, it could be argued that Russia and China are examples of choosing the option of desecuritization – keeping an issue out of the security realm. Although these examples are supporting the model in figure 2, it is recommended that in-depth case studies will be done in future research to see if the model works in different situations and in which ways it can be improved.

3.3 The consequences of labeling conflicts: from securitization to desecuritization

In this section the consequences of the labeling of (conflict) situations will be discussed. As has been pointed out in the previous section, desecuritization is inherent to securitization (see figure 2). There is a promise of the solution within securitization. So if a third party securitizes a conflict, it will usually be the consequence that emergency measures will be imposed. Uppsala Conflict Database Project, “Arabian Spring.” United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011). NATO Secretary General, “NATO’s Secretary General Statement on Libya No-fly Zone.” United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria.” United Nations Secretary General, “Kofi Annan Appointed Joint Special Envoy of United Nations, League of Arab States on Syrian Crisis,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsm14124.doc.htm.
taken to remove the threat (these measures can be diverse). So the third party will strive after desecuritization – the removal of the issue out of the security realm into the political realm. Desecuritization theory makes it possible to analyze how an issue is de-escalated and moved from a point in the hourglass in which the political space is narrowed to a wider point. This process will be reviewed in the following paragraphs.

First of all, the Copenhagen School has distinguished three options of how an issue can be desecuritized.\(^{163}\) The first option has been discussed in the previous section, namely: to keep an issue out of the security realm. This option is only possible before a conflict has been securitized and as such it can be done in the first half of the hourglass. It can be seen as a kind of conflict prevention. The following options can be used once an issue is securitized. The second option concerns the management of a security issue and in the case of conflict resolution of the conflict. It should be taken care of that responses do not take forms which will generate security dilemmas. This option can be integrated with conflict management. The third option deals with the transformation of a security issue or a conflict. An issue will be moved out of the security realm into the political realm. This option can be integrated with conflict transformation. The options are present in figure 3. With regard to conflict resolution it is argued that the last two options of desecuritization are also possible in the first half of the hourglass. If a situation is defined as a crisis/threat and the situation is defined as a war (the situation is placed in the central point of the hourglass) than it will be logical that de-escalation will take place in the second half of the hourglass. However, as a securitization takes places in the first half of the hourglass, there are two possibilities. First of all, the third party can decide to escalate to come to de-escalation like through a military intervention. Secondly, a conflict can be desecuritized without full escalation (without passing the central point of the hourglass). The de-escalation process then takes place in the upper halve of the hourglass. More about these options will follow in the next paragraphs.

Conflict resolution theory has coupled the de-escalation of conflicts with forms of conflict resolution. There have also been described several types of desecuritization and these are integrated in the hourglass model (see figure 4). As has been described in chapter 2.3, De Wilde has defined four types of desecuritization. The first type is that the problem is solved. The threat has been eliminated and everything can become normal again. This type of desecuritization refers to the management of a conflict. The conflict is settled. For instance, when a country is invaded and the invaders are forced to leave the country, the problem is solved. After the problem is solved the situation can become normal again. As such it can be seen as a form of peacemaking which paves the way for further peacebuilding. With regard to the transformation of a situation to a ‘normal’ one, a remark should be made. Normal is relative as the situation will never become the same again as before a conflict/the securitization of an issue. For instance, when a community has securitized another community as a threat to their existence and it comes to an armed conflict, people will have died and both conflict parties will have lost part of what they were defending. When the conflict has ended, it could be perceived that the ‘problem’ is solved and the threat is not longer a threat, but things have changed irreversible. The situation will never get back to normal but the new situation can be normalized. The aim of conflict resolution is to go back to a normal situation

as far as possible. The ultimate phase of conflict transformation and the solving of the problem is defined by conflict resolution theory as reconciliation. An example of how reconciliation can be stimulated is through truth commissions. The idea is that although the situation will never be the same anymore, relationships will be healed and that people accept each other. That they do not perceive each other as a threat anymore. A case in which truth commission have been used, is Sierra Leone. After the struggle over power which, according to the Uppsala Conflict Database, took place between 1991 and 2000\textsuperscript{165}, truth commissions were established to restore relationships.

The second type is the institutional adaptation to a situation. Certain threats and possible countermeasures become institutionalized in the government and the society. An example of this is Bosnia. In Bosnia ethnic differences are still present and there are still ethnic tensions. For instance, this can be seen in the formation of the government which started in 2010. The formation took over a year as there was no clear majority and the parliamentary seats were divided evenly between political parties which have different ethnical backgrounds. These parties did not come to an agreement until December 2011.\textsuperscript{166} Although tensions are still present, the ethnic differences are institutionalized and the society and the government have to live with it. The institutionalization has its foundations in the Dayton peace accords and it consists of inter alia a combination of cooperation on state level scale and decentralized autonomy.\textsuperscript{167} This type of desecuritization can be seen as a kind of conflict management. It can be defined as peacemaking and eventually, it can be structural peacebuilding as the institutional adaptation goes further than peacemaking. In the case of institutionalization it could be discussed to what extent this really is a situation of ‘peace’, where conflict resolution is striving after. As the concept is not defined very specifically by the Copenhagen School, it remains unclear if it should indeed be coupled to both forms or not. To clarify the exact coupling of institutionalization and conflict resolution theory further exploration of the different concepts is recommended.

The third type of desecuritization concerns a change of discourse. In case of a change of discourse the threat can remain to exist but priorities change, there can be a loss of interest or the security discourse changes. An example of a change of discourse is provided by Saudi

\textsuperscript{165} Uppsala Conflict Database Project, “Sierra Leone,” Uppsala Conflict Database Project, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=136&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.
Arabia. In 2011 the position of the rulers of Saudi Arabia was threatened by the opposition.\footnote{Neil MacFarquhar, “In Saudi Arabia, Royal Funds Buy Peace for Now,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09saudi.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all.} Like in other Arab countries there were uprisings and people protested against the ruling elite. As a response the Saudi Kingdom invested 130 billion dollars in inter alia the building of houses and salaries of policy officers.\footnote{Ibid.} By doing so the Kingdom tried to satisfy the people and especially the opposition. In this way the Kingdom distracted attention from the issues which the opposition was demonstrating for and as such it changed the discourse and addressed the threat. Another way in which a discourse can be changed is by looking for points to cooperate and focus on that. An example is the Israel-Palestinian water management.\footnote{Analysing Desecuritisations, 31.} Another example can be found with regard to the cooperation of Gulf countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The members of the GCC are ruled by Sunni elites. There are some conflicts between members but cooperation is mostly chosen above conflict as the securitization of possible Shiite domination is given priority.\footnote{Kristian Ulrichsen, “Gulf Security: Changing Internal and External Dynamics.” Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States (2009): 12.} The question is what form of conflict resolution change of discourse is. It might not always be seen as conflict resolution because the threat will not always be addressed and therefore, the conflict might not be resolved. However, it could also be seen as conflict resolution. When the values at stake are changed it could be a case of cultural peacebuilding and a form of conflict transformation. Moreover, change of discourse is also described as a lost of interest and as such it can also be described as cultural peacebuilding. In the case of Saudi Arabia it can be argued that a change of discourse is deliberately used as a policy tool.

The fourth option for desecuritization is that the case is lost. It means that the threat cannot be solved. An example of this could be that a government has to resign after the opposition started to rebel against it. In that case the structure has changed. Conflict resolution theory might not regard this as an option for conflict resolution as the idea of conflict resolution is that conflicts can be resolved but the new structure can be a loss for one party and a victory for another party. It can be the end of a conflict and a conflict transformation. However, it depends on the interpretation of case lost. It can be coupled to conflict resolution in another way as in some cases a solution is not possible, like in intractable conflicts. These could be compared to situations in which the case is lost as the issues involved are not at all negotiable. For instance, in the Israeli-Palestine conflict the status of Jerusalem forms an
obstacle for a peace.\textsuperscript{172} Because it remains unclear if the concept of ‘case lost’ can be regarded a form of conflict resolution, it is kept out of the hourglass model.

These four types of desecuritization refer to desecuritization as an outcome. However, desecuritization has not been applied very often to case studies. Therefore, it is unclear if these options are sufficient or that there are more options. Interestingly, some of the types seem to bring new options for conflict resolution. However, there have also been difficulties with the construction of this model. A first difficulty has to do with the type of concepts of both theories. The types of desecuritization refer to outcomes of the desecuritization process whereas the types of conflict resolution refer to phases and forms of conflict resolution. This distinction made it difficult to integrate the concepts.

Another difficulty has to do with the extent to which the concepts have been theorized. Desecuritization theory of the Copenhagen School is under theorized and has not explicitly worked out all concepts. This makes it difficult to interpret and to use the theory. On the contrary, conflict resolution theory has defined the phases of conflict resolution very explicitly Conflict resolution has made it very clear how conflicts could be dealt with.\textsuperscript{173} However, conflict resolution theory has not been clear about the relationship between the forms of conflict resolution. On the one hand, conflict resolution theory makes a distinction between types of peacemaking and peacebuilding. On the other hand, it states that different forms of conflict resolution can start at the same time.

Another problem with this model regards the empirical precision of the hourglass model. It is questionable if the types of desecuritization and conflict resolution can be distinguished so precisely within the phases of the hourglass. It can be argued that such an empirical precision is not possible. Different forms might occur in different phases of the hourglass. One type of desecuritization also occurs in two phases of the hourglass. However, to explore this model further the concepts of the Copenhagen School and conflict resolution should be clarified more and the relationship between the two theories should be explored further. Overall, the model provides an oversight of the options for conflict resolution and types of desecuritization but future research is recommended to improve and develop the model.


\textsuperscript{173} With regard to this, it would be interesting to see if conflict resolution theory can be seen as an operationalization of desecuritization theory. However, the focus of this study is on the usefulness of the Copenhagen School for conflict resolution and therefore, it is recommended for future research.
Figure 4: Options for conflict resolution and types of desecuritization.

Now the possibilities for conflict resolution are described, it will be reviewed how the desecuritization process can be analyzed. As has been pointed out earlier in this section, desecuritization is possible in the first and second half of the hourglass. The conflict resolution/desecuritization hourglass is also – contrary to the one for analyzing the labeling of conflicts – dynamic. In the process of desecuritization the situation is moving through the hourglass. Securitizing and desecuritizing moves can also both be present in the de-escalation phase of conflict resolution. They can explain the dynamics of a conflict resolution process. For instance, it is possible that a conflict is in general de-escalating but that some securitizing moves occur which halt this process (temporarily). For instance, in the conflict in Darfur between the Sudanese government, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, there have been negotiations in 2003 which resulted in the agreement over a ceasefire. This could be seen as a desecuritizing move, as a form of de-escalation. However, the ceasefire was breached and this has led to a new outbreak of the conflict. In the process of escalation, it is also possible that desecuritizing moves occur. An example is

the situation in Saudi Arabia which has been discussed before. The Saudi Kingdom successfully desecuritized the threat before it could fully become a security problem. These dynamics are part of conflict resolution and can be studied through the theories of the Copenhagen School. Furthermore, it is possible that a third party first escalates a conflict to come to de-escalation. This has to do with the different roles which a third party can fulfil. A third party can act like an arbitrator and try to de-escalate the conflict immediately but a third party can also take sides and chose to support one conflict party. The third party can then decide to intensify the conflict by supporting this party to eventually come to de-escalation.

This is also related to the fact that securitization carries the promise of a solution which will lead to desecuritization. It is expected that this solution will be part of the process towards desecuritization. The solution is usually captured in the emergency measures which a securitizing actor calls for. These emergency measures can be almost anything as long as it are measures which are not part of ‘normal politics’. A possibility is that the securitizing actor calls for military intervention. This intervention will than firstly further escalate the conflict but the aim is to eventually de-escalate it. It is also stated that an issue is desecuritized when the emergency measures are not needed anymore. The exact process of desecuritization has not been operationalized by the Copenhagen School. In this study desecuritization theory has been reviewed but too many open ends were found which made it impossible to fully develop the desecuritization process. Moreover, whereas the process of securitization can logically be traced back in speech acts as the securitizing actor calls for support from the audience, this is not necessarily the case with desecuritization. It will not always be clear on what moment and how a conflict is ended. This can be clear when there is a peace agreement but this is not always the case. As a result of these difficulties, the elements of the desecuritization process with regard to conflict resolution theory will shortly be reviewed but future research is recommended to complete the model and to make in-depth case studies possible.

The first element of the desecuritization process refers to the speech act. Within a case of desecuritization a change in the language will be expected (this is also the first facilitating condition). For instance, when an issue first has been described as a threat, this is not done anymore. It could even be explicitly said that a conflict is not a conflict anymore. Similar as in the case of securitization, it is not analyzed if something really is not a threat anymore, but if it is perceived as a threat by in this case a third party. So it could also be that the conflict

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175 It would be interesting to further explore the role of and the possibilities for emergency measures.
parties do not perceive the threat as being solved. Examples of speech acts are statements by the UNSC or the NATO about the resolving of a conflict or statements by political elites of states. However, how a case of desecuritization should be exactly analyzed remains questionable.

Another element which should be present is the desecuritizing actor. This could be another actor than the securitizing actor but in the case of third party conflict resolution it is assumed that the securitizing actor is the desecuritizing actor as well. The third party is a securitizing actor by defining a situation as a threat and a desecuritizing actor as it tries to de-escalate the conflict. It is assumed that the desecuritizing actor has to be in a position of authority (this is also the second facilitating condition).

An audience has to be convinced that the threat is addressed and that emergency measures are not necessary anymore. It could be possible that (a part of) an audience still urges the need of action while the desecuritizing actor already perceives that the threat is addressed. However, in the case of third party intervention it is also possible that an audience wants to stop addressing the threat while the desecuritizing actor does not want to end the intervention yet. Furthermore, it is possible that the conflict parties do or do not yet perceive that the threat is addressed while the third parties does have this perception.

The first and the second facilitating condition are already mentioned. The third one refers to features which can be referred to and are usually associated with the fading away of a threat. For instance, this could be a military victory but also more specifically, the capturing of the persons who were associated with the threat.

In the case of desecuritization the context will also be important. Changes in the context can stimulate desecuritization (the increase of international support for instance or the deserting of the army by former ‘enemies’) but changes can also lead to new securitizations and escalation of a situation (extreme violence by a conflict party or the breaking of a ceasefire). Therefore, these also need to be studied to get insight in the process of desecuritization.

Overall, it is recommendable to further develop this framework for analysis as this can be used to explore if there has been a case of desecuritization. The analysis will also give insight in the measures that third parties will take to de-escalate a conflict and what outcomes are possible. Application of this framework to several case studies might lead to new insights of possible de-escalation strategies. Moreover, insight in these processes might help third parties do not perceive the threat as being solved. It is recommended that desecuritization will be studied with reference to the conflict parties.
parties to develop better conflict resolution strategies. Furthermore, it will contribute to the awareness of the subjectivity of the labeling of a situation. This also counts for desecuritization as it will depend on the third party which measures are thought to be useful for the de-escalation process and to define when there is a case of desecuritization. It would also be interesting to study the desecuritization process out of the perspective of the conflict parties so it will become clear how they perceive conflict resolution.

In section 3.2 it has become clear that there has been a case of securitization by a third party – UNSC and NATO – with regard to the uprisings in Libya in 2011. The case of Libya is an example in which emergency measures have indeed been taken. NATO member states have supported the Libyan rebels with military assistance to win over the regime of Gaddafi. So this is a case in which the situation first has been escalated to come to de-escalation. In the end the rebels have defeated Gaddafi and have taken over power in the country. It could be said that the threat is addressed with the use of third party conflict resolution and that the situation is back to normal. The desecuritization of the conflict in Libya has also been uttered by the Secretary General of the NATO.\footnote{NATO Secretary General, “Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the Liberation of Libya.”} This example supports the model of the desecuritization process with regard to conflict resolution. However, it is recommended that in-depth case studies will be done to review the models extensively. However, to be able to make those, it is recommended that the desecuritization process with regard to conflict resolution will first be further explored and completed.

3.4 Contributions

In this chapter it has become clear that the two theories can be integrated. Two important links have been pointed out in this chapter. These links are presented in figure 2, 3 and 4. The first model is presented in figure 2 and provides a framework for analyzing the labeling of situations as conflicts/threats or not by third parties. In this model the Copenhagen School adds an awareness of subjectivity to the theory. The speech act approach makes it possible to analyze how third parties construct a certain definition of a situation and if they define a situation as a threat. It also makes clear if a third party will most likely intervene in a conflict or not. Overall, the model provides a framework for analysis which can give more insight in third party conflict labeling. These insights make it possible for third parties to use the labeling of conflicts as a policy tool. When a state does not want to intervene it can decide not
to define a situation as a threat. On the contrary, a state can also decide to label a situation as a threat to try to get an intervention legitimized.

With regard to the conflict resolution process especially the contribution of the integration of the types of desecuritization in the conflict resolution process is interesting. This integration is presented in figure 4. Furthermore, (de-)securitization theory can be used to analyze the process of conflict de-escalation and to get insight in the different moves, strategies and outcomes of third party involvement. The different securitizing and desecuritizing moves which can be detected can give new insights in the conflict resolution process and as such make it possible to deal with possible obstacles. However, this model should first be developed further and the concepts should be further theorized. A question is if the framework can be used as a tool by third parties and by de-escalating actors. The integration of the Copenhagen School and conflict resolution theory provides examples of types of de-escalation which might be used by de-escalating actors to resolve conflict. An example is the change of discourse. A policy maker could try to change discourses to create peace. It would be interesting to explore these options more extensively.

With regard to the use of (de-)securitization theory as a policy tool, it is interesting to refer to Floyd. In chapter 2.3, Floyd has been cited as she argued that desecuritization is the normative goal of securitization. Maybe it is not the intention of the Copenhagen School that desecuritization will be seen as morally right but it could be used as such in conflict resolution as the goal of conflict resolution is clear. Namely, the conflict should be resolved and the solving of a conflict is seen as morally right in conflict resolution.

178 Floyd, Security and the Environment, 56.
Conclusion

In this study it has been explored how (de-)securitization theory of the Copenhagen School can be operationalized as a framework for conflict resolution. This study was started because of the ideas that conflict resolution could be improved and that (de-)securitization theory could contribute to conflict resolution theory. Securitization theory provides a framework to analyze how a certain issue becomes a security issue. Securitization theory is about the mobilization of threats. It is argued that in case of a conflict a threat has been mobilized. Desecuritization theory works in the opposite direction of securitization theory and provides a framework to analyze how issues shift out of the security realm and back into the ‘normal’ realm. Because conflict resolution is about the transformation of a conflict into peaceful processes of change and as such wants to move the issue out of the security realm, desecuritization theory is linked to conflict resolution. However, when the study was started it was not clear what the outcome was going to be because it was not clear what would happen if these theories were integrated. Moreover, the two theories have different approaches which also made it unclear how the study would work out. Overall, this study had an experimental character. During the study several options were discovered of how to integrate the two theories. Eventually, there has been chosen to focus on third party involvement. The aim of this study was to integrate the two theories into models which can be used to analyze the labeling of conflicts by third parties and to analyze third party intervention.

As this framework should contribute to existing conflict resolution theory, first of all, the state of the art of conflict resolution theory was reviewed. In chapter 1 it is explored in which way conflict resolution needs to be improved. An important point of criticism regards the fact that conflict resolution theory assumes that conflicts can be defined objectively. It is argued that analysts and third parties who analyze conflicts are biased and that it depends on their interpretation of a conflict how it is defined. Next the state of the art of (de-)securitization theory has been reviewed and it was ascertained that this theory can contribute to conflict resolution on this point as it provides a framework to analyze how conflicts are defined by analysts and third parties. According to securitization theory, something does not become a security issue because it is an objective threat but because it is presented as a threat which should be dealt with by a securitizing actor. When an audience accepts this claim and accepts the use of emergency measures, an issue has become securitized. Contrary to conflict resolution theory, the Copenhagen School assumes that threats are defined intersubjectively. With regard to conflict resolution, desecuritization theory proved to be interesting as it
provides a framework to analyze the process of de-escalation. Furthermore, desecuritization theory provides different types of outcomes and these can form an addition to conflict resolution. So the usefulness of the Copenhagen School for conflict resolution theory was affirmed.

Next the two theories were integrated with the focus on third party intervention. With regard to this, two elements have been identified. First of all, third parties observe conflicts and label them in a certain way. They give their diagnose of a situation. Secondly, the label which a third party gives to a conflict has consequences and influences the therapy which follows. A third party decides if and how it will react to the conflict. These findings are both worked out. An important difference that has been found is that the labeling of a conflict requires a static model as the situation is placed on one point in the model whereas the consequences of the labeling are captured in a dynamic model.

The labeling of conflicts by third parties has been captured in the model in figure 2. It covers the options for third parties to label a conflict. Securitization theory can be used to analyze how a third party defines a conflict through the speech act approach. Furthermore, it provides a framework for analysis to see if the third party defines a conflict as a threat or not and if it calls for emergency measures. Roughly the third party has three options. It can define a conflict as a threat which should be dealt with, it can define a conflict as a threat but not find support to deal with it or it cannot perceive the situation as a threat. Analyzing this conflict labeling by third parties provides insight in perceptions of the third parties and of the actions which the third party most likely is or is not going to undertake to address the threat. In conclusion, the Copenhagen School and conflict resolution theory have been integrated successfully within this model. (De-)securitization theory has proved to be useful for understanding third party conflict labeling and it contributes to the awareness of the subjectivity of defining conflicts. However, in-depth case studies are recommended for future research to review the model.

The second model (see figures 3 and 4) covers the consequences of the labeling of a conflict by a third party. When a third party defines a conflict as a threat and it calls for emergency measures, it is inherent that the third party wants to resolve the conflict. In other words desecuritization is inherent to securitization. Therefore, in this model the desecuritization process is captured. In figure 3 the types of desecuritization are covered. These can be described as conflict management and conflict transformation. The logic applies that (de-)securitization theory can be used to analyze the de-escalation process as it provides a framework for analysis for the shifting of an issue out of the security realm. The de-escalation
process will most likely be dynamic and (de-)securitization theory will make it possible to analyze different securitizing and desecuritizing moves and as such give insight in the conflict resolution process. Moreover, it is assumed that the types of desecuritization can in some ways be coupled to the forms of conflict resolution. However, difficulties have occurred with the operationalization of this process.

In figure 4 the different types of outcomes of desecuritization are integrated in the hourglass model and coupled to forms of conflict resolution. However, some difficulties came up with the formation of this figure. First of all, the fact that both theories have different approaches became a problem. Whereas the types of desecuritization refer to outcomes, the types of conflict resolution refer to actions and the process. Another problem which came up is that the Copenhagen School has under theorized the desecuritization process and the types of desecuritization. The meaning of the concepts is not completely clear. On the contrary, conflict resolution theory is very precise about the different phases of conflict resolution. However, the relations between the different phases and the exact distinctions of concepts are partly unclear. The concepts of both theories should be theorized further to make the model balanced. Despite of these difficulties the concepts of conflict management and conflict transformation are coupled to the types of outcomes of desecuritization in figure 4. It is interesting that desecuritization provides options which have not been part of conflict resolution theory. These might provide policy tools for third parties.

With regard to the use of desecuritization theory as a framework to analyze the de-escalation process, it was also a problem that desecuritization theory is under theorized by the Copenhagen School. The process from securitization to desecuritization is not fully operationalized. To make the framework comprehensive the concepts of the desecuritization process should be explored further. For instance, the role of the speech act in case of desecuritization should be theorized and explored. When the desecuritization process is clear, it can be further operationalized as a framework for analyzing de-escalation and then it can be applied to in-depth case studies. Overall, the ideas of the usefulness of the integration of (de-)securitization theory and conflict resolution and the usefulness of (de-)securitization theory as a framework to analyze de-escalation in particular stand but they still have to be improved. Therefore, future research on these subjects is recommended.

In conclusion, the integration of (de-)securitization theory and conflict resolution theory is useful and can contribute to the understanding of third party conflict labeling and the consequences of this labeling. The model in figure 2 can be used to analyze how third parties perceive a conflict and if they label it as a threat. Securitization theory has successfully been
operationalized into a framework which can be used to analyze the escalation of conflicts and the labeling of third parties. The integration of desecuritization theory and the de-escalation of conflicts is also useful but has only partly been operationalized. Due to conceptual vagueness this could not be developed further. So the integration is useful but the models in figures 3 and 4 have to be improved and operationalized further. The desecuritization process needs to be made clearer and subsequently, both models can be applied to in-depth case studies. This will provide new insights and points for improvement for the models.

The integration of conflict resolution theory and the Copenhagen School is useful with regard to third party intervention but it has more potential. Therefore, future research on this subject is recommended. Examples of possible future research are the following. First of all, securitization theory can be operationalized as a framework for conflict analysis. It can be used to analyze how certain issues become security issues and how a situation escalates into a conflict. Secondly, it can be explored to what extent the insight which the Copenhagen School provides about the escalation and especially the de-escalation of conflict can be used as a policy tool. Desecuritization might be useful as de-escalation strategies for conflict parties themselves.
Literature


Zwitter, Andrej and Jaap De Wilde, “Prismatic Security: Expanding the Copenhagen School to the Local Level.” Forthcoming.