[POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA]

A comparative study between three post-conflict societies in Sub-Saharan Africa and their successful or unsuccessful quest for peace and democracy. Analyzed by using theories from Anna K. Jarstad & Timothy D. Sisk and Philip Stedman, Elizabeth M. Cousens & Donald Rothchild.
1. Introduction

The start of the 21st century has proven to be an exciting time for international relations scholars. With the War on Terror resulting in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current turmoil in the Middle East, the secession of Southern Sudan and the ongoing anarchy in Somalia, the question of how these societies can sustain peace and adopt democratic rule becomes an intriguing one. Based on Immanuel Kant’s idea of Perpetual Peace, the Western world has been promoting democracy as the most desirable form of governance since the 1990s (Banseka 2002; Jarstad and Sisk 2008). This is further illustrated by a passage out of a lecture given by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2001: ‘At the center of virtually every civil conflict is the issue of the State and its power – who controls it, and how is it used. No conflict can be resolved without answering those questions, and nowadays the answers almost always have to be democratic ones, at least in form...Democracy is practiced in many ways, and none of them is perfect. But at its best it provides a method for managing and resolving disputes peacefully, in an atmosphere of mutual trust.’

Annan’s lecture makes it sound like democracy can mitigate conflicts peacefully and enforce the peace in a post-conflict society. However, democracy and peace are not always mutually enforcing phenomena in post-conflict societies. The competitive characteristics of democracy, e.g. elections, could lead to the re-eruption of violence in a war shattered society, and the compromises necessary for peace could restrict or defer democracy (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Jarstad and Sisk further state that when the choice is between securing the peace and promoting democracy peace should be given priority. Besides the risk of introducing democracy in post-conflict situations, these situations are already dangerous by itself. Many post-conflict societies revert to violence within the first decade after reaching peace (Collier, 2008).

2. Research Question

It should, however, be clear that in a post-conflict society democratic governance should be aimed at. Annan already mentioned that there are numerous forms of democracy, also there are many types of civil conflict. How these subjects relate to each other in the most conflict prone continent, Sub-Sahara Africa, will be the focus area of this article in which the
following question will be analyzed; to what extent does the type of conflict and risk of a return to violence determine the possibilities for sustainable democracy in African Sub-Saharan post-conflict societies? This question consists of two elements; type of conflict and the risk of a return to violence and how this determines the chances for sustainable democracy to take root. For both elements different theories will be used. The type of conflict will be assessed using the theory of Philip Stedman, Elizabeth Cousens and, Donald Rothchild. The risk of a return to violence and it’s relation to sustainable democracy will be analyzed using the theory of Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk on war to democracy dilemmas. Both theories shall be further discussed in the theoretical framework.

3. Methodology

On the basis of a comparative study between three Sub-Saharan post-conflict countries there will be attempted to answer the research question. These countries are Rwanda, Mozambique and, Sierra Leone. They have been chosen because they have suffered from different types of conflicts, the outcomes differ and different external intervention strategies have been used.

- Rwanda has experienced a civil war from 1990-1993 (Doyle 2008), with a relatively low amount (5,000) of battle related deaths. However within a year, after the Arusha peace accords of 1993 in which was agreed to start the democratization process, Rwanda relapsed in one of the worst genocides of the last 50 years resulting in over 800,000 battle related deaths (Doyle 2008). After which an authoritarian regime came into place.

- Sierra Leone has suffered from a civil war lasting more than a decade (1991-2002) and costing more than 50,000 lives (Abdullah 2004). Also in Sierra Leone there were deep grievances between groups within the society. However, Sierra Leone held peaceful, free, and fair elections in May 2002, and has not relapsed into violence (Abdullah).

- The civil war in Mozambique lasted for over 15 years (1976-1992), causing more than 900,000 deaths from fighting and starvation (Scaruffi 2009). Naturally, after 15 years of conflict, there were deep grievances in Mozambique as well, but Mozambique also succeeded in holding relatively free and fair elections after conclusion of the war, and no relapse has occurred ever since.
As becomes clear from the above all three countries have suffered from different types of conflicts, which resulted in different outcomes. Even though, Sierra Leone and Mozambique have made a relatively successful transition from violence to democracy the path towards this governance system has not been similar. The differences between these post-conflict societies make them interesting research subjects for a comparative case study. Below the build-up of this article will be described.

First of all, the theoretical framework will be presented. This framework can be divided in two sections. It will start with a short overview of the ongoing discussion about the definition of democracy. After which the theories that will be used to answer the research question will be presented. The theoretical framework will be followed by the under mentioned sub-questions which will be answered for all three countries:

- From what kind of conflict did these countries suffer?
- To what extent has the conflict influenced the prospects for sustainable democratic governance?
- To what extent has the risk of a return to violence influenced the prospects for sustainable democratic governance?
- What was the role of the international community during and after the conflict?

The first sub-question will be answered by an empirical analysis of the conflicts based on Philip Stedman et al.’s theory. The outcomes of this analysis will be related to Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk’s dilemmas. By relating both theories it will be possible to answer the other three sub-questions. Sub-questions two and three will be discussed after the analysis of the horizontal, vertical and, temporal dilemma. The fourth sub-question will be discussed after the analysis of the systemic dilemma. These discussions will eventually make it possible to answer the research question and, hopefully, to present several recommendations for future peacebuilding operations in Sub-Sahara Africa.

4. Social and Scientific Significance

The aim of this article is, by answering the research question, to present several recommendations for future peacebuilding operations in Sub-Sahara Africa. Furthermore, it
aims at gaining a better understanding of the dynamics at work in post-conflict peacebuilding situations in Sub-Saharan Africa. From a societal perspective it is clear that research that aims at enhancing the possibilities for successful peacebuilding and democratization in war shattered societies should be embraced. All the more so because of the currently arisen post-conflict situations; the coming into being of Southern Sudan, the ongoing turmoil in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the conclusion of the civil war in Ivory Coast, and several other trouble spots. With keeping these developments in mind the need for a better understanding of the dynamics involved in successful peacebuilding operations becomes evident.

The scientific relevance of this article does not differ much from the social significance. From a scientific perspective it is also evident that a better understanding of the dynamics in post-conflict situations is desirable. However, already quite some research has been done on the subject. Nevertheless, by choosing a comparative case-study approach and looking at the relationship between the type of conflict and the prospects for democracy this article adopts a relatively new approach. Analyzing the link between the past, type of conflict, and the future, the risk on a return to violence and the prospects for democracy has been underexposed in the available literature. Due to this relatively new approach it is likely that new insights can be presented and new recommendations can be made. These points make, that also from a scientific point of view, this article could very well add knowledge to the current discussion on democratization assistance and peacebuilding.

5. Theoretical Framework

The main theories which will be used in this article are written by Philip Stedman et al. (2002) and Anna Jarstad (2008). These theories will be presented in this section. However, as democracy is the central issue in this article first a brief overview of the ongoing discussion about this concept will be depicted. Even though this is not a direct necessity for answering the research question, I feel that due to the importance of this discussion it can’t be omitted. Richard Lappin (2010) gives a very comprehensive overview of the different schools of thought on the matter. His book ‘Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance: A State of the Art’ (2010), is the source of the following discussion.
Democracy is a relatively recent phenomenon, the concept as we know it today has originated in the revolutionary turmoil at the end of the 18th century. Irrespective of the evolutionary process democracy has undergone in the following centuries, it is still a term over whose definition no consensus has been reached. There are, however, several components that have largely been agreed upon as a necessity to qualify as a democratic country. These consist of; the possibility of the people to choose its leaders through fair, free and, competitive elections, the ensurance of basic civil rights, and respect for the rule of law. Whether there should also be a strong civil society and civic culture, high levels of participation, and widespread political activity to qualify as a democracy is a matter of much more debate. These different views on the necessities to qualify for the label democracy have caused scholars to make a division between the minimalist and the maximalist schools of democracy.

Joseph Schumpeter is the most important advocator of the minimalist democracy school of thought. He defined democracy as; ‘that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’. This vision is supported by Samuel Huntington who states that a political system is democratic if ‘its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates clearly compete for votes and in which virtually all the adults are eligible to vote’. Robert Dahl also supports these electoral-based definitions of democracy, by stating that a political system can be named democratic if it is fundamentally based on party alternation or contestation.

The supporters of the maximalist tradition criticize the minimalist theory on being reductionist, elitist and, too focused on the procedural and mechanical aspects of democracy, such as elections. The advocators of a maximalist concept tend to stress the normative features and virtues of democracy. They also underline the importance of participation, citizenship, and political activity. Even though this broad concept of democracy allowed the minimalist democracy school to dismiss the maximalist vision on democracy as a garbage-can concept it seems as if the maximalists are having the upper-hand in the current political arena. Mainly, because the minimalist approach has caused pseudo-democracies to arise, these are regimes that possess a mixture of procedural features of democracy whilst retaining significant elements of autocracy (Lappin 2010), causing scholars to dismiss the purely technical approach of the minimalists. As Thomas Carothers proclaims; ‘reporting on the technical conditions of the elections without confronting their deeper political function tells a
dangerously incomplete story and risks legitimating undemocratic political processes’ (Carothers, 1997).

Besides the minimalist and maximalist approach to democracy, there are also scholars who look at the democracy discourse from the perspective of those experiencing democratic transitions in non-Western states. Meaning that they contest the western values the minimalists and maximalists incorporate in their view on democracy. This point is adopted by the UN who declares that ‘there is no single model of democracy, and that it does not belong to any country or region’ (Lappin 2010).

As becomes clear from the above, democracy is a contested term, people, societies and scholars give different meaning to democracy. The definition that is chosen plays a significant role for evaluating strategies, doing research, and deciding when a country has reached an adequate level of democracy, which is of particular importance for this article. Due to the fact that the maximalist school of thought has gained the upper-hand in the democracy discussion their view will be adopted in this article. Therefore, for a country to be classified as democratic there will have to be political activity, citizenship, and a healthy relationship between the civil society and the state, besides the commonly accepted components of democracy.

After having chosen the definition of democracy that will be used in this article, we can now focus on the components of the research question. ‘At the center of rebuilding a post-conflict society stands the question of how to construct a stable form of domestic power sharing and governance’, states Samuel Barnes (2001). The first step for the international community in order to peacefully rebuild a society is to identify the nature of the conflict (Doyle 2006). Doyle continues by indicating that, generally speaking, conflicts are about coordination and cooperation. Coordination conflicts have a payoff structure that gives the parties no incentives to unilaterally move out of equilibrium, once they reach equilibrium. This can be resolved by improving the level of communication between parties and the provision of information. Cooperation problems on the other hand, create incentives to renege on agreements. The parties will try to trick their adversaries into cooperating while they renege on their promises (Doyle). However, Doyle’s distinction between conflict types is quite narrow and focuses on probable conflicts after conclusion of the war. Therefore, the variables Stephen Stedman et al. (2002) use to assess conflicts before conclusion of the war will be added.
Stedman et al. name six variables that can help to classify civil wars in his book Ending Civil War (2002), which will be used in this article. These variables are:

- The number of warring parties; this variable will help indicating the amount of players needed at the negotiation table.
- The aims of the warring parties; this can be used to assess the probability of a cease-fire and peace agreement.
- The balance of military power; this will help to evaluate the likelihood that the parties will stand by the agreements.
- The size of the country; this is of importance since a bigger country will prove harder to control than a smaller one.
- The number of combatants; this is relevant because they will have to get alternative employment to make sure they do not get tempted to riot and loot again.
- The residual state and economic capability; this is a significant factor for the future stability of a country.

Other scholars use similar variables that can be used to assess conflicts. Elizabeth Cousens and Charles Call name practically the same indicators to assess the ‘degree of difficulty’ of specific post-conflict environments (2008). They use Stedman et al. as the reference for these variables. Two measures Doyle and Sambanis use to assess conflicts are also named by Cousens and Call. These two measures, degree of hostility and local capacity incorporate similar variables as the ones used by Stedman et al. as well. L. Reychler and A. Langer also believe that an assessment of the degree of difficulty is necessary for comparative research on peacebuilding operations. Most of the variables of Stedman et al. are part of their set of variables as well (2004). Virginia Fortna also uses variables alike to the ones from Stedman et al. (2004).

These findings make clear that the variables Stedman et al. name to assess conflicts are widely accepted among peace scholars. However, there are critics as well. Paris, for instance, states that these variables fail to assess the underlying causes of conflict (2004). According to Paris peacebuilding operations without addressing the underlying causes of conflict will probably not succeed in creating a stable and lasting peace (2004). Furthermore, Zartman states that by using variables like Stedman et al. findings can differ from reality making
comparative case studies less accurate. He claims that ‘concepts are clean, statistics are sharp, but events are messy’ (2005). Hence, assessing and comparing conflicts on the basis of the variables from Stedman et al. can cause conclusions that differ from reality. Even though, I acknowledge the critique on Stedman et al.’s variables, I believe that using these variables to assess the three selected conflicts is a justifiable choice, mainly because many other peace scholars use similar variables to assess conflicts. Furthermore, if one would adopt Paris’ root-causes approach this would mean to adopt an approach that is ‘as unrealistic, as it is difficult to measure’ (Call 2008). As for Zartman’s critique, he himself states that even though there are problems with empirical findings to conduct comparative case studies, they may very well be the best way to achieve useful generalizations for future peacebuilding strategies (2005). Hence, despite the critique these variables will be used to assess the conflicts Rwanda, Sierra Leone and, Mozambique have suffered from.

Besides identifying the conflicts there will also be looked at the risk of a return to violence after reaching peace. Banseka writes that states are more likely to return to violence when the conflict was concluded by a peace agreement then when it was concluded by an outright rebel victory (2002). Furthermore, there are several factors common to post-conflict societies that destabilize a country. First of all, post-conflict societies often suffer from ongoing ‘organized violence, rampant crime, and widespread lawlessness’ (Kumar and De Zeeuw 2006). Since peace is often fragile, these ongoing acts of violence can easily cause a return to widespread violence (Lappin 2010). Besides this factor, it is often the case that not all rebel factions have reconciled with the peace process and continue fighting in parts of the country which are not fully under control of the government (De Zeeuw 2007). This too can lead to a re-eruption of country-wide violence if the rebels gain ground. Furthermore, it is likely that the war has caused deep divisions and tensions between religious, ethnic, and regional groups of the population. These cleavages further polarize the already divided country, add the competitive characteristics of democracy and the post-conflict society becomes all the more vulnerable for a relapse into violence (Collier 2008, see also Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Finally, Large and Sisk state that after a long civil war, the meaning and logic of war can overtake the desirability of peace (2006).

As stated before, Jarstad and Sisk claim that when the development of democratic governance hinders the sustainability of peace, peace should be given priority. She introduces four dilemmas that may arise when peacebuilding and democratization processes have adverse
effects on each other. Besides the, in the previous paragraph, mentioned factors of possible risks on a return to violence, a failure to deal with the four dilemmas of Jarstad and Sisk can also cause a return to violence.

Jarstad and Sisk’s dilemmas are:

1. The horizontal dilemma
2. The vertical dilemma
3. The temporal dilemma
4. The systemic dilemma

Firstly, the horizontal dilemma is the dilemma of which groups should be included in the process of peace and democratization. Having a small group of parties will increase the decision making efficiency, whilst including all parties will enhance legitimacy, however, when violent parties are included this may have negative effect on the democratization process in total. Inclusion of violent parties could be seen as a reward for violence, hence contradicting the non-violence principle of democracy.

Secondly, the vertical dilemma is the choice between legitimacy and efficacy. This entails whether or not the citizens are included in all phases of the peace process. A difficult choice, since the elites often have an interest in a non-public process which hampers the democratic character of the state, forcing them to accept interference from the people might cause parties to renege on previous agreements. (Jarstad and Sisk 2008)

Thirdly, the temporal dilemma, Jarstad and Sisk explain that this is about long-term effects versus short-term effects. For instance, the risk of violence may increase due to democracy enforcing measures, and thereby undermine the chances for democracy to take root. The same goes for peacebuilding, it could be that in order to ensure peace constraints on demonstrations or free press can be necessary. This is, however, alien to democratic principles. The timing of elections is also a temporal dilemma. Democracy means rule by the people, but one can imagine that in a war shattered society with deep grievances elections can trigger renewed violence (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). It is argued by Paris that elections should not take place until there are stable and democratic institutions in place (2004).
Finally, the systemic dilemma is about ownership of the peacebuilding and democratization processes. Here the choice is between local or international ownership, on the one hand international ownership might be a necessity to warrant peace and democratic developments, on the other hand sustainable peacebuilding and democratization depend on the engagement of local elites and the people. This engagement might be less if they do not control the processes. Also, international ownership can cause diminishing legitimacy of the processes. (Jarstad and Sisk 2008)

That dilemmas may arise when peacebuilding and democratization effort have an adverse effect on each other is acknowledged by many peace scholars. In the available literature this phenomenon is often referred to as the ‘peace-development nexus’. Bahar Akman for instance comes to corresponding conclusions as Jarstad and Sisk do. He states that ‘similar to the conclusions of this [Akman’s] study they find that democratization presents many dilemmas for peacebuilding and that the short-term vision of peacebuilding does not suffice for democratization’ (2010). LeVan also conducts a similar research as Jarstad and Sisk, he finds dilemmas which are very much alike the ones that Jarstad and Sisk find. The horizontal, vertical and temporal dilemma Jarstad and Sisk described he describes as the matters of inclusion, representation and, short-term benefits versus long-term costs (2011). Martin also acknowledges the possibility of adverse effects from peacebuilding efforts on democratization and vice versa (2011). Wolff states that the book from Jarstad and Sisk has made important contributions to the debate about the ‘peace-development nexus’ (2010). A vision that is shared by Jackson, however he makes the reservation that although the book has ‘constituted an impressive contribution to the ongoing scholarly conversation’ it nevertheless is incomplete (2010).

This last observation by Jackson shows there are less positive critiques as well. Jackson for instance states that ‘much of the Jarstad and Sisk book sits uncomfortably within its nomothetic framework, suggesting space for further elaboration of their project in a more-historical analytical direction’ (2010). Furthermore, he criticizes the way the book deals with the four dilemmas. He would have expected it to give ‘detailed examinations of how actors manage to deal with these dilemmas in practice, but what we get instead are brief accounts of how peacebuilding and democratization impede each other’ (2010). Implicitly, he says that the dilemmas are likely to arise in peacebuilding operations but the way they are dealt with is insufficient, something this article will attempt to do better. Wolff also criticizes Jarstad and
Sisk’s book, mainly because the literature it is based on is ‘hardly comprehensive’ (2010). In his conclusion he states that further investigation in the how and why of constitutional failure or success in post-conflict societies is desirable (2010). This is something this article will attempt to do. Even though the above critiques are valid, I believe that choosing to build this article on Jarstad and Sisk’s theory is justifiable. Mainly because it is widely accepted that peacebuilding and democratization can have adverse effects on each other and many peace scholars identify comparable dilemmas as the ones Jarstad and Sisk identified in their book.

After having presented the theories of both Jarstad and Sisk and Stedman et al., the relationship between these views will be looked at. Stedman et al.’s theory will form the basis for an empirical analysis of the conflicts Rwanda, Sierra Leone and, Mozambique have suffered from. Relating the outcomes of this empirical analysis to the more theoretical dilemmas of Jarstad and Sisk can give more insight in possible ways to deal with post conflict situations. How the six variables of Stedman et al. relate to Jarstad and Sisk’s four dilemmas is schematically shown in the table below, after which these relationships will be further discussed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemmas Jarstad and Sisk</th>
<th>Variables Stedman et al.</th>
<th>Number of warring parties</th>
<th>Aims of the warring parties</th>
<th>Balance of military power</th>
<th>Size of the country</th>
<th>Number of combatants</th>
<th>Residual state and economic capability</th>
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<td>Horizontal Dilemma</td>
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The number of warring parties, the first variable of Stedman et al., is closely related to the horizontal dilemma. This dilemma is about what groups will be included in the peace process. For instance, if there are numerous warring parties there will have to be decided who will be included in peace process. Including all these parties will make it harder to reach difficult compromises but will increase legitimacy and may result in more lasting agreements. Also,
the way these parties acted during the war is of importance. If a party has violated human rights on a large scale including them in the peace process could lead to strong resistance among the population and the other parties (Jarstad and Sisk 2008).

The aims of the warring parties can be related to the vertical dilemma. This dilemma is about whether or not to include the desires of the civil society in the peace process. In a society emerging from civil conflict the aims of the former foes are often the complete opposite of each other (Belloni 2008). The aims of the different groups within the civil society are frequently as polarized as the aims of the formerly warring parties (Belloni 2008). Hence, including the desires of the civil society in the peace process may hinder the shaping of a viable peace agreement. On the other hand, not including these desires is detrimental for the legitimacy of the government. Since, a healthy relationship between the government and the civil society is a prerequisite in becoming a stable democracy.

The balance of military power influences the systemic dilemma. If one party has considerable more military power than the other parties they are less likely to stand by the agreements, which means that larger international interference is needed to keep the peace. This could mean that the engagement of local elites and citizens to the democratization process will be less, which could have a damaging effect on the sustainability of the democracy. Besides the systemic dilemma the balance of military power also influences the horizontal dilemma. If military power is quite evenly balanced amongst the warring parties it is less likely that one party will be able to obtain an outright military victory. When this is the case only a negotiated settlement can end the civil war. In this case a settlement will only succeed if the warring factions are included in the peace process hence, influencing the horizontal dilemma.

The number of combatants also influences the systemic dilemma. In post-conflict situations former rebel groups are often requested to make the transition to political parties (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). In this process combatants are required to demobilize and reintegrate in the society. These are very expensive programs and post-conflict societies often have to rely on the international community to make this possible. Since assistance from the international community is a necessity the international community will want to have a say in the way the peace and democratization processes take shape and is implemented. This influences the ownership over these processes.
6. Analysis

6.1 Classifying the Conflicts
In this section an empirical analysis will be made of Stedman et al.’s variables to classify conflicts. The outcomes of this analysis will be used to analyze the four dilemmas of Jarstad and Sisk. Which variable corresponds with what dilemma is schematically shown in the above table.

6.1.1 Rwanda’s Civil War
In October 1990 violence erupted in Rwanda (Khadiagala 2002). After a harsh famine in 1989 and a strong drop in coffee prices, Rwanda’s main export product, tensions grew among the Hutu and Tutsi population. Added to the internal strains were external pressures for democratic reforms, which jump-started domestic opposition groups to demand political participation. This led to strikes and demonstrations by university students in June 1990 (Khadiagala 2002). The incumbent president, Juvenal Habyarimana, gave in to the internal and external pressures and agreed to separate party and state in July 1990. Nevertheless, Habyarimana’s intended reforms did not achieve to take the widespread perception of state paralysis away. This perception led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) fighters to attack Northern Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990 (Khadiagala 2002) demarcating the beginning of the civil war, which would last for over three years and would cost 5,000 people their lives.

After this brief summary of the onset to the conflict and the conflict itself, we can now try to classify the conflict using Stedman et al.’s variables. In order to do this we will first look at
the number of warring parties, in this case there were two main factions; the Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR), whom were Hutu dominated, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Tutsi dominated. However, there also were two loosely organized militia groups, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi. Since they fought alongside the government troops they will not be treated as separate groups (Khadiagala 2002).

The aims of the warring parties will now be looked at. The RPF had demands coalescing around a program calling for restoration of citizenship rights, national unity, and an end to a dictatorial ‘system that generates refugees’ (Khadiagala 2002). The possibility to return for these refugees was also an important desire for the RPF. Habyarimana had made promises that refugees could return but did little to facilitate this, causing grievances by the RPF (Khadiagala 2002). Obviously, the FAR fought to keep Habyarimana in power. They claimed to fight the RPF in order to prevent them from restoring ‘a minority and feudal regime which was abolished in 1959 under the guise of liberation and democracy’ (Khadiagala 2002). Besides these official aims the civil war was also fought over what ethnic group had the power. The Hutu’s had been in power for several decades and had oppressed the Tutsi’s, the Tutsi’s fought to gain power and break their oppression.

The balance of military power between the two parties is the third variable that will be taken into account. At the onset of the war in 1990 the FAR counted approximately 5,200 troops, the army of the RPF consisted of 4,000 men at arms making it a pretty evenly matched battle. In 1992 both armies had experienced an enormous growth, the FAR grew to 30,000 troops and the RPF to 25,000. Still not a very big difference, however, there were the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militia as well, they consisted of 20,000 to 30,000 armed men by June 1992. Since the weaponry did not differ much between the different factions it seems as if the militia clearly shifted the balance of power to the incumbent government (Khadiagala 2002). This could very well be the reason the RPF changed its tactics from conventional to guerilla warfare at the end of 1990, making the difference in fighters less important. Besides this change in tactics the RPF proved to be far better organized and capable than the government troops making the balance of power quite evenly matched (Doyle 2008).

The fourth and the fifth variable, the size of Rwanda and the number of combatants, can be described briefly. Rwanda counts only 26,340 square kilometers (Doyle 2008) what makes one think the country should be relatively easy to control. However, Rwanda is very
mountainous making it vulnerable to the guerilla tactics the RPF adopted. The number of combatants has already been named in the above paragraph. In total approximately 75,000 fighters needed to be disarmed and given alternative employment at the end of the war.

Obviously, finding substitutive work for this amount of men is not an easy task. However, on paper this was partly solved by the provision in the peace agreement that an army consisting of former RPF and FAR fighters would be created (Doyle 2008).

Considering the residual state and economic capability of Rwanda after termination of the war we can conclude that the economy was not totally ravaged. Logically, the country had suffered, over 5,000 people were killed and nearly a million fled the country during the war. Most of the refugees were Tutsi’s, and since the Tutsi’s had formed a large part of the intellectual and entrepreneurial elite this did affect the economy. Looking at the GDP it also becomes clear that the Rwandan economy had declined. At the beginning of the war the real per capita GDP was $730. At the end of the war this had diminished to $681 (Doyle 2008). However taking all this in account a GDP decline of 6.71 percent is not that much if you consider Rwanda had just emerged from a civil war lasting for three years.

6.1.2 Sierra Leone’s Civil War

Sierra Leone was ravaged by a civil war that started in 1991 and would last for over a decade. More than 50,000 people were killed and over fifty percent of the population was displaced from their homes and thousands were victims of rape, mutilation, or other forms of assault (Human Rights Watch 1999).

If we look at the number of warring parties at the start of the war there were two main factions. On the one side you had the rebels unified in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and on the other side the government army, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) (Bellows 2009). During the war a third party came into being, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The CDF consisted of groups of civilians who had organized themselves in armed groups to protect them from the atrocities the RUF and the SLA committed against the population (Abdullah 2004). Besides these groups there were also numerous political parties of which only the ones that have held office during the war will be included; the All People’s Congress (APC), the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Adding these four parties to the three
armed groups makes a total of seven actors whom were at one time or another involved in the Sierra Leone civil war.

The aims of the three warring parties will be described below. The SLA at first, wanted to keep the All People’s Congress, the ruling party, in power. This changed when there was a coup in 1992 and a group of young officers seized power and installed themselves as the new government under the name National Provisional Ruling Council after which the SLA fought to keep the NPRC in power (Abdullah 2004). This did not end the war, even though the NPRC declared to do so, they continued to fight the RUF for the four years they were in power (Abdullah 2004). When the NPRC took office, they promised to break with the old ways of the APC, revamp the economy and, put the country on the path towards multi-party democracy (Abdullah 2004). In reality none of this came through, the NPRC receded in self-enrichment and despotism and only after popular support had diminished and the international community increased pressure to hold elections they conceded to hold elections in 1996 in which the SLPP got elected (Abdullah 2004).

During the election campaign the SLPP had promised to, among other things, ‘negotiate a war settlement with the RUF, resettle and rehabilitate the displaced and, usher a new dispensation free from corruption, extra-constitutional governments, incompetence, nepotism, favoritism, tribalism, regionalism and, gender discrimination’ (SLPP Manifesto 1996). The SLPP kept their most important promise and signed a peace agreement with the RUF, also they succeeded in establishing a six percent GDP growth rate in just one year. However, after just a year of holding office another coup d’état overthrew the relatively successful SLPP administration. This time the AFRC seized power and a military junta was installed (Gberie 2004). They invited the RUF to join them and successfully forged a coalition with the former rebels, together they formed the People’s Army. Nevertheless, this did not bring stability, the country receded in a state of anarchy (Gberie 2004). The main goal of the AFRC was to stop the ethnic based politics of the SLPP which had polarized the country into regional and ethnic factions. Again, just a pretense to seize power as the AFRC was also mainly interested in looting the vast natural resources of Sierra Leone for personal gain (Gberie 2004). Again international pressure and even an international intervention force were necessary to make the junta step down. In April 1998 the SLPP was re-installed as the ruling party. After a failed coup attempt by the People’s Army in January 1999 the SLPP and the rebels signed the Lomé Peace Agreement in March 1999. The RUF did not comply with the provisions of the
agreement and once again marched for Freetown in May 2000, still proclaiming to fight for their ultimate aim; installation of an egalitarian system (Abdullah 2004). British troops were flown in to assist the SLPP and they quickly defeated the RUF. This demarcated the end of the Sierra Leone civil war.

After having described all the aims of the different parties, it becomes clear that the war in Sierra Leone was a very complex battle for power between many parties. Even though, all of the parties claimed to fight for a certain ideology it seems like it was more about who controlled the vast mineral wealth of the country. Only the SLPP has shown during the year they were in power that they tried to lead the country to a better future.

The third variable to be looked at is the balance of military power. During the war there was never a group clearly dominating the others. This becomes clear since no group has succeeded in a total defeat of opposing groups without external assistance. Furthermore, there were agreements between the RUF and the SLA to avoid open battles between each other (Abdullah 2004). This also points in the direction that both groups were afraid of each other’s strength and neither one wanted to risk a full scale confrontation. These points make it a valid assumption that the military power of the different warring parties did not differ very much compared to the others.

The size of Sierra Leone is 71,740 square kilometers (CIA World Factbook). This does not make Sierra Leone a very big country but due to large rainforests and mountainous areas Sierra Leone is vulnerable to guerilla warfare and therefore hard to control if there are insurgents active within the country. The number of combatants was, like in Rwanda, an approximate 75,000 former combatants needed to be disarmed and reintegrated in society. This was done by launching the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DDRP) which became a huge success and added considerably to maintaining the peace in Sierra Leone (Abdullah 2004).

The sixth variable to be looked at is the residual state and economic capability of Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s economy was in a devastating state after the conflict. For nine consecutive years the natural resources had been looted and the infrastructure had been destroyed. This resulted in an annual decline of the GDP of over seven percent. At the end of the war the GDP had dropped with nearly 60 percent compared to the GDP at the onset of the war (UNDP 2008). Nevertheless, the economic capability of Sierra Leone remained quite
good as becomes clear by looking at the post-conflict GDP growth figures. From 2000 to 2005 Sierra Leone achieved an average GDP growth of 13.94 percent which are excellent numbers (Worldbank).

6.1.3 Mozambique’s Civil War

Mozambique has suffered from wars almost constantly from 1965 to 1992 (Hanlon, 2006). After reaching independence in 1975, the civil war that will be central in this article started in 1976. This civil war would last for over 15 years and cost more than one million people their lives and damage exceeded $20 billion (Hanlon 2006).

The number of warring parties can be described briefly. The civil war was fought between two parties, Frente de Liberação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), the liberation movement that liberated Mozambique from the Portuguese, and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), the South African backed guerilla movement. Also there were several external influences; South Africa was involved, as was Zimbabwe, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

The aims of the warring parties were quite clear. FRELIMO, the ruling party, adopted a one-party state based on modernization, rapid development based on big projects, and central planning based on Marxism-Leninism (Hanlon 2006). FRELIMO wanted to transform Mozambique to a communist country. With the Cold War in mind, RENAMO mainly fought to destabilize this communist based regime. They did so with the support of the South African and the U.S. government. Both countries tried to undermine the influence of the USSR in southern Africa by destabilizing regimes in this region that sympathized with the USSR.

During the war the balance of military power has always been in favor of FRELIMO. FRELIMO had a much larger army than RENAMO and more popular support (Hanlon 2006). Nevertheless, due to the guerilla tactics RENAMO adopted, FRELIMO never succeeded in defeating RENAMO by itself. RENAMO successfully used terrorist attacks to destabilize the country and cause maximal economic disruption. These tactics made sure that even though they were heavily outnumbered and had much less popular support they were able to fight FRELIMO for over 15 years.

The fourth and the fifth variable, the size of the country and the number of combatants, will be described below. Mozambique is by far the largest country of the three. With a total of
799,380 square kilometers it is over ten times as big as Sierra Leone making it much harder to control. However, this did not mean the size of both armies was much bigger as well. Compared to the other two countries the combined number of fighters was a mere 20,000 more. This becomes clear by looking at the number of combatants that were disarmed and reintegrated in the DDR program for Mozambique, approximately 92,000 combatants (UNDDR 2002).

After more than 16 years of war any economy would have suffered enormously. In Mozambique this was no different, the residual state of the economy was not good. About 40 percent of Mozambique’s immobile capital in agriculture, administration and communication was destroyed (Bruck 2001). The transport system had completely vanished and 80 percent of the cattle stock was lost during the war (UNDP). However, GDP had dropped but not as dramatically as one would expect. Compared with the GDP at the beginning of the war the GDP had declined with just over 20 percent at the conclusion of the war. One would expect that these figures would mean the economic capability of Mozambique was in a devastating state as well. Nevertheless, Mozambique achieved GDP growth figures averaging 7.16 percent in the first five years after the war. This shows that Mozambique’s economy proved to be capable of recovery (Worldbank).

Taking all three conflicts in account, we can conclude that they were all significantly different. Sierra Leone’s war involved much more actors than the conflicts in Rwanda and Mozambique. The aims and ideologies of the warring factions in each of the countries were distinctly dissimilar. None of the other variables were similar either. After comparing all the variables we can conclude that the only common factor is that all three countries showed to have a resilient economy as they achieved quite high GDP growth figures in the first five years after conclusion of the conflict. In the next section we will analyze how these differences influenced the peace-building operations for Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique and how they dealt with the dilemmas of Jarstad and Sisk.
6.2 Dilemmas in Peacebuilding and Democratization Processes

In this section the outcomes of the empirical analysis of Stedman et al.’s variables will be used to analyze Jarstad and Sisk’s dilemmas. We will begin by analyzing the effects of Stedman et al.’s first variable, the number of warring parties, on the horizontal dilemma. After which the vertical and temporal dilemma will be analyzed by using the designated variables. Following these analyses an attempt will be made to answer the second and third sub-question.

6.2.1 Horizontal Dilemma

If we look at the peace process in Rwanda it becomes clear that the peace negotiations were held between the two warring factions identified in the previous section. No other domestic groups were represented at the negotiation table. The RPF and the more moderate factions of Habyarimana’s party, the MRND, were the ones to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement. The more extremist Hutu factions in the MRND did not participate in the negotiations as they felt they had nothing to gain (Clapham 1998). In this peace process the choice was made for a selected group of more moderate elites whom could more easily reach difficult compromises than broad comprehensive and inclusive peace negotiations. Jarstad and Sisk state that rebel groups that expect to be excluded from future government may find peace too costly and continue fighting. The more extremist Hutu factions within the MRND were not rebel groups but did feel that peace would be too costly and excluded themselves from the negotiations. This made them a factor of possible instability, a factor that later proved to become reality as these factions instigated the genocide of 1994. One can argue that these extremist should either have been included in the peace process or should have been contained after the signing of the peace agreement by a stronger UN force.

Compared to the way the peace process took shape in Rwanda it becomes clear that like in Rwanda the negotiations were between the two warring parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO. Furthermore, there were no civil society organizations actively involved in the process and here too was chosen for negotiations between a selected group of elites (Gross 2009). However, in Rwanda the parties were promised a guaranteed seat in the future government, whereas in Mozambique RENAMO had to gain entry to the government via elections. Jarstad and Sisk point out that including groups that have committed human rights violations can negatively influence the democratization process following the peace process. Hence a choice needs to be made between including all the warring factions and excluding the ones that have
violated human rights. In Mozambique there was chosen for inclusion as RENAMO was considered to have violated human rights on a large scale and nevertheless, was included in the peace process (Gross 2009, see also Bornstein 2010). Even though the balance of military power was clearly in favor of FRELIMO a military victory was unreachable due to the guerilla tactics RENAMO used. Hence, including RENAMO in the negotiations was the only option for peace.

A difference between the peace processes in Rwanda and Mozambique was that the actors involved in the peace process of Mozambique were much more willing to reach a broad supported agreement. When the agreement was signed in 1992 there were no spoilers. FRELIMO and RENAMO were both exhausted by the fighting and in all layers of the two factions there was a willingness to reach and uphold a comprehensive peace agreement (Gross 2009). The fact that both parties had a true desire for peace made it less likely that a return to violence would occur.

Compared to Mozambique and Rwanda the peace negotiations went differently in Sierra Leone. Where in the other countries peace talks were between the two warring factions without any influence from other domestic groups, in Sierra Leone all stakeholders, including civil society representatives, were able to express their wishes. Although they were not present at the actual negotiations they did give recommendations that were partly incorporated in the eventual peace agreement (Francis 2000). Nevertheless, the negotiations were mainly between the SLA and the RUF. But due to the opportunities other stakeholders had to express their opinions and influence the process, we can conclude that a broader and more comprehensive approach was chosen than in Mozambique and Rwanda. A similarity between Mozambique and Sierra Leone’s peace process is that, as in Mozambique with RENAMO, the RUF is considered to have violated human rights on a large scale and were nevertheless part of the negotiations. Furthermore, here too no other option was available since an outright military victory proved to be unattainable for the SLA.
6.2.2 Vertical Dilemma

This is the dilemma between choosing for efficacy or legitimacy. Where efficacy stands for a selected group of elites making the decisions and legitimacy for a peace process in which the people have a say as well. Already in the theoretical framework it has been pointed out that the views of the civil society are often as polarized as the aims of the warring parties. This could hamper the shaping of a peace agreement, whilst inclusion of the civil society increases the legitimacy of the process. How the different countries dealt with this dilemma and chose their respective approach in the peace process will be discussed in the following section.

In Rwanda efficacy was clearly the leading factor in the peace process. This can be derived from several things. First of all, only the RPF and the Habyarimana government were party to the negotiations. No popular involvement was allowed in order to reach a peace deal as quickly as possible. It is believed that the international community did not care that much whether a workable political settlement came out of the negotiations as long as there would be an agreement (Clapham 1998). One can imagine that popular involvement would have slowed the process down and hence, was not desired by the international community or by the RPF and Habyarimana’s party. The omission of the people’s voice during the peace process becomes even clearer when we look at the power-sharing arrangement which was part of the final peace agreement. This arrangement provided for the sharing of the positions in the ministerial council between the RPF, the MRND and, former opposition parties (Clapham 2008). Amongst these opposition parties eleven of twenty one seats in the ministerial council were divided handing them a large share of the power without knowing how much popular support these parties had, another sign of the choice for efficacy over legitimacy in the Rwandan peace process. Including these opposition parties in the future government made sure they would not become spoilers, limiting the risk on a return to violence.

However, handing over that much power to former opposition parties meant that other parties lost power. Amongst these ‘losers’ this caused great dissent, and they launched a full-scale campaign to recruit the ‘losers’ of the peace process (Jones 2001). As the country had been in an ethnic war for the past three years the country was highly polarized. There was a clear division between the Hutu’s and Tutsi’s what made it easy for the ‘losers’ to recruit men along ethnic lines. This situation eventually culminated in the genocide of 1994. In my view this could have been prevented if there would have been more involvement of the civil society
in the peace process, better coordination of the implementation strategy, and a stronger UN peacekeeping force with a broader mandate.

Like in Rwanda the choice was made for efficacy in Mozambique. The negotiations were held between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The only other parties present at the negotiation table were the NGO Sant ’Egidio Catholic Movement, which was the mediator and facilitator of the process, and the UN who oversaw the whole process (Hanlon 2006). Like the RPF in Rwanda here too the former rebel group, RENAMO, gained status as a political party. All in all it looks as if both processes were quite similar. However, due to the fairly unique characteristics of the Mozambican conflict the non-involvement of the public did not result in any upheaval. As already mentioned both warring parties were exhausted by the war and did not want to continue fighting, this too goes for the population. That RENAMO gained political status after the atrocities they committed could easily have led to mass public uproar. That this was not the case suggests that the population was longing for peace and did not want to complicate the process by imposing demands. That the people were adamantly committed to maintaining the peace is further suggested by the high voter turnout and relative calm after and during the first elections in 1994 (Gross 2009). It becomes clear that even though the peace processes in Rwanda and Mozambique were relatively similar the conflicts were far from alike what made that the vertical dilemma was less an issue in Mozambique.

Analyzing the vertical dilemma for Sierra Leone makes clear that the peace process in Sierra Leone on the other hand differed from those in Rwanda and Mozambique. As already explained in the previous section here the population did influence the peace process. Through a National Consultative Conference civil society representatives were able to advice the Sierra Leone Government on the way forward in the process (Francis 2000). They advised that the RUF should not be incorporated in the transitional government, RUF members should be brought to trial for their crimes committed against human rights and, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be established. The first two recommendations were not followed but the Truth and Reconciliation Commission did become a part of the eventual Lomé Peace Accord. However, one can argue that due to the fact that the RUF did become part of the transitional government and blanket immunity was granted to the RUF leaders and its fighters, the most important wishes of the population were surpassed for the benefits of efficacy (Zack-Williams 2010). Therefore, efficacy was in this peace process the decisive factor as well, a little less clear than in Rwanda and Mozambique, but nevertheless the
balance clearly tips in favor of efficacy. Even though this can be seen as a negative influence on democratization it did reduce the risk on renewed violence. A decision in line with Jarstad and Sisk’s thought as she states that peace enforcing measures should be given priority over democracy enforcing measures.

6.2.3 Temporal Dilemma

The temporal dilemma is about the choice between long-term effects versus short-term effects, the choices that sometimes need to be made between democracy enforcing measures and peace enforcing measures. Whether this was a dilemma for Rwanda, Sierra Leone and, Mozambique and how they dealt with this dilemma will be discussed in the following section.

In Rwanda the temporal dilemma never became an issue due to the fact that within the first year after the signing of the peace agreement violence erupted leading to the 1994 genocide. Hence, no analysis of this dilemma for Rwanda is possible. In Mozambique on the other hand, this dilemma could have become an issue. However, due to the fact that the soldiers, the population and, the leaders of both warring factions were exhausted by the war and truly committed to maintaining the peace there never was a serious threat on a return to violence (Van den Bergh 2009). This made that peace enforcing measures were not a necessity and democratic characteristics like freedom of speech and press could freely develop (Van den Bergh 2009). The other temporal dilemma Jarstad and Sisk describe is the timing of elections. This dilemma did become an issue. The peace agreement stipulated that the first elections should take place at the end of 1993. This proved much too soon, in a little over one year it had been impossible to construct stable democratic institutions which are a necessity to minimize the risk on a return to violence (Paris 2004). The international community realized this and agreed to postpone the elections with a year even though this meant an enormous rise in their expenses (Van den Bergh 2009). The fact that the 1994 elections actually took place, were in general held in a free and fair manner and, no relapse in violence has occurred since proves that the situation in Mozambique was and is relatively stable. From the above can be derived that the temporal dilemma proved not to be as big an obstacle as it could have been. Once again this can be addressed to the widely accepted feeling that peace should be upheld at all costs.

In Sierra Leone many ingredients were present to let the temporal dilemma become a serious issue. This can mainly be addressed to the blanket amnesty granted to all the RUF fighters
what caused great dissent amongst the population. Mass demonstrations were held and the press openly condemned the blanket amnesty and the power-sharing arrangement with the RUF (Abraham 2004). The Kabbah administration and other mediators claimed that this was the only practical way to achieve peace (Abraham 2004). Even though the demonstrations could easily have led to renewed violence no restrictive actions were undertaken to stop the demonstrations or limit the freedom of press. This indicates that in Sierra Leone there was chosen not to limit basic democratic principles in order to maintain the peace. Concerning the first post-war elections of 2002 no temporal dilemma can be identified. This is mainly due to the successful marginalization strategy towards the RUF after their attempt to seize power in May 2000. Due to this marginalization and the successful disarmament program the RUF was unable to disrupt, overthrow the results or, in any other way hamper the continuation of the elections. The fact that the elections took place without any reported incidents of violence (Kandeh 2003) justifies the chosen timing of the elections. That peaceful elections could take place less than a year after the formal conclusion of the civil war can be regarded as an enormous accomplishment and shows that the temporal dilemma was of little significance in the decision when to hold the elections.

6.2.4 Answering Sub-Questions Two and Three

After having discussed these three dilemmas we can now try to answer the second and third sub-question. The second sub-question is; to what extent has the conflict influenced the prospects for sustainable democratic governance? And the third sub-question is; to what extent has the risk of a return to violence influenced the prospects for sustainable democratic governance?

If one looks at the conflicts and what this meant for the different dilemmas it becomes clear that in all three cases the conflict influenced the chances for sustainable democratic governance. In Rwanda the ethnic tensions and the exclusion of potential spoilers in the peace negotiations made that democracy could not take root. Throughout the peace process there was chosen for efficacy over legitimacy. No involvement of the civil society was allowed and the potential dangers of excluding the Hutu extremists were not recognized by the international community. These characteristics of the conflict and peace process made that the chances for sustainable democratic governance were very slim. Furthermore, the likelihood on a return to violence also increased because of the exclusion of the Hutu extremists, something that eventually became reality.
In Mozambique the situation was distinctly different. As became clear in the discussion of the different dilemmas all domestic parties involved in the conflict were exhausted by the war. They wanted peace and were committed to keep it once achieved. This made the chances for democracy to take root much larger. Furthermore, the risk on a return to violence was, due to this commitment to peace, very small. This also had positive effects on the chances for democratic governance.

The Sierra Leonean conflict influenced the chances for democracy as well. The previous analysis has shown that the RUF was not committed to keeping the peace. Time and again they breached the peace agreements, only after adoption of an international led marginalization and demilitarization strategy towards the RUF democracy had a proper chance to take root. Without this international intervention it is likely that the RUF would have taken up arms time and again and Sierra Leone probably would still not know democratic governance.

6.2.5 Systemic Dilemma

This is the dilemma between international and domestic ownership of the processes of peace building and democratization. Who controlled these processes in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique will be the subject of the following analysis. After this analysis the fourth sub-question will be answered.

The Rwandan peace process was highly internationalized, Tanzania was the host nation, delegations of Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, Senegal, France, Germany, Belgium and the United States were present (Clapham 1998). The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) along with the United Nations attended the peace talks as well. Lemarchand (1994) claims that ‘Many indeed wondered whether the Arusha accords would have been signed in the absence of repeated nudging from the OAU, Tanzania, the United States, and Belgium’. This can be explained by the fact that Western diplomatic and financial support would be a necessity for any effective settlement (Clapham 1998). It is clear that the international community had full ownership over the peace process. Furthermore, as already pointed out, the international community demanded an agreement. Whether this would be a workable agreement came in second place. Ultimately an agreement was reached in which was agreed that the RPF and FAR would dismantle a large part of their army and would form the new national army together consisting out of 19,000 soldiers (Arusha Peace Agreement 1993). The international
community would supervise the demobilization and reintegration of the remaining 75,000 combatants. However, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi were not included in this agreement and kept their militia. This shifted the balance of military power to these allies of the Hutu extremists. This could have been a reason for the international community to deploy a larger peacekeeping force or broaden the mandate of the existing UN force. Something the commanding officer, Romeo Dallaire, repeatedly requested but was never granted by the international community (Dallaire 2004). Furthermore, there was no local commitment to uphold and implement the Arusha Accords. The Hutu extremists created endless reasons to delay the implementation of the transitional government (Clapham 1998). One would expect that the international community would take the responsibility to force these spoilers to comply since they had full ownership over the peace process. The fact that they failed to do so eventually paved the way for the genocide of 1994 to occur.

Ownership of the Mozambican peace process lay with the international community as well. Even though during the actual peace negotiations the international community did not influence this process as much as it did in Rwanda, they did have full ownership over the implementation of the agreement (Hanlon 2006). This is especially evident when we look at the transformation of RENAMO from a rebel group to a legitimate political party. This transformation would not have been possible without international support. The international community raised US$ 17 million to help RENAMO making this transition (Kovacs 2008). Another clear example of international ownership was the demobilization scheme of the former fighters. In Mozambique an approximate 78,000 fighters had to be demobilized; all receiving between $15 and $120 per month remuneration (Hanlon 2006). Logically emerging from a civil war Mozambique was not able to pay this, so here too they had to rely on the international community. This dependency on foreign funding made that the international community controlled the processes. Different than in Rwanda here the international community spared no resources to make the peacebuilding operations in Mozambique a success what eventually led to a relatively stable democracy.

The ownership of Sierra Leone’s peace process lay with the international community too. This becomes clear when looking at the way the process took shape. The international community urged the Sierra Leonean government to strive for peace after the RUF had attacked the capital in January 1999 (Zack-Williams 2010). Where before this attack they supported the government in their quest for outright military victory they now pressed to start
negotiations with the RUF, and urging president Kabbah to regard them as a legitimate political counterpart (Hanlon 2006). It is even believed that international mediators and donors pressured the president into accepting the Lomé Peace Accord, whilst most government representatives were very weary to do so. (Hirsch 2001, see also Kovacs 2008). Not only within the SLPP there was discontent about the peace process, also within the RUF and the AFRC there were dissidents (Francis 2000). Both groups deliberately violated the ceasefire agreements. De Zeeuw points out that these acts can easily lead to renewed country wide violence. This is exactly what happened in Sierra Leone when in May 2000 the RUF once again marched for Freetown in order to seize full power. Only after this attack the international community shifted to a strategy of political and military marginalization of the RUF, a scheme that better reflected the wishes of the population. This can be derived from the fact that the RUF gained a mere 1.7 percent of the popular vote in the first post-war elections in 2002 (Kovacs 2008).

Once again the international community controlled the processes, eventually they did so effectively and were able to build a good foundation for democracy to take root. It is likely that the marginalization of the RUF helped in the chances for the development of a stable democracy. Without the RUF as a potential spoiler Sierra Leone even had a change in the ruling party when the SLPP were defeated in the 2007 elections. The fact that this did not lead to a re-eruption of violence indicates that domestic commitment to democratic rule is present despite the international ownership of the peacebuilding operations.

6.2.6 Answering Sub-Question Four

After having analyzed the systemic dilemma we can now try to answer sub-question four which is; what was the role of the international community during and after the conflict? What has become clear in the previous discussion is that the international community, even though they had ownership over all three peacebuilding operations, still played very different roles in each of the three conflicts. In Rwanda they took ownership over the processes by demanding an agreement whether this would be a workable one came in second place. Furthermore, their financial and diplomatic support was a necessity for any effective agreement. Also, the UN deployed a peacekeeping force. However, when things started to go wrong the international community did not react in the necessary manner. By not sending additional troops to force the Hutu extremists to comply with the Arusha Peace Accords they
showed not to be fully committed to the peace process. This lack of decisiveness and commitment made it possible for the atrocities of 1994 to occur.

The international community had ownership over the peace process in Mozambique as well. However, the peace negotiations were not by far as internationalized as in Rwanda. The Mozambican peace deal was constructed without external influences. Nevertheless, the implementation of the peace agreement happened under supervision of the international community. Also the Mozambican dependency on foreign funding made that ownership of the peacebuilding operations lay with the international community. The role of the international community was, to make sure the peace was kept, the agreements were implemented and, assist RENAMO in making the transition to a legitimate political party. Differently than in Rwanda no resources were spared here. The international community showed true commitment to bringing this peacebuilding operation to a good end. This eventually resulted in the first free and fair elections in 1994 in the post-conflict era.

Compared to the role the international community had in Rwanda and Mozambique their role was once again different in Sierra Leone. Where they failed to effectively intervene in Rwanda when violence was about to erupt again they did act in Sierra Leone. When the RUF marched for Freetown in 2000 a British led intervention force was deployed that quickly defeated the rebels. After this operation the international community adopted a strategy of demilitarization and marginalization of the RUF. This strategy became a success and the RUF has not been able to start a revolt since. A remark that has to be made is that the international community only took their responsibility after the RUF started the revolt of 2000. The fact that they were able to do so shows that the original measures taken to keep the peace were insufficient. However, eventually the international community proved to be committed to the peace process in Sierra Leone and made sure that a relatively stable democratic administration was put in place.
7. Conclusion

After the previous analyses it is now possible to answer the research question; *to what extent does the type of conflict and risk on a return to violence determine the chances for sustainable democracy in African Sub-Sahara post-conflict societies?* What the previous analyses have shown is that in all three countries there was aimed at installing democratic governance systems. In all three countries the international community played an important role in the transition to democratic rule. In all three countries the conflict influenced the chances for democracy to take root. However, it has also become clear that none of the above happened in a similar manner.

With regard to the research question I believe the analyses in this article have shown that the conflict definitely does influence the chances for democratic rule to take root. Where in Mozambique the characteristics of the conflict made that democracy was installed without many problems. The features of the Sierra Leonean conflict made this installation much harder. Whereas in Rwanda no democratic governance system was installed at all what also can be related to the characteristics of the conflict. However, to state that the type of conflict determines the chances for sustainable democracy is in my opinion a bridge too far. Many other factors influence these chances as well. For instance, the international community plays a very important role in the creation of democratic governance in post-conflict societies. The discussions in this article have shown that in Sierra Leone and Mozambique the chances for sustainable democratic rule would have been very slim without international interference. Whereas in Rwanda it was the lack of international interference and commitment that made it impossible to install a democratic government.

Concerning the risk on a return to violence it has become clear that this is a factor to be reckoned with as well. In Rwanda, due to the ethnic tensions, the risk on a return to violence was much larger than in Mozambique. This risk made the situation in Rwanda less stable what made it harder to install a democratic governance system. Like in Rwanda this risk on a return to violence was existent in Sierra Leone. Eventually an external intervention force was necessary to minimalize this risk and make the transition to democratic rule possible.

However, once again to say that the risk on a return to violence determines the chances for sustainable democracy in post-conflict societies is not possible. It is a definite influence on these chances but it does not determine them.
Furthermore, the three conflicts have proven to be different and hence, warranted different peacebuilding and democratization strategies. I believe the assumption can be made that this is the case for practically all conflicts. No blueprint for future peacebuilding operations exists, for each individual conflict a different intervention strategy should be composed. However, it is possible to find some generalities in the analyses and hence, give some recommendations on commonalities for future peacebuilding missions. It has for instance become clear that commitment from the international community to peace and democratization processes was of great importance for the chances of success in the selected countries. Therefore, the international community should truly commit to a peacebuilding operation once they start it. Furthermore, conflicts with an ethnic component need a stronger peacekeeping force than conflicts without this component. The situation is often very explosive after ethnic conflicts and a strong peacekeeping force will be able to force compliance from potential spoilers to prevent escalation like what happened in Rwanda. On the basis of the analyses made in this article these are the possible recommendations. Deeper and broader research with more conflicts as research subjects would be necessary to give further recommendations and be able to come to more general conclusions.
8. References


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