Internal Displacement: Cooperation and International Organisation

Martine Seinstra
s1382519
Goeman Borgesiuslaan 481
9722vm Groningen
0646453490
Master thesis
International Relations and International Organization
04-03-2015
Thesis advisor: Prof. dr. L. Lobo-Guerrero
I hereby declare that this thesis, “Internal Displacement: Cooperation and International Organisation “, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name            Martine Seinstra
Signature       Martine Seinstra
Date            23-01-2015
# Table of Contents

**List of Abbreviations** 3

**Introduction** 4

  - Theoretical framework 6
  - Structure 10

**Chapter One: the Organisation of Aid for IDPs** 12

  - 1.1. Internal Displacement as an International Issue 12
  - 1.2. The Structure of the Provision of Aid 14
    - 1.2.1. The Cluster Approach 14
    - 1.2.2. Previous Structures 18
  - 1.3. Calls for One Organisation 19
  - 1.4. Future Developments 20
  - 1.5. Conclusion 21

**Chapter Two: Liberal Institutionalism and Cooperation** 22

  - 2.1. Liberal Institutionalism 22
  - 2.2. Liberal Institutionalism and Cooperation 23
    - Prisoner's Dilemma 25
    - Factors influencing Cooperation 26
    - Degree of Formalisation 27
  - 2.3. The Internal Displacement Regime 28
    - Hypotheses on Cooperation 29
  - 2.4. Conclusion 30

**Chapter Three: Human Security and Cooperation** 32

  - 3.1. Human Security 32
  - 3.2. Human Security and Cooperation between States 34
  - 3.3. Human Security and Internal Displacement 35
  - 3.4. Conclusion 36

**Conclusion** 37

**Bibliography** 41
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRCS</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Introduction**

Since the end of the 19th century states have attempted to overcome some of the largest injustices and problems that follow from the international state system. For example, some of the most heinous weapons are no longer allowed to be used in wartime, the right to go to war has been limited and civilians fleeing from oppression can ask for protection in another state and get granted asylum. Treaties and international organisations have been protectors of these agreed rules to make it more difficult for different political interpretations over time to change the content. Rules in these areas of international relations however also illuminate that there are still many fields where insufficient protection exists for civilians.

The international community cooperates in a great number of areas. To make this cooperation more effective, or even possible, several international organisations have been created in the past decades. It is not entirely clear though why there is cooperation in some areas of international relations and not in others and why states on some issues create an international organisation (IO) and not in other situations. This first question is central in International Relations Theory. It is answered differently by different perspectives within International Relations Theory. However this thesis will look more closely into to the second question, more specifically in the field of internal displacement. Refugees are protected by both an international treaty and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), but there is to this day no international organisation which can coordinate aid and protect the internally displaced.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are defined in the non binding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GP), the most generally accepted document which sums up all the rights of IDPs, as:

(persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result or in order to avoid natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border).

Internally Displaced Persons are often in similar situations as refugees. The main difference is however that as opposed to refugees, they do not leave their own country. Although they have fled their place of residence, and may be facing several problems because of that, since they have not crossed an international border they remain under the protection of their own state. In case they have problems, the assumption is that their own government will deal with that

---

and help them. In practice the situation is often not that straightforward. Some governments are simply unable to help the IDPs, either because they do not have the means or do not have control over the area where the IDPs are staying. In other situations the policies or actions of their own government are the reason why the citizens have felt they had to flee, which means that they are not likely to receive help. Their situation is also not likely to improve as long as the underlying cause has not changed.

Because IDPs remain in their own country, the principle of non-interference generally rules out the possibility for other states or the international community to legally come to their aid. However, some of the humanitarian crises around IDPs in the past decades have caused a shift in this principle. In some exceptional circumstances did the Security Council (SC) of the United Nations (UN) vote for intervention in those states to make the provision of aid possible, like for example in Somalia in the 1990s. One of the reasons for this shift was the increasing number of countries with IDPs within their borders and the increasing total number of IDPs. Nowadays the number of IDPs is even higher than the number of refugees.  

At that point the international community became more actively involved. International organisations and nongovernmental organisations started diverting part of their resources specifically towards the internally displaced. These were often organisations which had experience with the provision of aid to refugees, and they extended their mandate to be able to also provide help to IDPs. However no international organisation for the internally displaced was founded. Neither received any of the organisations which were involved in supporting IDPs the primary responsibility for them, like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has for those displaced who do cross an internationally recognised border.

This thesis will look into the fact that there is to this day no international organisation for internally displaced persons which can coordinate aid and protect them. This is an important subject to research since most displaced persons nowadays are internally displaced persons as opposed to refugees. Not only the people who are forced to flee are in need of help, the arrival of large groups of IDPs also affects the host communities. Even though displaced persons have come under the attention of the international community in the past decades and are receiving some aid and protection, it is not done in a predictable way since there is not one

---

organisation that looks after their interests and coordinates all aid. Since it involves such a large group in multiple countries, it is important that their aid is well organised so all their needs are met adequately and efficiently. In 2005 large scale reforms were made to make the aid more predictable and make it more clear which organisation is responsible for which area where aid is required. This was however an attempt to improve the current system and not a new approach.

States also have been unwilling to this day to make an international treaty on the rights of the internally displaced. One may argue that if states are unwilling to draft and comply with a treaty which solidifies the rights and duties of the internally displaced, then they will also be unwilling to commit to a treaty which will give an organisation the responsibility for protecting and helping IDPs. Some may even say that the question of an IDP IO is irrelevant as long as there are no steps towards an IDP treaty.

Even though these two questions are closely related, it is too simple to dismiss the possibility of an IDP organisation because of legal problems. It is still useful to research the legal and the organisational aspects separately. Firstly because the reasons for states to be against a new treaty may be very different from the reasons why they are not in favour of one organisation taking over all the duties on the subject of internal displacement. Secondly because it is not necessary to found a organisation. Giving an already existing organisation more responsibilities would require only a change in mandate, and could still be feasible even when states do not want to commit at this point to an IDP treaty.

Theoretical Framework
International cooperation and organisations are viewed very differently by the mainstream international relations theories. For example realists consider it very difficult to have cooperation in an anarchical world. On the other hand are the liberalists, and more specifically the institutional liberalists, more positive about the possibilities for cooperation.

Realism says that states can only rely on themselves, since there is no central authority to enforce rules. Cooperation is greatly impeded by this. The risk of cooperating can not be mitigated because there is no central authority to reduce these risks. Realist theory argues that international institutions are unable to reduce anarchy's constraints on cooperation

---

between states. So the theory is pessimistic for prospects of cooperation and the capabilities of international institutions.

Neorealism explains the difficulties in cooperation by the fact that in an anarchical world states look to relative gains of cooperation. Even though states realise that cooperation could be beneficial to them, they are more concerned that the advantages of the cooperation for other countries will be higher than for them. Only when the relative gains outweigh the ones for the other states, states are potentially willing to cooperate. Realism says however that even when a state would benefit relatively from cooperation, it is still very difficult to achieve, because of the lack of central government. Neorealism says that cooperation is possible, but only when a hegemon is willing to back the cooperation. Once the hegemony ends, cooperation will also end.

Most realists downplay the significance of institutions. They see institutions as the material interests of the powerful which can only have independent effects in very minor issue areas. International organisations are according to them of little help in channelling the power struggle, since it can not change the anarchic structure of the international system. International organisations are simply used by the powerful states to implement their power politics more effectively and pursue their self-interest. The establishment and success of an IO is dependent on a hegemon with a large amount of power resources. Such a state has significant power so it can afford to let other states have high relative gains, meanwhile benefitting from the absolute gains. This state thus bears an over-proportional part of the cooperation costs. It can bind other states into the organisation by using carrots and sticks. How effective the cooperation is depends on the rise and fall of hegemonic states.

---

6 Ibidem.
8 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading etc., 1979, pp.106.
10 Donnelly 2005, pp. 47.
11 Ibidem.
12 Rittberger 2006, pp. 15.
13 Ibidem, pp. 16.
Realism and neorealism would explain the absence of an international organisation by the fact that the anarchical world makes cooperation very difficult or very dependent on the presence of a hegemon. Since there is actually cooperation on the IDP issue, these theories can not provide us with an understanding why there is no international organisation on internal displacement. That is why this thesis will not further look into these theories.

Liberal theories of international relations are more optimistic about cooperation. Believing that man is good and willing to cooperate in general, they also see states as essentially looking for peace and cooperation. While pursuing their own interests, there is a potential of harmony of interests between people, so also for states.\textsuperscript{15} Complex interdependence makes extensive cooperation more necessary. States need to cooperate to meet the complex and diverse needs of their citizens. Institutions are necessary to coordinate the interdependence.\textsuperscript{16} Institutions are seen as performing a facilitatory and a regulatory function in international relations.\textsuperscript{17}

Neo-liberal institutionalists have similar ideas to neorealists about the world being an anarchical system. However, as opposed to the neorealists they believe that cooperation is possible because states are looking for absolute gains from cooperation. Since they are not as focused on what other states gain from cooperation, cooperation will be possible. To overcome some of the remaining problems around cooperation, states create IOs to overcome problems of incomplete information, transaction costs etc. The organisations make cooperation more easy to establish and more durable.\textsuperscript{18} Anarchy is mitigated by regimes and institutional cooperation which brings higher levels of regularity and predictability in international relations. Institutions encourage the cooperative habits, monitor compliance and sanction defectors.\textsuperscript{19}

Liberalism and more specifically neo-liberal institutionalism has a clear view on the advantages an IO on internal displacement can have. That is why this theory will be the main focus of chapter two, in which a closer look will be taken on what neo-liberal institutionalism says about cooperation and international organisations and how this theory understands the fact that there is no IO for IDPs.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem, pp. 41.  
\textsuperscript{17} Ibidem, pp. 39.  
\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem, pp. 42-43.  
Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal have elaborated on the kind of organisation states decide to create to facilitate cooperation.\textsuperscript{20} They try to explain why organisations differ on features like membership, scope, centralisation, control and flexibility. According to them states are goal seeking actors who consciously make a decision for a certain design of an organisation which benefits them the most. The design is made to solve the particular cooperation problems of a specific issue area. They do not see international organisations as actors on their own, they are conscious creations by states to advance their interests. They are not empty vessels though.\textsuperscript{21} The authors look at the different cooperation problems, distribution, number of members, enforcement and uncertainty. By using rational choice theory the authors try to explain differences in institutions.

When looking at the question why there is no international organisation yet for IDPs, one could also conclude that the states have simply chosen to organise the cooperation in another form than one central international organisation. In that sense is the writing of Koremenos very interesting. However, the authors’ theory is too general to explain exactly why in this case states have chosen this design for cooperation. They make conjectures about how the different variables interact with each other, which would lead to a certain design. This is too general though to apply in this specific case. They look at the creation of new organisations and since the tasks for protecting and aiding IDPs are taken up by already existing organisations, their theory is not that straightforward to apply and hence will not be used in this thesis.

Constructivist theorists are more difficult to pinpoint because of the great diversity of theorists who are labelled this way.\textsuperscript{22} They have generally in common though that they see the world in a very similar way as realists and liberalists, but challenge rationalism. They also see the anarchic state system as one of the reasons why cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve. However, as opposed to the other theories, constructivists do not take the aspects of this system as fixed or unavoidable. They see for example the concept of anarchy as socially constructed.\textsuperscript{23} This means that the concepts are not a given, but can be changed and hence change the way international relations is done. States may be self-interested, but what this means is redefined by the states continuously.\textsuperscript{24} According to constructivists the persistence of

\textsuperscript{21} Ibidem, pp.5.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibidem, pp. 2 and 4.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibidem, pp. 4.
regimes is not only explained by the absolute gains regimes can have for the states, but also by the socialisation process. Over the years norms and principles of a regime become part of the identity of its members, which will mean that states will remain in an organisation even when the absolute gains have diminished or disappeared over time.

This is a very different way of looking at international relations. Though this thesis will not go into more detail on this way of seeing the world, the human security discourse which shares some of the constructivist premises, will be the subject of the third chapter.

Barnett and Finnemore have also developed a theory on international organisations. According to them, as opposed to what other theories claim, international organisations do have at least a degree of autonomy, which gives them the opportunity to act autonomously from the states which have created them. This is because IOs are bureaucracies, which have their own internal logic and tendencies to behave in a certain way. This theory does seem to provide an argument why states would be unwilling to create another international organisation. However, since states are actually cooperating in this area and have given additional tasks to other organisations which makes those even more powerful, this may only be a very secondary concern for the states. It is more a theory about how international organisations behave, not so much about behaviour of state. Hence it will also not be used as a starting point of analysis in this thesis.

Structure

The main question, which is 'why is there to this day no international organisation for internally displaced persons which can coordinate aid and protect them?,' will be answered by looking at the subject matter through the lens of liberal institutionalism and the human security discourse. First the topic of internal displacement is further introduced in chapter one. The chapter will look into what internal displacement is and how aid has been organised in the past decades. More specifically, it will look into why the topic has become more important in the past decades and which organisations have until now been preoccupied with aiding IDPs and how their tasks have been divided. It will also look at the reforms that have been made to the way the aid was organised and into the question whether this resulted into more efficient delivery of aid. Finally, it will look into the proposals that have been made over the

27 Ibidem, pp. 3.
past decades to create one international organisation for IDPs.

The second chapter will look into the question how liberal institutionalism understands the fact that there is no international organisation for IDPs. The first paragraph will give a brief introduction of liberal institutionalism. This will be followed by an overview on what liberal institutionalism says about cooperation and international organisation. The last paragraph researches what liberal institutionalism's explanation would be of the fact that there is no international organisation for IDPs and what would have to change to make this possible.

The third chapter will research the question how human security discourses and practices can be used to understand the fact that there is no international organisation for IDPs. Firstly it will give an introduction into the human security discourse. Then it will look what human security theorists exactly say about cooperation and international organisation. Finally it will look into the question how human security understands the situation that there is no international organisation for internal displacement and what changes would make such an organisation more likely to be founded.

The conclusion will finally give an overview of the main arguments brought forward in the thesis and will attempt to answer the main question by analysing the information from the previous chapters.
Chapter One: the Organisation of Aid for IDPs

This chapter will further introduce the topic of internal displacement. First the way the topic became a subject of international concern over the past decades will be explored. Second the current structure of the international aid will be described. It will also look at the reforms that have been made to the way the aid was organised and if this resulted into more efficient delivery of aid. Finally, it will look into the proposals that have been made over the past decades to create one international organisation for IDPs.

1.1 Internal Displacement as an International Issue

Internal displacement does not have one clear definition, nevertheless the most generally accepted is the descriptive definition from the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The most important elements of this definition are the parts that the movement is coerced and that the people remain within their own national borders. The causes of displacement are quite broad, which means that one cannot simply call IDPs 'internal refugees'. In refugee law the definition of a refugee is much narrower, so a large part of the IDPs would not qualify for asylum in case they did cross a border.

The current definition used for IDPs is quite broad and does not give any special status to those who are internally displaced with extra rights attached to it. It is not clear who makes the determination who is forced or obliged to leave, and leaves room for interpretation for states who wish to interpret in a different way depending on the circumstances. This way the people who drew up the GP and the definition tried to gather much support for their project. The moment the definition gets narrowed down, and an international organisation would be in charge of defending the specific rights of IDPs, states would have no longer have the option of interpreting the definition in their favour and it could actually infringe on their sovereignty.

This also means though that as long as there is no generally agreed upon more narrowed down, clear and workable definition, this will be an obstacle to setting up an IDP organisation.

Though the issue of internal displacement has existed for centuries, the problem only recently was placed on the international agenda. This can be explained by the fact that by definition the people who are suffering from this form of displacement are staying within their own country, which makes them less visible to the world. Additionally, because the displacement takes place within the state of which they are a citizen, not the international

---

28 This section was to a large extent part of my previous thesis, *Moving from the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement towards a binding framework*. 
community but the state itself is principally responsible for the well-being and the protection of the internally displaced.

The IDP issue was brought to the attention of the United Nations in the late 1980s. Since then the international community has been seeking ways to meet the challenges of this matter. To meet the human rights and humanitarian needs of the internally displaced, several international organisations have broadened their mandate or scope of activities to help IDPs.

There are several reasons why at that time IDPs started to get international attention, but especially the large increase in numbers changed the attitude of the international community towards the issue. In the beginning of the 1980s there were only a few million persons internally displaced in half a dozen countries. Now the number is 27.5 million in over fifty counties, as opposed to 10.5 million refugees. This increase was mainly due to internal conflicts, which have become more prevalent than interstate wars in the post Cold War era. The severity of the problem in intensity and scope became obvious from the number of displaced and the fact that virtually no region was spared from the issue.

Statistics are often seen as an a-political statement of the facts. However in reality the way numbers are collected can be extremely political. The numbers about refugees are collected by the UNHCR. The numbers on IDPs are collected by the Norwegian Refugee Council, an independent NGO which does rely on information from governments, but also from other NGOs, IGOs and the ICRC. This way they try to avoid giving states the chance to downplay the problem. States do influence the numbers though by defining the IDP group in a certain way. Having a different definition would probably lead to different statistics.

The international community also started to realise that though it was in principle an internal problem, internal displacement does have implications for other states. Situations which cause internal displacement often also cause refugee flows. States were becoming less eager to accept large flows of refugees, which made them interested in protecting and assisting IDPs as a means to discourage them from seeking asylum abroad.

---

31 Refugee Figures, at <www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1d.html> (consulted 8 January 2013).
33 Ibidem.
Besides refugee flows, the violence and instability that cause internal displacement often also economically or politically affected other states or whole regions. Simultaneously came the realisation that peace and reconstruction in war torn societies depend in part on the effective reintegration of displaced persons. The issue of internal displacement became in addition more prominent due to the telecommunications revolution which helped bringing the issue to the public attention. Internal crises in Ethiopia and Sudan received wide media coverage, which resulted into international pressure compelling the governments to acknowledge the problem and allow the international community to provide assistance.

Moreover, the rigid interpretation of the principle of sovereignty had started to change in the previous decades. The notion that sovereignty also meant absolute immunity from all international scrutiny had altered. By endorsing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and signing human rights protocols and treaties, states changed the concept of sovereignty, by limiting their freedom to act in their own country. By not complying with obligations under those instruments they opened themselves up to severe criticisms, boycotts or even armed intervention.

1.2 The Structure of the Provision of Aid

1.2.1. The Cluster Approach
One of the most complicated debates concerning internal displacement issues has been around the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements. Nowadays a large number of international organisations are preoccupied with the aid of IDPs. Most of them have already been involved in the provision of aid over ten years, but only recently officially took on a role as provider of aid. Due to this large number, a good coordination of the efforts is necessary. However due to the fact that all the organisations are equal, since there is not officially one organisation that can overrule them, the efforts for efficient coordination of tasks are hampered. A further complicating factor is the fact that some of the organisations are part of the UN system, like the UNHCR and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), but

34 Ibidem, pp. 4-5.
35 Ibidem, pp. 5.
36 Ibidem.
others are not, like the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Over the years a structure has developed which has tried to make a more efficient delivery of aid possible.

The most important organisations involved in the provision of aid to IDPs and which are part of the interagency coordination efforts are: the UNHCR, IOM, World Health Organisation (WHO), ICRC, World Food Programme (WFP), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Under the Cluster Approach the humanitarian efforts have been divided into sectors. Based on their own specialities have the above mentioned organisations been assigned a special area of expertise in which they will act as sector leader by coordinating the efforts that are being undertaken in that sector regarding humanitarian assistance. For example logistics are coordinated by the WFP and shelter by the ICRC and the UNHCR. The sector leader is the organisation to approach as the first stop, it is also the provider of last resort and will be held accountable for overall performance. The goal of the new approach was to strengthen the partnership between NGOs, IOs, UN agencies and the ICRC. The lead agencies would have to find a way to involve all of the actors actively in that sector so all can play a role in setting and participating in the direction, strategies and activities of the cluster.

In practice the coordination goes along two lines. Interagency cooperation on the top level is done through mechanisms that OCHA oversees. The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the head of OCHA and chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The executive heads of all UN humanitarian organisations, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Representative on IDPs are the core of the committee. The IOM, ICRC, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS) and three international NGO consortia (InterAction, The International Council of Voluntary Agencies and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response) have also been invited to participate in the IASC. During the IASC meetings are the heads of the agencies consulted on humanitarian matters and they make common decisions to make a coherent and

---

40 What is the cluster approach? <http://clusters.humanitarianresponse.info/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach> (consulted 1 September 2013).
42 Ibidem, pp.7.
43 Phuong 2004, pp.111.
44 Ibidem, pp. 103.
A comprehensive UN response to humanitarian crises. However even within the UN coordination is difficult, since the ERC has no authority over the heads of the other agencies. The heads of the agencies are not accountable to the ERC, but to the boards of their own agency.

In the field the UNDP Resident Coordinators (RC) are designated Humanitarian Coordinators (HC) for the whole UN system. They are responsible for coordinating the assistance to the internally displaced. The UNDP was chosen for this task because of the large network of field offices. The Resident Coordinator is presumed to have great familiarity with the local situation and to have a network of contacts in the country. It is possible to assign another person to be Humanitarian Coordinator, but in practice this does not happen often. The Humanitarian Coordinator is supposed to ensure that the needs of the IDPs are being met, advocate on their behalf on rights issues, recommend to the ERC a division of responsibilities among the agencies and if necessary recommend to the ERC that a lead agency be assigned to assume operational responsibilities for the IDPs.

The Cluster Approach has been reviewed twice since it has first been used in 2005 after the earthquake in Pakistan. The main reasons for the reforms were to increase predictability, accountability and partnership. Some of the old problems remain also in the Cluster Approach. For example, having the UNDP Residence Coordinator also operate as Humanitarian Coordinator has the downside that they often have only experience in development work. In that line of work a good relationship with the authorities is necessary. As a Humanitarian Coordinator it may be necessary to be critical of the governmental policies, which can put the RC/HC into a difficult position. The consequence may be that the HC insufficiently advocates on behalf of IDP rights, which may cause protection problems. This has been tried to overcome though by giving RC/HCs special trainings on how to operate in complex emergencies. Also is being questioned whether the RC/HC will be seen as

---

47 Phuong 2004, pp. 111.
49 Phuong 2004, pp. 112.
50 What is the cluster approach? <clusters.humanitarianresponse.info/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach> (consulted 1 September 2013).
51 Phuong 2004, pp. 112.
52 Ibidem.
sufficiently neutral in case there are multiple warring factions, since the RC has such close connections to the authorities.\(^{53}\)

Coordination at the top remains difficult because of the independence of the organisations who are not part of the UN system. Especially the ICRC is very adamant about staying neutral and independent from the UN system, by refraining from participating in predetermined coordination arrangements.\(^{54}\)

In the 2007 evaluation of the implementation of the Cluster Approach, it is concluded that the reforms have generally been a positive development. Especially the issues of filling gaps and extending capacity have been improved. Also the predictability of leadership enhanced by giving agencies the responsibility for a sector. Accountability for performance has been lacking in progress though. The end conclusion is that it is a large improvement from the collaborative approach. Besides a very radical reform in which a single line of management and accountability would be created through the HC, this seems the best approach so far.\(^{55}\)

A second evaluation took place in 2010 and was focussed on the question whether the delivery of humanitarian assistance had improved through the reforms.\(^{56}\) The conclusions of the report were positive to some extent or at least hopeful. The coverage of humanitarian needs has improved and gaps in the assistance have been better identified and duplications reduced. This means a more efficient use of resources.\(^{57}\) Leadership has become more predictable because of the division of the responsibilities into different clusters. The leadership also gives a clear point of contact for all the parties concerned. \(^{58}\)

There is however still room for improvement in several areas.\(^{59}\) Local and national actors are often not involved in the implementation process and already existing coordination systems. This way the clusters have weakened national and local ownership and capacities. In some cases the introduction of clusters have led to a threat to humanitarian principles. This may occur when cluster members are financially dependent on the cluster or the lead organization, or when the lead organisation has a close relationship with a peacekeeping

\(^{53}\) Ibidem.
\(^{54}\) Ibidem, pp. 103.
\(^{57}\) Ibidem, pp.8.
\(^{58}\) Ibidem, pp.9.
\(^{59}\) Ibidem, pp.9.
mission or an actor in the conflict. Cluster management and facilitation can also be improved on. A lack of training, time or a common handbook makes it difficult to coordinate in an efficient way. Even when coordination in the clusters is going well, inter-cluster coordination is often problematic. Crosscutting issues are neglected because of that. The report concludes that the approach is an investment into the future and the implementation is a learning process which will reap its benefits in the future. In any case have the organisations lost their initial scepticism and are in support of the approach.  

1.2.2. Previous Structures
During the process of drafting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in the 1990s the question arose how to deal with the issues on the institutional level since no official form of coordination took place at that time. Francis Deng, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, contemplated three ways to deal with the topic. The creation of a new agency especially for internal displacement did not seem politically feasible nor were the funds available to back it. Another option was to give an already existing organisation or agency the mandate on IDPs. In that case Deng and Cohen were in favour of giving that responsibility to the UNHCR, since the needs of refugees and IDPs are very similar. Besides that it had both a human rights and humanitarian mandate, so it was potentially better equipped to deal with both the practical and protection needs of the internally displaced persons.

However, since the UNHCR itself was divided on the issue, no substantial steps were taken to change the system. Pragmatists were in favour of giving the UNHCR a mandate since the great number of IDPs and because of the fact that the organisation was already involved in aiding IDPs since they were often mixed with refugees. Others feared that official UNHCR involvement would undermine its ability to protect and assist refugees. Some thought that involvement with IDPs would mean that they were playing into the hands of states who were no longer willing to accept large groups of refugees. Besides clashes within the UNHCR, also the other IOs and NGOs did not seem to be in favour of giving part of their responsibilities to the UNHCR. Especially UNICEF, WFP and the NGOs in the InterAction

---

60 Ibidem, pp.10.
62 Weiss and Korn 2006, pp. 76.
consortium saw the proposed changes as a threat to their territory. They feared a large and powerful UNHCR making decisions for them.\(^{64}\)

Since the other options did not appear viable, Deng worked towards the next best option which was the increased coordination of the efforts. In theory coordination work effectively when there is sufficient guidance. However in practice, as many NGO and UN officials have claimed: "everyone is for coordination, but nobody wants to be coordinated". The ERC has the same rank as the heads of the UN organisations and cannot force decisions upon them for that reason. Only by chairing the IASC and setting the agenda he can have some influence. He has no large staff at this disposal or a large budget to control, and because of that he can only try to influence decisions by recommending courses of action and pleading his case.\(^{65}\) Because of the way the UN system is set up, where the agencies are separate entities operating independently under the authority of the Secretary-General, the agencies are very defensive about protecting their independence. Each agency has its own boards of directors where it is accountable to and its own funders.\(^{66}\) This makes cooperation more difficult even though a lot of the actors are all part of the same UN system.

In the end some form of coordination was set up in the form of the Collaborative Approach. Like in the later Cluster Approach the different agencies and organisations met in the IASC to coordinate their approaches. However, like Roberta Cohen summarised the main problems of the collaborative approach:

> there is no real locus of responsibility in the field for assisting and protecting (...) . There is also no predictability of action, as the different agencies are free to pick and choose the situations in which they wish to become involved on the basis of their respective mandates, resources, and interests. In every new emergency, no one knows for sure which agency or combination thereof will become involved.\(^{67}\)

### 1.3. Calls for One Organisation

From the 1990s on there has been a discussion about the question whether there should be one organisation for IDPs. Luke Lee argued in favour of not extending the mandate of the UNHCR to IDPs, but to change the definition of refugees in a way that it would also include

\(^{64}\) Weiss and Korn 2006, pp.78.

\(^{65}\) Ibidem, pp.79.

\(^{66}\) Ibidem, pp. 80.

internal refugees. Though this appeared to be a relatively simple solution to the problem, in practice this was more difficult to achieve due to the fact that the definition of IDP is broader than that of a refugee. Creating a separate international legal status for IDPs is in any way complex, due to the sensitivity of the issue. The people concerned do not cross an international border, and remain under the protection of their own government. States usually prefer the least amount of outside interference in their internal affairs as possible. Due to that they are unlikely to agree to a new legal category that may hinder them in their affairs. Because of these institutional difficulties the focus in the 1990s was more on the question of the appropriate legal framework for IDPs, which resulted into the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

1.4. Future Developments

The Collaborative and Cluster Approaches were pursued when it did not seem possible to work towards the creation of one organisation responsible for all IDPs. The initial proposals to create such an organisation or give the responsibilities to the UNHCR have become less strong in the past decades. However in 2005 Georgetown's Institute for the Study of International Migration revived the idea. Experts in the field of internal displacement also continue to see a gap in the protection and help of IDPs and do argue for improvements, like for example Roberta Cohen in her article in Refugee Watch in 2008. However due to the magnitude of the problem and difficulties for raising money, a new agency may not be possible or even the best option necessarily.

Weiss and Korn are very critical in their book about the coordination approach that is chosen. They argue that no real choice was made for this approach, it was simply the only default option since the other options did not seem feasible. According to them it is a sign of the general problem of inertia within the United Nations.

---

72 Cohen 2008a, pp. 84-99.
73 Ibidem, pp. 92-93.
Another problem is the lack of public knowledge about the subject. Commonly do the general population or journalists not understand the difference between refugees and IDPs and why it so important for the last group to get additional protection.\textsuperscript{75} The issues surrounding the way the aid is organised is too complex and technical for most people to understand, so it not an issue that is high on the agenda due to lack of public pressure.

Turf-consciousness in the UN system and of NGOs made a more uniform approach not possible. Also donor disarray has made it difficult.\textsuperscript{76} Coordination in a relatively simple field may be possible, but as discussed above, the situation of IDPs is often complex enough to begin with because of the huge impact leaving one's home can have on themselves, but also host communities.

David Turton is also very critical about the developments is the past years. He argues that the interests of the states and the organisations have been given priority over the needs of the persons who are displaced.\textsuperscript{77} Because of all of these developments it is not likely much will change in the near future.

1.5. Conclusion

The current system in which aid to IDPs is organised has seen a lot of changes over the past decades. There have not been any revolutionary changes though, due to lack of political will of the organisations and agencies to relinquish part of their responsibilities and power that comes with that. Also a lack of budget for a new organisation appeared to be a concern. The current system is one of coordination of the tasks. There have been many improvements over the past decades, moving from \textit{ad hoc} aid without the organisations taking responsibility, to a more coordinated approach through the Collaborative and the Cluster Approach. Reviews from the impact of the latest changes have been reasonably optimistic, but there remains a lot of room for improvement. The question remains though if efficient organisation of aid will ever be really possible through any of the coordination approaches, since a lot of the problems appear to source from the issues that occur during the coordination and cooperation of the organisations. The Cluster Approach is seen as an improvement from the previous system, but remains a second best option since one IDP organisation has not been feasible to far.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibidem, pp. 115.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibidem,, pp. 116.
Chapter Two: Liberal Institutionalism and Cooperation

This chapter will characterize liberal institutionalism and will describe how it understands the fact that there is no international organisation for IDPs. The first paragraph will introduce liberal institutionalism. This will be followed by an overview on what liberal institutionalism says about cooperation and international organisations. The last paragraph researches what liberal institutionalism's explanation would be of the fact that there is no international organisation for IDPs and what the prospects for more extensive cooperation are.

2.1. Liberal Institutionalism

The most powerful challenge to neorealism has been posed by neoliberal institutionalism. However after the events following 9/11, authors like Mohammed Nuruzzaman argue that liberal institutionalism has lost some of its importance since the international environment has undermined the potential of international institutions.

According to Grieco there is not one liberal institutionalist theory, but several successive phases can be distinguished. In the 1940s and 1950s there was functionalist integration theory. In the 1950s and 1960s there was neofunctionalist regional integration theory and interdependence theory in the 1970s. The latest liberal institutionalism started in the 1980s and accepts the main premises of realist assumptions about the world.

Liberal institutionalism accepts like neorealism that states are the central actors in the international system, which are pursuing their self-interest in a world that can be characterised by anarchy. The main difference is the conclusion they draw from these premises. Liberal institutionalism claims that states will be able to overcome problems of mistrust and cooperate to achieve common goals in the international system. Anarchy remains a constant, but it still allows for a variety of patterns of interaction between states.

The latest liberal institutionalism phase can again be divided into rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The difference between these two streams

---

80 Grieco 1988, pp. 486.
81 Ibidem.
is that rationalistic institutionalists use mainly tools from economic research, f.e. applying game theory to the study of international behaviour. Sociological institutionalists on the other hand use critical methods to research international politics.\textsuperscript{84}

The focus in this chapter will be on the rationalist stream of liberal institutionalism. The next paragraph will look in more detail into the question what liberal institutionalism says about cooperation and how international organisations can help to achieve it. Paragraph 2.3 will subsequently elaborate on how the IDP regime fits into what liberal institutionalism says about cooperation and international institutions.

2.2. Liberal Institutionalism and Cooperation
Robert Keohane explained the concept of cooperation by distinguishing it from the situation of harmony and discord.\textsuperscript{85} In a situation of harmony an actor's policies automatically help others attain their goals. When there is harmony, there is no need for cooperation since the end goal is already achieved without any intervention. Cooperation requires that actions or policies of actors are brought into conformity with each other through a process of negotiation. As Keohane put it:

\begin{quote}
intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.\textsuperscript{86}
\end{quote}

This means that cooperation does not imply an absence of conflict. Discord happens where cooperation is not attempted or fails to be achieved in the end. In that situation the policies of other governments hinder each other's attainment of goals.\textsuperscript{87}

Liberal institutionalism assumes that states prefer cooperation over non-cooperation. However they also prefer cheating over cooperation.\textsuperscript{88} This way they can reap the benefits from the cooperation without carrying the costs. States do not act that way since they are evil, but since they pursue their self-interest. Institutions can help overcome this tendency to cheat, and resolve the Prisoners' Dilemma.\textsuperscript{89} This can be achieved by verifying compliance and sanctioning cheaters, so cheating becomes a less attractive option than cooperation.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{84} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibidem, pp. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibidem, pp. 52-53.
\textsuperscript{88} Grieco 1988, pp. 493.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibidem, pp. 495.
Cooperation to achieve common goals is not an easy thing to establish. Even though all parties would benefit from cooperating, each party will want to make sure that the other parties will hold up their end of the deal and not end up non-complying or cheating. Liberal institutionalism admits that it is not easy to overcome these obstacles, but it is possible with the help of international institutions. The institutions alter the patterns of costs of the cooperation and that way make cooperation a rational self-interested option for states. The institutions do that by reducing uncertainty and altering transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie exchange. These are costs related to communication, monitoring and enforcing agreements.

In case transaction costs are very low, then the chance of an institution being founded is low, since the benefits of cooperation are likely to outweigh the costs anyway. In case transaction costs are very high, an institution is also unlikely to be founded since the benefits will even then not outweigh the costs. Institutions will only be able to make a difference in states’ reasoning in the case the transaction costs are present, but lower than the potential benefits.

States are often aware of their common interests, but are unable to cooperate due to the fear of being deceived and double crossed. Uncertainty can be diminished by international institutions by stabilising the expectations of the states. The institution can more easily monitor the compliance of the parties, so they have more complete information. Without these institutions there is often a gap between the amount of information the different parties have access to, which forms a barrier to agreements. In an anarchical system states can never be sure that others will comply in the end, but the chances of them keeping their commitments increase with a higher general level of available information since that way the costs of violating agreements increase. The chances increase that defectors will get caught and will have to face coordinated enforcement measures.

International institutions are however not created in a vacuum. They often emerge from previously institutionalised contexts. This may have an influence on how the benefits and costs are perceived by the parties. These previous institutions may not reflect the idea of

94 Ibidem.
95 Keohane 1984, pp. 92.
96 Ibidem, pp. 93.
97 Ibidem, pp. 97.
contracts between rational actors maximizing their utility. The mutual confidence created by old regimes also makes the creation of a new regime easier.

Prisoner's Dilemma

The Prisoner's Dilemma has often been used in International Relations Theory to explain how states come towards the decisions they make. Neorealism often uses it to show why even though cooperation would be beneficial to both parties, because of the international system states will not choose cooperation due to insecurity about the other actor's actions. Authors like Axelrod and Keohane have however tried to show that cooperation is actually possible even when one uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as a starting point.

Two factors can change the equation so states are actually willing to choose to cooperate. The first factor is the iterativeness of the interactions. As Lipson says 'the mere fact of repetition changes several key features of the game, especially if the players can communicate.' It allows for making threats, making commitments and makes reputation important. States do not just interact incidentally, but do it continuously. When they expect that their interactions will continue for an indefinite period of time, states will make different choices. It gives states the option to learn from their previous interactions and try different strategies. In one interaction it may not be the rational choice to cooperate, but with multiple interactions that becomes possible. For example by using the tit-for-tat strategy, which means that one actor decides to cooperate and from then on does what the other player does. This is a strategy based on reciprocity. Repeated transactions create this way stable expectations which can be the basis of international rules.

The second factor is the so called shadow of the future. Not only the advantages of cooperation of the current interaction can be valued, but also the advantages this current cooperation may have on securing cooperation in the future can be given a value. If this cooperation in the future is valued very highly it will make states more willing to cooperate now, since there is less incentive to defect. However, since it never can be sure whether this continued cooperation in the future will actually take place, potential benefits will be valued lower than the current advantages. Factors which can help make the shadow of the future a

99 Keohane 1984, pp. 79.
100 Lipson, C. 'International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs', World Politics (37) 1984, pp. 4.
101 Ibidem, pp. 5.
102 Ibidem, pp. 1.
promoter of cooperation, are long time horizons, regularity of stakes, reliability of information about the other's actions and quick feedback about changes in the others' actions. International organisations may play an important role by changing state's expectations about the future, for example the extent states expect their present actions to affect the behaviour of others in the future. An organisation may also increase the likelihood defectors will be punished, thereby linking the future to the present.\textsuperscript{104} International institutions can make the shadow of the future longer by making norms more explicit so there is no ambiguity, which makes effective reciprocity possible. By creating surveillance mechanisms, the verification possibilities and transparency will be increased to make cooperation in the future seem more secure from the perspective of the present.\textsuperscript{105}

Factors influencing Cooperation

Keohane and Axelrod tried to make a set of hypotheses about which factors affect the chances for development of cooperation. These hypotheses predict that mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future and the number of players are important dimensions in the success and failure of cooperation.\textsuperscript{106} The context however also matters, like for example linkages among issues and the role of international institutions.\textsuperscript{107} Within a context different strategies can be pursued though, and the context can also be altered by for example building institutions with certain principles, norms, rules and procedures for the conduct of international relations.

The payoff structure of a situation is an important indicator of how easy cooperation could be achieved. When there is a great conflict of interest, cooperation is less likely to be achieved. Some game settings are a better base for cooperation.\textsuperscript{108} For example the Stag Hunt has a higher chance of ending in cooperation than the Deadlock. The payoff structure may be changed however, for example by reducing the costs of being exploited by the other party or reducing the gains that can be achieved from exploitation. The linkage of issues may also alter the payoff structures.\textsuperscript{109}

The number of actors and how their relationship is structured, is the last dimension which influences the chances for cooperation.\textsuperscript{110} Reciprocity can induce cooperation in an

\textsuperscript{104} Ibidem, pp. 232-234.
\textsuperscript{105} Oye, K., 'Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies', World Politics (38) 1985, pp. 17 (from now on: Oye 1985).
\textsuperscript{106} Axelrod and Keohane 1985, pp. 227.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibidem, pp. 227-228.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibidem, pp. 228-230.
\textsuperscript{109} Oye 1985, pp. 10.
\textsuperscript{110} Axelrod and Keohane 1985, pp 234.
iterated, bilateral Prisoner's Dilemma, as Axelrod has shown.\(^{111}\) However, reciprocity is only effective on the condition that players can identify defectors, are able to focus retaliation on defectors and have incentives to punish defectors. With many actors these conditions for effective reciprocity are more difficult to fulfil. With a large group of actors, it may not be possible to detect or punish defection. States will look for other states to enforce the rules, so they can free-ride on the benefits.\(^{112}\) Institutions can play an important role in making cooperation easier for larger groups of actors, by decreasing information and transaction costs.\(^{113}\)

As mentioned above, besides these three dimensions the context is also important.\(^{114}\) Institutions alter the payoff structures, may lengthen the shadow of the future and can break down games into games with smaller number of actors. With issue-linkage, games on different issues affect each other.\(^{115}\)

Cooperation can thus be facilitated by the establishment of regimes. They usually do not enforce rules in the traditional sense, but change patterns of transaction costs and provide information. Also they reinforce and institutionalize reciprocity. By making reciprocity the norm, it illegitimates defection and makes it hence more costly.\(^{116}\)

**Degree of Formalisation**

International regimes have a very broad meaning. They can be anything between all relations between countries and very formalised international institutions.\(^{117}\) In any case, the main qualifications appear to be that the choice set is restrained and expectations converge.\(^{118}\) However in a situation of complex interdependence that is the case any way.

To avoid cheating there is a need for a high degree of formalisation, to make clear what is qualified as cheating and cheating can be detected immediately.\(^{119}\) In situations which reflect the Dilemma of the Commons, there is less need of formalisation and a very loose regime can suffice. Some factors that explain regime formation also explain maintenance,


\(^{112}\) Axelrod and Keohane 1985, pp.235.

\(^{113}\) Oye 1985, pp. 20.

\(^{114}\) Axelrod and Keohane 1985, pp. 238.

\(^{115}\) Ibidem, pp. 239.

\(^{116}\) Ibidem, pp. 249-250.


\(^{118}\) Ibidem, pp.35.

\(^{119}\) Ibidem, pp.41-42.
change and dissolution of the regime. Patterns of interests may shift, which can lead to a change in the character of the regime.\textsuperscript{120}

2.3. The Internal Displacement Regime

In this paragraph the predictions of liberal institutionalism on cooperation will be compared to the reality of the internal displacement regime. The regime of internal displacement is difficult to qualify. Internal displacement is only partially an international issue, it is mainly a domestic one. The displacement may cause regional instability, but the main reason for states to get involved into the issue is humanitarian. Since only a part of the world deals with problems of internal displacement it is difficult to make agreements based on reciprocity. This led in the end to a very dispersed form of semi-institutionalisation. The IDP regime does not really exist, both legally and institutionally speaking. Although since 1998 the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GP) gives an overview of all the rights IDPs have, they have no more rights than the general population. The monitoring of these rights occurs through the regular human rights mechanisms.

Liberal institutionalists claim that the problems of anarchy are an impediment to cooperation, but cooperation is still possible. The regime for IDP protection confirms this. States have been cooperating in this area for decades, though it was only recently that cooperation on this issue became more formalised. It has however only became semi- institutionalised, since not one institution has taken on the task of protecting internally displaced persons.

The fact that states were able to cooperate on a basic level without institutionalisation would imply that there is at least some degree of harmony around this issue. This coincides with what Wagner has said about conflict and cooperation. When you observe cooperation in a certain area, it is best to assume there is a state of harmony, before attempting to analyse how states were able to transcend the temptation of cheating. He claims that the game theory models are not the right way to analyse international situations in a lot of cases.\textsuperscript{121} However to stop the analysis here, by assuming there is harmony in this area appears too easy. Since cooperation only on a very basic level was possible, it may be the case that there is only harmony to some extent and for more elaborate cooperation some institutionalisation was necessary.

\textsuperscript{120}Ibidem, pp.50.
Considering that a degree of cooperation was possible without formalisation, implies that the transaction costs were low, so there was no need for an institution to lower these costs. Low transaction costs may also explain that even now, when there is more elaborate cooperation, there is still no international organisation for IDPs. Apparently having the tasks of such an organisation being fulfilled by several international organisations is at this time enough to overcome the transaction costs of cooperation. At the same time one can also argue however that taking the cooperation to a next level, in the form of a treaty on the rights of IDPs and the founding of an organisation who will guard these rights, has not been possible so far since states deem the transaction costs too high. By surrendering part of their independence on how to treat their own citizens, they would have to accept a great amount of uncertainty which can only be outweighed by an organisation which is able to monitor compliance and enforce when is necessary. And since no such organisation exists yet, one could argue that this means that the transaction costs are too high for an institution to compensate for.

As mentioned in the previous paragraph can the existence of other institutions have an influence on the creation of a new regime. This seems to be especially the case for IDPs. The existence of a highly formalised regime for refugees made it on the one hand clear that the contrast was very large when looking at the very unorganised protection of people in refugee like situations. It gave morally an incentive to solidify the IDP regime. It however also gave a good example to states on what the benefits, but also the disadvantages are of the regime that was chosen for refugees. In the past decades some states have been less willing to abide by the rules of the Refugee Convention, which possibly also influenced their willingness to invest a large amount of resources in the founding of a new international organisation for IDPs.

Hypotheses on Cooperation
According to Keohane and Axelrod the extent of cooperation depends on the payoff structure of the situation, the shadow of the future, the number of players and the context. When considering the payoff structure of the issue of IDP protection, it is difficult to relate a specific game from game theory to this topic. Since it concerns the states' own citizens, this means that a party will not have a large strategic or economic interest in another state treating their IDPs well. Only from a moral and humanitarian standpoint they have a direct interest and only indirectly they may have an interest in the sense of avoiding regional instability and refugee flows. On the other hand, states do have a strong interest in protecting their own
independence to act. Committing to giving certain rights to IDPs or giving an organisation great power to intervene or criticize on certain situations, could be seen as an infringement to their sovereignty. So states would benefit from cooperation, but the costs are also high. Since the costs are so high, they would probably prefer to have assurances that other states will not defect so their sacrifices are not in vain. So in that sense the situation does have some similarities to the Prisoner's Dilemma, more than with Stag Hunt and Chicken. The Prisoner's Dilemma according to Keohane and Axelrod is not the best starting point to achieve cooperation, but it is possible to overcome the problems with an international organisation.

The shadow of the future for the IDP issue is probably only moderately relevant. The states probably would prefer to keep working together on this issue also in the future, but it seems more likely that they are not considering cheating in this area right now because of interests in other areas. Not cooperating on IDP protection, could have consequences for their reputation in other regimes. The shadow of the future of these other regimes are likely to play a larger role in the state's motivation to cooperate now and in the future, than the shadow of the future of the regime itself.

There is a large number of states involved in the protection of IDPs. For that reason the chances of cooperation would be considered considerably lower due to problems with reciprocity and high transaction costs. International institutions may be very helpful though to make to cooperation easier.

The context for cooperation on the IDP issue is also very important. The fact that there is a regime for IDPs with semi-institutionalisation, is something that will make cooperation easier to facilitate and continue in the future.

2.4. Conclusion
Liberal institutionalism is optimistic about the prospects of cooperation in international relations, since states prefer cooperation over non-cooperation. They only need some help to overcome problems of uncertainty and high transaction costs. By monitoring compliance and facilitating enforcement the costs of cooperation can be lowered, so cooperation becomes a rational choice. The Prisoner's Dilemma can be overcome by iterativeness of interactions and by taking into account the shadow of the future. The chances for the development of cooperation can be increased by certain pay-off structures, like for example the Stag Hunt. Also a long shadow of the future and a small number of actors will increase the chance for cooperation. The context is however also important, for example the presence of an
international organisation and issue linkage may help overcome problems. The higher the degree of formalisation in such an institution, the lower the chance states will cheat.

Liberal institutionalism can explain to some degree why cooperation has been possible between states on the topic of IDPs. The IDP topic is however very complex since it mostly a domestic issue, which brings a lot of sensitivities along with it. The theory however seems to mostly focus on predicting whether or not cooperation is possible in the first place and not so much on the level of cooperation or the type of institution that would make more cooperation possible. There is clearly some cooperation on this issue between states, but the fact that there is not one organisation which organises all aid and protects IDPs does not seem that easily explained by liberal institutionalism. This while there appear to be many benefits to such an organisation.
Chapter Three: Human Security and Cooperation

This chapter will look into the human security discourse, its views on cooperation and the role of international institutions in that process. Finally it will elaborate on the connection between human security and internal displacement and how its understanding of cooperation fits with the fact that there is no international organization for IDPs.

3.1. Human Security

The concept of human security is easiest to explain by comparing it to the traditional way of looking at security. Traditionally the recipient of security was the state. The core values that had to be protected were sovereignty and territoriality. This meant that security issues were mostly the protection of the state, its boundaries, its people and its institutions from external attack. Threats were assumed to come from external sources and the instruments to achieve security were mostly military.\(^{122}\)

After the Cold War the meaning and content of security became more contested. More conflicts were intrastate wars and the proportion of civilian casualties was increasing.\(^{123}\) In 1994 the UNDP published the so called Human Development Report which introduced the concept of human security. The concept introduced referent objects of security beyond the state. Individuals and communities became the principal referent object of security. It also entailed an expansion of the security concerns, so people would have freedom from fear and freedom from want. The concept was broader than just the physical safety of people during conflict. The ideas of freedom from fear and freedom from want are not new. The founders of the UN already mentioned these two sides of security and the importance of the security of people. In practice however did the focus mainly go to state security and the needs of people moved to the background.\(^{124}\)

However there is not just one definition of human security. A good example of this is the fact that the states who were most committed into putting the human security discourse on the international agenda, have very different definitions of human security.\(^{125}\) Japan focuses on

---


\(^{123}\) Ibidem, pp.8.


\(^{125}\) Ibidem, pp. 32.
the freedom from want and Canada on freedom from fear. The UNDP definition of human security is especially broad, aiming for sustainable human development to achieve security for the individual. This can be achieved by securing economical, food, health, environmental, communal, personal and political security. In general human security has been praised for focussing on the comprehensivity of security problems and the interlinkage of the components of security. However such broad definitions as the one of the UNDP have been heavily criticized for making everything a security concern, and because of that it becomes extremely difficult to make policy choices.

According to Frerks and Klein Goldewijk are the main characteristics of human security the following: it is of universal concern, relevant to people everywhere, the components of human security are interdependent, the focus is on prevention instead of intervention and it is people centred.

At the World Summit Outcome human security was defined as:

*the right of all people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all these rights and fully develop their human potential.*

Some see individuals as the only referent of security, others only see it complementary to state security. Some states were at first suspicious of human security and saw it, like the debate surrounding humanitarian intervention, as a pretence for intervention in their domestic affairs and an infringement of the principles of national sovereignty. Despite the reluctance of some states, human security has gained a place on the international agenda. Due to the personal commitment of Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN, it has become a topic in many UN documents like ‘In larger freedom’ and fora like the World Summit.

---

127 MacFarlane, Human Security and the UN, pp.13.
131 World Summit Outcome A/RES/60/1, par. 143.
3.2. Human Security and Cooperation between States

Human security in the broad sense, which aims for both individual and state security, sees the current international state system with a focus on sovereignty to be the main hindrance to achieving both human security and meaningful cooperation. As long as the state remains a closed entity with the right not to have interference from other states or international organisations in its internal affairs, cooperation will remain limited. As long as sovereignty remains absolute, on certain subjects there will not be any cooperation since some states are not willing to open themselves up to scrutiny from the international community. That is why human security wants to change the rigidity of the current system, not so much by revolutionary changing the international system but by making sovereignty and the principle of non-interference less absolute. Human security is however not in contradiction to the state and state security, both can complement each other. That was the conclusion of the Commission on Human Security in 2003. \(^{134}\)

To achieve human security the principle of sovereignty has to become less rigid. The means to achieve state security do not serve to achieve human security at the same time, so to achieve human security or both, the way international relations are done will have to change to some degree. This way subjects on which cooperation thus far has not been possible, or have been hindered by the way the international system works, can finally develop their full potential. One of these subjects would be the issue of internal displacement.

Constructivism is closely connected to the human security discourse in how they perceive the world around them. They share some important assumptions. Human security sees more than states with their security concerns, and looks beyond that to zoom in at the individual. Constructivism sees behaviour, interests and relationships as socially constructed. Therefore they can change. This also means that threats to security are constructed and not inevitable. \(^{135}\) By looking at problems in a different way, solutions may present themselves that would otherwise stay hidden. As Mary Kaldor said, new language to describe the world is needed since the old language prevent us from finding new solutions to problems. \(^{136}\)

The human security focus means that because many of the current threats to the individual’s safety are no longer issues that can be solved nationally, transnational cooperation is necessary. An example of this are environmental problems, but many of the threats

\(^{135}\) Williams, Security Studies, pp. 241.
individuals face are no longer of a domestic nature. Therefore to achieve human security states will have to work together more closely and will need the help of international organisations to deal with issues.  

Human security can be seen as an important contributing factor to achieving international security. Order cannot rest solely on sovereignty and viability of states. It also depends on the individual and their sense of security. This is opposed to liberal institutionalism which sees order as resting on institutional arrangements.

### 3.3 Human Security and Internal Displacement

Internal displacement is one of the major issues where international cooperation has been hampered by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Until this point IDPs are out of reach of the international community, because of the negative approach to sovereignty. Because the issue is purely an internal matter, states have been hesitant so far to commit to extensive cooperation in the form of a treaty or an organisation. Once it is the main goal or one of the main goals of the international society and the states themselves to attain human security, then sovereignty can no longer be used as an impediment to attaining that goal.

The close connection between internal displacement and human security can also be shown by the fact that Mary Kaldor suggested to measure human security by displaced persons, since it is a key feature of the current crises. This is not entirely surprising, since internal displacement is a very specific issue which shows that in some situations it is not acceptable to aim for protection of human rights and at the same time allow states to hide behind a shield of sovereignty and non-interference when they act towards their citizens in a way contradictory to international law.

The persons promoting the rights and needs of IDPs were very important in opening up the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. As mentioned before, Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen played a large role in the development of the idea that states have a responsibility to provide for protection and be concerned with the general welfare of their citizens.

---

141 Deng, 'Trapped within Hostile Borders', pp. 42.
The subject of internal displacement was actually specifically mentioned by the UNDP in one of their later reports concerning human security. In 1994 the UNDP determined that the biggest threats to human security were drug trafficking, migration, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Population displacements in general were also mentioned as threats and challenges to human security at that stage. Also the interdependence between the several challenges was emphasized.\textsuperscript{142} A subsequent report made internal displacement one of the main focus areas which should receive increased attention.

It has often been said that the current cooperation on IDPs is too much focussed on the freedom from want, or the humanitarian aid part. The freedom from fear is much more politically sensitive. On the one hand are states reluctant to admit that they are repressing their own people. In the case the fear is caused by rebel groups which control part of the territory, states are not likely to admit that their government is not strong enough to control all of its territory. Human security is focussed on prevention, this matches with diverting from the main focus on freedom from want, which would be comparable to providing humanitarian aid after the displacement has occurred. Instead the strengthening of people’s right not to be displaced in the first place and the prevention of security threats should become more prominent.

3.4. Conclusion

Human security focuses on several threats that influence the sense of security of human beings. To achieve this kind of security, cooperation of states, with or without the aid of an international organisation, is necessary. Especially since many of the threats to human security are transnational. Like constructivism, does the human security discourse not see threats as inevitable and institutions, like the state, as fixed. This is on the one hand an optimistic view, because when things can change, the goal of human security for all mankind can be achieved. However to change the way the world thinks about concepts like sovereignty and non-intervention can take a long time. Although it appears that sovereignty and non-intervention have become less absolute in the past decades, they are still the main principles of international relations.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibidem, pp. 237-238.
Conclusion

This thesis has looked into the way the international system around internally displaced persons is organised. More specifically it has tried to answer the question why is there to this day no international organisation for internally displaced persons which can coordinate aid and protect them. This was done by using liberal institutionalism and the human security discourse to find some explanations for this situation.

At this point several organisations share the efforts of helping IDPs in case their own state fails to do so. In practice this means that extensive cooperation is necessary to ensure that the needs of the IDPs are being met in an efficient manner. In the past decades it has been attempted to improve coordination between the organisations, however besides reluctance from the side of states, the equal status of the organisations involved, the hesitation of some IGOs and NGOs to give up their work in this area and the fact that some of them are part of the UN system and others not, have hindered attempts to improve coordination. Some changes have occurred by implementing the Collaborative and Cluster Approaches, and even though especially the implementation of the Cluster Approach has had a positive effect on the predictability and filling gaps of the aid, some issues remain. Though more time will likely lead to an even smoother working of the Cluster Approach, some problems seem inherent in the system of cooperation as opposed to one organisation which looks after the needs of IDPs.

States may have been unwilling to change this system so far, due to the fact that it concerns the treatment of their own citizens. This is one of the core elements of sovereignty and cooperation on this issue does not give them large direct gains which makes states very hesitant to make enforceable commitments. The definition of an IDP has remained very broad but loosely phrased, so no special status or rights are awarded to IDPs. Additionally this has given states the option to interpret the definition in a way that best suited them at a certain point in time. This approach gave them the option of cooperating without committing to anything. This lack of a more narrow definition has however made it more difficult to set up an IO for IDPs, since it would not be clear who this organisation exactly would be protecting and helping.

Even though the current system is not performing as well as one central organisation could, there are no prospects of such an organisation in the near future. Liberal institutionalism understands the fact that there is not one organisation on internal displacement by focussing on the costs and benefits of cooperation. In general they are optimistic about the possibilities of cooperation. International organisations can in their view
be very helpful in making cooperation possible, by lowering uncertainty and transaction costs. This way perceived benefits and costs will change. When the benefits outweigh the costs, cooperation will be possible. Since there is cooperation in the field of IDPs, this would mean that states do perceive this cooperation to have more positive effects than negative effects for them. But since they are not willing to go one step further, and found an organisation for internally displaced persons, one could deduce that this extra step would mean that the extra benefits do not outweigh the extra costs of infringing on their sovereignty.

Liberal institutionalism however does also look beyond absolute costs calculations. The context also affects the possibilities for cooperation. Cooperation and international organisations emerge often in a previously institutionalised context which may influence the way parties perceive costs and benefits. The confidence in a regime can make the creation of a new regime easier. In the case of IDPs the opposite seems to be the case. The refugees regime is very strong, and in the past years states have experienced the restrictions this regime gives them. Their attempts to bend the rules in their favour so they can accept less refugees is a good example of that. The experience of the refugee regime made states extra aware that an extensive regime on IDPs would also mean handing over a large amount of control on this issue. So in this sense liberal institutionalism would explain the absence of an IDP IO by a hostile context for cooperation.

The human security discourse looks at the situation in a different way. This discourse points at the way international relations are done as the constricting factor. The absoluteness of sovereignty and connected to that the principle of non-interference make it very difficult to focus on human security besides or instead of national security. Internal displacement is an issue that has a large effect on the life of people and their security, but since in many cases it only affects national security on a very limited scale, there is little incentive in the current focus on national security to cooperate on this issue to a larger extent. In the case of freedom from want states have been willing to waive some of their sovereignty, but that has not been the case regarding freedom from fear.

This means that the human security discourse thinks it is necessary to change the primary subject of security. When one wants to put individuals or communities at the centre, this would mean that sovereignty can no longer be absolute and used as a shield against outside interference when the security of people are in great danger. As long as the absoluteness of these principles remains, there will be little incentive for states to truly commit to the security and the rights of the internally displaced. This means that the potential for an organisation for IDP cooperation is in their view low, since the absoluteness of the
principles of international law have only changed very slightly in the past years.

It can be concluded that both discourses have a different explanation for the fact that there is currently no international organisation for IDPs. Liberal institutionalism however is better suited in explaining why there is cooperation at all on the issue of internal displacement, and to a lesser degree why it is not more extensive cooperation. Human security explains better that the main issue holding further cooperation back, is the way the international system works which affects the way states perceive the transaction costs of an IDP international organisation. The absoluteness of sovereignty and non interference are holding back cooperation. These have to change before human security can be achieved and extensive cooperation like an IO for IDPs would become possible.

Realist and neorealist theories are too pessimistic about cooperation in this field since there is some cooperation occurring between countries on IDPs. However it can be concluded by looking through the lenses of liberal institutionalism and human security at the IDP issue, that even theories which are optimistic about the possibilities of cooperation in the current state system, say that the prospects for an international organisation on internal displacement are not that good. Reality also confirms this, since even though a binding treaty on internal displacement has been created for the African continent, this has not resulted in the creation of a continent wide organisation to coordinate the efforts.

Further developments in cooperation in the next years are likely to be fine-tuning of the coordination of the aid provided by different agencies and institutions. Focussing on how to improve the current system would seem to be the best approach according to the conclusions from these two theories on the potential for an IDP organisation being founded. Even though sovereignty has become less absolute in the last decades, it is still an important basic rule of international relations and states consider handing over parts of their sovereignty still as a threat. Overruling sovereignty does not happen often, and those instances where it did happen are controversial and should be seen as the exception to the rule.

Looking in this way at the IDP issue shows once more how large of an impact the choice for the current state system has on the lives of people. Only the crossing of an artificially created border between two countries means that a completely different set of rules applies to them. As a refugee they would get extensive international protection, as an IDP they have to hope their own state looks after them. Because of the way the international system is set up the IDP issue will probably never be completely solved, which shows that the current system does have many inherent imperfections that warrant serious consideration.
for changing it at least to some extent. The reality in the world has changed, new problems arise like IDPs, but the old system is not equipped to deal with those issues.
Bibliography

Books and articles


- Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading etc., 1979.


Documents

- World Summit Outcome A/RES/60/1.

**Websites**


- What is the cluster approach? <http://clusters.humanitarianresponse.info/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach> (consulted 1 September 2013).
