Academics and Foreign Policy

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Abbreviations

- ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile
- ACDA – Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- ARVN – Army of the Republic of Viet Nam
- CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
- CPC – Community Party of China
- DPG – Defense Planning Guidance
- EXCOMM – Executive Committee of the National Security Council
- FPA – Foreign Policy Analysis
- ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
- ICC – International Criminal Court
- IMF – International Monetary Fund
- IR – International Relations
- MIRV – Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle
- MIT – Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- NSC – National Security Council
- NSDM – National Security Decision Memorandum
- PNAC – Project for the New American Century
- PRC – People’s Republic of China
- RAND Corporation – Research And Development Corporation
- SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
- UN – United Nations
- WINEP – Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- WSAG – Washington Special Actions Group
Introduction

Since gaining independence from the British Empire in 1776, the United States of America has produced and been shaped by some of the greatest thinkers of the modern era. Whether it be politicians, scientists, or civil rights activists, people with exceptional abilities have been fundamental in the formation of this nation-state as we know it today. By 1945, and after two world wars in less than forty years, the United States had been dragged out of its nineteenth century political isolationism and into a position of world hegemony. This unique degree of influence – which was the product of an economic and military strength unrivalled by any country the world over – placed the government of the United States in a position of immense power. As a result of this rise to prominence, various academics in the United States began to wonder what their country’s superiority could achieve in the international arena. Given the title of “defense intellectuals” by recent scholarship, these academics were divided in a variety of ways; ranging from their political affiliations and social background, to their education and worldview. Over the next 70 years of U.S. politics, their importance in the foreign policy decision-making process fluctuated radically. This was because the level of influence they were able to exert was dependent on the President in office and the foreign policy decision-making modus operandi within that specific government. John F. Kennedy, for example, drastically reduced the size of the National Security Council (NSC) and established the much smaller Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) in an effort to make the foreign policy process more simplistic.

At this juncture it is necessary to clarify the definition of the term “defense intellectual” which will be used throughout this thesis. Determining exactly when the term “defense intellectual” entered the academic vocabulary proved to be somewhat of a challenge. However, after extensive research, the earliest recorded use of “defense intellectual” was by Andrew Cockburn in his 1987 article The Defense Intellectual: Edward N. Luttwak. Later that year, Carol Cohn published an article in the ‘Journal of Women in Culture and Society’ titled Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals. In this article Cohn characterised “defense intellectuals” as ‘civilians who move in and out of government, working sometimes as administrative officials or consultants, sometimes at universities and think tanks’. Since the 1980s, the term has become more widespread. Andrew

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Bacevich is one eminent academic who has used the term on multiple occasions. During an interview in 2005, he remarked that ‘by the time we got to the 1960s, these “defense intellectuals” were arguing that in order to maintain nuclear deterrence we had to have the capability to actually go fight small wars, brushfire wars, wars of national liberation’. Although the quotation has little relevance at this stage of the study, the fact that Bacevich uses the term shows it is well established within the current academic vocabulary.

The underlying premise of this project is how and why knowledge is fundamental to the foreign policy decision-making process. There are a number of academic debates and publications concerning the relationship between knowledge and foreign policy decision-making; these include Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic’s book Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance, and Peter Haas’s article Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. Peter Haas describes epistemic communities as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain’. These individuals, although potentially differing in occupation and social background, have ‘a shared set of normative and principled beliefs… shared causal beliefs… shared notions of validity… and a common policy enterprise’. Therefore, a politically orientated epistemic community is a collection of like-minded professionals who, despite working in various departments of the U.S. political system, seek to influence state interests ‘by directly identifying them for decision makers or by illuminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the decision makers may then deduce their interest’.

Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, on the other hand, assess the argument that ‘for many reasons, connections between scholarly ideas and policymakers’ thinking in international relations are less common today’. One of the reasons proposed by Lepgold and Nincic is that since the end of the Cold War, it has been increasingly difficult to find models which accurately link social

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4 Ibid, p. 3
5 Ibid, p. 4
science theory with the reality of the international environment. The authors contest this argument by highlighting how ‘people’s ability to process information is limited’, therefore ‘they must perceive the world selectively in order to operate effectively in it… for these reasons, both theorists and practitioners seek a clear and powerful understanding of cause and effect about policy issues, in order to help them diagnose situations, define the range of possibilities they confront, and evaluate the likely consequences of given courses of action’. These similarities in approach suggest that social science theory and foreign policy have the potential to be compatible, despite the disparity in recent years. The academic publications discussed above are intimately related to the central concepts of this study. Peter Haas’ description of epistemic communities, for example, shares a close affinity with the “defense intellectuals” employed throughout this investigation. One of the three “defense intellectuals” analysed in the latter stages, Paul Wolfowitz, was an integral part of the neoconservative epistemic community that came to prominence around the turn of the twenty-first century. By devoting attention to several academic publications regarding the relationship between knowledge and foreign policy decision-making, it is the aim of this study to situate itself within the context of this broad yet pertinent debate.

As a fairly new concept within academia, there are still significant gaps in our understanding of “defense intellectuals” and their rise to prominence in U.S. politics. This lack of knowledge regarding “defense intellectuals” – particularly their influence on foreign policy – is due to a lack of awareness and appreciation for the scale of their importance. Even though some specific “defense intellectuals” have an extensive volume of literature examining their careers in and outside of government, such as Albert Wohlstetter and Henry Kissinger, there has been little work analysing their impact on the foreign policy decision-making process. Generally speaking, International Relations (IR) scholars are quick to dismiss the effect that individuals may have on the foreign policy decision-making process. In their article Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bring the Statesman Back In, Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack recount how ‘many political scientists contend that individuals ultimately do not matter, or at least they count for little in the major events that shape international politics’. Byman and Pollack assert that by doing this, such intellectuals are guilty of dismissing ‘the crucial impact of individuals on war and diplomacy’.

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7 Ibid, p. 3
8 Ibid, p. 3
while at the same time neglecting ‘the extent to which social science can tease out useful generalizations regarding the role played by individuals’. The analytical inconsistency explained above is why “defense intellectuals” have been selected as the main investigative subject of this thesis. By assessing the impact that “defense intellectuals” have had on foreign policy, both individually and as a collective, one can hope to reveal more about how influential each individual was in the foreign policy decision-making process.

The academic who has arguably explored the impact of “defense intellectuals” most thoroughly is Bruce Kulick. Despite referring to them by a different term in his book *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger*, Kulick states that he aims to examine ‘what occurred in the United States from World War II to Vietnam, when men interested in applying scholarly concepts to international policy obtained a distinctive voice in the counsels of state’. The individuals who Kulick describes in this quotation will be considered the archetypal “defense intellectual”; in other words, civilians who sought to aid the U.S. government by solving foreign policy issues with academic ideals and principles. Kulick expands on this definition by outlining three different categories of “defense intellectual”. The first, in his words, consists of ‘a scientifically orientated cadre of experts, usually working in or close to the collegiate world…these men often had a significant association with the Research And Development (RAND) Corporation, the think-tank run by the air force’. The second collective of “defense intellectuals” is closely associated with the first and contains ‘foreign policy academics who were allies of the political scientist Richard Neustadt and the historian Ernest May, particularly in “the May Group” at Harvard and the Kennedy School of Government’. Kulick’s third and final group encompasses those who ‘had bases in the university and who achieved the highest positions of influence’, and therefore will be used as the definitive “defense intellectual” during the course of this investigation. The purpose behind this decision is that the third group of “defense intellectuals” were the only individuals to reach the highest positions of influence in U.S. politics. As such, it will be easier to analyse the impact they had on the foreign policy decision-making process because they were the “defense

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10 Ibid, p. 109
12 Ibid, p. 6
13 Ibid, p. 6
14 Ibid, p. 6
“defense intellectuals” who had the most measurable amount of influence over U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, there is a greater volume of literature and source material detailing the scale of their involvement.

Whereas Kuklick writes that he will analyse their role from the end of the Second World War to Vietnam, this project will take into account more recent events in U.S. foreign policy, such as the Iraq War. It is essential to define the precise period of time to be examined, because as Kuklick states himself ‘over the course of American history, diplomacy has attracted many thoughtful people… in the nineteenth century we can look to Jefferson, Madison, John Quincy Adams, William Seward, and Richard Olney.15 This shows that “defense intellectuals”, in their most simplified definition, are far from a recent phenomenon in U.S. political history. Nevertheless, in this essay the timeframe is 1945 to 2008, and three prominent “defense intellectuals” who influenced U.S. foreign policy during this period. The individuals selected as case studies – George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, and Paul Wolfowitz – have been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, each exerted a substantial degree of influence over the administrations of Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, and George W. Bush, primarily in the foreign policy decision-making process. Secondly, there is a sizable time-lapse between these aforementioned “defense intellectuals” and the presidents with whom they were associated. This subsequently offers a chance to chart any discrepancies or similarities that may have occurred across 60 years of U.S foreign policy. With regards to the political affiliations of the “defense intellectuals”, George Kennan was part of Truman’s Democratic government whilst the other two were primarily associated with the Republican governments of Nixon and Bush Jr. As U.S. politics is, by its very nature, partisan, the three case studies have been selected so that both Democratic and Republican parties are incorporated. This is imperative to ensure that the eventual outcome is truly representative of foreign policy decision-making for the entire U.S. political system. Only the key events of the Truman, Nixon and Bush Jr presidencies are to be investigated; mainly, though not exclusively, focusing on the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War. The Korean War has been omitted from Kennan’s chapter as when the conflict began in 1950, he no longer exerted a significant amount of influence over the foreign policy of the United States.

15 Ibid, p. 2
The three academics turned government officials were advocates for various schools of thought, such as realism and neoconservatism. Realism, perhaps the most well-known school of thought within political science, has been described as ‘the foundational school of thought about international politics around which all others are orientated’. The academic who made this claim was William C. Wohlforth, and he discusses realism at great length throughout his chapter in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. In addition to discussing various realist schools of thought, Wohlforth’s chapter highlights George Kennan and Henry Kissinger – two of the three individuals used as case studies during this investigation – as prominent advocates for a realist approach to foreign policy. Kennan, who held the position of U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1946, was chief architect of the famous “Long Telegram”. In response to a plea from the Treasury Department, Kennan’s telegram demonstrated how the Soviet Union ‘was in a position that threatened the global balance of power and that the country was internally disposed to continue expanding unless it met a powerful counterweight’. This telegram was to inspire a policy of “Containment” that would dominate American political discourse throughout the administration of Harry Truman and beyond. Wohlforth explains that Kennan exhibited several realist points of view in his appraisal, such as ‘the fundamental importance of the world’s power centres, a penchant for discounting the universalistic rhetoric on both sides, (and) a focus on narrow group interest and the potential for conflict’.

Kissinger, on the other hand, is well-known for his roles as Secretary of State (1973-1977) and National Security Advisor (1969-1975). Along with President Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger orchestrated a systematic restructuring of the U.S. foreign policy. This included actively seeking better relations with communist China and easing tensions with the Soviet Union by engaging in a policy which would later be known as détente. At the heart of this change in tack ‘was Kissinger’s hard-headed analysis of the relative decline in U.S. power against the backdrop of the increasing power of the USA’s own allies in Europe and Asia, as well as that of their main rival.

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17 Ibid, p. 44
19 Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy”, p. 44
20 Ibid, p. 44
the Soviet Union, and many other regional states’. It is evident that both Kennan and Kissinger’s realist beliefs allowed them to assess the state of international politics and help modify U.S. foreign policy accordingly. However, the extent of his influence on U.S. foreign policy will be scrutinised more thoroughly in due course.

Another political school of thought that has dominated U.S. foreign policy in more recent times is neoconservatism. Realism, of course, has a much broader tradition within IR than neoconservatism; it has been the driving force behind a plethora of academics, “defense intellectuals” and their scholarship, as well as historically emanating from universities. Despite having support in an academic context – neoconservatives repeatedly claim Leo Strauss as their founding father – neoconservatism was primarily a Jewish intellectual movement that gained popularity in professional circles and explicitly sought to re-write the political order across U.S. society. Yuen Foong Khong argues in his chapter from Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases that there are four tenets to neoconservative foreign policy thought. It is important to note that Khong devises his four tenets from the work of notable second-generation neocons Robert Kagan, William Kristol, and Francis Fukuyama. The first of these tenets is based on the idea that neocons possess a ‘moral clarity about the forces of good and evil in the international arena… this moral clarity or certainty is starkly articulated in terms of the internal characteristics of states – democratic leaders and liberal democracies are good; tyrants and tyrannical regimes are bad’. In the wider context of IR and its various schools of thought, Khong points out that this ideal differentiates from the one held by classical realists, such as Henry Kissinger, who are suspicious of including morality in foreign policy because morality and interests are not always able to be achieved in unison. This is just one of the proposed foundations of neoconservative foreign policy thought.

From a theoretical perspective, determining the influence certain “defense intellectuals” have had on U.S. foreign policy requires the incorporation of a theory that sheds light on the foreign policy decision-making process. The most suitable theory is a branch of IR known as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The field of Foreign Policy Analysis has for over 40 years analysed and debated

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21 Ibid, p. 44
23 Ibid, p. 313
issues related to the basic question: how do governments decide upon and enact foreign policy? The underlying principle behind all IR theory, at least according to the scholar Valerie M. Hudson, is ‘all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups’.24 This premise shares an immediate connection with realism and neoconservatism, which are themselves a set of beliefs and opinions promoted by a group of like-minded individuals. Moreover, in an article with Christopher S. Vore, Hudson writes that ‘the decision-making approach of FPA breaks apart the monolithic view of nation-states as unitary actors… it focuses on the people and units that comprise the state’.25 With this point in mind, it is apparent that when trying to better understand “defense intellectuals” and their impact on U.S. foreign policy, an all-encompassing theory from the field of FPA – one that attempts to explain how foreign policy is formed by individuals operating in the U.S. government – will give a greater sense of clarity. Although there are many theories and counter-theories associated with Foreign Policy Analysis as an academic field, there is one in particular which can help this investigation comprehend the degree of influence that various “defense intellectuals” had on the formation of U.S. foreign policy.

The concept in question is called the Concentric Circles theory and it is compatible with the actor-specific approach that Valerie M. Hudson advocates. In other words, it assesses how groups of decision-makers work with one another in various levels of the U.S. government and society. It was first comprehensively devised by Roger Hilsman in his 1967 book To Move a Nation. Those well-versed in American politics will recognise Hilsman as an essential component in the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, most notably as head of Intelligence in the State Department during the Kennedy presidency. Despite retiring from politics in 1964 to teach at Columbia University, Hilsman’s credentials prove he has extensive first-hand experience in U.S. foreign policy decision-making. The central theme of this theory, which will subsequently be used as the bedrock of this theoretical framework, is that the ‘policy-making process presents itself as a series of concentric circles’.26 Put simply, Hilsman suggests there are several sets of

*Concentric Circles* within foreign policy decision-making; for example, the *Executive Branch* of the government is located in the centre of this apparatus and has the most substantial amount of influence over foreign policy. This is the reason why Hilsman’s theory is also referred to as the *Presidential Preeminence* format.

Although Hilsman was the first scholar to create a structure for the particular premise in use here - and was no doubt inspired by his time within the upper echelons of the United States government - he concedes that individuals such as Gabriel A. Almond, Charles E. Lindblom, Robert A. Dahl and many others had a profound impact on his work.27 Along with Hilsman’s work, more recent additions to the theory will be of great importance to this thesis. In the 1998 book *After The End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers posit that, in contrast to the structure put forward by Hilsman, the *Concentric Circles* system should be viewed more as a series of *Shifting Constellations* that interact with one another in differing fashions. Scott and Crothers go on to explain that in the post-Cold War world, foreign policy ‘may emerge from shifting and uncertain interactions between the White House, Congress, bureaucratic agencies, and groups and individuals from the private sector’.28 This point is summarised with the statement that ‘the White House may dominate, but it does not necessarily dominate… therefore, the influence of the institutions that make American foreign policy will vary, and this variation will likely manifest itself on the micro-level and the macro-level’.29

Evidently, both branches of the *Concentric Circles* theory are well-suited to the project; this is because one claims that the formation of U.S. foreign policy – specifically during the Cold War – was rigid and dictated by the White House, whereas the other claims that since the end of the Cold War, other departments of the U.S government have had more of a say in the foreign policy decision-making process. By analysing the impact that “defense intellectuals” have had through these branches of the *Concentric Circles* theory, it will be possible to ascertain the level of influence certain “defense intellectuals” were able to exert.

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27 Ibid, p. 562
29 Ibid, p. 8
The overall success of this inquiry relies heavily upon the conceptual framework that will be employed. It is clear from the outset that Kennan, Kissinger, and Wolfowitz exerted a different form and level of influence on foreign policy in comparison to one another. This is due to the fact that each “defense intellectual” operated in a specific government, and thus had to contend with the organisational and communicative limitations that were inherently unique to that government. However, there are hitherto unknown factors which also contributed to the influence that each individual was able to wield. For example, one of the “defense intellectuals” chosen as a case study may have somehow altered the configuration of the Concentric Circles system and subsequently had a more considerable impact on foreign policy. A primary objective of this investigation is to discover more about the inner-workings of the Truman, Nixon and Bush Jr governments, particularly in the foreign policy decision-making process. In order to achieve this, the conceptual framework of this study will focus on the effect that ideologies – such as realism and neoconservatism – have had on our “defense intellectuals” and the success they had implementing them through the medium of U.S. foreign policy. Taking the political beliefs of Kennan, Kissinger, and Wolfowitz into account yields an opportunity to assess how successful these “defense intellectuals” were in executing their principles on the international arena. This approach will also allow us to evaluate the effect they had on the foreign policy of the United States at numerous points throughout the Cold War and beyond. Generally speaking, the academic debate concerning the influence of individuals and the influence of ideas on government puts them at odds with each other. This examination will strive to combine them and create a heuristic model by looking at
how the political concepts that inspired Kennan, Kissinger, and Wolfowitz had an impact on their ability to influence foreign policy as individuals. Analysing the impact of the “defense intellectuals” in this format will provide a comprehensive idea of how influential they were in foreign policy decision-making process during their respective tenures.

Aside from the conceptual framework, perhaps the most fundamental aspect yet to be addressed is the methodology that will underpin this entire investigation. In the social sciences there are traditionally three methodological approaches; quantitative, qualitative, and comparative. Even though these three techniques each represent a specific means of testing and investigating issues related to social science, a significant amount of overlap often occurs. Indeed, Charles C. Ragin – who has published extensively about all three strategies – writes in his book *Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method* that ‘like qualitative research, comparative research pays close attention to individual cases; like quantitative research, comparative research focuses directly on differences across cases and attempts to make sense of them’. From the above quotation it can be deduced that a comparative approach would be most applicable. The purpose of this approach is to ensure that this examination pays attention to individual case studies, in the form of Kennan, Kissinger and Wolfowitz, whilst also highlighting differences and similarities between the three “defense intellectuals”.

There are many methodologies within the wider context of comparative analysis, ranging from case-orientated methods to variable-orientated methods. Ragin asserts in *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* that case-orientated approaches – especially interpretive pieces of work – endeavor to ‘account for significant historical outcomes… by piecing together evidence in a manner sensitive to historical chronology and offering limited historical generalizations which are sensitive to context’. In addition, Ragin goes on to affirm how ‘most, but not all, case-orientated work is also causal-analytic… this companion goal is to produce limited generalizations concerning the causes of theoretically defined categories of empirical phenomena common to a set of cases’. In this instance, the ‘theoretically defined categories of empirical phenomena’ would be the influence Kennan, Kissinger, and Wolfowitz

32 Ibid, p. 35
were able to exert through the theoretical *Concentric Circles* system, whereas the ‘common set of cases’ would be the “defense intellectuals” themselves. With reference to the original quotation, the structure would adopt a chronological style and seek to offer conclusions that respect the contextual nuances of each administration. As such, an approach based on the case-orientated approaches listed previously will provide the methodological base of this investigation.

With these points in mind, the main research question of this project is: by employing this heuristic approach, how can the impact that “defense intellectuals” have had on the foreign policy of the United States be best understood? The more specific, secondary questions will seek to discover: having applied the *Concentric Circles* theory, what does the influence that these “defense intellectuals” exerted disclose about how foreign policy was decided upon in the governments of Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, and George W. Bush? Did some “defense intellectuals” have more of an impact than others? If so, why? What similarities and differences are there regarding the influence they each wielded? These questions will play an indispensable role in discovering how the chosen “defense intellectuals” have contributed to U.S. foreign policy from the beginning of the Cold War to the modern era. Both the theory of *Concentric Circles* in foreign policy decision-making and “defense intellectuals” are underappreciated aspects of academia. By pinpointing debates concerning the structural shape and nature of the *Concentric Circles* theory – in conjunction with the impact of “defense intellectuals” on U.S. foreign policy – this project hopes to shed some light on and make an original contribution to the debates. It is my opinion that by examining these two in tandem with each other, it will be possible to generate the recognition that their values warrant.

Another vital facet of this thesis is the utilisation of an extensive volume of academic literature and primary source material. Without a comprehensive and carefully selected collection of sources, it would be impossible to answer the research questions and accurately define the influence that each “defense intellectual” had on U.S. foreign policy. The primary source material has been acquired from various depositories and takes the form of government documents, minutes, personal memos, and notes. In accordance with the conceptual and methodological frameworks, this paper will be divided into five sections. The first will engage with a substantial volume of literature to provide a synopsis of numerous arguments that explain the intellectual parameters of realism, the *Concentric Circles* theory, and neoconservatism. The second chapter
focuses on George Kennan and makes use of secondary literature such as Kennan’s autobiography *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, John Lewis Gaddis’s *George F. Kennan: An American Life*, David Mayers’s *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy*, and John Lukacs’s *George Kennan: A Study of Character*, among many others. As with the chapter on Kissinger and Wolfowitz, this section will analyse events throughout the life of George Kennan, such as his educational background and tutelage at the Foreign Service School, that have helped mould his political beliefs and worldview. This will be supplemented with a number of articles published in various academic journals. With regards to primary source material, the presidential library of Harry S. Truman contains documents that divulge how much influence Kennan held over U.S. foreign policy.

Following on from Kennan, the next chapter addresses Henry Kissinger’s early years and his role in foreign policy decision-making during the presidency of Richard Nixon. The reasoning behind this decision is twofold. Firstly, Kissinger’s tenure as National Security Advisor for the Nixon government is incredibly well-documented; secondly, the most significant foreign policy events of his career generally occurred during this period. A variety of books are utilised in this section, such as Kissinger’s memoirs *The White House Years*, Walter Isaacson’s *Kissinger: A Biography*, Christopher Hitchens’s *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*, Jussi M. Hanhimäki’s *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*, as well as a variety of texts that focus specifically on Kissinger’s role in the Vietnam War and other foreign policy issues he had an impact on. Once again, a multitude of articles will be used throughout the duration of this chapter. The National Security Archive at George Washington University will provide much of the primary source material for the analysis of Kissinger. This includes the so called “Kissinger Telcons” and several additional documents which describe his actions in countries such as Chile, Vietnam, and Cambodia.

The final chapter concentrates on the life of Paul Wolfowitz and his influence on the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration, particularly the Iraq War. Despite being considerably more recent than the other two “defense intellectuals”, there is a plethora of literature that discusses his impact in great detail. Chief among these are Richard H. Immerman’s *Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz*, George Tenet’s *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, Richard A. Clarke’s *Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror*, and Lewis D. Solomon’s *Paul D. Wolfowitz: Visionary Intellectual,*
Policymaker, and Strategist. Many other books will be referenced in conjunction with them, yet those mentioned above are of paramount importance. The reason for this is that Clarke was Chairman of the Counter-terrorism Security Group between 1992 and 2003, while Tenet was Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1996 to 2004. These books – published by former government officials who occupied the positions in the center of the Concentric Circles system – supply vital information about the Bush administration’s foreign policy decision-making and the part Paul Wolfowitz played in it. An unfortunate consequence of these events happening so recently is the scarcity of available primary source material. There are, however, an abundance of articles devoted to evaluating his influence during this time. All in all, the diverse source material described above is essential in defining the influence that our “defense intellectuals” had on U.S. foreign policy and also ensuring that this project adds an original perspective to the existing historiography.
A Brief History of Realism, the *Concentric Circles* Theory, and Neoconservatism

As explained in the introduction, this chapter will give a concise overview of realism, the *Concentric Circles* theory, and neoconservatism. Beginning with the theoretical foundations of realism, it will then progress onto the *Concentric Circles* theory before finishing with an analysis of neoconservatism. According to William C. Wohlforth, political realism is a theoretical worldview based on three core assumptions of how people interact with each other.33 The first assumption is Groupism; this premise asserts that ‘humans face one another mainly as members of groups… people need the cohesion provided by group solidarity, yet that very same in-group cohesion generates the potential for conflict with other groups’.34 Wohlforth adds that in today’s complex international system the most ‘important human groups are nation-states, and the most important source of in-group cohesion is nationalism’.35 Not only is nationalism the most prominent source of in-group cohesion, but the nature of the international system means that it can also act as a catalyst for conflict between nation-states.

Moving on from Groupism, the second assumption adopted by realists is Egoism. It explains how ‘self-interest ultimately drives political behaviour… although certain conditions can facilitate altruistic behaviour, egoism is rooted in human nature’.36 In other words, Wohlforth argues that even though nation-states are capable of acting in a friendly manner, self-interest is the factor which primarily dictates how states interact with one another. The third and final assumption realists make about social interaction is Power-centrism. Wohlforth writes that this ‘is the fundamental feature of politics… once past the hunter-gatherer stage, human affairs are always marked by great inequalities of power in both senses of that term: social influence or control (some groups and individuals always have an outsized influence on politics) and resources (some groups and individuals are always disproportionately endowed with the material wherewithal to get what they want)’.37 The inequalities described here are evident in both nation-state societies and the international arena; certain socio-economic groups within nation-states have more resources at

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33 Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy”, p. 36
34 Ibid, p. 36
35 Ibid, p. 36
36 Ibid, p. 36
37 Ibid, p. 36
their disposal, and thus a greater influence over domestic politics, whereas some nation-states are more powerful than others, thus allowing them to exert more influence in the international arena.

By asserting that these principles dictate human interaction, and in turn the world, realists are inclined to view international politics in a certain way. The main groups with which people associate themselves, whether they be ‘tribes, city-states, empires, or nation-states… will exert a major influence on human affairs’.  This truism infers that ‘the group’s collective interest, however defined, will be central to its politics’. Because of this, it follows that humanity is unlikely to ever abandon the politics of power for the power of reason. This simplistic explanation provided above fails to properly cover the intellectual ramifications associated with a realist point of view. Indeed, the consequences of possessing such a worldview are diverse and somewhat complex. Although it is not the objective of this study to evaluate them in great detail, it is still necessary to present a brief synopsis of realism and its place within the wider realm of IR.

There are many divergent theoretical schools of thought within realism; Classical realism, for example, is the name given to ‘all realist thought from Thucydides to the middle years of the Cold War’. Then, in 1979, American political scientist Kenneth Waltz posited in his book Theory of International Politics that classical realists ‘were weakened by their failure to distinguish clearly among arguments about human nature, the internal attributes of states, and the overall system of states’. The crux of Waltz’s argument is based on the idea that the ‘mere existence of groups in anarchy can lead to powerful competitive war – regardless of what the internal politics of those groups might be like’. He expands on this by stating how ‘in the family, the community, or the world at large, contact without at least occasional conflict is inconceivable’. Put simply, Waltz maintains that the sheer presence of other groups, either in domestic or international politics, will inevitably lead to conflict. This new political outlook, collectively referred to as Neorealism, forced IR scholars to reassess their assumptions regarding the factors that inspire one group to

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38 Ibid, p. 37
39 Ibid, p. 37
40 Ibid, p. 37
41 Ibid, p. 38
42 Ibid, p. 38
43 Ibid, p. 38
wage war against another. As a consequence of this intellectual awakening, the parameters of realism shifted and other sub-schools were formed. Among them are Defensive realists; they cite that ‘the stronger a group identity is – as in the modern era of nationalism – the harder it is to conquer and subjugate other groups’. ⁴⁵ As well as Defensive realists there are also Offensive realists; they claim, among other things, that ‘with no authority to enforce agreements, states could never be certain that any peace-causing condition today would remain operative in the future’. ⁴⁶ These are but a handful of the countless sub-schools that exist within the vast theoretical spectrum of realism.

Another theory that resides within the spectrum of IR is the *Concentric Circles* of foreign policy decision-making. Roger Hilsman first described the intricacies of this theory in his book *To Move a Nation*, which was published in 1967. This text reveals a substantial amount of information on how he viewed the foreign policy decision-making process at that time. Although the idea of a set of *Concentric Circles* existing within foreign policy decision-making preceded the work of Hilsman, he was the first individual to truly establish a structured theory. As described in the introduction, Hilsman begins his theory with the statement that the process of policy-making offers itself as a set of *Concentric Circles*. ⁴⁷ This follows with the explanation that the innermost circle contains the President, staff in the White House, the Secretaries of State and Defense, Director of the CIA and Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense. ⁴⁸ The author observes that ‘some matters never go beyond this circle, but even here the process is political – the “closed politics” of highly secret decision-making’. ⁴⁹ Using the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as an example, Hilsman highlights how the most sensitive and important foreign policy decisions were decided by this small group of government officials. Additionally, James N. Rosenau states in his book *International Politics and Foreign Policy* that ‘presidents can very rarely command, even within what is supposedly their most nearly absolute domain, the Executive Branch itself’. ⁵⁰ Rosenau demonstrates that U.S. presidents, despite their position as commander-in-chief, are unable to dominate foreign policy decision-making within the *Executive Branch*. This is a key concept to

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⁴⁵ Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy”, p. 39
⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 39
⁴⁷ Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 542
⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 542
⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 542
the investigation of “defense intellectuals” and the influence they exerted within the *Executive Branch*.

On the periphery of this central layer resides an outer circle, otherwise known as the *Bureaucracy*, consisting of lesser *Executive Branch* departments, presidential commissions, scientific advisory panels and other similar organisations.\(^{51}\) Hilsman elucidates, however, that both the inner *Executive Branch* and the first outer *Concentric Circle* reside within the realm of “closed politics”. This is because the decision-making of highly-classified policies involving *Bureaucracy* officials may still be kept hidden from ‘the press, the Congress, and the public’.\(^{52}\) That is not to say all sensitive policies are kept hidden from the public and the press; on the contrary, Hilsman writes how ‘the longer a policy goes on, no matter how delicate the issue is, the more people will become involved until eventually the debate spills over into the public domain’.\(^{53}\) The issue explained here illustrates how the longer over which a policy is deliberated, the greater the likelihood that the debate will start to involve those who reside in the outer *Concentric Circles*.

The third and final *Concentric Circle*, at least in the theory developed by Roger Hilsman, contains the *Public Arena*. This sphere of interest includes ‘Congress, the press, interest groups, and – inevitably – the “attentive publics”’.\(^{54}\) Because it incorporates many different governmental bodies and external influences, such as the press and the public, there are various ways in which policies can be formed within this peripheral arena. As an example Hilsman once again refers back to the Cuban missile crisis, stating that although “the decision was made in the arena of “closed politics”… the President had always to consider the effects and reactions and repercussions in the wider public arena”.\(^{55}\) This shows that the United States’ foreign policy was directly operated by the National Security Council, Congress, the press, academic journals, and numerous departments and agencies in the *Executive Branch*, yet they were always wary of public opinion.\(^{56}\) The relationship between these distinct factions and government officials are both complex and somewhat random. With regards to the Vietnam War, individual ‘members of the embassy and CIA shared the views of a segment of the press’, whereas ‘other members of the embassy and CIA

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\(^{51}\) Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 542-543

\(^{52}\) Ibid, p. 543

\(^{53}\) Ibid, p. 543

\(^{54}\) Ibid, p. 543

\(^{55}\) Ibid, p. 543

\(^{56}\) Ibid, p. 543
were allied with the opposing segment of the press'. It becomes clear from Hilsman’s theoretical apparatus that not only can the process of foreign policy decision-making vary from policy to policy, but also how there can be huge divisions in opinion between the various bodies and organisations involved. This is confirmed by Hilsman when he states ‘the fact that policy is made through a political process of conflict and consensus-building accounts for much of the untidiness and turmoil on the Washington scene’.

As Hilsman openly admits in *To Move a Nation*, the primary inspiration for his theory was Gabriel A. Almond and his 1950 text *The American People and Foreign Policy*. Within this book Almond categorises members of the public based on their influence on foreign policy, making a clear distinction between the ‘general public’, the ‘attentive public’, ‘policy and opinion elites’, and the ‘official policy leadership’. The definitions proposed by Almond are different in name and content to those laid out by Hilsman - aside from the use of *Attentive Public* - but they follow the same basic structural pattern. The *Official Policy Leadership* evidently resembles the inner, *Executive Branch* dominated *Concentric Circle*, while the *Policy and Opinion Elites* are markedly similar to the outer *Concentric Circle* that contains lesser *Executive Branch* officials, scientific advisory panels and others of a similar vein.

The other model of the *Concentric Circles* theory which will be applied in this investigation is the one formulated by James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers in *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*. Published in 1998, this text sought to re-define how U.S. foreign policy would be decided on after the conclusion of the Cold War. In their alternative framework (see page 10, figure 2), the authors almost completely revolutionise Hilsman’s original layout. Instead of defining the central *Concentric Circle* as the *Executive Branch*, the *Shifting Constellations* model adopts the term *The White House*. Regardless of the different titles, Scott and Crothers go on to explain that ‘this circle commands the Executive Branch and thus had access to its expertise, information, and capabilities for implementing policy’. In addition to this premise, they state that *The White House* ‘has the ability to set agenda… seize the initiative, mobilise opinion, set the bureaucracy in motion, exert pressure on Congress and force it to react’,

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57 Ibid, p. 543  
58 Ibid, p. 543  
60 Scott & Crothers, “Out of the Cold”, p. 8
while also including specific powers ‘bestowed on the commander in chief, chief executive, chief diplomat, and chief legislator of the U.S. government’.61 This highlights how integral the inner section of Scott’s and Crothers’s *Concentric Circles* theory is to the foreign policy decision-making process.

Following *The White House* in Scott’s and Crothers’s model is the *Foreign Policy Bureaucracy*. This division of the *Concentric Circles* system, which is less important in comparison to *The White House*, still plays a vital role in the making of U.S. foreign policy. It consists of the CIA, the State Department, Defense Department and other agencies formed to offer advice and physically implement policies.62 More importantly, the authors identify that ‘the bureaucracy’s expertise and control of information place it in a position to shape the formulation of policy by performing much of the generation and consideration of policy alternatives’.63 As recognised by both Hilsman and Almond, this arena suffers from intense competition between rival government agencies which sometimes leads to contradictory and ineffective policies. The final arena in Scott’s and Crothers’s framework is *Congress*. This comprises the ‘leadership, committees, and individual members of both houses’; although ‘members and the institution are limited by many structural characteristics, the institution and its individual members have access to potentially potent avenues of influence’.64 Indeed, these avenues are plentiful and include the constitutional authority to hold hearings, order reports, the ability to legislate and express disdain for a policy, request briefings from *Executive Branch* officials, and offer advice on political appointments.65 These three arenas – in the opinion of Scott and Crothers – encompass the primary actors which contribute to U.S. foreign policy decision-making.

The fundamental divergence in their work in comparison to Hilsman’s, however, is its focus on the idea that leadership for a specific policy fluctuates between these various arenas. For example, some of the factors that cause this fluctuation are ‘policy type (e.g. crisis, strategic, or structural); timing, policy stage, or policy cycle; issue area, situation (e.g. crisis or non-crisis); and policy instrument (e.g. aid, troop deployment, diplomacy)’.66 Because of these variables, the authors

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61 Ibid, pp. 8-9
62 Ibid, p. 9
63 Ibid, p. 9
64 Ibid, p. 9
65 Ibid, p. 9
66 Ibid, p. 10
suggest that the *Shifting Constellations* theory can take no less than five different forms. *White House Leadership*, as the title suggests, assumes that ‘after discussion and debate, the president decides on a course of action, which is then implemented… since the White House is dominant, a small group of advisors and their personal characteristics, group dynamics, and policy preferences will be of great importance’. 67 The second possible form of leadership is *Bureaucratic Leadership*; this postulates that foreign policy is deliberated and decided upon by the middle and lower levels of the *Executive Branch*. This occurs due to ‘the broad range and complexity of policy that must be attended to (i.e. literally countless decisions on foreign policy matters, in which the White House and Congress figure relatively low), and because high-level officials in either branch are limited in their time and interest’. 68 With this point in mind, it is apparent that *Bureaucratic Leadership* is most common in non-crisis, low-priority scenarios and therefore plays an unobtrusive role in high profile foreign policy decision-making.

Perhaps the most intriguing mode of direction for U.S. foreign policy is *Interbranch Leadership*. This manifests itself when all three of the major governmental circles (*The White House, Foreign Policy Bureaucracy, and Congress*) unite together and share the responsibility for formulating foreign policy, with nongovernmental actors and advisors offering support. 69 As opposed to the first two forms of leadership, *Interbranch Leadership* may occur during both crisis and non-crisis foreign policy issues. *Sub-government Leadership*, the fourth version of leadership in U.S. foreign policy, is ‘closed policy systems consisting of alliances between members of subcommittees in Congress, bureaucratic agencies, and relevant interest groups’. 70 Scott and Crothers explain that sub-government leadership is almost entirely found in defence policies, procurement decisions, and budgeting. 71 The final form of leadership is *Congressional Leadership*; with Congress at the helm, foreign policy is formulated through the official legislative process. In a similar fashion to *Sub-government Leadership* and *Bureaucratic Leadership*, *Congressional Leadership* only really happens on the less important, non-crisis foreign policy decisions. In conclusion the authors predict, which is of the utmost significance to this examination, that ‘if the Cold War era contributed to consensus and executive leadership, the post-Cold War era should be expected to

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67 Ibid, p. 10
68 Ibid, p. 10
69 Ibid, p. 11
70 Ibid, p. 11
71 Ibid, p. 11
contribute to...greater fragmentation of leadership’. All in all when applied to the foreign policy decision-making process, the fabric of the *Concentric Circles* theory proposed by Hilsman is pivotal in achieving a greater understanding of the influence that “defense intellectuals”, such as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger, were able to exercise during the Cold War. Scott and Crothers’s model, on the other hand, provides us with an interesting vantage point from which to analyse the impact that Paul Wolfowitz had on the formation of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War administration of George W. Bush.

The George W. Bush administration’s primary intellectual influence was neoconservatism. As a political movement and academic school of thought, neoconservatism consisted of ideas and principles associated with both the anti-Stalinist Left and traditional American Conservatism. Referring back to Yuen Foong Khong’s four tenets of neoconservative foreign policy thought – the first tenet was briefly touched upon earlier during the introduction – it is apparent that these tenets summarise the goals of neoconservative foreign policy after the transformation initiated by second-generation neocons in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. Khong devises his four tenets from the work of notable second-generation neocons Robert Kagan, William Kristol, and Francis Fukuyama. The first tenet addresses the idea of applying a degree of moral clarity to foreign policy. This essentially meant labelling tyrannical, dictatorial regimes as ‘bad’ and liberal democracies as ‘good’. The second premise of neoconservative foreign policy dictates that the United States, as the ‘exemplar of liberal democracy… should work towards what Kristol and Kagan call “a benevolent US hegemony”, meaning a situation where the USA “enjoys strategic and ideological dominance” in the world’. Maintaining the United States’ position as the sole power in a unipolar world was perhaps the most fundamentally important concept devised by second-generation neocons.

The third tenet is based on the belief that the United States, as the dominant military force in a post-Cold war world, should utilise this unbridled power to ensure the success of its foreign policy goals. There are two underlying principles that justify this approach in the eyes of neocons; firstly, if ‘one’s ends are noble and good, one would be morally derelict if one did not use all the means at one’s disposal’ to support a foreign nation’s desire to live in a democratic society.  

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72 Ibid, p. 19
73 Khong, “Neoconservatism and the Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy”, p. 314
74 Ibid, p. 314
as the ‘pre-eminent military power, few would have the resources or gumption to counter America on this terrain’. The fourth and final tenet describes neoconservative distrust of international law institutions, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the United Nations (UN). In the eyes of neoconservative academics, government officials and political commentators, institutions such as the ICC and the UN are ‘mechanisms used by weaker powers to tie down the USA… if the weaker nations had as much power as the USA, they would also be suspicious of these institutions’. Throughout the 1990s to the present day, these maxims serve as the definitive motivation behind neoconservative foreign policy thinking.

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75 Ibid, p. 314
76 Ibid, p. 315
George Kennan

Born in Wisconsin on February 16th, 1904 to parents of Irish and Scottish descent, the early years of George Frost Kennan’s life were defined by a traumatic event that would have a tremendous impact on him. Kennan’s mother, Florence James Kennan, died of peritonitis only two months after giving birth. He was primarily raised by his older sisters whilst his father, Kossuth Kent Kennan, had to balance caring for his young children with a career as a tax attorney. When he was eight years old, Kennan’s sister Jeanette and their stepmother accompanied him on an extended trip to Europe where ‘he visited various European cities and received some elementary education in Germany’.77 His first official school, however, was St John’s Military Academy in Delafield, Wisconsin. Kennan recounts how ‘he hated “the grubby military school” that his father and stepmother made him attend’.78 Despite his average grades, the school’s headmaster ‘recognized George Kennan’s mental talents… it was he who advised and directed him to apply for admission to Princeton’.79

His subsequent acceptance into Princeton would prove to be of the utmost significance. According to John Lewis Gaddis, Kennan left Princeton ‘less of a chameleon than he had been while there, or before he had arrived – and he knew something about the world that lay beyond’.80 When attempting to choose a career path Kennan remarked that he ‘enjoyed the study of international politics and had prospered in it’, while he also ‘recalled having studied history and politics “with increasing enjoyment and success”’.81 Despite always possessing a natural ability with foreign languages – he was able to speak German and had studied Latin and French at both St. John’s and Princeton – it seemed logical to have a meeting with his international law professor, Philip M. Brown, about the possibility of becoming a diplomat. Brown was relatively encouraging about the proposal, and after graduating from Princeton in 1925 with a modest academic record, Kennan entered the Foreign Service. This is the moment when Kennan first entered the lower levels of what Hilsman’s Concentric Circles model would describe as the Bureaucracy.

79 Ibid, p. 14
81 Ibid, p. 37
At this point in time the Foreign Service was a popular choice for aspirational and intelligent young Americans. Applicants had to negotiate two stages of formal examination before they were allowed to enroll. Kennan passed both stages and was officially accepted into the Foreign Service as an unclassified officer on September 9th, 1926. Upon his induction, Kennan was immediately registered into the Foreign Service School. After enrolling in the Foreign Service School for a year, a short-term position as vice-consul in Geneva was followed by a placement at the U.S. consulate in Hamburg. Kennan later reflected in *Memoirs: 1925-1950* that ‘for anyone so callow, so unformed, so restless, so lacking in knowledge of himself and the world, there could have been no professional framework better than that of the Foreign Service’.  

As Kennan prepared to resign due to a lack of intellectual stimulation, his former teacher William Dawson informed him that the Foreign Service ‘permitted some of its young members to enroll in a European university for three years of graduate study, for the purpose of special language and area studies’. Kennan later wrote that Dawson was ‘like a protecting angel, he intervened to save me from my foolishness’. Shortly after his acceptance into the new Foreign Service program for “language assignments” in March 1929, Kennan was ‘given the choice of becoming a language officer in Arabic, Chinese, or Russian’, he chose to study Russian at the University of Berlin. Kennan claims that he chose to study Russian as no relations existed with the Soviet Union, and therefore ‘it was logical to suppose that there would some day be favorable opportunities of service there for people knowing the language’. This judgment was pivotal in laying the foundation for his path towards becoming an expert on the Soviet Union.

The next five years were principally a time of solitude and reflection for Kennan. Instead of spending the duration of his placement in Berlin, as he might have expected, Kennan was ‘sent to Berlin and to Tallinn and to Riga, the capitals of Germany, Estonia, Latvia’. It was in Tallinn and Riga that Kennan began to formally develop his understanding of the Russian language, people, and society. In the words of David Mayers, these ‘venerable cities were ideal for students of Russian history and politics… located near Soviet territory, they were in the late 1920s and

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83 Lukacs, *George Kennan*, p. 26
84 Kennan, *Memoirs*, p. 23
85 Mayers, *George Kennan*, p. 20
86 Kennan, *Memoirs*, p. 23
87 Lukacs, *George Kennan*, p. 27
early 1930s still heavy with the influence and atmosphere of prerevolutionary Russia'. Along with his colleagues, Kennan ‘closely followed the Soviet economy, interviewed émigrés, and analyzed Soviet journals, newspapers, and speeches’, whilst he also ‘poured over Soviet periodicals and books, plodded through Soviet economic statistics, and studied Moscow’s propaganda’. From this extract alone it is evident that Kennan was committed to learning everything he could about Russian society. John Lukacs affirms this by stating that Kennan’s ‘intense concentration on his Russian studies was outstanding among his then colleagues… whether in Tallinn or Berlin or Riga he kept learning and reading Russian; whenever he could he cultivated personal relations with Russian families who had left their homeland after the Bolshevik revolution’.

By 1933, the anticipated reconciliation in Soviet-American relations was starting to become a reality; President Franklin Roosevelt held talks in late autumn with the Soviet commissar of foreign relations, Maxim Litvinov. Within a matter weeks, Kennan happened to be visiting Washington while on leave from his placement in Riga and was introduced to William C. Bullitt, the newly appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union. After five years travelling around Eastern Europe studying every facet of Soviet culture, Kennan had established ‘his reputation, within the Foreign Service, as the best of its young Russian specialists’. Following their introduction to one another, Bullitt proceeded to test Kennan’s knowledge of the Soviet Union, particularly its economic policies. Satisfied by the responses provided – as well as his fluency in Russian – Bullitt asked if Kennan would ‘join the U.S. delegation bound for Moscow just a few days hence’. Kennan naturally jumped at the opportunity, and within a couple of days he was travelling to the Soviet Union with Bullitt and the rest of his entourage.

Arriving in November 1933, this chance meeting with Bullitt heralded the beginning of a four year stint in Moscow. Kennan occupied numerous roles during his time at the embassy; these included acting as unofficial provisional representative when Bullitt was in the United States assembling a workforce, and then as a regular diplomatic secretary once Bullitt and the rest of his staff arrived

88 Mayers, George Kenan, p. 24
89 Ibid, p. 24
90 Lukacs, George Kenan, pp. 27-28
91 Gaddis, George F. Kenan, p. 65
92 Mayers, ‘George Kenan and the Soviet Union’, p. 526
93 Ibid, p. 526
in March 1934.\textsuperscript{94} Kennan had risen through the ranks of the \textit{Bureaucracy}, yet he was still unable to have any impact on the foreign policy of the United States. By December 1934 the political status quo within the Soviet Union had shifted dramatically. In the words of John Lukacs, the ‘darkest purge years of Stalin’s rule began… Diplomats were now by and large sequestered; their movements were limited’.\textsuperscript{95} Despite the strict limitations imposed on embassy staff by the Soviet hierarchy, Kennan regularly travelled around the country in an effort to appease ‘his great and genuine appetite for knowing more and more about Russians, about their remnant traditions, (and) about the presences of the Russian past in their lives’.\textsuperscript{96} This stint at the embassy would prove to be short-lived. In 1936, William Bullitt resigned as ambassador to the Soviet Union and was replaced by Joseph E. Davies. In contrast to Bullitt, Davies was said to be brash, poorly educated, and less receptive to the opinions of those who worked under him.\textsuperscript{97} Much to his relief, Kennan was reassigned to Washington in September 1937.

Kennan’s tenure in Moscow proved fruitful; the knowledge he had acquired helped him draw preliminary conclusions about the inherent political nature of Stalinist Russia. Among other observations, Kennan noticed that ‘beneath Marxism there was an age-old Russian, here and there even Byzantine, element in the politics of Stalin and of his cohorts: an ancestral suspicion and fear of human differences and of the outside world that explained almost everything of the brutalities and dishonesties of that regime’.\textsuperscript{98} The lessons that Kennan learnt from his time in pre-Second World War Russia helped inspire a realist intellectual framework that would eventually manifest itself in the form of his “Containment” theory. After completing a transfer to Washington in the summer of 1937, Kennan was put in charge of the State Department’s Soviet desk for a year. In September 1938, his request to be sent to Prague – inspired by Hitler’s demand that certain regions of Czechoslovakia be merged with Germany and Kennan’s desire not to ‘miss the climax’ – was approved by Foreign Service officials.\textsuperscript{99} The day after his arrival in Prague, news spread that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier had agreed to Hitler’s terms regarding the annexation of the German-speaking region of

\textsuperscript{94} Kennan, \textit{Memoirs}, p. 60
\textsuperscript{95} Lukacs, \textit{George Kennan}, p. 35
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid, p. 35
\textsuperscript{97} Mayers, \textit{George Kennan}, p. 44
\textsuperscript{98} Lukacs, \textit{George Kennan}, p. 36
\textsuperscript{99} Gaddis, \textit{George F. Kennan}, p. 119
Czechoslovakia, otherwise known as the Sudetenland. With the end of the Munich Conference and seizure of the Sudetenland, Kennan wrote that Prague ‘was blacked out and in a state of military emergency’. The ongoing situation in Europe presented an irresistible opportunity for Kennan to both escape the comparative safety of Washington and, although he did not know at first, witness first-hand events that would preclude the beginning of the Second World War.

Despite being situated in Prague for a year prior to the outbreak of war in September 1939, Kennan travelled around Europe until its cessation in September 1945. Indeed, Kennan was based in as many as four nations throughout the conflict, namely Germany, Portugal, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. During his first posting in wartime Germany, Kennan analysed various political and diplomatic aspects of the war and the Nazi regime itself. In reference to a bestselling book at the time, *Germany Sets the Clock Back*, Kennan posited that ‘Hitler and the Nazis were the very opposite of an anachronism; that their ideas and their practices and their instruments were not old and reactionary but new and revolutionary’. Perhaps the most significant analysis Kennan made during his time in Berlin was the dilemma Hitler faced after having conquered most of Europe by June 1940. This dilemma, according to Kennan, was that the Germans must either ‘try to remain permanently in military occupation of most of the remainder of Europe, something which was physically almost impossible… or to accommodate themselves in some way to regimes differently inspired than their own’. He reasoned that with the Nazi’s dilemma in mind, the ‘prospects for political success of the Soviet leadership in its effort to play the part of an imperial power, dominating and guiding the behavior of other states, particularly in Eastern Europe’, seemed unlikely. The reason why this observation is so significant is because, as Kennan admits himself, it had a direct impact on his “Containment” theory.

The placement in Berlin would prove to be fleeting. On December 11th 1941, four days after Japan attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hitler declared war on the United States. After contacting Hitler directly, the Foreign Service received a response two days later simply stating that ‘by the end of the week the Americans must be out of Berlin’. At eight o’clock in the morning on December 14th, American embassy personnel were escorted out of the building and

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100 Kennan, *Memoirs*, p. 87
101 Lukacs, *George Kennan*, p. 46
102 Kennan, *Memoirs*, p. 129
103 Ibid, p. 129
104 Ibid, p. 137
‘sent away for five months of confinement, incommunicado, under armed guard and Gestapo supervision, in a building on the outskirts of Bad Nauheim, near Frankfurt’. By May 1942, Kennan and the other American captives were sent to Portugal to be exchanged with a party of Germans who had been working at their nation’s embassy in Washington. On September 4th 1942 – after being given a lengthy summer vacation – orders came through for Kennan to ‘proceed at once… to Portugal to assume the duties of counselor of legation’. As counselor of legation, he was ordered to gain access to military bases on the Azores. With the United States now officially engaged in the conflict, protecting the Atlantic shipping lanes became of paramount importance. Kennan played a central role in the discussions, to the point where he described them as his ‘baby’ in Memoirs. Despite the fact that he had been crucial in setting-up the negotiations, Kennan was recalled to Washington before they were finalised in December 1943.

After spending Christmas at home, Kennan was sent to London in January 1944 ‘as political advisor to Ambassador John G. Winant in his capacity as American delegate to the newly established European Advisory Commission’. The European Advisory Commission had been created following a meeting between the foreign ministers of Britain, Russia, and the United States in Moscow in October 1943. With German forces in retreat, the Allies sought to open a dialogue amongst themselves regarding plans for ‘the military zoning of Germany at the end of the war’. The Commission was given little power and Kennan returned to Washington more disillusioned with the State Department than he already had been. In Memoirs, he confesses that ‘the department… had no clear idea as to what it wanted to do with me’. Chip Bohlen – who was liaison officer between the White House and the State Department at the time – introduced Kennan to Averell Harriman, the newly appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union. During a meeting at the Mayflower Hotel, Kennan expressed that he disagreed with the current administration regarding on how best to structure policy towards the Soviet Union, especially the decision to extend lend-lease. Harriman, unperturbed by Kennan’s admission, replied that ‘his views, in fact, were also no longer exactly in line… they agreed that Kennan would report for duty at the end of

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105 Ibid, p. 136
106 Ibid, p. 143
107 Kennan, Memoirs, p. 162
108 Ibid, p. 164
109 Lukacs, George Kennan, p. 54
110 Kennan, Memoirs, p. 180
June’. He arrived in Moscow in June 1944 to take the job of minister-counselor, which marked a significant improvement on his previous position within the Bureaucracy. The duties were mainly administrative, yet he was second in rank only to the Harriman himself. Kennan remained de facto deputy head of the American embassy until April 1946. Throughout this period, he again roamed the country and spoke to ordinary citizens whenever possible. One particular exchange with a friend in July 1944 proved to be of great significance for Kennan’s “Containment” theory. During a discussion about distrusting foreigners, the Russian diplomat said that ‘we are being very successful these days…the more successful we are, the less we care about foreign opinion… this is something you should bear in mind about the Russian… the better things go for him, the more arrogant he is’. This statement both emboldened Kennan’s realist analysis of the Soviet Union and reaffirmed his belief that the United States should seek to disengage from its wartime alliance with the country.

By February 1946, Kennan was once again contemplating handing in his resignation and returning to the United States. His resignation never reached Washington because as he lay in bed recovering from illness, the American embassy was sent a request by the State Department to provide an explanation for recent Soviet behaviour. Since the end of the Second World War and the death of President Roosevelt, relations had soured between the United States and the Soviet Union. The State Department was concerned by the rhetoric Stalin had used in his election speeches, as well as the disagreement over Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union’s refusal to become a partner in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Kennan writes in Memoirs that this was “it”, his opinion was finally being sought, ‘here was a case where nothing but the whole truth would do, they had asked for it… now, by god, they would have it’. Kennan was acting as chargé d'affaires at this time because Averell Harriman had resigned and the new ambassador, Bedell Smith, was yet to arrive in Moscow. Therefore, it was his responsibility to reply to the State Department.

His response, sent on February 22nd and commonly referred to as the “Long Telegram”, became the bedrock of U.S. foreign policy for the entirety of the Cold War. Kennan used the telegram to

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112 Kennan, Memoirs, p. 197
113 Ibid, p. 25
114 Kennan, Memoirs, p. 293
detail how, amongst other things, the Soviet Union leadership believed ‘everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society… conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers’.\(^\text{115}\) He goes on to say that one of the main inspirations behind the ‘Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity’.\(^\text{116}\) This realist observation was evidently influenced by Kennan’s time in the Soviet Union, particularly his interactions with fellow diplomats and members of the public. With regards to the colonial regions of the world, or ‘dependent peoples’, he states that ‘Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor communist-Soviet penetration’.\(^\text{117}\) In addition, Kennan asserts the Soviet Union will seek to ‘develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to western centers of power… this applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries’.\(^\text{118}\) In order to counteract this he suggested a two-pronged approach; firstly, Kennan pointed out that the Soviet Union is prone to withdrawing when confronted by sufficient resistance. Therefore, as long as the United States demonstrated its capabilities and appeared willing to use them, it would most likely never have to.\(^\text{119}\) Secondly, he implored the U.S. leadership to ‘formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past’, citing that ‘many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past’.\(^\text{120}\)

Upon its arrival at the State Department, the “Long Telegram” sent shockwaves across Washington. Indeed, the “Long Telegram” was sent ‘at a moment when the Department… was floundering about, looking for new intellectual moorings… now in this communication it was


\(^{116}\) Ibid, p. 5

\(^{117}\) Ibid, p. 9

\(^{118}\) Ibid, p. 10

\(^{119}\) Ibid, pp. 14-15

\(^{120}\) Ibid, p. 17
offered a new and realistic conception to which it might attach itself’.\footnote{Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 26} He writes in *Memoirs* that it was seen by some of the most influential figures in Washington; President Harry Truman was supposed to have read it, while ‘the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. James Forrestal, had it reproduced and evidently made it required reading for hundreds, if not thousands, of higher officers in the armed services’.\footnote{Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 294-295} Kennan’s burgeoning popularity among the Washington elite coincided with his departure from the Foreign Service and Moscow in April 1946. After returning to the United States, one of his most fervent supporters – the Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal – orchestrated a ‘transfer to the National War College, where he served as deputy commandant in charge of instruction to foreign relations’.\footnote{Mayers, *George Kennan*, p. 100} While Kennan proceeded to teach some of the most promising young officers in the U.S. armed forces, President Truman witnessed the turmoil in Europe and decided that action needed to be taken.

The Truman Doctrine, as it came to be known, was formed in response to the crises in Turkey and Greece in February 1947. Both nations were suffering from political destabilisation as a result of Britain’s reluctance to continue providing financial aid after the end of the Second World War. Concerned about the Soviet Union’s growing influence in Eastern Europe, Truman instructed the State Department to prepare a speech for Congress which planned ‘to cover more than just Greece and Turkey’.\footnote{Ambrose & Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 81} Truman’s strategy was ‘to explain aid to Greece not in terms of supporting monarchy but rather as part of a worldwide program for freedom’.\footnote{Ibid, p. 81} Kennan was not included in the writing of Truman’s speech and, after reading a draft version, made it clear that he disagreed with the militaristic focus of the proposal, arguing that the United States’ support should be solely economic. Moreover, he was ‘anxious about overstating the case and making commitments that the U.S. could not realistically honor’.\footnote{Isaacson & Thomas, *The Wise Men*, p. 394} On March 12th, 1947 President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and outlined his belief that ‘it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure’.\footnote{Ambrose & Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 82} In the words of Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Truman had ‘defined
American policy for the next generation and beyond… whenever and wherever an anti-Communist government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, foreign invasion, or even diplomatic pressure (as with Turkey), the United States would supply political, economic, and, most of all, military aid’. Along with the help of Senator Arthur Vandenberg and a small collection of others, Truman was able to convince Congress to provide Turkey and Greece with $400 million in financial aid.

Although the Truman Doctrine’s implementation of “Containment” deviated from that of Kennan’s, Stephen Graubard claims ‘in many traditional accounts of how Truman came to formulate the policies that initiated the Cold War, Kennan’s Long Telegram figured prominently’. With that point in mind, it is clear that George Kennan had a tremendous impact on the establishment of the Truman Doctrine. His revolutionary “Containment” theory changed the political discourse in Washington D.C. and united governmental departments that were previously at odds with each other. The importance of his role in providing a coherent direction for U.S. foreign policy cannot be overstated. Perhaps most importantly, Kennan gave Washington elites an intimate yet concise lesson on the inner-workings of the Soviet Union leadership and society in general. Even though the “Long Telegram” laid the foundation for the Truman Doctrine, it is somewhat difficult to judge exactly how influential it was. For example, if Kennan had never articulated his “Containment” theory, would Truman have reacted differently to the crises in Turkey and Greece? The most likely answer is no, but it almost certainly would not have included a “worldwide program for freedom”. This is telling in itself; without Kennan’s “Containment” theory, Truman would have been unable to modify it into his own doctrine.

Kennan’s impact on the foreign policy of the Truman administration was not restricted to the Truman Doctrine. The Secretary of State George Marshall - who was appointed on January 21st 1947 - returned from a visit to Moscow in April ‘shaken by the realization of the seriousness and urgency of the plight of Western Europe’ as talks ‘with the Russians had compelled him to recognize, however reluctantly, that the idea of approaching the solution to Europe’s problems in collaboration with the Russians was a pipedream’. The next day Marshall organised a meeting

128 Ibid, p. 82
130 Kennan, Memoirs, p. 325
with Kennan and told him to immediately assemble a Policy Planning Staff, in spite of his placement at the National War College.\textsuperscript{131} This request indicated Kennan’s substantial progression through the ranks of the \textit{Bureaucracy}; he was now the Secretary of State’s most trusted aide at a time when the Secretary of State had a great deal of say in U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Over the course of the next ten days, Kennan and his assorted collection of staff discussed the complex problem of Europe and how the United States could act as a catalyst in its recovery. According to a member of the Policy Planning Staff, they would ‘all gather round the table and George would start talking… very often none of us would say a word, but we’d just be looking at him… and he, by watching us, seemed to know just what we were thinking’.\textsuperscript{132} Following ten days of deliberations, Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff concluded that the United States should ‘offer massive economic aid to its struggling allies on the Continent… but its avowed purpose… must be to restore health to Europe’s economy and society, not to “combat Communism”’.\textsuperscript{133} This policy, dubbed the Marshall Plan after the Secretary of State, appealed to the Truman administration because a rejuvenated Europe would be far more effective at resisting Soviet subjugation, as well as being a vital source of trade.\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, the Marshall Plan was an economically focused policy which the United States leadership could use to implement Kennan’s “Containment” theory, thus avoiding the risk of military warfare with the Soviet Union. On March 31\textsuperscript{1}, 1948, the House of Representatives approved a bill to initially provide $4 billion for the revitalisation of Europe. The total figure given by the United States over the next four years was closer to $13 billion. When analysing Kennan’s role in the process, John Lukacs claims that he was ‘an author – or, perhaps, even \textit{the} author – of the Marshall Plan’.\textsuperscript{135} Wilson D. Miscamble, on the other hand, argues that Kennan ‘did not start from scratch but built upon earlier efforts to address the issue… it evolved in the post-World War I years, as it developed during the New Deal, and as it was amended during World War II’.\textsuperscript{136} Irrespective of this debate about whether the Marshall Plan was an original concept or a variation of similar initiatives, Kennan indisputably played a pivotal role in the planning and execution of the Marshall Plan. This is confirmed by

\textsuperscript{131} Lukacs, \textit{George Kennan}, p. 83
\textsuperscript{132} Isaacson & Thomas, \textit{The Wise Men}, p. 405
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, p. 405
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, p. 405
\textsuperscript{135} Lukacs, \textit{George Kennan}, p. 83
\textsuperscript{136} Miscamble, \textit{George F. Kennan}, p. 44
Kennan’s attendance at the Conference of European Economic Cooperation in Paris in July 1947, where representatives of sixteen European nations met to discuss, among other things, how the financial aid would be divided. Miscamble himself admits that ‘Kennan’s journey to Paris marked a new stage in his role as Director of the Policy Planning Staff… not only would he be involved integrally in the day-to-day formulation of policy in Washington but he would be called on directly to participate in its implementation overseas’. The fact that Kennan was the only American official to physically participate in discussions about the Marshall Plan’s application demonstrates his importance to the success of the policy.

During his tenure as head of the Policy Planning Staff, Kennan’s influence over U.S. foreign policy was at its peak. Whilst the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine were being formulated by Kennan and other members of the U.S. government, he had ‘emerged as a widely recognized public figure and authority on the Soviet Union and U.S. policy towards it’. David Mayers goes on to explain that ‘his celebrity in these two fields owed much to the publication in July 1947 of his famous “X article” in *Foreign Affairs*’. The controversial “X article” was originally written for James Forrestal – the United States Secretary of the Navy who was so fond of Kennan’s work – as an updated literary analysis of the Soviet Union. The content of the “X article” was markedly similar to that of the “Long Telegram”; it stressed how the United States should ‘continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability… rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power’. In order to effectively counter this antagonism, Kennan suggested that the ‘main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant “Containment” of Russian expansive tendencies’. The article generated much excitement and speculation about both its content and the identity of its creator. Although it was published under the pseudonym “X”, Kennan was eventually revealed as the author of the article. This led to him being described as ‘the visionary behind the Administration foreign policy; the Times dubbed him...

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137 Ibid, p. 64  
138 Mayers, *George Kennan*, p. 105  
139 Ibid, p. 105  
141 Ibid.
“America’s global planner”.142 The fact that a middle-ranking government official residing within the *Bureaucracy* caused such headlines demonstrates his standing at the time.

Kennan’s growing celebrity status coincided with a sudden decrease in influence. The primary cause behind his reduced standing in the Truman government was George Marshall’s resignation as Secretary of State in January 1949. Truman hired Dean Acheson to succeed the outgoing Marshall, whose relationship with Kennan was vastly different to that between Marshall and Kennan. Within only a matter of months, Acheson had grown ‘impatient with his mercurial seer, the abstract theoretician who seemed to feel that anything practical and workable was, by definition, flawed’.143 By the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25th, 1950, Kennan had been replaced as Director of Policy Planning by the more militarily focused Paul Nitze. Kennan acknowledged his waning influence in a memo to Dean Acheson on August 24th, 1950, in which he stated that his recommendations for the Korean conflict were ‘like so many of my thoughts… too remote from general thinking in the government to be of much practical use to you’.144 Apart from two brief stints as ambassador to the USSR and Yugoslavia, Kennan’s days of orchestrating U.S. foreign policy were over as he exited the *Bureaucracy*. As a realist academic critical of U.S. foreign policy, he continued to publish throughout the Cold War until his death in 2005.

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142 Ibid, p. 422
143 Ibid, p. 474
Henry Kissinger

Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born on May 27th, 1923 to a Jewish family living in Bavaria, Germany. After the Nazi Party and Adolf Hitler rose to power in 1933, Jews became increasingly marginalised and persecuted within German society. In order to escape the oppression and violence of Nazi Germany, the adolescent Heinz and most of his immediate family fled the country in 1938. Walter Isaacson states in his book *Kissinger: A Biography* that Kissinger’s childhood experiences in Nazi Germany had a profound impact on his personality, particularly the manifestation of ‘a deep distrust of other people… he harbored an instinctive distrust of colleagues and outsiders alike’. As a result, the author claims that these events ‘could have instilled in Kissinger either of two approaches to foreign policy: an idealistic, moralistic approach dedicated to protecting human rights; or a realist, realpolitik approach that sought to preserve order through balances of power and a willingness to use force as a tool of diplomacy… Kissinger would follow the latter route’. According to Isaacson, living under Nazi rule had a notable impact on his choice to become a political realist as an adult.

The Kissingers set sail for the United States on August 20th, 1938. Stopping off briefly in England to spend time with relatives, the family continued their journey and arrived in New York in September that year. Having settled in the Washington Heights district of Manhattan, Heinz – who now went by the name of Henry – was enrolled at George Washington High School and worked part-time in a shaving brush factory. A model student back in his native Germany, Henry was initially categorised as having a “foreign language handicap”. Apart from a 70 (out of 100) in his first semester of English, Kissinger proceeded to get ‘a 90 or better in every course he took – French, American history, European history, economics, algebra, and bookkeeping’.

On completing his first year at high school, Kissinger began to work full-time at the brush factory by day and attend his classes by night. This trend continued as he graduated from George Washington High School and enrolled at the City College of New York. With the intention of becoming an accountant like his father, Kissinger ‘was able to breeze through his classes at City College… he got A’s in every course he took, except for one B in history’. Then in 1942, on the eve of his

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146 Ibid, p. 31
147 Ibid, p. 35
148 Ibid, p. 38
nineteenth birthday, Kissinger received a draft notice informing him that he was being called up to the United States Armed Forces.

In February 1943 Kissinger left New York and headed for Camp Croft in Spartanburg, South Carolina, to receive army training. Whilst he was stationed there Kissinger officially became a naturalised American citizen. Within a matter of months he had been transferred to Lafayette College in Pennsylvania to study engineering; the course was shortly cancelled and Kissinger reassigned to the 84th Infantry Division. It was in the 84th Infantry Division that he was ‘recognized for his brainpower… he served in Division Counterintelligence and, as the war ended, was part of the denazification unit’.\(^{149}\) The individual primarily responsible for the direction of Kissinger’s military career was Fritz Kraemer. A well-educated German immigrant from Wiesbaden, Kraemer and Kissinger immediately struck up a friendship. Over the next three years ‘he would pluck Kissinger out of the infantry, secure him an assignment as a translator for General Bolling, get him chosen to administer the occupation of captured towns, ease his way into the Counter-Intelligence Corps, have him hired as a teacher at a military intelligence school in Germany, and then convince him to go to Harvard’.\(^{150}\)

When questioned about the impact he had on Kissinger’s career path, Kraemer simply responded that ‘my role was not discovering Kissinger! My role was getting Kissinger to discover himself’.\(^{151}\) It appears as though Kraemer provided the impetus that Kissinger, the shy and unassuming Jewish boy from Bavaria, needed to fulfil his potential. Furthermore, he ‘saw in Kissinger – and helped nurture in Kissinger – a reflection of his own conservatism’, with Kraemer disclosing how ‘Henry’s knowledge of history, and his respect for it, led to his reverence for order… the lay of his soul was conservative… he had an understanding that it was the state’s duty to preserve order’.\(^{152}\) This extract reveals that Kissinger had a predisposition towards conservatism and political realism long before his education at Harvard University and subsequent roles in the foreign policy decision-making system.

It was 1947 when Kissinger returned to the United States from Europe and enrolled at Harvard University. After three years studying politics and history at Harvard, Kissinger graduated summa cum laude in 1950 with a Bachelor’s degree in political science. At the advice of mentor William

\(^{149}\) Kuklick, Blind Oracles, p. 182
\(^{150}\) Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 45
\(^{151}\) Ibid, p. 45
\(^{152}\) Ibid, p. 45
Y. Elliot he continued at Harvard as a graduate student, obtaining a master’s degree in 1951 and a Ph.D. in 1954. Kissinger’s Ph.D. dissertation, titled *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Restoration of Peace: 1812-1822*, was a continuation of his lifelong ambition to find reason in the chaos of history. Whilst Kissinger impressed his peers in an academic sense, many at Harvard ‘regarded him as… pretentiously solemn, obsequious to professors, (and) awkward and calculating with his contemporaries’. Early on in his fledging academic career Kissinger’s attention shifted from history to more pressing developments in modern day politics, particularly the United States’ foreign and nuclear strategy. One afternoon Arthur Schlesinger Jr. asked Kissinger to review a paper he had written on the current U.S. doctrine of “massive retaliation”. “Massive retaliation” was ‘the official U.S. strategy of threatening a no-holds-barred nuclear response to any Soviet attack, conventional or nuclear’. Professor Schlesinger Jr. was so impressed by his critique – Kissinger highlighted how the doctrine of “massive retaliation” was outdated now that the Soviet Union had built its own bomb – he sent it to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, who in turn published it in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1955. It was through this connection with the Council on Foreign Relations that he came to meet Republican politician and future Governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller. Kissinger states in his memoir, *White House Years*, that Rockefeller ‘introduced me to high-level policymaking in 1955 when he was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Eisenhower’. The relationship that Kissinger forged with Rockefeller had a significant impact on his ability to successfully establish a career in foreign policy decision-making.

As Kissinger started to make progress in the political world, he found himself increasingly isolated at Harvard. Bruce Kuklick asserts that his time there ‘was tortured… as even one of his close friends wrote, Cambridge regarded Kissinger as “ambitious and power hungry”… another old Harvard acquaintance said he was “a wanderer with no moral center’. Many prominent “defense intellectuals” of the mid-1950s, such as Richard Neustadt and McGeorge Bundy, were among those who held a negative opinion of Kissinger. His lack of popularity within Harvard meant that opportunities for progression were few and far between. Bundy, on the other hand, was offered a tenured position in the Department of Government despite the fact that he neither possessed a

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153 Kuklick, *Blind Oracles*, p. 182
154 Isaacson, *Kissinger*, p. 82
156 Kuklick, *Blind Oracles*, p. 183
doctoral degree nor had a major publication to his name.\textsuperscript{157} In stark contrast to Bundy, Kissinger had his doctoral dissertation published along with a number of other papers. This is not to say that Kissinger’s time at Harvard was entirely fruitless; he was appointed study director in nuclear weapons and foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations from 1955 to 1956, as well as working for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund as director of their Special Studies Project between 1956 and 1958. Acquiring these positions at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund – which Hilsman’s \textit{Concentric Circles} model would refer to as “scientific advisory panels” – meant Kissinger was able to enter the lower levels of the \textit{Bureaucracy} for the first time in his career. It was only towards the end of the 1961-62 school year that Kissinger was awarded a permanent position in Harvard’s Department of Government.\textsuperscript{158} Although he was having greater success academically, Kissinger found himself generally overlooked in the world of high-level political decision-making.

In February 1961, Kissinger and a number of his colleagues at Harvard, later known as the “whiz kids”, were invited to advise President John F. Kennedy on foreign policy. The fact that Kissinger was selected for this role is significant because it demonstrates how he had entered the \textit{Executive Branch} as a presidential \textit{Advisor} (see page 10, figure 1), and thus advanced further through Hilsman’s \textit{Concentric Circles} model. As a member of the White House Staff Kissinger’s opinion was occasionally sought after, most notably during the Berlin crisis of 1961. The flow of refugees from East Germany to West Germany via Berlin was extremely damaging to the Soviet Union, especially as they ‘could not afford to continue to lose their best human resources to the West nor give the West such an ideal propaganda advantage’.\textsuperscript{159} The situation in East Germany, combined with an escalating arms race that Washington publicly claimed to be winning, led Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to threaten the United States with the prospect of Russian forces physically preventing them from accessing West Berlin. At the behest of President Kennedy, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson argued that if this were to happen, the United States should offer a full scale military response. To ensure the president was provided with a balanced judgment, Kissinger – along with Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Carl Kaysen – countered Acheson’s evaluation with their earlier assessment about how current U.S. policy ‘did not have any alternatives between fighting

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157} Ibid, p. 183
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ibid, p. 184
\item \textsuperscript{159} Ambrose & Brinkley, \textit{Rise to Globalism}, p. 179
\end{itemize}
a conventional war and an all-out nuclear war’.\textsuperscript{160} To cement their argument further, the three advisors wrote a paper advocating an approach which later came to be known as “flexible response”. Put simply, “flexible response” was the capability to analyse events objectively and react accordingly. The idea behind “flexible response” was typical of Kissinger’s realist thinking; Isaacson writes that his realist attitude towards foreign policy was based on a capacity to ‘address each problem by asking what the desired outcome was’.\textsuperscript{161} President Kennedy decided to adopt this approach and applied it on numerous occasions throughout his presidency, particularly during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Kissinger may have proved his worth on this occasion, yet he still parted company with the Kennedy administration in mid-1962 and remained a peripheral figure throughout the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson.

Following the conclusion of the 1968 presidential election – which ended in victory for Republican candidate Richard Nixon – Kissinger was presented with an opportunity to re-enter the world of high-level foreign policy decision-making. He acted as an advisor to and supporter of Nelson Rockefeller in his campaign for the Republican nomination in 1968, as he had done before in 1960 and 1964. During the post-election aftermath Kissinger received a call from Nixon’s appointments secretary, Dwight Chapin, who extended an invitation to meet the President-elect. Despite being initially hesitant due to his close relationship with Nelson Rockefeller, Kissinger attended the meeting at the Pierre Hotel in New York on November 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1968. Writing in his memoir a number of years afterwards, Kissinger described how he ‘did not anticipate a conversation that would change my life… I thought it likely that the President-elect wanted my views on the policy problems before him’.\textsuperscript{162} The meeting turned out to be an extended discussion in which both parties expressed their views on the recent failings of U.S. foreign policy. It was not until they met again two days later that Nixon offered Kissinger the position of National Security Advisor. Kissinger immediately sought the advice of those he trusted most; family members, colleagues at Harvard, and even Nelson Rockefeller. All of these individuals, Nelson Rockefeller included, unanimously urged him to accept the President-elect’s proposal. On November 29\textsuperscript{th}, he called Nixon’s advisor Bruce Harlow ‘and asked him to convey to the president-elect that I would be honored to accept’.\textsuperscript{163} By accepting his offer to become National Security Advisor, Kissinger had once again

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{160} Isaacson, \textit{Kissinger}, p. 112
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, p. 112
\textsuperscript{162} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p. 10
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid, p. 16}
entered the realm of the *Executive Branch* – albeit as a much more pivotal figure than during his stint in the Kennedy administration – and it was from here that he would have the greatest impact on U.S. foreign policy.

After an official announcement of Kissinger’s appointment was made on December 2nd, both he and the President-elect set about initiating significant changes to the U.S. government’s foreign policy decision-making apparatus. During these meetings with Kissinger, Nixon disclosed how he mistrusted the State Department and thought the CIA was generally incompetent.\(^\text{164}\) His negative opinion of these government departments reflected Nixon’s desire to concentrate power within the upper echelons of the *Executive Branch*. As the President-elect would be unable to personally analyse the masses of reports compiled by the State Department and CIA on a daily basis, Kissinger’s position as National Security Advisor ‘was therefore crucial to him and to his plan to run foreign policy from the White House’.\(^\text{165}\) Kissinger agreed with Nixon, citing that the current system left ‘little opportunity for conceptual approaches, consecutive action, or a sense of nuance’, leading him to conclude that ‘a more systematic structure seemed… necessary’.\(^\text{166}\) For this new structure to be successful, Kissinger reasoned that it needed to be formulated so he could both oversee foreign policy and provide the President-elect with an array of options before deciding on a particular policy.\(^\text{167}\)

Apart from the duties normally afforded to him as National Security Advisor and head of the National Security Council, Wilfrid Kohl explains how Kissinger ‘took on other roles which served to enlarge further his and the President’s control over foreign and national security policy, reducing still more the role of bureaucracy’.\(^\text{168}\) Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who had first-hand experience working in foreign policy decision-making with Kissinger as President Kennedy’s personal assistant, writes in his book *The Imperial Presidency* that Kissinger’s additional duties were accentuated by Nixon’s decision to ‘abolish the cabinet in a traditional sense, superseding it by a small super-cabinet to which the lesser cabinet members would report’.\(^\text{169}\) Kissinger was the head

\(^{164}\) Ibid, p. 14  
\(^{165}\) Ibid, p. 15  
\(^{166}\) Ibid, p. 11  
of this super-cabinet; he would personally receive reports from the traditional cabinet members, such as the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, identify their key elements, and discuss them with the President in private.  

Harvey Starr supports this by stating that ‘he became both the conduit and screen for the great bulk of information about foreign policy and foreign policy alternatives that moved from the bureaucracy upward to the president’.  

By essentially controlling what information the President received, Kissinger possessed the ability to manipulate the foreign policy decision-making process. This is not to say that he did so, it is merely an indication of how much power he wielded within the Executive Branch. Not only was Kissinger the individual who controlled the stream of information to the president, he also ‘came to chair the five major interagency committees that supervised foreign policy: the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG)… the Defense Programs Review Committee, the Vietnam Special Studies Group, the Forty Committee… and the Verification Panel dealing with SALT negotiations’.  

With this greater level of responsibility added to the role of National Security Advisor – as well as the many major committees that he chaired – Kissinger had acquired a level of influence over U.S. foreign policy that was virtually unrivalled.

Now that his powers as National Security Advisor had been expanded, Kissinger was able to have a wide-ranging effect across the foreign policy of the Nixon government. This included issues that might normally reside outside of the realm of the National Security Council, such as ‘the opening to China, U.S.-Soviet relations, and the Vietnam peace negotiations’.  

Indeed, Nixon’s desire to increase presidential authority meant that Kissinger was at the forefront of developing the most important foreign policy decisions of the Nixon administration. Arguably the most pressing aspect of U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of 1969 was the country’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Kissinger placed immense importance on the state of American-Soviet relations, to the point where his ‘diplomacy in regional crises – from Vietnam and the Middle East to Southern Africa and Europe – was constantly driven by concerns about Soviet intentions’.  

The underlying premise behind Kissinger’s fixation on the Soviet Union was linkage. The idea of linkage assumed

170 Kohl, ‘The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy’, p. 8
172 Ibid, pp. 467-468
that in the Vietnam War, for example, supposedly lesser countries such as North Vietnam and South Vietnam were ‘pawns to be moved around the board by great powers’, with Kissinger specifically ‘viewing the war as a highly complex game in which the moves were made from Washington, Moscow, and Peking (Beijing).\textsuperscript{175} Nixon shared this realist power-centric worldview with Kissinger, and as such both the President and his National Security Advisor decided to adopt a foreign policy approach that focused on easing tensions between these great powers.

Détente, as this policy came to be called, was first advocated by President Kennedy following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. With both sides coming close to mutual annihilation, Kennedy and Khrushchev took the first steps towards détente by establishing the 1963 Test Ban Treaty and installing a direct telephone link between the Kremlin and the White House. Lyndon B. Johnson continued this precedent by initiating the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), yet his government ‘had given them… a low priority’.\textsuperscript{176} Therefore, when Nixon and Kissinger decided to restart the discussions, they were essentially starting from scratch. The first round of negotiations took place in Helsinki on November 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1969 and lasted over a month. It was only after numerous rounds of negotiations that an agreement was signed on May 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1972. Both sides promised to cease ‘ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) deployment but not MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle)’, which Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley argue ‘was about as meaningful as freezing the cavalry of the European nations in 1938 but not the tanks’.\textsuperscript{177} Unbeknownst to those involved in the negotiations, Kissinger and the Soviet Union’s Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, had established a now infamous “back channel” line of communication between Moscow and Washington months before the first round of discussions. As officials from the Soviet Union and the United States met in Finland, Kissinger and Dobrynin secretly deliberated about the conditions necessary for any agreement. During a meeting on January 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1971, for instance, Kissinger expressed to Dobrynin that ‘we were prepared to make an ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) agreement only, provided it was coupled with an undertaking to continue working on offensive limitations and… that there would be a freeze on

\textsuperscript{175}Ambrose & Brinkley, \textit{Rise to Globalism}, p. 229
\textsuperscript{176}Ibid, p. 229
\textsuperscript{177}Ibid, p. 231
new starts of offensive land-based missiles’. 178 This “back channel” was utilised regularly and proved to be an essential tool for the Nixon administration as it meant that sensitive policy issues could be discussed behind closed doors. Although he played a minor part in the official negotiations, Kissinger evidently helped formulate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.

The policy that most symbolised Nixon and Kissinger’s new-look foreign policy approach was perhaps the decision to also begin easing tensions with China. Ever since the Communist Party of China (CPC) emerged victorious from the Chinese Civil War – and subsequently established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 – successive U.S. governments had refused to recognise its legitimacy. With Sino-Soviet relations drastically deteriorating towards the end of the 1960s, Nixon and Kissinger saw an opportunity to capitalise on the situation. It was the Chinese government, however, who initially extended an olive branch; following the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, the PRC leadership planned to improve ties with the United States in order to further isolate the Soviet Union. On April 27th, 1971, the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai sent a message to Kissinger detailing how his government was willing ‘to receive publicly in Beijing a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for a direct meeting and discussions’. 179

Instead of organising a public visit to China, Nixon decided that Kissinger would secretly meet with Zhou Enlai in Beijing on July 9th, 1971. The content of their discussion ranged from U.S. policy in Indochina, Taiwan, and Sino-Soviet relations. 180 It’s unclear why Kissinger was chosen for this sensitive diplomatic mission. According to Jussi M. Hanhimäki, these events confirmed ‘that China policy was his personal reserve’, to the point where ‘in subsequent years he would control U.S. China policy even more than he did the Nixon administration’s Soviet policy through the back channel’. 181 Nixon publicly announced Kissinger’s secret meeting had taken place on July 15th, adding that he had accepted an invitation to visit China personally in February 1972. The meeting in July was followed by another on October 20th, its purpose being to make ‘preparations

180 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 749
181 Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, p. 118
related to the political discussions and the technical arrangements of President Nixon’s visit’. By re-opening ties with China, the Nixon administration hoped to convince ‘Moscow to accept an agreement on arms control’, as well as ‘the obvious corollary of Vietnam and the (unfounded) belief that Moscow and Beijing could pressure their North Vietnamese ally’. Once again, this goes to show that political realism and the idea of linkage were the fundamental driving forces behind Kissinger’s foreign policy worldview. More importantly for this investigation, it reveals how important Kissinger was in re-establishing a political and diplomatic relationship between China and the United States.

Another foreign policy issue on which Kissinger had a notable impact was the Chilean election of 1970. The election on September 4th, 1970 – to the dismay of Nixon and Kissinger – culminated with a narrow Allende victory. The presidency had not been secured, however, as Allende required a vote of confirmation from the Chilean Congress. During the time it took Congress to make a decision, Nixon and Kissinger tried their utmost to eliminate the Marxist leader. When it reached Nixon that Allende had won, he responded immediately by forming the Forty Committee. The Forty Committee was an interagency group chaired by Kissinger with the sole aim of undermining Salvador Allende’s election. As head of the Forty Committee, it was Kissinger who ordered ‘the CIA to use propaganda, political and economic pressure to persuade the Chilean congress to approve Allende’s opponent’. This tactic, known as Track One, was unsuccessful as Chilean Congress members refused to submit to external influences. Despite the failings of Track One, a more duplicitous approach was undertaken named Track Two or Project FUBELT. This policy suffered the same fate as Track One when ‘CIA meddling contributed to a bungled kidnapping attempt in which… Rene Schneider (Commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army), was assassinated’. The uproar within Chile caused by Schneider’s death consolidated support for Allende and Congress promptly declared him as president on October 24th, 1970.

182 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 777
185 Grace Livingstone, America’s Backyard: The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror (London: Zed Books, 2009) p. 53
Although Track One and Track Two failed to prevent Allende from becoming president, Nixon and Kissinger responded by formulating the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 93 in a National Security Council meeting on November 6th, 1970. This directive confirmed that while the U.S. government’s ‘public posture towards the Allende government should be correct and cool… the United States will seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S…. interests’. These “pressures” included bringing ‘maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions to limit credit or other financing assistance to Chile’, whilst also prohibiting ‘new bilateral economic aid commitments’. By applying economic and political pressure on Chile through financial institutions such as the IMF, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to render Allende’s position untenable. These policies, combined with domestic pressures that arose from inside Chile, caused mass disruption throughout the country over the next three years. Indeed, Kristian Gustafson describes how ‘rudderless economic policy, a drop in copper prices and agricultural production, massive inflation, and vigorous opposition caused Chile’s economic and social fabrics to disintegrate’. The combination of these factors resulted in a CIA-led coup which overthrew Allende on September 11th, 1973.

As National Security Advisor, Kissinger played an essential part in the decision-making behind and implementation of NSDM 93. His role is best illustrated by the secret memorandum he sent to Nixon a day before the National Security Council meeting on November 6th, 1970. The opening paragraph addresses how he believed that Nixon’s ‘decision as to what to do about it may be the most historic and difficult foreign affairs decision you will have to make this year’. As well as having an impact on the politics of the Western Hemisphere, Kissinger wrote that Nixon’s decision influenced ‘our relations with the USSR… they will even affect our own conception of what our role in the world is'. Kissinger’s rhetoric indicates again how important the idea of linkage was

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188 Ibid, p. 2
191 Ibid, p. 1
to his foreign policy decision-making. Robert Dallek states that ‘exaggerated fears of Allende’s capacity to undermine U.S. security in the hemisphere speaks poorly of the Nixon-Kissinger judgment’.\textsuperscript{192} Kissinger rejects this analysis in his memoirs, maintaining that ‘we were right in our assessment of the perils to our interests and to the Western Hemisphere of Allende’s accession to the presidency’.\textsuperscript{193} Even though it is dangerous to speculate about the impact Kissinger had on Nixon’s judgment, this memorandum shows he considered Allende a serious existential threat to the United States and used his substantial clout to ensure that he was removed from the political arena.

The primary foreign policy issue during the tenure of President Nixon was undoubtedly the Vietnam War. By the time Nixon was officially declared president on January 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1969, the United States had ‘536,000 troops in Vietnam… Americans were being killed at a rate of about two hundred per week… the cost of the war to U.S. taxpayers was running about $30 billion a year… nor was the proverbial light visible at the end of the tunnel’.\textsuperscript{194} With domestic support for the conflict diminishing, Nixon promised during the presidential election campaign of 1968 to withdraw U.S. troops and still achieve “peace with honor”. Kissinger clarified the incoming government’s policy plans for Vietnam more extensively in an article published by \textit{Foreign Affairs} in January 1969. The recently appointed National Security Advisor criticised the approach of previous governments, citing that ‘we sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion… in the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerilla war: the guerilla wins if he does not lose… the conventional army loses if it does not win’.\textsuperscript{195} In order for the people of Vietnam ‘to work out their own destiny in their own way’, he concluded, the Nixon administration would work towards a ‘withdrawal of U.S. forces, the provision of the Geneva agreements calling for neutrality for North and South Viet Nam, and reunification on the basis of popular wishes’.\textsuperscript{196}

However, what Kissinger did not disclose in the article was that soldiers from the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) would replace the departing U.S. forces. Nixon, who referred to

\textsuperscript{193} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p. 677
\textsuperscript{194} Isaacson, \textit{Kissinger}, p. 159
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid
this policy as Vietnamization, waited until he was six months into office to announce ‘that his secret plan to end the war was in fact a plan to keep it going, but with lower American casualties’.

Immediate withdrawal from the region was not deemed a viable option, for Kissinger was wary of damaging the United States’ credibility abroad. When in February 1969 French President Charles De Gaulle asked Kissinger “‘Why don’t you get out of Vietnam?’”, he explained that ‘a sudden withdrawal might give us a credibility problem’. De Gaulle queried exactly where a credibility problem would be created, to which the National Security Advisor replied the Middle East. In addition to losing credibility, Isaacson writes how Kissinger ‘frequently said in private talks and seminars that the appropriate goal of U.S. policy was a “decent interval” of two or three years between the withdrawal of U.S. troops and a communist takeover in Vietnam’. It is apparent that the goal of Vietnamization was not to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict; on the contrary, the ultimate aim appears to have been retreat from the conflict, reduce the number of American casualties in the meantime, and attempt to prevent the United States’ international standing from being harmed when South Vietnam inevitably collapsed.

As mentioned above, a vitally important aspect of Vietnamization was ensuring that South Vietnam did not capitulate before the United States had fully withdrawn. The way in which Nixon and Kissinger planned to accomplish this was by giving ‘air and naval support to ARVN and rearming ARVN with the best military hardware America had to offer’. Within two months of entering the White House, Nixon had ordered the U.S. Air Force to begin a largescale bombing campaign against the neighboring country of Cambodia. Given the codename Operation Menu, the main objective ‘was to cause severe damage to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the enemy’s main infiltration route that ran south from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia to South Vietnam’. Beginning in March 1969, the campaign lasted fourteen months and was successful in limiting North Vietnam’s capacity to launch a military operation similar to the Tet Offensive. Despite there being a scarcity of primary documents regarding Kissinger’s involvement in the planning of Operation Menu, Christopher Hitchens writes in The Trial of Henry Kissinger that for

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197 Ambrose & Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, p. 227
198 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 110
199 Ibid, p. 110
200 Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 161
201 Ambrose & Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, p. 227
202 Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, p. 44
203 Ibid, p. 44
‘the first six months of 1969… Henry Kissinger had assumed much authority over the conduct of the war’.\(^{204}\) A handful of documents from the “Kissinger Telcons” suggest that the National Security Advisor’s unique position of influence allowed him to continue dictating events in Cambodia. One of these aforementioned telephone conversations describes how on December 9\(^{th}\), 1970, Nixon raged that the Air Force had ‘to go in there and really go in… I want everything that can fly to go in there and crack the hell out of them… there is no limitation of mileage and there is no limitation on budget’.\(^{205}\) Once the conversation ended Kissinger immediately called his Deputy National Security Advisor, Alexander Haig, and told him that ‘our friend’ had ordered a massive campaign; Kissinger and Haig were aware that what the President demanded was logistically impossible and subsequently converted his orders into a largescale bombing mission in a specific part of eastern Cambodia.\(^{206}\) These documents reveal that Kissinger not only controlled what information reached Nixon, but also how he assessed the President’s commands and interpreted them as he saw fit.

Even though operations were being carried out in Cambodia and Vietnam, the Paris Peace Accords had been ongoing since 1968. Principally involving the United States, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam, negotiations reached impasse after impasse; more often than not because Nixon and Kissinger rejected North Vietnam’s demand that the South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, be removed from power. As the chosen American representative, Kissinger played a vital part in the discussions along with Le Tho Duc, the North Vietnamese representative. Their meetings were ‘dragged out and terribly complex… incredibly small points were haggled over while each side blamed the other for insincerity’.\(^{207}\) On October 8\(^{th}\), 1972 a breakthrough came as Le Duc Tho and the North Vietnamese leadership agreed that Thieu’s government could remain in South Vietnam. The elated National Security Advisor shortly declared that “peace is at hand” and an agreement was signed by all parties on January 23\(^{rd}\), 1973, ending the United States’

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\(^{207}\) Ambrose & Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 246
military involvement in the region. His impact on the Paris Peace Accords is best illustrated by the fact that he and Le Duc Tho were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Henry Kissinger influenced many other foreign policy events throughout his time in Nixon’s government that were omitted from this analysis, such as in the Middle East, Cyprus, and East Timor among many others. He was made Secretary of State on September 22nd, 1973 and continued in both positions after Nixon resigned in August 1974. With President Ford’s defeat to Jimmy Carter in the 1977 presidential election, Kissinger exited the Executive Branch and high-level politics. As a public figure, he continues to publish academically and is regularly consulted by presidents and government officials alike until this present day.
Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Dundes Wolfowitz was born into a Jewish immigrant family residing in Brooklyn, New York on December 22nd, 1943. His father Jacob Wolfowitz – a prominent university lecturer and mathematical statistician – immigrated to the United States from Poland in 1920 and settled in New York. Similar in many ways to the Kissingers, 10 year-old Jacob and his parents fled the country after the end of the First World War to escape the region’s growing anti-Semitism. The rest of his extended family remained in Poland and subsequently lost their lives after the Nazis rose to power in Germany in the 1930s. Richard H. Immerman states that the suffering of his relatives had an enormous impact on Wolfowitz from a young age; he would read masses of books about the Holocaust and Hiroshima, which he referred to as the “polar horrors”. After visiting Israel as a fourteen year-old, Wolfowitz returned committed to the Zionist cause and firmly convinced ‘that there was great evil in the world… History taught that humankind must confront this evil or suffer horrific consequences’. This realisation is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, the mindset explained above is similar to Khong’s first tenet of neoconservative foreign policy thought, suggesting that Wolfowitz exhibited neoconservative tendencies as a teenager. Secondly, it indicates that the formative years of Wolfowitz’s life had a substantial impact on his political convictions.

Wolfowitz studied at Ithaca High School in New York and quickly established himself as a model student. Lewis D. Solomon writes that he ‘was a spelling-bee champion… an Eagle Scout…excelled on the Ithaca High School debate team, and was the features editor for the school newspaper’. In his senior year Wolfowitz attended a freshman calculus class at Cornell University every morning before heading to his regular classes. His father Jacob was lecturing at Cornell at the time and after being offered a full scholarship, Wolfowitz decided to enroll at the University in 1961. Graduating with a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and chemistry in 1965, many assumed that he would follow in his father’s footsteps. However, he rejected the chance to study for a graduate degree in biochemistry at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

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209 Ibid, p. 199
and instead chose to read political science at the University of Chicago. The incentive behind this choice, Wolfowitz later revealed in a New York Times article, was the belief that he ‘could prevent nuclear war’. His judgement in this situation marked the first step on a path that would lead to a career in high-level foreign policy decision-making.

During his time at the University of Chicago Wolfowitz studied under the tutelage of renowned Cold War “defense intellectuals” Leo Strauss and Albert Wohlstetter. He never grew close to Strauss, despite the fact that he enrolled in two of Strauss’s classes. Albert Wohlstetter, on the other hand, became Wolfowitz’s mentor; Wolfowitz’s gravitated to Wohlstetter due to his expertise in nuclear strategy. As well as lecturing at the University of Chicago, the New York native was also a policy analyst for the RAND Corporation. The majority of his academic publications ‘challenged the principles that underlay mutually assured destruction by preaching that America must cement its strategic superiority through technological innovation’. His appreciation of mathematics and fixation on the military capabilities of the Soviet Union correlated with Wolfowitz’s own political outlook. Moreover, the nature of their relationship – in other words Wolfowitz’s admiration for his mentor – meant that Wohlstetter played a central role in helping to develop his growing conservatism.

Then, in the late 1960s, Wohlstetter returned from a trip to Israel gravely concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. He was particularly perturbed by ‘the possibility that nuclear-powered desalination stations near Israel’s borders with Egypt and Jordan could produce plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons’. Wohlstetter brought back volumes of documentation on the subject, which in turn formed the basis of Wolfowitz’s Ph.D. dissertation. With this material in hand, Wolfowitz set about writing a dissertation that argued against the construction of nuclear-powered desalting stations in Israel. According to Wolfowitz, the supposed benefits of building nuclear-powered desalting stations ‘were vastly overestimated and the risks of nuclear proliferation were too great’. He supported this position by highlighting

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212 Solomon, *Paul D. Wolfowitz*, p. 13
213 Immerman, *Empire for Liberty*, p. 201
214 Ibid, p. 200
216 Ibid, p. 14
‘the difficulties of conducting effective, international nuclear inspections and the risks of a secret diversion of nuclear material to weapons production’.\textsuperscript{217} Wolfowitz’s doctoral dissertation was well-received and he earned a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago in 1972. Although his choice of dissertation topic was undoubtedly influenced by Wohlstetter, Wolfowitz’s decision to write about the Middle East is important as it represents the moment when he first became aware of nuclear proliferation in the region.

Academic achievements aside, Wolfowitz also started to make headway in the political world while studying at the University of Chicago. It was in 1969 that Wohlstetter recruited the aspiring policy expert to conduct research for the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, a Washington based lobbying group in favour of ABM systems. This is the first time that Wolfowitz had entered the \textit{Concentric Circles} system in what Scott and Crothers would call the \textit{Foreign Policy Bureaucracy}, albeit as a very low-ranked member. Another student enlisted by Wohlstetter, Richard Perle, worked with Wolfowitz to produce a series of papers which aimed to garner political support for an increase in missile defense spending. Their efforts proved worthwhile as the Senate approved a larger budget for ABM systems.\textsuperscript{218} By convincing the Senate to increase missile defense spending, Wolfowitz had influenced the foreign policy decision-making process for the first time. The fact that he managed to do so as an intern at a scientific advisory panel is noteworthy. This internship was beneficial for many reasons; the two former government officials who established the Committee – legendary Cold War “defense intellectuals” Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze – taught Wolfowitz and Perle much about the realities of foreign policy decision-making in Washington.\textsuperscript{219}

As a result of his work with the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, Wolfowitz saw his stock rise in Washington. Throughout the 1970s, his burgeoning reputation resulted in a number of positions within the \textit{Foreign Policy Bureaucracy}. These included serving as an aide to Democratic Senator Henry M. Jackson, assisting the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in the SALT negotiations, and a role as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs in the Carter administration. Wolfowitz resigned from the Pentagon in 1980 and had a brief stint teaching at John Hopkins University as a visiting

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid, p. 14
\textsuperscript{218} Immerman, \textit{Empire for Liberty}, p. 201
professor. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 symbolised a turning point in Wolfowitz’s career and the neoconservative movement as a whole. Up until this point, neoconservatism had been a school of thought isolated within the intellectual world. Neoconservatism spawned partially in response to the Kennedy and Johnson administration’s foreign policy during the 1960s. The repercussions of their lackadaisical approach to foreign policy, in the view of Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol and other first-generation neoconservatives, was that it would herald renewed Soviet aggression. As political commentators, Podhoretz and Kristol regularly published articles in the monthly magazine *Commentary*. *Commentary*’s importance in the rise to prominence of neoconservatism is epitomised by Bacevich when he states that ‘without *Commentary*, it seems fair to say, neoconservatism would have been stillborn’.\(^{220}\) Now that Reagan was in office, neocons such as Podhoretz and Kristol believed that there was finally a president in office who would be willing to confront the threat of Communism head on. Richard H. Immerman explains how the platform provided by Reagan helped generate ‘an atmosphere in which strategically placed advisors and like-minded journalists and intellectuals could launch a conservative insurgency’.\(^{221}\)

In January 1981, President Reagan offered Wolfowitz the role of Director for Policy Planning at the State Department. This position saw Wolfowitz’s standing within the *Foreign Policy Bureaucracy* increase substantially. It was from this position of influence that he broke the official party line and not only criticised the regime of Saddam Hussein, but also identified ‘Iraq as a likely future threat to American interests… Wolfowitz distrusted the ruthless Saddam Hussein and thought him susceptible to Soviet influence’.\(^{222}\) Refusing to stop there, the Director for Policy Planning ‘formulated a radical theory that the Middle East represented fertile ground on which to plant American-style values… he concluded that this oil-rich, Muslim-majority region would embrace westernization’.\(^{223}\) Even though his warning was not heeded at the time, it reveals how he had recognised Iraq and the Middle East as a region vital to American interests from early on. Despite this outburst Wolfowitz was promoted to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs in 1982. He remained in this position until 1986 when he was made U.S.

\(^{221}\) Immerman, *Empire for Liberty*, p. 205
\(^{223}\) Ibid, p. 668
Ambassador to Indonesia. These years spent working for the Reagan administration not only saw Wolfowitz climb up the *Foreign Policy Bureaucracy* ladder, but it also had a direct role in shaping his and Richard Perle’s outlook on the international arena and the United States’ place within it. In fact many of the second-generation neocons who would go on to have a prominent role in the George W. Bush administration, and in turn influence U.S. foreign policy, held positions of relative importance in the Reagan government.

Despite their insistence that the safety of the United States was threatened by the sheer presence of the Soviet Union, prominent first-generation neocons such as Norman Podhoretz were left in a state of confusion when the Communist regime began to crumble towards the end of the 1980s. Indeed, they were understandably delighted at first by the collapse of their arch enemy. Once the initial excitement wore off, neoconservative intellectuals came to the collective realisation that without a rogue enemy state, their planned foreign policy for the United States had lost its *raison d’être*. Maria Ryan agrees with this assertion when she writes that before the end of the Cold War, neoconservative ‘strategy had been defensive: premised on the existence of a competing superpower, which they regarded as an existential threat’.²²⁴ As the Soviet Union was being divided into multiple separate nation states, this lack of direction continued, with Podhoretz admitting in *Commentary* that he was unable to decide ‘as to what… America’s purpose should be now that the threat of Communism… had been decisively eliminated’.²²⁵ This paradigm shift in the global geopolitical structure would mark a watershed moment in the history of neoconservatism.

The inauguration of George H.W. Bush as president in January 1989 coincided with the disillusionment experienced by first-generation neocons such as Norman Podhoretz and Irving Kristol. Their time in the limelight was coming to an end, and sooner rather than later a new breed of liberally minded intellectuals would take their place as the chief spokesmen for the neoconservative movement. Recognising the need to revamp the focus and orientation of neoconservative values, the rise of second-generation neoconservative intellectuals and academics began to take place during the post-Cold War early 1990s. These individuals, Charles Krauthammer and Francis Fukuyama chief among them, came to the conclusion that without

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²²⁵ Bacevich, *The New American Militarism*, p. 81
Communism as a direct challenger to U.S. hegemony ‘the world was no longer bipolar or even multipolar; it was “unipolar”’.\textsuperscript{226} The general acceptance of this premise within neoconservative circles had huge repercussions for the conception and formation of neoconservative foreign policy thought. In the eyes of these second-generation neocons ‘such apparently unprecedented freedom of action was something worth preserving; thus they argued that the United States’ new global strategy should not be defensive, as it had been during the Cold War, but offensive; to actively preserve America’s position as the single pole of world power’.\textsuperscript{227} This supposition was not only formed by neoconservative intellectuals and academics. On the contrary, Ryan reveals that neoconservative officials in the George H.W. Bush administration ‘used their positions… to develop new ideas, which, though never implemented, became integral to the new neoconservative foreign policy vision’.\textsuperscript{228} Wolfowitz had been appointed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in May 1989 and was one of these government officials who used their roles to scrutinise the foreign policy decision-making process.

When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President George H. W. Bush responded by deploying U.S. troops as part of an international coalition. Now that he had re-entered the \textit{Foreign Policy Bureaucracy} as a highly-ranked member of the State Department, Wolfowitz was instrumental in the planning of the Persian Gulf War by helping to coordinate and analyse the United States’ military strategy in Iraq. Despite his involvement in the planning process, there is no evidence to suggest that Wolfowitz convinced the President to enter the conflict.\textsuperscript{229} After dealing a decisive blow to the Iraqi military in February 1991, Hussein accepted defeat and announced that his army would withdraw from Kuwait. On February 27\textsuperscript{th} President Bush declared that ‘Iraq’s army is defeated and Kuwait is liberated’, officially ending the United States’ ground operations in the region.\textsuperscript{230} Wolfowitz’s reaction to this decision was one of severe frustration; he maintained that U.S. forces should continue on to Baghdad and physically remove Hussein from power.

This profound disappointment had a revolutionary impact on Wolfowitz. From this point on, he remained adamant that the United States had a moral duty to rid the world ‘of all those tyrants who

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{226} Ryan, \textit{Neoconservatism}, p. 2
  \item\textsuperscript{227} Ibid, p. 2
  \item\textsuperscript{228} Ibid, p. 12
  \item\textsuperscript{229} Immerman, \textit{Empire for Liberty}, p. 214
  \item\textsuperscript{230} Ambrose & Brinkley, \textit{Rise to Globalism}, p. 395
\end{itemize}
held in contempt the values and liberties that the United States stood for'.

Inspired by Wolfowitz, the Defense Department’s annual review of 1992 – otherwise known as the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) – addressed ideas that were dismissed by many in the George H. W. Bush government but would later act as the foundation of the George W. Bush administration’s foreign policy approach. The initial draft was based on the premise that ‘America was destined to win the Cold War and the hearts and minds of populations worldwide because of its exceptional character, values, and power, all of which served the cause of liberty’. Now that the United States was firmly established as the world’s most powerful nation, it was necessary to ‘take full advantage of its current preeminence to ensure that this status continued – indefinitely if not in perpetuity’. This notion is identical to Khong’s second tenet of neoconservative foreign policy thought, revealing that the 1992 DPG espoused explicitly neoconservative principles. Richard Immerman writes that ‘although Wolfowitz was the driving force, it was a collective effort’. With regards to the Middle East, the DPG simply stated that the United States’ overall objective should be ‘to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil’.

It was leaked to The New York Times by an unnamed government official and the contents were subsequently published in the newspaper on March 8th, 1992. The document was condemned and labelled imperialist by many within the media, the public, and the political world. As a result of this negative reaction, President Bush ordered for it to be rewritten and made consistent with his government’s foreign policy. Once Bill Clinton assumed office following the presidential election of 1992, Wolfowitz left his role in the Department of Defense and returned to John Hopkins University as a professor.

Once second-generation neocons had officially taken over from their Cold War era contemporaries, neoconservative attention shifted towards a region that Wolfowitz had deemed of vital interest to the United States; the Middle East. Even though Wolfowitz had earmarked the

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231 Immerman, Empire for Liberty, 216
232 Ibid, p. 217
233 Ibid, p. 217
234 Ibid, p. 217
Middle East in the late 1970s, it was not widely accepted as a region of vital interest among neoconservatives until after the Soviet Union had collapsed. As soon as the Middle East had been identified, a set of ‘revised strategic priorities emerged, centered geographically in the energy-rich Persian Gulf but linked inextricably to the assumed prerequisites for sustaining American freedom at home’.\(^\text{237}\) This premise would become the bedrock of second-generation neoconservative foreign policy, especially during the presidency of George W. Bush. In 1996, a crucial election year for the Clinton administration, several neoconservative advisory groups chose to release reports on the Middle East, with Iraq in particular taking center stage. The first academic advisory group to publish an extensive report on Iraq was the Presidential Study Group of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). Far from consisting solely of neoconservative officials and intellectuals, the WINEP study group contained a cross-section of individuals with varying political views and beliefs. Paul Wolfowitz was among those members of the WINEP study group who would be considered a staunch neoconservative. Despite mentioning other nations such as Iran, the main issue addressed in their report concerned the toppling of Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Maria Ryan posits that this was ‘the first time there was universal agreement that Washington’s “top-priority” in the Middle East should be to take steps that “hasten the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime”’.\(^\text{238}\) Introducing a policy of regime change in Iraq was part of a much wider strategy, one which the WINEP study group hoped would ‘transform the region and fashion a more pro-American Middle East’.\(^\text{239}\) Having assessed this report and the makeup of its members, it is clear that neoconservative foreign policy values were becoming more popular among a cross-section of policy makers and academics as early as 1996, irrespective of their political allegiances.

Perhaps the most well-known neoconservative advisory group from the 1990s is the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). The reason for this is that William Kristol and Robert Kagan, probably the two most notable second-generation neoconservative intellectuals operating in the United States at this time, established the PNAC in 1997. As their brainchild the PNAC became the flagship neoconservative academic advisory group. In its ‘Statement of Principles’, the PNAC claimed that pre-existing American hegemony had to be sustained, whilst also claiming that the United States ‘had a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia and the Middle

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\(^{237}\) Bacevich, *The New American Militarism*, pp. 176-177

\(^{238}\) Ryan, *Neoconservatism*, p. 84

\(^{239}\) Ibid, p. 84
Incidentally, a number individuals of who signed their name to the PNAC’s ‘Statement of Principles’ would also go on to have central roles within The White House section of the George W. Bush administration; this includes Bush’s vice-president Dick Cheney, future Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. It was not just individuals from the inner circle of Bush’s forthcoming government who signed the PNAC’s ‘Statement of Principles’, but also Kristol and Kagan themselves, academics such as Francis Fukuyama, and significantly George W. Bush’s brother and Governor of California Jeb Bush. For the sake of this investigation, it is vital to point out that Wolfowitz is the consistent member in both of these scientific advisory panels.

In June 1999, the Governor of Texas George W. Bush publicly announced his candidacy for the Republican Party in the presidential election of 2000. One year later at the Republican National Convention, George W. Bush and his chosen vice-president Dick Cheney were officially nominated to represent the Republican Party. In a controversial election, Bush narrowly succeeded against Democrat candidate and former vice-president during the Clinton administration Al Gore. When it came to foreign policy Bush was derided by many ‘for his lack of ideas’, yet in a televised debate with Al Gore on October 11th 2000 he ‘promised a “humble” approach toward other nations’. It was not a secret to anyone on Capitol Hill that Bush had little interest in or knowledge of U.S. foreign policy. In the immediate years preceding the election, James Mann writes that ‘throughout the long presidential campaign, (Condoleezza) Rice and (Paul) Wolfowitz served as Bush’s two principal advisors on international affairs’. Wolfowitz clearly had a direct role in shaping President Bush’s views on foreign policy. While Condoleezza Rice was undoubtedly Bush’s main advisor on international affairs, Wolfowitz’s position provided him with a unique opportunity to educate the future president on the neoconservative world view.

The debate around President Bush’s inner circle and the differing ideological perspectives of its members is embodied by the relationship between Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz. Condoleezza Rice was a strong proponent of conservative realism, much the same as Henry Kissinger and other notable realists. Paul Wolfowitz, on the other hand, was a staunchly passionate

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241 Ryan, Neoconservatism, p. 89
243 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 251
neocon. These two individuals represent the division of Bush’s inner circle, with Rice and Colin Powell on one side, and Richard Perle and Wolfowitz on the other. After close examination of an article that Rice wrote for the magazine *Foreign Affairs* in early 2000, Maria Ryan argues that ‘she had nonetheless already moved beyond the narrower interests of a realist outlook toward a worldview more sympathetic to unipolarism in substance and even more slightly akin to neoconservatism’. 244 This assessment shows that even individuals from *The White House* of the Bush government who did not endorse the neoconservative world view as a whole, such as Condoleezza Rice, were at least influenced by certain tenets of neoconservative foreign policy thought.

After George W. Bush was declared victorious in the 2000 presidential election, he rewarded Wolfowitz by giving him the role of Deputy Secretary of Defense. For the first time in his political career, Wolfowitz had moved beyond the *Foreign Policy Bureaucracy* and into the center of the *Concentric Circles* system, otherwise known as *The White House*. This appointment would have tremendous consequences when Al-Qaeda flew two commercial airplanes into the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. It is somewhat difficult to determine the route that Bush’s foreign policy might have taken if Al-Qaeda had not attacked the World Trade Center. Nevertheless, this shocking event and its effect on the foreign policy of the Bush administration cannot be underestimated. President Bush summed up the sentiment of his government later that day when he said to members of the Emergency Operations Center – of which Wolfowitz was one – that ‘I want you all to understand that we are at war and we will stay at war until this is done… everything is available for the pursuit of this war… any barriers in your way, they are gone’. 245 When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded that only prevention and not retaliation was allowed by current international law, Bush set a telling precedent for the rest of his time as president by remarking that ‘I don’t care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass’. 246 Clearly the commander-in-chief was overwhelmed with emotion on a day which stayed long in the memory of every American, let alone those whose responsibility it was to prevent this sort of catastrophe.

244 Ryan, *Neoconservatism*, p. 163
246 Ibid, p. 214
On the following day on September 12th, however, President Bush was far more specific on which nation he believed the United States should be focusing its efforts. Richard A. Clarke, the Bush government’s chief counter-terrorism advisor and member of the National Security Council, recalled in his tell-all book that the President asked him to ‘see if Saddam did this… see if he’s linked in any way’.247 When Clarke explained that he was certain Al-Qaeda were behind the attack, Bush responded ‘I know, I know, but… see if Saddam was involved… just look… I want to know any shred’.248 The President’s insistence on Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s possible involvement shocked those who were present. As a government employee wondered what had just happened, one key official by the name of Lisa Gordon-Hagerty answered that Wolfowitz had ‘got to him’.249 From this exchange it is evident that Wolfowitz, who had supported the removal of Hussein for over thirty years, influenced the President’s judgment regarding the September 11th terrorist attacks.

Richard Clarke, the counter-terrorism chief who had been baffled earlier by the President’s demand to investigate if Iraq had been involved, claimed that at this moment he realised ‘Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try and take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq’.250 Clarke was not alone in reaching this conclusion; numerous individuals who attended these discussions quickly realised that neocons in the government were seeking to enact a long-standing plan. Paul O’Neill – Secretary of the Treasury from January 20th 2001 until December 31st 2002 and a highly-ranked member of President Bush’s inner circle – was another to recognise that the policy to invade Iraq had been in the pipeline long before the September 11th terrorist attacks. O’Neill recounts in the Pulitzer Prize-winning book The Price of Loyalty that during the government’s first NSC meeting on January 30th 2001, over seven months before the September 11th terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked those in attendance to ‘imagine what the region (Middle-East) would look like without Saddam and with a regimes that’s aligned with U.S. interests… it would change everything in the region and beyond it… it would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about’.251 From this meeting O’Neill became conscious

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248 Ibid, p. 32
249 Ibid, p. 32
250 Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 30
of the fact that ‘we were building the case against Hussein and looking at how we could take him out and change Iraq into a new country… and, if we did that, it would solve everything… it was all about finding a way to do it’.\textsuperscript{252} Although Rumsfeld made the statement, it was his assistant Wolfowitz that had been advocating regime change in Iraq for over a decade. Clarke’s testimony shows that many ‘who served Bush can be called architects of the Iraq War… nevertheless, Wolfowitz was, to cite a \textit{New Yorker} profile, its most “passionate and compelling advocate”\textsuperscript{.253}

The hubristic atmosphere surrounding the Bush administration at this time, one which neocons such as Wolfowitz were integral in creating, caused the entirety of Bush’s inner circle to believe that they were unequivocally correct about the morality of their policies. In this sense, Wolfowitz and other neoconservative government officials played a pivotal role in the United States’ decision to initiate an illegal war in Iraq in 2003 on the false premise that Saddam Hussein was harboring nuclear weapons. After leaving the George W. Bush administration in 2005, Wolfowitz went on to become President of the World Bank. This proved to be short-lived as he vacated the position in 2007 under accusations of malpractice. He remains in the public eye and is currently advising several Republican candidates for the presidential election of 2016.

\textsuperscript{252} Ibid, p. 86
\textsuperscript{253} Immerman, \textit{Empire for Liberty}, p. 224
Implications for debates on “Defense Intellectuals” and U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making

The findings illustrated above have significant ramifications for current debates on “defense intellectuals” and U.S. foreign policy decision-making. With regards to Kennan, the process of U.S. foreign policy decision-making was far more open in the period immediately following the end of the Second World War. Hilsman’s *Presidential Preeminence* model was based on the John F. Kennedy government of the early 1960s. Even though Hilsman’s model discusses *Bureaucracy* involvement in the “closed politics” of high-level foreign policy decision-making, it cannot sufficiently explain the level of influence Kennan was able to exert. A crucial factor which served to help Kennan was that the State department, and the Truman administration in general, was struggling for a clear foreign policy agenda after the end of the Second World War. Kennan – an academic who had spent his entire career studying the Soviet Union – advised his government to contain their new geopolitical rival with economic and diplomatic policies. Max Paul Friedman maintains that Kennan’s realist mindset is the reason why ‘he argued that traditional Russian security concerns should be taken into account, and that they underlay the transient rhetorical forms of Marxist-Leninist ideology’.\(^{254}\) This signifies how influential political realism was in Kennan’s analysis of foreign policy decision-making, particularly towards the Soviet Union.

Even though “Containment” was adapted to fit the more militaristic approach favored by President Truman and his staff, it still contained the conceptual essence of Kennan’s proposal. The fact that “Containment” was transformed in such a way shows Kennan could only influence foreign policy if his superiors were receptive to his ideas. When George Marshall was Secretary of State, for example, he openly sought Kennan’s opinions and applied them to foreign policy initiatives, such as the Marshall Plan. Marshall’s successor Dean Acheson, on the other hand, was less receptive to his diplomatic approach and advocated a more militarised foreign policy instead. Although Hilsman’s *Presidential Preeminence* model was conceived over a decade after Kennan worked in the State Department, it is important to note that the furthest he progressed was as a member of the *Bureaucracy*. This meant that he was unable to implement his own ideas and relied on the support of those who actually occupied positions of power within the *Executive Branch*. However,

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Kennan’s intellect and the versatility of his “Containment” theory allowed him to have an enormous impact on U.S. foreign policy from a supposedly less influential section of the Concentric Circles system. Therefore, because of the open nature of foreign policy decision-making at the time and the uniqueness of his “Containment” theory, George Kennan – a lowly but highly respected diplomat working in the Foreign Service – was able to help design the most consistent U.S. foreign policy of the entire Cold War.

In a political sense, Henry Kissinger could not have been more different to George Kennan. Having established himself as an eminent academic at Harvard University, Kissinger found moderate success in the lower levels of the Bureaucracy; this success manifested itself in the form of positions on several scientific advisory panels, such as his role as study director in nuclear weapons and foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Kissinger entered the Executive Branch, albeit briefly, as a presidential Advisor to John F. Kennedy in 1961. After breaking away from the Kennedy government in mid-1962, it was not until November 1968 that he was presented with an opportunity to re-enter the Executive Branch as President Nixon’s National Security Advisor. By the time Nixon was inaugurated in January 1969, Kissinger had conspired with the President-elect to further concentrate foreign policy decision-making in his and the president’s hands. Nevertheless, Jussi M. Hanhimäki writes in The Rise and Fall of Détente that ‘within a month of Nixon’s inauguration, the media had clearly figured out who would make the decisions about foreign policy in years to come’.255

Now that the foreign policy decision-making process largely excluded other members of the Executive Branch, such as the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, Kissinger could set about actualising his foreign policy grand plan. The nature of this grand plan enabled him to have control over almost every facet of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, Kissinger’s level of control is best shown by the fact that he ‘de facto conducted the SALT negotiations, keeping experts and members of the U.S. delegation in the dark… assumed responsibility for managing the opening to China by sidelining the State Department… (and) participated in seemingly never-ending peace talks with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris’.256 Without Nixon’s distrust of many within both the

255 Hanhimäki, Rise and Fall of Détente, p. 39
256 Del Pero, Eccentric Realist, p. 105
Executive Branch and the Bureaucracy, Kissinger would not have been able to exert such a widespread impact on U.S. foreign policy.

As mentioned previously, the idea of linkage underpinned Kissinger’s thinking when it came to foreign policy decision-making. Whether it affected the Soviet Union, China, Chile, or Vietnam, every foreign policy decision was inextricably connected to the other in Kissinger’s eyes. His obsession with linkage can be traced back to his Ph.D. dissertation A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Restoration of Peace: 1812-1822. Metternich’s ability to orchestrate a détente with Napoleonic France on behalf of the Austrian Empire inspired Kissinger, to the point where he even wished to ‘out-Metternich Metternich’. The connection between Kissinger’s foreign policy decision-making and his analysis of historical cases is of particular importance to this investigation; it reveals a continuity with his academic work and the decisions that he made when in control of U.S. foreign policy. As such, it is clear that the primary influence behind Kissinger’s realist approach to foreign policy decision-making was history and the lessons that he could draw from it. All in all, the factors listed above combined to allow Kissinger to have the greatest impact on U.S. foreign policy of any “defense intellectual”.

Paul Wolfowitz’s impact on President George W. Bush’s decision to declare war on Iraq in 2003 is best understood as the fulfillment of a long-term political goal. The hatred he possessed for tyrannical despots, which had been instilled in him as a teenager due to his family’s suffering at the hands of the Nazis, caused Wolfowitz to identify Saddam Hussein’s regime as evil. Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, his and the neoconservative movement’s attention shifted to the Middle East. The disappointment of the Gulf War – in other words the decision not to oust Saddam Hussein – caused Wolfowitz to assert that the U.S. government required willpower to spread liberty and democracy in the name of global security, even if that meant acting unilaterally. Unfortunately for Wolfowitz, he was a medium-ranked member of the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy and therefore restricted in his ability to influence the foreign policy decision-making process. Moreover, the social and political environment of the time meant that the country as a whole was unreceptive to the neoconservative foreign policy agenda.

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257 Ambrose & Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, p. 229
This changed at the turn of the century as Wolfowitz entered *The White House* as Deputy Secretary of Defense and Al Qaeda launched a terrorist attack on the United States. After September 11th, 2001 the American people were willing to trust their government’s judgment and go into war without really thinking to question the reasons why, let alone the morality or legality of such a policy. With the social and political climate now in favour of unilateral military action, Wolfowitz utilised his increased influence to inspire a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Despite occupying a position of significant influence within *The White House*, Wolfowitz lacked the power to make decisions himself and much like Kennan, he relied on the support of his superiors to carry them out. The key to Wolfowitz’s success is based on the fact that he was part of a collective; the neocons of the Bush administration possessed an incredible ability to convince those around them about the legitimacy of their agenda.

In reference to the *Concentric Circles* theory, the fact that Wolfowitz was able to influence the Nixon government’s policy on missile defense spending as an intern at a scientific advisory panel in 1969 shows that Cold War-era foreign policy decision-making was perhaps less rigid than Hilsman’s *Presidential Preeminence* model suggests. On the other hand, the criticism directed towards the Department of Defense’s DPG in 1992 reveals that even though the foreign policy decision-making process was supposedly more open in a post-Cold War world, it did not necessarily mean that it was easier to have an impact on U.S. foreign policy from the outer reaches of the *Concentric Circles* system. It appears that the further you are outside of *The White House* or the *Executive Branch*, the more your ability to influence U.S. foreign policy depends on the current political and social climate. Because there was widespread concern about the threat of a Soviet missile attack in 1969, it was easier to convince Congress to pass legislation in favour of ABM systems. When the general consensus of the country was firmly against the idea of unilateral military ventures and the maintenance of U.S. supremacy, such as in 1992, implementing this policy from inside the *Foreign Policy Bureaucracy* proved exceedingly difficult. After the September 11th terrorist attacks, for example, the societal and political climate had shifted drastically in favour of unilateral military involvement, thus neocons such as Wolfowitz were now able to fulfill their plan for U.S. foreign policy.

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258 Immerman, *Empire for Liberty*, p. 234
Conclusion

Employing the *Concentric Circles* theory in tandem with a comparative methodology throughout this investigation has facilitated a more nuanced understanding of the impact that “defense intellectuals” have had on U.S. foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War. Since 1945 it is evident that U.S. foreign policy has been dramatically influenced by “defense intellectuals”. Without their input, the landscape of U.S. political history over the last seventy years would be completely different. As individuals, their influence varied depending on the “defense intellectual” in question, the government in which they served and the social and political zeitgeist of when they served. Whereas Kennan and Wolfowitz were restricted in their capacity to implement their respective foreign policy agendas – which is ultimately the result of occupying a lesser position within the *Concentric Circles* system – Kissinger had progressed sufficiently through the *Executive Branch* to physically put his realist worldview into practice. Kennan was able to have such a dramatic impact on U.S. foreign policy due to a combination of his “Containment” theory fitting the desired narrative of the Truman administration and the foreign policy decision-making process being more open after the end of the Second World War. Wolfowitz’s success was primarily the result of his and the neoconservative community’s ability to function as a unified collective. These individuals, who each held an unshakable belief in the neoconservative school of thought, conspired together to persuade the most influential officials of the Bush administration that their foreign policy approach was the best route for the country after the September 11th terrorist attacks.

As they currently stand, both *Concentric Circles* models consider the impact that societal and political factors have on the foreign policy decision-making process. However, neither of them fully explain the relationship between where one resides within the *Concentric Circles* system, the societal and political climate at the time, and how these factors affect an individual’s ability to influence the foreign policy decision-making process. These findings help situate this investigation in the debate on both “defense intellectuals” and the *Concentric Circles* theory. When the factors described above are also taken into account, a more complete picture of foreign policy decision-making and how it has changed since the end of the Second World War can be perceived.
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