Anti-corruption in a mission scenario

How did an international military mission impact on corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo?

Author: Roezana Khanamirjan
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Roezana Khanamirjan
S1723375

Thesis Supervisor: dr. A. van den Assem
Military Mentor: Captain M. Corbe
Military Mentor: Major J. Stiegler

Jardensweg 40
9472 PH Zuidlaren
0031(0)645656517
Preface

This thesis was written in the context of my graduation from Master International Security (International Relations and International Organization). Besides representing my Master Thesis, this paper is also the result of an internship program at the Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence (CCOE) from November 2014 until March 2015. Embedded in the Concepts Interoperability and Capabilities (CIC) Branch I provided an assessment on the influence of a military operation on corruption in the mission area. I analyzed the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The project was aimed at supplementing the CCOE’s work in the area of general awareness for corruption, its consequences and possible counter measures. Several interviews with Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Staff that have been deployed to SFOR and KFOR brought an additional flavor to my thesis¹ and demonstrated the importance of the topic.

The aim of this analysis was to identify the impact of an international military mission on corruption and to find tools which CIMIC can use before and during a mission to avoid and/or counter corruption. Methodologically, I used a combination of literature study, case study analysis and qualitative interviews with soldiers that have been deployed to SFOR and KFOR. The CCOE personnel have been of huge relevance in conducting this research by providing experiences and insights. These experiences and the findings contributed to generate new knowledge on the topic and led to recommendations how the military can avoid and/or counter corruption during their mission.

During the period in which I conducted this research I came across difficulties and unexpected circumstances. Luckily my supervisors helped me out with the questions which I had, and provide me advice, which helped me to find answers to the research question. Therefore, I want to thank my thesis supervisor A. van den Assem, my military mentors at CCOE Captain M. Corbe, and Major J. Stiegler for their valuable feedback and advice. Furthermore, I want to thank CCOE, in particular director Colonel Roel Been, for providing me the opportunity to conduct my research at the organization. Special thanks go to all the interviewees who were willing to share their valuable experiences with me. Furthermore, I want to thank Lieutenant-Colonel S. Meic for his help and involvement. Finally, I want to thank my family and fiancée for their support and for their patience.

¹ The views expressed in the study are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I hope you enjoy reading.

Roezana Khanamirjan

Zuidlaren, 16 June 2015.
Abstract

In this thesis the focus is to identify the impact of an international military mission on corruption and to find tools which CIMIC can use before and during a mission to avoid and/or counter corruption. In order to find answers I used a combination of literature study, case study analysis and qualitative interviews with soldiers that have been deployed to SFOR and KFOR. The CCOE personnel have been of huge relevance in conducting this research by providing experiences and insights. These experiences and the findings contributed to generate new knowledge on the topic and led to recommendations how the military can avoid and/or counter corruption during their mission.

Corruption is a complex multi-faceted phenomenon, both in the interdisciplinary academic debate and in its appearance in societies. This does not only provide the context for this study, but also a definition applicable to the regional appearance in the Balkans. The regional and cultural context are best reflected by defining corruption as “any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs”.

The analysis demonstrated that a military mission – in this case SFOR and KFOR – has both negative and positive effects on corruption. During these missions the local economy was stressed by the huge increase of the international funds. The demand for local services by the military provided additional sources of income for the population. On the contrary, this accelerated the culture of providing favors and gifts in return for access to public services in the healthcare and government sector, thus leading into a dilemma with little choice to avoid corruption.

For the military evidence for positive impact of these missions can be found in detailed contracts that only allowed cooperation with ‘clean’ companies. However, despite that the NATO CIMIC Doctrine advocates for “zero tolerance for any corruption”, it was not always possible to avoid the corruption in local structures at all times. Missing awareness on the cultural circumstances and a lack of detailed knowledge sometimes led to careless behavior that indirectly fueled corruption. The complex society structures did not always allow a clear distinction between a lawful businessman and corrupt companies or information and security provider. Thus, the Military was also facing the dilemma of avoiding corrupt practices.

In order to avoid possible negative effects on corruption by a military mission I have analyzed possible tools – mainly based on the findings from interviews – which can be used before and/or during a mission. First, I identified a missing awareness on corruption in the context of culture,
economic and social structures in the mission area. Everybody should be aware that corruption has many facets and in some cultures is perceived as normal and accepted behavior. Training and Education military personnel in specific mission preparation for example at national and international training centers. More specific, the distinct training opportunities at the Civil Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, the *NATO CIMIC Field and Staff Worker Courses* and the *NATO CIMIC Higher Command Course*, are focusing on cultural awareness. If tools for countering corruption were included in those trainings it would also contribute to CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, which seeks that the “*projects reflect the respect with the cultural background of the respective society*”.

Second, the military can also avoid and/or counter corruption by establishing clear guidelines and purchase policies for every project and involvement of local business. In this process fund management and application of the guidelines need to be strictly enforced. Third, the use of Functional Specialists during a mission in the areas of legal service, contracting and governance could be an asset in supporting the military with specific expertise and avoiding careless behavior on an unfamiliar subject. Finally, corruption can also be avoided and/or countered by being transparent and open. Although idealistic, the request for transparency and openness from every actor the military deals with is important and adheres to the principles of NATO CIMIC Doctrine. Countering corruption should have a higher priority during a mission, because the same corruption has an impact on the outcome of the mission as well as on the safe and secure environment the military is striving for.
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List of Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCOE</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Concepts, Interoperability and Capabilities Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deutsche Mark</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO-led Implementation FORCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSF</td>
<td>Kosovo Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>NATO-led Stabilization Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCAC</td>
<td>United Nations Convention against Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMBiH</td>
<td>UN mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Social Republic</td>
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</table>
Introduction

“Unless we equip ourselves to be better prepared, future missions are doomed to repeat old mistakes”\(^2\). With these words Pyman, Director of Transparency International UK’s Defence & Security Programme, reacted on the report *Corruption: lessons from the international mission in Afghanistan*. He emphasized the importance of anti-corruption policies during international missions, because the slow response to corruption in Afghanistan by the international community endangered the international mission. Consequently, anti-corruption measures in the planning process of future international missions are advocated\(^3\). In North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO’s) *Building Integrity Education and Training Plan* NATO too states that “corruption has a negative impact on the Alliance’s ability to conduct effective operations”\(^4\), therefore it is aiming to develop an understanding of corruption and its impact by training of military personnel\(^5\). Both, *Transparency International* and NATO have expressed a focus on how corruption influences the outcome of an international mission, and how corruption impacts the stability and the (economic) development of a mission area in their policy documents.

However, these organizations do not (entirely) deal with possible negative impacts corruption may have on the outcome of an international mission and on the establishment of a secure and stable environment. Therefore, in this study I will try to address this gap with the following research question: how did an international military mission impact on corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo? In particular, there will be a case study analysis of the international missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. In addition, to answer the research question, possible tools how the military can avoid and/or counter corruption before and during a mission will be identified and discussed. The analysis focuses on the military function Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), because CIMIC implies interaction and close connection between military and civilian elements by definition. This organization focuses on civil-military cooperation, which is important in the process of counter corruption. Furthermore, most of the research was conducted at the NATO Think Tank on CIMIC, the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) in The Hague, where I got access to primary sources and

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\(^3\) Ibidem.


\(^5\) Idem, p. 3.
interviews with CIMIC personnel. In this context it is important to briefly elaborate on the organization to have an understanding of it.

The CCOE – founded in 2005 – is a NATO accredited multinational Centre of Excellence. Its primary mission is “to assist NATO and its Sponsoring Nations and other military and civil institutions/organizations in their operational and transformation efforts in the field of civil-military interaction.” To achieve this goal CCOE offers “innovative and timely advice and subject matter expertise in the development of existing and new concepts” in the form of publications, conferences and seminars; updated policy and doctrine; specialized education and training; and the contribution to the lessons learned processes”⁶.

Methodology

The analysis follows an approach of qualitative research. Besides the literature study, documents of international organizations – such as Transparency International, the United Nations and the NATO – have been analyzed. Furthermore, the research at the CCOE provided an excellent opportunity for data generation through qualitative interviews with CIMIC-staff and non-military personnel that has been deployed in the Balkans, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Thus, the missions in Bosnia and in Kosovo will function as case studies, where I will investigate this contemporary phenomenon in the real-world context in more depth⁷. I will not elaborate on the background of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo in too much detail. However, in Appendix A there is a list of sources about the conflict in Bosnia and in Kosovo for the reader who is interested in the background information.

Reasons to choose Bosnia and Kosovo as case studies are the profound body of literature and that the missions are almost completed. Moreover, these two cases share a culture and a history – such as being part of the same political system⁸ and being part of former Yugoslavia. They also share similar problems after the fall of the system and the dissolution of the former Federal Republic of

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⁶ The information about the CCOE which is provided in this analysis can be found on the following website http://www.cimic-coe.org/ (17 April 2015). A detailed description of the tasks can be found in the following document: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, “Conceptual Considerations on Civil-Military Interaction,” May 30, 2014.


Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{9}. Due to these similarities a case study research allows to compare the cases with each other and find patterns real-world perspective\textsuperscript{10} in how an international mission affected corruption in these mission areas. While I realize that this multiple-case study research might “\textit{require extensive resources and time}” and the results might be literal replication\textsuperscript{11}, this allows me to test the findings of the first case study and verify them on base of the other. Besides case study research the methodology of this paper is also based on Qualitative Data Analysis. In the process of conducting interviews I had to be aware of response bias and inaccuracy, because of poor recall of information by the interviewees\textsuperscript{12}. However, because the interviews have been recorded and transcribed the interviewee had the opportunity to revise the incorrect information. Unfortunately, during the approval of the interview some sensitive information was not approved.

The interviews were then coded and analyzed according to the code system shown in table 1. I will shortly elaborate on why I have chosen for these particular codes. By choosing for the code \textit{definition} I was able to analyze how several interviewees defined corruption. Second, by choosing for the code \textit{subjects to corruption} I strived to find out how several societies, cultures and actors perceived corruption. These two codes were relevant for the discussion in chapter one where I discuss extensive amount of definitions of corruption and perceptions of corruption. I used the code \textit{situation} in order to identify the mission area, under which conditions the interviewees had to operate (war, peace period) and how they dealt with corruption. By using this code I also could identify examples how the missions affected on corruption in the mission areas. This code was relevant for the chapters two and three and for the formulation of answers to the research question. Finally, by using code \textit{tools} I strived to identify key actors/factors and several tools which could be implemented in order to avoid and/or counter corruption during future missions. This code was relevant in chapter four where I elaborate on the tools in the process of counter corruption.

Table 1: Code system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Description of the codes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Definition of corruption provided by the interviewee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects to corruption</td>
<td>Different perspectives about corruption:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{11} Idem, 57.
\textsuperscript{12} Idem, 106.
From the perspective of the military who have been on an international mission.
- From the perspective of the local actors: how they experience and define corruption.

**Situation**
- The country in which the interviewee has been on a mission.
- The situation in the mission area.
- Guidelines during the mission on how to deal with corruption and how military actually dealt with corruption.
- Examples of corruption during a mission provided by the interviewees.
- The influence of a mission on corruption in the mission area.

**Tools**
- Tools to counter corruption. Here the tools are categorized in three groups, namely
  - Tools general: general tools which the international community can use to counter corruption in a mission situation.
  - Tools CIMIC: tools for CIMIC which can be used to counter corruption during a mission.
  - Tools military: military tools to counter corruption in a mission situation.
  - Key actors/factors: which are the key factors/who are the key actors, which can be used as tools in countering corruption.

The relevant information deduced from the interviews were compared with the literature, which enhanced the study by practical examples, insights and personal perceptions. Although the sample of the conducted interviews is not representative for the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo as a whole, the data provides valuable information on personal experiences that cannot be found in the literature.

In total I have conducted twenty four interviews. Twenty of these interviews were with soldiers from NATO nations who have the perception from Western democracies. Eight of these interviewees have been on the mission in Bosnia and five of them in Kosovo. Three have been in both countries. However, there are also four interviewees without a military background, nevertheless they have worked closely with the military in the Balkans. Hence, the findings of this analysis is not only based on military experiences. These non-military interviewees provide relevant insights that differ
from military perspective or are confirmative. Furthermore, some of the interviewees work and/or live in the Balkans, hence they have close links with the mission areas. Due to security reasons more details about the interviewees will not be provided. Security also formed a limitation in search for information, because not all the interviewees were willing to share. Furthermore, there were three interviewees who had no experiences in the Balkans, but they were in Afghanistan and/or in Africa. These interviews provided additional perspectives from different societies which will be discussed in chapter one. Besides that they provided also valuable insights to formulate recommendations on possible tools for countering corruption in a mission scenario. However, it is relevant to mention that these findings are not holistic, because they are based on few and individual sources of information. In table 2 there is an overview of the division of the interviewees.

Table 2: Overview of the interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24 interviewees</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 military</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 non-military</td>
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</table>

- 8 interviewees: mission in Bosnia
- 5 interviewees: mission in Kosovo
- 3 interviewees in Bosnia and in Kosovo
- 3 interviewees: mission in Afghanistan and/or in Africa

Finally, the methodology is complimented by the theoretical frameworks of constructivism and game-theory. I have chosen for these theories, because game-theory is strong in explaining interest and chances, but it is weak in explaining the cultural context. Constructivism, on contrary
explains well the cultural context of corruption. Therefore, the combination of these theories helps in explaining the corrupt behavior of the several actors in the Balkans. If I would exclude one of the theories, the analysis would not be complete, because the actors in the mission areas not only act in a corrupt way because it is in their culture, but they also act in a corrupt way, because it is in their interest to have access to the basic goods.

The research designed follows a division of the research question into sub-questions. Chapter one is a literature study to elaborate on the phenomena and definitions of corruption. It is illustrated that corruption is a complex phenomenon and it is difficult to formulate a universal definition of corruption, because there is disagreement about the definition of corruption in several cultures and several societies. The disagreement is also clear in the theoretical framework, where game-theory states that an agent is rational and therefore his/her actions are based on maximizing utility\textsuperscript{13}. In maximizing utility an agent might choose for corrupt behavior after making a cost-benefit analysis. From this analysis it is clear that a person will consider acting in a corrupt way when the benefits outweigh the costs\textsuperscript{14}. Thus, from game-theory perspective corrupt behavior is defined in the (economic) terms of ‘maximizing utility’, ‘power’, and ‘getting and expending own interests’.

Constructivists on the other hand focus on norm development, identity, ideas and ideational power\textsuperscript{15}. Consequently, in defining corruption constructivist scholars emphasize the importance of norms. This becomes clear from the definition of corruption conceptualized by Samuel Huntington, who stated that corruption is “behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends”\textsuperscript{16}.

Furthermore, chapter one further elaborates on corruption from a Western and from a non-Western perspective. Western perspective is defined with European and transatlantic democracies, such as the member states of NATO and EU. The several Western definitions of corruption, discussed in this chapter, have overarching elements such as ‘abuse of power’, ‘private/personal gains’, ‘public official’, ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct’. The non-Western perspective is heterogeneous and more


difficult to define. I have differentiated between several cultural regions like Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa, former U.S.S.R. and Mediterranean littoral – in particular the Balkans. Because this research focuses on the Balkans, the discussion in chapter one establishes that in the Balkans corruption is perceived as ‘part of the normal behavior and normal living’, as ‘way of life’, and ‘part of the culture’.

From this discussion I conclude that when there is the cultural component of corruption then the actors are not only act in the terms of game-theory, maximize utility, be rational, but they also act according to the norms and values, which is emphasized by Constructivism. Thus, there is a different pay-off structure and therefore I will use a combination of Constructivism and game-theory in the following chapters in discussing corruption. After discussing the different perspectives and the different theories in this chapter I have chosen the following definition which will guide the research: corruption are “any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs”. The reason why I have chosen for this definition of corruption is, because it reproduces the aspects which are important when we deal with corruption from different perspectives and in different cultures, like from Western and non-Western societies and cultures. A detailed justification for this choice can be found in chapter one.

Chapter two analyzes the sub-question of the impact an international mission has on corruption? The analysis points out that an international mission may affect corruption in a positive and in a negative way. The several positive and negative impacts of an international mission are tested in the case study analysis in chapter three. In this chapter I discuss the case studies Kosovo and Bosnia in order to find out whether the findings from the previous chapters can be applied to the missions in the Balkans. The case studies Kosovo and Bosnia provide strong evidence for the positive and negative affects the international missions had on corruption. The examples and perceptions provided by the interviewees illustrate extensive amount of similarities in how the missions impacted on corruption.

The case studies analysis also enforce the normative-cultural and the theoretical considerations on corruption. The population acts in a corrupt way, because it is common to give a doctor a gift or do a favor to a person. This fits in the line of reasoning of the constructivists, where the cultural norms are emphasized. The citizens are also involved in corruption, because if they would

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not pay a governmental official or a university, they would not have access to these services. Thus, it is in their own interest to act in a corrupt way. This fits in the way how game-theory – where the actors make a cost-benefit analysis – approaches corruption. As the interviewees argued it is better to deal with this corrupt system, because otherwise the mission goals will not be achieved and the inhabitants will not have for example schools and/or houses. From these chapters I digested main answers and conclusions to the research question, namely that an international military mission affects corruption both positively and negatively.

After establishing the effects of a mission on corruption during these missions, in chapter five I discuss what the military tools are to counter-corruption in a mission scenario? Here I formulate tools – based on the interviews – which can be used before and during a mission scenario to avoid and/or counter corruption. As this chapter will illustrate countering and/or avoiding corruption can be achieved by enhancing awareness of the culture, the situation, and the corrupt system of a mission area. This can be achieved by training of the military at the CCOE, where the centre already deals with inter alia good governance and culture. However, anti-corruption is not cooperating in these courses. Moreover, corruption can also be avoided and/or countered in establishing clear guidelines and purchase polices in the process of building projects. Here it is important that there is control so everybody strictly follows these guidelines. Finally, corruption can also be avoided and/or countered by being transparent and open, and by requiring transparency and openness from every actor with whom military deal with. To conclude, in this paper I advocate for the fact that countering corruption should be a priority during a mission.

Chapter 1: Defining corruption

Corruption is a phenomenon which has different forms and is considered to be complex\(^\text{18}\). The complexity of corruption already starts with the various definitions it has\(^\text{19}\). To demonstrate this, this chapter will elaborate on the several definitions of corruption. In order to do so, first different general


definitions of corruption will be analyzed to identify patterns. Corruption will also be discussed from different cultural perspectives – from the perspective of Western democracies and from various non-Western perspective, in particular from the perspective of the Balkans. Furthermore, corruption will be discussed from different theoretical approaches, such as constructivism and game-theory. Finally, this chapter concludes in a definition of corruption that will be applied in this study.

In the Oxford dictionaries corruption is defined as “dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery.”20 Other frequently cited dictionaries come to similar definitions21. Corruption.org provided four different definitions of corruption starting with the simple definition “the misuse of public power (by elected politician or appointed civil servant) for private gain”, and ending with a more complex definition – developed by dr. Van Duyne: “corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker consents to deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule his or her decision-making, in exchange for a reward or for the promise or expectation of a reward, while these motives influencing his or her decision-making cannot be part of the justification of the decision.”22. Another frequently used definition of corruption is formulated by the World Bank Group, stating that corruption is “the abuse of public office for private gain”23. Transparency International, an international non-governmental organization that monitors and publicizes political corruption, builds on the definition of corruption formulated by the World Bank Group defining it as followed: “corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It hurts everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority”24.

Since 2003, The United Nations have a multilateral convention against corruption: the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). This is the first international legal binding instrument against corruption25. Despite that there is no consensus about how to define the

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phenomenon in the UNCAC, examples of corruption are covered in the Convention. NATO, too provides no own definition. Instead, NATO uses the definitions provided by Transparency International and the World Bank – “the abuse of entrusted authority (public or private) for illegitimate (private or group) gain” – in its reports.

Although, the United Nations and NATO have no clear definition of corruption, the European Union, i.e. Council of Europe, defined corruption in the Civil Law Convention on Corruption in article 2 as “corruption means requesting, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behavior required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof.” Moreover, in 1997 the European Union established a Convention on the Fight Against Corruption where a distinction is made between active corruption – “the direct or indirect promise of a bribe to a government official or other third party” – and passive corruption – “the direct or indirect request or receipt of a bribe for requester or a third party”.

In this Convention corrupt behavior is considered as a criminal act and therefore, the Member States of the European Union have to implement legislation against corrupt practices. Consequently, for example in the Netherlands penalties for a corrupt act can be found in the Criminal Law. This


way of dealing with corruption is supported by the ‘legalists’ who are inclined to define corruption in legal terms and consider the use of bribes as illegal. They put an emphasis on the illegality – when a behavior is not according to the law – not taking into consideration whether this particular law is moral or not. From this perspective corrupt behavior is defined in terms of ‘illegality’ and is about violation of the law.

Besides formulating corruption in legal terms political scientists give priority to legitimacy and effectiveness of Governance. As Ustinov stated “corruption is nature’s way of restoring our faith in democracy”33. Huntington and Leff further argue that “corruption is democratic (because) it offers opportunities to those who would otherwise be excluded”34. This political dimension is supported by several scholars who emphasize this in corruption. As Johnston formulated, in an article in Comparative Politics, corruption as “abuse of public roles and resources for private benefit”35. The wordings of Johnston is supported by Bukovansky, who defined corruption as “use of public office for private gain or the illegitimate purchase by private actors of political considerations”36. Kurer’s definition of corruption – “corrupt acts are characterized by a holder of public office violating non-discriminating norms in order to gain a private advantage”37 – focuses on the violation of non-discriminating ‘norms’. Shleifer and Vishny conceptualized corruption as “the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain”38. According to these scholars is

corruption not only ‘illegal’ and ‘criminal behavior’, but it is also ‘illegitimate’ and the violator is the ‘public office’ and/or a ‘government official’, thus there is also a political aspect in corruption.

On the other hand, while it is argued that corruption can also degrade the economic efficiency and the civil rights, mainly in terms of free-market democracy and leads to instability, economists argue that corruption can have a positive effect on economic efficiency and political stability. “Corruption may have helped to lubricate the creaky old machinery of communism” in Eastern Europe. Dimitrova and Verheijen claim “some forms of corruption in the communist past even helped to humanize relations between street-level bureaucrats and their clientele”. This is supported by Huntington who argued that “the inflexibility and brutality of an autocratic regime may be softened by corruption”. Rose-Ackerman, on the other hand, claim that corruption creates “costs and distortions”. Schleifer and Vishny add to this way of reasoning by stating that “distortion is worse than the costs as such, and that corruption therefore damages economic development more than taxation”. Klitgaard, a leading expert on corruption, defined corruption in a single formula, namely: “Corruption=Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability (C=M+D-A). By formulating corruption in this way Klitgaard argues that corruption is caused by the Monopolies (monopolies over the resources), by Discretion (lack of transparency) and by lack of Accountability. Thus, from this perspective corruption is defined in the terms of ‘economic (in) efficiency.’

While in the previous paragraphs there is disagreement about whether corruption is good for the economic growth and for the political stability, the revisionists state that corruption neither good

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40 Idem, p. 9.

41 Idem, p. 9.


for the economic growth, nor for the political stability. Nye, an American political scientists and a revisionist, defined corruption as “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding pecuniary or status gains.” Another revisionist scholar, Leff formulated corruption as “an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As such the existence of corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.”

Whereas, above mentioned scholars define corruption in legal, political and economic terms, moralist on the other hand define corruption in ethical terms. Banfield states that “one who follows the rule is without morality...in relation to persons outside the family – [but] in relation to family members, he applies standards of right and wrong.” Another moralist, Leys states that “… the results of nepotism and all other forms of what they call corruption are serious and bad.” In the conceptualization of corruption the moralists use value-laden concepts as ‘right and wrong’ and ‘serious and bad’. The problem with this kind of definitions is that what one society considers as ‘wrong’ and ‘bad’, the other society can consider as ‘right’ way of behavior.

To continue the debate about how corruption should be defined I will elaborate on the discussions between two different approaches – constructivism and game-theory – in order to analyze the underlying causes of corrupt practices. These approaches will be applied in this study and contribute to understand corruption and in formulating counter-corruption measures. Before explaining corruption from these perspectives I will shortly elaborate on the different approaches.

From the perspective of game-theory the social behavior of an agent is explained from the idea that the choice of an agent is bounded by the surrounding structure of an agent – political,

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The theory implies that an agent is rational and therefore action is based on maximizing utility, i.e. striving to get and expend own interests in life. In maximizing utility an agent might choose for corrupt behavior, but before acting in corrupt way this person gathers more information and makes a cost-benefit analysis. From this analysis it is clear that a person will consider acting in a corrupt way when the benefits outweigh the costs - like material costs, risk costs and moral costs.\footnote{Sun Lianju, and Peng Luyan, “Game Theory Analysis of the Bribery Behavior,” \textit{International Journal of Business \\& Social Science} 2:8 (2011), p. 104. Retrieved from \url{http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._8;_May_2011/13.pdf} (28 January 2015).} Besides maximizing utility an agent will act in corrupt way when there is the need for despite that corrupt behavior is condemned.\footnote{Idem, p. 105.} As Klitgaard stated “\textit{a crime of calculation, not of passion. True, there are both saints who resist all temptations and honest officials who resist most. But when bribes are large the chances of being caught small and the penalties if caught meager, many officials will succumb}”\footnote{Robert Klitgaard, “International Cooperation against Corruption,” \textit{Finance and Development}, p.4. Retrieved from \url{http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp191_gephart.pdf} p. 12. (22 January 2015).} Thus, from this analysis about corruption – where the actors are rational and strive to maximize their utility – it can be concluded, that “\textit{power tends to corrupt, and absolute power leads to corrupt absolutely}”\footnote{Acton Institute for the study of religion and liberty. Retrieved from \url{http://www.acton.org/research/lord-acton-quote-archive} (3 February 2015).} Thus, from game-theory perspective corrupt behavior is defined in the (economic) terms of ‘maximizing utility’, ‘power’, and ‘getting and expending own interests’.

Constructivism argues that the reality is socially constructed. The key factors are norm development, identity, ideas and ideational power. Constructivists emphasize “\textit{the meaning that are assigned to material objects, rather than the mere existence of the objects themselves}”\footnote{Jonathan Cristol, “Constructivism”, Oxford Bibliographies. Retrieved from \url{http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0061.xml} (23 January 2015).} Furthermore, constructivist scholars emphasize that a state constructs its identities and norms within the social environment and in the process of social construction certain groups, which are powerful, play a privileged role. Moreover, constructivist theory focuses on culture and social analysis arguing that (a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; (b) the
most important ideational factors are widely shared or ‘intersubjective’ beliefs; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors\textsuperscript{59}. 

Hence, constructivism focuses on norms and ‘social facts’, like money, sovereignty and rights\textsuperscript{60}. In defining corruption constructivist scholars emphasize the importance of norms which is inter alia illustrated in the following definition of corruption \textit{“behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends”}\textsuperscript{61}. Besides, constructivist scholars state that social understanding and norms have different impact on different agents. Thus, the international norms have different impact on different actors in different states, and these norms are not universally shared. One should bear in mind that these international norms come from somewhere – from a certain culture – and there are local variation to these norms, so one should not treat these international norms as \textit{‘oobleck’ that covers the planet and homogenizes us all”}\textsuperscript{62}. From this perspective it can be concluded that it is corruption when you give a meaning to this kind of behavior and label it as corruption.

Besides the different norms, culture plays a role in defining corruption. Every society has its own cultural norms and cultural way of acting. The consequence of these differences in culture is that perceptions on corrupt behavior are different. The lawfulness of corruption is therefore dependent of the culture and the country\textsuperscript{63}. In the literature it is mainly argued that the Western definition of corruption is not always applicable to non-Western, and in particular to developing countries, way of defining corruption. This is due to the fact that culture determines the beliefs, customs, values and lifestyles of the population. In the upcoming paragraphs several non-Western perspectives will be clarified by analyzing definitions of corruption from Sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, and from the Balkans. Main focus will be on corruption from Western (cultural) perspective and from the (cultural) perspective of the Balkans.

\textsuperscript{60} Idem, p. 393.
First, I will start discussing corruption from the perspective of African continent, especially how corruption is defined and perceived in the African Union (AU), in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Nigeria in particular. On 11 July 2003 the AU has adopted the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. However, just like the UN and NATO, African Union too has no explicit definition of corruption. Instead in article 4 of this Convention the AU recognizes particular acts as corruption\(^6^4\), which are similar to the examples of corruption provided in the UNCAC. Although the African Union has no clear definition of corruption, corruption from the perspective of Sub-Saharan Africa is defined as “*the abuse of public office for private or personal benefit*”\(^6^5\), the inhabitants in this part of the world have accepted corrupt behavior\(^6^6\).

In Sub-Saharan Africa culture with its norms, values and symbols is a key element\(^6^7\). In this culture there is ‘*gift-giving process*’ which is normal and which creates opportunities for corruption. After the independence of Africa this process only increased\(^6^8\). Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by “*donnez du pot de vin a quelqu’un*”- i.e. “giving away a bottle of wine to someone”. This way of interaction is part of their everyday life\(^6^9\) and is a way of interaction between individuals on their daily basis.\(^7^0\) This is demonstrated by the case of Nigeria. Nigeria is a Sub-Saharan African country, and has no clear definition of corruption. In this state corruption includes conducts such as


\(^{6^8}\) Idem, p. 1.


\(^{7^0}\) Idem, p. 171.
bribery and fraud. The system in Nigeria is characterized by inequality and systematic corruption, where none of the actors have the incentives to refrain from corrupt practices. In this state it is corruption when “there is violation of ethical norms that command societal consensus.”

Second, Afghanistan is characterized by a patronage system which is part of the Afghan culture. The local citizens have to pay bribes to have access to basic services, they have “the impression that it is cheaper to buy a judge than to hire a lawyer,” and as Van Koeveringe – a staff officer at the Concepts, Inter-operability, Capabilities Branch and lecturer in the courses at the CCOE – stated corrupt practices are additional benefits of a job in Afghanistan. Thus, in Afghanistan there is “a pervasive culture of corruption” after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2011. As the Counter-And Anti-Corruption report of NATO stated “Afghan Muslims consider bribery to be an unjustifiable violation of Islamic law which should be punished, yet in Afghanistan, patronage is considered to be an obligation.”

Finally, the culture in the former Union of Soviet Social Republics (USSR) and in the Mediterranean littoral is characterized by collectivist culture, where the power is “in the hands of a small and self-perpetuating ruling elite who often inherit the right to govern through family ties or social position.” In this kind of culture the rule of law is weak. In fact, in the Balkans giving gifts is part of the payment traffic, thus “you can be corrupt if you do something to get you a favor, not necessarily monetary...not necessary (…) money or tangible things.” Therefore, one of the definitions in the context of the Balkans is formulated as “any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding...

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72 Idem, p. 7.
73 Idem, p. 13.
75 W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “...maar dat zijn de bijkomende voordelen van de baan.”
80 D. Cole (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 3.
payoffs’. In this region there is this culture of doing favors: ‘I give you something and you give me something’. ‘Corruption can also be associated with power and not only with money’. Due to the different values acts of corruption are more accepted and less prosecuted in some cultures. As Klich and Noonan stated ‘corruption is accepted practice among developing countries’. As argued corruption in the Balkans is ‘neither the most frequently annoying nor the most intensely annoying aspect, nor a very significant source of annoyance in some of them’.

Whereas in the Western culture corruption is considered ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct’, ‘the misuse of public power’, and is defined in the terms of ‘right and wrong’, corruption in the Balkans is considered as ‘part of their normal behavior and their normal living’…and part of their culture, so ‘they don’t see their behavior as corrupt’. In fact, corruption in the Balkans is ‘absolutely accepted’, and ‘might not even been looked as being corruption’. Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also described as followed: “here they have a different perspective and it involves remuneration for the services where you should be entitled to. Now, after the war, it seems that this system is blurt out…if you do not pay (especially with money) for these...

82 Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 2. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “In die regio met gunsten wordt gewerkt: ‘ik gun jou iets en jij gunt mij iets’.”
91 Idem, p.3.
92 Idem, p.5.
services (doctor, municipality), you do not get these services – you have to wait longer, or you get bad services.”...”The culture of exuberant reward has slipped into corruption”95.

Thus, in the Balkans “they accept that they have to pay, because it is the system”96 – not only the public system, but also the private system – otherwise “you will not get to the point where you will be treated appropriately”97 and get the services or goods. Here an actor has to make a cost-benefit analysis to decide to be corrupt and benefit from it by having access to these services and/or goods, or not be corrupt and accept the costs of not having access to the services. To have access to goods and services you have to have a certain amount of money. From above it can be concluded that this cultural aspect plays an important role in corruption. In order to define corruption and find solutions how to counter corruption in the Balkans we should take into account that corruption in the Balkans is experienced differently than corruption in Western countries.

As this chapter demonstrates corruption is a complex phenomenon with no universal definition, because of different perspectives from different societies, and different cultures. Besides the fact that corruption has different definitions and is differently perceived in different societies, the complexity of corruption is also clear from the fact that important international organizations, such as the UN and NATO, have no specific definitions, and cite definitions from other organizations or provide a list of corrupt conducts. Thus, despite the fact that NATO and the UN have no clear definition of corruption and there is no consensus about a universal definition, there are “Most Commonly Recognized Forms of Official Corruption”98.

As this chapter further has illustrated, in the Western definitions of corruption we find patterns and overarching elements – such as ‘abuse of power’, ‘private/personal gains’, ‘governmental and public official’, ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct’, ‘illegal’, ‘illegitimate’ and ‘(in)efficient’ – which are emphasized in theories and by scholars, organizations. Corruption in the Balkans on contrary is considered as ‘part of their normal behavior and their normal living’, ‘way of life’, and ‘part of their culture’. This way of dealing with corruption can be explained by constructivist theory where it is argued that social understanding and norms have different impact on different agents, and these norms

95Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 1. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Het is een andere kijk op dingen en gaat het om extra beloning voor de diensten waar jij recht op zou moeten hebben. Nu, na de oorlog, lijkt dit systeem volslagen doorgeslagen...als jij voor die diensten (dokter, gemeente) niet betaalt (vooral met geld), krijg je die diensten niet – dan moet je extra lang wachten of krijg je slechte diensten.”...”De cultuur van uitbundige beloningen is afgeleid naar corruptie.”

96Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015, p. 4.

97Interview number 10 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 3.

are not universally shared. That underlines the importance of including cultural aspects in the definition of corruption. This also underlines the fact that in order to understand and analyze corrupt behavior one should not only look at game-theory, but also at Constructivism. In societies where the cultural component of corruption is important, an actor not only is striving to maximize utility by being corrupt, but he or she acts in this particular way, because it is accepted and normal behavior. The norms and values of a particular culture – according to the assumptions of Constructivism – combined by acting rationally and maximizing utility results – according to the assumptions of game-theory – in another pay-off structure than when we look to Constructivism or game-theory separately.

Therefore, to put corruption in the context of the Balkans and adopt the cultural context, I have chosen the following definition of corruption “any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs”99. In contradiction to the other definitions discussed earlier in this chapter, this definition is broad and deals with ‘any transaction’, so it is applicable to the Balkans, where corruption is not only expressed in monetary terms, but also in terms of ‘giving gifts’ and ‘doing favors.’ Furthermore, where in the other definitions the emphasis is on ‘governmental officials’ who are involved in corruption, in this definition the actors in ‘the public and private sector’ are also included, which means that no actor is excluded from corruption.

Besides, that the population in the Balkans has to pay to get access to collective goods most of the time, these payments are not subject to tax-systems, but go to the pockets of the private person, whether it is a government official or a random individual who provides the service. The definition – which will be used in this research – also deals with these aspects, namely ‘collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs’. To conclude, this particular definition of corruption is not only applicable to the Western perspective of corruption, but also to the non-Western perspective. It reproduces the aspects which are important when we deal with corruption from different perspectives and in different cultures.

Chapter 2: How an international military mission can impact corruption?

In the context of the impact of an international military mission on corruption, on the one hand it is argued that a military mission mostly takes place in a fragile and/or failed state\textsuperscript{100}. As one of the interviewees stated about the impact on corruption “we bring money in a poor world and corruption will start immediately”\textsuperscript{101}. On the other hand, Opsteen is not sure about the immediate impact of a mission on corruption. He argues that a military mission can create opportunities for corrupt practices, because there are certain individuals within the forces and/or within the citizens who misuses the conflict situation for personal benefits. However, he doubts whether the level of corruption increases due to a mission\textsuperscript{102}.

In the line of this debate, in this chapter I will analyze the general effects of an international military mission on corruption in a mission area. In this chapter the focus will be on corruption during a military mission, especially how the military perceive corruption in a mission area, and in the case of corrupt practices how they deal with these practices, i.e. how military deal with corrupt leaders and corrupt entities. Subsequently, I will analyze how a military mission impacts the society and what the consequence of these effects are. Therefore, consulted literature – mainly the publications and the reports of Transparency International – will be complemented by the findings from the interviews, in order to compare them and find answers to the main question of this chapter.

First, the impact of an international military mission on corruption already starts in the pre-mission phase. As the analysis of the interviews has shown before going on a mission majority of the military, who have been interviewed, had no or limited training about corruption and during a mission they also had no guidelines about how to deal with corruption\textsuperscript{103}. One of the respondents stated that they had only two and half hours lecture on culture and history of the conflict area, and according to this person it was not enough to have a full understanding of the situation\textsuperscript{104}. The consequences of this lack or limited amount of training will be illustrated in the following two cases. The first example

\textsuperscript{101} Interview number 3 (personal communication, December 11, 2014), p. 6.
\textsuperscript{102} H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Ik weet het niet…moeilijk te zeggen. Ik denk dat een internationale missie heel erg bezig is om te proberen om dat soort dingen juist uit te bannen. Dat wil niet zeggen dat er op individueel niveau geen corruptie plaatsvindt, dat mensen geen misbruik maken van de situatie (beide kanten op: zowel van de militaire missie naar de burgers toe als van de burgers naar de missie toe).”
\textsuperscript{103} For detailed answers of the interviewees see Appendix E and F question 3d.
\textsuperscript{104} Interview number 22 (personal communication, February 11, 2015), p. 1. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Wij kregen maar 2,5 les over cultuur, achtergrond en geschiedenis. Ik leerde meer over de cultuur en de geschiedenis tijdens en na mijn missie, dan tijdens de 2,5 lessen.”
is from the mission in Kosovo where there were no guidelines about corruption. Because of this absence, the military developed their own guidelines in 2000\textsuperscript{105}. However, these guidelines were based on their own Western perspectives and own Western understanding of corruption. As chapter one has illustrated this is not how it should work, because there are different cultural perspectives about corruption. The consequence is that there is a mismatch of cultures and mismatch how to understand corrupt behavior, whereby countering corruption from different perspectives is not always productive.

The second case is from the military mission in Afghanistan, where the military had no understanding about the nature of corruption there, had no clear definition of corruption\textsuperscript{106} and there too were no guidelines how to counter corruption. Commanders and other military staff had no understanding of the operational environment and they had no idea how to deal with corruption\textsuperscript{107}. Consequently the military mission flourished corruption and culture of impunity\textsuperscript{108}. This case could be seen as an indicator that over time there was no development in creating awareness among the military about corruption, or establishing guidelines about corruption.

Missing awareness on the cultural circumstances, a lack of detailed knowledge on corruption, and lack of guidelines sometimes led to careless behavior during the mission that indirectly fueled corruption. To start, as interviewees stated during an international mission “\textit{military come in with huge budget of money}”\textsuperscript{109} and “\textit{all the money that comes in to a country has influence on corruption}”\textsuperscript{110}. One of the effects of this money on corruption in the mission area is when military are part of the reconstruction process. Although Forbes –Student Allocation Representative at the NATO School Oberammergau – argued that Contracting Officers had “\textit{an ethical/anti-corruption module lasting approximately one hour}” during the Contracting Course\textsuperscript{111}, international military bring money in a country without controlling how the money flows during tendering, or there is limited control from

\textsuperscript{105}Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{107} Interview number 2 (personal communication, December 9, 2014), p. 1.
\textsuperscript{109} Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{110} Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “\textit{Alle geld wat in een land binnenkomt, heeft invloed op de corruptie in een land. Een internationale missie heeft ook invloed op de economie, op de handelingen van de overheden.”}
\textsuperscript{111} Khanamirjan, Roezana. “RE: Enquiry re. M8-141 NATO Pre-Deployment Contingency Contracting Course for Theatre Contracting Officers.” Message to NATO School. 20 March 2015. FORBES.Boyd@natoschool.nato.int.
the teams who supervise the projects. As a consequence, these military “teams supported the locals in a best intent with the money.” However, these projects had been delayed or not finalized at all. Colonel Braterschofsky, Deputy Director of the CCOE, aimed to explain this by stating that “…with the involvement of the local companies, there is the potential that the money got lost in different ways” 112. A specific illustration of the potential loss was when NATO and/or a NGO paid a local authority to rebuild the infrastructure and because of lack of control this money disappeared in to the family and/or friends113.

Moreover, the potential loss of money, and the potential contribution of the international money and international reconstruction projects to corruption might be clarified in this process where major contracts are being signed with entrepreneurs. These contractors might subcontract, because they do not always have the capacity to meet the requirements. This subcontracting might lead to the fact that contractors have space to procurement fraud114 due to (limited control), and according to General De Kermabon, Special Advisor to NATO, “the process of tendering is not always respected”115. Furthermore, according one of the other interviewees the culture of doing business also plays a role herein. This person argues that the contractors in the mission area will use their means, like their way of doing business to get money and goods from the international parties116. As already discussed in chapter one the differences in culture and in perspective might lead to corruption, because due to these differences several actors have different way of doing business.

Furthermore, when the international money is injected into the economies of a country it can leak to undesired groups and/or to the opposition – such as criminal groups, warlords, and insurgents – due to a lack of control. Consequently, as Knowles – Project Officer-Security Policy at the Transparency International – argued military do not know who they are empowering with this money. This money might also indirectly contributes to the duration of a conflict or to destabilization117. This leak to undesired groups is demonstrated in the case in Iraq, where there is the fight against Islamic

112M. Braterschofsky (personal communication, January 21, 2015), p. 3.
113W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “dat zien wij dat heel veel van dat geld – die naar een gouverneur gaat en waar wij geen controle over hebben – dat naar familie en relaties gaat.”
115Y. De Kermabon (personal communication, April 4, 2015), p. 3.
116Interview number 22 (personal communication, February 11, 2015), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Ik denk dat de cultuur, die daar heerst, die zullen hun middelen gebruiken om geld en goederen los te krijgen van de partijen die in het gebied zijn.”
State. This Islamic State sells oil to other states and uses this money to buy weapons\textsuperscript{118}. Another illustration is the case of the Balkans where European institutions invested financial resources in the region. However, due to corruption and organized crime the investments did not always achieve their goals in the peace-building process\textsuperscript{119}.

Moreover, “\textit{an international mission has also influence on the economy and on how governments act}”\textsuperscript{120}. Because there is not always fiscal control, no transparency, and lack of capacity in the government to manage international funding\textsuperscript{121}, the international money can also be vulnerable to misuse by national and/or local authorities\textsuperscript{122} and might increases the risk of corrupt practices\textsuperscript{123}. For example, foreign aid can also be stolen by local militants or local leaders, or used to influence certain actors and/or enterprises\textsuperscript{124}. According the report of Transparency International this creates more instable environment, because the population do not get the aid\textsuperscript{125}. Furthermore, like the definition of corruption already implied in chapter one ‘\textit{collective goods} – in this case the international aid – \textit{are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs}’. So the aid is being used for own purposes instead of using it for the population\textsuperscript{126}. In addition, the political leaders also misuse the weak political and economic system to enrich themselves\textsuperscript{127}. In this political patronage people in power also control criminal activities rather than build up a “\textit{representative political power}”\textsuperscript{128}. This

\textsuperscript{118} W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 5. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “\textit{Wat je nu in Iraq ziet – gevecht met IS en andere kant verkoopt IS olie aan landen en daarmee indirect het conflict in stand houden door dat geld, waarmee wapens gekocht kan worden. Dus geld speelt altijd een rol in een gebied.}”


\textsuperscript{120} Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 3. T The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “\textit{Een internationale missie heeft ook invloed op de economie, op de handelingen van de overheden.}”


\textsuperscript{123} Idem, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{124} Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 3.


\textsuperscript{126} Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “\textit{Met een internationale missie maak je bij de overheid middelen vrij die zij niet meer voor de bevolking moeten inzetten, maar die kunnen zij nu dus inzetten voor andere doeleinden}”

\textsuperscript{127} Idem, p. 25.

group profit from the war and might have the power to maintain the unstable situation. As a result they strive to maintain this unstable situation. This could be dangerous, because as game-theory implies these parties strive to maximize their interest, which might result in the fact that those powerful groups go back to the old system where it is more beneficial for them to act corrupt than build a representative political structure in their country, or give the foreign aid to the inhabitants.

Moreover, it is also argued that besides not getting the aid the wellbeing of the local citizens is harmed due to corruption when an international mission fails to address it. A mission might also contribute to corruption, because the staff might (unconsciously) be involved in corrupt practices, or cooperate with local actors who are involved in corruption. For instance, during a mission military collect information to report and send it to the higher level. One of the interviewees gave an example that sometimes citizens provided them information which did not exist, so the information was fictive. However, military did not mind to report this fictive information and send it to Pristina in Kosovo. In addition, in this process of collecting information there were also cases where citizens provide information to the soldiers and military give them ‘special security’. As stated in the definition of corruption, which guides this paper, corruption can be ‘any transaction’, thus not only in monetary terms, but in the terms of ‘doing favors.’ This example describes how corruption is expressed in terms of ‘doing favors’.

Another risk factor during a mission is when military support citizens who are corrupt and trade in illegal and fake goods. Although that is known by military, there are cases where the soldiers continue to buy illegal replications of brands, or let “them come to their bases and sell plagiarism (fake stuff)”.

Military also buy cultural goods and take home items of high value, so

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129 J. van Benthem (personal communication, December 15, 2014), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “En dat is een hele kleine groep die van een oorlog profiteert en wellicht ook de macht heeft om de oorlog langer in stand te houden.”


131 H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 7. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “dat je bepaalde mensen in een positie brengt die dusdanig economische macht kunnen verwerven dat zij, als zij vertrekt, het oude systeem in stand gaan houden.”


135 Idem, p. 3.

136 Idem, p. 2.

they sometimes actively participate in the black markets. A different way how the military also (indirectly) flourish illegal activities is when they cooperate with local authorities and sell the mission equipment and supplies, like weapons, to the locals and/or on the black market\textsuperscript{138}. Especially when there is the rapid withdrawal of a large-scale missions, the materials are not always properly disposed. Here the corrupt actors might be empowered, because the military equipment are being sold to them\textsuperscript{139}. Especially in fragile states this can contribute to flourishing corruption, because in these states the forces are poorly trained and equipped. As a result in these states government actors and/or forces are incentivized to sell materials\textsuperscript{140}. As these activities and the definition of corruption – which I use in this analysis – show corruption is about “any transaction between private and public sector”, in this case not only local officials and population, but also the international military staff.

Another way how an international mission impacts corruption is in the process of transportation of goods. Military set up agreements with local enterprises without considering in their mind that they might contribute to corruption and parallel structures. The transportation of army supply might affect corruption when in a mission area there are border conflicts. Warlords profit from these disagreements, because there is a vacuum\textsuperscript{141} and there is nobody who guards the borders. This occurred during the mission in Afghanistan, where the warlords were empowered with money to ‘protect’ the transportation of the US army’s supply\textsuperscript{142}. Another example from Afghanistan is when military had contracts with local transportation companies for the transportation of fuel. In this process these companies used subcontractors who had to transport the goods via Pakistan and Tajikistan. In the contracts it was stated that these contractors were not allowed to pay money. However as General De Kermabon already had argued the tendering process “\textit{was not always respected}”\textsuperscript{143}, and in such an insecure environment it is hard to say ‘we will not pay’, so in such cases contractors had to pay. This is due to the fact that if you do not pay the trucks will be blown up. Thus, from the implication of the game-theory military and the transportation companies make a cost-benefit analysis in such cases. They have to deal with this humanitarian dilemma of not paying and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[139] Idem, p. 25.
\item[140] Idem, p. 19.
\item[141] Idem, p. 18.
\item[143] Y. De Kermabon (personal communication, April 4, 2015), p. 3.
\end{footnotes}
not being corrupt, and not getting humanitarian aid to help the inhabitants\textsuperscript{144}; or being corrupt and paying bribes to help the local population with a humanitarian aid.

Besides transportation of goods, an international military mission needs bases for the forces. National and/or local authorities offer these forces a land at a very inflated price. The local population might interpret this as a land grab by the forces and make them target of violence\textsuperscript{145}. Moreover, when there is an international mission military spend millions in the area, because during a mission military need goods and services such as food, fuel and personnel who work in the bases\textsuperscript{146}, thus there is an economic boost\textsuperscript{147}. Such a mission is thus a source of income for the citizens\textsuperscript{148} and the demand for personnel in the bases creates opportunities for corruption, because this personnel earn more by working for international environment, and can misuse his/her position within the society creating contradictions\textsuperscript{149}. For example, a translator (who was a legal advisor) earned during a mission for times more income than when he worked as a legal advisor. This also applies to the cleaners in the bases, i.e. they earned more by cleaning the camps than when they would work outside the camps\textsuperscript{150}. A secondary impact on the society is the recruitment of personnel by the international mission. In this process the brains – like the lawyers and the doctors who now work for the mission – are taken out of the society in order to serve the mission goals. According to General De Kermabon by doing this the mission creates “an important gap for the local stability”\textsuperscript{151}. Thus, this is also another impact on the society.

Another unforeseen circumstance of this all is that there arises the impression that the international forces are not careful and corrupt too. The credibility and the legitimacy of a mission

\textsuperscript{144}W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “Want de andere optie is, is dat er geen eten of andere dingen komen. Zelfs vanuit de andere missiegebieden, zoals Africa, betalen de humanitaire hulporganisaties om toegang te krijgen. Is dat goed? Nee, maar als zij niet doen, komen er geen hulpgooderden door. Dat is een humanitaire dilemma.”


\textsuperscript{146}W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 6. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “Elke keer als militairen in een land komen, geven ze miljoenen uit. Van kopen van brood bij de plaatselijke bakker, inhuren van personeel, tot kopen van brandstof.”

\textsuperscript{147}R. Been (personal communication, January 26, 2015), p. 4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “en kreeg je ook economische impuls.”

\textsuperscript{148}Interview number 3 (personal communication, December 11, 2014), p. 2.

\textsuperscript{149}H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Wat je wel krijgt, is dat er scheve verhoudingen ontstaan, omdat de mensen die ingehuurd worden door de internationale organisaties (en ik denk dat het bijna een markt aan het worden is) en dan denk ik aan tolken/ondersteunend personeel/poetsvrouwen/wasbazen relatief hogere salarissen verdienen dan gemeengoed is in het land.”

\textsuperscript{150}M. Piotrowski (personal communication, January 12, 2015), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{151}Y. De Kermabon (personal communication, April 4, 2015), p. 2.
can also be endangered by this corruption, and by lack of support from the local population. As Lieutenant General Stoltz, SHAPE Deputy Chief of Staff, stated “corruption within military organizations reduces public trust in the armed forces, whereas the impact of external corruption on the military can lessen operational effectiveness and it certainly wastes scarce resources.” He furthermore emphasized that “…corruption can lead to a cycle of recurring instability and conflict”

To conclude, there are certain ways how an international military mission directly and/or indirectly contributes to corruption in a mission area. During a military mission money comes into the country and these spending might not help the economy of this state and might instead fuel corruption. A mission thus puts pressure on the local economic system by creating a pseudo-economy, because first there are thousands of soldiers who need goods, services and personnel – who work in the bases – and when the military leave the area the economy might get damaged due to the absence of demand and due to a vacuum. As Cole described this process “in fact we create corruption, not in terms of money, but corruption the natural way of development.”

Moreover, during a mission the military impact the level of corruption by (un)consciously acting in uncareful way, for example by selling military equipment and/or supporting citizens and/or political leaders who are corrupt. The support might be expressed in the form of contracting without controlling the local parties or not controlling the flow of the money, which they pay to these actors. This is inter alia due to the fact that military lack cultural awareness, lack the understanding of the cultural aspect of corruption, and there is also no focus in the military planning on the topic of corruption. As a consequence, it is not always clear for the military how to deal with corruption in a mission scenario.

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155 H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 7. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Wij als militairen moeten heel bewust zijn hoe wij met de lokale leveranciers, lokale werknemers omgaan en wat ga je doen op het moment dat jij eruit gaat, want het heeft gewoon consequenties als jij jarenlang een soort pseudo-economie in stand hebt gehouden, door duizenden internationale militairen in een gebied hebt (die moet eten, drinken en alles wat erbij komt kijken). “...” Alleen wat je daarmee doet, is een economisch systeem zodanig onder druk zetten dat als jij weggaat het in elkaar gaat zakken.”

The impact of an international mission can be concluded in the words of the interviewees, namely “military come in with huge budget of money...indirectly, or directly we support the system with our money, so we have to have a look on what we pay and how we pay it, because we influence with our money the economy in these countries. And of course we influence corruption”\textsuperscript{157}. And “if you are really honest the more money you put into it, the more you feed it\textsuperscript{158} ...I will put here: the more money flows, the more you feed the monster, the more you keep the system going”\textsuperscript{159}.

Chapter 3: Case studies

As the previous chapter illustrated an international military mission has an impact on corruption. I will illustrate this on the international military missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo as case studies for the analysis, which will form the two parts of this chapter. In the beginning of each case study I will briefly address the background of the conflict. This will be followed by an analysis how the international missions in Bosnia and in Kosovo contributed to corruption in the countries, in order to identify patterns and effects of the missions. Finally, I will formulate a conclusion where I will compare the cases with each other by focusing on the similarities and differences of the effects and examples.

Case study: Bosnia and Herzegovina

As the previous paragraphs illustrated an international military mission has an impact on corruption. On the basis of the case study Bosnia and Herzegovina I will analyze how the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission impacted corruption in this area. To analyze this I will first briefly elaborate on the history of the conflict in Bosnia. This will be followed by the analysis of the situation there during the international military mission. For this analysis the interviews with the soldiers, who have participated during the SFOR mission, and the consulted literature will function as main sources of information. From the findings I will finally draw a conclusion.

Bosnia and Herzegovina – a multi-ethnic society comprising Bosnians (also called as Bosnian Muslims), Croats and Serbs – was one of six republics of Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{160}. After the World War II

\textsuperscript{157}Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{158}Interview number 10 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{159}Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{160}Mihalio Crnobrnja, \textit{Yugoslav Drama} (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), p. 22.
Bosnia was granted the status of a republic and was called Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 Bosnia became an independent republic\textsuperscript{161}. However, the aim of Croats and Serbs was to create national enclaves in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, the Yugoslav National Army – under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic – and Serb nationalist forces attacked BiH\textsuperscript{162} in 1992. This was the beginning of a war which lasted until 1995\textsuperscript{163}. During this war Bosnian Muslims were banished from their territories and in this process ‘ethnic cleansing’ was committed on the Muslims in Srebrenica and Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serb forces\textsuperscript{164}. More than 8,000 Muslim men were executed by the Serb militia. During this conflict about 100,000 citizens (80\% Bosnians) were killed. The United Nations did not intervene in this conflict, because the Member states could not agree on counter measures. The international community was also not able to provide humanitarian aid. Eventually, in 1994 the UN, NATO and United States\textsuperscript{165} succeeded to mediate in the conflict and imposed cease-fire which was the beginning of the Dayton Peace agreement in 1995\textsuperscript{166}. In this agreement the parties also accepted that UN peacekeepers would be present in order to supervise the compliance with the Dayton agreement\textsuperscript{167}.

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1031 in order to authorize the NATO-led Implementation FORCE (IFOR)\textsuperscript{168} in Bosnia “\textit{to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace agreement}”. After a year this operation was replaced by the NATO-led Stabilization Force, which was based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1088\textsuperscript{169}. During SFOR the objective was to establish a safe and secure environment, and to facilitate reconstruction in Bosnia. Moreover, NATO had a military headquarters in Sarajevo in order to assist the European Union in governmental

\textsuperscript{165} Idem, p. 1061.
reforms of the defense sector. Furthermore, NATO supports the EU-led Operation in Althea by providing planning, command support and logistics\textsuperscript{170}.

Before analyzing how the international mission impacted corruption in Bosnia the cultural context needs to be reflected. As consulted literature\textsuperscript{171} and findings from the interviews describe corruption in Bosnia is perceived as customs, thus there is a cultural expectation of ‘gift giving and doing favors’ in the daily lives of the society\textsuperscript{172}. In the perception of Michael Piotrowski the society in Bosnia has accepted corruption “to a certain level as normal, as part of their lives, as part of their culture”\textsuperscript{173}. Moreover, Opsteen added that the citizens perceive corruption as a ‘way of life’, thus they do not entirely perceive it as a crime\textsuperscript{174}. One of the interviewees explained that when a citizen gives a gift to an official, he or she does not necessarily perceive it as corrupt practice, but this person describes his or her act as “this official was nice to me and I am also kind to him”\textsuperscript{175}. As the definition of corruption already suggested corruption in BiH is thus about “any transaction” – from using money to giving gifts and doing favors. Consequently, in Bosnia we see practices such as paying an official for certain services, or giving gifts to the doctor to have access to him. These practices are so embedded in the culture that the citizens perceive it as a normal behavior\textsuperscript{176}, and not as a crime or as corruption.

The way how several actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina deal with corruption is comparable from a cultural perspective and fits in the way how constructivist theory explains corruption. In the case of Bosnia it a cultural norm to give gifts and do favors, so corruption is part of their cultural norm, and therefore they do not perceive it as corruption and/or as a crime. Moreover, in a society

\begin{footnotes}
\item[173] M. Piotrowski (personal communication, January 12, 2015), p. 3.
\item[174] H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 2. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “in bepaalde culturen corruptie minder crimineel wordt beschouwd/ervaren, meer als een ‘way of life’ dat het eenmaal erbij hoort in vergelijking met andere gebieden. Ik wil niet zozeer zeggen dat het cultureel gebaseerd is, maar dat het juist in bepaalde culturen een geaccepteerd feit is.”
\item[175] Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 2. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: ‘hij is aardig voor mij geweest ik ben netjes en ben ook aardig voor hem.’
\end{footnotes}
where cultural norms and values are more important than rule of law\textsuperscript{177}, the population prefer to follow these norms, otherwise access to certain basic needs might be denied. Finally, the citizens in Bosnia act in a corrupt way, because it is normal to give a gift or pay a doctor and/or a nurse to have access to the healthcare. An example from Bosnia was the case where someone had to pay additional 1000 euros to be treated by the doctor\textsuperscript{178}. If this patient would not pay these additional euros he or she might find that the doctor had no time\textsuperscript{179}. An interviewee also provided the example of a person paid extra 4000 euros to register his or her son at the University\textsuperscript{180}. Thus, the citizens pay to be better treated or have access to the healthcare or education. Another case in Bosnia is when the citizens pay a policeman to avoid fines for speeding\textsuperscript{181} or to speed up procedures\textsuperscript{182}. Thus, we can find corruption in \textit{“the public and private sector”} as discussed in the definition.

Furthermore, BiH was also one of the post-communist countries in Europe\textsuperscript{183}. In this system there was lack of certain goods and services, whereby people had to act in an illegal way to have access to these. As a result this system already created basis for corruption in Bosnia\textsuperscript{184}. Moreover, this old political system also created weak democratic values and institutions and non-transparent decision-making in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the Bosnian war of 1992 left a vacuum which created a corrupt political society. These political elites have close relationships with the criminal elites in Bosnia who accumulated the capital for their own personal gains\textsuperscript{185}. A Western


\textsuperscript{178}Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 2. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Mensen die veel geld moeten betalen voor hun medische behandeling, wat vaak niet minder is dan de 1000 euro. En die 1000 euro is extra wat betaald moet worden, dus geldt niet voor de behandeling, maar het geldt om gezien te worden door de dokter. En dit is alledaagse corruptie.”


\textsuperscript{180}Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 1. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Iemand die 4000 euro extra geld moest betalen om zijn/haar zoon te laten inschrijven op universiteit.”

\textsuperscript{181}D. Cole (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 5.


\textsuperscript{184}H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 8. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Tijdens het communistische systeem waar gebrek was aan bepaalde zaken dan ga je een mentaliteit creëren, waarbij mensen zwart gaan handelen, wat per definitie al een basis is voor corruptie.”

European diplomat stated the following about the close ties of the political elites with the criminal elites "some politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina have more corpses in their cellar than a crematorium of a mid-sized German city". An example from Bosnia where the criminal ties of a politician are illustrated is the case in Busovaca, where the old mayor tried to stage a coup against his successor, so he could become mayor again. Another example is the case of a church which functioned as a storehouse for illegal weapon transport. According to Pargan – head of the Department at Deutsche Welle and Regional Coordinator for South-Eastern Europe – after the war, this criminal governmental structure was made more complex by the Dayton Peace Agreement, where the country now is divided along ethnic lines. The distribution of the resources, of subsidies and the distribution of jobs is also divided along these ethnic lines

Consequences of all this is that the governmental structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not transparent enough, there is not always accountability to the citizens, and there is no involvement from the society in the decision-making procedure. Furthermore, as stated in the CHR. Michelsen Institute Report the corrupt national political parties make the corrupt administration sector more corrupt by manipulating and exploiting it. Politicians also do not have the incentive to change this and start a campaign against corruption, because they are self-involved in these corrupt practices and they only gain from this corrupt system

Besides the lack of political will to counter corruption the other enforcement bodies – such as the police and judiciary – are not build in such a manner that they can protect the citizens from abuse of power, because they do not have the skills and the capacity for, and they are also corrupt. As the UN mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBiH) found out these enforcement bodies have

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186 M. Olthof (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Dat zag je ook in Busovaca: daar was ook iemand die burgemeester was geweest probeerde ook weer een aanslag te organiseren op de huidige burgemeester om zelf weer aan de macht te komen.”

187 Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 6. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “...er wapenkisten in een kerk waren, dus die kerk was een opslagplaats voor illegale wapentransport.”


192 Idem, 280.

close ties with the national elites, so they were influenced by the politicians. Consequently, these enforcement bodies are not independent and the judges do not consider themselves independent. The staff of these bodies are appointed according to the ethnical group to which they belong. In the judiciary and administration sector work employees who belong to the ethnic majority. Hence, the other minorities are being denied to have an impartial treatment in these sectors. In addition to the fact that the judges and the police are corrupt, because they are manipulated by the officials, they are also corrupt because they have a low salary. Consequently, due to this low salary police officers and the judges have higher incentives for corrupt behavior, because being corrupt is a way to earn more income, and be able to survive and to support their family.

The way several actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina deal with corruption can also be explained by applying game-theory. As we derived from game-theory the actors – in this case the governmental officials – are rational and they act in a way which is beneficial for them and is in their own interest. It is beneficial for the politicians to not counter corruption effectively by manipulating the judicial system. Moreover, the enforcement bodies act in corrupt way to generate more income, because they have a lower income without being corrupt. Besides, as mentioned earlier there is no competent judicial system which would force the politicians to counter corruption.

The part of the inhabitants and entrepreneurs in Bosnia who benefit from corruption do not want to stimulate anti-corruption campaigns too, because they profit from this situation, i.e. they pay an actor and they get the things done and/or get their desired result. Moreover, the acceptance of corruption is also due to the fact that because of this several actors receive basic goods – like access to health care and jobs – thus they profit from corruption too. In addition, due to the low income of the citizens, it is in the interest of these employees to be corrupt so they earn more money in order to support the family. From the implications of cost-benefit analysis, if all these actors would start an anti-corruption campaign it would have a negative effect on their own personal gains. Therefore,
having this corruption in their society is beneficial for them and is thus not in their interest to counter it.

Overall, as this part of the chapter illustrated corruption affects the daily lives of the local citizens in Bosnia and corrupt practices are at every level of the society. Like the CHR. Michelsen Institute report described this “corruption is rampant in all spheres of public and political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina”199. Now we have a better understanding of the culture and the system in the country, in the upcoming paragraphs I will analyze how military dealt with corruption during the mission – based on examples and insights provided during the interviews – and how their behavior impacted the level of corruption in the country.

As chapter two already illustrated during an international mission besides securing safe environment, the military also have the task to support a mission area in its reconstruction process. During the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina one of the tasks of the military was to assist in country’s reconstruction200 and in this process money was involved. As already discussed the local economy was stressed by the huge increase of the international funds and a consequence is that the normal monetary transaction might be off balance. According to Colonel Been when there is disturbance in the normal supply-demand system you get weird side effects such as corruption, and the increase of the prices201. An example from of corruption in Bosnia was the case when the international forces organized a barbecue. They bought many pounds of meat at the local butcher. After the visit of the military, this butcher took few days off. Because the price of the meat was higher for the international forces than for the local citizens the butcher earned his weekly revenue once the military had visited him, and could afford few days off202.

There are multiple indications for practices where the humanitarian aid provided during the missions were sold on the black markets in Bosnia203. There were people who sold these goods to


201 R. Been (personal communication, January 26, 2015), p. 4-5. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Waar donorgeld is, is ook corruptie. Dit geld brengt het normale geldverkeer uit balans. Dus waar jij in het vraag-aanbod systeem gaat storen, d.m.v. subsidies, krijg je rare bijverschijnselen zoals corruptie.”

202 H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 9. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Als wij niet voldoende vlees konden krijgen, dan gingen wij naar de lokale slager en kochten wij daar vele kilo’s vlees. Het grappige was dat als wij bij die slager geweest waren, dat die man één of twee dagen gesloten was. Die had waarschijnlijk zijn weekomzet al binnen, waarschijnlijk ook doordat hij een andere prijs aan ons vroeg dan aan de lokale bevolking.”

203 Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 2. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Wij hebben ook de spullen van de zwarte markt gehaald en terug gebracht naar distributiecentra.”
earn more money. To prevent such practices the international stuff took these away from the black market and brought them back to the distribution centers. By doing so, the international mission tried to stop illegal and corrupt practices. Another example was the price of salt which was very high. International organizations sent extra salt to the black market (because according to the interviewee the only existing market in Bosnia at that moment was the black market), so there would be more supply and the price would decrease. However, the price of the salt did not decrease, because local actors who had the power there blocked this aid, or they used this salt for their own personal benefit. Thus, instead of helping the citizens – by decreasing the price of the salt – the international aid indirectly helped the corrupt officials, because the price remained at the same level, but now the officials took advantage of this aid and used it for own benefits. Hence, “these collective goods were illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs.”

However, military also contributed to corrupt practices by acting in corrupt way, because most of the time they had no guidelines and do not know how to deal with it. An example of a corrupt practice during the mission in Bosnia was provided by one of the interviewees. One of the staff members was bribed and he was now the co-owner of forestry. In this period a forester was killed. The weapon with which this forester was killed was found in the car of this international staff member. He claimed that somebody had put the weapon in his car. This incident illustrates that besides that the international staff try to avoid illegal activities, they are sometimes also involved in this activities. A side effect is that such rare incidents undermine the legitimacy of an international mission.

Furthermore, during these reconstruction projects CIMIC officers had to deal with other corrupt practices, like the presence of only one big construction company which was able to build the projects. In the area there were other companies active, but when the military approached these companies to investigate why they were not interested in the building process, these companies reacted by stating that ‘no, we are not interested in it, because we are not allowed to be interested in it’. The military staff found out that ‘bad guys’ and politicians were behind this. Sometimes the military tried to avoid corruption by saying that they would stop doing projects if other construction companies were not involved in the process, and sometimes it worked, because this big construction company would lose money. However, it did not work every time and CIMIC personnel continued to

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204Ibidem. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Dan zag je dat de overheden (of de mensen die daar voor het zeggen hadden) de zoutleverantie tegenhielden of gingen opslaan.”

205Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 2. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Hij had het raam van zijn auto open gelaten en het wapen, waarmee die boswachter was vermoord, lag toevallig op zijn achterbank. Het ging dus om onzuivere praktijken.”

work with this corrupt company\textsuperscript{207}, because otherwise they would “not get anything done”\textsuperscript{208}. In this case the military and the construction company had to make a cost-benefit analysis. In the case of the CIMIC soldiers they had the choice to not participate in this corrupt system and not finish their projects, or participate in this corrupt system and achieve their mission goals. The construction company also had the choice to continue in acting in a corrupt way and lose a project (and money) or stop being corrupt and earn money by building projects. Thus, in this process an international mission had positive and negative effects on corruption in Bosnia.

Another example how the international mission had a positive impact on the level of corruption in Bosnia was during these construction processes when the contractors tried to bribe CIMIC staff. When they made them clear that they do not accept bribes, these contractors stopped to try to bribe the military\textsuperscript{209}. Consequently, these contractors got used to how CIMIC soldiers worked and cooperated with them. This practice helped the military to avoid corruption during their missions.

During the construction process the contractors not only tried to bribe the military, but they also tried to benefit by using cheaper construction materials. This happened during the construction of two schools in Bosnia, when the constructors had used cheaper woods for the roofs. They also tried to ask money for services which they did not provide. In this case CIMIC officers controlled the construction process and when the buildings were not build in the right sequence, or cheaper materials were used, military had discussions to hold the construction processes\textsuperscript{210}. By controlling the process, the military tried to avoid corrupt behavior, however as already the example of the schools demonstrated military could not always avoid it.

This was also the case when military had big projects and they hired contractors. These contractors not always had the means to finalize the projects on their own and therefore they subcontracted the projects. An illustration of this from the mission in Bosnia was the case of a contractor who had to build an aircraft hangar. During this construction process this entrepreneur had to subcontract the project. The military did not control how the sub-contracting process was, or what kind of materials the contractors used and from whom they bought these materials. Moreover, they also did not check who the employees were, or whether they were paid properly\textsuperscript{211}. Hence, due to this lack of control military could be involved in corruption without being aware of that and might unconsciously impact on corruption in Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{207}Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{208}M. Piotrowski (personal communication, January 12, 2015), p. 1.
\textsuperscript{209}Idem, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{210}M. Piotrowski (personal communication, January 12, 2015), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{211}D. Cole (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 3.
Another way how CIMIC officers in some cases supported illegal activities of the locals is the example of military who bought illegal replications – such as DVD’s and cd’s from illegal shops\(^{212}\) in BiH. In some cases military authorities let these actors – involved in selling illegal goods – come to their camps and sell them\(^ {213}\). Thus, whereas the NATO CIMIC Doctrine advocates for “zero tolerance for any corruption”\(^ {214}\), military staff contribute to corruption in Bosnia by buying these fake goods, by ignoring the fact that buying them is not allowed, and by supporting the corrupt local actors.\(^ {215}\) However, not every military camp was supporting these illegal activities. In some camps military started to close the black markets\(^ {216}\) and/or made reports about these illegal shops. At a certain point some of the illegal shops were removed, so in some cases this problem was addressed\(^ {217}\). Thus, even though the military tried to avoid illegal activities, there were incidents of such activities during the mission in Bosnia. These negative effects were partially due to unawareness and careless actions by the military.

Furthermore, as argued in chapter two the mission in BiH needed infrastructure and services for the forces and this demand of services might create opportunities for corruption\(^ {218}\). In the process of building these camps a company might act in such a way which is normal in the country, but what was not normal from the perspective of the international society\(^ {219}\). These contractors sometimes had to pay to be able to transport materials. By making a cost-benefit analysis the military sometimes had to cooperate with them, otherwise they could not operate without a camp and this was not in their interest. So, the military had to accept the system in Bosnia stating that “sometimes it is better to deal with the devil”, or “we have to deal with that system, because it is a working system there and we cannot ignore it”\(^ {220}\). If they would not accept it they would not get the services and the goods they needed to operate\(^ {221}\) and achieve the goals of their mission.

\(^{212}\) M. Olthof (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “daar gebeurde ook best veel: illegale cd’s verkoop en laten we eerlijk zijn iedere militair ging voor 10 euro een cd’tje kopen.”
\(^{213}\) D. Cole (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 5.
\(^{217}\) M. Olthof (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Daar is op een gegeven moment meldingen van gemaakt en dan zag je ook dat het aantal cd-shops echt met meer dan de helft verminderd werd. Dus jij zag wel dat het aangepakt werd.”
\(^{218}\) D. Cole (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 5.
\(^{219}\) Idem, p. 6.
\(^{220}\) Interview number 9 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 4.
\(^{221}\) Interview number 12 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 2.
Moreover, during the SFOR mission military needed personnel – such as translators and cleaning ladies – who work in the bases. Such a mission is thus also a source of income for the inhabitants. In addition, the demand for personnel in the bases creates opportunities for corruption, because this personnel earn higher wages by working for international environment. By earning more than it is normal in Bosnia, these employees might misuse their position within the society creating contradictions. This was also the case in Bosnia, where the translators – who earned much more money – were dressed differently than the local citizens. Besides, the employees at the camp, for example a hairdresser, tried to offer more than a haircut to influence the soldiers, so they would not be fired if the amount of soldiers would reduce after a time period. This behavior can be explained from the constructivist and game-theory perspective. From the constructivist point of view the hairdresser acted in this particular way, because in Bosnia it was normal to do a favor in order to get something done. Furthermore, the game-theory analysis adds to this explanation by implying that it was also beneficial for this hairdresser, because she now might work longer for this mission.

Finally, as argued during the conflict in Bosnia within a conflict situation there were certain actors who benefit from the unstable situation. As a result a group of citizen and officials strived to maintain this unstable situation to benefit from an international mission, because the mission brought money into the country. By extending the mission and not fully controlling the flow of money – inter alia due to the lack of clear guidelines – this international money leaks to the undesired groups. Thus, the extension of a mission also contributes to corruption by continuing to indirectly support actors who benefit from an unstable situation.

To conclude, as the previous paragraphs illustrate Bosnian and Herzegovina is a country where corruption is in the daily lives of the citizens, it is at every level of the society, and where corruption is experienced as part of their culture. So, they do not perceive corruption as a 'real' crime, but they perceive it as normal behavior. Consequently, not all inhabitants and politicians do not have the incentives to counter corruption. In addition, from the game-theory perspective it is also not beneficial for them to counter corruption, because without this corrupt system there, they would not

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222 H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 4. The original tekst is in Dutch and is as followed: “Daar zaten over het algemeen goed opgeleide en goed uitzienende jonge dames in, die dan toch anders gekleed over straat gingen dan de lokale bevolking.”


224 J. van Benthem (personal communication, December 15, 2014), p. 3. The original tekst is in Dutch and is as followed: “En dat is een hele kleine groep die van een oorlog profiteert en wellicht ook de macht heeft om de oorlog langer in stand te houden.”

225 J. van Benthem (personal communication, December 15, 2014), p. 6. The original tekst is in Dutch and is as followed: “En dat die groep probeert de situatie in stand te houden, want zolang de situatie zo is, kunnen zij floreer en nog meer geld achterover drukken. Dus die zijn erg gebaat bij het handhaven van de situatie...”
always have access to basic needs, such as health care, education and income. As the examples in Bosnia demonstrated there are close links between governmental officials and criminal groups, so these officials are themselves involved in corrupt practices and criminal activities. As a consequence, governmental officials are also not interested in countering corruption and stimulate the punishment of criminals, because it is not in their interest. Finally, another reason why corrupt and criminal behavior is not always being sanctioned is the fact that in Bosnia the law enforcement bodies – the police and the judges – themselves are corrupt, in order to earn more money, because of their low wages. Furthermore, especially the judges are being controlled and manipulated by the governmental officials, so they are not able to act independently. Thus, besides the fact that corruption is part of the culture in Bosnia, is corruption also beneficial for the actors in the country; thus it is in their interest to be part of this corrupt way of acting.

As illustrated in this chapter during the military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina the military brought money with them and in the last part of this chapter I elaborated on how these soldiers dealt with the corrupt environment and how the mission impacted on corruption in the country. On the one hand, during the mission CIMIC officers had a positive impact on the level of corruption, inter alia by controlling the construction process and by stopping cooperation with construction companies who acted in corrupt way – such as using cheaper materials. Moreover, part of military tried to stop illegal activities, like in the example of closing the black markets. They also made reports of the illegal shops and the result was the fact that the amount of these illegal shops reduced.

On the other hand, despite that the NATO CIMIC Doctrine explicitly advocates for “zero tolerance for any corruption” there were also incidents where the CIMIC members also directly and/or indirectly contributed to corrupt practices. They directly contributed to corruption by supporting and cooperating with corrupt local actors, knowing that they are corrupt and they are involved in illegal activities. An example was the case where the other part of the military did not report the existence of illegal shops in BiH. On contrary they visited these shops and bought these fake goods – like DVD’s and CD’s. CIMIC personnel knew that it was not allowed to purchase these and they also knew that they were supporting illegal activities. These corrupt practices by military was possible, because there were no guidelines during their mission and/or there was no control by their authorities. These soldiers acted in a corrupt way, because it was also in their own interest to do so. By refusing to act in a corrupt way CIMIC members would not have the information which they needed or cheap goods.
In Bosnia the military also impacted on corruption in an indirect way by buying goods and services from one enterprise which was corrupt — such as the butcher who asked higher prices from the international community for the meat, or cooperating with a company who build a military camp. The problem was that sometimes there was also only one big construction company operating in that particular mission area, thus they had no other choice than cooperate with this company. Furthermore, the military mission also indirectly contributed to corruption in the process of hiring personnel who would work for the mission and in the camps. This was the case with the interpreters and the translators. By paying those employees much more salary than they were used to earn in Bosnia, the mission created opportunities for corrupt practices. In some cases these employees endangered the mission, because they were working undercover for the Bosnian intelligence service. However, at the first instance the military had no choice. If they would not hire these employees, they would not have personnel who would work for them in the camps. To sum up, an international military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina directly and/or indirectly impacted on corruption in a positive and in a negative way.

Case study: Kosovo

As the previous chapters illustrated an international military mission has an impact on corruption. The findings of the previous paragraphs will be tested with a second case study with a similar cultural background. On the basis of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in Kosovo I will analyze how the international military mission affected corruption there. To analyze this I will use the same methodology as the first case study.

On 17 February 2008 Kosovo unitarily made a declaration of independence\textsuperscript{226}, however on their way to this independence Kosovars fought a war – Kosovo conflict – from 1998-1999. During this conflict the government of Yugoslavia and ethnic Serbs fought against ethnic Albanians. Atrocities – such as ethnic cleansing – were committed by the army and by the police during the conflict\textsuperscript{227}. After unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations NATO intervened in 1999 to make an end to these atrocities\textsuperscript{228}. In June 1999 a peace agreement was signed which resulted in the fact that Kosovo


\textsuperscript{228} Idem, p. 1057.
came under the administration of the UN and NATO military controlled the country. Almost ten years later Kosovo claimed independence.

Besides ending the atrocities, the aim of the international community was to establish a safe and secure environment, and built peace and stability in the area. Therefore, NATO started “a peace-support operation in Kosovo” – the Kosovo Force (KFOR) – in June 1999. Like the SFOR mission in Bosnia, this mission too was authorized by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. The initial tasks of KFOR were to assist the return of the displaced persons and refugees, reconstruction, provide border security, deal with weapons smuggling and protect the minorities. Since 2008 additional tasks have been implemented, namely KFOR has to assist and train the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).

Before analyzing how the international mission affected corruption in Kosovo it is relevant to elaborate on how the society is structured in Kosovo and how the country perceives corruption. As illustrated, corruption needs to be interpreted from a cultural perspective. According to interviewees and consulted literature, it is common in Kosovo to have informal agreements within the business society and within the judicial structure. Like in Bosnia the local actors and the citizens in Kosovo perceive corruption as ‘part of their culture’, part of their ‘way of life’ and perceive it as a ‘normal behavior.’ For example, it is normal in Kosovo to pay the doctor to be treated by him. Paying a doctor is for speeding up the waiting period and for being better treated. Thus, paying a doctor, giving gifts in return for doing a favor is not experienced as a ‘real’ crime, but is part of cultural accepted

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229 Idem, p. 1062.
238 Interview number 10 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 3.
norms and behavior. These practices fit well with the definition of corruption, which guides this paper, where corruption is about “any transaction”. Hence, it is not only expressed in monetary terms, but corruption in Kosovo is also demonstrated by ‘doing favors’ or ‘giving gifts’.

The way how several actors – inter alia governmental officials, the population – in Kosovo deal with corruption fits in the way how constructivist theory explains corruption. Just like in Bosnia, in Kosovo it is a cultural norm to give gifts and do favors in exchange for goods and services. So there too is corruption part of the cultural norm, and therefore not all the inhabitants interpret it as crime or corrupt activity. Moreover, in a society where norms are important the inhabitants prefer to follow these norms, because there is the fear of being sanctioned by “dirty looks and unfavorable gossips” or by the “loss of job opportunities and business relations”. Thus, social norms may be equal or even more important than the law.\textsuperscript{240}

In addition to the fact that the perception of corruption is bound to culture, Kosovo is one of the former Yugoslavia countries in Europe\textsuperscript{241}. Due to the breakdown of Yugoslavia there is space for abuse of power\textsuperscript{242} and accumulation of capital by privileged individuals\textsuperscript{243} for personal gains. The political structure in this country is characterized by insecurity and survival\textsuperscript{244}, and the society is divided into clans where these clans control their area of interest\textsuperscript{245}. Furthermore, the government officials and military forces in Kosovo have strong relations with organized crime\textsuperscript{246}. The chair of Transparency International, Ugaz, stated that “corrupt officials smuggle ill-gotten assets into safe havens through offshore companies with absolute impunity”\textsuperscript{247}. As The 2004 Organized Crime Report of Europol has illustrated Kosovo is one of the Balkan states where ethnic Albanian organized crime

\textsuperscript{244} Idem, 74.
\textsuperscript{245} Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 1.
groups are established\textsuperscript{248}. Research has also demonstrated that the Kosovo National Front, the Kosovo Liberation Army and Albanian drug traffickers have strong relationships with each other. As a consequence, the Kosovo Liberation Army used the money from heroin trafficking to buy weapons\textsuperscript{249}. Finally, extra payments and/or giving gifts to a certain actor – to a policeman or to a doctor – is due to the fact that the employees do not earn enough money. Consequently, they act in a corrupt way to generate more income\textsuperscript{250}. Hence, as the definition of corruption –which I use in this analysis – implies corruption in Kosovo occurs \textit{“between private and public sector actors”}, such as between citizens and governmental organizations.

This corrupt and criminal behavior is possible, because officials themselves are engaged in corrupt practices and therefore it is not in their interest to implement the laws to effectively counter corruption and/or effectively punish the criminal; even though there are several (inter) national agencies and/or laws – such as Anti-Corruption Agency, the Law on the Suppression of Corruption, and Law on Anti-Corruption – to counter corruption\textsuperscript{251}. Just like in Bosnia, in Kosovo there is thus no effective judicial institution, no rule of law in the efforts of anti-corruption and the governmental officials are reluctant to counter corruption effectively. An example is the former prime minister of Kosovo, Ceku, who showed his unwillingness to take effective actions against corrupt ministers\textsuperscript{252}. As a consequence, the citizens in Kosovo have no trust in their political and judicial structure\textsuperscript{253}. Finally, besides that the justice in Kosovo is weak in order to address corruption, General de Kermabon added that the employees in this organ \textit{“are moreover being threatened by some bad guys to accept money if they close their eyes”}\textsuperscript{254}. This leads into a dilemma with little choice to avoid corruption.

Corrupt behavior in Kosovo is closely related to the theoretical framework of game-theory. Actors –i.e. the governmental officials – are rational and try to maximize benefits in their own interest. In this case politicians do not counter corruption effectively by not implementing anti-corruption laws. The part of the population and entrepreneurs in Kosovo who benefit from corruption do not

\textsuperscript{250} Interview number 10 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 7.
\textsuperscript{253} Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p.1.
\textsuperscript{254} Y. De Kermabon (personal communication, April 4, 2015), p. 2.
want to stimulate anti-corruption campaigns too, because they profit from this situation, i.e. they pay an actor to get their desired results. Moreover, corruption is widely accepted there, because it eases access to basic goods in the health care sector and on the job market. Consequently, corruption is profitable for these actors\textsuperscript{255}.

Besides, a part of the inhabitants in Kosovo are also afraid to do something about corruption, because they are afraid to be killed\textsuperscript{256} by the actors who are corrupt. In addition, due to the low wages of the employees, additional sources of income are important to support the family. Finally, there is no competent judicial system which could force the politicians to counter corruption. Thus, these officials do not argue that “if I do not attack corruption I may be punished so severely that I shall lose power, whereas if I attack it I shall be rewarded so generously that may hold on power will be maintained or enhanced”\textsuperscript{257}. Therefore, having this corruption in their society is beneficial for them and is thus not in their interest to counter it. In addition, there is also no threat that if actors are involved in corrupt activities they will be punished or prosecuted by the judicial body.

Overall, from a Western perspective corruption can be identified in many parts of the society in Kosovo and corruption affects the daily lives of the citizens there. These same patterns were also identified in Bosnia. Now we have a better understanding of the culture and the system in Kosovo, in the upcoming paragraph I will analyze how the military dealt with corruption during the mission – based on examples and insights provided during the interviews – and how their behavior impacted corruption in Kosovo.

As I already discussed in chapter two during a military mission the military have the task to support a mission area in its reconstruction by starting projects. This also applied to the mission in Kosovo where one of the tasks of the military was being part of the reconstruction process\textsuperscript{258}. As already discussed during the reconstruction process money is involved and this money influences the economy of a mission area by bringing the normal monetary transaction off balance. So when there is disturbance in the normal supply-demand system you might get negative side effects such as

\textsuperscript{256} Idem, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{257} Idem, p. 14.
According one of the interviewees this also applied to Kosovo, because as this person argued in Kosovo there is no import and export. Consequently, the money brought by the military is an important source of income for this country\(^{260}\). As Corstjens – a CIMIC instructor in the Belgian Armed Forces – described the locals in Kosovo knew that the international forces had money, so the prices went up for the international community\(^{261}\).

It is remarkable that like during the SFOR in Bosnia, during the reconstruction projects in Kosovo the contractors tried to bribe the military or they provided additional services without asking for\(^{262}\) to get contracts\(^{263}\) and to earn money. However, on contrary to Bosnia, in Kosovo the legal advisors made detailed contracts to avoid corruption by contractors, and if the contractors did not follow the contracts and tried to act in a corrupt way, CIMIC units immediately stopped cooperating with them. Before signing contracts these units did a background checks on the companies and in case of suspicions these companies did not get a contract\(^{264}\). Military also worked only with contractors who were registered by the UN as ‘clean’ enterprises\(^{265}\). Thus, unlike in BiH in Kosovo detailed contracts and UN registration functioned as a sort of a guideline how to deal and/or avoid corruption during these projects. Those ‘guidelines’ had a positive influence by limiting cooperation with corrupt contractors and by not contributing to corrupt practices.

Another example how the military attempted to avoid corruption, was during the reconstruction process of a bridge. The military hired a company which installed a “make-shift-bridge” between two big cities in Kosovo. However, this company asked one Deutsche Mark (DM)\(^{266}\) as ‘road tax’ from the local population who wanted to make use of this bridge. This ‘road tax’ was forbidden. Consequently, military cleared this check point, so the inhabitants could make use of this bridge without paying for it. As a consequence, this company removed this “make-shift-bridge” and installed a ford. When the citizens had to cross the river by their car a tractor was needed to trail the car and bring it on the other side. To make use of this service they now had to pay five DM\(^{267}\).

\(^{259}\)R. Been (personal communication, January 26, 2015), p. 4-5. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Waar donorgeld is, is ook corruptie. Dit geld brengt het normale geldverkeer uit balans. Dus waar jij in het vraag-aanbodsysteem gaat storen, d.m.v. subsidies, krijg je rare bijverschijnselen zoals corruptie.”

\(^{260}\)Interview number 3 (personal communication, December 11, 2014), p. 5.


\(^{262}\)Interview number 10 (personas al communication, December 16, 2014), p. 2.


\(^{264}\)Interview number 10 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 9.


\(^{267}\)Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 2.
inhabitants were not content about it. However, they accepted it, because it was part of their system\textsuperscript{268}. Like this example illustrates, the military tried to avoid corruption by removing the checkpoints, but the result was that the local population now had to pay even more to get access to this service. So, the attempt of military to avoid corrupt practices was not beneficial for the citizens, because the costs were now higher for them.

Besides, as argued in chapter two and three a military mission needs bases and other services\textsuperscript{269}. This demand of services might create opportunities for corruption. Like in Bosnia, the forces in Kosovo also needed camps. In order to transport, gravel and bulldoze in the camps there was only one company which had the license in this area. This had to do with the fact that this company was owned by a powerful and corrupt clan family. As a result, other companies could not get a license, so the military had to cooperate with this company\textsuperscript{270}. From the game-theory perspective, it was in the interest of the military to cooperate with this company even though they contributed to corruption in this area. Otherwise they could not operate without a camp and this was not in their interest. Another example where there was one company who dominated the infrastructure in this area was the vehicle dealer in Kosovo. During the mission in Kosovo the Headquarter needed 2000 vehicles. Because there were no other vehicle dealers KFOR had no option to choose between other companies. Therefore, the military had to accept this and bought all the vehicles from this one dealer\textsuperscript{271}, which was also the only this company benefited from the mission. This was similar to the situation in Bosnia where CIMIC officers had to accept the system too. As one of the interviewees stated in this context “it was not so easy, because there is the need for our camps and when you have no choice...so okay, then you use this company”\textsuperscript{272}.

Moreover, like during other missions, for example during SFOR mission in Bosnia, KFOR also needed personnel – such as translators – who would work in the bases\textsuperscript{273}. Consequently, this might form an additional or lucrative source of income for the inhabitants\textsuperscript{274}. The recruitment for personnel in the bases also creates opportunities for corruption, because by working for KFOR this

\textsuperscript{268} Idem, p 4.
\textsuperscript{270} Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{271} Interview number 3 (personal communication, December 11, 2014), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{272} Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{273} W, van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 6. The original text is in Dutch and is as follows: “…inhuren van personeel…”
\textsuperscript{274} Interview number 3 (personal communication, December 11, 2014), p. 2.
personnel earn more. These employees might misuse their position within the society creating contradictions. Furthermore, according to General de Kermabon the higher wages might ‘create unbalance and counter-productive action for the population’. This was also the case in Kosovo when a local legal advisor earned four times more income by working as a translator during the mission than when he worked in his original profession.

Another example is the case of a policeman who earned about 150 euros per month by being a policeman. However, he decided to work as an interpreter during the mission, because by working for KFOR he now earned about 600 euros. According to General De Kermabon an unforeseen consequence of recruiting personnel on the society was the fact that ‘we are taking the best part of the population from the society – well-educated – and we pay them salary. With this we create an important gap for the local stability’. However, as game-theory implied this recruitment is beneficial for both the population and the international mission, because these employees earn more money and the international mission has well-educated personnel.

Another illustration how the demand of employees affected corruption in Kosovo was the case of special agents who had to hire employees. Both the special agents and the employees were controlled by the clans. These clans made the decision who was allowed to apply for a job at the camps. To get the approval these employees had to pay part of their income to the clans. These personnel had the choice of not paying the clan to not act in a corrupt way, but then they would not have a job. Thus, the military too ‘…have no choice, you have to accept it. If you do not accept it, you have the problem that there is no one who works in your camp’, and therefore ‘sometimes it makes sense to accept it, to pay and play this game with the family clan’. The examples mentioned above also demonstrate that military contributed to this corrupt system by acting in such a way, because they had no other options.

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275 H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed ‘Ik wil niet meteen zeggen dat het zo is, maar het schept mogelijkheden voor de mensen.’
276 Ibidem. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: ‘Dus ja, ik denk dat je daar wel tegenstellingen krijgt, die corruptie in de hand kunnen werken. Want dat zijn dan mensen die vervolgens over geld beschikken en dan op die manier hun positie kunnen versterken in de omgeving.’
278 M. Piotrowski (personal communication, January 12, 2015), p. 3.
279 Interview number 3 (personal communication, December 11, 2014), p. 5.
281 Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 2.
282 Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 3.
283 Ibidem, p. 2.
284 Ibidem, p. 5.
By hiring these employees this military mission supported the clan system. The following examples illustrates that besides supporting this system, the military mission in Kosovo also supported corrupt local actors, what also occurred during the mission in BiH. General De Kermabon stated during the interview that “sometimes there is also support to this people (referring to the “bad guys”) by the international community.”...”The US ambassador also supported bad people.” He explained that this support of the international community during KFOR was because “there are political, economic and financial reasons for this support”285.

Another illustration of this was provided by one of the interviewees who stated that his/her team supported “the warlords”286 in Kosovo by building them a new street and they gave the soldiers security. Besides building a new street for these “warlords” in Kosovo, the military also had to pay lots of money to them to get security287. Another example where the soldiers supported the illegal activities of the locals in Kosovo was when some of the soldiers bought replications of “brand clothes, like Nike, Hugo Boss”288, while knowing that these were fake and were illegal. There were also teams which “had special conditions and did not have to pay and was free, but the rest of the militaries had to pay for it – about 10 euros”289. Finally, General De Kermabon provided an example from his mission in Kosovo where he was “confronted with smuggling of fuel” and tried to “fight against this”290. However, by buying these fake goods, by ignoring the fact that buying this is not allowed, and by supporting the corrupt local actors these military also contribute to corruption291. Similar incidents also occurred during the mission in Bosnia. Which implies that after years no significant progress was made in addressing this.

As argued earlier within a conflict situation there are certain actors who benefit from the unstable situation and strive to maintain this unstable situation292. In Kosovo, where according to one of the interviewees there is no import and export, the local actors benefit from the international mission, because the mission brought money into the country. Thus, as game-theory implies part of

286 The term “warlords” was used by the interviewee. By using this term this interviewee meant the person who was in power in that certain area. This was not the central authority.
288 Idem, p. 2.
289 Idem, p. 2.
the citizens and officials prefer to have an unstable situation, so the international money flows in their country. As a consequence, there are incidents where when the NATO came into the area to check the safety, some of the citizens and the governmental officials tried to destabilize the environment – such as clashes and shootings – so the military mission extended\textsuperscript{293}. However, by extending the mission part of the international money might leak to the undesired groups, because as illustrated above there is no governmental fiscal control and there is also no proper control by the military staff, inter alia due to the lack of clear guidelines. Therefore, the extension of a mission also impacts on corruption by indirectly supporting actors who benefit from the unstable situation.

To conclude, as the previous paragraphs demonstrate Kosovo is a country where corruption is present at every level of the society, and where corruption is experienced as part of their culture. So, the population do not perceive corruption as criminal behavior, but they perceive it as normal. As a consequence, as well the citizens as the politicians do not always want to counter corruption. Furthermore, it is also not beneficial for them to counter corruption, because if the citizens would not participate in the corrupt system, they would not have access to basic needs, such as health care, education and income. As the examples illustrated there are links between governmental officials and criminal groups, so these officials are themselves involved in corrupt practices. Consequently, governmental officials are also not interested in countering corruption. Thus, besides the fact that corruption is part of the culture in Kosovo, it is also beneficial for the actors there, because as game-theory implies being part of this corrupt system might be helpful to maximize the interests of the actors.

During the military mission in Kosovo CIMIC staff brought money with them and in the last part of this chapter I elaborated how these soldiers dealt with the corrupt environment and how the mission impacted on corruption in Kosovo. On the one hand, during the mission military had a positive impact on corruption, inter alia by setting up detailed contracts, by only cooperating with ‘clean’ companies and by stopping cooperation with enterprises who acted in corrupt way. Moreover, the military tried to stop corrupt activities – such as the example of the “make-shift-bridge”, where they removed the illegal checkpoints.

On the other hand, the KFOR also directly and/or indirectly contributed to corrupt practices. They directly contributed to corruption by supporting and cooperating with corrupt local actors, knowing that they are corrupt and are involved in illegal activities. This was inter alia due to the lack

\textsuperscript{293} Interview number 3 (personal communication, December 11, 2014), p. 5.
of guidelines and due to lack of control during the mission. Moreover, in the examples provided by the interviewees, incidents were illustrated where some of the military argued that they acted in a corrupt way, because it was in their own interest to do so. They argued that if they would refuse to act in a corrupt way CIMIC officers would not have information and/or security, cheap brand cloths, or achieve their mission goals.

The military also contributed to corruption in an indirect way by buying goods and services – such as the vehicles for the Headquarters in Kosovo – from one enterprise which was corrupt. Furthermore, in the process of hiring local staff who were essential for the mission, the military were drawn into clan controlled structures. By paying those employees much more than they were used to, the mission created opportunities for corrupt practices. This way of acting was also in the interest of the military, because they argued that they had no other options. It can also be argued that careless behavior of CIMIC officers lead to undesired effects, such as to corrupt or illegal activities. Overall, KFOR mission in Kosovo too directly and/or indirectly contributed to the level of corruption in a positive and negative way.

Conclusion

As the case study analysis of the military missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have illustrated, the missions SFOR and KFOR had impact on corruption in these areas. The findings of the case studies show that almost the same positive and negative effects of the mission in Bosnia have been repeated during the mission in Kosovo. Despite few differences, during both missions same examples of corruption were provided by the interviewees. This can be explained in two ways, namely that the mistakes from the SFOR mission were not entirely addressed during KFOR. In addition, the environment in which military had to operate was also almost the same. The cultural background and how corruption was perceived by several actors were similar in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Consequently, the effects of both the missions were the same.

Chapter 4: What are the military tools to counter-corruption in a mission scenario?

As mentioned, corruption is a complex phenomenon and countering it in general terms is thus a complex process, especially when there is also a disagreement about who is responsible for the fight against corruption. On the one hand, counter corruption is not a military task in general. Therefore,
all the twenty four interviewees argued that CIMIC had little to do in counter-corruption, because they would lose credibility. Consequently, they argued that countering corruption is a task for the civilians and the legal system. On the other hand, it is argued that “fighting corruption has to be everyone’s job, not just one group’s job,” thus everyone in the society should be involved in this process. Being involved in the process of counter-corruption is necessary, because the international community already has problems with credibility and legitimacy in the Balkans and it is in the interest of achieving the goals of a mission.

Furthermore, as the previous chapters have demonstrated an international mission has direct and/or indirect impact on corruption in a mission area. However, this is not the aim of an international mission. Therefore, this chapter will discuss the tools which can be used to counter, or at least avoid careless behavior which could lead to corruption. In particular, I will elaborate on the role of CIMIC and how the organization and its staff can use these tools to counter and/or avoid corruption in a mission area, in order to be in line with NATO CIMIC Doctrine which pleads for “zero tolerance for any corruption.” It is worth to mention that the tools which can be used by CIMIC are based on the findings from the interviewees, and in particular the interviews with CIMIC staff.

Being in a mission area military had to deal with corrupt situations. As chapter two and the case studies demonstrate sometimes they had to accept corrupt practices to achieve their mission goals or finalize their projects. By doing so, CIMIC officers were directly/indirectly and/or unconsciously part of this corrupt system. Consequently, this careless behavior fueled corruption in the mission.

294 This opinion is also shared by the soldiers who I have interviewed. All the interviewees confirmed that it is not the task of the military to counter corruption. Detailed answers on this question can be found in Annex D question 7.
295 Interview number 12 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 3.
areas. Even though the majority of CIMIC personnel, who have been interviewed, argued that it is not their task to counter corruption case studies demonstrated that they are directly or indirectly being involved in corrupt practices. Therefore, there are certain measures which can be taken by military to counter corruption or at least avoid corrupt practices.

First, it is argued that the majority of military and CIMIC-officers do not have an understanding about the cultural component of corruption and they are not specialized in that particular field. They only know that corruption is forbidden and before going on a mission they have to sign a document in which it is stated that corrupt practices are subject to prosecution. As the interviews illustrate, most of the soldiers did not have any guidelines about how to deal with corrupt situation during their missions. Consequently, the military in Kosovo developed their own guidelines in 2000. However these guidelines were based on their own Western perspectives and own Western understanding of corruption. Hence, Corstjens – CIMIC instructor in the Belgian Armed forces – argued that countering corruption and/or avoiding corrupt acts in a mission scenario starts with making soldiers aware of corruption in that particular area. At least the officers who are making contracts and who are dealing with the local enterprises need awareness to avoid careless acting. Piotrowski, the Branch Chief Lessons Learned/Development at the CCOE, added “CIMIC can influence own troops – to make them aware what corruption is, where corruption starts, and how the population is dealing with corruption. The soldiers, coming into a mission, were shocked about the situation and about the poverty. But by making them aware everything is fine and they are now not shocked when they see a policeman not only controlling the passports, but also taking bribes to get things running. That is normal”.

Because CIMIC officers work closely with civil actors they should be aware about how the official and parallel system works and how corruption in the context of a particular country and culture works. If military is not aware of the situation and the culture, or the corrupt system of the mission area, they might (un)consciously and/or (in) directly contribute to corruption. Therefore,

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302 Majority of the interviewees argued that it is not the main task of CIMIC to counter corruption. Detailed answers on this question can be found in Annex D and E question 7.
304 Majority of the interviewees confirmed that during their mission there were no guidelines about corruption. Detailed answers on this question can be found in Annex D and E question 3d.
305 Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p. 3.
308 Interview number 10 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p.3.
309 Idem, p. 8.
making them aware of corruption is important. Training and educating of CIMIC personnel can be used as tools to raise awareness about the situation, the cultural aspect of corruption, and the corrupt system in a mission area. A concrete example how awareness of the CIMIC-soldiers can be raised, and how they can be trained and educated, is during the NATO CIMIC Field and Staff Workers Courses, and during NATO CIMIC Higher Command Courses at the CCOE in The Hague. During these courses there is focus on culture, good governance, social and economic systems and gender.

According to Hans Opsteen, a staff officer at the CIC branch at the CCOE, the topic corruption should be addressed in these lectures. By addressing counter corruption tools during these trainings the CCOE would also contribute to CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, which seeks that the “projects reflect the respect with the cultural background of the respective society.”

Another interviewee added that training of CIMIC soldiers should not be passive – not only be based on the lectures – but these trainings should be active, thus for example using case studies. These tools mainly can be used in the pre-mission phase.

There are also other tools which can be used in order to raise awareness and to counter and/or avoid corruption. To raise awareness the CIMIC-officers have to map the (corrupt) system, the (corrupt) culture of a mission area, and have to map who the key players there are. To achieve this, one of the core competences of the CIMIC, namely liaison, can be used. During liaison and patrolling military “can observe, identify things and rapport it,” and talk to the locals in order to collect information. On of the interviewees suggested that information can also be collected by having conversations with the local government and by listening to rumors. According to this interviewee the value of this ‘soft intelligence’ should not be underestimated, this ‘soft intelligence’ should be

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310 H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 8. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Het is zeker een onderwerp wat je in bepaalde vakken binnen de courses kunt aanstippen. Wij (CCOE, red.) hebben een lecture over economic systems. Dat zou bij uitstek voor mij een les zijn waar het thuis hoort. Maar in de lessen zoals good governance, sociale systemen kun je het ook naar voren laten komen. En corruptie heeft ook heel zwaar te maken met gender, want je ziet dat mensenhandel vaak vanuit de corruptiedachte komt. Een stuk bewustwording bij CIMICers die hier hun lessen komen volgen.”


312 Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 7. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “…trainingen met behulp van case studies.”


314 Interview number 12 (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p.3.

315 J. van Benthem (personal communication, December 15, 2014), p. 10. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “CIMIC-ers … informative verzamelen over mogelijke corruptie.”
reported and should be passed it on to the headquarters\textsuperscript{316}. Information collected by military should also be shared with other actors – like International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – in a mission area, so there should be cooperation with other actors. This was also done in the Balkans, where CIMIC members worked together with Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Office of High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR)\textsuperscript{317} by exchanging information and by organizing meetings\textsuperscript{318}. Finally, after collecting and exchanging information CIMIC soldiers can make assessments about how corruption affects the development and stability of the area, formulate suggestions and give advice\textsuperscript{319}.

In Bosnia, CIMIC houses and CIMIC centers have been introduced as installations for the local population for information exchange with the military. They also might function as anti-corruption measures or tools to enhance awareness. During an interview one of the interviewees suggested to make these houses ‘anti-corruption centers’, where the population can report corruption\textsuperscript{320}. In addition, I suggest that besides establishing ‘anti-corruption centers’ there is also the possibility for CIMIC to cooperate with other organizations or persons who are experts in the field of corruption. In these centers the population can make their complaints about corruption, so the complaints can be reported and can be passed on to higher institutions, like politicians, so they make it public\textsuperscript{321} and investigate it. Though, it is important that the soldiers deal with this complaints in a serious way, otherwise they might lose credibility. Finally, the locals should be informed about the existence of this centers and where they are situated, and the inhabitants should be informed about

\textsuperscript{316} Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 5. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Gesprekken voeren met de bevolking en proberen om de personen te laten praten. Praten, daarna verwoorden en doorgeven aan het hoofdkantoor...en de waarde van deze soft informatie moet je niet onderschatten.”

\textsuperscript{317}R. Been (personal communication, January 26, 2015), p. 3-4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Wij hebben ook gecoördineerd met de andere actoren, zoals IOs en NGOs. Wij gingen onze kennis koppelen.”...

\textsuperscript{318}Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 5. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “uitwisseling van informatie is ook belangrijk. Dit kan door middel van bijeensommen”.

\textsuperscript{319}H. Opsteen (personal communication, January 1, 2015), p. 7-8. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “de informatie ook te verzamelen, daar een goede assessment te maken en daar adviezen op te geven.”

\textsuperscript{320}Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 5. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “Jij kan die huizen specifiek anti-corruptie maken en aan de bevolking laten weten dat deze voor anti-corruptie zijn. De bevolking moet ook weten waar deze huizen gestationeerd zijn en dat zij hun klachten anoniem kwijt kunnen, dan is er een rol voor CIMIC.”

\textsuperscript{321}M. Olthof (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 6. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “Corruptie kan je alleen maar aanpakken door te zien en een melding van te maken. En die meldingen worden in rapporten geschreven en gaan steeds hogerop. En daar heb je op een gegeven moment natuurlijk een legaat bij zitten en dat is politiek niveau. Politieke niveau kan dan het aan de kaak stellen.”
their possibility to report corruption. They also have to know that they have the opportunity to make their complaints anonymous.\textsuperscript{322}

Besides liaison and being point of contact, CIMIC-soldiers also do projects – like quick impact projects to facilitate access to water\textsuperscript{323}, building schools and hospitals – in mission areas. However, these projects are small, so they have a limited budget, but this is also money. As Colonel Been, the director of CCOE, stated “in the projects money is involved, and when there is money involved there is also influence”\textsuperscript{324}. Another interviewee argued that if you bring it in a poor world “corruption will start immediately”\textsuperscript{325}, thus in accordance with the interviewees money has influence on corruption in a country\textsuperscript{326}. Therefore, it is important that during the projects the military controls the purchase of goods\textsuperscript{327}, and control the flow of the money. In the wording of one of the interviewees “we have to look what we pay, and who we pay”\textsuperscript{328}. Corstjens added to this “we have to be in control of everything, so we have to check everything, just to avoid that they do things that was not allowed”\textsuperscript{329}. To control the projects and the flow of money Corstjens is of the opinion that CIMIC has to make their legal experts and the persons, who make the contracts for the projects, aware of the corrupt system. So these experts take the corrupt entrepreneurs and the system into account when they make contracts. To avoid corruption the contracts should be really detailed “where it is stipulated what can be done and what cannot be done”\textsuperscript{330}.

Besides, in the process of (re)constructing a school and/or a hospital there should be concrete and strict procedures\textsuperscript{331}, where anti-corr upt criteria and the regulations are clearly explained\textsuperscript{332}. Furthermore, during negotiations and contracting with the local entrepreneurs the military should

\begin{itemize}
  \item Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 5. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “...aan de bevolking laten weten dat deze voor anti-corrup tie zijn. De bevolking moet ook weten waar deze huizen gestationeerd zijn en dat zij hun klachten anoniem kwijt kunnen, dan is er een rol voor CIMIC.”\textsuperscript{322}
  \item M. Olt hof (personal communication, December 16, 2014), p. 6. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “we hebben wel projecten - quick impacts, zoals behoeftie aan water voorzien.”\textsuperscript{323}
  \item R. Been (personal communication, January 26, 2015), p. 1. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “in de projecten gaat geld om en waar geld omgaat, heb je dus ook invloed.”\textsuperscript{324}
  \item Interview number 3 (personal communication, December 11, 2014), p. 6.\textsuperscript{325}
  \item Interview number 19 (personal communication, January 13, 2015), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “Alle geld wat in een land binnenkomt, heeft invloed op de corruptie in een land.”\textsuperscript{326}
  \item W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 6. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed “...de inkoop/logistiek.”\textsuperscript{327}
  \item Interview number 16 (personal communication, January 6, 2015), p 6.\textsuperscript{328}
  \item M. Corstjens (personal communication, December 12, 2014), p. 2.\textsuperscript{329}
  \item Idem, p. 4.\textsuperscript{330}
  \item R. Been (personal communication, January 26, 2015), p. 4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Je moest heel streng proces opzetten...Je moest dus ferm optreden.”\textsuperscript{331}
  \item Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 2. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “...de criteria moet helder verwoord worden.”\textsuperscript{332}
\end{itemize}
clearly indicate that in the case of violation the criteria’s and the regulations by the local entrepreneurs, the projects will be stopped and the enterprises will be out of business. Besides, Colonel Braterschofsky – Deputy Director of the CCOE – suggested that military also have to make clear guidance addressing “how much money there should be transferred in which phase, who is responsible for the contracts, who is responsible for the equipment.” He further added that military “have to deal with it by following certain rules / conditions: if you provide the service then you will get the money.” Finally, Colonel Bratershovsky argued that before starting a project each party should agree on this process. In this way the contractors will make a cost-benefit analysis and act in the way which is in their own interest. In addition, when during a project it becomes clear that an enterprise acted in a corrupt way, it should be made public and the person who was corrupt should be hold account to make clear that it is not the way it works. This happened in Bosnia, where some projects are not finished because of corruption. In this case acting in a corrupt way is not beneficial for the enterprises, because they have no projects to run and have no income.

Thus, everyone should follow the rules, exceptions should not be tolerated and in this stage commanders have to take a stand on which practices are not acceptable. This is how General De Kermabon acted during KFOR, where he “punished the people who were corrupt and I showed that I do not accept it.” Moreover, by having this conditionality CIMIC staff force the counterparts to follow the rules by showing that they are not corrupt and they do not participate in this corrupt system. At the end it is also beneficial for the local actors to have a school and/or a hospital than nothing. Thus, by actively negotiating and training in own environment; and by functioning as a role model.

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333 Ibidem. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “…Zij kunnen het beïnvloeden door heel duidelijk te zijn in de criteria/voorwaarden in de projecten: ‘uitleggen dat als jij aan de criteria voldoet, dan krijg je de vergunning of subsidie.”


336 Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p 4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Een aantal projecten in Bosnië zijn nu stilgelegd, aangezien zij niet voldeden aan de criteria’s.”


and including international best practices in their own behavior\textsuperscript{340} the military can support in the process of counter-corruption.

Furthermore, counter and/or avoid corruption during the projects can also be achieved by being transparent and open, and demanding transparency and openness from the counterpart. As Van Koeveringe stated “be transparent, honest and open when you bring money and spend the money in a transparent and open way, so everybody can see where the money goes”,\textsuperscript{341} thus be open for the public and for the press\textsuperscript{342}. There should also be transparency during the tendering process, because as General De Kermabon argued the tendering process is not always respected. Therefore this process should be accessible for multiple companies, and before doing business with a company there should be a background check. If military get the idea that the process of a project cannot be controlled\textsuperscript{343}, and if there is suspicion that this enterprise is not ‘clean’ there should not be any cooperation with him. As Colonel Been stated “if you want to counter corruption you should not hire a corrupt contractor”.\textsuperscript{344} In addition, when CIMIC-soldiers hire a contractor for a project they can control the process by asking the contractor to justify his expenditures\textsuperscript{345}, and control the process by not giving the whole amount of money once, but in steps just like suggested by Colonel Bratershovsky.

Besides, the military can counter corruption during a project by making sure that the projects – like the schools and/or the hospitals – are supported by the local citizens, and are accessible to everyone, inter alia every ethnicity in a society\textsuperscript{346}. This should be assessed before doing a project. And when a project is not accessible to every ethnicity it should not be started. Because as Piotrowski


\textsuperscript{341} W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 8. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “wees zelf transparant, eerlijk en open. Als jij geld inbrengt, doe dat op een open en transparante manier dat iedereen het ziet waar het geld aan besteed wordt.”


\textsuperscript{343} W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 3. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “een stuk van corruptie waar je moet voorkomen is dat je een opdracht geeft waarbij je op vrijheid de controle niet kunt betrekken.”

\textsuperscript{344} R. Been (personal communication, January 26, 2015), p. 6. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “Als jij corruptie wilt verminderen, moet je geen corrupte aanbieder gaan aannemen. Dat deed je niet.”

\textsuperscript{345} Interview number 17 (personal communication, January 8, 2015), p. 4. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “CIMIC kan ook de lokale bestuurders vragen om hoe zij hun uitgaven verantwoorden. Er moeten meer bindende regels komen voor publicatie en transparantie.”

\textsuperscript{346} W. van Koeveringe (personal communication, December 17, 2014), p. 7. The original text is in Dutch and is as followed: “dan moet je proberen om te zorgen dat als je een project bouwt het voor iedereen is, dat het transparant is, dat het gedragen wordt door de bevolking, dat het niet iemand zeg maar alleen maar beter wordt, maar dat een hele bevolkingsgroep beter wordt.”
stated “as long as the population is not behind that – everybody can come up with brilliant ideas how to counter it- but it has to come from the population itself. Otherwise it will never change”\textsuperscript{347}. 

Finally, in the process of countering corruption it is important to bear in mind that like constructivist theory implied corruption has a cultural component – such as certain norms, values within a culture, and certain accepted practices. As case study analysis demonstrated this is also the case in Bosnia and Kosovo. To have an influence on this cultural aspect and change this way of acting time and education are essential factors, because cultural changes require generations\textsuperscript{348} while military are for a short time period in a mission area. As a consequence, the military will not see immediate results of their efforts in the process of counter-corruption. However, they can play an important role in the process of cultural change.

The role of the commanders –who is in charge of the mission – is important in counter corruption in a mission area where corruption is part of the culture there. As the majority of the interviewees confirmed there are no guidelines during a mission which explicitly deal with corruption. Hence, it is important that the commanders incorporate anti-corruption and the cultural aspect of corruption in their decision-making, operational planning, exercises, and provide guidelines how to deal with corruption\textsuperscript{349}. They have to be explicit about how to deal with corruption, “\textit{thus not be silent about it and just ignore it}”\textsuperscript{350}, and should be strict and control the execution of the guidelines. Finally, as case studies illustrate political will\textsuperscript{351} is essential in counter-corruption and as a consequence politicians and key (local) leaders should be engaged in the whole planning process\textsuperscript{352} during the mission. However military should not cooperate with corrupt politicians and corrupt key leaders, otherwise the mission will be associated with corruption.

To conclude, as this chapter illustrates even though military at the first instance argue that there is no role for them in the process of counter-corruption, there are several tools which can be

\textsuperscript{347}M. Piotrowski (personal communication, January 12, 2015), p. 6.
\textsuperscript{350}Interview number 2 (personal communication, December 9, 2014), p. 1.
used by them to counter and/or avoid corruption. It can be achieved by at least making the military aware of the situation, the culture and the corrupt system of a mission area. Creating awareness about the operational environment is important to understand the structure in which CIMIC soldiers operate. Collecting information and exchanging it with other actors is important in this process. Furthermore, CIMIC centers can also function as tools in countering corruption. Via these centers CIMIC officers can use the collected information by reporting the complaints, and contribute to counter corruption by making the international community and the politicians aware of the corrupt practices.

In addition, corruption can also be countered in the process of carrying out projects. In this process it is important to have strict purchase policy, clear criteria’s, clear guidelines –based on cultural understanding of corruption – and strict rules. This is relevant, because importance of guidelines was acknowledged by the military itself during KFOR mission. In this mission they developed their own guidelines, however these were based on the Western perspective. Therefore, it is significant to base the guidelines on the country where the mission takes place. Besides having policies and guidelines, the contracting parties and the military should follow the rules. No exceptions should be tolerated, and the actors who are involved in a mission scenario should have the same approach, thus be unified353. In this phase it is important that the involved parties strictly follow the rules and the guidelines. Transparency and openness should also be required from all the participating parties. To control how the money is spend during these projects is also a tool in countering corruption. These can be achieved by doing a background check of the contractors during tendering to ensure that military are not dealing with contractors who are corrupt354. Moreover, participation of multiple enterprises in the tendering process should be transparent, open and accessible for everyone. If the contractor is not transparent, is corrupt, and violates the criteria’s and the rules there should be no cooperation with this party. In this way the military show the enterprises that it is not in their interest and is not beneficial to be corrupt.

Finally, in the counter-corruption process during a mission situation the military should take into account that corrupt practices can be seen as normal and accepted behavior in a certain culture – like it is the case in the Bosnia and Kosovo. Therefore, corruption and cultural component of corruption should be prioritized355 and addressed this cultural aspect of corruption during a mission.

In addition, anti-corruption should be part of the military policy, training, assessment and operational planning. Otherwise, military might lose credibility and might be seen as corrupt actors.

Conclusion

In this study I analyzed the impact of the international military mission on corruption in Bosnia and Kosovo. Therefore, the research question was as followed: *how did an international military mission impact on corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo?* To answer to the research question I have put the research in the theoretical context of game-theory and constructivist theory. I have chosen for this combination, because game-theory is strong in explaining the interests and chances of the actors. However, it is weak in explaining the cultural context. Constructivism, on the other hand, can be used in relation to the cultural context. Therefore, constructivism compliments the findings from game-theory and vice versa. Methodologically, I used a combination of literature study, case study analysis and qualitative interviews with soldiers who have been deployed to SFOR and KFOR. Additional insights into the military context, especially the function CIMIC resulted from a research internship at the CIMIC Centre of Excellence. The findings, evidence and results leads to recommendations how the military can avoid and/or counter corruption during their mission. Corruption is a complex multi-faceted phenomenon, both in the interdisciplinary academic debate and in its appearance in societies. This debated is discussed in chapter one. This does not only provide the context for this study, but also a definition applicable to the regional appearance in the Balkans.

As chapter one demonstrated is corruption a complex phenomenon and to formulate a definition which would be universally applicable is not easy, because different societies have different cultures and perspectives. Due to these differences in cultures several societies interpret corruption differently. As I already discussed in this paper in Western definitions of corruption we find patterns such as *‘abuse of power’, ‘private/personal gains’, ‘public official’, ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct’*. Whereas from the perspective of the Balkans is corruption considered as *‘part of their normal behavior and their normal living’, ‘way of life’, and ‘part of their culture’*. Therefore, it is important to include this cultural differences in the definition of corruption, and take the cultural component into account when dealing with corruption in the, otherwise we will be off our target.

To put corruption in the context of the Balkans and adopt the cultural context, I have chosen for the following definition of corruption *“any transaction between private and public sector actors*
through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs”\textsuperscript{356}. This definition is broad and deals with ‘any transaction’, so it is applicable to the Bosnia and Kosovo, where corruption is not only expressed in monetary terms, but also in the terms of ‘giving gifts’ and ‘doing favors.’ Furthermore, the actors in ‘the public and private sector’ are also included, thus no actor is excluded from corruption. In addition, the inhabitants in the Bosnia and Kosovo most of the time pay to get excess to collective goods, which are not part of the legal tax-system, but end in the pockets of an official or a group who provides the service. These aspects, namely ‘collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs’ are also incorporated. To sum up, this definition of corruption reproduces the aspects which are important when we deal with corruption in different cultures.

In chapter two I analyzed how an international military mission can impact corruption. From this discussion I concluded that an international military mission can directly and/or indirectly contributes to the level of corruption in a mission area. This impact can be in a positive and/or in a negative way. Firstly, when there is a military mission international money comes into a mission area and this money and other spendings might put pressure on the economy of this state and might fuel corruption. As discussed, during a mission the local economy might be stressed by the creation of a pseudo-economy, because first there are thousands of soldiers who need goods, services and personnel. When these military leave the mission area the economy might get damaged due to the absence of demand of goods and services, and due to a vacuum. As Cole described this process “in fact we create corruption, not in terms of money, but corruption the natural way of development”.

Furthermore, as the findings of the interviewees demonstrated military contribute to corruption during a mission by (un)consciously acting in corrupt way, for example by selling military equipment and/or supporting –by contracting without controlling the contractors or not controlling the flow of the money – citizens and/or political leaders who are corrupt. This is inter alia due to the fact that military have no understanding of the cultural component of corruption and do not know how to deal with corruption in a mission scenario. They had also no training about the culture in a mission area and had no (clear) guidelines during a mission. To sum up one of the interviewees described the impact of a mission on corruption as followed “if you are really honest the more money you put into it... the more you feed the monster and keep the system going”.

In chapter three I tested the findings of chapter two on the missions in Bosnia and in Kosovo. The interviews and the examples provided during the interviews were indicators for the findings, which led to the conclusion of the chapter. Before assessing how these missions affected on corruption I shortly elaborated on how the society in Kosovo and in Bosnia perceived corruption. As the case study analysis have illustrated Kosovo and Bosnia are one of the former Yugoslavia countries, and both the countries fought a war before becoming independent states. The political system and the wars have created opportunities for corruption and illegal activities in the mission areas. As discussed corruption is at every level of the society in Bosnia and in Kosovo. In both the countries corruption is experienced as part of the culture, as way of living, and is seen as a normal behavior, thus the population do not perceive corruption as a ‘real’ crime. Consequently, as well the citizens as the politicians do not have the incentives to counter corruption.

Furthermore, it is also not beneficial for them to counter corruption, because if the citizens would not participate in the corrupt system, they would not have access to basic needs, such as health care, education and/or income. The governmental officials are also not interested in countering corruption, because as the case studies have illustrated these officials have close ties with criminal groups, so these officials are involved in illegal practices. Finally, another reason why the corrupt and criminal behavior is not being sanctioned in Bosnia is the fact that the law enforcement bodies – the police and the judges – themselves are corrupt, in order to earn more money, because their salary is low. In addition, especially the judges are being controlled and manipulated by the governmental officials, so they are not able to act independently. Thus, besides that corruption is part of the culture in Bosnia and in Kosovo, it is also beneficial for the several actors there to be corrupt. Therefore, it is not in their interest to counter corruption in these countries.

During the military mission in Kosovo the forces had to operate in such an environment. The interviewees stated that they brought money with them to Kosovo and Bosnia. The impact of these missions on corruption was on the one hand positive, inter alia because CIMIC soldiers set up detailed contracts, they only cooperated with ‘clean’ companies. When a company acted in a corrupt way – like using cheaper materials – they stopped cooperating with these enterprises. Moreover, the military tried to stop corrupt activities in Kosovo – such as the example of the “make-shift-bridge”, where they removed the illegal checkpoints. Moreover, as discussed one part of the military tried to stop illegal activities – for example by closing the black markets and by making reports of the illegal shops. Due to these reports the amount of these illegal shops reduced.
However, the international mission also (in) directly affected in negative way on corruption both in Bosnia and in Kosovo. The findings of the interviewees demonstrated that CIMIC personnel directly contributed to corruption during SFOR and KFOR by supporting and cooperating with corrupt local actors knowing that they are corrupt and they are involved in illegal activities. As an example illustrated the military paid money to the ‘warlords’, or build streets for them in exchange for security or information. Another example was the case where CIMIC soldiers bought fake goods – like brand cloths Nike, Hugo Boss – from illegal shops during both the missions, while knowing that this was not allowed. Thus, instead of reporting these illegal activities they sometimes supported it. Due to the lack of understanding of the consequences of their behavior, due to the lack of guidelines, and due to the lack of control by military commanders these soldiers acted in illegal and corrupt way. Another reason why they acted in a corrupt way, was the fact that it was in their own interest to do so. By refusing to act in a corrupt way the soldiers would not have information and/or security, or cheap brand cloths.

The military also contributed to corruption in an indirect way by buying goods and services – such as the vehicles for the Headquarters in Kosovo – from one corrupt enterprise. In Bosnia military cooperated with a corrupt company who build a military camp. The problem was that sometimes there was only one big construction company operating in that particular mission area, thus they had no other choice than cooperate with this company. Furthermore, when the military needed personnel who would work in the camps, occasionally military in Kosovo and in Bosnia had to deal with agents and employees who were corrupt. In the case of Kosovo these employees and agents were controlled by a clan and earned much more than they were used to. Consequently, the mission created opportunities for corrupt practices, because these employees gained power by earning more salary. In such circumstances military had no other choice, because on the one hand they needed staff to work in the camps, so they could operate during a mission. On the other hand, they needed services, thus they had to cooperate with this company. As the majority of the interviewees argued “sometimes it is better to deal with the devil”, or “we have to deal with that system, because it is a working system there and we cannot ignore it”.

Overall, as the case study analysis illustrated the SFOR and KFOR missions in Kosovo and in Bosnia directly and/or indirectly contributed to corruption in a positive and negative way. Hereby it is relevant to mention that both case studies show very similar results. The examples and the experiences provided by the interviewees, and the effects of the missions are also identical. It ould be an indicator that the mistakes made during SFOR mission by the military were repeated during KFOR.
The similar effect of the missions could be explained by the same cultural background of Bosnia and Kosovo and the same way of perceiving corruption.

Therefore, despite that the interviewees at the first instance argued that there is no role for CIMIC soldiers in the process of counter-corruption, in chapter five I elaborated on the tools which CIMIC officers can use in order to avoid and/or counter corruption and avoid repeating the same mistakes. Countering and/or avoiding corruption can start in the pre-mission phase by making the military aware of the culture, the situation, corruption, and the corrupt system of the operational environment. CCOE provides training opportunities for the military. In particular, themes such as corruption and culture fit in the NATO CIMIC Field and Staff Worker Courses and the NATO CIMIC Higher Command Course. By including counter-corruption in those trainings it would not only contribute to raising awareness, but it also would contribute to CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, which seeks that the “projects reflect the respect with the cultural background of the respective society”. With its civil military characteristics, CIMIC centers can function as tools in the process of counter-corruption. In these centers CIMIC soldiers collect information and they can use the collected information by reporting the complaints, and avoid corruption by making the international community and the politicians aware of the corrupt practices.

Moreover, CIMIC officers can avoid and/or counter corruption in the process of building projects, like schools and houses. Hereby it is important to have clear criteria’s, strict purchase policies, clear guidelines –based on cultural understanding of corruption – and strict rules about corruption in the mission planning process. In addition, the contracting parties and the military should follow the established rules and guidelines, so no exceptions should be tolerated. This is necessary, because even though corruption is not tolerated in the NATO CIMIC Doctrine, the examples provided by the interviewees demonstrated that this Doctrine is not always being followed. Therefore, the actors who are involved in a mission scenario should have the same approach and strictly follow the rules and the guidelines. In this phase supervision is essential factor so everybody acts the way he or she should act.

In addition, control of how the money flows, transparency and openness should also be required from all the participating parties. If the counterpart is not transparent, is corrupt, and violates the criteria’s and the rules there should be no cooperation with this party, even if the mission goals are in danger. In this way the military show the enterprises that it is not in their interest and is not beneficial to be corrupt. Finally, in the counter-corruption process military should take into account that corrupt practices can be seen as normal and accepted behavior in a certain culture – like it is the
case in the Balkans. Therefore, during a mission this cultural aspect of corruption should be prioritized and addressed to make the military aware of how the society in the mission area perceives corruption. Anti-corruption should also be part of the military policy, training, assessment and planning, so CIMIC officers do not effect on corruption in a mission area, like it was the case during the missions in the Bosnia and in Kosovo.
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https://www.google.nl/search?q=military+waste+money&biw=1366&bih=657&tbm=isch&source=lms&sa=X&ved=0CFMQ_AUoAWoVChMI_uyawO-UxgIVS0AUCh3dVABo#imgrc=zxEAzCKr2VY1IM%253A%3BCZaTf0KEJJH9_M%3Bhttps%253A%252F%252Fi2.wp.com%252Fi.imgur.com%252F0e7Ys5Z.jpg%253Fresize%253D350%252C200%3Bhttps%253A%252F%252Fthisgotmyattention.wordpress.com%252F2014%252F02%252F07%252Fa-long-tradition-of-wasting-our-money-hand-over-fist%252F%3B800%3B393
Appendix A: List of sources about the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo


Appendix B: “Most Commonly Recognized Forms of Official Corruption”\(^{357}\)

### Table 2.1

**Most Commonly Recognized Forms of Official Corruption**

- Treason; subversion; illegal foreign transactions; smuggling
- Kleptocracy; privatization of public funds; larceny and stealing
- Misappropriation; forgery and embezzlement; padding of accounts; diverted funds; misuse of funds; unaudited revenues; skimming
- Abuse and misuse of power; intimidation; undeserved pardons and remissions; torture
- Deceit and fraud; misrepresentation; cheating and swindling; blackmail
- Perversion of justice; criminal behavior; false evidence; unlawful detention; frame-ups
- Nonperformance of duties; desertion; parasitism; cronyism
- Bribery and graft; extortion; illegal levies; kickbacks
- Tampering with elections; vote rigging; gerrymandering
- Misuse of inside knowledge and confidential information; falsification of records
- Unauthorized sale of public offices, loans, monopolies, contracts, licenses, and public property
- Manipulation of regulations, purchases and supplies; bias and favoritism in decision making
- Tax evasion; excessive profiteering
- Influence-peddling; favor-brokering; conflicts of interest
- Acceptance of improper gifts and entertainments; “speed” money; junkets
- Protecting maladministration; cover-ups; perjury
- Black market operations; links with organized crime
- Misuse of official seals, stationery, residences, and perquisites
- Illegal surveillance; misuse of mails and telecommunications; improper use of electronics and computers

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Appendix C: Corruption Index\textsuperscript{358}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{corruption_index.png}
\caption{Corruption Index}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{358} The information of this graph can be found on the website of Transparency International by searching for the particular country and particular year. Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index.” Retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi (16 April 2015).
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL
15 December 1995

RESOLUTION 1031 (1995)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3607th meeting,
on 15 December 1995

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia,

Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity of all States there within their internationally recognized borders,

Welcoming the signing on 14 December 1995 at the Paris Peace Conference of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace Agreement, S/1995/999, annex) by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other parties thereto,

Welcoming also the Dayton Agreement on implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995 (S/1995/1021, annex),

Welcoming further the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 8 and 9 December 1995 (the London Conference) (S/1995/1029), and in particular its decision to establish a Peace Implementation Council and its Steering Board as referred to in those conclusions,

Paying tribute to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) for its efforts aimed at achieving a peace settlement and taking note of the decision of the London Conference that the Peace Implementation Council will subsume the ICFY,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December 1995 (S/1995/1031),

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Determined to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Welcomes and supports the Peace Agreement and calls upon the parties to fulfil in good faith the commitments entered into in that Agreement;

2. Expresses its intention to keep the implementation of the Peace Agreement under review;

3. Welcomes the progress made towards mutual recognition among the successor States to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, within their internationally recognized borders;

4. Reaffirms its resolutions concerning compliance with international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, reaffirms also that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and its organs in accordance with the provisions of resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and the Statute of the International Tribunal, and shall comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under article 29 of the Statute, and calls upon them to allow the establishment of offices of the Tribunal;

5. Recognizes that the parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of the peace settlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and that the parties have in particular authorized the multinational force referred to in paragraph 14 below to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;

6. Welcomes the agreement by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to adopt and put in place a programme of elections for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the request of the parties to Annex 3 of the Peace Agreement;

7. Welcomes also the parties’ commitment, as specified in the Peace Agreement, to securing to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, stresses that compliance with this commitment is of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, and welcomes the invitation by the parties to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the OSCE, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other intergovernmental or regional human rights missions or organizations to monitor closely the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

8. Welcomes further the parties’ commitment to the right of all refugees and displaced persons freely to return to their homes of origin in safety, notes the leading humanitarian role which has been given by the Peace Agreement to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in coordination with other agencies involved and under the authority of the Secretary-General, in assisting with the repatriation and relief of refugees and displaced persons, and stresses the importance of repatriation being phased, gradual and orderly;

9. Emphasizes the importance of the creation of conditions conducive to the reconstruction and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and encourages Member States to provide assistance for the programme of reconstruction in that country;

10. Underlines the relationship, as described in the conclusions of the London Conference, between the fulfilment by the parties of their commitments in the Peace Agreement and the readiness of the international community to commit financial resources for reconstruction and development;

11. Welcomes the agreement of the parties to Annex 1-B of the Peace Agreement that establishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to creating a stable peace in the region, emphasizes the importance of all Member States supporting their efforts to this end, and supports the OSCE's commitment to assist the parties with the negotiation and implementation of such measures;

II

12. Welcomes the willingness of the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to assist the parties to the Peace Agreement by deploying a multinational implementation force;

13. Notes the invitation of the parties to the international community to send to the region for a period of approximately one year a multinational implementation force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;

14. Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in order to fulfill the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement;

15. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall be held equally responsible for compliance with that Annex, and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by IFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that Annex and the protection of IFOR, and takes note that the parties have consented to IFOR's taking such measures;

16. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above, in accordance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules and procedures, to be established by the Commander of IFOR, governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic;
17. **Authorizes** Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of IFOR, either in defence of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and recognizes the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack;

18. **Demands** that the parties respect the security and freedom of movement of IFOR and other international personnel;

19. **Decides** that, with effect from the day on which the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR has taken place, the authority to take certain measures conferred upon States by resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993, 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993 and 958 (1994) of 19 November 1994 shall be terminated, and that the provisions of resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and subsequent resolutions regarding safe areas shall also be terminated from the same date;

20. **Requests** the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate with the IFOR Commander to ensure the effective management of the airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the responsibilities conferred on IFOR by Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement with regard to the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

21. **Decides**, with a view to terminating the authorization granted in paragraphs 14 to 17 above one year after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR, to review by that date and to take a decision whether that authorization should continue, based upon the recommendations from the States participating in IFOR and from the High Representative through the Secretary-General;

22. **Decides also** that the embargo imposed by resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 shall not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above, or of international police forces;

23. **Invites** all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support and facilities, including transit facilities, for the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above;

24. **Welcomes** the conclusion of the agreements concerning the status of forces as referred to in Appendix B to Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, and demands that the parties comply fully with those agreements;

25. **Requests** the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to report to the Council, through the appropriate channels and at least at monthly intervals, the first such report be made not later than 10 days following the adoption of this resolution;

26. **Endorses** the establishment of a High Representative, following the request of the parties, who, in accordance with Annex 10 on the civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement, will monitor the implementation of the
Peace Agreement and mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of, the civilian organizations and agencies involved, and agrees the designation of Mr. Carl Bildt as High Representative;

27. Confirms that the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of Annex 10 on the civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement;

28. Decides that all States concerned, and in particular those where the High Representative establishes offices, shall ensure that the High Representative enjoys such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of his functions, including the capacity to contract and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property;

29. Notes that close cooperation between IFOR, the High Representative and the agencies will be vital to ensure successful implementation;

30. Affirms the need for the implementation of the Peace Agreement in its entirety and, in this context, stresses the importance it attaches to the urgent implementation of Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement, decides to act expeditiously on the report of the Secretary-General recommending the establishment of a United Nations Civilian Police Force with the tasks set out in that Annex, together with a civilian office with the responsibilities described in the report of the Secretary-General, and further decides that in the interim civilian police, de-mining, civil affairs and other personnel that might be required to carry out the tasks described in that report shall continue in theatre, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 33 and 34 below;

31. Stresses the need for early action in Sarajevo to create confidence between the communities and to this end requests the Secretary-General to ensure the early redeployment of elements of United Nations civilian police from the Republic of Croatia to Sarajevo;

32. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council reports from the High Representative, in accordance with Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement and the conclusions of the London Conference, on the implementation of the Peace Agreement;

III

33. Decides that the mandate of UNPROFOR shall terminate on the date on which the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR has taken place;

34. Approves the arrangements set out in the report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and headquarters elements from the United Nations Peace Force (UNPF), including the arrangements for the command and control of UNPROFOR following the transfer of authority from it to IFOR;

35. Expresses its warmest appreciation to all UNPROFOR personnel, who have served the cause of peace in the former Yugoslavia, and pays tribute to those who have given their lives and those who have suffered serious injuries in that service;
37. Calls upon the parties to ensure the safety and security of UNPROFOR and confirms that UNPROFOR will continue to enjoy all existing privileges and immunities, including during the period of withdrawal;

38. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council when the withdrawal of UNPROFOR is complete;

IV

39. Recognizes the unique, extraordinary and complex character of the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, requiring an exceptional response; Adopted by the Security Council at its 3723rd meeting,

40. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

The Security Council.

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, including resolutions 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995 and 1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995,

Reaffirming its commitment to the political settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States there within their internationally recognized borders,

Welcoming the conclusions of the Ministerial Steering Board and of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina held in Paris (the Paris Conference) on 14 November 1996 (S/1996/968), and the guiding principles of the two-year civilian consolidation plan of the peace process referred to in those conclusions,

Welcoming also the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 4 and 5 December 1996 (the London Conference) (S/1996/1012), which, following the conclusions of the Paris Conference, approved an Action Plan for the first twelve-month period of the civilian consolidation plan of the peace process,

Welcoming the progress in the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace Agreement, S/1995/999, annex), and expressing its appreciation to the High Representative, the Commander and personnel of the multinational implementation force (IFOR), and the personnel of other international organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for their contributions to the implementation of the Peace Agreement,

* Reissued for technical reasons.
Noting with satisfaction the holding of the elections called for in Annex 3 of the Peace Agreement, and welcoming the progress in establishing the common institutions in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Underlining also the important role for the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to play in the successful development of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 9 December 1996 (S/1996/1017),

Noting the report of the High Representative of 9 December 1996 (S/1996/1024, annex),

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms its support for the Peace Agreement, as well as for the Dayton Agreement on implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995 (S/1995/1021, annex), calls upon the parties to comply strictly with their obligations under those Agreements, and expresses its intention to keep the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina under review;

2. Expresses its support for the conclusions of the Paris and London Conferences;

3. Underlines that the primary responsibility for the further successful implementation of the peace process lies with the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves, which during the next two years should assume increasingly a greater responsibility for the functions now undertaken or coordinated by the international community, and stresses that without compliance and active participation by all the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in rebuilding a civil society they cannot expect the international community and major donors to continue shouldering the political, military and economic burden of the implementation and reconstruction efforts;

4. Underlines the link, as agreed by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the conclusions of the Paris Conference, between the availability of international financial assistance and the degree to which all the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina implement the Peace Agreement, including cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
cooperation with the Action Plan which has been approved by the London Conference;

5. Welcomes the mutual recognition among all the successor States to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders, and stresses the importance of full normalization of relations, including the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations, among those States;

6. Welcomes the reaffirmation by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the conclusions of the Paris Conference of its commitment to fully pursuing, in the name of the three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the peace process, in accordance with the Peace Agreement and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, including the development of a Bosnian State based on the principles of democracy and consisting of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, and underlines in this respect the importance of establishing the remaining common institutions provided for in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina without delay, as well as the importance of the commitment by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate in the working of these institutions at all levels;

7. Reminds the parties that, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, they have committed themselves to cooperate fully with all entities involved in the implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as it carries out its responsibilities for dispensing justice impartially, and underlines that full cooperation by States and entities with the International Tribunal includes, inter alia, the surrender for trial of all persons indicted by the Tribunal and provision of information to assist in Tribunal investigations;

8. Recognizes that the parties have authorized the multinational force referred to in paragraph 18 below to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;

9. Welcomes the agreement of the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to supervision by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of the preparation and conduct of the municipal elections to be held in 1997, and also welcomes the decision of the OSCE to extend the mandate of its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to take forward its work on elections, as well as that on human rights and regional stabilization;

10. Underlines the obligation of the parties under the Peace Agreement to secure to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, calls upon them to cooperate fully with the work of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber and to implement their conclusions and decisions, and calls upon the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the OSCE, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other intergovernmental or regional human
rights missions or organizations to monitor closely the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

11. Welcomes the commitment of the parties to the right of all refugees and displaced persons freely to return to their homes of origin or to other places of their choice in Bosnia and Herzegovina in safety, notes the leading humanitarian role which has been given by the Peace Agreement to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in coordination with other agencies involved and under the authority of the Secretary-General, in assisting with the repatriation and relief of refugees and displaced persons, and stresses the importance of facilitating the return or resettlement of refugees and displaced persons which should be gradual and orderly and carried out through progressive, coordinated programmes that address the need for local security, housing and jobs, while ensuring full compliance with Annex 7 of the Peace Agreement as well as other established procedures;

12. Emphasizes the importance of the creation of conditions conducive to the reconstruction and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, encourages Member States to provide assistance for the programme of reconstruction in that country, and welcomes in this respect the important contribution already made by the European Union, the World Bank and bilateral donors;

13. Underlines the importance of control of armaments in the region at the lowest possible level of weapons, calls upon the Bosnian parties to implement fully and without further delay the agreements signed in Vienna on 26 January 1996 and in Florence on 14 June 1996 and, following satisfactory progress in the implementation of the Article II and Article IV Agreements, calls for efforts to continue to promote the implementation of Article V of Annex 1-B on regional arms control of the Peace Agreement;

14. Stresses the importance it attaches to the continuation on a reinforced basis as agreed at the Paris and London Conferences of the role of the High Representative in monitoring the implementation of the Peace Agreement and giving guidance to and coordinating the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved in assisting the parties to implement the Peace Agreement, and reaffirms that the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding the interpretation of Annex 10 on civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement and that in case of dispute he may give his interpretation and make his recommendations, including to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina or its Entities, and make them known publicly;

15. Reaffirms its intention to keep the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina under close review, taking into account the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs 26 and 34 below, and any recommendations those reports might include, and its readiness to consider the imposition of measures if any party fails significantly to meet its obligations under the Peace Agreement;
16. Pays tribute to those Member States who participated in the multinational force established in accordance with its resolution 1031 (1995), and welcomes their willingness to assist the parties to the Peace Agreement by continuing to deploy a multinational implementation force;

17. Notes the confirmations by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its constituent Entities, and by the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the understandings set out in the letters dated 29 November 1996 from the Secretary-General of the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement (S/1996/1025);

18. Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish for a planned period of 18 months a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as the legal successor to IFOR under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement;

19. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 18 above to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall continue to be held equally responsible for compliance with that Annex and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by SFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that Annex and the protection of SFOR, and takes note that the parties have consented to SFOR's taking such measures;

20. Authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of SFOR, either in defence of SFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and recognizes the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack;

21. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 18 above, in accordance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules and procedures, to be established by the Commander of SFOR, governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic;

22. Requests the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate with the Commander of SFOR to ensure the effective management of the airports of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the responsibilities conferred on SFOR by Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement with regard to the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

23. Demands that the parties respect the security and freedom of movement of SFOR and other international personnel;

24. Invites all States, in particular those in the region, to continue to provide appropriate support and facilities, including transit facilities, for the Member States acting under paragraph 18 above;
25. **Recalls all the agreements concerning the status of forces as referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, and reminds the parties of their obligation to continue to comply therewith;**

26. **Requests the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to report to the Council, through the appropriate channels and at least at monthly intervals;**

* * *

**Noting the request of the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the mandate of the United Nations civilian police force known as the International Police Task Force (IPTF), which is a part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), be renewed,**

**Reaffirming the legal basis in the Charter of the United Nations on which the IPTF was given its mandate in resolution 1035 (1995),**

**Expressing its appreciation to the personnel of UNMIBH for their contribution to the implementation of the Peace Agreement,**

III

27. **Decides to extend the mandate of UNMIBH, which includes the IPTF, for an additional period terminating on 21 December 1997, and also decides that the IPTF shall continue to be entrusted with the tasks set out in Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement, including the tasks referred to in the Conclusions of the London Conference and agreed by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina;**

28. **Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on the work of the IPTF and its progress in assisting the restructuring of law enforcement agencies, and to report every three months on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIBH as a whole, and, in this context, also requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 16 June 1997 on the IPTF, in particular its work in assisting the restructuring of law enforcement agencies, coordinating assistance in training and providing equipment, advising law enforcement agencies on guidelines on democratic policing principles with full support for human rights, and investigating or assisting with investigations into human rights abuses by law enforcement personnel, as well as to report on progress by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in regard to such issues, in particular their compliance with IPTF-prescribed guidelines including their taking prompt and effective action, which could include dismissal where appropriate, in respect of any officer notified to them by the IPTF Commissioner as failing to cooperate with the IPTF or adhere to democratic policing principles;**

29. **Stresses that the successful implementation of the tasks of the IPTF rests on the quality, experience and professional skills of its personnel, and urges Member States, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure the provision of such qualified personnel;**
Security Council

Reaffirms the responsibility of the parties to cooperate fully with, and instruct their respective responsible officials and authorities to provide their full support to, the IPTF on all relevant matters;

31. Expresses appreciation for the efforts under way to enhance and strengthen the logistical and support capabilities of UNMBH by the Secretary-General, and urges that those efforts be increased;

32. Calls upon all concerned to ensure the closest possible coordination between the High Representative, SFOR, UNMBH and the relevant civilian organizations and agencies so as to ensure the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement and of the priority objectives of the civilian consolidation plan, as well as the security of IPTF personnel;

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,

33. Encourages Member States, on 18 June 1999 to demonstrate progress by the parties in restructuring their law enforcement institutions, to assist the parties, through the IPTF, in following up the United Nations programme of assistance to the police forces;

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in particular in compliance by the parties with their commitments under Annex 


35. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Regretting that there has been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on
2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;
8. **Affirms** the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and **demands** that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. **Decides** that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

   (a) **Deterring renewed hostilities,** maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

   (b) **Demilitarizing** the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

   (c) **Establishing** a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can **return home in safety,** the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

   (d) **Ensuring** public safety and order until the international civil presence can **take responsibility for this task**;

   (e) **Supervising** demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

   (f) **Supporting,** as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

   (g) **Conducting** border monitoring duties as required;

   (h) **Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself,** the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. **Authorizes** the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. **Decides** that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

   (a) **Promoting the establishment,** pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, **taking full account of** annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

   (b) **Performing basic civilian administrative functions** where and as long as required;
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.

2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
   - Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
   - Marking/clearing minefields;
   - Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
   - Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other
countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.¹ A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

 Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

Notes

¹ Other required elements:

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;

- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;

- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.
Appendix E: Interviews (Alphabetical order)

RE: Enquiry re. M8-141 NATO Pre-Deployment Contingency Contracting Course for Theatre Contracting Officers

Van: FORBES.Boyd@natoschool.nato.int
Verzonden: vrijdag 20 maart 2015 12:45:42
Aan: roezana_87@hotmail.com

Dear Rozana,

Thank you for your message and understanding. I am happy for you to quote me as the source confirming that the Contracting Course contains an ethical/anti-corruption module lasting approx one hour.

Regards

Boyd

[Signature]

NATO SCHOOL
Oberammergau

Boyd Forbes
Interview report

Interview with David Cole: on 17-12-2014 at 18.30. The interview took place at the coffee room of the CCOE. He was at the CCOE for the higher command courses. We had an interesting conversation. David Cole had to work at the European Union Force Headquarters at Camp Butmir Sajarevo, so he did not experience any corrupt behavior even though there were plenty of opportunities that someone could try to act in a corrupt way. Therefore I did not deal with question 3 of the interview guideline. Question 3 is more or less dealt in question 1. He was impressed by the professional way his partners were acting. He was in Bosnia in 2006 for 6 months. During the interview I asked him the questions mentioned on the interview guideline in the same order as written in the guideline. We had a nice discussion. He knew about my research and he was willing to help me by sharing his experience. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research, especially his ‘recent’ experiences.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkans? A. In which country? B. What were your tasks there?

“So, I am in the British Royal Air Force and I am a Logistics officer and I was appointed to be Chief of logistics in the Headquarters European Force Bosnia. My responsibilities in Headquarters (the headquarters there were of higher level formation), which is in Sarajevo, commanded other units within the Balkan, such as Banja Luca where the British were and many other bases there. This Headquarters was led by a two star Italian military officer) and it would have all areas of responsibility that the EU force held, but not the small NATO HQ in Sarajevo: it covers administration to intelligence, operations, logistics, engineering, communication and so on. And we were there as the main Headquarters as NATO was still there, but it was in much smaller role, because it handed over its operations to the HQ European Force. So I was appointed there for 6 months – from May 2006 till November 2006. In this Headquarters as Chief of Logistics I was responsible making sure that all logistic support for all of the bases was satisfactory and that we planned for the future. Normally it is quite routine and it is just a matter of coordinating with all of the other bases to make sure that things go okay, and they come back to us with assessments. But I also did couple of projects which brought me in contact with the local community: ministers and also private organizations.”

“I think the best example is the plan to move a capability: we had some aircraft at the airbase in Tuzla and Tuzla was going to close. So I was given the job, as a project management, to move these aircraft to Sarajevo. There was only one option which was to move them to the international Sarajevo airport and then negotiate with them, build an aircraft hangar, to store and maintain the aircraft. So the most of the work was liaising with the military at the current base and the EUFOR civilians who were employed at HQ EUFOR who would be responsible for the engineering elements of the project. But then I had to start negotiating with the Ministry of Interior and also the Sarajevo airport and the staff there. Sarajevo airport was a private airport and the Ministry of Interior was the governmental official of the Bosnian government, so we went to their offices regularly. I do not know whether this disproves or proves that some elements in Bosnia are actually quite good, because what I found that the Ministry of Interior was very professional and we used interpreters in discussions with them. I think they and the Minister could speak English, but I think
it was not that strong.”... “We could literally go and use that airport, but we were in a more of a cooperation stage rather than ‘we can stage (which would have been the case during the conflict). So the purpose in the Ministry of Interior was to seek his approval to allow us to do what we were entitled to do anyway, which was operate our aircraft out of Sarajevo international airport. And seek his and airport’s authority to build aircraft hangars to operate there. But because it was a private airport we had to pay fees to use the airport etc. And in all of this negotiations with the Ministry of Interior I found that it was as professional any normal western organization. And he gave me his authority for us to go ahead and begin the negotiations with the airport. I met the general manager, finance manager and operations manager of the airport and my job was to present them what we wanted, basically to operate the number of aircraft, to base there, to establish refueling/security, then get the approval to build an additional aircraft hangar in the area. Again they knew their business, this is 2006 and they had moved on from the war. When you moved on through the Sarajevo airport it is very similar to most western major airports. It was a well-presented airport. It was not huge, but everything about it was good and there were quite few international operators who worked there. The interviews were also very professional: what were the requirements, what were the issues etc. Now, in terms of money we explained what our requirements were and they explained what the fees would be. And again I am struggling to remember, but there was some negotiation in terms of that. They were trying to apply higher rates, but I got them to agree on a lower rates. The rates to use the airport were straight. So in all of my time, I worked with contracting and contractors in arranging contracts. Again I found them to be no different than western operators. I worked with them for six months and it was quite professional. Most of the time I did not use interpreters, occasionally I did and then I dealt with the finance manager. I managed to negotiate and there were lots of opportunities for offers of fraud, because I had to lead on the negotiations with them. It was just absolutely what you expected with any western company. Then we contracted with them and we also arranged to build these aircraft hangars. In terms of time, the way it was executed, and the support we got from the international airport and Ministry of Interior...no delays at all. You were not dealing with anything that arose suspicion. On corruption side I never saw that. In terms of professionalism – providing data, services- it was as good as it was in the West (most Western standards). They responded as we wanted and it was a good service. Eventually, a hangar was built and aircraft came and it was fine. In this particular instance, it was a big contract and lot of money and I was, when I think about it now, the single point of contact between the Ministry of Interior and the airport manager. There were plenty of opportunities where I was with them- the finance/operation manager – and sometimes there was no interpreter there and no party from the EUFOR, and they could have made offers.

“Conversely, although I was not involved in it, there was a lot of intelligence work conducting by EUFOR on surveillance...in particular the deforestation of the Balkan. That was an illegal activity and not in terms of corruption.”

“Most of the staff were international, but there were locally employed employees working in bars/shops and some working in HQ. And again, in terms of the way in which they operated it was never anything that made me think that there were differences. The locally employed employees, as I understood, had contract with the EU and probably were based on EU/NATO conditions. But there were allowed to pay tax free. I think that makes someone being more professional and respectful where they were. I saw lot of local employed Bosnians and again I would say that in the way they worked was professional.”
“There were many people in Bosnia doing illegal activities, but the local employees and the people with whom I worked with there was never any unprofessional approach to it. The way they –local employees, airport staff, the Ministry - executed tasks I found it was good. It was nothing to have questions. Do not forget that I was at the top level.”

“For instance, when we contracted with a contractor to build an aircraft hangar he would obviously sub-contract or make arrangements, but we did not control it how they did it and where they got the materials from. We would go to a single point of contact with whom we set the requirements. Of course they could sub-contract, but we would not know who were these employees, whether they used illegal immigrants, whether they were paying them. All we were concerned were the requirements. Corruption could be at the base level,”

**Question 2:** In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

*He had to think about it:* “I think it is normally implied where it provides you something that you are not entitled to or you have not paid for something. Normally, it is associated with business, but I think you can be corrupt if you do something to get you a favor, not necessarily monetary. I do not think it has necessary to be money or tangible things. I think you can be corrupt individual and it can be in people’s perception. I do not know...maybe there are better words to apply to, but I think it is normally associated with doing something or to obtain something you are not entitled to or for lesser price. Money service or something like that, or a favor. You are corrupt if you gain some sort of authority over people by wrong means...then you are not clean, you are not living by universal standards of ethics.”

**Question 3:** a.Did you witness corrupt behavior? b.Give an example? c.How did you deal with it and what were the results?

*David Cole had to work at Headquarters, so he did not experience any corrupt behavior and therefore I did not deal with question 3 of the interview guideline. Question 3 is more or less dealt in question 1.*

d.Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“Yes, rules of engagement. I cannot remember, but every military person who arrived we did a program and I think it was mentioned.

**Question 4:** Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“I think there is in certain countries where culture is considered more important than rule of law. Although I think even you are educated and democratic, I think fundamentally human beings still can go back to their original fundamental human instincts – hence why even in the Western world there are many cases of corruption. When we were reasonably intelligent –emotion, hatred and things like that can be controlled, suppressed or educated out of us. And the only difference is that
those people in the world become more educated and become aware of these issues. People learn to restrain and control their anger and emotions."

“So I think it depends on the strand of character of the individual. I do not know whether it has necessarily to do with education. I think fundamentally in everyone there is something that says ‘oh, I just found 10 euros...should I hand it to the reception and send an e-mail about it or it might be better to take this 10 euros before someone takes it.’ So, I think fundamentally within humans there is something (I do not know whether corruption is the good word) in your psychology, your way of thinking that takes you back to your basic instinct to survive. And if you can do it and get away with it you will do it, because it will make you better.”

“If you take into your definition of corruption that corruption is endemic across the world, I think it is fundamentally...somewhere in the brain it is in everyone – the need to look after yourself (survival). Some of us can control it regardless of the culture we are in and some people don’t. And it might be dishonest/illegal, but it can also be called corrupt way of living.”

“I read about the Romans and you could say that they were buying services, but essentially they were bribing. Or they provided ‘security’ and you could say that it is corruption to achieve an aim. And I think that this sort of practices still apply now. Financial issues by the EU and US on Russia: is that a ‘Just Cause or is that corrupt cause? Now is Just Cause associated with UN mandate. Is it corruption to achieve a means to an end, because a particular country (a large country) wants to have more power. They might argue that there is democratic benefit of the world, but some might say no it is not the case. So, in the case of powerful Russia it is a bad news for another big country.”

“By being manipulative it is not democratic behavior, but that is a sort of pressure which continues to allow certain things to happen. Corruption can also be associated with power and not only with money.”

“In certain countries we the West call it corruption, they call it normal business transactions to achieve an end. The trouble with globalism is that certain people can consider that as corruption and not normal transactions of day to day business. You can do this with other analogy: gender, religion and you see that they perceive it differently than we do. I think that is the problem: when you look at corruption within the constraint of the area it is perceived to be it. And who is perceiving it? Normally the externals. Do the internals perceive it? Even those internals perceive it, because they have read what the externals have perceived.”

“Bosnians are not different from the British people. People are very judgmental: they think then ‘they are all corrupt...well, this particular the British government has had Ministers go to jail for legal activities.”

“I think it is the way they are used to living, it is evolved. An anecdotal discussion: if you gave a policeman money, you did not get a ticket and things like that. Everything I got from the Balkan is anecdotal: A Bosnian stopped for speeding, he simply pays the money directly to the policeman and goes on his way. You know, maybe if you were back to UK in 1940’s and ’50 it might been the same. If you look at the Balkans like Western 1940’s in the state of its economy, you might look at it in a different light.”
Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Illegal activities...yes. Because by virtue, positioning and building a military camp you would require services and by second and third order effect you must support corruption or illegal activities. You might contract waste disposal or food, some contractors are sub-contracting. So by virtue, building up a camp you do that and most of the camps, same in Afghanistan, you end up with these illegal shops selling dvd’s and cd’s. And in a way, what is surprising, the military authorities let them come to their bases and sell them. Bringing in those people during a mission you are actually perpetuating illegal activities, which is in your definition corrupt. So who is corrupt? ISAF mission is corrupt by allowing illegal activities? Or is that just completely wrong in a black and white situation. In the Balkans it is the same: so you have camps and you will find all this illegal shops. Inside the camps in the Balkan they were not allowed, but in Afghanistan it was allowed (approved people to work in the camps, like mini markets). You could buy illegal goods, like fake Rolexes, downloaded music and things like that. People knew it is illegal and it was illegal to take it back to their countries. Commanders would know what was going on.”

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“I think it may depend on which perspective you are in, which state, which conditions you are working within.”

“When you look at the highest level, which is contracting, we probably do as much as we can. We contract normally with western companies. What we cannot do is when we made this particular contract with this contractor is stipulate ethical rules to him. The reality is once we contract with him, we are only checking the services he is responsible providing. But unless we specify in a contract that he has to use his employees, lot of time they just sub-contract. To achieve the sub-contracting, dependent of the culture/the environment we are operating in, there may be a case where this person/this company has to do what in the country - they are involved in- is seeing as normal, but to us at this level is abnormal/corrupt. But how we can stop that...I do not know. If we did try to stop that we might find that we will never get services or contractor here has to bring in stuff, cannot employ locals, cannot buy things local to provide us services. So the prices go up. I think the only thing you can truly make sure is that you are not impacting on it to go in an operation and the only way you can stop it is to be completely self-contained. Which means flying in, shipping in, moving in all of your contractors, all of your assets and doing it all of your own. You could argue that in certain instances, even if we would do it, we provide jobs we ultimately corrupt, because we leave eventually. We corrupt the economic social infrastructure of a country. Because we build up something and immediately disappear and leave a vacuum. In fact we create corruption, not in terms of money, but corruption the natural way of development.”

“I don’t know, because there are so many second and third order affects if a military force going in. We never think deep about contractors who sub-contract and what happens when they have to pay. So, the answer is I don’t know. I do not think we got the capability. We think about very direct corruption and not about second/third/fourth line affects.”
**Question 7:** Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

*Role for the military:* “Yes, certainly if the mission is orientated that way. Normally there is a sort of fighting and security issues going on...needing military assets and we provide control and checks. Human intelligence teams can provide feedback, but, but they are not specialists for assessing corruption in industry, ministries, etc.”

*Role for the CIMIC:* “I do not really have enough experience in CIMIC. They would tell me that CIMIC officer provides liaison, and situation awareness, information. But to me, unless you got detailed experience knowing what to look for in terms of corruption, it is highly likely they can provide the level of detail and can support that. I do not think they got the competences to counter corruption...no.” “I don’t think there would be accuracy in creating awareness, because it requires detailed investigation, long term analysis. Even with police force and specialist investigating corruption, you now are talking about people who are just used to liaison and picking up information and passing it to others...so no.”

**Question 8:** What did you learn from your experiences?

“I don’t know...I always think that end state objectives are probably too optimistic. There is always too much optimism, because we are in a country for six/twelve months there and even longer, but it is still short in the life time of a country. I have quite often seen end state objectives being refreshed and told that the old ones are been met and we are now doing this. I think we need to be more realistic about what we are doing. It is the politicians who send the military in there with a particular mission.

“I think that military now is also becoming much more complex. We tend to associate it with safety and security, but so many things are being added to that...it is quite complex and then that is where it gets confusing. We do not fully understand the situations we are going into. It is okay when it is Cold War type conflict, but when it is much more complex –Afghanistan, Iraq- it becomes much more complex for us to try and achieve an end state objective. That is part of politics.”

**Question 9:** Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“No, I am fine.”

“I think the hardest thing is the definition. You can define it in America, in the UK, but when you are trying to define it somewhere else it is not corruption, but it is day to day business. Corruption may not be only to do with money, corruption can other issues and depending on your culture even perceived good UN, western government or industry good initiatives could be perceived as corruption of another culture in trying to change them.”
Question 10: Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been at this position?
Interview report

Interview Emily Knowles: on 27-3-2015 at 9.00. The interview took place via Skype. She is a Project Officer-Security Policy at the Transparency International. During our conversation I did not ask Mrs. Knowles the questions stated in the interview guideline, but we had a nice conversation and shared our experiences with each other. I learned a lot from her experiences and examples. This is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

People were depressed about corruption> there is cycle of bribe-taking place. People face these issues on the ground and they have not found tools how to work in this environment.

Mission mandate is to stabilize the situation, but because they do not know who they are empowering, where the money goes, the situation destabilizes. Example: Afghanistan Mali. Money which we bring in during the mission goes to the opposition, especially when weapons are involved.

Key messages: you do not know who you are empowering. It is strategic issue as well: if the mandate is to stabilize and secure, you cannot leave dealing with corruption, because corruption is one of part that takes control out of the hands of the military.

Corruption should be part of the mission mandate from the beginning of a mission. Be careful giving large amount of money to an organization, do not heavily rely on one group of translators and interpreters, and put an effort to trace the money that you feed in the beginning.

The hard core how the military think: it is not our job, first we have to stabilize the situation, do not think about longer development issues. Military have to think about the long-term consequences of their short term actions. Show the military how they fit into the larger picture> and incorporate corruption in all the three levels: the strategic goals, tactical and operational levels.

Sarah Chayes: the whole system is patronage. When a military organization comes into such a country, you have to understand that any money you put in the system (security system) it is going to be part of this corrupt system. It gives the people opportunities to generate more money, exploit more people. Goal of a mission: stabilize the situation, but instead with more money during a mission weakens the states legitimacy. It gives terrorist organization propaganda tools –such as join us, look how corrupt your politicians are, they are stealing your money, the army is taking bribes from you. This all makes a state more unstable and it means that it is a military task when you are coming in to stabilize and have an operation in support of peace. However, a military operation can make a crisis more durable and much worse. This is why the military have to deal with corruption, but it does not mean that it is only a military problem. Development agencies have to be involved: more control, share information, control how the money is spend. You have to cooperate and share the info to find how the power structures work.

The problems in the Balkans: when you fail to build/help/use the initiative when you have the most influence over the government, then you just end up a stronger and more capable corrupt system. The military have to understand that in the beginning they have the most leverage. They can say: we are not going to help you unless you do X. You have less influence when you work with the people for couple of years and all this time you have not pointed out the problems.
Tendency of military: set up a unit to deal with corruption, or a corruption person (anti-corruption advisor).

Training & education: to have the knowledge. If you do not understand who is fighting who and why they are fighting the violence will not stop. The presence of military then only pushes the violence elsewhere, where there are no military present.

Without knowing the power structures at the end you might support the wrong parties such as Al Qaida with your money when you pay them. They are much clever than us and they know how to exploit our weaknesses. And one of our weakness is that we want instant results, without knowing who you are empowering.

Winning the hearts and the minds of the people and convince them that what you are doing is right, but when you buy off the warlords it is catastrophic. Therefore, they need the training, because the military make decisions quickly which might end being counter-productive.

Map of the corrupt system can be integrated in their tasks. Example: NATO set up a unit in Afghanistan to track networks. NATO actually tasked the military with mapping. Without knowledge you cannot do anything. The military need to be tasked otherwise they will not do it. Military and intelligences have to cooperate> make better use of intelligence services and local actors (NGOs). 

Information sharing> create a database. Start with the information what you can share. You have to begin with small steps. Military have resources, because they talk to people (by asking questions) and they patrol. Integrate couple of questions during patrolling. To avoid that they get not misleading information military could be trained to recognize it by looking at somebody’s body language.

Reputation of a mission should not be endangered by scandals, because public opinion should no turn against the mission. This happened in Kosovo: people thought that the military would come in to protect them, create a better environment and once the war is over there will be more opportunities. But there was the realization that the military did not want to do everything> so they did not put pressure on the politicians to change, to take democracy seriously. At the end people in Kosovo end up with the same corrupt politicians who now felt powerful with all the money from the US. People felt cheated by this, because the opportunity for a better life was not there. You have to adopt more realistic goals, because we cannot establish a full stabilized society.
Interview report

Interview with General Yves de Kermabon: on 8-4-2015 at 11.00. The interview was conducted via Skype. The internet connection was not always good, so sometimes it was difficult to understand. During the interview we had a nice conversation and I learned a lot from his experiences by discussing the questions mentioned on the interview guideline. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkans? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“I stayed five years in the Balkans. Two times in Sarajevo: first with the UN and then with NATO. I was in the Chief of Staff division in Sarajevo. Then I was three times in Kosovo. From 2004-2005 I had the command of NATO KFOR mission. In 2007 I was the head of the EULEX mission in Kosovo. So, in total I was for five years in the Balkans: two times in Bosnia and three times in Kosovo as a military, and later I was the head of the EULEX mission.”

“Fighting corruption was not a priority during the military mission in Kosovo (KFOR), however it was a priority during the EULEX mission in Kosovo.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“Corruption is every violation of duty of official persons or responsible persons, and every activity of initiators/beneficiaries of such behavior, committed in response to a directly or indirectly promised, offered given, demanded, accepted or expected reward”.

But for sure, there are also other corruption: to give some money to checkpoints, or get some papers.”

“I do not want to say that we have to excuse corruption, but we can sometimes understand corruption.

Question 3: Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results?

“During KFOR you had internal and external corruption. Inside military mission military can be corrupt. During the mission in KFOR I was confronted with smuggling of fuel, gasoil. It was relatively easy to sell fuel to the poor people in Kosovo. I fight against this.”
“There is also corruption within KFOR coming from outside: cigarettes and alcohol. Outside the camps there were lots of shops selling DVD’s or other articles, which were very cheap. Lots of military bought these DVD’s. I decided to close these shops to avoid this smuggling, because it is part of corruption.”

“I punish the people who were corrupt and I showed that I do not accept it. And as a military we have to avoid that we are being corrupted, because as military we are an example toward the people. We have to support the people and not exploit them.”

“During EULEX we were confronted with huge corruption, even some political leaders/ministers who were corrupt.”

“We have to push justice to act, which is not easy in Kosovo, because there is no tradition of justice and the system is weak. This people are moreover being threatened by some bad guys to accept money if they close their eyes. Therefore, this is very difficult. Sometimes there is also support for this people by the international community. There are political, economic and financial reasons for this support.”

“The US ambassador also supports bad people, because there is some economic interest.”

“There is high and low level of corruption and it is hard to find a balance position.”

Was there a guideline during your mission how to deal with corruption?

“No, not at all.”

**Question 4:** Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context?

How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“Lot of people in Kosovo have to survive with the minimum food. To make living possible inhabitants are involved in smuggling. Knowing this, it is relatively easy to understand why corruption is accepted by the population.”

“It is a habit/custom to give some money for checkpoint, or to get a paper.”

**Question 5:** What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Military organizations and CIMIC as well bring a lot of money in a poor country and we pay an important salary, which is important for the locals there. This creates sort of unbalance between the international organization and the local people. We need to recruit people, such as interpreters, cleaning ladies, secretaries. We are taking the best part of the population from the society – well-educated – and we pay them salary. With this we create an important gap for the local stability. For example, my secretary was a former medical student. When EULEX arrived she became a secretary, because she now earned six time more salary than working as a doctor.”
And because of this she was not a doctor for the population. The same was also with the teachers who worked as interpreters or drivers during the mission. This is an effect on the population. This is a source of corruption: we create unbalance and counter-productive action for the population.” … “These employees might also be paid by other organizations to inform them what is happening inside a mission.”

“When there is a huge amount of money during a mission, it is difficult to control it and it might disappear, or go to the wrong direction. Therefore, we need strong control, which is not always the case.”

“Tendering is also a problem, because the process of tendering is not always respected. For example, corruption of some international people in Kosovo. They needed a highway and lots of money was involved in this project, which was misused. The US ambassador had a role in this.”

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“To educate the young people and the people have to fight against corruption. We can go to the universities to give lectures about corruption and show them that it is a bad thing.”

“We have to organize the basic economic situation, so everybody has access to the basic needs. Give good life to the people, for example provide the children opportunity to go to schools. If we want to eradicate corruption, we have to increase the financial level. Because there is another fact which could help in countering corruption, namely salary. For example: a policeman who has five children. He might get the offer to watch the other direction for one minute and he gets lots of money. The same counts for the prosecutors.”

“Education and the training is important and therefore this training should occur before a mission starts.”

“You have to be sure that your actions are applicable to the country. We also have to let the population know that we do not accept bribes and make clear how we work.”

“We have to organize ourselves. Once again, in the military you try to stabilize the situation.”

“We have implemented in Kosovo Anti-Corruption Strategy with including media, political actors, and civil society in the process. From this strategy we implemented Anti-Corruption Action Plan and finally we implemented Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency.”

“We also include the cultural component in our recommendations. It is important to understand the history, corruption and the situation, because you cannot act in the same way in Kosovo as somewhere else.”

Question 7: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?
Role for the military: “No, I think fighting corruption is a task of the police and justice. But military can help and support. They can deter some of the guys and have a common operations with the police. For example: during an operation you have a blue area with the police and a green area where the military support police. But, basically it is not a military mission to fight against corruption, because it is technical and because we need a lot of investigation.”

“Military have to act in a right way. In a mission area, military have to stabilize the situation and support the police.”

“First military have to take internal action, within the military self. They have to make sure that they are not corrupt. Then they have to support fight against corruption outside the military environment. Once again, in the military it is a basic capacity not to be a corrupt soldier and we have to be an example for the outside world. Reaction is the best action: to show how professional military are, take a balanced position, be clear. I think this is a good step in fight against corruption.”

Role for CIMIC: “First role for CIMIC is to be a good example. This is very important, because when you look from the perspective of the population they think in the terms of “the family” and not in terms of “the country as a whole”. They have to understand what they have to do for the country.”

“CIMIC has also to identify good projects and formulate good actions. They have to avoid the bad guys and they have to avoid that they are corrupt. CIMIC also has to show the population what integrity is. They can also bring some support.”

“There is a Chinese sentence: it is not on me to give a fish to the people, but it is more important to teach the people how they can fish. So, CIMIC has to show the population how they have to act. This can be achieved by: let people look how the CIMIC personnel act.”

Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?

Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“No, I wish you good luck.”

Question 10: Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been in this position?

General Yves de Kermabon was Special Advisor to the Executive Secretary General of the European External Action Service for the Common Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, he is Special Advisor to NATO, and Referent for the Institute for Higher National Defence Studies for auditor training sessions.

He is chief of international relations of MARS analogies and associate fellow of the GCSP.
Interview Hans Opsteen: on 5-1-2015 at 9.00. The interview took place at his office at the CCOE. It was the first working day after the Christmas break. During the interview I asked him the questions mentioned on the interview guideline in the same order as written in the guideline. I learned a lot from his experience and we had a nice conversation. He found it difficult to give answers on some of the questions, because it was a long time ago that he was on mission in the Balkans (in 1998). However, he helped me by providing information. He emphasized that military do not have a big role in countering corruption, because military have other tasks, namely providing a safe and secure environment. He knew about my research and he was willing to help me with sharing his experience with me. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights. Our conversation was in Dutch.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkan? A.In which country? B.What were your tasks there?

“No, ik ben van mei 1998 t/m december 1998 in het hoofdkwartier van de SFOR geweest, toenertijd nog, in Sarajevo. Ik was daar één van de protocol escort officieren, en daarna ook senior escort officer, die zich bezig hielden met het organiseren van alle bezoeken van VIP’s. Dus eigenlijk alles boven één sterren generaal, overwegend commandanten van krijgsmachtendelen (landmacht commandant, zeestrijdkrachten), maar ook de chefs van de defensie staf (de hoogste bazen van de militairen) en heel veel politici. In mijn geval zelfs ook een aantal keren het koninklijk huis. Dus dat zijn beetje de taken die ik daar had.”

“Als senior escort officer was ik met name verantwoordelijk voor de alle bezoeken van SACEUR, (Supreme Allied Commander Europe, red.) dus de hoogste militaire baas van NAVO. En ik heb ook genoegen gehad om het bezoek te organiseren van doktor Solana, toen de president/voorzitter van de EU. Dus een heel interessante periode.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“Als ik naar corruptie kijk, dan is het met name voor het gewin van iemand zelf en daar noem ik het voorbeeld van de scheidslijn. Op het moment dat het ten goede komt aan de bevolking of ontwikkeling van de bevolking...is het dan corruptie? Ja en nee, want van ene kant is het ten goede van (de bevolking, red.)...en blijft het bij diegene hangen die op dat moment daar de macht heeft, wat kan hij zelf doen op het moment dat hij dat soort geld/goederen binnen krijgt om zijn eigen positie te versterken. Dat is al binnen de politiek per definitie het zoeken: wat is toelaatbaar en wat is niet toelaatbaar.”

“Op het moment dat iemand dat echt doet puur voor zijn eigen gewin dan is het voor mij echt corruptie en anders gaan we eigenlijk een beetje de politiek in: wat is toelaatbaar en wat is acceptabel voor de bevolking om zijn leiding en positie te behouden.”
“Als het niet juridisch is vastgelegd, dan wordt het heel moeilijk. Zelfs als het juridisch is vastgelegd, dan kun je je eigenlijk afvragen of bepaalde activiteiten van mensen op hooggeplaatste posities, en niet alleen maar politici maar de laatste jaren mag je het bankwezen ook erbij betrekken, ja dan zit je in een soort grijs gebied waar kennelijk meer getolereerd wordt. Het is niet acceptabel, maar we kunnen ze toch niet strafrechtelijk vervolgen, omdat er mazen in de wetten zitten. Vaak omdat zij het idee hebben dat die groep mensen boven de wet staan. In dit soort (uitzendgebieden, red.) gebieden is het nog veel erger: een soort van warlord-achtig gedoe van sommige leiders die daar rondliepen. Het was een beetje raar om te zien hoe zij met de lokale belangen omgingen, vooral als die lokale belangen hun eigen belangen waren.”

Question 3: a. Did you witness corrupt behavior? b. Give an example? c. How did you deal with it and what were the results?

“In mijn directe werkzaamheden niet. Maar wat er wel meespeelde, was dat de mensen die binnenkwamen ook met de lokale autoriteiten gingen praten, omdat ze een aantal dingen niet deden die de NAVO/internationale samenleving wilde. Volgens hun eigen agenda. Maar om zo één twee drie te zeggen van heb je corruptie in je werk meegemaakt? Nee, dat kan ik niet zeggen.”

d. Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“Die zullen zeker wel geweest zijn, maar die weet ik niet meer. Het is gewoon te lang geleden. Er waren wel duidelijke richtlijnen over het omgaan met de lokale bevolking en de lokale autoriteiten, maar je zit dan als begeleider van die VIP’s zo ver van de club af dat je er niet direct mee te maken krijgt. Wel met het opzetten van het verhaal (VIP programma, red.), maar heb ik of mijn collega’s iets in die tijd gemerkt van ‘we willen bezoek wel toestaan, maar dan moet er wel iets over de brug komen?’ Ja, maar is dat echt corruptie of is dat meer in de zin van ontwikkelingshulp bedoeld? Dan kom je in de grijze schermslijn.”

Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“Nou wil ik hem omdraaien…ik denk dat in bepaalde culturen corruptie minder crimineel wordt beschouwd/ervaren, meer als een ‘way of life’ dat het eenmaal erbijhoort in vergelijking met andere gebieden. Ik wil niet zozeer zeggen dat het cultureel gebaseerd is, maar dat het juist in bepaalde culturen een geaccepteerd feit is. Maar dan wil ik niet zeggen dat de menselijke cultuur per definitie daar de grondslag aan is.”

“Ik heb het hele land rondgereisd en hele Bosnië gezien, omdat wij met die VIP’s overal naar toe gingen. Stukje Kroatië zat er ook bij, Servië mochten wij helemaal niet komen. Wat ik zo heb gezien en wat ik terug kan halen van die tijd is dater wel dergelijk sprake was van corruptie. Je komt met de lokale bevolking in aanraking, niet zo extreem als mijn CIMIC-collega’s toentertijd, maar daar merkte je wel dat bepaalde papierstromen in gemeentes erg traag gingen en die weleens versnield konden worden door iets over de tafel te schuiven. En dat soort systemen waren daar zeker van toepassing: vriendjes zijn met de machthebbers waren altijd toch handig. Je kan van ene kant
zeggen dat ’je kennissen waren belangrijker dan je kennis’, maar het ging naar mijn mening wel verder.’"

“Je zit in een post-conflict situatie en overleven is per definitie daar van toepassing. Alleen voor mijn gevoel ging dit nog een stukje verder. Het zat ook een beetje in het mechanisme van de bevolking, waarbij je hele duidelijke scheidslijnen zag tussen de bevolkingsgroepen. Serven waren heel erg rechtlijnig, duidelijk, bijna zwart-wit en daar kon je duidelijke afspraken maken. Voordat je afspraken had en tot een compromis kwam, was je heel lang bezig. Van de Kroatische en heel sterk aan de Bosnisch-moslim zijde (vanuit mijn perspectief) was het heel makkelijk om afspraken met ze te maken, maar zich eraan houden per definitie niet. Daar kon je niet op vertrouwen…nooit. En dan ga je al automatisch naar mechanismen van corruptie toe om ze dan toch dwangmatig mee te laten werken. Om hun precies te laten doen wat jij wil, moet je als machthebber dan corruptische mechanismen gaan toepassen om hun in je invloedssfeer te krijgen en houden. En dan speelt mee dat na verloop van tijd dit in hun cultuur binnensluipt en onderdeel wordt van hoe mensen met elkaar omgaan in zo’n land.” Wij concludeerden hieruit dat het een ‘way of life is’.

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Ik heb in de missie in Bosnië niks meegemaakt dat de militairen zeiden dat ze ook maar iets van corrupt-achtige zaken hebben gedaan om onze doelen te bereiken. Nee, ik kan zo niet zeggen dat het gebeurd is. Ik denk dat er ook teveel westerse mentaliteit in de club zat om het te voorkomen. Wat er op lokaal niveau gebeurd was van andere cultuurstromen? Weet ik gewoon niet.”

Op de vraag of een internationale missie het niveau van corruptie in een land beïnvloed, antwoordde Hans Opsteen als volgt: “Ik weet het niet…moeilijk te zeggen. Ik denk dat een internationale missie heel erg bezig is om te proberen om dat soort dingen juist uit te bannen. Dat wil niet zeggen dat er op individueel niveau geen corruptie plaatsvindt, dat mensen geen misbruik maken van de situatie (beide kanten op: zowel van de militaire missie naar de burgers toe als van de burgers naar de missie toe).”

“Wat je bijvoorbeeld heel duidelijk zag, was dat er poetsvrouwen ingehuurd werden en die bijverdienden door de was te doen van de militairen. Zit daar je corruptie? Dus ja, nee ik kan niet zeggen dat als je een missie krijgt dat er meer corruptie is. Wat je wel krijgt, is dat er scheve verhoudingen ontstaan, omdat de mensen die ingehuurd worden door de internationale organisaties (en ik denk dat het bijna een markt aan het worden is) en dan denk ik aan tolken/ondersteunend personeel/poetsvrouwen/wasbazen relatief hogere salarissen verdienen dan gemeengoed is in het land. Zeker daar waar veel internationale organisaties zijn, dus veel tolken nodig zijn, zul je ook zien dat de beste salarissen kunnen verdienen, die in mijn optiek soms buiten verhouding zijn van wat de normale/gangbare salarissen voor deze mensen. Wij hadden een heel duidelijk poeltje van tolken die voor staf bedoeld was, met name de hogere legerleiding, en wij hadden beschikking over die tolken, aangezien wij met de VIP’s op pad gingen. Daar zaten over het algemeen goed opgeleide en goed uitzijende jonge dames in, die dan toch anders gekleed over straat gingen dan de lokale bevolking. Dus ja, ik denk dat je daar wel tegenstellingen krijgt, die corruptie in de hand kunnen werken. Want dat zijn dan mensen die vervolgens over geld
beschikken en dan op die manier hun positie kunnen versterken in de omgeving. In welke mate dat is en in welke hoedanigheid? Daar heb ik geen beeld bij en kan ik niet zien.”

“Ik denk dat ontwikkelingshulp een fenomeen is wat jij ziet in Afrika, waar over de tientallen jaren veel geld naar binnen gepompt is, waar de situatie niet verbeterd is, waar bepaalde leiders met eigen gewin dat geld opgestreken hebben. Dat zal ook zeker gebeurd zijn in de Balkan. Ik denk dat het toezicht daar een stuk minder (het wel aanwezig was) is dan in onze landen waar de checks and balances in het politieke systeem veel beter georganiseerd zijn. En dat is in een post-conflict situatie niet zo en zeker niet als de strijdende partijen met elkaar samen moeten werken. Dan krijg je hele rare verhoudingen, hele rare mechanismes waarbij het vertrouwen niet aanwezig is en dan zijn dit soort spelletjes middelen om toch je zin door te drijven ten opzichte van een ander. Dus, het is zeker aanwezig. Ik wil niet meteen zeggen dat het zo is, maar het schept mogelijkheden voor de mensen.”

“Als je kijkt naar de hoogtijdagen dat ik in Bosnië zat, hadden wij ergens tussen 500-600 NGO’s rondlopen in een heel klein gebied. Variërend echt van de Internationale Rode Kruis, OVSE tot twee idealistische jonge mannen die met busje naar binnen reden met poppen om door middel van marionette poppenspel kinderen duidelijk te maken dat de mijnen gevaarlijk waren. Deze mannen vroegen zich dan ook af waarom de kinderen niet naar hun toekwamen, maar als je met je busje middenin een mijnveld staat, dan komt er geen hond naar je toe. Dus krijg je ook hele rare verhoudingen.”

“Er werd ook een donorconferentie georganiseerd in Sarajevo en als je dan ziet hoeveel geld daar door landen gedoneerd wordt om de wederopbouw van zo’n land te faciliteren, dat zijn waanzinnige bedragen voor een gewoon mens. De voorwaarden die daar aan hangen, die zijn niet allemaal één op één te controleren. Ik denk dat in Bosnië de corruptie heel veel de kop is ingedrukt doordat de EU op een gegeven moment zich is gaan bemoeien met de Balkan. Het gebeurde onder het mom van ‘de wetgeving aanpassen, samenleving aanpassen aan onze standaard die wij als EU onderling hebben afgesproken’ en daarmee kun je op termijn lid worden. En ik denk dat dat het mechanisme is geweest om in ieder geval de openlijke corruptie erg de kop in te duiken. Omdat wij dat niet tolereren. Maar van de andere kant, in hoeverre is de latente corruptie nog aanwezig? Ga naar Griekenland en dat ligt niet ver van de Balkan af. Ik denk dat er mechanismes zijn die mee hebben gespeeld om de openlijke (corruptie, red.) te onderdrukken, maar wat daar nog onder sluimert? Dat weet je niet.”

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“Je moet in je politieke en juridische systeem de checks and balances goed hebben zitten. Daarmee kun je dat dan een heel stuk voorkomen. Je moet echt die scheiding van machten goed organiseren, ervoor zorgen dat zij in balans zijn. Daarnaast zal je daar een aantal mensen uit moeten pikken die als een soort van een rolmodel moeten fungeren. En daarna is het een kwestie van tijd. De nieuwe generaties moeten juist opgroeien met het gevoel dat corruptie niet kan of slecht is. Als je in een systeem blijft zitten, waar je van jongs af aan meekrijgt dat corruptie onderdeel is van de samenleving en dat moet je accepteren en dat hoort eenmaal bij, dan zal het nooit geëindigd worden.”
“Zit het een beetje in de menselijke natuur? Ik denk het wel. Ik denk dat de mensen die macht over andere mensen krijgen, daar zitten soms perverse elementen bij die zich altijd tot dit soort dingen laten verleiden. Ik denk dat dit ook een aanleiding is geweest dat de banken bijvoorbeeld in de Westerse wereld zover hebben kunnen gaan met het voorbereiden van een economische crisis. Dus is het dan daarmee een automatische garantie dat als jij al deze systemen in positie hebt en van jongs af aan de mensen opgevoed worden met het gevoel van corruptie kan niet? Nee, want het zit toch kennelijk in de menselijke natuur om zichzelf te verrijken, om macht over anderen te willen hebben.”

“Maar ik denk dat politieke systeem, checks and balances, scheiding van machten, goed juridisch systeem, goede wetgeving erover en veel educatie naar jongelui dat het niet gepast is, de belangrijkste zijn.”

“In de Balkan, zeg ik, is met name de invloed van de EU heel doorslaggevend geweest. De politieke en economische dwang van grote organisaties van de samenwerkende landen en het gedachttegoed dat je daar lid van uit kan maken, waardoor je economisch jezelf kunt verbeteren. Ikzelf ben daar voorstander van, ik denk dat het een systeem is naar mijn mening waarom de missie in de Balkan één van de eerste en één van de weinige geslaagde missies is van alle missies die wij de afgelopen twintig jaar hebben gedaan. Daar ben ik heilig van overtuigd. Niet het militaire componentje, maar juist de EU die daar een rol gespeeld heeft om een aantal mechanismes te laten werken naar Westerse maatstaven. Wij hebben altijd het idee dat wij de Westerse gedachte niet altijd één op één kunnen toepassen en heel voorzichtig moeten zijn.”

Op mijn suggestie om een soort van een beloningsysteem van te maken, antwoordde Hans Opsteen als volgt: “Beloningssysteem absoluut, maar als je op nationaal of semi-nationaal niveau gaat zitten, dan moet je een hele sterke organisatie hebben zitten. Dat vond ik ook één van de frappante dingen die ik in één van mijn recente cursussen gedaan heb: heel veel van de donors hebben ook een eigen agenda. Ook als landen donors zijn, hebben zij een eigen agenda en op het moment dat zij een eigen agenda hebben, zit daar ruimte in om dingen te doen, die soms het daglicht niet kunnen verdragen. Dan krijg je dat er dubbele agenda’s gaan ontstaan en één van mijn collega’s die rezevisit is, die bijvoorbeeld veel met de Palestijnen heeft samengewerkt. Die zegt gewoon: ‘als jij binnenkomt bij één van de Palestijnse leiders, vragen zij hoeveel geld ik kom brengen en dan wordt er gekeken hoeveel tijd er vrij gemaakt kan worden.’ Dus daarmee zie je al dat het systeem van donor vanuit landen en organisaties al corruptie-achtige verschijnselen kunnen oplopen in bepaalde gebieden. En daar zeg ik van dat je daarmee ook heel erg voorzichtig moet zijn. Ik pleit er dan ook voor dat de EU met één stem en met één beleid naar buiten gaat. Dat gebeurt niet, want elk land heeft individueel een eigen beleid en dat wordt samengevoegd als een soort van compromis in EU, maar je ziet dat als Catherine Ashton naar een gebied gaat, waar een conflict is, om namens de EU te praten. Je niet vreemd van moet opkijken (ze is nota bene Brits) dat de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van haar eigen land er al geweest is en het standpunt van Engeland heeft neergelegd, voordat de EU zijn verhaal kan doen. Als wij dit soort mechanismes in stand houden, dan blijven er altijd ruimtes voor leiders in dit soort gebieden om de één tegen de andere uit te spelen en hun eigen positie/financiële omstandigheden te verbeteren. Oekraine en in dat soort gebieden zie je dat ook heel sterk: de ene president wordt afgezet, die miljarden uit het land heeft gehaald, en de andere heeft ook al miljarden. Het zit toch ergens in het systeem dat naarmate de mensen hogerop de ranglijst staan (ontbroken doordat Oliver Vanek binnen kwam en kon Hans Opsteen zijn zin niet afmaken)... dus kun je het helemaal uitbannen? Ik denk dat het een utopie is, het zit ergens kennelijk in de natuur van de mens en zeker in de machthebbers.”
“Om aan banden te leggen zijn de systemen van scheiding van machten, checks and balances heel erg belangrijk. Je ziet ook de laatste tijd in Nederland dat op een gegeven moment een aantal mensen zo vervelend worden van de directeuren van woningcorporaties, die heel veel geld binnenschuiven/verkeerde beslissingen nemen/de woningcorporaties ten gronde richten, dat het zo ver gaat dat er een parlementaire enquête uitkomt. Maar het mooiste is dat de uitkomst van een parlementaire enquête is dat men niet verder gaat met het onderzoek en strafvervolging, omdat de politiek zelf de handjes niet schoon heeft. De politiek moest toezicht houden, maar heeft zelf boter op zijn hoofd. Is dat corruptie? Waar is die scheidslijn? Het is erg onduidelijk. Naarmate een systeem nog in ontwikkeling is, is er naar mijn mening meer ruimte voor corruptie en voor mensen om daar in hun voordeel te doen.”

“Dwang van zo’n externe organisatie als de EU is naar mijn mening een voorwaarde om een missie te laten slagen en een land ‘naar rechts te richten’ en zich aan te passen aan een meer op VN-ideeën gebaseerde samenleving en zo’n samenleving neer te zetten, waarbij de VN zwaar westers gedomineerd is.”

“De scheve verhoudingen werken systemen in de hand, waarbij dus een mens tot rare dingen kan krijgen, zoals corruptie. En in zo’n land is het zelfs een onderdeel van de samenleving geworden –om je bureaucratische systeem te omzeilen moet je wel geld schokken. Naarmate je meer geld hebt, kun je meer bureaucratie omzeilen en sneller zaken voor elkaar krijgen...het hoort erbij.”

Question 7: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

Rol van de militairen: “Ja, maar de militairen zijn niet primair verantwoordelijk daarvoor. Naar mijn mening zijn het de andere systemen. Systemen die door donorlanden, grote internationale organisaties in stand moeten worden gebracht. Wat je vaak ziet in deze gebieden is dat zo’n land van grond af aan moet worden opgebouwd, regelgeving moet worden aangepast en dat soort zaken. En daar zijn de militairen niet per definitie voor. We bemoeien ons met bepaalde zaken die hiermee te maken hebben, bijvoorbeeld veranderen van de papaveteelt in Afghanistan, maar dat is niet primair een militaire taak. Waar wij als militair wel voor moeten waken, is dat we het systeem niet versterken door als we binnenkomen proberen zoveel mogelijk met lokale contractors te werken. Alleen wat je daarmee doet, is een economisch systeem zodanig onder druk zetten dat als jij wegaat het in elkaar gaat zakken. En daar moeten wij heel erg voor waken. Ik heb al het voorbeeld gegeven van de tolken en de mensen die worden ingezet voor ondersteunde diensten, maar ook de leverancier van transport van brandstof kan zich heel erg verrijken over de rug van de eigen bevolking. Dat soort taferelen hebben wij in Afghanistan gezien: een bepaald stuk waar één transporteur was en die was ook tevens de baas van de bergingsdienst. Dat zijn systemen die horen en zitten daarin en daar moeten wij heel erg voor waken.”

“Wij als militairen moeten heel bewust zijn hoe wij met de lokale leveranciers, lokale werknemers omgaan en wat ga je doen op het moment dat jij eruit gaat, want het heeft gewoon consequenties als jij jarenlang een soort pseudo-economie in stand hebt gehouden, door duizenden internationale militairen in een gebied hebt (die moet eten, drinken en alles wat erbij komt kijken). Deze militairen leggen druk op zo’n gebied, waarbij je waarschijnlijk grondstoffen weghaalt uit een land die noodzakelijk zijn voor de eigen bevolking of dat je bepaalde mensen in een positie brengt die
dusdanig economische macht kunnen verwerven dat zij, als jij vertrekt, het oude systeem in stand gaan houden. Dus ja, ik denk dat wij daar heel erg van bewust moeten zijn en de samenwerking zoeken. Met name de samenwerking zoeken…dat je met de internationale samenleving en de organisaties tot een gezamenlijk doel/afspraken komt over hoe je met bepaalde dingen omgaat. En daarmee kun je een soort wedloop in salarissen voor ontwikkelde mensen, zoals tolk, tegengaan. Het is een soort van kartelvorming, maar dit is in deze situatie niet slecht, want daarmee voorkom je dat je scheve verhoudingen gaat krijgen binnen een land. En ik denk dat het niet zozeer is dat NATO-tolken gevucht zijn, omdat zij voor de westerse mogendheden gewerkt hebben. Ik denk dat zij eerder gevucht zijn, omdat zij zich verrijkt hebben in de ogen van de anderen door voor de westerse mogendheden te werken…en daar zitten nuances in.”

Rol voor CIMIC: “CIMIC moet vooral in kaart brengen of er sprake is van corruptie, wat die corruptie teweegbrengt voor de lokale bevolking en in hoeverre die het ontwikkelen van een stabiele staat tegengaat. Ik denk dat dit met name de rol is van CIMIC…in kaart brengen. Moeten wij actief worden ingezet om corruptie te bestrijden? Kom ik terug bij jou vorige vraag (de rol van de militairen)...ik denk van niet, maar het is heel belangrijk dat wij inzicht hebben hoe corruptie in elkaar zit, zodat wij daar in besluitvorming vanuit onze militaire kant van zaken daarop, op een adequate manier antwoord kunnen geven, zodat wij zelf niet in een valkuil stappen. En ook andere organisaties kunnen beïnvloeden door te zeggen van ‘op het moment dat jij hiermee geconfronteerd wordt, kunnen er consequenties zijn en dat willen wij nu net voorkomen. Doel van de militairen is om erin te gaan en zo snel mogelijk weer te vertrekken. Als je heel lang daar (in een uitzendgebied, red.) gaat zitten, wordt het ‘een gebed zonder einde’, maar dan moet dan wel eerst een stabiele/veilige situatie creëren. Daar waar corruptie is, is vaak geen sprake van veilige situatie…niet voor de lokale bevolking. En je krijgt bepaalde machtsverhoudingen die de stabiliteit tegen kunnen gaan. Je moet dus beeld en geluid krijgen. CIMIC is naar mijn mening daar bij uitstek de aangewezen persoon voor om te kijken waar het zit, de informatie ook te verzamelen, daar een goede assessment te maken en daar adviezen op te geven.”

“Het is zeker een onderwerp wat je in bepaalde vakken binnen de courses kunt aanstippen. Wij (CCOE, red.) hebben een lecture over economic systems. Dat zou bij uitstek voor mij een les zijn waar het thuis hoort. Maar in de lessen zoals good governance, sociale systemen kun je het ook naar voren laten komen. En corruptie heeft ook heel zwaar te maken met gender, want je ziet dat mensenhandel vaak vanuit de corruptiedachte komt. Een stuk bewustwording bij CIMICers die hier hun lessen komen volgen.”

“Ik denk dat wij heel vaak erg naïef zijn met onze westerse mentaliteit als wij een land binnengaan en met een hele grote zak geld gooien en denken dat wij onze zaak voor elkaar krijgen. ‘Ja’ in ons gezicht krijgen, maar voor 50 procent ‘nee’ opleveren, want dat geld verdwijnt ergens anders. Dat systeem begint al dichterbij huis dan wij denken. Niet voor niks hebben Spanje, Italië, Griekenland en zelfs tot op een zekere hoogte Ierland een economische ramp. Daar (Ierland, red.) hebben zij de economie gebouwd op een luchtbel, daar zullen de corruptiemechanismes minder zijn, maar daar zijn ook mensen die zich verrijkt hebben over de rug van de EU door subsidies binnen te halen om hun economie her op te bouwen/opnieuw te stimuleren. Maar vervolgens hebben ze een luchtbel gebouwd (Ieren met ICT-industrie die inmiddels is ingestort en daar hebben wij ook miljarden ingestoken). In dit soort landen moet je rekening houden dat als je met grote zakken geld binnenkomt, dat de mensen dollartekens in hun ogen krijgen op het moment dat zij voor je mogen werken. Dan zit je in hele scheve/rare verhoudingen.”

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Op de vraag of de inwoners corruptie willen aanpakken, reageerde Hans Opsteen als volgt: “De machthebbers denk ik niet, want dat is hun mechanisme om buiten de gevestigde orde controle te hebben over de situatie. Naarmate jij op een lager niveau komt, krijg je een gelaten houding van ‘het hoort er nou eenmaal bij’ en dat moet je doorbreken en de enige manier om dat te doen is, denk ik, de jeugd doordringen dat dit niet het systeem is. En ik denk dat dat ook één van de aanleidingen is geweest in een aantal landen waar Arabische lente heeft gespeeld. De jeugd die in contact is gekomen via de sociale media/internet/ met andere denkbeelden en andere manieren van kijken. Op een gegeven moment hebben zij gezegd ‘tot hier en niet verder meer’...dat dan Morsi alsnog gekozen is, heeft te maken dat een achtergebied van zo’n land als Egypte heel veel mensen heeft die niet kunnen lezen/schrijven en daardoor heel beïnvloedbaar zijn door sterke personen/groeperingen. Dat soort systemen kan je alleen maar ondermijnen en corruptie voorkomen als je hun van jongs af aan leert dat het zo niet werkt en mensen leert naar meerdere denkbeelden te kijken en hun eigen mening te vormen. Dan praat je over generaties voordat je het eruit krijgt? Ja, absoluut. En de oude generatie in Balkan heeft natuurlijk onder het communistische systeem geleefd en in hoeverre is het onder het communistische systeem juist door gebrek die ontstonden, is corruptie niet in hand gewerkt. Tijdens het communistische systeem waar gebrek was aan bepaalde zaken dan ga je een mentaliteit creëren, waarbij mensen zwart gaan handelen, wat per definitie al een basis is voor corruptie.”

Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?

“Als ik ga kijken naar Bosnië op het gebied van corruptie heb ik niet veel lessen, maar wat mij heel erg opviel, was de andere manier van denken over omgaan met geld die ik tegenkwam. Een voorbeeld: elke vrijdag hadden wij van mijn kantoor een barbecue, waarbij mensen uit andere delen van hoofdkwartier ook werden uitgenodigd om daarmee onze invloed wat breder te maken. Klinkt het als corruptie? Nee, dit is netwerken. Als wij niet voldoende vlees konden krijgen, dan gingen wij naar de lokale slager en kochten wij daar vele kilo’s vlees. Het grappige was dat als wij bij de slager geweest waren, dat die man één of twee dagen gesloten was. Die had waarschijnlijk zijn weekomzet al binnen, waarschijnlijk ook doordat hij een andere prijs aan ons vroeg dan aan de lokale bevolking. Daar begint het al. Ik vond het heel frappant. Dan had hij kennelijk heel veel aan ons verdiend.”

“De mate van corruptie heeft ook vaak te maken met de primaire behoeftes die mensen nodig hebben om te kunnen overleven en met elkaar om te gaan.”

“Wij gaan erg naïef met onze westerse gedachte een gebied binnen, waarbij wij denken het woord te kunnen verkondigen zoals wij dat in het westen doen, zonder in de gaten te hebben wat de lokale culturen/verhoudingen zijn. De rol van CIMIC: uitvinden wat de cultuur is, welke mechanismes hier werken, welke patronen moeten wij doorbreken om het land te hervormen naar een stabiele staat. Waarbij wij in ons hoofd moeten houden dat wij (de militairen,red.) daar niet primair verantwoordelijk voor zijn, maar de internationale samenleving, met name de politiek. En dat wij daar niet de invloed uit kunnen oefenen die wij graag zouden willen, maar dan wel een heel groot onderdeel van kunnen uitmaken met ons verhaal van het halen van spullen van de lokale markt. En dan kom je terug op ‘money is a weapon’.”
“Wij (de militairen, red.) moeten ons realiseren dat het niet onze taak is. Wij moeten de veiligheid regelen, zodat de anderen naar binnen kunnen die dat moeten opknappen. Om dat te kunnen doen, moeten wij heel duidelijk weten met wie wij te maken hebben. Op het moment dat wij veiligheid bewerkstelligen door bepaalde warlords in een bepaalde positie te brengen, die terug kunnen vallen in het oude systeem, en in een cultuur waar ‘ja niet per definitie ja is’ en afspraken niet zo rechtsgeldig zijn (zelfs niet als je contracten ondertekent)...dan moet je naar hele andere mechanismes toe.”

**Question 9:** Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“Nee, kan ik zo niet bedenken. Op dit moment niet.”

**Question 10:** Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been at this position?

“Staff officier CIMIC binnen de CIC. 2 jaar.”
Interview report

Interview with Michael Piotrowski: on 12-1-2015 at 10.00. The interview took place at his office at the CCOE. He works at the CCOE. During the interview I asked him the questions mentioned on the interview guideline. He emphasized that he did not see a role for the military in countering corruption. He added that for countering corruption the solutions should come from them. He also saw education as an effective way in countering corruption. I learned a lot from his experiences. He knew about my research and he was willing to help me with sharing his experience with me. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkans? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“I had one mission in the Balkans in 2004. It was a German CIMIC company. I was there for seven months and I was responsible for the intelligence regarding CIMIC and also responsible for the teams going out for operations. Finally, I had to send out all our mission and projects reports and during that time we were changing the way how we had to work from the reconstructing and rebuilding towards the new role “Support of the Force”.”

“Regarding the project work we were like an armed NGO, so we had a lot to do with national and multinational organizations, (GOs and NGOs), but also with UNMIK and UNDP. We had dedicated teams for rebuilding things, like architectures to design and build schools, houses and sewage systems. Rather few NGOs were interested in sewage systems...Therefore, we had a lot to do with local construction companies and local officials at the municipality level and below.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“I would like to go in another way. I think if you look to corruption from our understanding then you are lost there. Sometimes you have the feeling that corruption is part of their normal behavior and their normal living. We have these CIMIC centers where the populations could come and complain about things that are not happening. We had complaints about the official bureaucracy – it was not working the way it should. So we had complaints from the population about things that are not happening and that they always had to pay money to get things done. It was very normal that if you wanted something from an official you had to do something for him. And only if it was really strange, then the people would complain about that. So, you cannot go with our view of corruption and our understanding of corruption to such an out of area mission if you want to get something done. Then you have to deal with this kind of corruption. And for us the cutline was: ‘we would not deal with someone who had really dirty hands’ and otherwise we had to deal with that, because otherwise we will not get anything done.’”

Question 3: Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results?
“It took us a couple of years to get behind all these national structures there and we found out that a lot of the ‘bad guys’ were running this show. And do not forget that we changed the personal roughly every six months and more or less start every time new. And the bad guys stayed...So, they had legitimate business and they had also no legitimate business. So we had to question with whom do we work? Because at that stage every time we have a new project half of the money came from Germany and half of the money came from the municipality where we were building this things, this funds from EU or the UN. And sometimes it was difficult to get more than one company who wants to have a deal. And we were asking ourselves: ‘we know that here there are three big construction companies...why we always get this one?’ Of course we have to go for the cheapest, but if you have only one guy who builds...that is not easy.”

On the question how they dealt with the situation explained above Piotrowski answered as followed: “The problem was that our predecessors used the same companies and we tried to have a deeper look into them and to see what is behind it. We asked the other companies why they were not interested and they answered ‘No, we are not interested in it, because we are not allowed to be interested in it.’ We saw that there are local influences which we cannot deal with, because it was from the political side and it was also from the side behind it. So, there are still ‘warlords’ (in the terms of Afghanistan) or call the Grey Eminences or non-official shadow structures. There were mostly one or two guys/families/clans who run this show. We decided that we should have a deeper look into it and tried to get more information about these guys behind it. We found some things that we did not want to deal with, so we said ‘We will not support this project if we will not work with another company. We do not want to work always with this company’ They did not like our decision, but sometimes they said ‘okay, if this is the last word from your side then we will make it a more open system and we will allow others in.’ Sometimes this worked, because otherwise they would lose money and they would lose a project. From this you could also derive how connected the politicians were with this family.”... “However, sometime you have to deal with the situation.”

I asked Piotrowski to give another example and he elaborated the following case: “We had always to look at how the buildings were build, because we had of course our architectures – who made the plans of the building – and we had to look whether the building was built in the same way. For instance, whether the walls were built in the right manner and the right sequence, whether the woods of the roofs were in the right sequence. Because we had an experience in two different schools were they tried to build a roof not according to our plan, because they used cheaper woods. And then we had lots of discussions whether we had to hold the construction. We had to look whether it was built in the right way and whether they get money for something which they do not do.”

Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“No, and this also has changed, because in Afghanistan you had already in the training something about corruption. It was not a lot, but something. And in theatre you have also specialists you can ask.”
Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“From my understanding corruption was part of their culture. We saw years later the same in Afghanistan: it was also part of their culture. As long as the guys want something and the population accepts the level and is complaining just a little bit about corruption, then it is a deal. That is the way things are running in the Balkans.”

“As I already mentioned as long as it is on an acceptable level the population understand it and they understand that some of the officials, like ordinary policeman, were not really paid well and they have to rely to this kind of income to sustain their families. Even though, there were some complaining about it, but it (paying and bribing someone) has to be done.”

Basically the citizens/local actors do not want to counter corruption?

“I think that the problem was that they were not mad enough about corruption to really starting to counter it. So they accepted it up to a certain level as normal, as part of their lives, as part of their culture.”

“Sometimes these officials tried to bribe us. When we signed a contract we had a big invitation from the company. There were other officials trying to bribe us, but we made them clear that we had no interest in additional projects, because we receive our income with or without this project. So we made them clear that they could not bribe us. Our only interest was to build the school and not to have another project. They got used to our way of offending it and did not try to bribe us, because they saw that they did not get anything from us.”

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“The problem is that a lot of money flows in during an international mission. The money is not from the military, but from other Ministries and donors. So we do not talk about a lot of money from our side, because for the projects we do not have such an amount of money. For example, for the seven months we spend not even one million euros. But when a lot of money is coming in then you are paying much more for the translators etc...so I had a translator who was a legal advisor and he was now translating, because with translation he could make four times more money than if he would work as a legal advisor. And there were also fights to get these jobs. Even the cleaners inside the camps made more money than if they would work outside. I do not know whether it is corruption, but it goes this way, because we bring in the money, we get all the smart people doing jobs where they are overqualified for. So we take this people out of the society, out of the reconstruction of their own country and use them for our own purposes. That is what I do not like and I think that it is a big problem. It is also a big problem to bring lots of money in a country without any process to control it. But I think it’s the same for the civilian side.”
Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“I think that if you deal directly with corruption (direct confrontation with corruption), like contracts, that is from my point of view rather easy: then you have to make a line which you will not pass. To establish this line it is different from country to country: the line in Afghanistan is different from the line in the Balkans.”

“At least the IOs have changed their procedures since the Balkans to get rid of the most hilarious things of corruption.”

“In the Balkans we had nothing like what we had in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan we could put an official like a district manager or police chef on a list and when we had enough evidence against it, we could give it to Kabul saying ‘we do not want to work with this guy because of …’ and sometimes he was removed by his own government. You know about the levels of corruption. When I was in Kosovo I was only dealing with town or village mayors, but in Afghanistan you are speaking about the province level – higher level guys. Then you see what kind of money they are speaking about.”

Piotrowski gave an example from Afghanistan: “there was a man (a province governor and indirectly through his family the owner of the transportation company and other big companies) who was corrupt, but the population loved him and in their eyes he was not corrupt, because he put all this money in his family, but he was wise enough to leave something for the population and show the population what he was doing for them – he build new schools, he brought new labor for the population. Then the population loved him, because this person was taking care of the population. But he has hundreds of millions outside the country, but the population loved him. They hated the provincial government and claimed that all these official were corrupt but they still loved the governor. So in the end it’s all about the perception of the population.”

“The difference was that this guy used part of the money for the population and lots of the other guys only put the money out of the system and out of country, or build palaces for themselves. As military you do not have to deal with these guys, but you can go at a lower level and gather information about these players. You have to use the information and make an assessment whether you can live with that or not. Sometimes you have to say ‘that is enough, so organized crime, capital crimes, human trafficking is (or should be, or must be) a ‘no go’’.”

“If you want to fulfill the mission and get things done, and as long as the population can live with it and can accept it, and there is still benefit for them in the process of rebuilding/reconstruction…you have to accept that. We cannot come with our moral lenses and say ‘you can’t do it this way, because it is not done in our way’. We will do it in their way, because we (the military) do not want to be there the rest of our lives.”

Key actors/key factors in countering corruption: “I think the most important is the education of the population. So change in their culture, in their behavior in regard to corruption. Then, a really strong legal and judicial system is needed, which mostly does not exist when we talk about Kosovo after the Serbs left. So you need the civilian missions for that: to train the police, to train the judges, to train all the official in how they should behave.”

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Question 7: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

Role for the military: “To be honest...not really. The only thing that we can do is share information with the civilian side. We have our sources and they have their sources, so we have to share our information with them. We have to support their mission, but countering corruption? The population should come up with how to counter corruption and then we have to do everything in support of countering corruption. But we, the military, should not and cannot be the main actor on this large massive field. We have other interests and strengths. We are not so good in countering corruption.”

“With education and schools we can show them that the system/the government does not have to be corrupt in order to get something done. And that is really about the education and then couple of generations later when the system is working without corruption, I think then we can get rid of corruption.”

On the question how these inhabitants should be educated ‘neutrally’ Piotrowski gave the following answer: “We can use the civilian missions: to train the police, to train teachers, to train the judges...we had also one project which was dealing with the schools and the curricula in the school – what they should learn and how they had to learn. Change the curricula to get the right ideas to the kids.”

Role for CIMIC: “It depends on their mission. In Kosovo it was all about rebuilding and reconstruction, which was thus the main focus. It also depends on the situation in a country: in Afghanistan there was a window of opportunity for that which we missed and afterwards it was counterinsurgency which we did not finish But I think regardless of the kind of operation you are in CIMIC can influence own troops – to make them aware what corruption is, where corruption starts, and how the population is dealing with corruption. The soldiers, coming into a mission, were shocked about the situation and about the poverty. But by making them aware everything is fine and they are now not shocked when they see a police man not only controlling the passports, but also taking bribes to get things running. That is normal.”

“From my point of view you have to stick to your mission: you have goals and aims during a mission, and you have to reach that. There are things that you cannot deal with: you cannot deal with corruption in a country within six months when it is based in their culture. You need years to counter corruption, you need guys and girls that are not there for six months, but who stick there for longer time to get involved in it, to know who the players are, to deal with them and that, from my point of view, can only be done by civilians. We can just support them and we can support our own troops in making them aware how to deal with it, to inform others if they have seen something like that, to gather information about that...but countering? It is not possible.”

Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?
“Information exchange with the civilian side, but also to exchange information with the international organization, but also to exchange information inside the military, because it was bad at that time.”

“In Afghanistan the exchange of information within the military improved, because now the CIMIC guys were talking to the intelligence guys. The mindset was in the beginning different (the issue that the information of military importance was not being exchanged). If all the information is mixed (military information, civilian information) then we can come together and use the part you need.”

“Cooperation with the civilian side wherever possible.” .... “If you speak about the civilian actors you are not only speaking about the IOs and NGOs, but also about the Host Nation and their structure. In the end they are responsible.”

Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“No, just to sum up: from my point of view military can do something about corruption or to deal with corruption, but it is not the the right tool to counter it. That has to come from the other, the civilian part. And here not only from the International Community but also most important from the Host Nation Government. And as long as the population is not behind that – everybody can come up with brilliant ideas how to counter it- but it has to come from the population itself. Otherwise it will never change.”

Question 10: Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been in this position?

“Since May 2014 I’m the BC Lessons Learned / Development at the CCOE.”
Interview report

Interview with Marcel Olthof: on 16-12-2014 at 18.00. The interview took place at the Paresto (the restaurant of CCOE where it was sometimes noisy). Marcel Olthof is at the CCOE for the higher command courses and he could find time to share his experience with me. During the interview I asked him the questions mentioned on the interview guideline in the same order as written in the guideline. We had a nice discussion and the interview was in Dutch. I learned a lot from his experiences and he was positive about his missions. He knew about my research and he was willing to help me with sharing his experience with me. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkan? A.In which country? B.What were your tasks there?

“Ik ben drie keer in Bosnië geweest. Daarna ben ik ook twee keer in Iraq geweest en ik heb ook negen maanden in Afghanistan gezeten. De Engelsen waren vergeten om ons af te lossen, dus we moesten wat langer blijven, aangezien de Canadezen weg gingen.”

“Ik was twee keer hoofdzakelijk als groepscommandant, dus ik was altijd bezig. En één keer als ploegcommandant. De missies waren vrij kort achter elkaar: de eerste was in 1997 en dat was voor 6 maanden, de tweede keer was in 2000 en de andere was kort daarna, aangezien ik een nieuw functie kreeg. In die nieuwe functie stond ook dat ik naar Kosovo moest, dus binnen een jaar zat ik weer in Bosnië. Daar merkte je wel dat het langzamerhand werd afgebouwd en rustiger werd. In ’97 was het heel hoog, want het was eigenlijk net met de overgang van IFOR naar SFOR, dus daar was wel redelijk wat aan de hand. In 2000 was er ook redelijk wat aan de hand, maar je had veel te maken met corruptie en criminaliteit. In 2001 was het in de wintermaanden en viel heel veel sneeuw, waardoor we niet veel kon doen. Hierdoor was er weinig contact met de lokale bevolking en was meer zelf trainen. Dus dat was wel jammer, want daarvoor zat je niet.”

“In 2000 gingen we steeds hoger de bergen op en de bevolking wist niet wat SFOR was en wist niet zo goed wat er in hun eigen land gebeurde. Ze wisten wel redelijk, maar het was heel ander iets.”

Op de vraag of Marcel Olthof leuke ervaringen had tijdens zijn missies antwoordde hij als volgt: “Ik zou graag naar toe willen als er een missie zou komen, zodat ik kon zien hoe het nu is. Het mooiste zou ik vinden om in contact te komen met de tolken, maar die kans is nihil.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“Ja kijk, corruptie kan je overal tegenkomen en zeker daar. We hebben in 2000 heel veel dingen aan gedaan. We hebben in die tijd peletonshuizen gehad. In Vitez was een bolwerk van criminaliteit en corruptie, dus dat was een criminele stad. Hier hadden we peletonshuizen en daaruit hebben we patrooilles gedaan, waar heel veel afpersingen werd gedaan. Daar waren ook twee cafe’s waar jij van SFOR niet in de buurt mocht komen. Het had te maken met de Bosnische Kroaten die in Vitez zaten en de rest van de bevolking probeerde onder de duim te krijgen. De
jeugd was ook niet aan het werk en als jij aan de mensen daar vraagt hoe het met de gezondheid zit, dan komen de verhalen: medicijnen die uit de kasten verdwijnen, etc. In 2000 hebben wij een inval gedaan, omdat het niet klopte met de papieren en de politie deed net zo hard mee. Ze hadden extra telefooncel en werden er bepaalde praktijken afgeluisterd over wat er ging gebeuren. Het had te maken met de veteranen die in de oorlog hadden gediend en niet eens waren met de huidige gang van zaken. Zij beheersden bijna de hele stad en ze hielden dus de bevolking redelijk onder de duim.”

“Corruptie komt op grote schaal voor in Bosnië-Herzegovina. Het gebeurt zo openlijk dat niemand het probeert te ontkennen. Iedereen is het er officieel over eens dat het bestreden moet worden, maar dat blijkt in de praktijk bijna onmogelijk. Veel politici zijn zelf betrokken bij smokkel in bijvoorbeeld drugs, gestolen auto’s, sigaretten en bij vrouwenhandel. Dit gebeurt op zo’n grote schaal dat ze elkaar de hand boven het hoofd houden. Politie, douane en de rechterlijke macht staan vaak ook onder invloed van deze, meestal extreem-nationalistische politici. Ten tijde dat ik hier was hebben we dat ondervonden en ook daartegen opgetreden op laag niveau, dat wil zeggen op het gebied van de corruptie binnen het leiderschap binnen een gemeenschap en het politie apparaat. Dit heeft zeker zijn vruchten afgeworpen.”

Question 3: a. Did you witness corrupt behavior? b. Give an example?

“Als jij de mensen gingen vragen stellen in een winkel pakten ze een lijst en gaven als antwoord: ‘ja, we hebben water, ja we hebben elektriciteit.’ Daar heb je op een gegeven moment niks aan. Dus ga je andere dingen doen, namelijk uitlokken door onbeheerd de voertuigen achter te laten om eens te kijken hoe het nu zit met de criminaliteit en wat we ermee konden doen.” Dit werd gedaan, aangezien uit de voertuigen heel vaak de radiospelers werden gejat. “Op die manier (door uit te lokken) kwamen wij erachter dat een hele bolwerk zat en daaruit konden we traceren waar het vandaan kwam. Die veteranen zijn dan niet mee eens en dan komen zij in opstand, waardoor er criminaliteit is. Dat zag je ook in Busovaca: daar was ook iemand die burgemeester was geweest probeerde ook weer een aanslag te organiseren op de huidige burgemeester om zelf weer aan de macht te komen.”

c. How did you deal with it and what were the results?

“Je moet natuurlijk zoveel mogelijk inventariseren, doorgeven aan de staff en wat ermee gebeurd, weten wij niet. Er waren mensen die de taak hadden om te kijken wat er gebeurde, rapporten schrijven en dat ging vervolgens naar boven. Liaison praktijken, hogere staff, legats die met bepaalde bestuursleden in aanraking komen en dat aan het licht stellen. En daar moet vanuit de politieke oogpunt wat aan gebeuren, wat niet aan ons is. Wij constateren wat er in de omgeving ligt en dat geven wij vervolgens door aan de leiding door middel van de rapporten. De leiding bepaald wat ermee moet gebeuren.”

“Je merkte wel dat er meer toezicht kwam. Een voorbeeld: als je echt praat over corruptie dan is de politie die daarvoor was. De politie mocht ergens staan, maar niet langer dan 10 minuten op een plek staan. Ze gingen willeens langer staan om boetes uit te schrijven, want er was altijd iets niet goed. De mensen hadden al weinig geld, dus ze wilden geen boetes betalen. Wij hadden dus afgesproken dat de politie niet langer dan 10 minuten daar staan en ze gingen dus na 9 minuten weg, maar ze werden ook soms gepakt. Dan werd een aantekening van gemaakt en werden hun
pasjes en wapens afgepakt. Als het vaker gebeurde, kregen ze dan ontslag. We leverden de namen bij de hoofdcommissarissen en wat er verder gebeurde weten we niet, maar wat wij zagen in verloop van tijd was dat de politie steeds meer mee ging werken. Dus er is waarschijnlijk wel wat gebeurd, want we kwamen steeds minder agenten tegen die langer dan 10 minuten bleven staan. Het heeft dus wel zin gehad. We hebben ook samen opgetreden met de korps mariniers: we gingen stiekem opgesteld staan, de tijd in de gaten houden en dan aan twee kanten de politie klem rijden. Ze moesten de pasjes en wapens inleveren. Als jij dat maar lang genoeg volhoudt, zie je dus het aantal incidenten minder worden.”

“De discotheken groeiden ook als paddestroelen vanuit de grond, dus kreeg je steeds meer dronken mensen in het verkeer. De politie ging steeds meer daarop controleren en dus heeft het wat dat betreft geholpen, want wij hebben ook lang genoeg onze aandacht op gevestigd. Het heeft dus wel zin, maar het gaat niet in één maand.”

“Als er na zes maanden nieuwe militairen komen, proberen ze te testen hoe de nieuwe militairen (SFOR-club) zijn. Ze keken hoe ver ze konden gaan bij de nieuwe club. Als zij weten dat wij lang genoeg volhouden, dan ban je op een gegeven moment uit en gaat het de goede kant op, zeker op de hoge posities. Daar zagen wij dus in ieder geval.”

“Er waren ook mensen die aanslagen wilden plegen en wij gingen ze in de gaten houden, zodat de lokale autoriteiten wat aan ging doen. Op den duur en dat praat jij over jaar 2000 en verder werd er langzamerhand samengewerkt en de samenwerking ging steeds beter.”

d.Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“Nou kijk je kreeg iedere dag een Dailey Sitrep over wat er is gebeurd en er werd ook over Sarajevo gesproken. In je vrije tijd ging je naar het bekende SDN en daar gebeurde ook best veel: illegale cd’s verkoop en laten we eerlijk zijn iedere militair ging voor 10 euro een cd’tje kopen. Er gebeurden ook andere dingen: als je daar bijvoorbeeld met 100 DM betaalde, kon je even wachten, want je kreeg je geld niet terug.”

“Er waren ook meisjes die daar werkten en ze waren heel aardig, maar als er een grote, geblindeerde auto kwam, wilden de meisjes dat we weg gingen. Die meisjes kwamen vervolgens met blauwe ogen terug. Daar is op een gegeven moment meldingen van gemaakt en dan zag je ook dat het aantal cd-shops echt met meer dan de helft verminderd werd. Dus jij zag wel dat het aangepakt werd. Dan zie je ook verbetering in. Een militaire basis maakt dus ook meldingen en op die manier ban je dat ook uit, wat de kracht is van zo’n base. Je ziet in de loop van de tijd dat er resultaten zijn en verbetering is.”

“Je gaat met een bepaalde doel naar een missie en wil je ook graag resultaat zien en of het helpt. En het is motiverend als je ziet dat er wat aan wordt gedaan. En dat hoor je dan in de Dailey Sitrep: voordat je de dag begint krijg je informatie, voorbeeld er zijn verkiezingen dus wij kunnen dit verwachten etc. Via dat merk je zelf of er verbetering in zit. Zo kregen wij de informatie terug. Dat is dan wel positief.”

**Question 4**: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?
“Wat jij heel vaak meemaakt als jij met mensen praat die heel weinig geld hebben, die geven het af op de regering. Laten we eerlijk zijn, doen wij het precies hetzelfde: de invoering van de Euro en sindsdien gaat het bergafwaarts. Er klopt dus iets niet en in Nederland zijn wij nuchter en niemand stapt op om te zeggen dat het afgelopen is. Maar in dat soort landen, in Bosnië is het heel anders. Alleen oudere mensen worden de dupe van en dat zie je heel vaak. De jeugd die de toekomst heeft en in bepaalde steden waar criminaliteit heerst, daar heeft heel veel invloed. Want zij willen dan ook zo’n grote BMW en betere welvaart. Daar zie je dat er verandering komt: de middenmaat die voor de ouders en voor de kinderen moet zorgen, pakken het wel op. Die gaan op zoek naar een baan. Maar de schuld wordt heel vaak gelegd op de regering: er zijn weinig inkomsten, dat alles niet te betalen is. Na een oorlog zijn de ouderen de dupe, want als jij bijvoorbeeld aan de ouderen over de Tweede Wereldoorlog gaat vragen, dan kunnen de Duitsers niet goed doen. Maar als jij het aan de jeugd vraagt, weten ze het niet meer. Dat heb ik ook ervaren toen ik op school voorlichting gaf: ik vertelde over Afghanistan en zij wisten niet dat er oorlog was in Afghanistan. Dus het moet generatie op generatie langzamerhand slijten. Dat is niet makkelijk, maar het moet eigenlijk slijten. Dan merk je dat de tussen de culturen niet meer zo is. In Sarajevo zag je wel dat er nieuwe wijk werd gebouwd voor de Bosnische bevolking en aan de andere kant, net een grens (een straat), daar woonden de Serven. Vandaar dat jij af en toe van die haat hebt en dat blijf je nog wel houden.”

“In een oorlog zeg ik altijd dat de beide partijen schuld hebben en als jij vrede wilt hebben, moet je de beide partijen tevreden stellen. En als dat niet gebeurd, kan het escaleren en dat zag je in Sarajevo: aan ene kant werden nieuwe wijken gebouwd en aan de andere kant werd er niks gedaan, waardoor het haat bleef bestaan. Als de rijken steeds meer geld krijgen en de armen steeds minder, krijg je steeds meer onvrede en gaan mensen stelen, dus dan werken we in de hand. En ik vind dat de politiek de schuldige is en die moet het beter in de hand houden.”

“De oudere mensen die begrijpen en werken niet mee aan corruptie: ze klagen erover en ze overleven door bijvoorbeeld hout te gaan stelen. Dat was natuurlijk een grote item na de jaren 2000: de illegale houtkap welke de grens over ging. De bevolking wordt dan gepakt, maar de grote illegale bedrijven worden niet gepakt, want jij denkt dat het bedrijf met een vrachtauto legaal is. Maar de gewone mensen die een auto vol met hout hebben, denkt je dat het niet klopt. Die mensen proberen wel zo goed mogelijk te overleven. En de jeugd denkt er eigenlijk niet over na. Die heeft zoiets van ik weet niet beter en het zal wel beter worden. De oudere jeugd, tussen 25-30 (die klaar is met school, er is weinig werkgelegenheid voor hun), die houden zich met andere praktijken bezig. Zij willen welvaart (discotheek, grote auto) en dus moeten ze ergens aan geld komen en dan krijg je dus die praktijken. Dat is heel moeilijk om het in één keer te bestrijden. Er is oorlog geweest, mensen moeten voor de familie zorgen (dat heb je in die culturen – de zorg voor elkaar) en dan krijg je criminele gebeuren, zoals auto’s stelen en onderdelen smokkelen.”

criminaliteit en corruptie. Je krijgt steeds betere leiders die toezich houden. Dat merk je in Bosnië. Je krijgt steeds meer mensen die daadwerkelijk wat aan willen doen, dus het werkt.”

**Question 5:** What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Uiteraard zoals ik al heb beantwoord in vraag 2 helpt het zeker om de corruptie aan te pakken ook al is het maar op kleine schaal. Je moet immers ergens beginnen om vervolgens op te kunnen treden op hoger niveau en dat aan het licht brengen. Daar kan onze organisatie zeker een belangrijke rader in het geheel aan toe dragen.”

**Question 6:** From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“Je moet sowieso de verkiezingen hebben, dus niet steeds weer hetzelfde mensen krijgt, maar mensen krijgt die door de bevolking worden gedragen. Zij moet oppassen, want één bevolkingsgroep is altijd de dupe. Bijvoorbeeld in Busovaca: er werden verkiezingen gehouden en mensen konden kiezen en zag je dat de industrie opgroeide. Dit zorge ervoor dat de EU geld ging investeren, want zij zagen ook een vooruitgang. Ook de NGO’s, die veel meer geld hebben dan de militairen, starten projecten die aansluit op de behoefte van de bevolking. Wij constateren heel veel, maken een melding van.”

“As jij een strakke leider hebt zitten, die én door de bevolking is gekozen én geld weet los te peuteren van de EU om vervolgens daar geld in te steken en mensen aan het werk te helpen.”

“As jij mensen tevreden gaat houden (dat is de belangrijkste factor), dan heb je minder te maken met corruptie. Want dan denken de mensen van: ‘ik laat me niet pakken, want ik heb toch alles al.’ Natuurlijk heb je een slag mensen erbij zitten die steeds meer willen, maar dat hebben wij hier ook, o.a. de directeur van ABN. Dat zie je dus overal en daar dus ook. Het verschil is dat in Bosnië men nog van een oorlog omhoog moet krabbelen en dat is iets moeilijker dan hier waar men huizen heeft.”

“Je moet een sterke leider hebben, die zich daar niet voor laat lenen en het geld in eigen zaak steekt. Die leider moet de corrupte mensen dan aanpakken.”

**Question 7:** Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

**Role van de militairen:** “Kijk zoals wij met onze missie verzamelen alleen maar inlichtingen en dat brengen wij politiek aan het licht. Wij nemen geen bakken geld mee, we hebben wel projecten - quick impacts, zoals behoefte aan water voorzien. Voor langere termijn moeten de mensen zelf doen, wij hebben het geld niet voor. Daar zijn de NGO’s voor en die kunnen dat bestrijden. Wij
kunnen als militair niks aan. Wij zijn voor safe and secure environment, zoals criminaliteit. Wij houden ons bezig om ervoor te zorgen dat de mensen veilig terug kunnen keren naar hun stadje...daar zijn wij eigenlijk voor. Er kan een geestelijk leider zijn of iemand die aan het hoofd zit die dit tegen wil houden. Dan had je de militairen die de bussen met de mensen die terug wilden keren, begeleidde zodat zij terug konden keren. En dat moet je dan monitoren en in gaten houden. Wij zorgen ervoor dat de mensen kunnen wonen waar zij willen.”

“Corruptie kan je alleen maar aanpakken door te zien en een melding van te maken. En die meldingen worden in rapporten geschreven en gaan steeds hogerop. En daar heb je op een gegeven moment natuurlijk een legaat bij zitten en dat is politiek niveau. Politiek niveau kan dan het aan de kaak stellen. Wij constateren corruptie, maar we kunnen geen geld in stoppen. Het politiek en de NGO’s en al die andere mensen hebben geld en daar kunnen zij iets doen om een land op te bouwen en misschien criminaliteit tegen te gaan, zodat iedereen baan heeft, economie op gang komt. Wij als militairen moeten bewaken en constateren dat er criminaliteit is: uitzoeken wie crimineel is. Politiek niveau kan dan wat aan doen: verkiezingen organiseren. Militairen dragen wel aan mee.”

“Het voorbeeld wat ik aanhaalde van de politie. Dan ben je actief bezig om corruptie te bestrijden, want dan betrap je ze op heterdaad en dan ga je dus daar wat mee doen ... Je ziet ook dat er steeds meer samenwerking komt en dat de politie zich dan aan houdt, die weten ook dat er straf op staat. En als jij drie keer op wordt gepakt, is er een database van. Op die manier werk je wel aan mee...Het enige is dus rapporteren, controleren en observeren. Je kan niet mensen oppakken, tenzij zij een oorlogsdadenaan hebben begaan.”

“In 1997 hebben wij wel gehad dat alle oorlogsdadigers zich vrijwillig konden melden en dat zij dan een proces kregen. Anders zouden ze worden opgepakt door de militairen. Heel veel hebben zich vrijwillig gemeld en dan konden zij een proces krijgen. Dus op die manier werk je wel aan mee, maar jij kan niet zomaar mensen oppikken. Daar ben je niet aan toegerechtigd, daar zijn de plaatselijke autoriteiten voor. In het voorbeeld van de politieagenten kan je ze wel naar de politiebureau brengen, zodat de hoofdcommissaris het kon aanpakken. Die hoofdcommissaris werkt op een gegeven moment ook aan mee, want straks is hij zijn baan kwijt.”

Role voor de CIMIC: “Ik ben nooit een CIMICER geweest. Wat wij vroeger zagen van CIMIC was dat zij ergens gingen om lekker te eten (zo keken wij ertegenaan). Maar die hebben natuurlijk gesproken met de mensen, directeur van de scholen, maar dat zagen wij niet. Maar die hebben wel een budget, dus als er ergens een directeur een school wilde hebben, dan zijn die wel bezig en komen er nieuwe scholen bijvoorbeeld. Zeker is er dus een kans om een rol in te spelen.”

Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?

“Wat heel belangrijk is dat er continuïteit zit in de opvolging van verschillende missies die daar naar toe gaan. Wat je vaak merkte en zeker in lage stadium, wanneer het iets rustiger werd, dat je continuïteit aanwezig hebt van de militairen die je daar hebt, die overal op gaan letten o.a. corruptie en criminaliteit, dat een commandant opnieuw het wiel uit gaat vinden. Je hebt natuurlijk mensen die vaker in Bosnië zijn geweest en die hebben meer ervaring. Die worden ook gedebriefd wat daar speelde. Er werd niet veel gesproken over wat er in het land gebeurde, maar wel hoe de missie onderling was en wat je van een commandant vond. En ik vind dat jij als commandant
continuïteit moest waarborgen en niet proberen van ‘ik moet hier zes maanden zitten en ik moet met mijn eenheid de beste gaan doen’. Nee, je moet met de werkzaamheden blijven doorgaan. Dat is belangrijk van continuïteit...als je ergens gaat verslappen of een hoofdstuk laat liggen, dan komt het oude wel terug. Want de mensen hebben echt wel door als er een nieuwe club zit, dus ze gaan even proberen tot hoever ze kunnen. En als er iets blijft liggen, dan geef je authomatisch vrije brief mee. De mensen hebben door en gaan oude dingen oppakken om geld ermee te verdienen. Je moet het oude blijven monitoren, maar ook nieuwe gedeelte moet je monitoren.”

“Als je continuïteit houdt en met alle facetten blijft doorgaan, dan pas kan je het uitbannen.”

“Je hoort eigenlijk heel weinig over Kosovo en ik ben best wel benieuwd hoe het nu daar is. Wij moeten het van de media hebben en daar hoor je ook niks meer. CNN heeft af en toe meer nieuws dan wat er is. Af en toe hoor je wel eens dat een mijn is ontploft in Sarajevo. Het is toch niet helemaal veilig, maar de mensen kunnen wel over straat. Dat is denk ik heel erg goed.”

**Question 9:** Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“Nee, ik vind het mooi dat ik drie keer ben geweest. Elke keer dat ik terug kwam, zag je overal steeds meer verbetering en op een gegeven moment had ik zoiets van: ‘ja wat doe ik hier eigenlijk nog. Het is leuk om mijn tolk, mijn kapster weer te zien, maar er waren bijna geen highlights meer.’ Het ging allemaal de goede kant op: de volgende keer dat je kwam, zag je een nieuw bedrijf, meer auto’s. Tuurlijk hebben mensen altijd wel wat te klagen, maar daar gaat generaties overheen. Als er ergens oorlog is geweest, duurt het even voordat het helemaal goed is.”

“Ik vond het heel erg mooi dat je ziet dat ik drie keer ben geweest en dat iedere keer als ik terug kwam dat er verbetering was. En dat eigenlijk wij niet overbodig waren, maar wij zoiets hadden van wij redden ons wel. Als jij er bent, is het niet leuk, want jij moet daar zes maanden zitten, maar van andere kant dachten wij van het is eigenlijk hatstikke goed. Je ziet meer reductie van SFOR troepen en dat je steeds minder op het journaal hoort, is een goed teken. Dus dat vind ik positief en dat ik de kans heb gehad om drie keer daar naartoe te gaan. En dan zie je dat de politiek en de militairen, die daar zijn geweest, hun invloed hebben gehad.”

“Je ziet dat in de loop van de jaren het beter is gegaan.”

**Question 10:** Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been at this position?

“CIMIC Onderofficier bij het 1 CMI Commando.”
Interview report

Interview with Marco Corstjens and another interviewee: on 12-12-2014 at 11.00. The interview took place at the coffee room of the CCOE. Corstjens is at the CCOE for the higher command courses and he is one of the instructors. I was introduced to them by Marian Laine. It was a bit crowded in the coffee room, however it did not impact the interview. I had the interview with Corstjens and another interviewee simultaneously. During the interview I asked them the questions mentioned on the interview guideline and they had to take turns to answer the questions. All the questions were addressed. Corstjens and the other interviewee were willing to help me and they shared their experiences with me. The interviews are of huge relevance for my research.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkan? Which country and what were your tasks there?

Marco Corstjens: He was deployed in Croatia, in Bosnia and in Kosovo. He was there as CIMIC officer in all the three countries. His daily job was to have contact with local authorities and local population, what CIMIC is all about. He had mixed feelings about his mission. He was not sure whether NATO was doing the right things, because of the Serbs and the Albanians. “We cannot say that the Serbs are the bad guys and the Albanians are the good guys.” He is not sure about that and whether they took the right decision during this conflict. Both sides were doing bad things, so he do not know how to tackle this. His suggestion was to build a wall around Kosovo and let them fight against each other.

Corstjens agreed that the history is big part of the conflict, so everything starts from the history in the Balkans and that is huge part of the conflict; and added to this that he is not sure whether it will stop if the international forces will withdraw completely from Bosnia and Kosovo.

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

Marco Corstjens: He thinks about corruption as “getting personal benefits out of some commercial/public official deals. Maybe also benefits for a certain group in a society and not only individual benefits.”

Question 3: Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what ere the results?

Marco Corstjens: He has witnessed corrupt behavior, because as a CIMICER he had contacts with the local authorities, local population and local enterprises. “Because CIMIC, especially in the Balkan, was focusing on CIMIC project which meant money. The locals know that international coalition forces have money, so they will raise the prices for the international community. Another thing is that they will try to bribe you by offering you some goods/services to get contracts> it is kind of corruption.” He was confronted with this kind of corruption.
So what Corstjens and his team were doing was making detailed contracts –set up by their legal advisors, which covered local and international laws- when they did projects. By having this contracts they tried to avoid corruption and when the locals were not following the contracts they stopped immediately cooperation with the locals. Another thing is, the most of firms –with which they had to cooperate- were registered by the UN or by the government. They were working only with those firms which were registered as ‘clean’. They did not work with companies who were not registered by the government or by the UN (UNMIK).

Thus, the only thing the CIMICERS were doing in case of corruption, was stopping working with this companies. CIMICERS had to be conscious about it, they had to control it. “We have to be in control of everything, so we have to check everything, just to avoid that they do things that was not allowed”. Due to this guidelines and the contracts the results were positive> “they were aware of that if they would not follow the contract they will out of business. So they were aware of that”.

Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

Marco Corstjens: He says that due to this registration they had kind of guidelines how to deal with corruption.

Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

Marco Corstjens: He thinks that corruption is cultural dependent. He adds that the citizens and the local actors perceive corruption as part of their culture. Everything what he experienced in the Balkan when he had contact with the inhabitants was the fact that those inhabitants thought in the following way: “what is the beneficial for me?” So he thinks that corruption is part of their culture which is different from our culture. And the other way “we have to make them aware that this is not the right thing to do, but on the other hand it is not up to us to change their culture. We cannot change their culture and we are not allowed to change it.”... “You can bring under their attention and say that it is not the way it works and it is not the way we are expecting to work with us, but it is the way they are working, we have to accept that. We have to deal with it and we have to take measures toward that. We cannot avoid that we will be confronted with corruption”.

He don’t think that the locals are willing to counter corruption. “We force them to follow some rules, but if we will not force them, they will be corrupt again, so I do not think. They used to live with that corrupt system. Not only the companies, but the government too. They do not care about it. It is their society, so be it.” He sees potential in the younger and educated population, because this category know that the system is corrupt and it is not good, and they are trying to change it and Corstjens think that it will change in the future when this young and educated people are in charge. “But as long as the old people are running the system corruption will be in place, you can never avoid corruption. It is also existing in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, however it is not in the way it is in the Balkans. The older people do not care about it, but the younger people try to change it, which will take time.”... “Culture is so important!”
**Question 5**: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

**Marco Corstjens**: He definitely sees a relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption. Like already mentioned, “due to an international mission, where there is huge amount of international money involved, the prices will immediately rise. That will have an impact on the local society, namely because of the international presence the locals now have to pay more for goods.”

**Question 6**: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

**Marco Corstjens**: He thinks that this is difficult. “The key actor in countering corruption is the youth. More and more of this young people go to universities and are educated. With the support of international community they can counter corruption.” He thinks that the support of international community is crucial to lower/minimize corruption> “we can lower or minimize corruption, but take it out completely? I am not sure... I do not think...it will never happen. But counter it? Yes, if the young people who become the leaders in this countries are supported by the international community then we maybe can counter it. But avoiding it, that is impossible”. “We have to make them aware that this is not the right thing to do, but on the other hand it is not up to us to change their culture. We cannot change their culture and we are not allowed to change it.” “You can bring under their attention and say that it is not the way it works and it is not the way we are expecting to work with us, but it is the way they are working, we have to accept that. We have to deal with it and we have to take measures toward that. We cannot avoid that we will be confronted with corruption”.

He sees potential in the younger and educated population, because this category know that the system is corrupt and it is not good, and they are trying to change it and Corstjens think that it will change in the future when this young and educated people are in charge.

**Question 7**: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

**Marco Corstjens**: He thinks that as a CIMICER you can play a crucial role in that: “We should know the system/the legal system, but also the corruption system. Then we can raise the awareness among the military by explaining them how the system is working to avoid that we are supporting that corruption system. As CIMIC we can play a crucial role there.”

He agrees that there is a role for the military and for CIMIC in improving the situation: “yes definitely”. By creating awareness of the people who are making the contracts or of the people who are dealing with the local enterprises. “Make them aware of the corruption system and they have to be conscious when dealing with those people. They have to make really founded contracts where it is stipulated what can be done and what cannot be done”... “Military can play a role in that.”... “I believe that we can do something about corruption, but I am not saying that we can
ban it out of the system, but we can raise awareness of the international coalition forces and also the awareness of the local society.”

Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?

**Marco Corstjens:** “Make sure that you know the system before you go in. Make sure that you know local structures before you go in. That helps a lot. To understand you must understand the local system and when you understand the local system then you can manage, especially the expectations of the locals. And that is crucial thing that we have to manage those expectations. Because they are expecting a lot from us, but we have to manage the expectations. Be prepared before you go in, this is for me one of the keys.”

Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

**Marco Corstjens:** “No, not really.”

Question 10: Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been in this position?

**Marco Corstjens:** *I started with CIMIC mid-1998 and my current position is CIMIC instructor in the Belgian Armed Forces. This I am doing since 2000.*
Interview report

Interview with Martin Braterschofsky: on 21-1-2015 at 15.00. The interview took place at the office of Colonel Martin Braterschofsky at the CCOE. He works at the CCOE and he is the deputy director since April 2013. During the interview I asked him the questions mentioned on the interview guideline and question three was not addressed, because Colonel Braterschofsky pointed out in the beginning of our conversation that he did not witness corrupt behavior. Despite the lack of examples the interview is useful, because Colonel provided a nice definition of corruption and he also had some ideas how to avoid/counter corruption. During the interview we had a nice conversation and I learned a lot from his experiences. He knew about my research, he was willing to help me.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“I was in 1995-1996 for the first time in Bosnia. In that time I served in the intelligence being responsible for the Croatians forces. Within this capacity, I was participating in trips to Bosnia with a Dutch General (Division Chief) and with the branch chief of the cell where I was working in. That started to be my first time in Bosnia.” …”When it comes to corruption, in this period of time it was difficult to give any information about how money could have been bypassed. What we have learned is that there is a huge need for reconstruction.” … ”Many organizations and many nations were involved to sponsor and of course assets were flowing into the country. But how it has been used, misused, and bypassed? I cannot tell.” I was there for around ten days to get an overview of the entire BiH region, not limited to Mostar only as I have done so in 1999 to 2000.”

In a follow-on visit in Bosnia from 1999 to 2000 thus in the SFOR time period, I served as a military assistant for the General of the Multinational Division South-East in Mostar. During both times in Bosnia I had a supervision functions: traveling from places to places to see the things as they are, but it was not day-to-day basis. I saw the changes of status. It was interesting to see the status in which a country was in and has developed.

“As a military assistant from 1999-2000 I had for six months the chance to see development and details.”

“Within the Multinational Division South-East we paid a visit to different places and we have visited houses and communities, where the money has been spent. What we have seen is houses that started to be build and be reconstructed, but they were stopped at a certain stage because of limitation of certain means – for example they did not have furniture, they did not have roofs – to finalize the reconstruction. Obviously houses have been rebuild to allow Bosnians and Croats to turn back into their homes, regardless whether they were welcome or not. So, from our briefings that we have received from the community/the mayor/the governors there were certain reasons highlighted: one was that the citizens did not want anybody else to return, so the building of the houses has been stopped. But I do think that the reconstruction has been stopped, because of a different agenda, a behind the curtain organization and not the Bosnians or the Croats who were actually rebuilding them in person. Therefore, there must be a good reason why they have not completed it. In 1999 the population was really reluctant to accept the resettlement, so it was the
intent to provide the conditions to rebuild houses. But it was a challenge to give motivations and additional factors to the families to return back to a threatening neighborhood. So, that is what I have to say… I was not involved in planning and I did not have a budget, so I could not follow the money – how it went into the project or even bypassed the official channels.”

“In the six months we were trying to find out what the limiting factors were for the resettlement of the families and why the families could not return into the neighborhood. The neighborhood did not want to accept the returnees, there were threats, so this families at the end did not want to go back. Hence, the situation did not change in this six months.”

“In 2004, as a CIMIC-battalion commander, I was responsible for the CIMIC-personal to be deployed in mission areas. We started with liaison teams, CIMIC-centers in communities, projects and patrolling. In 2004-2005 you received reports from the teams about projects. In many cases the projects have been delayed and in most of the cases there must be reasons for this. Is this delay due to the financial lack, due to the lack of support or due to the interruption of flow of reconstruction material? I do not know, but in this timeframe the misuse of power and misuse of money had lots of opportunities not to be tract. I cannot give any example of this misuse, however what I can say and support is that even though projects – like building schools – have been accomplished, but there were no roads to go to this school, no furniture, no teachers. So, why should a person go to this school? But there were people who went to those newly constructed schools to destroy it and to rob materials for their own purpose. This example is not misuse of money but in a certain way connected.”

**Question 2:** In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“Corruption is the active misuse of power and trust of a person that has been trustworthy tasked to act as an honest broker and to spend the money according the rules and regulations as mandated. And that is what I see as corrupt behavior.” Colonel Braterschofsky then continued “For an individual that has received money for any given reason that person can even represent an institution, an organization or a government and the more you are investigating in the individual person, you will be able to multiply the probability to find corruption compared to an organization, to a mayor, to a district or a government…there is more potential in the individual than in the organizational structure due to a lacking control.”

**Question 3:** Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results?

“I do not have examples with relation to this topic.”

Was there a guideline during your mission how to deal with corruption?

“I cannot say for sure. Even in the six months that I was in the Headquarters in Mostar, I cannot say for sure that there was a guiding document about how to avoid or identify corruption. I do expect however, that the HQ staff was working on the topic as there was obvious and clear evidence. Even in the period 2004-2005 I cannot say that there was a guiding document.”
Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context?

“I had no real contact with the citizens, because I was never in a position/role. To link corruption with a cultural context is too easy and not valid.”

How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“To answer this question it requires that you have contact with the local population. And if I go back to 1999-2000 when we were on the spot and talked to the families, who have moved back, they expressed their disappointment about the conditions. Of course they mentioned that the process was supported by external elements, but from inside (government) nothing was happening. These were individual statements. One of the reasons of this situation could be the corruption. It could also be that a certain ethnicity is not supported by other communities. It could also be that certain people are being supported but on return support their projects only. In this case the persons who really need the support are not being supported.”...

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Of course it could affect. I described the situations – to observe the houses being rebuilt, the statements of the district government saying that they want the citizens to come back. If this is real or if they were avoiding that the houses were reconstructed, allowing the inhabitants not to finding the conditions to come back this is a different message.”

“With all the projects – build a school or a bridge – in 2004-2005 we received national donations to spend for a certain projects. These donors where companies who paid the money and said ‘when the project is finished, let me know and I will come there to take a picture.’ So, the control was limited to our teams, who supervised the projects. Our teams gave the opportunity to the local companies to realize the projects. And our teams supported the locals in a best intent with the money. The projects have been delayed and accomplished in different speed anyway. What is the real reason why a project is not finalized or delayed? There is of course, with the involvement of the local companies, the potential that the money got lost in different ways.”

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“If you want to spend any money elsewhere, you have to set it up in limited portions and in a conditional way. So, for example you receive five euros and when you have accomplished step one you will get another ten euros to continue for step two. Thus, do not hand over the entire money, because it will get lost.”
“Corruption can only be avoided if you integrate local employees, local enterprises in the reconstruction phase. You provide them an advisor or a mentor, who is advising and has a constant control on daily basis about the progress, about how the money is spend and has information why there is a delay. This allows also to support and to train them in exercising responsibility. In the training effort you can avoid that the money get misused and you have a benefit to teach them how to do it. You have to have a close look at the detail and you have to monitor the fellow entrepreneurs, support them in improving and to understand the process, because always there is a process behind. If you invest money you have to make contracts, and even from a legal perspective, it remains a challenge and a dilemma.”

“But again, a honest person who would mentor a project...that would be perfect.”

Question 7: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

Role for the military: “Corruption from a military perspective is that – and now we go away from money, because money nowadays is not ours – we support and equip the forces to set them in conditions to perform accordingly. In this context corruption is: the equipment that we have handed over yesterday is not available tomorrow anymore, because it has been stolen or lost. How can we avoid this? You can only avoid this as long as you remain responsible for it. It means that you are not allowing the third party to exercise their responsibility. You can share the responsibility when there is a certain mature behavior and/or serious conduct, taking the business seriously. As long as this is not given you (the military) have to maintain the responsibility.” Colonel Braterschofsky made his point clear with a practical example: “In the first phase only you have the key of the storage compound, so you are responsible for this. In the second phase you share the key timely limited with another guy. It can happen that he loses his key by accident...it can happen; then reconsider before continuing. In the third phase you hand over responsibility to them, but by then they should have been proving themselves to be trustworthy.”

“When it comes to the military and the military tools to counter corruption I think it is not the task of the military and therefore military cannot be involved in this. The only phase where they can do something is in the training and in stabilization mission, when you hand over responsibility, when you provide military equipment.”

Role for CIMIC: “I only see a role for CIMIC in countering corruption when it comes to reconstruction efforts, where the militaries are in charge to support these reconstruction efforts, because other organizations are not on the spot and are not able to enter because of the lack of security. Here I am referring to certain projects and during this phase in particular when military is on the spot to support the locals, when it provides the money and remains responsible for the money. This is the only moment that the military has a chance.”...”They can avoid/counter corruption in this phase once they have clear guidance and follow these guidelines. Military can take advantage of a clear guidance addressing the following: how to counter corruption, how much money there should be transferred in which phase, who is responsible for the contracts, who is responsible for the equipment.”...”Other aspect remains that the military are responsible for
the money, but they have to deal with it by following certain rules/conditions (if you provide the service then you will get the money). The challenge here of course is for a dedicated cultural awareness. You have to respect the cultural process. But if you emphasize to continue a close implementation process by supporting, by mentoring, by training...then at least you can reach out to a person and make a difference.”

On the question how to deal with the cultural aspect of certain behavior Colonel Braterschofsky stated that “it is difficult and it is an on-spot-decision. It might be life threatening or it might be in support...it depends on the situation. If it is life threatening then you have to consider. But in other cases you have the opportunity to make the point and to advocate how money is going to be spend."...”So it is a combination of cultural respect combined with a teaching/supporting moment, but it remains depending on the situation and pending of human character.”

**Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?**

“I can only reflect to the period 2004-2005 when CIMIC was involved in the projects. The process of a project should be clear, outlined and the responsibility should be commonly shared. Thus, not just giving the guidance. In a mission like in Bosnia, you have ethnicities – like Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Each ethnicity is different and you have to describe a process, commonly agree on the process before a project starts. Then you have the understanding of the parties...this is the way how the guidelines have to be set up and they have to be updated accordingly to the mentality and the maturity of the progress of the mission.”

**Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?**

“It might be an overarching aspect. It might apply to the military, but also to the civilian.”

Military side: “The point is: from a military perspective we have experienced soldiers who just returned from a recent mission, recovered at home for a month and then immediately volunteered and returned back to the mission. Those service members have then a relationship, with the population and with the enterprises, that goes beyond the working relationship; it opens doors but in contrary the military are vulnerable to certain behavior. This is a loss of military behavior, because of this friendship. So, there is this easy-going approach. There is also a good side of the story, namely that there is the trust in corporation, but this trust can be misused.”

Civilian side: “When it comes to the civil engagement, the civilians are following their organization’s mandate. Thus civil representatives stay even much longer than their military colleagues. They are confronted with conflicting and challenging situations and in the end they are left alone in dealing with corruption.”

“Bottom line is, the individual member of the services, who wants to engage himself in missions in high sequence, is vulnerable especially in the tactical level of engagement, because it mostly finds himself in the same function and continues the once started project. This remains a real danger. Moreover, the military are being pushed for mission success and for mission goals (there is more command control than applicable to civil actors). Similar point applies for the civilians. However, there is no explicit pressure on the civilian actors and there is a wider responsibility of what civilians are doing, because of the timeline a civil organisation is engaged in a country and
each civil organization seems to be happy to man their share of contingent having professional civilian actors in a particular country.”

Question 10: Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been in this position? “See intro.”
Interview report

Interview Mr. J. van Benthem: on 15-12-2014 at 15.00. The interview took place in his office at the CCOE. Mr. Van Benthem works at the CCOE at the Concepts, Interoperability and Capabilities (CIC) branch. During the interview I asked him the questions in the same order as mentioned on the interview guideline. I learned a lot from his experience. He was informed about my research and he was willing to help me with sharing his experiences with me. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experiences and insights. Our conversation was in Dutch.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkan? A. In which country? B. What were your tasks there?

Hij is in 1992 en in 2011 in de Balkan geweest.

In 1992: dat was in het begin van de oorlog. Hij is in die periode hoofdzakelijk in Sarajevo geweest. “De Nederlanders waren verantwoordelijk voor de communicatie verbindingen tussen alle locaties waar staven en eenheden van bataljonsgrootte waren gestationeerd. Nederland had naast een Verbindingsbataljon ook een Transportbataljon in Bosnië gestationeerd. Deze missie, UNPROFOR genaamd, vond plaats onder VN-mandaat.

Zijn persoonlijke taak: hij was het hoofd van het communicatie/verbindingscentrum op het divisie VN-hoofdkwartier in Bosnië Herzegovina in Sarajevo. Het overkoepelende VN hoofdkwartier van de missie in heel voormalig Joegoslavie was geplaatst in Zagreb. In Sarajevo waren in 1992 drie bataljons: een Egyptisch, een Frans en een Oekraïens bataljon. Het Franse bataljon zorgde voor het openhouden en beveiligen van het vliegveld om een luchtbrug mogelijk te maken om de stad van goederen (vooral voeding) te voorzien omdat de stad in die tijd volledig was omsingeld.

Nadat de NAVO vanaf 1995 de missie heeft geleid (IFOR en SFOR), heeft de EU in 2004 de verantwoordelijk voor de missie overgenomen (EUFOR). Gedurende de daarop volgende jaren is de missie jaarlijks aan het afbouwen. In 2011 was Mr. Van Benthem verantwoordelijk voor de tweejaarlijkse Periodic Mission Review (PMR). Dit is een rapport dat inzage geeft hoe de missie zich ontwikkeld en wat de feitelijke stand van zaken is met betrekking tot o.a. de algehele veiligheidssituatie, de hervorming en opbouw van de zogenaamde Security Sector (SSR) en het opruimen van o.a. munitiedepots en mijnen (Demining). Mede aan de hand van dit rapport wordt er uiteindelijk besloten door hogere bestuursorganen (EUMC&EU) of het mandaat voor de missie met een jaar moet worden verlengd en de missie wordt voortgezet of niet. “Op dit moment zijn er nog ongeveer enkele honderden militairen aanwezig, maar het mandaat van de UNSC om daar aanwezig te zijn als internationale militaire macht bestaat nog steeds. Dus mocht de situatie uit de hand lopen, hoeft de procedure niet opnieuw door de UNSC opgestart te worden>internationaal kan er dus ingegrepen worden, aangezien er een speciale reserve eenheid klaar staat. Dit geldt zowel voor Bosnië als voor Kosovo.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

Hij vroeg eerst vanuit welke perspectief het omschreven moest worden: Nederlands of internationaal? Het mocht allebei en Mr. Van Benthem moest er eerst over nadenken. Daarna
omschreef hij corruptie als volgt: “Niet rechtmatig toegeëigende financiële en niet-financiële middelen en/of diensten. Ook het omkopen van mensen voor bepaalde diensten is corruptie. Als jij alleen maar iets kunt bereiken door mensen om te kopen noemen wij dit corruptie, maar in sommige landen wordt dat misschien een kruiswagen genoemd. Het hangt ook af van de cultuur en het karakter van waaruit jij corruptie moet beschrijven, dus vanuit welk oogpunt.”

“Kortom: Corruptie is wat jij niet rechtmatig toeëigend of laat toe-eigenen, of verkrijgt.”

“Ik denk dat corruptie van alle tijd en van alle geledingen (rangen en standen) is. En ook maatschappelijk gezien op alle niveaus plaatsvindt, alleen in meerdere of mindere mate. En ik denk dat wij vanuit onze cultuur, hier in West-Europa, het minder nodig hebben en dat het daardoor minder gebeurd. Het aanpakken/ verminderen van corruptie is een kwestie van lange adem en kan generaties duren voordat jij resultaten hebt bereikt. Maar van de andere kant maakt het in de Westerse samenleving niet meer uit of je voor een goede baan bijvoorbeeld afhankelijk bent van familie of andere connecties. In principe heeft in Nederland iedereen een gelijke kans om te kunnen leren/studeren en later op een baan. Als jij kijkt naar de opleidingsmogelijkheden: vroeger kon je alleen maar studeren als jouw ouders geld hadden. Iedereen heeft nu wel de mogelijkheid om te studeren door allerlei studiebeursen. Alhoewel die situatie wel een beetje aan het veranderen is. Maar als jij het vanuit een ander perspectief bekijkt, waar de mensen minder financiële middelen hebben, moet je het anders gaan verklaren. Het zit in feite in de cultuur. Ik denk dat in andere landen veel meer voorkomt. Ik heb dit persoonlijk meegemaakt tijdens mijn missie in 2011. In Sarajevo moest ik contant geld afdragen om met voorrang behandeld te worden en dat zou je eigenlijk niet meer verwachten. Dat maakt een onderdeel uit van het systeem...dat is gewoon zo.”

Hij gaat verder: “Als je kijkt naar de toegang van de mensen tot medische hulp: in het Westen, in Nederland, iedereen krijgt in principe toegang tot dezelfde medische zorg ongeacht afkomst-financiële middelen en dat is niet overal zo. Er zijn landen waar diegene die het meeste betaald, het eerst aan de buurt is. Ik denk dat in andere landen dit veel meer voorkomt. Ik heb dit persoonlijk meegemaakt tijdens mijn missie in 2011. In Sarajevo moest ik contant geld afdragen om met voorrang behandeld te worden en dat zou je eigenlijk niet meer verwachten. Dat maakt een onderdeel uit van het systeem...dat is gewoon zo.”

“In 2011 had ik meer bewegingsvrijheid omdat er geen sprake meer van een oorlogsstoestand was. Ook heb ik meer met lokale bevolking gesproken. Het ging een tijd best goed om werk te verkrijgen, maar de economische crisis van 2008 heeft daar veel hardere toegeslagen, want investeerders en bedrijven trekken zich in zo’n situatie het eerst terug uit economisch zwakke gebieden. De klap kwam daar nog harder aan, waardoor de werkloosheid steeg en men alleen een baan kon krijgen via familiebanden en anders kon je het wel schudden.” “Dit vatten we samen onder de noemer corruptie of corrupt handelen.”

Question 3: a. Did you witness corrupt behavior? b. Give an example?

“Wat ik in het begin van mijn missie zag, in 1992, dat bijvoorbeeld onze Oekraïense collega’s van een andere cultuur waren. Zij handelden behoorlijk met de lokale bevolking. (handelen in brandstof en sigaretten). Ook bleven Oekraïense collega’s zo lang mogelijk op missie, want dan verdienden zij nog veel meer door de VN toelagen. En Oekraïense collega’s hadden vaak
voertuigen die regelmatig niet inzetbaar waren, maar hun brandstofverbruik was minstens net zo hoog als die van de andere militaire eenheden. Dus er gebeurde van alles, ook zaken die zij meebrengen vanuit hun cultuur. Zij zetten deze praktijken gewoon voort. Wij gaan natuurlijk met hele andere verwachtingen en ogen naar zo’n gebied.”

c. How did you deal with it and what were the results?

“22 jaar geleden ben je niet in een positie om daar echt iets concrete aan te doen. Op dat moment heb je andere dingen aan je hoofd. In 1992 was er sprake van oorlogsomstandigheden, gebrek aan voeding, redelijk wat slachtoffers, dus heb je op dat moment andere dingen aan je hoofd. Eigen eenheid, ervoor zorgen dat alles wat er gedaan moet worden goed wordt uitgevoerd. Op dat moment kun je weinig doen. Ook op iemand met een andere nationaliteit/buitenlandse mogendheid, die in eigen compound zit, heb je weinig invloed. Het is gewoon een feit dat dat soort landen niet dezelfde mogelijkheden hebben als de Westerse landen. Zij hebben ook een andere mentaliteit/ethiek en daar heb je mee te doen.”

d. Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“Op dat moment keken we niet specifiek naar corruptie. Het ging op dat moment meer om “the rules of engagement (ROE)”: wanneer mag jij schieten of niet: in principe alleen uit zelfverdediging. Natuurlijk was er wel corruptie in de missie en in het land zelf ook. Er waren mensen die heel rijk waren, zelfs voor de Westerse begrippen waren zij schatrijk, en in een omgeving waar niemand zo rijk is, vraag jij je af hoe zo’n iemand het voor elkaar krijgt. En dat is een hele kleine groep die van een oorlog profiteert en wellicht ook de macht heeft om de oorlog langer in stand te houden. Ik denk dat het grootste deel van de bevolking, die echt onder een oorlog lijdt, al lang blijft als de oorlog over is. Als jij er niet beter van wordt, dan wil je eigenlijk dat het snel over is. De Balkan was begin jaren 90 puur overleven. Pas toen het afgelopen was, in 1995 en later, zijn ze begonnen met investeren. In die tijd zijn er vast wel mensen die goed hebben geprofiteerd van de situatie.”

De ontwikkeling van de stad Sarajevo tussen de missies in 1992 en 2011 viel Van Benthem tegen: “het is niet spectaculair qua verandering, dat jij zegt dat jij de stad niet herkent. Daar zie je ook een stukje cultuur terug: mensen die redelijk snel tevreden zijn met wat ze hebben. Wij denken van ga bouwmaterialen kopen en je huis opknappen, maar het zit een beetje in hun…zij nemen genoegen met wat ze hebben. Het was niet spectaculair en ik had meer verwacht. De oorlog zelf is nog steeds heel erg zichtbaar. Ze hebben nieuwe grenzen getrokken, maar er staan nog veel door oorlogsgeweld vernielde huizen in dorpen die op de naam van de voormalige eigenaren staan (een Serviër die een huis heeft op Bosnië’s grondgebied en andersom). De kinderen groeien op met zichtbare beelden dat er oorlog is geweest…en dat is nu al meer dan 20 jaar geleden. En het is niet goed dat de jeugd daarmee opgroeit.”

“Buiten Sarajevo zie je nog steeds wel dat er tussen de etnische bevolkingsgroepen spanningen aanwezig zijn en daar gaan ook heel veel jaren overheen en dan kan het zelfs opnieuw beginnen. Want als jij kijkt naar de geschiedenis zit je op de scheidslijn van steeds terugkerende conflicten.”

generatie hierna, misschien de kinderen ervan zullen een keer (in onze ogen) op een normale wijze kunnen solliciteren en aan een baan komen. Ook de EU heeft inmiddels veel geïnvesteerd - voordat de landen lid kunnen worden van de EU, moeten ze aan veel regels voldoen. De EU en de VN proberen “ons” openbaar bestuur (het bestuur zoals wij denken dat het hoort te zijn) te implementeren in die landen, maar dat is in mijn ogen ook niet geheel juist, want jij kan niet zomaar onze organisatie daar implementeren. Dat hebben wij ook weer geleerd in Afghanistan. Eeuwenoude rechtspraak kan je niet zomaar vervangen door een rechtbank zoals wij dat gewend zijn. Misschien kun je kleine dingen veranderen maar dat gaat heel langzaam. Ik denk dat het wel beter gaat, maar niet zo snel als iedereen dat verwacht... niet zo snel als vroeger (dat de militairen een paar jaar lang kwamen en dat het conflict opgelost werd). In de Balkan zitten wij inmiddels meer dan 20 jaar en Kosovo gaat ook nog aantal jaren duren...als jij één keer aanwezig bent, ben je ook niet zomaar weg. Je moet van te voren bedenken wat jij wilt bereiken en dat jij heel lang aanwezig zult zijn, niet alleen militair, maar ook civiele organisaties zoals de VN”

Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“Wat dat betreft heb ik niet veel referenties, maar van de mensen die ik gesproken heb hoorde ik wel van een aantal dat ze hun eigen systeem behoorlijk zat zijn. Natuurlijk komt dat ook omdat zij op dat moment geen baan hebben. Sommigen krijgen bij de buitenlandse militairen tijdelijk een baantje voor enkele uurtjes en daar zijn ze wel blij mee. Het is ook afhankelijk wie je vraagt: als iemand advocaat kan worden, is die persoon hardstikke blij met het systeem, maar al die mensen die het niet worden of zien dat het niet om de kwaliteit gaat maar om vriendjespolitiek, zijn die niet blij met deze vorm van corruptie. Deze mensen krijgen na verloop van tijd ook kennis hoe het anders kan. Veel vluchtelingen vanuit die landen naar Nederland/Duitsland/Skandinavie etc. hebben nog steeds nauwe banden met het land van herkomst en dan zie je wat jou ouders geleerd hebben. Dat gaat vroeg of laat voor veranderingen zorgen. Een aantal vluchtelingen keert terug en uiteindelijk gaan ze inzien dat het anders en beter kan.”


Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?
“Ik denk zeker dat er een kans bestaat dat corruptie in eerste instantie groter wordt. De een is beter om nog meer van de situatie te profiteren en de andere doet alles om over te leven. Als het echt om leven of dood (eten of geen eten) gaat dan ben je bereid om heel veel te doen. Het daadwerkelijk aanpakken van corruptie is tijdrovend en dient uiteindelijk door de lokale bevolking zelf plaats te vinden.”

**Question 6:** From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“Ik denk sowieso dat wij iedereen bewust moeten maken dat corruptie fout en oneerlijk is en tot ontwrichting van de samenleving leidt. 20 jaar geleden dachten wij hierover niet/te weinig na. Bij alle beslissingen die je als militair neemt tijdens een operatie moet je bekijken wat de invloed kan zijn op de lokale situatie. Dus als jij met contracten bezig bent, kun je nadenken om niet steeds voor dezelfde leverancier kiezen maar om ook andere firma’s contracten te gunnen. Bewustwording is hierbij heel belangrijk, zeker op de langere termijn bij het opzetten van allerlei ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. Die programma’s proberen bijvoorbeeld ook het openbaar bestuur te transformeren. Dit moet in kleine stapjes gebeuren en dat moet je niet te rigoureus doen.”

“Als alliantie kan je wel afdwingen: wij zijn best bereid om een operatie uit te voeren om de veiligheid te garanderen/ te beschermen, maar daar hoort wel bij dat jullie bepaalde hervormingen doorvoeren. Dus dat er sprake is van een totaalpakket. Zij moeten hun eigen economie /maatschappij op orde brengen. Probeer de bevolking zelf te laten inzien en ervaren wat dat is…Good Governance. Het is wel makkelijker gezegd dan gedaan.”

“Het inzien van de burgers dat corruptie iets slechts is moeten zij zelf ervaren. En laat zien dat het beter kan…dat er meer mensen in welvaart kunnen leven dan alleen maar die paar mensen die heel erg rijk zijn.”

**Question 7:** Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

“In eerste instantie moet men niet richten op de militairen om corruptie te bestrijden. Dat is een taak van civiele instanties , maar dat is beschouwd vanuit de Westerse gedachte. Misschien zijn er landen die zeggen dat het een typische taak is van de militairen. Maar vanuit ons oogpunt is het niet de primaire taak van de militairen. Het is een taak van de civiele instanties zoals politie en fiscale opsporingsdienst. Militairen moeten geen politie taken uitvoeren.

“CIMIC is in principe niet bedoeld voor het bestrijden van corruptie, maar CIMIC kan wel een signaalfunctie hebben. Zij opereren in het civiele domein en als het goed is hebben zij dan goed inzicht in wat er zich allemaal afspeelt in dit civiele domein en CIMIC eenheden hebben veel contacten, die veel informatie kunnen verzamelen over mogelijke corruptie of andere wantoestanden. Dat kan gerapporteerd worden, maar direct tegengaan kunnen zij niet. Het belangrijkste is de signaalfunctie.”

**Question 8:** What did you learn from your experiences?

“Dat jij ziet dat corruptie in een oorlog situatie er alleen maar voor zorgt dat de mensen die al rijk waren alleen maar rijker worden. En dat die groep probeert de situatie in stand te houden,
want zolang de situatie zo is, kunnen zij floreren en nog meer geld achterover drukken. Dus die zijn erg gebaat bij het handhaven van de situatie en dat is niet goed. Als de internationale gemeenschap in staat zouden zijn om deze groep(en) te isoleren en elimineren, dan gaat het oplossen van conflicten of crises misschien een stuk sneller. Alle mensen die onder conflict situaties lijden, hebben er geen baat bij dat het langer duurt. Die willen dat er zo snel mogelijk een einde komt, zodat zij weer aan een toekomst kunnen denken en bouwen.”

Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“Ik denk dat “corruptie” een wezenlijk deel uitmaakt van een missie en continu punt van aandacht moet zijn. Good Governance is vanuit het positieve oogpunt geformuleerd en is onderdeel van de cursussen die wij op het CCOE geven.”

Question 10: Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been at this position?


“De kracht van NATO is het “spreken” van dezelfde taal en dat heet doctrine.”
Interview report

Interview with Piet Biesheuvel: on 3-12-2014 at 13.00. The interview took place at my office. Piet was at the CCOE for the SSR conference and I was introduced to him by Hans Opsteen. During the interview I did not ask specific experience, because Piet took the initiative to share his experiences with me. Moreover, the interview guideline was not approved yet. Piet did not mind if I would quote him in my research and he also did not want to have the notes for approval. We have had a friendly contact with each other. Piet’s expertise is in Africa, so he could not help me with the case studies, however he mentioned general things during the interview which are applicable everywhere. Moreover, he gave some recommendations about how to counter corruption. He was eager to help me with my research. Overall the interview is relevant for my research, especially for the recommendations.

Piet Biesheuvel has a wide range of developmental experience in the governance, justice and security sectors, especially in sub-Saharan Africa where he operated in the field for over sixteen years. He has provided governance, security & justice policy support to the UK and Dutch Governments. He is a regular speaker on security and justice development issues and the lead facilitator of the UK Government’s Security & Justice Development Course.

Some random of thoughts: “the international community made difficulties for themselves in dealing with corruption. They have separated corruption from other dishonesties, which is incorrect.”

“For example: if a woman is raped and she goes to the police, but this policeman says: ‘I will only let you talk to the investigators if you give me 50 euros.’ This is corruption. When this woman goes eventually speak to the investigator and when these investigators ask money to investigate the case it is corruption. But when these investigators rape this woman for the second time it is no corruption. This is very bad and is criminal act, but it is corruption. Here you have two jurisdiction being involved.”

“Corruption has many definition and within the security and justice we have one definition and this is: abuse of power for personal advantage.”

“What is really bad in international development? When a problem is seen and new institution is put together to improve it...what the donors are doing for 25 years in security and justice, is that there is corruption so we have to anti-corruption institutions. Then the donors invest to build these institutions – buildings, computers etc. When they go away it turns to be unsustainable. But in short term that unit has to define what corruption is. There are examples of fraud of violence that are not included as corruption.”

“Rather setting of new anti-corruption agencies, you can look at the existing anti-corruption agencies and say ‘why we do not expend it and support the police for example?’ It is much cheaper option, because they already exist, you do not need new people – who might have the required level of skills. So, the problem is the same, but saving the costs are enormous.”

“So separating corruption from all other crimes is a very serious mistake and this happens too often.”
“The drivers of corruption:

- the access to services (if you want water, electricity, education for your child, medical service). Whatever service it was you had to pay for it. Access to services and paying to get access to these services is a major issue.

- to influence the outcomes: you want a certain outcome and you influence it. This brings us back to the courts: if you pay the prosecutor/judge you will not be prosecuted. Access to the healthcare is also an issue. In the criminal courts it is also a big issue: police is one of the worst institution.

- to avoid bureaucracy: the systems at place are old fashioned. Why would you pay the police instead of having a process before a judge. You save yourself bureaucracy and you safe yourself money too, because if you get a fine by the judge it might costs you 400, but you can also pay 40 to this policeman and you are done. When there is an old fashioned system at place there are too many forms involved.

- to accumulate wealth: this is rich becoming richer. If you look to corruption in police it might be a way of having an income, but how about corrupt senior officers who have cars etc.? They are also corrupt and this has nothing to do with income. Greed: wanting more.”

- “Corruption can be an organizational culture.”

- “to overcome poverty: poor people needing the extra money, because of law income.”

“Enablers of corruption:

- the systems/procedures are outdated and old fashioned. You have thus gaps. There is manual system and no electronic system.

- leadership in an institutions: the leadership is not willing to deal with corruption. There is no political will to deal with corruption. It is important that an international supervisor knows how to deal, but if they are not trained and tell what they can expect, there is no supervision/control. So, when you start an anti-corruption program and no one knows how to work with the people who make the institution work and behave in private rules. So, leadership, supervision is important.

- the absence of accountability: accountability in all forms (vertical and horizontal: NGO’s, IO’s, civil society) and on all levels. There is poor capacity in the departments. There should be pressure on the government to be accountable from the people and from the international society (well organized, otherwise they can be ignored). You have to have this 3+1 system: democratic elected representatives, you have to have a judiciary; and you have to have an independent and honest executive; and the +1 is the media/civil society.”

“Every country is different.”

“Change in legislation when nobody adheres to it is waste of time and money. Training is useless, because you can train them that corruption is wrong etc., but after people leave the training and go to work, they will carry on where they were. Everyone knows that corruption is wrong, so you do not have to train them that is wrong. Thus, that approach is not working.”

“Solutions and key actors:
-you will not change anything in a country when there is no high level (president, prime minister) political will. If they do not want to improve or tackle it, it will not happen. So political will, you have to have this political will at the highest level. This is a high level approach.

-you have to work on public demand: too often you work with the supply of services. So, you have to demand better services. This is a low level approach. The problem with this low level approach is when you do a perception survey then you would find out that lot of people were involved in corruption, while at the first instance they would deny it. Thus, the problem is: how can the inhabitants demand anti-corrupt measures while they are involved in corruption. As long as the inhabitants are motivated to act in a corrupt way there will be no demand for anti-corruption.

-Education: having a prevention role. To spend time with people letting them know that corruption is not a good idea and show them the consequences. So, it is not about having a teaching role, but having a mentoring role. It seemed to have an impact.

-you should deal with corruption as break of criminal law and break of general law, and not as a separate issue. So, do not categorize corruption as separate crime.”

-> “Corruption is widespread and people do not discuss it, so it has a secret character. Problem with corruption is that people do not talk about corruption and therefore you do not know how much corruption there is in a place.”

-> “Corruption is a behavioral issue.”

On the question whether there is a role for the military to counter corruption, Piet Biesheuvel reacted as following: “I am certainly sure that there is no role. I do not see any role, but it is up to the criminal justice – police, judiciary, prosecutors – system to deal with it Apart from the fact that they make sure that their own transactions are not corrupt.”

“When you start a mission what you have to do is put in new systems, like computers which can be unlocked by certain people. Hold people accountable when something goes wrong.”

“Corruption is going on for centuries and it will not be stopped tomorrow. And corruption is prevalent in some countries more than in others. There is corruption in every country.”
Interview report

Interview with Colonel Roel Been: on 26-1-2015 at 13.00. The interview took place at the office of Colonel at CCOE. He is the Director of CCOE. During the interview I asked him the questions mentioned in the interview guideline not applying the order laid down in the guideline. I did not ask every question mentioned in the guideline, because some of the questions were covered in the other questions. During the interview we had a nice conversation and I learned a lot from his experiences. We talked about his experiences from Bosnia. Roel Been emphasized the cultural aspects of corruption and that there are differences between what we consider corruption and what corruption is in Bosnia. Moreover, he emphasized that the role of military is to secure a safe environment. He knew about my research and he was willing to help me with sharing his experience. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“In 2001-2002 ben ik het Hoofd CIMIC geweest van de Nederlands battlegroup. Dus ik zat bij SFOR-10 en SFOR-11 in Bosnië in kanton 6. En dit was de area of operations voor de Nederlandse bataljon en wij hadden ook een gebiedsverantwoordelijkheid. Wij roteerden elk half jaar halverwege de bataljonsperiode. Zo had je kennis van het land en kon je de kennis behouden.”

“Ik voerde mijn functie uit op kanton-level, dus ik sprak met de gouverneurs en ministers die het kanton bestuurden.”

“Wij waren één van de enige bataljons met eigen geld. Het ging ongeveer om half miljoen (convertible Marks) per half jaar en het was dus serieus geld. Wij lieten het systeem, o.a. het bestuur, meedenken om zelf met ideeën te komen om te kijken waar wij het geld aan gaan besteden – scholen, wegen, bruggen, speelplaatsen – dus dit waren de doelen die vaak geïdentificeerd werden. En dan lieten wij hun zeer prille democratische systeem met voorstellen komen. Soms wilden zij een bepaalde weg gemaakt hebben, terwijl alleen maar een bepaalde etniciteit plezier aan had en de rest niet. Dus jij moest goed kijken of hun voorstellen voor het algemene nut was of voor bepaalde groep mensen (bepaalde etniciteiten – zoals Kroaten, Bosniërs) waren. Dus daar keken wij ook naar.”

“In de projecten gaat geld om en waar geld omgaat, heb je dus ook invloed. Jij moet goed opletten dat het goed besteed wordt en niet bij sommige mensen in de zakken gaat en er niks uitkomt.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“Jij moet kijken naar de situatie voor de burgeroorlog, waarin de mensen happy waren. Je moet terug naar de mate van wat wij ‘corruptie’ noemen, maar eigenlijk is het een soort van overheidsgedrag of gezagsdragers die niet alleen maar salaris krijgen, maar op andere manier geld of diensten ontvangen. Kijken naar wat de basis was en wat men toen (voor de burgeroorlog) normaal vond? Hoe deden zij het toen? En dan kun jij die lijn als een leidraad nemen.”
“Tijdens en na een ramp, zoals een burgeroorlog, gaat het om het recht van de sterkste en dus neemt de sociale context af. Ik denk dat hoe socialer de context is hoe lager de graad van corruptie...ze delen meer.”

“Corruptie is dat jij deelt met jezelf en zo min mogelijk met de rest. Misschien deel je wel met je familie, maar dat zijn andere banden. Delen in de brede zin, dat zit in een hoog conjectuur.”

“Mijn idee zou zijn: probeer te achterhalen hoe de levensstandaard is, hoe men omgaat met geld en benader dat. En geen maatregelen nemen die te rigoureus zijn, want zij snappen het dan niet...zij begrijpen niets van, want het gaat om mensen die nooit in een ander land zijn geweest. Dus zij vinden normaal wat in hun eigen land gebeurt en dat willen zij. Als jij rigoureuze maatregelen neemt en vervolgens weg bent uit het land, dan vallen ze terug. Ik heb altijd gezegd ‘we gaan geen West-Duitsland maken, waar alles goed geregeld is en puntlachelijk’. Dit krijgen wij niet en dat moeten wij ook niet willen, want dan raken wij gefrustreerd en de bevolking snapt het niet, dus jij bereikt niets en jij gooit geld weg. Dus dat is corruptie nulmeting van wat normaal is.”

“Mensen in andere landen vinden dingen normaal wat wij niet normaal vinden, zoals vrouwenbesnijdenis in Afrika. Wij kunnen zeggen dat zij het niet mogen doen en als militair kan je misschien klein succesje behalen, maar jij kan het niet in een half jaar veranderen. Dat zijn zaken die veel tijd kosten en daar zijn wij als militairen (misschien wel als mens wel voor) niet voor.

Question 3: Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results?


“Wat is dan corruptie? Het is net wat jij onder verstaat? Jij moet het heel lokaal bekijken en lokaal beoordelen, omdat jij zelf geen dilemma moet krijgen. Jij moet jou eigen normen aanhouden en de projecten volgens jou normen uitvoeren. Dus wij gingen niet marcheerden hoezeer de cultuur daar ook was. Wij deden gewoon niet mee en daardoor blijf je ook altijd ‘straight on’. Dat andere partijen anders mee omgingen...dat heb je gewoon niet in de hand. Dan kan je vragen of het erg is? Misschien is het niet erg, want zo doen ze het de afgelopen 200 jaar. Wat jij wel wilt voorkomen is dat het geld de foute kant oprolt, dus de kant oprolt die niets te maken heeft met de vrede en veiligheid en jou missie tegen kan werken.”

“Geld rolt daar een deel de goede kant op en een deel niet de goede kant op. Jij moet op een gegeven moment jezelf afvragen wanneer jij gaat optreden: ga je optreden als het tussen jou en de missie gaat staan? Ik vind van wel!”
“Ik heb niet bewust meegemaakt dat ons eigen geld de verkeerde kant oprolde. Maar wat er wel gebeurde, was dat er een school werd gebouwd waar tot nu toe geen kind inzit. De aannemer heeft wel geld aan verdiend, maar er is geen kind op dat school. Dit is een mislukte project en de mislukking kan te maken hebben met corruptie of met het feit dat de urgentie van de bouw belangrijker is gemaakt....dat weet ik niet. Wij zijn heel kort daar, wij zijn daar voor een half jaartje.”

“Onze tolk had een goed geheugen, die wist heel veel en waarschuwde ons over bepaalde partijen.”

“Als jij met geld binnenkomt, ben je vatbaar dat het de foute kant opgaat. Dus moet je regelen dat het niet gebeurt.”

“In Bosnië waren wij kleine spelers vergeleken met Afghanistan.”

“Wij hebben ook gecoördineerd met de andere actoren, zoals IOs en NGOs. Wij gingen onze kennis koppelen, zodat het niet de foute kant op ging en zodat het bouw zinvol was.”

“Wat jij wel zag was dat de ministers daar een redelijk kleine formele salaris hadden. Ik denk dat mijn tolk meer verdiende dan de ministers daar. Maar een minister had op de ene of andere manier meer dan een tolk. Die had mooiere huis, luxere auto, dus die had andere wegen om zijn salaris aan te vullen. Dat zouden wij corruptie vinden. De bevolking spraak kwaad over de politie...die vonden zij niks.”

Was there a guideline during your mission how to deal with corruption?

“We hadden daar een proces voor. Als wij besloten hadden dat een bepaalde school gebouwd of herbouwd ging worden, dan hadden wij technische mensen mee –die militairen waren –en die deden voor mij het aanbestedingsproces. Die maakten een ‘program of work’ en die werd op de markt gezet, dus konden contractors zich inschrijven. En het ging zoals het in Nederland ging, dus het wordt openbaar gesteld, de contractors kunnen zich dan specificeren – dus met een prijs komen – binnen paar weken en dan werd een keuze gemaakt. Dat werd heel goed gedaan en er was dus geen speld tussen te krijgen. Wij gingen op kwaliteit en prijs, dus moest men binnen de kwaliteitsnormen de projecten inleveren.”

“De beste contractor werd gekozen en die werd ieder keer gecontroleerd of hij ook deed wat hij ook moest doen. Wij waren ook de enige die dat zo deden en daardoor werd onze school/een afdeling van een ziekenhuis afgebouwd. Dus hele bouwproces werd goed begeleid en zat dus goed dicht. Dat vonden zij niet altijd leuk, want het liefst werd een Kroaat (en het liefst een familielid) aangenomen als een Kroatisch deel verbouwd moest worden. Maar dat ging bij ons niet op. Het kwam ook voor dat een Bosnisch contractor werd aangenomen voor de bouw in Kroatisch deel en als jij beveiliging nodig had, kreeg je dat ook. Dus wij voelden wel aan dat bij toedeling van sommige projecten tot spanningen kon leiden en gingen wij als SFOR meer patrouilleren in het gebied.”

“CIMIC, IO’s, NGOs, OVSE, OHR monitorden samen het gebied en wij wisten samen waar de corruptie in het gebied zat. Wij wisten ook dat bepaalde benzinestations banden hadden met of familie waren van oorlogsmisdadigers. En die ontliepen wij dan ook wel. Wij hadden geen black
“Wij leenden onze militaire ingenieurs ook aan andere NOGs.”

“Je moest heel streng proces opzetten en dan werd het gevolgd, want men had toch liever die school. Je moest dus ferm optreden.”

“Wij hadden veel geld en wij konden snel projecten starten en mijn opvolger maakte het af, maar er kwam wel een ‘flavor’ eroverheen wat een bepaalde bataljon wilde.”

“Dus het was een militaire ondersteuning, maar ik kreeg ook heel veel informatie van de civiele en militaire autoriteiten. Ik kreeg meer informatie dan onze intelligence jongens. Dat kreeg je terug van je projecten. Je kreeg naast informatie ook de hearts and the minds van de bevolking. Aangezien jij geld inpompte, gingen mensen aan het werk en kreeg je ook economische impuls.”

Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“De vraag is: wat is corruptie? Onze soort corruptie vinden de mensen in Bosnië heel normaal: ‘zo doen wij de dingen’, ‘wij helpen mekaar’. In hun cultuur is dat geen corruptie en dat kan je niet binnen vijf of tien jaar veranderen, dus moet je een modus in zien te krijgen. Je moet ook accepteren dat een deel van corruptie er in het land is, het bestaat en nooit weggaat...ook met jou geld.”

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Ik weet het eigenlijk niet. De internationale gemeenschap bracht geld binnen –redelijk vrij besteedbaar geld, met name de NGOs – en de NGOs hoefden ook niet snel weg uit het gebied. Dus tijdens een missie gaat veel geld om, vooral veel donorgeld. Waar donorgeld is, is ook corruptie. Dit geld brengt het normale geldverkeer uit balans. Dus waar jij in het vraag-aanbod systeem gaat storen, d.m.v. subsidies, krijg je rare bijverschijnselen zoals corruptie. Het is ‘easy money’. Mensen kiezen op een gegeven moment voor zichzelf. Als jij op een overlevingsstand staat en er ligt een grote zak geld is het logisch dat het geld anders wordt besteed dan normaal als jij mensen hebt die in een andere fase leven.”

“Ik denk dat waar heel veel geld binnen komt en waar machtsstructuren bestaan, die dus anders zijn dan de normale structuren (de machtsmonopolie niet bij de centrale overheid ligt), dus een failed state, dan gaat het geld niet op een normale manier door het land heen. Men gaat geen belasting betalen...waarom zou je betalen en aan wie? Maar dit heb je nodig om rule of law te krijgen en jij hebt een overheid nodig die zijn verantwoordelijkheid gaat nemen. Maar nu heb je een overheid die constant gevoed wordt door de internationale organisaties.”

“Waar veel geld komt, gaan de prijzen stijgen.”
Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“Bij een aanhouding door een politieagent voor snel rijden kan je kiezen voor bekeuring met of zonder bonnetje. Zo werkt het ook in Bulgarije en dat is dus raar binnen de EU, maar dat is ook zo in Bosnië.”

“De handhavers, the law enforcers zijn zelf corrupt en dat helpt niet. Dus die moet je ook gewoon betalen, want zij kregen geen salaris of liepen vijf maanden achter met salaris betalen. Dus dan krijg je vanzelf, want zij moeten ook hun boodschappen betalen. Ik denk dat de law enforcers worden opgeleid en worden betaald. Dat zou wel helpen. Als zij niet rond kunnen komen met hun salarissen gaan zij het ergens anders halen. Zij hebben de wapen, dus zij gaan rommelen.”...”Dus deze law enforcers moeten goed worden opgeleid. Het justitiële apparaat moet versterkt worden. En dat kan jij als internationale land bijdragen. Daar is een rol voor CIMIC, IOs, NGOs.”

“Van andere kant moet je zo’n land eigen verantwoordelijkheid geven, want het is hun land en niet ons land. Verantwoordelijkheid geven, want als jij ze blijft voeden, kunnen zij niet verder ontwikkelen. Men moet ook durven om stappen te ondernemen om stap voor stap weg te gaan uit zo’n land om verantwoordelijkheid terug te geven. Jij mag hun wel monitoren ‘à-la-Balkan’. Balkan wordt nooit West-Duitsland en dat moet je ook niet proberen.”

“What ook heel belangrijk is, is het banksysteem en het geldsysteem, want dan kom je aan de kern van corruptie –daar waar het geld vandaan komt en daar waar het geld naar toe gaat. Daar moet je dus iets slims voor verzinnen. Een Nederlandse bankier en ik hadden bedacht om een garantiefonds te maken met het geld dat het Ministerie van Financiën vrij hadden gekregen. Dus het ging om een garantiefonds ter dekking van leningen aan ondernemingen tegen goede rentes en looptijden. Het is helaas niets geworden.”Als de toegang voor legitiem geld niet is, dan zoekt men andere manieren, o.a. corruptie. Dan houd je dus de zwarte markt altijd in stand, krijg je dus nooit belastingen binnen, krijg je nooit een regering die vrij kan zijn en salarissen kan geven. Dus geld en macht zitten aan elkaar vast: machtigste mensen hebben geld en vice versa.”

“De grote uitdaging is: normaal (banken) systeem, normaal rule of law. En hoe krijg ik een land uit een failed state situatie? Daar heb je ook goede ondernemers voor nodig. Een voorbeeld is IDEA: groep mensen die korte projecten deden, zoals investeringen in kleine winkels. Het idee was om een middenstand te creëren, die welstand kreeg en die van hun regering veiligheid eisten – dat hun bezit beschermd. Daarmee jaag je het interne gevoel voor veiligheid aan en dat is de reden om een stevige middenstand te krijgen. Deze initiatieven hebben gewerkt en daar moet je dus in investeren. Het gaat dus niet alleen maar om schieten, maar economie en normaal rechtssysteem is belangrijk. Als jij geen normaal systeem hebt, dan gaat niemand daarop vertrouwen en dan lossen zij het zelf op. Dat zorgt voor een zwart circuit, want niemand gaat automatisch belastingen betalen.”

Question 7: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

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Rol voor de militairen: “Je hebt de CIMIC-mensen en als jij goede CIMIC-mensen hebt, weten zij goed contact te maken met de locals, en de CIMIC-mensen horen en zien veel. Je hebt ook de veiligheidsdiensten natuurlijk, maar die zullen zich vaak richten op corruptie die tegen de missie werkt, of het geld wat naar terrorisme gaat.”

“Andere militairen middel is het creëren van een safe en secure environment, want dan krijgt men geloof en toekomstbeeld. Dit voorkomt dat men via corruptie zich snel wil verrijken. Als jij geld hebt, kan jij jezelf verdedigen.”

“Militairen kunnen vertrouwen geven dat het goed komt. Bovendien kunnen de militairen ‘er zijn’, dus aanwezigheid.”

Rol voor CIMIC: “Door de dingen waarvan je weet dat corrupt is afstand te nemen en geen projecten mee doen. Maar het ook benoemen is belangrijk, bijvoorbeeld ‘hier zit vriendjespolitiek in’, ‘dit is niet voor het algemeen belang’, ‘dit zit niet in onze missie’. Als een project, bijvoorbeeld ziekenhuizen, niet open is voor alle etniciteiten van de samenleving dan gaan we het niet bouwen. Dat heb ik ook tijdens mijn missie verteld: projecten werden niet gedaan als het niet toegankelijk was. Daarmee geef je aan dat jij niet met hun meedoen, geef je ook aan waarom jij dan niet doet en waarom jij een bepaald project niet uitvoert. Met die projecten kan je dus beïnvloeden.”

“Als jij corruptie wilt verminderen, moet je geen corrupte aannemer gaan aannemen. Dat deed je niet.”

“Je moet ook op brede gebied gaan richten, want safe and secure environment gaat niet om dat er geen kogels rondvliegen. Als jij een winkeltje hebt en het geld wat jij verdient ook kunt houden, dat is het fijn. Ook economisch zijn er middelen. Financiële, juridische systeem moet opgebouwd worden. Maar wij, de militairen, zijn geen financiële mensen.”

“Wij namen tijdens onze missie tegenmaatregelen als er corruptie was en wij probeerden ook corruptie te vermijden.”

Over hoe wij corruptie uit hun cultuur kunnen halen, antwoordde Colonel Been als volgt: “dat is een te grote broek die je als militair aantrekt. Als jij een stevige missie ingaat, blijf je ongeveer tien jaar, maar dit is een kwestie van generaties. En dat krijg je niet zomaar uit. Er moet dan wel wezenlijk iets gaan veranderen, bijvoorbeeld als de inwoners in het buitenland hebben gewoond en weer terugkomen. Als jij die invloeden vanuit het eigen volk hebt, dan kan wel veranderen, maar dat duurt gewoon lang.”

“Om bewegingen in te krijgen, moeten andere partijen zijn die het voort moeten zetten, want wij, de militairen, zijn dan na een tijdje weg. Enige manier wat jij kunt doen, is samen de goede beweging inzetten. En dat is heel lastig.” Colonel schetste dit met het voorbeeld van een auto: “als een auto stil staat, is het moeilijkste deel om het te laten rollen. Als de auto eenmaal rolt, dan krijg jij makkelijker beweging in. Maar om los te krijgen, om te rollen, is een hel of job. En men moet wel allemaal hetzelfde kant op duwen, anders gaat het helemaal niet rollen.”

“Wat wij kunnen doen is goed idee krijgen van de situatie, slim zijn en snappen wat er gebeurt, begrijpen hoe de cultuur in elkaar zit en dan hopen dat jij met elkaar dus met al de andere partijen, dus civiel-militaire interactie tussen de partijen – activiteiten ontplooi die de boel de goede kant op gaan bewegen en die beweging in houden. En als jij wegaan dan moet er genoeg
beweging in de auto zitten, zodat het door blijft bewegen en het liefst op een gegeven moment met eigen bevolking.”

“De militairen zijn bijna altijd één van de eerste in een gebied en het is belangrijk om het in de goede richting te brengen.”

**Question 8:** What did you learn from your experiences?

“Ik denk dat de doelen bij een missie hoog liggen en jij moet je doelen reëel stellen. Houd je doelen bij je zelf en als jij stappen richting de missie maakt, is ieder stap goed. En als jij vier stappen hebt gemaakt en twee zijn gelukt, moet je tevreden zijn. Jij gaat de wereld niet in een half jaar veranderen met je half miljoen zakgeld.”

“En onze normen zijn niet de wereldstandaard. Of het nu over corruptie gaat, of omgang tussen man en vrouw...onzie norm is niet de wereldnorm, hoewel wij dat heel graag willen. Het is gewoon niet zo en die norm ga jij niet in een half jaar brengen.”

**Question 9:** Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“Nee, niks om toe te voegen.”

**Question 10:** Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been in this position?

“Directeur van CIMIC Center of Excellence.”
Interview report

Interview with Wouter van Koeveringe: on 17-12-2014 at 11.00. The interview took place at his office at the CCOE. He works at the CCOE at the CIC branch. He has no military experience in Balkan, but he has been on a mission in Afghanistan. However, he has experiences in the field of corruption and works at the CCOE and this can be of relevance for my research. During the interview I asked him the questions mentioned on the interview guideline in the same order as written in the guideline. We had a nice discussion and the interview was in Dutch. He knew about my research and he was willing to help me by sharing his experience. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research, especially for the recommendations.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in Afghanistan? A.In which country? B.What were your tasks there?

“Ik ben vorig jaar mei teruggekomen uit Afghanistan en ik heb daar gewerkt als contracting officer – het kopen van goederen in Afghanistan en daar zaten wij met lokale contractors. Binnen mijn afdeling werkten wij met vier Afghaanse buyers en daar moest ik mij hele tijd bezig houden.”

“Hiervoor was ik een contracting officer in Brunssum en het maakte niet zoveel uit of ik het in Afghanistan doe of in Brunssum. Het moeilijkste deel van inkoop komt beetje uit met wie doe ik zaken? Wat heel erg moeilijk is in die landen. Je moet realiseren dat andere culturen andere werkwijzes hebt. Binnen Europa is het heel strikt geregeld, binnen Europa kent men European tender system – dan moet je conform regels hanteren, dan moet je alle aanbestedingen conform regelgeving doen. Op het moment dat je het niet doet dan is de leverancier in staat om een rechtszaak aan te spannen. Je moet je realiseren dat jij in Afghanistan bent dat het anders is...het is geen open, transparant proces, hoewel wij van onze kant proberen, maar de andere kant is niet altijd transparant. Wij weten niet altijd met wie wij zaken doen. Dus is het frustrerend? Nee.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“Corruptie is naar mij idee verrijking van een persoon ten koste van anderen/eigen bevolking. En dat is een beetje corruptie.”

Hij ging verder: “Het is niet alleen maar verrijking, maar ook bevooroorDELING...nog even als aanvulling op zo’n definitie, wat niet echt een definitie is.”

Question 3: a.Did you witness corrupt behavior? b.Give an example?

“Corruptie is heel moeilijk te signalering in landen zoals Afghanistan. Het probleem is dat de regering geen bewijs van “goed gedrag” uit geeft aan de hand van dergelijke bewijzen zouden we kunnen kijken of iemand een schone leverancier is. Waar in Afghanistan heel veel moeite en effort is in gestopt, zijn de Amerikanen die heel erg mee bezig zijn geweest om anti-corruptie databanken aan te leggen: wie doet zaken met wie, wie staat op de rode/zwarte/groene lijst. De Amerikanen hebben databanken opgestart en hebben niet altijd geshared met NATO, terwijl zij onderdeel van
NATO zijn. Het is hun eigen contracting system. Als je informatie hebt, werd een leverancier tegen die lijst gehouden en is het dan groen – daar kan je mee zaken doen, rood is het verdacht en is zwart daar moet je geen zaken doen, want het heeft banden (niet alleen banden met corruptie, maar ook banden met de Taliban of andere insurgency partijen, dus het hoeft niet altijd te zijn dat die corrupt is.). Het onderliggende gedachte is om te kijken met wie je zaken kan doen en in principe kan je alleen maar zaken doen met de groene mensen.”

“Het probleem in landen zoals Afghanistan is dat Mohammed of Yusof de volgende keer Achmed heet en ook een andere legitimiteitsbewijs heeft. En bedrijven zoals ‘Best NATO enterprise incorporate’ heeft volgende maand ‘We support NATO incorporate’. Daar geef ik mee aan dat in die landen waar weinig controle is en dat het heel moeilijk te bewaken is.”

“De tweede wat je kan doen, is dat jij de lokale economie steunt, maar op het moment dat jij grote partijen koopt/grote orders moet maken, is het heel moeilijk om je netwerk uit te breiden. Het heeft te maken met de veiligheidssituatie: je kan niet zoals in Nederland een bedrijf bezoeken en een interview houden, vragen bij de Kamer van Koophandel en bij andere database over de eigenaar. Om een lang verhaal kort te houden: je probeert te achterhalen of er corruptie is en ook dat het geld niet naar verkeerde personen gaat, gebaseerd op de kennis die je hebt.”

“Een voorbeeld: wat er heel veel in dat soort landen gebeurt, is dat de familie wordt bevooroordeeld. Dus jij hebt een contract en het werk gaat naar een familie. Binnen de NATO proberen ze door tenders te doen, dus je zet een aanvraag uit en bedrijven kunnen offertes uitbrengen, en de bedrijven met het laagste prijs krijgt het. Wie achter een partij zit, is moeilijk te achterhalen. Het enigste wat ik met stelligheid kan waarderen is dat de NATO alles doet om zelf niet te gunnen aan iemand op basis van corruptie. Binnen NATO, hoewel in het verleden gevallen zijn dat er militairen in bepaalde projecten geld hebben aangenomen van een leverancier om de order te krijgen. Maar NATO heeft in principe een strikte inkoopbeleid, dus danig dat jij op compliance en op prijs gunt. Dus binnen de NAVO is dat goed. Wat aan de achterkant van een project gebeurt – dat als jij firma X een opdracht gunt, heeft firma X vaak zelf niet altijd de capaciteit om een order uit te voeren. Jij daarvoor aanschrijft, dat kan een maat van corruptie zijn.”

“Een voorbeeld noemen: wij deden aan brandstof in Afghanistan. NATO heeft in zijn anti-corruptie policy staan ‘wij betalen geen tolgeld of andere gelden aan warlords en wij verplichten onze contractenleveranciers om dat niet te doen, dus zij mogen niet betalen aan een partij om doorgang (freedom of movement) te krijgen.’ Op het moment dat jij zo’n verklaring aan een leverancier stuurt, zegt zo’n leverancier dat zij het niet doen. Er bestaat het vermoeden en er zijn leveranciers geroyeerd aan de hand van vermoeden (als jij goederen binnenvoert via Pakistan de grenswacht aanvulling op zijn salaris vraag…is dit corruptie? Ja, dat is corruptie.).”

“Ik weet dat bepaalde leveranciers gebruik maken van gevaarlijke routes in Afghanistan en bepaalde warlords betalen om te zorgen dat zij niet worden aangevallen. Dus je betaalt voor bescherming. Is dat corruptie? Ja, want normaal zou de regering jou die veiligheid moeten garanderen. Dat is in het kort mijn ervaring in Afghanistan.”

c.How did you deal with it and what were the results? d.Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?
“Heel veel dingen in Afghanistan zijn niet te controleren. Soms start je een contract maar stop je de procedure omdat dingen niet te controleren zijn. Om een voorbeeld te geven: we moesten contract gunnen voor het ijs en sneeuw vrijhouden van een stuk snelweg/een belangrijke verbindingsweg (misschien is een snelweg een groot woord). Vanuit contracting hebben wij gezegd dat moeten wij niet willen doen, want in principe moet dat de Afghaanse regering doen en ten tweede wij kunnen een contract gunnen en op het moment dat het contract gegund is, en het gaat sneeuwen, kunnen wij nooit controleren of er daadwerkelijk sneeuw geruimd wordt. Dat er sneeuw is en als je het ruimt, 2 dagen later komt nieuwe sneeuw en kan de leverancier geld betaald krijgen en gewoon niet doen, omdat die weet dat het gebied zo gevaarlijk is dat er niet gecontroleerd wordt op de uitvoering.”

“Een stuk van corruptie waar je moet voorkomen is dat je een opdracht geeft waarbij je in principe niet kan controleren. Dus moet je dat niet doen. En dat soort dingen probeer je voor te beschermen.”

“NATO heeft strenge regelgeving – zo gaan we de inkopen doen- we proberen zo eerlijk mogelijk te doen, we proberen zo goed mogelijk zaken te doen met leveranciers die zich niet bezighouden met corruptie. Maar ik weet ook dat wij ook een heel grote brandstofcontract hebben, daar gebruiken wij subcontractor voor die goederen via Pakistan/Tachtkistan de grens overbrengt en hij mag geen geld betalen. Maar in zo’n land als Afghanistan, met zulke gevaarlijke gebieden, is het soms heel moeilijk om te zeggen van ‘wij betalen niks’. ”... “Het is heel makkelijk voor onze Westere wereld, op een gegeven moment als jij van A naar B moet en als jij niet betaalt, gaan je vrachtwagens de lucht in, dan kan ik het begrijpen. Je moet het niet accepteren, maar je moet niet vreemd zijn in sommige landen. Want de andere optie is, is dat er geen eten of andere dingen komen. Zelfs vanuit de andere missiegebieden, zoals Africa, betalen de humanitaire hulporganisaties om toegang te krijgen. Is dat goed? Nee, maar als zij niet doen, komen er geen hulpgoederen door. Dat is een humanitaire dilemma.”

**Question 4:** Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“Het is cultuurgebonden en het is gebonden aan welvaart/levensstandaard. Ik ben overtuigd als jou familie geen geld te maken heeft en jij krijgt een contract en je kan geld ermei verdienen dat jij zoveel mogelijk familie erin schuift om te laten verdienen aan het contract. Zo probeer je te voorkomen dat een ander gezin bevooroordeeld wordt. In heel veel culturen is je eigen familie het belangrijkste en daar ga je heen. Dus hebben wij niet veel te bemoeien, maar ik kan mij voorstellen dat een gouverneur via NATO/NGO geld krijgt voor infrastructuur (en nogmaals ik praat het niet goed) dat zien wij dat heel veel van dat geld – die naar een gouverneur gaat en waar wij geen controle over hebben – dat naar familie en relaties gaat. En dat is de corruptie waar jij wel wat aan moet doen. Daarom vind ik ook dat je heel veel landen niet geld moet geven, maar je moet ze helpen met het sluiten van een contract en afhankelijk betaal je de rekening of in ieder geval dat je de grip op hebt. Op het moment dat jij in die landen geld geeft om dingen te organiseren, dan verdwijnt het en dat is in principe corruptie...geld verdwijnt in eigen zaak of in de familie.”

“Corruptie is voor die mensen een aanvulling op hun bestaan.”
“Ik denk dat zij anders tegenaan kijken dan wij. Zelfs dat onze regelgeving in Europa heel erg streng is, is het in die landen heel anders...de regelgeving is er niet en de controle is er niet.”


“Corruptie op het laagste niveau – bepalen om eerder aan de buurt te komen, bepalen om legitimiteitsbewijs te krijgen – dat is corruptie in kleine vorm. In Nederland zou ik hiermee moeite hebben, maar in die landen heb ik minder moeite mee.”

“De mensen die daar zelf moeten betalen, vinden zij dat niet zo heel raar. Veel erger is de corruptie op het niveau waar het gaat om zelfverrijking/bevooroordeiling/macht. Dat gebeurt op een gemeente/provinciaal niveau.”

Op de vraag of de inwoners de corruptie willen bestrijden, antwoorde Van Koeveringe als volgt: “Ja, ik geloof dat iedereen in Afghanistan wil dat het transparant gebeurt. Ik kan mij niet voorstellen dat een gewone burger het goed vindt dat een politicus zijn zakken vult met het geld dat bedoeld is voor humanitaire hulp/bouwen van huizen etc. Ik denk dat de bevolking voor dat soort dingen geen begrip heeft. Maar als de bevolking iemand wegstuurt, komt een andere en het begint opnieuw. Dus niemand is voor corruptie.”

Op de vraag hoe de militairen corruptie ervaren, gaf Van Koeveringe een voorbeeld uit Afghanistan: “Een mooi voorbeeld is van mijn Hongaarse collega: er zijn twee manieren om aan zaai goed te komen, namelijk je geeft zaai goed aan de gouverneur en het probleem is opgelost. Aan de achterkant verkoopt hij het of hij geeft het aan zijn familie etc etc. De Hongaren hebben via een Shura (dorpsraad) de goederen verdeeld (in overleg met de gouverneur) en gezorgd dat de SHura de controle over de verdeling hield. Na afloop is met de Shura overlegd hoe de verdeling was verlopen. Daarnaast werd na de verdeling aan de bevolking gevraagd of die verdeling naar ratio had plaatsgevonden en dus geen corruptie. 1. Je probeert local ownership te maken en 2. Je probeert het transparanter te maken. Dit hebben de Hongaren als een project gedaan en dat is goed gelukt, want de hele bevolking kreeg voordeel. Doe je het niet en geef je ze hun zak geld, gaan ze geld verdienen of eigen familie bevooroordeelen en de rest niets geven.”

“Dus wat wij als militairen moeten doen als jij over inkoop praat, is denk ik dat de NATO het goed gestructureerd heeft en het is geen waterdicht verhaal. Ze proberen door offertes te vragen meerdere partijen te benaderen, dus niet alleen firma Jansen. We proberen open en transparant te doen. Wat wij kunnen controleren is moeilijk. Daarnaast als wij militairen hulp geven, proberen wij dat er controle is. En nogmaals Afghanistan is groot en complex land en het gaat allemaal zo’n beetje zoverre je kan zien.”

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?
“Geld is altijd gevaarlijk in een missie. Eén van de criteria wat ik in het begin zei, is dat het geld gaat naar de verkeerde partijen. Wat je nu in Iraq ziet – gevecht met IS en andere kant verkoopt IS olie aan landen en daarmee indirect het conflict in stand houden door dat geld, waarmee wapens gekocht kan worden. Dus geld speelt altijd een rol in een gebied.”

“Je komt niet direct, maar indirect. Een transportbedrijf in Afghanistan heeft een soort bewijs van inschrijving bij de Kamer voor Koophandel (er is een Afghaanse benaming voor). Dit moet je hebben en dat wordt gegeven door de regeering. Dat heeft te maken met hoe goed met je bedrijf gaat en hoe goed is je bedrijf. Hoe groter en beter je bedrijf is, des te meer moet je betalen. Als zo’n bedrijf zaken wil doen, gaat hij naar de Ministerie van Economische Zaken in het land en zegt dat die een bedrijf is die eten importeert en exporteert voor NATO. Dan moet je dus een bewijs krijgen en daar zijn kosten aan verbonden. Voor zo’n bewijs betaal je aan zo’n meneer en het liefst contant. Daar kom je dus niet achter. Als wij paspoort vragen, betalen wij ook leges. Daar worden leges betaalt en het verdwijnt in het zaak en niet in het zaak van de ministerie.”

...“Wat kunnen wij daaraan doen? Afspraken maken, maar dat is heel moeilijk. Zorg dragen dat die functionarissen worden aangesproken op hun gedrag, maar als het heel toevallig familie van Karzai of de broer van een minister...het is heel erg moeilijk. In elke oorlogsituatie is het heel erg moeilijk. Des de structuur georganiseerd is, des te beter er grip is, des te meer invloed de bevolking heeft op wie daar zit, des te beter kan je corruptie bestrijden. Ik geloof ook niet dat jij het kan oplossen.”

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“Vooral moeten wijzelf transparant zijn en wij moeten zorg dragen dat het geld wat wij besteden als militairen in een missie gebieden en de goederen die wij geven op de juiste plaats komen. En dat moet dus zo transparant en accountable mogelijk doen. En nogmaals wat ik zeg: je loopt in heel veel landen tegen een grens aan en achter die grens zie je niet wat er daadwerkelijk gebeurd. Je kan geen grip op hebben en je kan het alleen maar als je het gaat onderzoeken, maar landen zoals Afghanistan is heel moeilijk. In sommige landen zal het wel wat makkelijker gaan op het moment dat je ingang hebt om naar de echte kosten te kijken.”

“Ik hou van Westerse model en als de bevolking ziet dat er corruptie is met de mensen wordt het in de krant aan de kaak gesteld d.m.v. journalistiek/nieuws (zoals wij het in het Westen doen: vaak wordt er door de journalistiek iemand op zijn corrupte gedrag aangesproken en dan daardoor verdwijnt het. Zie je hier dat een directeur van een woningbouwvereniging in een Maserati rijdt, dan denken wij dat het naar corruptie ruikt. Dat is oneerlijk gebruik van middelen. Dus dat wordt aan de kaak gesteld. Op het moment dat de bevolking in een land als Egyte aan de kaak stelt dat de regime corrupt is en puntje bij paaltje komt (dus protesteren zij) en krijgen zij hun zin. Uiteindelijk is de volgende regeering net zo corrupt. In Egypte gaan ze dan niet elke maand de straat op. Het is een golfbeweging en opnieuw accepteren ze weer. En ik denk dat in sommige landen, en dat is mijn persoonlijke mening, de mensen het gewoon accepteren als ‘het is zo’. En op het moment dat jij de houding hebt ‘het is zo, dus’ zal er minder aan gedaan worden. De burgerbevolking kan in de Westerse wereld meer aan doen dan in gebieden waarbij het meer geaccepteerd is en waarbij de politieke druk en journalistieke druk om actie te plegen...kijk naar Turkije die niet zo ver weg ligt. Kijk wat Erdogan gedaan heeft: de mensen die tegen hem zijn, zijn gewoon weggedaan. Het heeft niet zoveel met corruptie te maken, maar met machtspositie die je gaat versterken. Waarom? Erdogan is niet armer van geworden: een gigantisch paleis gebouwd
die groter is dan de Witte Huis. De familie wordt ook beter van en de Turken kunnen ook protesteren, maar als hij weg is, komt er een nieuwe. Nogmaals, bevolking...ik heb niet zoveel vertrouwen in dat zij in alle landen invloed op corruptive hebben of kunnen krijgen.”

“Uiteindelijk moet verbetering van de mensen zelf komen en niet van de politiek. Uiteindelijk moet het van de mensen komen die op een bepaalde positie zitten, die zeggen van ‘ik gedrag mij volgens de regels. Ik als politiecommandant behandel de mensen allemaal gelijk, dat betekent dat iemand met veel geld en iemand met weinig geld die hetzelfde strafbaar feit hebben gepleegd, worden op hetzelfde manier behandeld.’ In principe is dat de humanitaire gelijkheidsbeginsel. En doe je dat niet en ontloopt iemand zijn straf door 100.000 te betalen, is dat puur corruptie. Dat gebeurt in EU nog steeds. Als je als burger doet, is het een menselijk probleem.”

“Ik zie het probleem alleen maar opgelost op het moment dat de mensen die....als je van bovenaf begint, gaat de hele keten naar corruptie. Want diegene die het niet doet, verdwijnt die via de achterdeuren weg. Dus uiteindelijk moet je bij de politiek beginnen.”

**Question 7:** Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?


“Nogmaals, als je ergens een brug gaat bouwen en die brug moet komen, die project doe je samen met de bouwers van de defensie. Uiteindelijk zet je neer wat er moet komen. Nogmaals Afghanen zijn moeilijk en soms als je maar één leverancier hebt, heb je maar één leverancier. Wij proberen om twee/drie/vier leveranciers te krijgen, afhankelijk van het bedrag, zo kan je als militair bevaken betreft inkopen.”...“Moeilijker gaat het als het gaat om financiële hulp, het geven van geld aan ministerie om zijn toko op orde te krijgen...waar gaat het heen? Contant geld is het grootste gevaar die een militair kan geven in een gebied.”

De rol van CIMIC: “Ik denk dat als jij naar de kerncompetenties van CIMIC kijkt (liasion en support of de force), dat zijn meer dingen waarvan wij proberen om liasion praktijken tot stand te brengen. Daar zie ik een middel in. Praat je over CIMIC in support of civil environment, doe je projecten dan moet je proberen om local ownership te creëren en wat ik ook net zeg, dan moet je proberen om te zorgen dat als je een project bouwt het voor iedereen is, dat het transparant is, dat het gedragen wordt door de bevolking, dat het niet iemand zeg maar alleen maar beter wordt, maar dat een hele bevolkingsgroep beter wordt. Dat kan je als CIMIC, als je projecten zou doen, doen. Dus als jij een school gaat bouwen, dan zou je eigenlijk hetzelfde moeten doen als NATO doet met contracting: dan zou je moeten kijken naar de plaatselijke bedrijven, wie het kan bouwen, hoe gaat die met geld om. Je kan best een project begeleiden en kijken of het transparant is. Wat erbij komt, is dat jij maar voor paar maanden zit, er komt iemand anders en die heeft andere
interesse, andere projecten etc. Het gaat dus niet altijd goed. Maar als CIMICER kan je wel, denk ik, dat soort dingen doen.”

“Liasion: ook met een corrupte warlord zou je een gesprek moeten aangaan. Kan je die corrupte warlord aanpakken? Misschien kan je wel de omgeving creëren dat er weerstand tegen die man komt. Het is heel erg moeilijk. Een warlord in die gebieden beveiligd ook die gebieden tegen het kwaad, dus in hun ogen is een warlord niet altijd een slecht iets. Wij zouden zeggen dat een warlord...hoe gaat hij met zijn mensen om, is hij transparant, hoe merken wij hem? Maar als hij een essentiële speler is in een veiligheidsgebied, dan kan hij corrupt zijn, maar daar moet je wel zaken mee doen. Kan je zo’n iemand veranderen? Moeilijk, denk ik.”

“Heel veel van onze theorieën zijn gebaseerd op dat wij mensen kunnen veranderen. Voorbeeld vanuit de missiegebieden: Soedanese politie slaat gevangenen nog steeds en dat mag hij niet doen, wat een Westerse norm is. Het moet een wereldwijde norm wezen, maar in Soedan slaan ze nog gevangenen. Twee collega’s wilden daar tegen wat aan doen en die moesten rennen voor hun leven, anders hadden ze zelf wat overkomen. Je kan zo’n cultuur, corruptie proberen te veranderen en beïnvloeden. Maar dan moet je niet verwachten dat als jij tegen iemand dat zegt, die jarenlang zijn zakken heeft gevuld, dan zegt hij ‘waar bemoei jij je mee’. Tijd is nodig.”

“As jij meer betaalt voor je ziektekostenverzekering en eerder aan de buurt bent...is het corruptie? Nee, want jij betaalt meer premie. Is het eerlijk? Dat jij meer geld hebt, kom je eerder aan de buurt. Dus het is een hele lastige discussie. Daarom probeerde ik ook in het begin te zeggen dat zelfverrijking en zelfbevooroordeeling...dat is corruptie. Buitenproportioneel, in ieder geval dat je dusdanig geld verdient dat je eigenlijk geen oor aan andere hebt.”

“As jij in die culturen bij een dokter komt, is het gebruikelijk dat jij onkostenvergoeding betaalt. Ben jij straks de arts, in een land als Afghanistan/Soedan, dat zegt ‘nee bij mij hoef je niet te betalen.’ Dat zou uiteindelijk het streven moeten zijn, maar dan moet je de salaris opkrikken, want dan heb je het minder nodig. Ik vind het heel mooi onderwerp, maar ook een heel moeilijk onderwerp. Wij kunnen heel makkelijk praten in het Westen, laat ik het zo zeggen.”

“Waar ik een beetje tegenaan loop en dat is hetzelfde wat jij in Afghanistan hebt: dat wij met onze ‘Westerse lekker makkelijk praten cultuur’ zeggen van dat mag niet en dat is fout. En dat doen wij allemaal uit onze eigen comfort zone in het Westen en we zouden ons moeten plaatsen in het land. Op het moment dat ik in zo’n land elke dag in de vuilnis moet kijken om mijn gezien eten te geven, of op het moment dat ik corruptie pleeg...”...”Het is een discussie vanuit onze Westerse democratie en die projecteren wij en brengen wij naar bijvoorbeeld Mali.”

“Nogmaals ik keur het niet goed, maar in bepaalde mate...een mooi voorbeeld: ik deed aan brandstof en het ging om brandstof van miljoenen liters per dag. Elke dag gingen ongeveer 2000 vrachtwagens op weg. Wij hebben alles gezien: mensen die een slangetje van de tank naar eigen motor hadden lopen, mensen die schotten in de vrachtwagen brachten. Dit heet officieel diefstal, het is dan geen corruptie en ik keur het niet goed, maar als jij niks hebt en jij en je familie heeft honger...ja dan vervagen de grenzen. Nogmaals, het is niet goed en ik keur het niet goed, maar ik ben huiverig om een waardeoordeel aan te geven. Ik heb meer begrip voor dan de zakenvullers op governmental positions. Ik vind Karzai erg.”

“As jij moet betalen om de grens over te kunnen met je branstof en jij zegt dat je het niet betaalt (Nederlads visie), dan kom je niet door en dan heb je helemaal niks. Wij moeten ons inleven in
de anderen. Politieagent is fout die geld vraagt, douaneambtenaar is fout die geld vraagt en dat moeten wij allemaal proberen terug te brengen. Het gaat niet op één dag en het heeft te maken met levensstandaard en kijken naar boven- wat hij op kleine schaal doet, kan ik het ook.”

“Je kan zeggen van je moet het niet betalen en haal je je baas maar, maar die baas is ook corrupt, want die is vroeger ook corrupt geweest. Het is een utopie en ik denk dat het uiteindelijk met straf het kan oplossen. Op het moment dat jij ergens aan begint, kijkt men hoe groot de pakkans is: als de kans heel laag is, dan ben je corrupt. Als de kans groot is dat jij gepakt wordt, heb je heel weinig corruptie. Zo zit de wereld in ieder geval.”

**Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?**


**Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?**

“Nee, ik denk dat dit een beetje is.”

**Question 10: Please tell me what your current position is? How long have you been at this position?**

“Ik ben staff officer, dus beleidsmedewerker. En een staff officer is een heel wijd begrip. Ik hou mij bezig met de military police. Ik ben zelf ook een military police. Ik probeer hier zelf bezig te houden met cultuur. Van de CIC ben ik beleidsmedewerken en lecturer in CCOE courses.”
Appendix F: Interviews (Anonymized)

Interview report

Anonymized interview number 2

Interview: on 9-12-2014 at 11.00. The conversation took place at the office and it was a spontaneous conversation. There is no audio-record of the interview, because the intention was to make an appointment with this person. However, this persons experience can be relevant for the research, especially for the recommendations. This person knew about my research and wanted to help me, therefore this person decided to share his/her experiences in Afghanistan.

This person has been on a mission in Afghanistan. We had a relaxed and random conversation, thus no specific questions from the interview guideline were asked. This person told about his/her experiences in Afghanistan. This person remembers the corrupt case in Afghanistan: there came a new head of the Afghan Border Police and he was involved in drugs traffic. He had lots of influence and had villa’s, so he was rich. The interviewee had to deal with him even though he/she knew that he stinks and is a bad guy.

The interviewee remembers that the participants of the mission knew about the corrupt behavior of the local leaders, they knew that corruption was a fact, they talked about it, however they did not know how to handle it/what they could do. The soldiers did not know how to deal with it. There was no guideline how to react, but the participants knew about the corrupt persons with whom they had to deal with. There was nothing said about corruption in their mandate (in the mandate of the mission).

As suggestion how to improve the situation the interviewee gives the following advice:

- structural approach
- make counter-corruption a priority in the mission
- the parties that are involved (international and local actors) have to have the same approach/same perspective (be on 1 line).
- during a mission the commanders have to be explicit about how to deal with corruption. Make a choice how to deal with corruption. “Keuze maken om niks te doen, is ook een keuze”, so not be silent about it and just ignore it.
- this person thinks that the role for the militaries to improve the situation and/or counter corruption is challenging, because the soldiers are just for 6-12 months in a particular area and the military personnel is constantly rotating, so it is challenging to do something in a short term.
- the question is also: what can you, as a soldier, offer them so they do not act in a corrupt way?
Interview report

Anonymized interview number 3

Interview: on 11-12-2014 at 9.00. The interview took place at an office at the CCOE. This person works at the CCOE. He/she has been on a mission 8 times (in Afghanistan and in Kosovo). During the interview I asked him/her the questions mentioned on the interview guideline in the same order as written in the guideline. During the interview I got the impression that the interviewee liked to share his experience with me. I learned a lot from his/her experiences and how the real world works (the real world where things are different than in theory). I was impressed how he/she reacted on certain things, like the example with children in Afghanistan who had no shoes for in the winter. Because of his/her experiences this person found it very normal. He gave lots of examples (also examples from his missions in Afghanistan). The interviewee highlighted the difference in corruption in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. He/she emphasized that there is no role for the CIMIC and the military to counter corruption. This person also emphasized that corruption will never stop and said that we are all part of corruption. I left the room with positive energy, because I had a nice conversation and I learned a lot.

The interviewee knew about my research and was willing to help me by sharing his/her experience with me. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkan? In which country? What were your tasks there?

*He has been on a mission 8 times overall: 4 times in military terms- 2 times of 8 months- in Kosovo; and 4 times in Afghanistan.*

“First mission in Kosovo was in 1999-2000 and it was a millennium year there.” He found it interesting, because the former UCK warlords called themselves TMK after the war. Even though they changed the name, they were the same warlords. During the second mission in Kosovo he was in a team and he found that he was then nearby the corruption.

The interviewee do not know whether it is really corruption. He/she makes his/her doubt about corruption clear with the following example: “warlords asking militaries to build them a new street and the warlords gave them security in this area.” So this person do not know whether this is corruption. He/she tells that they paid lots of money for their security to most of the warlords and know drugs smugglers.

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

The interviewee started with: “Kosovo is quite different, because there is always corruption, “special payments”.”

This person gave an example of corrupt behavior in Kosovo and described this example as the most interesting corruption in Kosovo: “the vehicles from the HQ in Kosovo. There was only one
dealer and KFOR bought approximately 2000 vehicles, but it was a private persons with special conditions. The vehicles came thus from one dealer and not from different people.”

The interviewee gave another example: “in Prizren they supported a man to buy an area. It was very interesting and there he build a carwash factory. The water was for free, but the militaries paid them 10 euros (he guesses. First it was 10 DM and then 10 euros), which is also interesting, because the price doubled. For this car wash owner was the water free, it was not really environmental friendly.” The interviewee thinks that this is also a form of corruption, because they supported the citizens, knowing that the citizens deal with plagiaat and for the team it was their money and they used this money to support the citizens.

The interviewee gave another example: “brand clothes, like Nike, Hugo Boss, the team had special conditions and did not have to pay and was free, but the rest of the militaries had to pay for it – about 10 euros.”

Definition of corruption which we digested from the examples given is following: “different way of treating people.”

The interesting example which the interviewee gave was: “they needed information and in Afghanistan they had to pay for this information. In Kosovo it is different, because the relationship with the interesting people is quite different. You will be invited to barbeques and this kind of ‘thinks’”, so the interviewee sees it as friendship instead of corruption. “But one comes to this friendship when you are there for many missions. Over the years they know what the militaries can do for them.” It really depends on the relationships and this person is sure that some information which they received from the citizens they never existed, but it was their truth and the team took it as it was. And for the team it was fine, because they could write their report and send them to Pristina so everything is fine. He/she started to laugh and said: “maybe it is corruption, but I do not know.”

**Question 3:** Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example?

“Interesting in Prizren with inhabitants over 50,000 you will find more than 100 millionaires there. This person did not know whether it was a war city or war area where there are lots of rich people. There was also last research in 2007 showing that in one city there are 10 billionaires there, so normally it is the richest city in Europe (in relation to the inhabitant), but there is no import and export in Kosovo”, so the interviewee wonders where the money comes from. And he/she never asked for that, but you have always the same key players/role players.

“International donors/international militaries are a source of income, because the militaries need workers who clean the camp and update militaries with information.” The interviewee thinks that is quite near to corruption.

The interviewee gave an example: “in Prizren when you look at the workers list you will find almost the same names, example Krasniki. But when you get in contact with the workers and ask them about their family you will find out that in the field camp/Prizren nearly two families are working. There are thus about 200 civilians workers divided over two families.” He/she agreed with me that this is an example of nepotism.
And the interviewee gave an interesting example about the interpreters: “the director decided who works there and one young lady worked there and the team found out that she had a huge family with connections.” In this case the interviewee doubts whether it is corruption, but this is how it works there. “Because officially you will never hear that military is being corrupt, but the soldiers have different ways to work with the inhabitants. It is hard to categorize what is corrupt behavior, because sometimes you need information. Soldiers and military will not accept money, because they earn enough. The citizens give the soldiers information and the soldiers give them special security/protection and that is kind of corruption.”

How did you deal with it and what were the results?

For the interviewee worked the best to ignore corruption. He/she gave a special example: “a very poor family and I decided to help them with short-impact project (cloths, food) by collecting the money from the NGO’s and I was very happy to bring them this help. They organized a barbeque and during this barbeque the gate opened and two Porsche Cayenne came inside the compound with German number plates. Then I found out that the family Sulemany run the red light district in Hamburg, so this family was related to this rich family. The family elder said that they decided to life in the poor area, because they do not want to be connected with the rich part of the family, so this ‘poor’ family had enough money (they had millions of euros), so I run into that fake. I was happy to give the family that gift – food, rice, oil, 200 euros- but they are millionaires.” He/she says: “that is how it works. When you take it to your heart you will fail your mission. Thus, you have to ignore this.”

The result was that the soldiers started a research about millionaires and what came out was that there are many millionaires and billionaires.

“KFOR: it is not allowed to buy plagiarist stuff and fake stuff, like dvd’s, cd’s, but it was very normal there. You could find it everywhere. Even though it is not allowed, nobody will tell them not to do so.” My conclusion from this was: what you are doing is actually keeping corruption alive.

In the beginning of the KFOR the team are very close to the inhabitants and the normal soldiers are not allowed to leave the camp or go into the city. There are only few people who are involved in that area.

For the interviewee it was interesting: “normal field soldiers were shocked because of the poor situation and they could not understand the reaction of the soldiers who had more experience and had seen more (young children in winter times without shoes and it is horrible for this soldiers, but this is the situation for centuries in Afghanistan, so it is very normal there> so you do not have to buy shoes. For the most people it is heartbreaking, but for him it was normal).”

The interviewee gave another example: “I gave bottle of water to a girl and she did not like this clean water, so she threw it away and filled the water with water from the river which was not clean. With that experience it is useless to give them clean water. Every normal soldier who is for the first time outside will give the children sweets and water.”

“Over the years you will find out how it works” experience.

The interviewee had to deal with the most powerful man there and I asked whether you can do anything about his corrupt behavior. The interviewee said: “you have the possibility to stop the
contract, but what is the next step? Because he is the most important person in that area, you will not find anybody else who is willing to support you.” The interviewee found that maybe in this case it is also corruption, because you know that he is a poppy farmer, but it is fine and that is the way how it works.

Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“Officially corruption is forbidden.”

**Question 4:** Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“In that area in which I was active corruption was experienced as necessary to survive, because it is useless to be the good man of this world when you are the only one in that area. You have to earn money.”

To have a better understanding why the poppy industry in Afghanistan grows every year the interviewee gave the following example: “for example one potato you get 1 Afghani but for one kilo poppy you get 2000 Afghani. So you can sit there and say I am the good man by doing business in potatoes, but you then will be the poorest man in that area. So you have to survive.”

Basically the citizens/local actors do not want to counter corruption?

“Oh no”, according to the interviewee they do not want to counter corruption, there is no interest to counter corruption. Afghani use the money from the poppy to buy clothes and food, so not for own use.

“In Kosovo you can buy everything. I had the opportunity for many times to buy weapons, drugs. So basically corruption is normal way of life.”

The interviewee found it interesting that one could “buy” women. Officially is prostitution forbidden in a Muslim country, but he/she doubts whether they are real Muslims based on his/her contact with the citizens: “they ate what they wanted, drinking in the morning was normal, so it is how it works.”

The interviewee found Kosovo quite interesting in every way: “there is really no law, you can buy everything, also buy the officials (like a police officer).” This person gave the example of the interpreter who decided to become a policeman after 6 years working as an interpreter. However, this policeman wanted to be an interpreter again during his/her mission in Kosovo in 2007, because a policeman earned about 150 euros per month, but KFOR paid about 600 euros per month.

“Being a policeman and catching a drugs dealer who gives you 2000 euros than you would take it, because you earn lesser as a policeman. I would also accept it if there was the need to stay alive and support the family.”
“In the moment the richest man of Kosovo is the president and therefore he could be interested to stop corruption in Kosovo, but I do not think the president would counter corruption, because to become the richest man you had to be corrupt before.”

Basically there is no interest from the officials to stop corruption.

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

Of course, Kosovo is according the interviewee the best example. This person says: “we go into that area and decide that Serb money is not allowed, so we created our own money in Kosovo, first DM but now euro. Kosovo is not in the Eurozone. In Kosovo you do not have import and export, but you have millions there, so the military bring the only income for that country.”

“So therefore, this country need to have the military there, especially you see that in Kosovo and in Mitrovica. Every time NATO, EU commission come there to check the area about security you will find clashes and shootings (which the interviewee found normal), because the citizens/officials/mafia bosses are aware that they need military in the country because of the money. So they create some trouble. The result is that military mission extends.” The interviewee adds: “we will have military mission in Kosovo for the next 20 years even though we will name it differently.”

“We will have more soldiers in Kosovo than in Afghanistan. The advantage in Afghanistan is that they have their own money and import/export, but the problem with Kosovo is that they do not have import/export. Kosovo has really nothing to export/import, besides corruption, mafia and smuggling. In Kosovo they have not the possibility to sell anything.”

The interviewee gave an interesting example: “in the past you had this green zone of Serbia. They had the possibility to grow things, but they do not use it. Maybe the way now they are doing business –selling Gucci bags- is fine. If they want to be a real existing country, I suggests that they have to forbid selling plagiart stuff.”

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“The key players must be the officials, but they are corrupt so there are no key players at all.”

“KFOR/EU/UN are also not interesting to counter corruption. And the soldiers are also not interested in countering corruption, because they could for example buy Microsoft for 5 euros or if you had special relations with somebody you could have it for free.”

The interviewee agreed with me that if we want to counter corruption effectively we have to have the will of the officials in Kosovo and of EU/UN/KFOR. This persons answered it with: “for sure, but you need very comfortable basics for your country to establish those things. And as we know there is no import and export, so they life from the money which we put in that country. So when KFOR will leave the country there will be no money. They have to create own industry”.

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**Question 7:** Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

_The role of military:_ “No, I do not see a role for the military. Military are for securing safe environment and the rest is for other organizations, like the EU.”

“For CIMIC there is ‘definitely no’ role to counter corruption, because the responsibilities of CIMIC are to support commanders, CIMIC can help functional specialist. I think that countering corruption or improving the situation is not part of the CIMIC. Most of the CIMIC soldiers are also not experienced in the field of corruption, they did not have lessons about it. The only thing that CIMIC soldiers know about corruption is that it is forbidden and they have to put their signature under this document. It is part for the political officials to counter corruption.”

_The interviewee says:_ “I had corruption around me, I worked with corruption, but counter it is not our job”. For this person corruption works all the time. The interviewee gave an example of Afghanistan where there was one warlord who wanted to have a small bridge to connect one part of the village with the other part. The river was really big, so building this bridge would cost about 30,000 euros. They did not have the money to build the bridge and the answer of this warlord was very clear: “next time that you cross my village you can be sure that your cars will explode.” As CIMICER it was easy, because the interviewee went to his commander and gave him this two possibilities: “accept the loss of your soldiers or pay 30,000” and they paid it. The interviewee had the possibility to say “no it is corruption”, but it is about protecting himself/herself and his/her comrades. This is how the world works> hijack persons and have money from the country.

“Western world will all the time be involved in corruption, you do not have other options, because we will have corruption all the time.”

“The officials, the president they are all corrupt and all they want to have is money, so we will be deeper involved in paying money. Corruption never will stop or improve.”

“We bring money in a poor world and corruption will start immediately.”

**Question 8:** What did you learn from your experiences?

“Take it as it is! Corruption is all the time there and we all are involved. There comes the time that you are also corrupt.” The interviewee sees it as: “Not being corrupt, but dealing with the money. You have the official rules and you can deal with this rules.”... “That is the way it is”.

“You can think about how to counter corruption in the Netherlands and in Germany, where it is quite warm in your room then you can talk about corruption, but go in that area, find out how it is and try to solve corruption there. You will leave that country within about 6 hours.”

**Question 9:** Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“No, I can talk hours about this topic. There are so many shocking experience.”
Interview report

Anonymized interview number 10

Interview: on 16-12-2014 at 14.00. The interview took place at the coffee room. During the interview I asked the interviewee the questions mentioned in the interview guideline applying the order laid down in the guideline. During the interview we had a nice conversation and I learned a lot from the experiences. We mainly talked about the experiences from Kosovo. The interviewee emphasized the cultural aspects and cultural changes. This person knew about my research and was willing to help me with sharing his experience. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“I have experience in Bosnia and in Kosovo. I was in Kosovo in 2003, roughly seven months. There was so called CIMIC center, downtown Prizren. This office was free of barriers, as far as it could be. And it was accessible by the average populace as well by the NGOs, IOs, GOs, by the politicians in order to get any kinds of problems addressed or solved. Sometimes it was just about providing certain information, but also looking at the problems they had on hand. Thus, from information sharing to dealing with the problem as such.”

“Kosovo in 2003 was still in a period of depression and which was characterized by almost no leadership and no administration in place. There was an administration already, but it was very weak, because it was run by unskilled people. Sometimes you did not have a clue how they ended up in the offices and maybe it is already related to corruption. But the main problem was that after the territory was free from Serbs the public services were not provided. And this is mainly due to the reason that in the history when Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia and Serbia later on, the key positions within the administration were kept by Serbs. So you can imagine that when the Serbs left, after the forces came in, due to that vacuum someone was put in place, but not appropriately educated, not appropriately trained to serve the people. It was mainly the reason why in our office we had to deal with all this kind of issues which usually belong to the public services and run by the country instead of foreign military. That is why we got in contact with almost everybody who were a player in this area where we were responsible for.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

When I asked to define corruption interviewee’s first reaction was: “I think that is already a very very dilemma you are talking about.”

This person continued: “I guess it is difficult to define, but it has definitely to do with services being provided by non-official service providers and money being involved or services being involved which are difficult to trace or are untraceable.”
The interviewee had read about definitions in context of Afghanistan, because corruption was also a cross-cutting problem to all the sectors to be developed. “But when we talk about private gain it is difficult to define what it is: is it private gain, because an individual is gaining, or families participating in that process, or systems participating, or being kept alive due to corruption (as far as shadow economy is involved).”

“If you refer to services being provided, most likely in absences or in competition to other services being provided legally and as far as services and money are concerned you cannot oversee due to being hidden/kept behind curtain then it is very much what corruption is all about. At the end you provide something and you gain something, but it is not coming from the official lines of communication.”

“You could make it more sophisticated, because talking about corruption it most likely forcing us to look at the cultural aspects as well. Because from a more Western mindset perspective looking into corruption might be something totally different than looking from a Middle East or even Eastern mindset perspective. I might observe something spoiling my mind, saying that this is corruption based on what I have learned and how I have been educated, but for someone from the Middle East or from the East that might be kind of normal, it might be absolutely accepted and might not even been looked at as being corruption. So this cultural aspect, from my perspective, plays a significant role in how to define corruption, because either it broadens your mindset in regard to corruption to be looked at and find possible solutions to it, or it narrows it down. It is dependent from the perspective you look at.”

Question 3: Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results? Was there a guideline during your mission how to deal with corruption?

After thinking a while the interviewee stated the following: “Maybe we have been involved and even I have been involved, not knowing that I was involved. Example: we were mostly dealing with projects and of course there is money involved. But do you know where the money goes? If you sit around the table to negotiate about the contract and you get additional services provided… how do you react on such situation? Of course it will occur anyway, but make sure that you will not be involved. So be aware not to be involved in such a nexus and we manage to stay away, but this is a form of corruption: in order to get a contract you get additional services provided without asking for. So it is a challenge and they know how to play this card.”

“No, at this stage there were no guidelines as such. At least not known to us. But I know that ones who had to put the contracts together were professionals, like lawyers and judges, and so they were experts in the specific contracts concerned. So whatever subject of a contract was, we were not the ones designing the contracts, we were talking to the different partners. The contracts were checked against host nation law, as far as it existed in that time, as far as UN (UNMIK) was concerned, and it was checked against our own law. I guess this was a certain measure against corruption as far as the forces involvement of money flow and flow of services were concerned. We did not experience that much, but for this specific people (the lawyers/experts) it was one of the activities. But whether it was sufficient and they really understood what is behind, I really doubt.”
Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“At the one hand there is the cultural aspect again, on the other hand it is also related to the shadow structures, or let’s say parallel structures. As far as my experiences from Kosovo are concerned: in order to survive appropriately it is worth to know how the system works. And I am not talking about the official system. You have to know the official system you like to have access too, but you also have to understand the parallel system to get access to this services.”

“One example: I came across to it and it is about the access to healthcare, which is one of the most corrupt sectors, because that is where the money is really getting generated. It involves lots of money. Insured without appropriate money you will not get access to the services you actually require, no matter what you are suffering from. So what my experience was: the official health care system is getting used as a kind of vehicle (from the Western perspective: there are running policlinics, ambulances, there are pharmacies and that looks very much like what we see here as well and is very known to us. So from that perspective looking into the hard facts I would not see any difference. But when you talk to the people then you experience a different story). So getting access to certain rooms/clinics where you have to wait to be treated, getting access to the nurse until the access to the doctor….there is always money involved. You have to have that money on hand and if you do not have the money you will not get to the point where you will be treated appropriately. So everybody has its share, everybody takes money misusing the official infrastructure and existing official system. And I guess that is very much what characterizes corruption in Kosovo. So official institutions, official structures of organizations are misused in a kind of parallel universe where money is taken from the potential customers in order to get to the point, because otherwise you cannot get to the target. And that is the nature what I have experienced. It is bad at the end, because you would say from your Western perspective: what is the problem? You have your hospitals, you have your doctors/nurses/ambulances. What actually makes the problem? But when you look from the customers perspective you will understand that the system is here, it is somehow related to what the state is actually providing its people with and it is most likely not paid by the country (tax payers money), but by someone else. And it is used to generate illegal income, because there is no tax paid. It is actually a dilemma: it is a very well developed system of corruption, and it is quite normal and it is accepted by everybody. Everybody knows that without having the appropriate amount of money you do not even have to try, because you are not getting to the point.”

“Everybody talks about it, and everybody says it is bad, and everybody knows somebody who is corrupt, and everybody will accuse everybody of being corrupt, but it is system imminent.”

Basically the citizens/local actors do not want to counter corruption?

“I think that for them it is so normal that they most likely do not….they know that it is somehow rotten and they know that it is somehow wrong (Kosovo is not so isolated that they would not understand that the system in neighbor countries are somehow differently), but they do not fight it, because everybody is somehow involved. It is a network of activities which is getting performed beside what we understand as official service provision. So everybody understands that if I want to get to a certain point I have to pay a certain amount of money. And since money in Kosovo is not really generated as we understand it by the tax payers, where taxes are used as kind of a
revenue which goes back to the populace in form of services being provided, everybody is just looking after its own pocket. And that is where the money goes.”

“For example: we were talking to a family suffering from not having electricity. This is a simple example where corruption is involved. For people in Kosovo, and in other countries, if electricity is available it is fine and if there is no electricity available it is also fine. If this services are not provided they do not understand that they have to pay for these services. They take some wire and hook them to the transmission system and just steal what they usually cannot get. And they do not think that it is bad, because they think that it is there, so why can I not get access to it if nobody else provides this access. If nobody provides this access I just take what I want.’ And for them it is quit normal. You can see these wires to the transmission system everywhere. And when you ask them: ‘don’t you think that you have to pay for those kind of services they say ‘no, why should I? It is there, I just can get it and it is there.’ And that is how it works.”

“The same goes for health care. They know that they have to have certain amount of money, otherwise they do not even have to try. And for the poor there is no access and this is the dark side of the structure: either you have to pay for whatever service you require or you are left behind. And that is bad. Usually the poor do not participate in that process, because otherwise they do not have to be poor, because corruption is for the rich. That is maybe another phenomenon about Kosovo: if you look at the way people think and act it is very Western minded, because they have lots of ties into the Western European context, because they have been refugees for years residing in the Netherlands/Germany/Austria/Switzerland, etc., so they know exactly how it works and how it looks like in the Western European countries. And this is a picture they take back to Kosovo still having in mind how it works in the other countries, but in Kosovo it works differently. The dilemma is for sure that even we try to change their system into a system as we understand or know it from our western minded experience, the they will not understand or appreciate it, because their unwillingness to pay taxes refers usually to the situation, that they state that this money is being used or misused because of corruption and this is a dilemma. They have a good argument not to pay in terms of official system feeding with taxes, because they accuse the system being that corrupt that the money is just going away (nobody knows where it goes).”

The interviewee agrees with this partially saying: “and maybe that is even true.” “If you try to convince them that they have to feed the official system so that the system can serve the people they will always argue: ‘no, no, no, no I am not paying anything, they are corrupt anyway. I am not feeding this.’”

The interviewee agreed with me that the inhabitants did not see themselves being corrupt and added: “it is everybody else, but not themselves. And that makes it obvious, because that is why corruption is imminent. Because everybody is somehow involved, even it is the very last line just paying, because as soon as you pay you are involved. Even if you are not one of the biggest parties and you do not win from it, you at least feed it.”

Additional question: How do the military experience corruption? Do you see it as a bad thing or you just accept it?

“No, I guess you cannot accept it. The dilemma is: usually by mandate we are bound to the nation we are serving with and for. If this is true then you will always be looked at in conjunction with
the local government/national/subnational government. So you are automatically, even though you look like a foreigner/deriving another culture, you will always been looked in conjunction with the system you are in support of or you are partnering with. If the system is corrupt you will be looked at the same way. So I guess you have to have a strong and transparent position on how do you deal with corruption to prevent you from being looked in the same way as the local government/etc., So you cannot just let it go, but the question is: what can you do about it? And that is where the possibilities are quit limited.”

**Question 5:** What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

The interviewee had to think about it and answered in the following way: “If you are really honest the more money you put into it, the more you feed it. I do not think you can do much about the system and the only thing you can do is: keep your fingers out of their business and do not pump money directly into the machine. Bottom line is: if you do not know what the impact is or what you are doing, then do not do it. Actually it is very easy.”

“The system designed of politicians/officials being part of that corruption will appreciate doing so, because actually you feed them with your money. But the average person/the random people will not appreciate what you are doing, since they understand that you are putting oil into the fire. I do not know to what extent. I will put here: the more money flows, the more you feed the monster, the more you keep the system going.”

“You could ask a question: is it still worthwhile doing the mission even if you know that you might contribute to a system you are not necessary to contribute to. You have to have a clear idea about your mission goals/what is the end state. Is it asked fighting corruption or is it asked fighting something else, i.e. what kind of undesired effects can you accept or what developments can be sacrificed on the altar of getting a certain level of security established. I guess there is no mean of getting corruption out of the system from one day or other. You do not have a button to press to diminish corruption. This is a culture based process closely related to time. To stimulate a cultural change as far as this particular issue is concerned and as far as various actors are involved, it takes generations. That is why you have to deal with the devil for a while, knowing that not everything what you are doing is doing any good before you can really see a change to come, which does not mean that you cannot accept everything. Even you are not allowed to do so, but as long as it is kept away from getting visible and you can accept for higher values/higher goals to be met, then you have to. As far as corruption is concerned there is the just a long-term perspective to it. There is no short-term solution, because of the cultural aspects. If you do not share the same culture, same value/standards (how services are being provided)/believe it is a problem.”

“I cannot imagine Kosovo being part of EU, because of the system, human/drugs smuggling. They do not need the official money.”

**Question 6:** From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?
“I guess the key actor is the random person. If this random person understands that services are getting provided by state actors, the state actors are being paid by the state in an official way, corruption anyway. Because if I do not have to pay the doctor/nurse anymore, because I get access to this services, I dry this line of money out anyway. But therefore we need this cultural change, so that one requiring the services gets the idea of ‘hey, I do not have to pay, because I get access to the services anyway and I am getting treated appropriately’. Then we are almost there were we need to be. But again this is not a thing you do overnight.”

The interviewee liked to share his/her first experience from Afghanistan: “A policeman guarding a bridge, so what can he do to generate income. He is there to provide his services and the citizen wants to cross the bridge. In return for his provision of security services this policeman is asking for 1 or 2 Afghani. From our perspective it is not a lots of money, but for the affected inhabitants it is quite some. This is another example of corruption. If this would happen in the Netherlands one would immediately report the name of this policeman taking the money pretending to provide security. There will be a case against this guy and everybody would stick to the procedures. In Afghanistan nobody would dare to do so, because security provision has historically been a local issue and the one who was tasked to be the security provider – by the community and not by the official/sub-national government – is not able to generate any other income. Consequently it is a normal thing that this policeman has to be paid for providing security, because he is kept away from generating any other legal income. He has no other choice. That is the nature how we look at stuff and how it is culturally anchored in other contexts. So, from my perspective this policeman taking an Afghani or two is corruption, but from his perspective it is not even close to corruption, it is a way of generating income enabling him to feed his family. And this is very much what you experience in Kosovo as well. People within the system not getting paid by the state/company everybody knows that they take their share and at the end there will be no paycheck coming from the administrative office, because it is already taken care of. This is more the system than the system we are used to.”

“Corruption is a parallel system, which is based on an official system. But the official system knows very well that when hiring employees they cannot pay them without the existence of the parallel system. Thus the other system has to be in place to run this system as such. So if you would say that corruption has to stop starting from tomorrow and everybody would concur, the general system will fall apart, because nobody will not get paid and they will seek for another, maybe illegal way, of creating income. Because there is no other official way of having income.”

The interviewee agreed with me that a key factor would be that the inhabitants have enough income, “but this income should be from another basis, because they care of their income because asking money. It is important to know how the official money is distributed. The income should be legally paid, so it can be taxed again>chain of value is corrupted in case of corruption.”

“The answer to corruption is complex and is a cultural change. It takes at least a generation, if not generations. So you have a period where the system is highly corrupted, then you have a transition period after 30 years and then you have a period of conciliation> a cycles which is not that separated from each other, but you have to be that patient in order to experience that kind of process until corruption gets out of the system.”
**Question 7:** Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

*Role of military:* “I guess as such…you have to be sure that you are not contributing to that kind of system based on your law/host nation law. This is difficult in a multinational environment, because you have several laws to be looked at. We have to obey the law given and this already makes it complex.”

*Role of CIMIC:* “CIMIC serves as a point of contact for any kinds of actors incl. the local ones. This is part of our core business. Information sharing and knowledge management is key to better understand the operational environment incl. its actors. For those to appear involved in corruption we can put the facts together and report those, as far as targeting is concerned.”

“If you do not have the means to enforce the law appropriately then you cannot have a case, so he/she will get away and the business will just go on. This is also a question of cultural change—culture is key here. The dilemma can be described by following traditional law on one hand and applying the Western mindset and understanding of law on the other hand. What is more effective?”

“Since the judicial system is very much involved in the business we are back to culture. I need to admit, when I was in Kosovo 2003 and in Bosnia in 1999 I did not know that it was such a cultural aspect. Of course we were warned about corruption and of course we understood somehow what corruption might be, but again from a very Western minded perspective. So, since I understand more and more what CIMIC is about and what I have learned from Afghanistan, I understand that culture is actually the key to success, but therefore you need to understand the cultural phenomena, cultural shaping factors and the cultural manifestation in a profound manner. This really helps to understand how a society is being designed. You definitely have to encompass this aspects, and that is what CIMIC does in order to make everybody aware of how they look at things and not just accuse them for acting differently.”

“At the one hand it is about targeting, where you can put evidence together but you have to have justification. Or you talk about cultural aspects and make the people aware how it works in such a culture and country. Here you have to define your level of acceptance. That is the CIMIC portion.”

**Question 8:** What did you learn from your experiences?

“My lessons learned from that particular time in Kosovo?! My lessons learned was that I did not understand anything. Because we were told that the system is corrupt.” The interviewee gave an example: “my translator started at a certain stage to visit a drivers’ school to get his driving license and I asked him why he did it, because he was the first Kosovarian guy I saw going to a drivers’ school, because everybody buys his driving license. This Kosovarian guy was afraid of buying a driving license, because he had already the idea of leaving Kosovo at a certain stage and working somewhere abroad. He was smart enough, but not rich enough not to buy a driving license, but not rich enough to buy a sophisticated one.”

“In such a system you do not care about the others if you have the money you buy the license.”
“It is a long lasting process and from a military and from a CIMIC perspective you can try to make sure that you do not contribute to the system as much as possible, but as far as cultural aspects are concerned you will most likely without knowing.”

Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“No, I think I confused you completely.”

“We accept that part of our income is taken away for taxes, health insurance, etc.. We accept it and it is part of our culture: we understand that part of our money is paid even if you do not need these services you now pay for. Because you know that when you require those services they will be offered to you and –up to a certain extend- likely for free. This is how our system works. I understand actually why a certain amount of money is taken away from my paycheck, because I know that I have access to the services without paying money on top. But it is not true for people who are residing in Kosovo. That is why I defined corruption being a parallel system, most likely misusing the official system and the official structure in order to feed itself. But not feeding back the official system creates a dilemma: there is nothing going back to the people in terms of revenues being built, services being provided, or subsidiaries being paid. They themselves are creating this problem. At a certain stage or time they could say ‘no I am not paying and I am not feeding the monster’, but if you do so then you are not getting serviced. The question is: would you sacrifice your health for the fight against corruption? No, you do not and that is why it is a cultural aspect with judicial aspect. You can also come up with the hammer and accuse everybody, but then you have a country packed with criminals. What do you do about it? They have the money to get out of the prison, so the system starts all over.”

The interviewee gave an example in the context of contracts: “we were always looking who is this person, what is his/her background, with whom are we signing a contract. Individuals known or suspected of being involved in corruption were left out. You take your measures, but how far can you get. This network is so sophisticated and is weaved into the society...where do you start your investigation and where does it come to an end?”

“If we understand corruption as a cultural issue and long lasting phenomenon, counter it becomes a question of generations. A military mission usually last half a year or a year, but in this short period of time you do not understand anything, you do not even get a glimpse. How do you actually understand to fight corruption? In Afghanistan we were accused of being part of the problem – referring to corruption-. The more you think about it and understand it the more you start to agree with them.”

“It is a question you have to ask yourself: what can I really sacrifice on altar of security being provided?”
Interview report

Anonymized interview number 12

Interview: on 16-12-2014 at 10.00. I could not record, because he preferred to not be recorded. The interview took place in the bar and it was crowded, however we could have a nice conversation. During the interview I asked the interviewee the questions mentioned on the interview guideline, however not all the questions were covered.

Despite the negative influences (noise and not making that much notes as I wanted) the interview is relevant for my research with insights and experiences.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkan? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“I have been deployed to Bosnia in 2002 and 2003. I collaborated with other colleges from other countries, like Italy, Spain and France. My tasks were to inform my battalion about ongoing operations and to contribute within the operation planning process. Every 2 or 3 days I had to report to my battalion down to exchange information.”

During the deployment in Bosnia the interviewee had the impression that when people built up enterprises there was always somebody supervising (if you want to start a business you have to pay), so the old structure was present after the fall of Yugoslavia. You could feel the presence of UCK even though you did not see that. There seemed to be no rule and no order after Tito.

The interviewee described the situation after Tito as following: “the inhabitants put their main effort in trying to survive and in their own advantage but nobody really put any effort in their country.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

According to the interviewee corruption is selling yourself.

The interviewee thinks that in one or the other way everyone is venal, the subject is the prising.

Question 3: Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results?

The interviewee did not witness corruption in Bosnia. The task was to support the return of refugees from Germany back to their country by ensuring the refurbishment or even reconstruction of damaged houses. At those days the main CIMIC mandate.
However, sometimes the refugees decided to sell their new houses and returned back to Germany (double cashed).

The interviewee did not mind to work with corrupt persons, because most important was to achieve the commanders intent. If necessary CIMIC had to work together with a venal people to achieve their targets. For exchange of information sometimes small favors had to be conceded.

It is a matter of how far is one willing to accept this corrupt behavior. So accept the way it is.

The interviewee gave the example of the warlords in Afghanistan. The interviewee thinks that sometimes those warlords are needed to keep the system running, because otherwise the system will collapse. “And you accept this, because you see that the system works and you have no alternative, so you have to deal with it. Sometimes it is better to deal with the devil.”

Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“I think that there were no guidelines, or maybe there were guidelines, but I did not know about these.”

Question 4: How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“As mentioned earlier in a system like in Bosnia the citizens do not know better, they experience corruption as normal behavior and they don’t see their behavior as corrupt.”

“Moreover, ‘being corrupt’ is necessary to survive, otherwise you do not have income for the family.”

“After Tito: the inhabitants put effort in their carrier, so nobody put an effort in the country and was willing to counter corruption.”

The interviewee thinks that the situation now will be different than in 2002/2003.

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“No comment.”

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?
“Population is a key factor in the fight against corruption. However, in a system like in Bosnia the citizens do not know better, they experience corruption as normal behavior and they don’t see their behavior as corrupt.”

“Pay decent salaries especially to those working on a governmental level. This should improve over the years and the people will start to gain trust and will care about the country. Education is also a key factor, so invest in it.”

“Good governance and a reliable government is also important to counter corruption effectively.”

Even though the interviewee gives examples how corruption could be improved he/she adds the following: “but who are we, to tell them what to do and make decisions, we can only kindly advise them, because it is their country”

“Build up relationship with the citizens, so you will gain their trust. However, be careful, because they can also foul you.”

Question 7: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

“I do not see a role for CIMIC in countering corruption, however CIMIC-ers can observe, identify things and rapport it.” The interviewee also says that “CIMIC should not interfere in countering corruption, because then CIMIC would lose its credibility.”

The interviewee also does not see any role for the military in countering corruption. He/she thinks that it is a political thing, so politicians have to deal with countering corruption. Militaries should ensure security so that others can deal with such problems.

Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?

“In some cases age is more important than the rank. Respect the way the other society thinks. Being hard during a mission but fair and open minded, these are tools which are required to achieve your goals.”

Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

The interviewee did not want to add anything.
Interview report

Anonymized interview 16

Interview: on 6-1-2015 at 10.00. It was a bit noisy in the room, however it did not affect the quality of the recording. First the interviewee started by telling about his/her experiences in the Balkans and by doing so the interviewee already answered question one. After finishing the story I asked the questions mentioned in the guideline, but not in the same order as mentioned in the interview guideline. During the interview we had a nice conversation and I learned a lot from the experiences. The interviewee emphasized that trust is very important. The interviewee knew about my research and was willing to help me with sharing the experience with me. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkans? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“Let’s talk about my experience with corruption in out of area missions. I was in five out of area missions: twice in KFOR and twice in Afghanistan and also once in Macedonia. I like to talk about my experience in Kosovo and Macedonia, because I think Kosovo and Macedonia are similar.”

“I was in Kosovo in 2000, in 2006 I was in Kosovo and also in 2000 I was in Macedonia. That is my experience in these two countries in out of area missions.”

“My first impression in Kosovo: the inhabitants are very poor and I had the feeling that there is not much money for corruption available. That was my first impression. Due to the fact that they were fighting against the Serbs I thought that the Albanians are close connected to each other, or better they are very united. So my first background was a huge cultural background that the Albanians had, and it looks structured. For me there was no corruption... my first impression, but this impression was not true. It was not easy to understand how this cultural background/system works. So, I soon realized that there were lot of clans inside this culture, family clans, and these clans controlled own area of interest: crime, drugs, smuggling. There were no state structures as we know from Europe. I think also they had no trust in their government. Maybe because the government was mostly controlled by the Serbs. I think this is one of the reasons why they had no trust and lot of people life in their own villages and I think (my feeling was) that they do not know each other. If you life in the North of Kosovo you have no connections to the South... mostly.”

“If you stay in an area for six months, after two or three months it is getting better and better to understand this culture.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

The interviewee had to think about it: “Corruption is for me if someone influence the system to earn money on an irregular way. That is kind of corruption. Corruption is to abusing the own power to get money from the people, to work against certain state, to work against the state
structure. But I think money is in the middle of the circle. What everyone wants is to earn more money.”

**Question 3:** Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results?

“I think they had lot of corruption. One example is graveling: to gravel you need a company who dig up gravel, you need someone who transport it, you need someone who bulldoze those gravels in your camp, and it was only one company who was responsible for digging up, for transporting and for bulldozing. Only one company, so you do not have choice between two or three companies. That was only one family clan which had the license to dig up gravel. Of course you need a license to dig up and only this one company had this license. I think if someone else wanted to get a license you will never get a license, because there is a kind of system behind where you never come in.”

“Is this corruption?... “It was not so easy, because there is the need for our camps and when you have no choice...so okay, then you use this company.”

“Another example, and we were responsible for a bridge which was damaged. It was a very important bridge, because it was a connection between two big cities, so it was a main road without a functional bridge. And there was a company who dig up gravel and they installed a make-shift bridge. Everyone who wants to use this make-shift bridge had to pay one DM and they call it ‘road tax’, but for us it is forbidden. What we did was we cleared the illegal check point and the company removed this make-shift bridge and what they did was the following: they installed a ford (ford is an area where you can drive through the rive with your vehicle) so if you had to cross the river by car, because the water was too deep to going by car without support, you had to use a tractor and the tractor trail the car and would bring you on the other side. Now you had to pay five DM and that is kind of economic thinking in Kosovo, so they have always solution to money. That is kind of the power of the strongest in Kosovo and in my opinion a kind of corruption too.”

“Another example and for us a huge problem: the employees at the camp. We need them for work like gravel the roads, as a waiter, as a translator etc. To get them we use agents and these agents are controlled by a clan. So they decide who can apply for those works and when they decided that someone can apply for the work, but ‘I get 10/20/30 percent of your income’...that is corruption and that is how it works. If you fire an agent and you have another agent it does not matter, because clans control the agents. So, you have no chance to make a free choice of who is working in your camp.”...”You have no choice, you have to accept it. If you do not accept it, you have the problem that there is no one who works in your camp.”

“Sometimes the important employees, like translators, are controlled by the clans. There is no chance to have a choice.”

“We accept it and we accept the system behind this culture. I think the biggest problem is trust. They have no trust in their government, so without trust they build their own system. And in this system it is normal to control these agents and if you like to have work/earn money you need to be in a clan. That is the system.”

“Such areas are based on force, violence, power, control and people need to be in a clan to be protected, to have a job, to get money and for us it is not so clear, because we came from a state with rule of law and separation of the power. They do not have it in this countries.”
"The biggest problem is the trust, trust in the government, trust in the rule of law, and trust in police. For example in Kosovo they installed in 1999 the UNMIK. The problem was if you had a policeman from an African state in Kosovo and an Albanian has the impression that this African policeman has no clue about rule of law, because in his own country there is no rule of law/separation of power, this Albanian will never...never trust. They had trust in German and American police from UNMIK, also from Austria...that is what I know. But they had no trust in the police from African states."

"If you come from Europe, from a stable state, concerning rule of law...you transport it to Kosovo. They feel it by how you talk with them, how you work with them. They think an African policeman or a policeman from a fragile state is much more violent. A policeman, who comes from a stable state, first of all talk with them and do not force you, because violence is the last middle to use."

Was there a guideline during your mission how to deal with corruption?

"First of all, in 2000 we were there in out of area mission with our rules and values from our own country, so we took our rules and values from our own country there. But it was not so easy to work there in an environment where you have no stable structure. One example, in Germany you need a driving license to drive a car. If you drive a car in Kosovo normally you need a driving license too, but you will find there, I think 50 percent of the inhabitants, who never had a driving license. So, in this case it is very hard to control the traffic and to force someone who has no driving license."

"For example, and that is the same with corruption, if you think about norms there, as mentioned before in my example when we cleared the illegal check points and the inhabitants had to pay much more money to cross the river (from one DM to five DM). It is not so easy, so you need a good feeling in such a country and I think in 2000 the military leaders and we were not so deep in this topic to give a guideline about corruption. So, we had to develop our own guideline during the mission, because no one knows what happens in this country. I think it was one of the first missions for my own country, we got a lot of experience there and I think with this experience we do at the moment better job in Afghanistan. Because you need a lot of experience to work in such an environment."

"To answer your question: I think our guideline was our experience from a stable state, like Germany."

Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context?

"With the first view, I think there was a relationship for me, but from the second view I think that the culture is a kind of state structure. The problem that they are structured in family clans...that is my view. There was not only state, but there are lot of states in one state. So, you have between these states, in my opinion, the corruption, because in these clans everything was structured and I think everyone knows how the system works in this clan and so it is a doable system here. But for us it looks like a cultural problem, but I do not really like this view."

"But trust, everything is about trust. If you install a system where you say 'now we have a state structure and everyone is under the umbrella of this state, everyone needs this trust in the system'.

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And maybe for the Albanians it is more understandable to life in their cultural system, because they know what it is. They have lived under the force of the Serbs in Kosovo and that was not so good for them.”

How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“A lot of inhabitants were angry about corruption and not happy about it. As I mentioned before with the example of the bridge, they were not happy about the situation – because they had to pay one DM and because of the cleaning now they had to pay five DM – but they accept that they have to pay, because it is the system. But you will also find lot of Germans for example who are angry about our tax system. That is the same problem, is it a kind of culture or a kind of state system? I do not know.”... “Because now (in the example of the bridge) the inhabitants had to travel 50 kilometers more, because there was a bridge, to cross the river...it costs lot of time, fuel and money.”

Additional question: How do the military experience corruption?

“I think it was mostly...they think about it the same as I think about it. They also developed a way of thinking about corruption during a mission, because everything was based on the experience. They had lot of experience, knew a lot of people and had the chance to understand their system. I think a big problem in Kosovo is the (organized) crime. To fight against those problems you need to separate this power – on the one hand you have the police, you have the government and that they do not influence each other...that is very important. And this is our way of thinking, but I think that is the only solution to control such a state and reduce the crime/the organized crime.”

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

I did not ask this question, because he covered this question in question 7: see part ‘role of the military.’

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“You need long time to get trust, so it cost time to stabilize a government in those states, to stabilize police, to separate the power from the judges and police and so on. When they have trust in their structure, then I think corruption will be not so much as we have it at the moment (You will never find a state where there is no corruption...never).

The interviewee already mentioned in his earlier answers that separation of power is a way of countering corruption.

“Economy is a big topic. Stabilization, a stable state.”
The interviewee had to think about it and answered it as followed: “You have to think about it, you have to accept that there is corruption, but you need a good feeling how you support it or it is a case to case situation, and case to case decision. Sometimes it makes sense to accept it, to pay and play this game with the family clan. Say: ‘I can live with this regulation and with this structure’, but you need a view in the future. They have to come up on the right way, I think, that in the future they will get a chance to have a stable state structure. Because, only if you have a stable system and a stable structure...only then you have the chance to get the trust of the inhabitants. Because without trust the system will be instable.”

On the question how then you could make the inhabitants aware about the future perspective the interviewee answered the following: “Education...start with the kids. Education is a big topic. To support the education system, like the schools you need a neutral education. But it is one topic – education – there is a lot of more to train, educate and improve.

Question 7: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

Role of the military: “Of course we have to have a look on it, because it is important. Military come in with huge budget of money and as I mentioned before Kosovo, for me, first of all looks like a poor country. Nowadays you find in this area some people who earn lots of money and they are driving BMW, Porsche. They got it from their business, crime business with all actors in the area - also the military. Indirectly, or directly we support the system with our money, so we have to have a look on what we pay and how we pay it, because we influence with our money the economy in these countries. And of course we influence corruption.”

The interviewee agreed with me that they have to control the flow of the money they bring into the country.

Role of CIMIC: “No, not in countering corruption, because CIMIC must know everything about corruption. Because there we work together with companies, we sometimes pay them. We have small projects, like quick impact projects. CIMIC normally does quick impact projects, so we deal with a small budget. But it is also money and we have to look what we pay, and who we pay. That is important. So we have to know everything about corruption, but to counter it? In my opinion that is no topic for CIMIC.”...”We have to think about what we do, with a normal mind, because that is important.”

Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?

“What I have learned is that you will find corruption everywhere, there is no state without corruption, but in my opinion...what I mentioned before if you have trust in your state, if you have trust in your government, if you have trust in your police, then you have a state where you have limited corruption, but not as in a state where you have no structure, where you have violence, where you have force/power there you will find much more corruption. So, what we try to do is stabilize a state to get this trust in the system and then you will counter corruption. But you will never get a situation where you have no corruption.”
“And it is all about money.”

“We do not know what is behind the doors.”

**Question 9:** Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“No!”
Interview report

Anonymized interview number 17

Interview: on 8-1-2015 at 13.00. First the interviewee started by telling about his/her experiences in the Balkans and by doing so this person already answered question one. After finishing the story I asked the questions mentioned in the guideline, but not in the same order as mentioned in the interview guideline. During the interview we had a nice conversation, which was in Dutch, and I learned a lot from the experiences. The interviewee knew about my research and was willing to help me with sharing his/her experience. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your (military) experience in the Balkans? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“Ik heb 6,5 jaar in Bosnië gezeten. Ik hield toezicht op de civiele aspecten. Ik had twee kantons en 21 gemeentes om te kijken wat wel klopte en wat niet klopte. Ik bracht verslagen uit naar het hoofdkantoor, ik had ook bemiddelende rol en als ik dingen had geconstateerd, moest ik het doorgeven aan de militairen. Ik had heel nauw contacten met de CIMIC-troepen.”

“De organisatie van High Representative kon bestuurders, zoals ministers, uit de functie zetten. Wij hebben ook ministers en burgemeesters uit de functie gezet.”

“Er was ook nadruk op het terugkeer van de vluchtelingen. De burgemeester wilde deze vluchtelingen kwijt, want de meeste vluchtelingen waren in de minderheid en moesten nu terugkomen naar eigen huizen, maar in die huizen zaten andere mensen en die moesten uit worden gezet. De gemeentes waren verantwoordelijk voor het uitzetten van de mensen die andermans huizen hadden gepikt. De vraag was: ga jij je trouwe kiezers het huis uitzetten? Het was een gevecht met de gemeentebestuurders. De burgemeesters werden daarop afgerekend.”

“Wederopbouw was ook mee gelinkt. Wij hadden contacten met de internationale financiële organisaties en CIMIC had ook wel geld. Wij keken ook naar hoe de vluchtelingen gemeenschappen waren georganiseerd: in sommige gebieden waren de vluchtelingen overal terecht gekomen, zoals Nederland en Duitsland, dus die kwamen niet terug. Maar sommige dorpen wilden wel terugkomen. In mijn werkzaamheden had ik ook te maken met de coördinatie van het donorgeld.”

“Op justitiële vak deugde niks in Bosnië”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“In Balkan is er teveel en te weinig aan wetgeving. Dat komt vanuit het communistische tijdperk waar teveel regels waren en waar de gemiddelde burger niks van snapte. Vaak waren deze regels ook tegenstrijdig, waardoor het nog onduidelijker was voor de gemiddelde burger. Het heeft ook een lange geschiedenis dat er in die regio met gunsten wordt gewerkt: ‘ik gun jou iets en jij gunt mij iets’. Dus die gunstcultuur verander je niet zomaar met betere wetgeving. Aan ene kant heb je
ook te maken met een hele oude wetgeving en de kwaliteit van de wetgeving schiet ook te kort. Met name gaat het om de uitvoerende wetgeving waar heel veel aan schort.’’

‘‘Veel mensen zijn zich ook niet bewust van de corruptie om hun heen, omdat zij het niet als corruptie zien, maar het als onderdeel van hun cultuur zien: ‘ik gun jou iets en jij gunt mij het’. Dat zie je ook in de politieke stelsel daar. Een voorbeeld: je stemt op een burgemeester, omdat hij jou weg heeft geasfalteerd. Die gedachte verander je niet zomaar, aangezien de mensen een beperkt beeld van democratie hebben die gebaseerd is op patronage.’’

‘‘Soms als mensen een fles wijn aan een ambtenaar geven, zien zij het niet als corruptie, maar zij denken: ‘hij is aardig voor mij geweest ik ben netjes en ben ook aardig voor hem.’ Het is moeilijk om de mensen dat af te leren, want het is een cultureel gegeven die jij niet zomaar wegneemt. Wel kan jij het beïnvloeden. Ik zie in de beïnvloeding een sterke rol voor CIMIC/NGO’s/IO’s. Zij kunnen het beïnvloeden door heel duidelijk te zijn in de criteria/voorwaarden in de projecten: ‘uitleggen dat als jij aan de criteria voldoet, dan krijg je de vergunning of subsidie.’’

‘‘Het spanningsveld tussen de criteria moet helder verwoord worden, zodat iedereen weet waar die aan toe is.’’....'’ Ik zie een taak voor CIMIC en andere internationale organisaties en die moeten hameren op de transparantie van de criteria ‘s.’’

‘‘Met het bouwen van een suffisticated systeem hoe je projecten uitvoert (waarom in een dorp brug komt en in een andere niet), kom je ook verder. Door het bouw van bijvoorbeeld een brug is er een economische impuls in een regio, daarom is zorgvuldigheid vereist.’’

‘‘In gebieden waar oorlog heeft geheerst, is snelheid belangrijker. Dus vanuit de donorkant is een realpolitik nodig. Maar hoe leg je dat uit aan de mensen die het geld niet krijgen? Dan denken die inwoners dat dorpsoudste een steekpenning voor heeft gekregen. Mensen in Balkan denken snel aan complottheorieën. Het is in hun volksaard.’’

**Question 3:** Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results? Was there a guideline during your mission how to deal with corruption?

‘‘Iemand had zich ingekocht in de bosbouw. Hij was mede-eigenaar van de bosbouw. Er is een boswachter vermoord en de stafflijf van de OHR was aan het eten in een restaurant. Hij had het raam van zijn auto open gelaten en het wapen, waarmee die boswachter was vermoord, lag toevallig op zijn achterbank. Het ging dus om onzuivere praktijken. Hij is niet ontslagen, maar hij moest een andere baan zoeken, want zij hadden hem niet meer nodig.”....’’ Wij hadden geen code of conduct die heel helder moest zijn. De VN heeft wel een hele duidelijke code of conduct, maar dat miste in de organisatie.’’

‘‘In het tweede geval ging het om een Duitse politie commissaris. Hij was het hoofd van een kanton van de European Police Mission (EUPM). Hij ging ieder weekend met de lokale politie commissaris naar zijn huisje aan de kust van Kroatië. Er werd gerapporteerd dat de banden heel innig waren. Nadat hij terug was van zijn missie is hem een verbod gelegd en hij mocht niet meer op een internationale missie. De EUPM had ook geen code of conduct.”

‘‘Er moet meer zijn dan alleen maar een code of conduct (bijvoorbeeld een role play, bijeenkomsten, film tonen), want veel mensen van CIMIC zijn geen lezers, maar doeners. Zowel
de senioren als junioren moeten bewust worden, zodat als zij signalen van onzuivere praktijken zien, dat zij dat ook kunnen rapporteren."

“Ik heb een mooi voorbeeld gezien van een integere captain: wij werden uitgenodigd om te eten bij een oude stel, omdat hun dorp zou worden herbouwd. Deze mensen hadden niks. Zij hadden wel kippen, maar geen haan. Dus heeft die CIMIC captain een haan voor die mensen gekocht met zijn eigen geld, dus hij gebruikte geen gemeenschaps geld. De aanleiding hier was puur humanitair.”

“Wij misten een code of conduct en wij misten een duidelijke training. De mensen waren ook voor één jaar, dus zij werden ook niet voldoende onderlegd.”

“CIMIC officieren rouleerde om de zes maanden, maar zij hadden wel continuïteit. De informatiestroom was ook aanwezig, maar de militairen lazen geen rapporten en schreven vaak ook slecht.”...“Een overlappende structuur waar een aantal CIMIC mensen niet tegelijkertijd vertrekken met de gewone militairen zie ik als erg nuttig. Dus zij moeten of langer zitten of moet er meer overlapping zijn in de periode van roulering.”

De respondent gaf volgende voorbeeld: “Er was een burgemeester die twee bankrekeningen had: officiële en niet-officiële. Wij kwamen erachter en dit is een aanleiding geweest dat de burgemeester uit de functie was gezet. De nieuwe burgemeester wist dat hij goed werd bekeken en hij had net een andere machtsbasis, waardoor de bevolking anders heeft durven stemmen tijdens de volgende verkiezingen.”

“Ik maakte ook gemeenteraadsbesprekingen mee waarbij de raadsleden moesten acteren en lovend moesten zijn over de burgemeester. Achteraf vertelden deze raadsleden dat zij moesten acteren, want anders zouden er onprettige gevolgen voor hen of hun familieleden zijn.”

Verder voegde de respondent een andere voorbeeld toe, namelijk: “Een bouwbedrijf heeft niet genoeg opdrachten om zijn mensen in dienst te houden. De eigenaar/manager overweegt enkele/alle werknemers te ontslaan als er niet snel zicht is op nieuwe opdrachten. Locale begroting zit vast omdat die nog niet goedgekeurd is door de gemeenteraad, waarbij geen enkele partij de meerderheid heeft en een 'deadlock' is ontstaan -- lokale politieke ruzies dus. Wethouder ziet ook dat weg X toch echt geasfalteerd moet worden -- het kan zo niet langer. Dus, er wordt informeel afgesproken met het bouwbedrijf dat het alvast de weg kan afsloteren..... de aanbesteding en het verstrekken van de opdracht aan het bouwbedrijf komt later wel. Het bouwbedrijf gaat voortvarend aan de slag en asfalteert de weg. Nu komt de aanbestedingsprocedure. Tja, die moet toch echt gewonnen worden door juist dit bouwbedrijf. Dus met creatief aanbesteden komt alleen dit bedrijf in aanmerking voor de opdracht of worden de procedures wat omzield of creatief toegepast, zodat juist dit bouwbedrijf de opdracht krijgt. Is dit corruptie? Niet in de zin dat er steekpenningen zijn verstrekt. Wel in de zin dat er een transparente/openbare aanbestedingsprocedure is omzield omwille van het op de been houden van een lokaal bouwbedrijf (die natuurlijk een uiterst goede verstandhouding heeft met deze wethouder). Alles draait maar om die ene eerste vraag die je ook stelde: hoe zie jij de definitie van 'corruptie'.”

Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?
Deze vraag is niet specifiek behandeld, aangezien de antwoorden van deze vragen zijn bij de andere vragen aan bod gekomen.

“In Balkan zag je ook dat de mensen dachten ‘als ik alles bij elkaar optel, dan moet ik in aanmerking voor komen.’ Maar zo werkt het niet en jij moet aan alle voorwaarden voldoen. Afwijken van een procedure is ook een vorm van corruptie.”

**Question 5**: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Het is hooguit meer geworden, maar dat is mijn gevoel. Een internationale missie geeft de bevolking het gevoel dat de leiders niet deugen, terwijl de bevolking de leiders hebben gekozen.”

“Ik denk dat het de taak is van de internationale bestuur om te zeggen ‘het is jullie land en jullie moeten verantwoordelijkheid nemen.’ In Bosnië had je ook te maken dat als de lokale bestuurders moeilijke beslissingen moesten nemen, dat zij naar de internationale organisaties kwamen om die beslissingen te nemen. Als de internationale organisaties in zulke gevallen vergaande bevoegdheden krijgen, kan het zijn dat zij dan de eigen democratie ondermijnen. Maar de lokale bestuurders moeten juist de beslissingen nemen... in Balkan zijn zij niet goed in. De laatste jaren weigert de internationale gemeenschap in Bosnië om interventie te doen, maar qua bestuur is het een puinhoop.”

“De ministers in Bosnië rijden in een Audi A4 en het hebben van een status zorgt ervoor dat de ministers de bijbehorende attributen willen. De internationale gemeenschap heeft daar te weinig op gehamerd door niet te zeggen dat zij ook in Opel Corsa kunnen rijden. Het is een symptoom en die moet je bestrijden om aan de onderliggende oorzaken iets te gaan veranderen. De bestuurders moeten accepteren dat wat zij doen niet altijd correct is. Maar de bevolking in Bosnië had enorm respect voor de hiërarchie en het idee van respect verander je niet zomaar.”

“CIMIC kan ook de lokale bestuurders vragen om hoe zij hun uitgaven verantwoorden. Men had daar een wet van openbaar bestuur aangenomen onder de druk van de internationale gemeenschap, maar de wet werd niet gebruikt. Het is ook een denkfout als men denkt dat wet van openbaar bestuur corruptie kan remmen. Er moeten meer bindende regels komen voor publicatie en transparantie.”

**Question 6**: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

Naast transparantie en aanpassen van wetgeving, wat zijn de andere middelen om corruptie aan te pakken? De respondent antwoordde als volgt: “Dan moet je naar het concept van patronage kijken. Veel transparantie van begrotingen, openbaar maken van subsidie toekenningen.”

“Wat ik zag in Bosnië was dat de salarissen van de openbare rechters omhoog gingen, maar de situatie werd niet beter. Het verhogen van de ambtenaren-salarissen zie ik als verspild geld. De salaris van een ambtenaar moet goed zijn en eervol zijn, zodat jij een gezin kan onderhouden. Duidelijke regels stellen, maar het is niet makkelijk. Maar het denken dat extreem hoge salarissen
iemand ongevoelig maakt voor corruptie is een denkfout. Democratie op een te lokaal niveau is ook gevaarlijk en dat zag ik ook in Bosnië. Sommige dingen moeten niet op lokaal niveau geregeld worden, want dan wordt de machtsbasis van de lokale politiek te sterk.”

“Lokale transparantie kan bewerkstelligd worden door middel van openbaar maken van besluiten, dus niet alleen op internet, maar ook ophangen bij gemeentehuizen. De internationale gemeenschap kan druk leggen op de bestuurders om de naleving van de regels te verbeteren.”

Op de vraag hoe corruptie uit het systeem moest gehaald worden, antwoordde geïnterviewde als volgt: “Met concrete procedures, criteria die heel duidelijk zijn. Soms als jij iets vaak genoeg hoort, dan ga je erin geloven. Als er voldoende mensen zijn die zelf ervaren hoe het is om de procedures na te leven.”

“Een aantal projecten in Bosnië zijn nu stilgelegd, aangezien zij niet voldeden aan de criteria’s. Dus conditionality is ook een manier, maar dan wordt de gewone burger de dupe van.”


“Gesprekken voeren met de bevolking en proberen om de personen te laten praten. Praten, daarna verwoorden en doorgeven aan het hoofdkantoor. Daar zijn de militairen niet aan gewend en zijn niet goed in soft intelligence en het opschrijven ervan. Informatie verzamelen op een manier dat toegankelijk is en de waarde van deze soft informatie moet je niet onderschatten. Soms moet je ook actief op zoek gaan naar informatie, maar macht van de lokale justitiële aanklager (lokale bestuur) moet je ook niet ondermijnen. Om dat niet te doen, kan je door nieuwsgierigheid te tonen kleine praatjes houden. Uitwisseling van informatie is ook belangrijk. Dit kan door middel van bijeenkomsten. Een voorbeeld is dat wij bijeenkomsten hadden met de CIMIC, OVSE en OHR. Dus in plaats van rapporteren, kom je fysiek bij elkaar om informatie uit te wisselen, want dat is veel efficiënter. In zo’n gebied is informatie uitwisseling heel erg belangrijk.”

“Ik geloof in persoonlijk contact: wekelijkse of maandelijkse bijeenkomsten. En vooral de soft information (roddels) zijn belangrijk. Situation awareness is belangrijk en de militairen zijn hier niet goed in. De militairen, die op patrouilles gingen, hadden niet altijd de benodige skills. Men heeft praters nodig binnen de militaire eenheid en deze moeten tijdens patrouilles de bevolking aanspreken (door interesse/medeleven te tonen). Daarmee kan je ook informatie verzamelen.”

Op de vraag of corruptie vanuit bottom-up approach moest of vanuit top down approach reageerde de geïnterviewde als volgt: “Bottom-up, maar de goede leiders moeten wel een goed voorbeeld geven.”

“Je moet de bevolking zelf redzaam maken.”

“Goede wetgeving en hardheidsclausules moeten zijn, maar die moeten goed afgebakend zijn. Als je een training zou moeten doen, dan is een training in hardheidsclausule goed, maar dat is niet voor de militairen missies maar voor de civiele missies.”

**Question 7:** Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?
Deze vraag, over de rol van CIMIC in het bestrijden van corruptie, heb ik niet specifiek gesteld, aangezien de antwoorden van deze vraag in eerdere vragen aan bod waren gekomen.

Rol van de militairen: “Nee, de militairen hebben toch een beperkte rol in.”

De respondent ging door met het geven van een voorbeeld: “Er gingen geruchten dat er paar bestuurders waren die niet deugden. Ik hoorde van CIMIC mensen dat er wapenkisten in een kerk waren, dus die kerk was een opslagplaats voor illegale wapentransport... De politieke informatie, dat bepaalde bestuurders niet deugen, werd doorgegeven aan de CIMIC-mensen en zij hebben een eigen manier om met illegale wapentransport om te gaan. Maar de illegale praktijken gebeuren niet zomaar en er zitten dus ook bestuurlijke elementen in: grenscontroles die niet goed zijn. Dus vanuit een militaire oogpunt: als zij gaan patrouilleren, moeten zij de informatie ook doorgeven aan de politieke mensen.”

“Vaak misten de militairen de civiele kant, dus militaire die een luisterend oor hadden en open vragen stelden (bijvoorbeeld vragen naar de lokale aspecten, vragen hoe de bevolking hun dagelijkse leven ervaart.”...”Je miste de civiele actoren tijdens de missie, terwijl heel veel militairen aanwezig waren.”

Rol van CIMIC: ”CIMIC-mensen kunnen ook met gemeenteraadsleden praten en toneel spelen tijdens patrouilles. CIMIC-mensen moeten de bevolking aanspreken en vragen stellen.”

“Juridische kennis is goed voor de CIMIC-officieren: ze moeten weten hoe de formatiebesprekingen gaan, wat de regels zijn, wie bevoegd is tot wat, wat de juridische basis is?”...”Dit is nodig, want in elk land is het anders en heeft een burgemeester in ene land andere bevoegdheden dan een burgemeester in een andere land.”

“Waar ik ook minder in geloof is trainingen, dus trainingen in abstractie. Een voorbeeld: training van het lokale bestuur. Tenzij deze trainingen meer actief zijn, zoals het schrijven van beleidsregels, je kan ook training geven op procedures, trainingen geven in beleidsregels maken over hoe de gemeentebestuur met de burgers omgaat. Dus ook trainingen over hoe de gemeente lokale verordeningen schrijft. Trainingen op te hoog abstractie niveau werkt niet, maar trainingen met behulp van case studies werkt beter.”

**Question 8:** What did you learn from your experiences?

“Ik vond het heel erg leuk werk, maar ik had het gehad met het land die maar niet vooruit komt.”

**Question 9:** Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“Nee, niet echt. Ik heb geen goed oplossing voor Bosnië. Er moet wel een nieuwe grondwet komen. Corruptie is een lang proces. Het heeft geen zin om corruptie te benadrukken, maar je moet het vanuit een positieve manier benadrukken (goed bestuur). Focus meer op transparantie, benader het vanuit de huidige realiteit, namelijk vanuit de huidige juridische, financiële en politieke realiteit.”
Interview report

Anonymized interview number 19

Interview: on 13-1-2015 at 16.15. The interview was conducted via the phone because the interviewee is residing in Sarajevo. Because this person is in Sarajevo his/her experiences are more up-to-date than the experiences of the other interviewees. We discussed the questions mentioned in the guideline. During the interview we had a nice conversation and I learned a lot from the experiences. The interviewee knew about my research and was willing to help me with sharing his/her experience. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research. There are lots of experience and insights.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkans? In which country? What were your tasks there?

“Ik heb van 1993-1996 in Bosnië gewerkt, dus dat was tijdens de oorlog. Ik deed logistiek, programmering, voedselhulp en voedseltransporten, opvang van vluchtelings en brandstofdistributie.”

“Ik heb ook in 1996 in Macedonië gewerkt. Ik werk nu weer in Bosnië.”

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

Vanuit het Westerse perspectief: “Corruptie is (ik ben erg streng in) dat geld of middelen inzet voor een doel waar het niet gebruikt zou moeten worden.”

Vanuit het Balkan perspectief: “De samenleving werkt niet iets anders, met is iets toleranter tegenover kleine corruptie. Traditioneel werd er altijd extra geld of kado’s gegeven voor geboden diensten, bijv. extra geld geven aan de behandeld arts. Het is een andere kijk op dingen en gaat het om extra beloning voor de diensten waar jij recht op zou moeten hebben. Nu, na de oorlog, is lijkt dit systeem volslagen doorgeslagen, en nu is de cultuur van belonen voor de diensten waar jij recht op hebt omgedraaid; als jij voor die diensten (dokter, gemeente) niet betaalt (vooral met geld), krijg je die diensten niet – dan moet je extra lang wachten of krijg je slechte diensten.”…”De cultuur van uitbundige belonen is afgegleden naar corruptie.”

Question 3: Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results?

“Iemand die 4000 euro extra geld moest betalen om zijn/haar zoon te laten inschrijven op universiteit.”
“Mensen die veel geld moeten betalen voor hun medische behandeling, wat vaak niet minder is dan de 1000 euro. En die 1000 euro is extra wat betaald moet worden, dus geldt niet voor de behandeling, maar het geldt om gezien te worden door de dokter. En dit is alledaagse corruptie.”

“Er is gigantische corruptie in de bouw: tendering van de aannemers. Te veel om op te noemen.”

“Tijdens de oorlog zag ik ook veel corruptie en het ging om waardevolle en kostbare spullen. Als ik dat merkte (want er werd opgelet of er producten op de zwarte markt kwamen, er werd gekeken naar de prijzen fluctuatie op de markt) dan werd er corruptie was – dus bijvoorbeeld als de hulpgoederen van de organisatie op de markt kwamen – dan werd dat bij de volgende levering in mindering gebracht. Wij reageerden wel op corrupte handelingen door middel van dit soort dingen. Wij hebben ook de spullen van de zwarte markt gehaald en terug gebracht naar distributiecentra.”

“Ja, in paar gevallen hielpen de maatregelen om corruptie te verminderen.”

Een andere voorbeeld: “In een gebied was de prijs van zout erg hoog. Toen hebben wij extra zout toegestuurd naar de zwarte markt in dat gebied (want in dat gebied had je geen andere markt), zodat iedereen zout had, maar de prijzen bleven even hoog. Dan zag je dat de overheden (of de mensen die daar voor het zeggen hadden) de zoutleverantie tegenhielden of gingen opslaan. Corruptie, of in dit geval diefstal is wel te meten.”

Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“Nee, maar we hadden wel de standard guidelines, a personal code of conduct, zoals het niet aannemen van geschenken, dure diners. Maar die guidelines waren puur persoonlijk, dus ze gingen niet over hoe met de goederen om moest worden gegaan. Het ging dus met name om personal conduct. Ik heb niet meegemaakt dat iemand mij probeerde om te kopen.”

Question 4: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context?

“Ja, dat denk ik wel. Bijvoorbeeld, in Nederland is niet onze eerste aard om voordat te solliciteren iemand in te schakelen, zodat diegene een goed woordje voor jou doet. Hier in Bosnië is het heel anders: er is hier bijna niemand die eerst een brief stuurt zonder iemand in te schakelen. Het is niet allemaal corruptie, maar het is een andere kijk op zaken.”

“In Nederland is het allemaal rigide, maar hier is het heel anders. Een land zoals Bosnië wordt helemaal niet geregeld en het enige systeem – belonen voor de diensten die eigenlijk geleverd moeten worden. Hier gaat het om extra belonen voor het geven van diensten wat eigenlijk niet hoeft.”

How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“Het corrupte systeem hier is nu zover ontstaat dat de bevolking het langzamerhand het niet meer pikt. Hier is het nu langzamerhand de bevolking zat van.”
“Er was iemand die zijn/haar zoon wilde inschrijven bij een faculteit van een universiteit en daarvoor moest die persoon heel veel geld betalen. Zij zijn heel huiverig om iets aan de kaart te stellen, aangezien het hun persoonlijke belangen raakt.”

“Als iemand een proces zou starten tegen een dokter die hem/haar slecht behandeld heeft, brengt diegene zijn/haar eigen gezondheidszorg in Bosnië ernstig in gevaar. Dus er is niemand die het doet, het is lastig om aan te kaarten.”

“Iedereen weet het en iedereen is zich totaal van bewust, maar het is lastig om het aan de kaak te stellen.”

**Question 5:** What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Met een internationale missie maak je bij de overheid middelen vrij die zij niet meer voor de bevolking moeten inzetten, maar die kunnen zij dus inzetten voor andere doeleinden, oorlogsvoering.”

“All geld wat in een land binnenkomt, heeft invloed op de corruptie in een land. Een internationale missie heeft ook invloed op de economie, op de handelingen van de overheden.”

“Bosnië is een oorlogsgebied en economie is één van de laatste zorgen.”

**Question 6:** From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

**Key actors/key factors:** “De hoofdpartners in het bestrijden van corruptie zijn de verschillende politieapparaten in een land, de aanklagers en de rechtbank.”

“Wat jij vaak ziet in veel corrupte landen is dat het vertrouwen in die instellingen – politieapparaat en rechtelijke macht laag is. Dat is ook een probleem bij het bestrijden van corruptie, want in je strijd heb je ook de bevolking nodig. Zonder de bevolking – als zij het probleem niet naar voren brengen, de corrupte mensen aanklagen – dan wordt het heel erg lastig. Maar de strijd tegen corruptie gebeurt niet, omdat het vertrouwen in de instellingen, die corruptie moeten aanpakken, laag is. Dus wat ik denk dat jij in een post-conflict situatie als eerste moet doen, is het werken aan het politieapparaat en aan de rechtelijke macht. Dat moet je goed krijgen en ervoor zorgen dat de mensen in die instellingen vertrouwen krijgen. Na een conflict is het belangrijk om hard te werken aan een betrouwbare politiemacht en rechtelijke macht.”

“Het is belangrijk dat de bevolking de instellingen als betrouwbaar ziet. In Bosnië is er een grote internationale politiemacht geweest het heeft ook gedeeltelijk gewerkt. Door middel van geven van trainingen, screenen van de rechters en legal staff (screenen op hun oorlogsverleden en op hun professionaliteit) en diegenen die een oorlogsverleden hadden, zijn bepaalde functionarissen uit hun functie gezet. Er zijn ook in Bosnië internationale legal staff gekomen om als werknemer voor aantal jaren hier te werken om ervoor te zorgen dat de rechters en officieren beter contact te kregen met hun collega’s. Zij probeerden op die manier hun Bosnische collega’s te betrekken bij de internationale rechtelijke macht. Dit zorgde ook voor meer vertrouwen vanuit de bevolking in
hun rechterlijke macht. De bevolking had meer vertrouwen in het internationale personeel dan in het nationale personeel. Door dit soort instrumenten zijn de standaarden bij de statshof enorm verhoogd.”

“Corruptie in rechterlijke macht in Bosnië is niet het hoofdprobleem. De internationale personeel is nu inmiddels vertrokken en laten wij hopen dat het hof sterk genoeg is om de standaarden hoog te houden en niet gaat afvallen. Hetzelfde geldt ook voor de politie. De missie heeft de rechterlijke macht enorm versterkt.”

Op de vraag of er veranderingen zijn sinds 1993, werd als volgt geantwoord: “Na de oorlog was er enorm hoop dat er een goed functionerende staat zou komen, maar dat is niet gebeurd en nu is de bevolking meer hopeloos en hebben zij minder vertrouwen in de staat. Dit heeft ook te maken met de corruptie, want de bevolking ervaart veel corruptie op verschillende niveaus. En dit zorgt weer voor dat de bevolking geen vertrouwen heeft in het systeem.”

Question 7: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

Rol voor de militairen/military tools: “In Bosnië zijn er weinig militairen en die kunnen niet veel doen. In de huidige Bosnië zie ik niet hoe de militairen iets zouden kunnen doen aan de corruptie.”

“Vorig jaar mei waren overstromingen in Bosnië en de leger heeft civiele taken uitgevoerd. Het ging goed: alles was goed georganiseerd en goed gecoördineerd. Na die overstromingen kwamen geldstromen in Bosnië op gang en het geld was bedoeld om de slachtoffers te helpen. Het geldstroom heeft ervoor gezorgd dat enorme corruptie toesloeg.”


“In BiH (Bosnië) bestaan zgn Liaison Observation team (LOT) huizen, gerund door EUFOR militairen, waar de bevolking naar toe kan voor klachten. Deze huizen kunnen ook ingezet worden voor het verbeteren van corruptie. Men kan daar zeggen ‘als jij met corruptie te maken hebt, kom het dan bij ons melden’. De bevolking wil dat wel doen, omdat zij vertrouwen hebben in de militairen. Het is wel belangrijk dat de militairen dan daadwerkelijk ook iets met die klachten doen en naar de juiste instellingen brengen.”

“Met corruptie heb je paar goede voorbeelden nodig en die voorbeelden ga je echt aanpakken. En als militair jij daaraan gaat werken, zorgt dat ervoor dat de mensen met hun klacht komen. Als er daadwerkelijk wat aan gedaan wordt, krijg je steeds meer mensen.”

Rol van CIMIC: “Jij kan die huizen specifiek anti-corruptie maken en aan de bevolking laten weten dat deze voor anti-corruptie zijn. De bevolking moet ook weten waar deze huizen gestationeerd zijn en dat zij hun klachten anoniem kwijt kunnen, dan is er een rol voor CIMIC.”
“Veel informatie campagnes voeren.”

Question 8: What did you learn from your experiences?

“In het begin is het heel belangrijk dat men de culturele achtergrond van een land goed begrijpt (iets wat wij corruptie zien, ziet een andere cultuur niet als corruptie).”

“Een missie moet heel erg transparant zijn en die transparantie moet je ook van jouw partners daar eisen. Het moet duidelijk zijn wat de voorwaarden zijn en het moet duidelijk zijn dat vanuit de missie volledige transparantie wordt geëist.”

Question 9: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“Het is belangrijk om te kijken in wat voor situatie je zit, bijvoorbeeld een post-conflict situatie. Misschien kan je kijken naar de relatie tussen de militairen en de politie. Als jij een anti-corruptie missie hebt, dan moet je veel met de politie werken en niet alleen met de militairen. Jij moet een goede werkrelatie met de politie opzetten.”
Interview report

Anonymized interview number 22.

Interview: on 11-2-2015 at 14:00. First the interviewee started by telling about his/her experiences in the Balkans. After finishing the story I asked the questions mentioned in the guideline, but not in the same order as mentioned in the interview guideline. During the interview we had a nice conversation, which was in Dutch, and I learned a lot from the experiences. The interviewee knew about my research and was willing to help me with sharing his/her experience. The interview was very informative and is of huge relevance for my research.

Question 1: Could you please tell me about your military experience in the Balkans? In which country? How many times you have been on a mission? What have been your tasks there?

“Ik ben in 2008 in Bosnië geweest.”

“De oude generatie van de bevolking spreekt Russisch als tweede taal, dus geen Engels. Maar er waren ook mensen die Duits spraken.”

“Tijdens mijn missie was er geen gevaar. Het enige wat je hebt: je moet een mijnen-kaart hebben, want jij kon niet overal van de weg afgaan. En de mijnen waren wel goed in kaart gebracht.”

“Wat ikzelf niet goed vond, waren de voorbereidingen vóór de uitzending. Wij hebben een week voorbereidingen gehad en drie dagen daarvan ging het om hoe je met echte tolken moest werken. Maar daar kom je in aanraking met tolken die niet het niveau hebben wat wij kennen. Hier wordt alles letterlijk vertaald, maar daar wordt alles samengevat en aan jou doorgegeven. Wij kregen maar 2,5 les over cultuur, achtergrond en geschiedenis. Ik leerde meer over de cultuur en de geschiedenis tijdens en na mijn missie, dan tijdens de 2,5 lessen.

Question 2: In the context of the mission, what do you understand by corruption?

“Corruptie vanuit de Nederlandse maatstaven: corruptie is als jij omkoopbaar of chanteerbaar bent. Mensen zijn beïnvloedbaar.”

“In de Balkan is er gewoon andere cultuur en als jij daar snel iets voor elkaar wilt krijgen, dan wordt er iets toegestoken. En dat hoeft niet in de vorm van geld, maar het kan zijn ‘ik doe jou nu een plezier en dan verwacht ik dat ooit een keer terug.’ Het gebeurt hier ook, maar dan minder.”

Question 3: Did you witness corrupt behavior? Give an example? How did you deal with it and what were the results?
“Ik heb niets gemerkt van corruptie tijdens mijn missie, maar ik heb wel wat gehoord. Dat hoor je van een andere partijen.”

“In Bosnië wordt er goed gecontroleerd aan de grens, tenzij er een corrupte medewerker is.”

“Vooral bij de grenscontrole heb ik niet het gevoel dat het corrupt is. Ik weet dat tussen 2009-2011 veel mensen zijn ontslagen wegens corruptie, dus ik heb de indruk dat zij wel op de goede weg zijn. Alleen doe je dat niet in twee of drie jaar, maar het heeft langere tijd nodig.”

“Wat jij wel ziet, is dat de ene de andere kent en dat de mensen weten bij wie zij moeten zijn.”

“Als jij over hoge niveau praat: de pensioenen zijn met 40% ingekort en de medewerkers van de parlement hebben 40% bij hun salaris gekregen, terwijl die al veel meer hadden.”

“Bij de gezondheidszorg zijn de mensen slecht verzekerd, maar heel veel wordt niet vergoed en als jij veel geld hebt, wordt jij goed geholpen. Maar dat is niet per se corruptie.”

“In de ziekenhuizen daar ziet het achterstallig uit, maar de kennis van de docenten zijn veel beter.”

“Ik ben zelf twee keer behandeld in het ziekenhuis en aangezien mijn vrouw de dienstdoende verpleegster kende, werd ik meteen geholpen en hoefde ik niks te betalen.”

“In het land zit wel een corruptie-probleem en met name in het bestuur.”

“Ik vond de politie daar kundig, maar ik moest ‘koffiegeld’ betalen als ik werd aangehouden wanneer ik beetje te hard reed. Dat had te maken met het systeem: als jij werd aangehouden, kreeg je een bonnetje. Met dat papier moest je naar de bank, ergens ver weg, om het te betalen en kreeg je een bonnetje terug. Daarmee kwam je terug en dan kreeg je je papieren terug. Daaraan ben ik drie uur kwijt en door ‘koffiegeld’ te betalen, ben je sneller van af.”

Did you receive guidelines how to deal with corrupt situation?

“Nee, wij kregen wel informatie wat wij wel moesten doen als er een conflict tussen partijen zou ontstaan en waardoor veel geweld zou zijn. Er werden verzamelplaatsen aangewezen waar wij konden verzamelen en dan zouden wij met de helikopters uit het gebied vertrekken. Maar over corruptie is er geen woord over gevallen.”

**Question 4**: Do you think there is a relation between corruption and cultural context? How did the citizens/local actors experience corruption?

“Het wordt als aanvulling gezien op de slechte salaris.”

“Hoe meer jij naar het zuiden gaat en ook Noord-Afrika en Midden-Oosten erbij neemt, probeert men de Westerse cultuur daar op te leggen. Persoonlijk denk ik dat dat niet werkt. Ik denk dat jij daarmee heel voorzichtig moet zijn, want de Westerse cultuur is niet leidend voor de rest van de wereld. Dat wil niet zeggen dat als er ernstige vormen van corruptie zijn, dat jij dat niet minder moet maken.”

“Corruptie hoort bij het mens zijn, maar jij moet zorgen dat het binnen een bepaalde omvang blijft...maar wat het omvang is, is onduidelijk.”
“Corruptie is er wel en het is meer in de Balkan dan in het Westen. Gedeeltelijk heeft het te maken met het cultuur en gedeeltelijk heeft het te maken met wat er in de jaren '90 gebeurd is, dus de oorlog. Dan wordt iedereen corrupt als het maar kan. Als ik 2008 en nu vergelijk, dan zie ik dat het beter gaat. Op politiek niveau heb ik geen idee, maar je leest wel dat er medewerkers van de politie of grensbewaking worden ontslagen door corruptie. Het gaat dus langzaam de goede kant op.”

“Zolang de salarissen laag zijn, dan is het moeilijk.”

Question 5: What do you think about the relationship between an international military mission and the level of corruption? Does an international military mission influence the level of corruption?

“Ik denk dat het begint wat de standaard van de regio is. En ik geloof niet dat als er een missie is – of het gecoördineerd is vanuit de EU, VN of de NAVO – dat het niveau van corruptie minder wordt. Dat is absoluut niet zo. Ik denk dat de cultuur, die daar heerst, die zullen hun middelen gebruiken om geld en goederen los te krijgen van de partijen die in het gebied zijn. Maar hetzelfde zou hier ook gebeuren.”

“De conflict in de Balkan is erg ingewikkeld en ik denk dat het conflict in het gebied één van de oudste conflicten op wereld is. Het conflict in kaart brengen is al heel ingewikkeld.”

“Met name in een conflictsituatie is corruptie in extreme maten aanwezig.”

Question 6: From your perspective, how could one counter corruption effectively? What are the key factors/actors which should be taken into consideration when countering corruption?

“Dat mensen een toekomstperspectief wordt geboden, zoals werk en inkomen. Scholing is uiteraard belangrijk. Als mensen dat vooruitzicht niet hebben, komt het niet goed. Jij moet de mensen een toekomst bieden.”

“Vooral Bosnië is een goed voorbeeld van: er is hoge werkloosheid, de pensioenen gaan omlaag en alles is duurder geworden. Toiletartikelen bij hetzelfde winkel in bijvoorbeeld Duitsland zijn goedkoper dan in Bosnië.”

“Politie en justitie gaan in de regio de goede kant op. Dat hoor ik, dus ik zie het zelf niet. Bij gezondheidszorg heeft men weinig geld om apparatuur te komen. De economische situatie is niet goed...het land is eigenlijk failliet. In Bosnië verdiende men het geld vanuit de wapenindustrie, maar dat mogen zij niet. Kapen van bomen is ook illegaal en dat is ook stop gelegd, dus er is geen toekomstperspectief. Het land toeristisch maken kan ook niet, want er liggen zoveel mijnen dat als men 600 jaar elke dag mijnen op zou ruimen, zouden zij dan nog niet opgeruimd zijn. Dus de toeristen zouden niet overal kunnen komen.”

“Republiek Serbska heeft veel meer geld. In Bosnische Federatie moet het geld verdeeld worden tussen drie groepen en het probleem is ook dat de beste mensen niet altijd op juiste plek komen te zitten.”
**Question 7**: Which developments do you foresee in the role of the military to counter corruption in a mission situation? Can the military and/or the CIMIC be valuable for the improvement of the situation?

*Role for military:* “Ik vind het geen militaire aangelegenheid. Het is puur politiek issue. Militairen hebben een rol in conflict, dus om vechttende partijen te scheiden en gescheiden te houden. Maar het oplossen van allerlei zaken, dat is voor politici en voor NGOs. Dat vind ik geen taak van Defensie.”

*Role for CIMIC:* “CIMIC is en blijft een verlengstuk van Defensie. En ik zie geen rol voor Defensie. Anders is wel als een land kapot is en bij het opbouwen ervan kan Defensie de Defensie daar opleiden. De militairen kunnen de militairen daar opleiden. Daar zie ik wel een rol in, maar om ons te gaan bemoeien met corruptie...nee.”

“Mensen goed voorbereiden op een uitzending. Cultural awareness, en corruptie is een onderdeel van, is het enige wat belangrijk is. Eén maand lang, voordat de militairen op een missie gaan, voorbereiden op een missie. Het gaat om diepgang en nog meer diepgang. Daarmee kom je heel ver, maar dat is een kleine stap. Als jij cultural awareness hebt, ga je met een andere mindset naar een missie toe en begrijp je ook dingen beter.”

**Question 8**: What did you learn from your experiences?

“Als jij als militair uitgezonden wordt, moet je goed voorbereid worden op de achtergrond van het gebied waar jij naartoe gaat.”

“Je moet ook open kunnen staan dat ergens anders anders is. Daar hebben de militairen moeite mee.”

“De Croatische tolken waren proberen makkelijker mensen om de tuin te leiden. “Mensen voor hun karretje spannen” als het ware. dan de Bosnische tolken. Deze waren veel socialer.”

**Question 9**: Is there anything you would like to add on this topic or in general?

“Samengevat: als jij corruptie gaat vergelijken naar Westerse maatstaven is het daar meer aanwezig dan hier. Maakt het allemaal slechter? Ik betwijfel het. Wat er op hoger niveau daar speelt, kan ik niet oordelen. Maar de oplossing: geef de mensen een toekomstperspectief. Je kunt van alles naartoe sturen, maar als er geen opleiding, geen uitzicht op werk is en geen betere economische situatie is, dan wordt het moeilijk.”