State-building through Security Sector Reforms in Afghanistan

Peyman Almasov

S 2819473

+31687948007

Hoendiepskade 7A, Groningen 9718 BD

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Luis Lobo-Guerrero

University of Groningen

2015
Declaration by Candidate

I hereby declare that this thesis, ‘State-building through Security Sector Reforms in Afghanistan’, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name: Peyman Almasov
Date: 2015-08-15
Abstract
This thesis aims to analyze how Security Sector Reforms (SSR) can contribute to state-formation. It has been argued that effective state-building requires an endogenous political process which aims at creating political legitimacy instead of certain Western style state institutions. In a post-conflict society this demands security for people- an environment in which they feel safe and protected-allowing them to participate actively in a state-fashioning process. The example of Afghan Police Reform demonstrates that a state-centric SSR is in danger of delegitimizing and destabilizing the state. In contrast, a human-centric security approach to state-building is more likely to support an endogenous process of building legitimate state structures. While the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) provides training for police and supports a design which reflects a human-centric approach to reforms and focuses on the rule of law and accountability, the United States-dominated NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan is state-centric and concentrates on the “War on Terror”. Due to US dominance the police is predominantly designed and trained in a paramilitary way to fight terrorism and protect the Afghan state and its institutions which were created according to the interests of foreign actors and the Afghan elite. Consequently, the police protects a state and values which are not owned by Afghan society and cannot provide effective security for large parts of the people.

Key words: Afghanistan, Security Sector Reform, European Union, United States, Institutional approach, Legitimacy approach, State, State-building, Human security
# Table of Contents

Declaration by Candidate .................................................................................................................. 2

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ 3

List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 6

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 8

Research Question and Sub-questions ........................................................................................... 9

Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 9

Conceptualization .......................................................................................................................... 11

The State ...................................................................................................................................... 11

State Capacity ............................................................................................................................... 12

Transformative capacity ............................................................................................................... 13

Relational capacity ...................................................................................................................... 13

Infrastructural and distributive capacity ....................................................................................... 13

The phenomenon of State Failure .............................................................................................. 14

1. Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................. 15

1.1 Weber, states and state-building: the rise of the institutional approach .............................. 15

1.2 Weber and legitimacy .............................................................................................................. 16

1.3 The legitimacy approach to the state-building process ......................................................... 18

1.4 State-building in post-conflict societies ............................................................................ 19

2. Security Sector reform as a State-building instrument ........................................................... 21

2.1 Defining security sector reform (SSR) ................................................................................ 21

2.2. Theoretical approaches to SSR ......................................................................................... 22

2.2.1. Core dimensions of SSR ............................................................................................ 23

2.2.2 Critics of SSR ................................................................................................................ 24


2.4 Local Ownership and Security Sector Reforms ................................................................. 27

2.5 Security Sector reform as a State-building instrument ....................................................... 29

2.6. Contribution of Human and State Security Approaches to State-building ................... 30

3. State-building and Security Sector Reforms in Afghanistan .................................................. 32

3.1 Bonn Process ........................................................................................................................ 33

3.1.2 Political Dimension ......................................................................................................... 36

3.1.3 Economic Dimension ...................................................................................................... 36

3.1.4 Institutional Dimension .................................................................................................. 36

3.1.5 Social Dimension ........................................................................................................... 38
3.2 Lessons Learned from the Afghan SSR Experience ................................................................. 38
4. Afghan Police Reform .................................................................................................................. 40
  4.1 Police reform and militarization ............................................................................................... 40
  4.2 The London Conference and Afghanistan Compact ................................................................. 42
    4.2.1 Afghan National Development Strategy .............................................................................. 43
    4.2.2 Dubai Conferences for International Police Reform Coordination .................................. 43
  4.3 The EU- A Human Security Approach to the Afghan Police Reforms .................................... 43
  4.4 The US- A State Security Approach to the Afghan Police Reforms ......................................... 45
  4.5 The Afghan Police- Ensuring whose security? ......................................................................... 46
    4.6. Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 47
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 50
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 50
List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIHRC</td>
<td>Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Afghan Military Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANBP</td>
<td>Afghan New Beginnings Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoPP</td>
<td>Coordination of Police and Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transformation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAG</td>
<td>Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Focused District Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft fur InternationaleZusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTJ</td>
<td>International Center for Transnational Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JCMB  Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A  NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONSC  Office of the National Security Council
R2P  Responsibility to Protect
SPP  Strengthening Peace Program
SSR  Security Sector reform
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
US  United States
USA  United States of America
USIP  United States Institute of Peace
“Security is a main demand of our people, and we are tired of this war”

Ashraf Ghani, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

29 September 2014

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of violent conflict and military interventions, the international community or coalitions of certain countries have become increasingly engaged in the post-conflict reconstruction and state-building process. An important element of the international post-conflict reconstruction and state-building agenda is Security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR aims to improve the security situation through reform of institutional bodies in post-conflict societies. While state-building by the international community is a relatively new concept, SSR is an even newer concept within it, having first emerged in the late 1990s, when it was put forward to a larger audience in a speech by Clare Short, the United Kingdom (UK) Minister for International Development in London in 1998 (H.Wulf 2004). Short identified five key areas of SSR that the Department for International Development (DFID) intended to promote: supporting the establishment of structures with proper civilian control over military forces, training members of the military in international humanitarian law and human rights, strengthening national parliamentary oversight of the security structures, supporting civilian organizations that might act as watchdogs over the security sector, and supporting the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (Alex J. Bellamy 2003). Scholars such as Paul Jackson (2011), Eleanor Garden (2008), Robert Egnell and Peter Halden (2009) argue that there is a close link between SSR and state-building. The academic discourse on state-building is framed by scholars like Francis Fukuyama (2004) and Robert Rotberg (2004), who focus on the creation of Western-style rational-legal institutions, which extend the state’s capacity for the provision of public goods and promise legitimacy by improved performance. However, a growing number of scholars such as Kalevi J. Holsti (1996) and Nicolas Lemay-Herbert (2013) argue in favor of a more socio-political understanding in order to ensure that institutions are embedded in society and therefore have political legitimacy.

Taking into account the role of SSR in state-building and the post-conflict reconstruction process, this paper seeks to analyze that process through the security sector reforms led by international actors
in Afghanistan. The internationally-supported stabilization and state-building efforts in Afghanistan have not been a success (ICTJ 2005). The United States (US) led international military intervention that ousted the Taliban regime was largely welcomed by the Afghan public. However, the consistent failure to ensure security and the rule of law has undermined the Afghan public’s trust in the Afghan government and its international allies. The internationally driven state-building process has focused more on the state, its institutions and leaders and less on the community and engagement of Afghan society in the process (ICTJ 2005). The main argument of this paper is that a state-centric reform process may destabilize the state in the long term by protecting institutions that are not embedded in society. In contrast, a human-centric approach is more likely to make a positive contribution by providing a safe environment which allows people to engage in the reform process by building state institutions with legitimacy. While this thesis does not wish to downplay the importance of building effective state institutions in the state-formation process, it particularly stresses the necessity for a human-centric reform process, as well as the engagement of local people in state-building and ownership of the reforms by society. As Marina Caparini (2010) argues, SSR programs that are not informed by the needs and concerns of people across society, weaken state resilience and encourage dependency, instability and insecurity, as has been seen in Afghanistan.

The primary goal of this thesis is to identify the role of SSR in the state-building process. The second goal is to discuss the effectiveness of the internationally-driven SSR programs, particularly police reforms, in Afghanistan.

**Research Question and Sub-questions**

To address these goals, the focus of this thesis will be on the following research question: “How can security sector reforms contribute to state-building in Afghanistan?”

Sub-questions: What is state-building? To what extent has the state-building process through security sector reforms been successful in Afghanistan? How have EU and US efforts affected Afghan police reforms?

**Methodology**

The methodology of the paper is based on qualitative research on state-building and the implementation of security sector reforms with regard to the Afghan Police. It aims to discuss and analyze theories of state-building and the role of reforms in the security sector on the state-building process, and to paint a picture of how the state-building process through security sector reforms in Afghanistan played out. Furthermore, the thesis makes use of primary and secondary sources from
both Western and non-Western scholars to review and critically discuss the state-building process through security sector reforms in Afghanistan.

In order to provide a satisfying answer to the main research question, the thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter highlights theoretical approaches to state-building. The theoretical discussion focuses on the rise of the "institutional approach" to state-building, strongly influenced by Max Weber's sociology of the state and legitimacy, and an alternative approach to states and state-building, called here the "legitimacy approach", concerned with the socio-political cohesion of the state, influenced by Emile Durkheim's sociology. Finally, the state-building process in post-conflict societies will also be discussed in first chapter. The second chapter aims to discuss the concept of security sector reform, local ownership and SSR as an instrument of state-building. It argues for a human-centric reform process and ownership of the reforms by the local community. The third chapter focuses on Afghanistan’s security sector reforms as led by the international community from the Bonn conference to the London conference. This chapter discusses the general reform process from 2002 to 2006 in Afghanistan, and argues that lack of coordination between donors, exclusion of the less accessible parts of the country from the reform process and little attention to the ownership of reforms by society hindered the achievement of successful results in the state-building process. And finally, the fourth chapter particularly focuses on the Afghan National Police reforms, highlighting the different approaches of the European Union (EU) and the US to that reform, and critically discusses theories of state-building as applied to security sector reforms in the Afghan Police case.

Besides that, each chapter of this thesis contains a small conclusion in which one of the sub-questions will be answered. The combined answers to these sub-questions will contribute to answering the main research question.
Conceptualization

Before moving to theories of and approaches to state-building, it is important to define the core understandings of the state and state-building.

The State

Given its complex and multi-dimensional nature, it is difficult to offer a comprehensive definition of the state. However, this section aims to answer the question, “what is the state?”. One of the most popular definitions of the “state” was provided by Max Weber, which will be discussed further in the first chapter of this thesis. On the one hand, one very common basic definition of the state with which many scholars agree involves a territory with defined borders that is populated by a certain homogenous or heterogeneous population, who may or may not share similar cultural values and norms and who may or may not be of the same ethnic or cultural background. On the other hand, some scholars focus on the state as a political entity. Hence, the state is also defined in terms of political sovereignty, which refers to the independence of a given country or political entity from any external force in regulating its local efforts. Or in the words of Guiguo Wang (2004; 473), a sovereign state is in possession of “the monopoly of legitimate violence, absolute supremacy over its internal affairs within its territory, [and an] absolute right to govern its people and freedom from any external interference in the above matters”. Additionally, functionalist theorists, such as Michael Mann (1984; 110), define the state as “a place, an arena, in which the struggle of classes, interest groups and individuals are expressed and institutionalized and implemented”. For Mann, there are at least two dimensions to states that require attention in order to understand their dynamics and nature. They are the domestic and international dimensions. The domestic dimension refers to the economic, ideological and military aspects of the state, while the international dimension includes the state’s relationship with other internationally recognized sovereign states (Mann 1984; 113-116). Wang’s definition of the state stresses the coercive and the administrative capacity of the state. What this state capacity means will be discussed in the next section. However, this Weberian focus on the state is not irrelevant, as neo-Weberian scholar Theda Skocpol (2008; 121) argues, in order to understand the changing dynamics of the state, “we must often look above and below the level of historic nation-states to see the most fascinating state-building going on in our time”. Moreover, Mann (1984; 111) claims that “the state is not an arena where domestic economic/ideological issues are resolved, rather it is an arena in which military force is mobilized domestically and used domestically, and, above all, internationally”. This means that, for Mann, the state is merely an embodiment of physical force in society. In this concept, the state remains a disputable term. Or in
other words, should the state be defined in terms of its institutions or in terms of its function? Consequently, there are different levels of analysis to define the state. Briefly, as discussed in this section, the state can be defined as an institution, which has the supreme right to govern over its people and territory and has a monopoly of violence to enforce domestic order and gain international recognition by other independent states.

**State Capacity**

The traditional notion of "state capacity" involves the ability of a state to form and execute policies and to enforce laws through legal means, that is, the legitimate monopoly on violence. However, discussion of state capacity is much more complex than this.

According to Mark Robinson (2008) state capacity can be understood using two different approaches: the "command-hierarchy" approach and the "influence-network" approach. The first refers to the hierarchical relationship between the state and society. In this model there is a clear boundary between government structures and the wider society. In this approach, "policy formation operates as a state-led linear process defined by distinct states of agenda setting and implementations" (Robinson 2008; 568). The latter approach stresses the density of networks and their inter-organizational relations on the one hand and the interdependence of the state and other interest groups on each other. This model views state policies as an outcome of the complex interactions between networks of groups in the state and society, with an emphasis on the quality of outcomes as the major determinant of accountability (Robinson 2008; 568).

For Robinson, the conventional approaches to state capacity suffer from error. He believes that in the era of globalization the state is compelled to extend its capacity in order to cope with the changing nature of politics and inter-state relations. Robinson identifies four exogenous forces that challenge the traditional approach to state capacity. These are Democratization, Globalization, Liberalization and Securitization or the so called "New Security Agenda' (Robinson 2008; 575). Of course, one can question the nature of this distinction, and claim that the other three terms are different expressions of Globalization, however, that debate requires more time and space than this thesis allows. The important thing here is that states are facing challenges from the transformation of the "command-hierarchy" model to the "influence-network" approach. Within the new global order, non-governmental institutions are gaining more power and therefore, states are bound to develop new capacities in order to maintain their power within the global structure.
Besides the conventional capacities of the state, it also needs to possess or develop "Transformative capacity", "Relational capacity", and "Infrastructural capacity". The next section aims to discuss all of these capacities.

**Transformative capacity**

The transformative capacity of a state refers to a set of attributes or core endowments “that a state or public agency may possess to give it a set of transformative powers over policy and structure” (Kanishka Jayasuriya quoted in Robinson 2008; 56). In other words, transformative capacity refers to the capability of policy elites to develop national policies and economic adjustment policies that evoke cooperation by organized and economic interest groups to transform the industrial economy. Moreover, transformative capacity incorporates the capability of the state to enter close partnerships with business to create the conditions for investment and sustained capital accumulation by substituting imports and by endorsing exports (Robinson 2008; 577).

**Relational capacity**

As a result of the structural transformation of the international economy, national governments have little power to follow transformative objectives. That is to say, the global environment in which states operate has changed. And with the aim of reacting to those changes, the state came to develop a new form of capacity. Within this context, relational capacity encompasses the facilitation of the strategic capability of different groups through specific institutional arrangements between state and non-state bodies (Robinson 2008; 576). In other words, the relational capacity of the state refers to the ability of the state to reach a higher level of development and integration into the international economy, which involves for the most part the developed capitalist economies (Robinson 2008; 578).

**Infrastructural and distributive capacity**

Linda Weiss and John Hobson (1995) describe infrastructural capacity as the ability of the state to penetrate society in order to extract resources and to achieve cooperation by organized interest groups in the pursuit of the collective good (Weiss and Hobson quoted in Robinson 2008). This capacity generally refers to the capacity of a state to engage in tax collection and to spend that income in the pursuit of the public good, rather than for the benefit of a political elite or a dominant social class in the society. The distributive capacity of the state, as a distinctive type of state capacity, refers to the ability of the state to distribute the economic income over a wider society (Robinson 2007).
In a nutshell, state capacity not only incorporates the conventional definition of capacity, which involves the monopoly over legitimate force and enforcement of the rule of law. Rather, as mentioned above, the capacity of the state is a wider concept within which transformative, relational, infrastructural and distributive capacities are important attributes for a state to develop its power within the changing global environment.

The phenomenon of State Failure
Like the notion of a “state”, the phenomenon of state failure remains a disputed concept and is therefore hard to define. Generally, a state’s failure is measured in terms of whether it is effective. The main purpose of this section is to discuss the ideas of different scholars on state failure. In the state-building literature, the effectiveness of the state refers to its ability to govern over its people, enforce rules and maintain domestic order independent of any external interference. The “failed state” as a term came to prominence in modern academic and policy discourse with the publication of Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner’s (1992-1993) article. They identify three groups of states whose survival is threatened. First are the failed states, like Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, Somalia, whose governmental institutions had been overwhelmed by circumstances (Helman & Ratner 1992-1993). They then identified Georgia, Ethiopia and Zaire in the group of failing states, where collapse is not imminent but could occur within several years. Finally, they include in the third group some independent states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, whose viability was difficult to assess (Helman & Ratner 1992-1993). However, it should be take into account that the article was written in the early post-Cold War era and some states included in these groups by Helman and Ratner later achieved successful results in the state-formation process. Unfortunately, Helman and Ratner do not go deeper into their analysis of the collapsed state phenomenon and do not provide any subsequent clarification, apart from a distinction between the degrees of collapse.

In his article, Robert Rotberg (2004) discussed state failure in terms of state functionality. For Rotberg (2004; 6), there are three crucial areas of service provision that states need to focus on. The first is the provision of national and individual security and public order. This includes the secure right to property possession and inviolable contracts grounded in an enforceable code of law. The second is the provision, organization and regulation of logistical and communications infrastructure. The core argument here is that a state without a well-maintained system of commerce and information will not be able to serve its citizens fully. The final important function that the state should provide to its citizens is basic medical care and education. Rotberg claims that when a state cannot provide these services to its citizens, failure is inevitable (Rotberg 2004; 7). Generally,
Rotberg’s ideas on state failure stress the necessity of the strong institutional state-building approach, which will be discussed later on.

The phenomenon of state failure is elaborated in the work of Robert H. Bates (2005). Bates believes that state failure means the collapse of the state. According to Bates, a state collapsing includes the transformation of the state into an instrument of predation. He claims that as states fail, politicians who are in power use the state to promote their own interests, rendering others insecure (Bates 2005; 2). Secondly, Bates identifies the loss of the monopoly of violence as a state collapsing. As a result of this, political competition takes place between groups bearing arms. Political groups or parties become political militias as elites transform them into military bands (Bates 2005; 3). The key problem with this explanation is that not every transformation of the state is state failure. Revolutions and regime changes can also transform the state, but the difference is that a revolution ends in a new political order, whereas failure of the state yields only disorder. Bates (2005; 4) also stresses the importance of economic factors, identity and democracy in the process of state failure.

1. Theoretical Framework

1.1. Weber, states and state-building: the rise of the institutional approach
To understand the debate on state-building, political sociology is key. With the aim of explaining this debate, this paper analyses the “institutional approach”, which is strongly influenced by the Weberian sociology of the state and legitimacy. As an alternative to this Weberian approach to state-building, this thesis favors the “legitimacy approach”, which views the state as a socio-political entity based on the ideas of Emile Durkheim.

One of the most prominent theories in the field, the institutional approach focuses on institutional reconstruction and is based on Weber's idea of legal rational domination. Weber (1948; 78) defines the state as "a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory". In order to be able to uphold the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force the state has to provide security for the population. Thus legitimacy is seen as a condition for exercising authority. Weber claimed that the formation of modern Western states relied on the constant progression of their bureaucratic foundations over time. Furthermore, he saw administration and the provision of security as benchmarks against which each state could be judged (Weber 1948). “Institutional approach” scholars define a weak state as a political entity that lacks the institutional capacity to implement and enforce policies, and state-building as the creation of new government structures and the strengthening of existing ones.
(Lemay-Herbert 2013). Thus, institutional approach scholars focus on the administrative capability of the state and the ability of the state apparatus to affirm its authority over society.

Helman and Ratner’s article is one of the first major post-Cold War works adopting the institutional approach, as their definition of a “collapsed state” emphatically revolves around governmental structures. The key problem with Helman and Ratner’s article is that the authors do not go deeper into their analysis of the collapsed state phenomenon and do not provide any subsequent clarification, apart from a distinction between the degrees of collapse. Helman and Ratner’s institutional focus has been developed by Rotberg. Rotberg (2004) identifies state failure in terms of the effective delivery of the most crucial public goods, which differentiates strong states from weak or failed states. These public goods involve state institutions and functions, including the supply of security, a transparent and equitable political process, medical and health care, education, railways and harbors. For Weberian theorists, the Western state is the universal ideal of social order, and they view the absence of Western structures as a security risk in a globalized world (De Guevara & Kuhn 2010).

The Weberian approach to states and state-building has also been echoed in the policy literature. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defines state failure as the collapse of state institutions (UN 1995), whereas the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) describes ‘fragile states’ as countries where governments are unable to deliver core functions to the majority of their people (DFID 2005). At the same time, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)(2007) indicates that, “states are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations”. Consequently, all of these positions view the strength or weakness of a state in terms of its institutional capacity and the effectiveness of its public goods delivery.

1.2. Weber and legitimacy
As mentioned above, the Weberian approach has had an important influence on the state-building literature, and the same could be said of the Weberian legacy regarding legitimacy. If Weber is rightly regarded as one of the core influential thinkers in the social sciences, his contributions regarding the concept of legitimacy have been deemed highly controversial. David Beetham (1991) argues that, on the subject of legitimacy, Weber’s influence has been an almost unqualified disaster. Weber (1948; 46) saw legitimacy as ‘the prestige of being considered exemplary or binding’. He believed that a claim of legitimacy is a bid for a justification of support and its success consists not in
fulfilling normative conditions but rather in being believed. Weber identifies legitimacy as a core condition of government and a means for it to exercise authority over society. Thus, in the terms of Weber, legitimacy principles are the principles of legitimation of the central authority. However, for Beetham and others, the basic shortcoming is not Weber’s but that of those social scientists – the neo-Weberians – who have reduced the explanation of beliefs to the process of their dissemination and internalization (Lemay-Herbert 2013).

Nevertheless, Weber’s definition of legitimacy has been criticized by scholars of political sociology. For instance, Hanna Pitkin (1972; 281) argued that it was “essentially equivalent to defining ‘legitimacy’ as the condition of being considered legitimate and the corresponding ‘normative’ definition comes out as deserving to be considered legitimate”. Additionally, Peter Blau (1970; 5) claims that Weber “takes the existence of legitimate authority for granted and never systematically examines the structural conditions under which it emerges out of other forms of power”, while Carl Friedrich (1963; 186) argues that Weber’s analysis “assumes that any system of government is necessarily legitimate”, and that Weber actually confuses the concept of legitimacy.

Weber’s concept of legitimacy has been quite influential and many leading social scientists in the twentieth century followed its definition of legitimacy as belief in legitimacy. For example, Seymour Lipset (1959) defines the legitimacy of a political system as its capacity to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political bodies are the most appropriate ones for the society, while Richard Merelman (1966; 548) regards legitimacy as a “quality attributed to a regime by a population”, where that quality is a product of the government’s capacity to engender legitimacy. Another interesting view of legitimacy is illustrated by Charles Tilly. For Tilly (1985; 171), “legitimacy depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed... Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority”. In this sense, Tilly can be considered a neo-Weberian. Therefore, under the influence of Weber’s ideas, scholars focused on institutional state-building tend to treat legitimacy either as a mere consequence of functioning institutions or as a process of legitimation. This comes from the Weberian approach to legitimacy. As Robert Grafstein (1981) claimed, Weber virtually equated legitimacy with stable and effective political power, reducing it to a routine submission to authority.

The enduring impact of this approach to legitimacy has had an important influence on the state-building literature. Rotberg’s piece is a good example of the tendency to reduce legitimacy to a consequence of stable and productive political power. Considering legitimacy only as the delivery of public goods, he claims that those public goods give content to the social contract between ruler and
ruled (Rotberg 2004; 2-3). Additionally, he argues that there is no failed state without disharmonies between communities, however he regards these “disharmonies” as a result of the failure of state structures. Therefore, legitimacy is treated as a natural by-product of successful state structures. Institutional failure produces a loss of legitimacy, as Rotberg (2004; 2-3) argues nation states also fail when they lose legitimacy, “that is when its nominal borders become irrelevant and autonomous control passes to groups within the national territory of the state, or sometimes even across its international borders”.

1.3. The legitimacy approach to the state-building process
While the institutional approach focuses on the security apparatus and state structures, the “legitimacy” approach views the state as a more socio-political entity. One of the interesting pieces adopting the legitimacy approach is Barry Buzan’s “People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era” (1991). Buzan emphasizes the “idea of state,” assuming integration between the territorial, societal, and political aspects of the state. He argues that the state exists on the socio-political rather than the physical plane (Buzan 1991; 63). In other words, “the state is more an idea held in common by a group of people, than it is a physical organism”. For Buzan (1991), the state is composed of three different elements, each crucial to understanding its strength: the physical base of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the idea of the state. The first two elements are directly connected with the institutional approach. However, the “idea of the state” is a unique element of the legitimacy approach. As institutional approach scholars stress, a state cannot exist without a physical base. However, on the other hand, as Buzan (1991; 64) claims, “without a widespread and quite deeply rooted idea of the state among population, the state institutions themselves have difficulty functioning and surviving”.

One could say that the “legitimacy” approach is more influenced by a Durkheimian than a Weberian concept of the state. According to Durkheim (1957; 44), the state “is the very organ of social thought”; it comprises “the sentiments, ideals, beliefs that society has worked out collectively and with time”. Contrary to Weber’s conception of the state, Durkheim (1957) claimed that the coercive powers of the state could vary independently of the level of social development, and that political society is determined neither by possession of a fixed territorial area, nor by density of population, but by the act of coming together. The main purpose of this chapter is not to uncritically claim that Durkheim’s ideas on the state are ideal; the aim is to demonstrate the wealth of current sociological approaches to the state and to explore an alternative approach to the institutional approach, which has had a significant impact on the current thinking on state-building. Lemay-Hebert (2013) claims that one of the important differences between these two schools –the institutional and legitimacy
approaches—stems from the conceptualization of the state. In the words of Anthony Giddens (1985; 17), the “state” sometimes means an apparatus of government or power, but sometimes the overall social system subject to that government or power. It can be claimed that the difference in definitions is at the root of the distinction between the two approaches and this leads scholars in both camps to adopt distinctive conceptions of a state’s collapse and its reconstruction.

The legitimacy approach has implications regarding state collapse. Firstly, state collapse is not only driven by institutional collapse, but also by the collapse of the central authority. As Mary Kaldor (2009) claims, state weakness is first and foremost a legitimacy crisis. Secondly, the strength of the state should be defined as “the capacity of the state to command loyalty –the right to rule” (Holtsi 1996; 82), as a government also requires the acknowledgment of the right to govern (Barker 1990). Generally, the legitimacy approach is more sociologically-oriented and emphasizes the particularities of each state and its social context. Edward Newman (2009) has summarized this approach with the term “transformatory peacebuilding”. Thus political legitimacy derives from a public discourse and engagement in the state-building process that exceeds that required for procedural legitimacy, such as elections. Consequently, state and society cannot be separated and institutions have to be seen as a vehicle through which people seek to exercise power and which simultaneously exercise power. Thus, state-building should be seen as a socio-political task, which cannot be achieved only by looking at institutions.

1.4. State-building in post-conflict societies

Modern state-building discourse is more policy-oriented and concentrates on the reconstruction of institutions in post-conflict societies. The main argument here is that, especially in post-conflict societies where state-building is driven by outside actors, the construction of Weberian states is problematic and likely to create a new layer of structures that are not accepted or supported by society. In order to create political legitimacy, the security of citizens and officials should be ensured, creating an environment in which they feel safe and protected and allowing them to express their opinions freely and actively participate in the reconstruction of state institutions.

The contemporary state-building discourse evolved in the 2000s from the peace-building debate, which had been criticized by a number of scholars for failing to emphasize the need for creation of state structures to achieve peace (Kukathas 2008). In contrast to the general theoretical debates on the state and its legitimacy, this debate focuses on the reconstruction of political authority in post-conflict societies outside Europe, in a globalized world where foreign actors are actively engaged in demanding change (De Guevara & Kuhn 2010). Roland Paris and Sisk T. David (2009; 1-2)
described this new concept as “a particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the exercise of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions”.

Implementing the dominant institutional approach to state-building by creating rational-legal structures in order to improve the state’s capacity for public delivery and to achieve peace is especially problematic in post-conflict states. Firstly, the attempt to build a Weberian state allows for straightforward operationalization into policy, as a clear goal is set. Thus, state-building can be planned step-by-step in a project-managed approach with certain goals and milestones, engaging bureaucrats and high military officers with mainly technical concerns. Secondly, as Weigand (2013) claims, many institutions in post-conflict societies are likely to be based on informal personal ties. However, Paul Jackson (2011) claims that the depoliticized understanding of state-building neglects local history, institutions and power relations. Moreover, the participating foreign actors tend to create alliances with local elites and NGOs, neglecting other voices in order to achieve their national interests such as global stability and security.

Sarah Lister (2007) illustrates this point from a different perspective. She argues that if a state-building process does not include the society it can result in layers of “hybrid” institutions, in which the introduced official institutions are only the surface but where unchanged informal structures govern interaction within the society. Thus, states are created which have a Western institutional façade and look like a democratic state but are governed on the basis of elite-dominated informal structures (Jackson 2011). As Lemay-Herbert (2013; 7) claims, these states are nothing but “phantom states” or “empty shells”, which are not legitimate as they do not represent the interests of the society.

Thus, referring to the Hebermasian understanding of political legitimacy, which requires a secure public sphere and an environment in which civil society can discuss the rules governing relations (Weigand 2013), it can be claimed that building new states that have political legitimacy is possible. As Hannah Arendt (1965) argues, this political realm should be secured and where necessary has to be protected with violence in order to allow politics to take place. Additionally, applied to the context of state-building, Rubin claims that to build legitimate state institutions, it is necessary to have sufficient security to allow unarmed citizens and nonmilitary officials to participate (Rubin 2006). Similarly Kaldor (2009; 188) argues that in the sense of protection from violence, security is at the heart of political legitimacy. Thus the international community can deliver the required security in order to enable societies to create structures endogenously which have political
legitimacy. In contrast, institutional approaches should be regarded as being one reason that state-formation fails rather than as a valuable contribution. Of course, the difficulties of an endogenous approach should be considered. However, creating a secure public sphere is theoretically feasible, although it requires foreign actors to relinquish their strategic interests and allow a process of endogenous state-building to occur, without knowing how long it will take or what the result will look like.

2. Security Sector reform as a State-building instrument

2.1. Defining security sector reform (SSR)
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce SSR as a general concept, with special emphasis on its relevance to the post-conflict state-building process. It is argued that the focus of SSR is often on building and securing state institutions, rather than the security of humans and the relationship between the state and its people. Thus, concentrating on the role of SSR in the state-building process and local ownership of the reforms by society, this chapter aims to answer the central research question of the thesis: "How can security sector reforms contribute to state-building?"

As mentioned above, the concept of SSR emerged in the 1990s and was coined “security sector reform” in 1998 by Clara Short, the first British Minister for International Development (Wulf 2004). For Malcolm Chalmers, the security sector includes “all those organizations which have authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight” (2000; 6). This broad definition incorporates a variety of organizations beyond the classic components of the sector such as the police, intelligence, military and judicial systems. According to the UK Department for International Development (DFID), “security sector reform is the transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. Responsible and accountable security forces reduce the risk of conflict, provide security for citizens and create the right environment for sustainable development. The overall objective of security sector reform is to contribute to a secure environment that is conducive to development” (DFID 2003; 30). For Heiner Hanggi, the core goal of SSR can be summarized as contributing to state building by achieving the effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance (Hanggi 2004).
2.2. Theoretical approaches to SSR

The study of the “security sector” is a rapidly growing field that has its roots in security studies, development studies, international relations and practical policy. Actually, the global defense reform agenda of security and development was first identified by Mark Duffield (2001; 16). Duffield (2001) identified that there is a noticeable convergence between security and development to the extent that they are now seen as interdependent. While this thesis does not aim to discuss SSR from the developmental perspective, it will be briefly discussed later on.

Wilhelm Germann (2002) identified the key normative objective of SSR as the maximization of the efficiency of the armed forces in the pursuit of their legitimate and democratically decided goals through programs designed to enhance the professionalism and democratic control of military structures. As with other “legitimacy” approach scholars, German also emphasizes the necessity of the active participation of the local community in the reform process. In contrast, Chalmers (2001; 10) primarily focuses on state institutions and argues that SSR is concerned with moving a state’s capacity –its practices, doctrines– towards Western norms and principles of behavior.

Allex Bellamy (2010; 106) tried to discuss SSR from the perspective of liberal democratic values and argues that SSR aims to promote a democratic peace by contributing to three interrelated processes (Bellamy 2010; 107). The first one is that SSR aims to enhance the physical security of the human. This argument is a widely accepted concept of SSR in academia and policy literature. The second way in which SSR contributes to the building of a democratic peace is its direct assistance to the broader process of democratization (Bellamy 2010). He claims that the provision of legitimate and legal internal security by professional armed forces is an important precondition of democratization (Bellamy 2010; 109). The weak point here is that Bellamy does not clearly identify what are “legitimate” security structures. The final process of SSR according to Bellamy is that, as a result of the previous two processes, SSR can contribute to development. He argues that SSR can contribute to development through the post-conflict demobilization and peace-building process (Bellamy 2003). In the case of Afghanistan, the demobilization of the uncontrolled armed forces and the integration of ex-combatants into society are necessary reforms for post-conflict state-building. Bellamy argues that successful SSR depends on professionalization and reduction of the actual size of the armed forces, and rehabilitation of former soldiers into civilian life (Bellamy 2003). According to Huntington, professionalization entails establishment of a professional class or "epistemic community" (Huntington 1957) that operates according to the rules and norms that constitute a profession. He argues that professionalization undermines corruption, and is instrumental in the prevention of abuses by security forces. It also leads to greater accountability for actions,
which can result in punitive measures being taken against transgressors, the prevention of human rights abuses and the polarization of a regime and its security forces (Huntington 1957).

Furthermore, scholars such as Bellamy (2010) and Hendrickson (2002) argue that, through a wide range of programs, SSR may contribute to "good governance". "Good governance" refers to the efficient, effective and legitimate use of resources by governing elites in targeted countries (Bellamy 2010). Duffield’s "new aid paradigm" claims that the main problem confronted by the development community was not poverty or lack of resources, but endemic inequalities and social injustice. According to Adedeji (1999), such inequalities are caused by global economic structures, and they are exacerbated in many developing countries by lack of good governance. Similarly to Bellamy, Hendrickson (2002) argues that SSR can contribute towards good governance by bringing the military forces under the control of parliament, curtailing so-called "off-budget expenses", and establishing transparent methods of governance and management that filter into other areas of governance.

2.2.1. Core dimensions of SSR

In his article, Wulf identifies four broad dimensions of SSR (Wulf 2000). The political dimension involves democratic, civilian oversight of the security structures. The main aim of reform in this dimension is good governance, including the capacity of civil society (for example, media, NGOs, the public at large etc.) to facilitate debate, as well as civilian oversight of security bodies. The economic dimension is concerned with the security structure’s consumption of resources, stressing the long-term sustainability of reforms. Promoting sound public financial management, consistent with the standards applied across the public sector, is central to meeting the resource demands of an appropriately sized and equipped security structure. The institutional dimension includes the structure of the security sector and institutional separation of the different forces and institutions. Those forces will be more efficient and more easily held accountable if the different institutional tasks are clearly defined. An institutional overlap between domestic public security and external defense increases the threat of intervention by the military in domestic affairs. The societal dimension involves the actual guarantee of the security of citizens. The main task of the security sector and its core actors is to guarantee the internal and external security of the inhabitants. Wulf claims that this security is not identical to the security of the state provided by the military forces; rather, it includes the security of citizens from attacks of all types on their life, property and health (Wulf 2000). This paper aims to discuss all dimensions of SSR in Afghanistan in the following chapter.
Before moving on, it would be beneficial to define the core security community that is the main object in the implementation of SSR. According to Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska, the core actors in the security sector are the following (Ball & Brzoska 2000):

- Core security institutions: armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, coast guard, militias, and intelligent services
- Security sector oversight bodies: legislatures and legislative bodies, ministries of defense, internal affairs, justice, foreign affairs, office of the president, and financial management structures.
- Non-core security structures: judiciary, customs, correctional services, and other uniformed bodies.
- Non-statutory security force institutions: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, traditional militias, political party militias, and private security companies.

Consequently, with the aim of increasing human security and state accountability, SSR contributes to development, post-conflict peace-building and state-building, through the professionalization and reduction of military groups in post-conflict or weak states. The results of SSR are reflected in the political, institutional, economic and communal aspects of post-conflict society.

2.2.2. Critics of SSR

There are several problems with this focus on SSR, including theoretical problems and more practical problems. One of the criticisms is that in fact, there is no democratic peace. Some scholars doubt the empirical evidence for the claim that democracies do not fight each other. Cohen (1995) argues that the evidence is too scant to prove that peace could be attributed to chance. At the same time, Russet (1998; 16) pointed out that the definitions of "democracy" and "war" are so vague that they can be manipulated to provide a basis for any thesis. Another group of critics claims that, there are lots of examples where democracies have fought each other, for example the Spanish-American war in the nineteenth century (Layne 1994). Additionally, one of the criticisms is that, SSR is an agenda imposed by the Western world and democratic ideals do not take root if they are imposed (for example, through aid conditionality) (Cohen 1994). Barkawi and Laffey (1999) argue that it is impossible to understand the development and democratization processes without recognizing that both of them are linked to colonization. Additionally, they argue that, not only were liberal democratic norms imposed on the rest of the world by Western imperialists, but many one-party systems evolved from the struggles of anti-colonial wars (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Viewed in this way, SSR is not the perpetuation of world peace or global development, but rather the
expansion and enhancement of international capitalism and the Westphalian model of a society of states in the Western European image.

Moreover, scholars such as Abrahamsen (2002) argue that SSR and the promotion of liberal democracy may create instability. Abrahamsen claims that associating SSR with liberal democracy may cause volatility and violence through a dissolution of the "patrimonial glue" that binds many states together (Abrahamsen 2002). Additionally, any reform of the security forces that is pushed through without proper preparation may become destabilizing and lead to the development of atavistic relations between civilian and military powers, particularly if the reform process is not indigenously owned and internalized.

Cooper and Pugh (2001) have also outlined several criticisms of SSR. They claim that concentration on security sector problems involves overlooking other important factors crucial to democratization and development projects. Namely, there is a possibility that the SSR program could be hijacked by actors pursuing a Cold War agenda of military assistance along with an asymmetrical patron-client power relation that is generally associated with these agendas. Further, the SSR policy may be used to legalize policies such as arms sales, which may not contribute to development and democratization; SSR tends to overlook the relations between local, regional and international actors and concentrate on the donors and overcoming the "weakness" of the targeted state (Cooper and Pugh 2001).

The other potential problem is that SSR may actually inhibit larger processes of democratization and development by effecting the prioritization of military over civilian aspects of governance. Much of the SSR literature stresses that the principle concerns of the SSR process are to actually reduce defense spending (Hendrickson 2006).


The notion of state security (which is also termed “national security”) evolved with the emergence of nation states in Europe after the Westphalian Treaty of 1648. It has evolved over the centuries from a focus on war, borders and military matters to ensuring the “absence of threats to acquired values” and the protection of national institutions (Wolfers 1952). The idea of human security constitutes a paradigm shift as it challenges these traditional ideas of security by concentrating on the human being, rather than the state, the nation or other institutions, as the subject that experiences security. The modern academic discourse is dominated by three streams of understanding of human security. The first and broadest definition is based on the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994, which coined the term “human security”, describing security as a major condition for development. This
developmental understanding of human security includes seven major elements, ranging from economic to food, health and political security (UNDP 1994). The second, narrowest definition is closely associated with the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and was adopted by the Canadian government. This concept focuses on the protection of people from large scale violence, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing (Pitcher 2009). In the context of SSR and state-building, however, an understanding is required that is open to compromise and acknowledges the long-term development perspective but is concentrated on ensuring the physical security of humans in a conflictual environment. Thus, the third understanding of the term human security is based on a concept, outlined by Kaldor, that emphasizes all of these aspects and concentrates on the prevention of violence and the creation of an environment where people feel safe (Kaldor 2004).

Depending on the context, the link between the concepts of state security and human security can be assessed differently. For the liberal democratic society, the theories are usually understood as being dependent on one another. For instance, from a Hobbesian viewpoint, which sees the sovereign state as the core provider of security, everybody is secure as long as the state is secure (Krause 2007). However, in contrast to the general perception that the two concepts are mutually reinforcing, according to Michael Lawrence, in the context of SSR the relationship between state and human security can be problematic (Lawrence 2012). Contradiction may appear where foreign actors and local elite communities are the major players in a country’s state-formation process. A concentration on state security consequently ensures the protection of institutions that reflect the conceptions of those foreign actors and national elites, as well as their physical security. Or in the words of Law, the state monopoly on violence might be directed against the citizens in order to ensure the survival of an artificial state or to extract resources from society (Law 2005). Additionally, Law points out “the crux of the problem is that states tend to seek security for governments and elites, as opposed to the people that they are supposed to serve” (Law 2005; 15). In contrast, the provision of real human security gives people the freedom to establish their own institutions at the expense of protecting existing state structures. It reduces the influence of foreign actors and national elites, who are required to ensure the security of the state in the long term. Jackson argues that the tension between state and human security in the context of SSR therefore reflects the clash in state-formation between enabling local ownership of the process and fulfilling the dominant interests of foreign actors and elites like planning stability and compliance with norms (Jackson 2011). Jackson explains that foreign donors are interested in seeing states adopt principles of transparency and accountability, but the governing elite of a state may not see that as important, and the citizenry may prefer merely to be safe - at least in the short term (Jackson 2011). Consequently, adopting Wulf’s words, it can be said
that “the human-centered concept of security ideally complements, but often contrasts or competes with the notion of state security, or more narrowly the security of the political elite” (Wulf 2004; 2).

2.4. Local Ownership and Security Sector Reforms

There is general agreement that local ownership is one of the major principles that SSR programs should adhere to if the outcomes are to be accepted locally and responsive to local needs and, thus, sustainable (Donais 2008; Mobekk 2010; Nathan 2007; Sedra 2010). However, there remains a gap between policy and practice. This section aims to discuss the role of local ownership in the post-conflict state-building process. It is argued that efforts that concentrate on building state institutions and structures, without paying attention to developing relations between the state and its people, will not result in successful state-building or peace-building in the long term. In the context of SSR, this section will discuss possible tensions between state-building in post-conflict societies and more inclusive approaches to building security. Additionally, it is argued that without ensuring substantive and inclusive local ownership of SSR projects, security sector institutions will not be made accountable or responsive to the needs of the local community and will, therefore, lack public trust and confidence.

As mentioned above, SSR as a new concept has a significant role in state-building process. Local ownership is widely regarded as the bedrock of and main precondition for successful SSR (Baker 2010; Donais 2008, 2009; Nathan 2007). If SSR programs are not locally owned, it is likely that security sector structures, processes and policies will be less able to respond to local needs. If they do not respond to local needs, efforts to increase security and rule of law will be compromised, public trust and confidence in the state and its security bodies will be limited, and institutions and other results of the programs will be rejected (Jane 2006; Gordon et al. 2011). For instance, this happened in relation to the National Security Strategy in Kosovo (Blease and Qehaja 2013). Additionally, Nathan argues that an approach that limits the engagement of the local community can also result in their “resentment, resistance and inertia” (Nathan 2007, 3).

However, while local ownership is an important part of SSR programs, it remains unclear precisely who the locals are and what constitutes ownership (Mobbek 2010; Donais 2009). Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that local ownership should entail a “nationally led and inclusive process in which national and local authorities, parliaments and civil society, including traditional leaders, women’s groups and others, are actively engaged” (UN 2008, 11) and are able to participate in decision-making during in the SSR process. However, it is widely accepted that there is a significant gap between this theory and practice, with foreign actors often imposing their models and programs on local actors (Donais 2009; Nathan 2007; Mobekk 2010). Scholars such as Hanggi and Nathan claim
that where SSR programs are externally funded and developed, there will be an inclination for external actors to promote their own models (Hanggi 2009; Nathan 2007).

One of the reasons for the gap between the theory and practice of SSR programs is that local actors may lack the will to engage in or support reform efforts. This is particularly the case with SSR, which may limit the power of local elites in society (Gordon 2011). It is possible that local actors may also not accept some of the core principles of SSR besides local ownership, such as the need for security structures to be affordable, responsive to the needs of the local community, and representative of them. It can take time to build awareness of some of the principles inherent to SSR other than local ownership, which often limits the level of local engagement in reform programs.

It is also important not to limit local ownership to the level that is often promoted by foreign actors in terms of the type of activities local communities are engaged in, the point at which local actors become engaged, and the type of local actors involved. Too often, local ownership is reduced to consultation, engagement after core decisions have been made, and involvement of only a few like-minded, state-level members of the security and political elite who accept the decisions reached previously by foreign actors (Mobekk 201; Sera 2010). There is a widespread understanding that security sector reform processes have to be inclusive if they are to be effective (UN 2008). However, the engagement of civil society in the reform process has often been limited. As Mobekk argues, recognizing that ‘locals’ do not constitute a homogenous whole who share common security interests and concerns demands engaging a cross-section of society in reform processes, which is costly and time-consuming and can hinder efforts to reach consensus (Mobekk 2010). The other assumption is that only experts, such as security sector professionals, have the requisite knowledge to engage in discussions about the security sector. In contrast, as Donais claims, non-state actors are widely considered to be only marginally relevant to the major concerns of SSR (Donais 2009). Moreover, it is considered that wider engagement of the general public will not only jeopardize efforts to create a successful security sector, because the general public lacks the requisite knowledge to reach sensible decisions, but also compromise operational security. As Donais argues, “labelling an issue as a “national security concern” has long served as a convenient excuse for keeping it out of the public domain” (Donais 2008; 284).

However, as Caparini argues, limiting engagement in SSR decisions to external actors and amenable local security and political elites may have serious consequences for the capability, responsiveness, legitimacy and accountability of security sector bodies, and undermines the principle of democratic governance that underpins SSR (Caparini 2010). A concentration on political elites and state-level institutions can undermine the extent to which SSR processes are broadly locally owned. Thus, it can hinder the improvement of security and justice at the community level, public support and
confidence in security institutions and, consequently, affect whether or not SSR programs are ultimately successful (Donais 2009).

As well as having a broad understanding of who the “locals” are and what they should own, it is equally important not to limit the timeframe within which the “locals” “own” the reforms. The core argument here is that, it is important to engage civil society and representatives at the community level throughout the SSR process. Mobekk argues that the nature of the involvement will, to an extent, depend upon the nature of the stakeholder and, of course the specific context (Mobekk 2010). However, the needs and concerns of all stakeholders should be considered in the reform process and inform reform decisions, with the result that SSR outcomes can be said to be broadly owned by local actors across society (Narten 2009). Engaging the general public for longer durations in SSR processes increases the time as well as the cost of SSR programs. However, SSR should be viewed as a long-term endeavor, and should engage civil society representatives in the reform process, prioritizing human security and grassroots approaches to building security and acknowledging that the process of SSR is instrumental to its outcomes and sustainability.

2.5. Security Sector reform as a State-building instrument

In the post-9/11 world, weak and failing states are regarded as potentially greater threats to international peace and security than more powerful states. To counter some of these threats, the international community has focused on building the capacity of post-conflict states and state institutions. In the context of SSR programs the largely top-down, state-centric approach has dominated state-building processes in conflict-torn societies. Scholars such as D. Benedix and R. Stanley argue that the security sector is often perceived as representing the core element of modern statehood (Benedix & Stanley 2008) and SSR is often central to state-building efforts, as has been seen in Afghanistan. However, as with state-building, the focus of SSR is often on building and protecting state institutions with less regard for human security and building relationships between the people and state (Anderson 2012; Jackson 2010, 2011). For instance, this could be seen in Afghanistan, where the marginalization of civil society from the SSR process and a greater focus on state institutions came across as a disregard by the international community of the security concerns and needs of Afghan citizens. As a result, in turn, this undermined the legitimacy of and public support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and contributed to its failure to control the insurgency (Caparini 2010). As has been stressed earlier, the involvement of people at the community level in the SSR process tends to be characterized by, at best, occasional consultation, information delivery and limited engagement in oversight of SSR outcomes.
The focus, therefore, is more on state institutions and less on people, the community or the relationship between the state and its people. Jackson emphasizes that the state requires legitimacy and in order to gain it, it needs public support (Jackson 2010). As mentioned in the first chapter, scholars such as Holsti and Lemay-Hebert claim that institutions that are embedded in society have political legitimacy (Holsti 1996; Lemay-Hebert 2009). In order to solicit that support, the local community and representatives of civil society should be involved in the state-building process for it to be meaningful and to resonate with cultural values. In agreement with Jackson and Anderson, D. Kostovicova argues that state-building is more than just a technocratic exercise; it is about building relationships between the governed and the governors and, as such “it relies on the governed having a stake in the process by having a “say” in it” (Kostovicova 2008; 643). Following the “legitimacy approach” scholars, M. Knight argues that SSR should incorporate a social contract perspective, through which citizens are seen to bestow legitimacy upon the state (Knight 2009). This would shift the focus of attention from state institutions to the human, and the relationship between the state and its citizens, and, thus, more likely result in successful SSR and broader state-building.

The focus of SSR, however, remains on building or reforming state security sector structures. Building state structures is instrumental to building state resilience and, thus, to the peacebuilding process. However, without ensuring substantive local ownership of SSR projects, security sector institutions will not be accountable or responsive to the needs of the local community and will, therefore, lack public confidence and trust. This would leave the state vulnerable to renewed outbreaks of conflict. Where security sector reforms are imposed by foreign actors or driven by the self-interest of elite groups, they are likely to have little resonance with the everyday experience of people at the community level (Coning 2013; Scheye 2008). As Kirste Samuels argued, the concentration on building predominantly Western-inspired institutions and structures “has largely resulted in shell-like institutions, unenforced and poorly understood legislation, and judges and police with little commitment to the rights and values sought to be entrenched through the reform” (Samuels 2006; 18). In a nutshell, SSR programs that are not informed by the needs and concerns of the local community weaken state resilience and encourage dependency, instability and insecurity, for example as has been seen in Afghanistan.


The tension between human and state security characteristic in the concept of SSR requires decision-makers to decide what to concentrate on. However, the two concepts of security each have potential to contributing to state-building. With the aim of answering the central research question of this paper, it is argued that a focus on state security reflects a depoliticized Weberian approach to state-
building and can destabilize the state and prevent a more sustainable process of state-formation from the inside. In contrast, a concentration on human security is more likely to allow an endogenous process of state-fashioning, which can create political legitimacy. Conducting state-centric reforms on the security sector seems a welcome policy choice for foreign actors as it promises to fulfill their interests in controlling and preventing violence by protecting newly established or apparently stable existing institutions against enemies. As Jackson argues, even though this is commonly seen as a technocratic exercise, the impact is highly political and likely to destabilize the state, thereby contradicting global actors’ interests in the long term (Jackson 2011). A major reason for the negative contribution of a state-centric SSR to state-formation is that it is likely to protect state institutions that are not fixed in society. If the security of the state is the primary goal and the first step in the attempt to build a state, it can only ensure protection of state structures that either existed before (which in a post-conflict society are likely to be dominated by local strongmen) or that are imposed simultaneously by the global community in cooperation with the local elites (Weigand 2013). Thus this method reflects a Weberian understanding of legitimacy, as a means to an end. If legitimacy is derived from the outside and from elites, it might result in the government exercising authority without being owned by major parts of the local community, which might even consider the state as extractive and abusive. Consequently, the state lacks political legitimacy, which then causes state weakness. The Weberian idea of increasing the legitimacy of the state by capacity-building measures in the security structures, like handing out guns and providing training, is likely to increase the oppressive capacity of a state and could reduce accountability and acceptance of the state. Additionally, the outlined negative impact of protecting state institutions on human security is particularly problematic in the context of state-formation. Finally, not only is the state delegitimized, but the space for civil society to meet and voice concerns without danger is also limited, making an endogenous state-formation process hard or even impossible. Moreover, the depoliticized idea that state-centric SSR, which protects state institutions and increases the state’s capacity, contributes to effective state-building is built on the questionable assumption of “the state” being only the possible legitimate provider of security. As Lawrence argues that in both practice and theory, state-formation tends to associate the state with order and stability and the non-state with chaos and insecurity, but this often distorts a more complex reality (Lawrence 2012). In the absence of formal state structures, informal institutions that provide a basic degree of security often exist but are, however, determined by distinctive norms and not necessarily based on the Western understanding of human rights. For instance, this became apparent in Haiti and Sierra Leone (Fitz-Gerald 2004). Therefore, a state-centric SSR approach, despite being considered a bureaucratic exercise, is always political due to its impact on local power relations. Another
interesting idea about the provision of security by the state comes from W. Reno. Reno claims that attempting to create or extend a state’s monopoly of violence challenges other actors who legitimize themselves by providing security. Hence, extending the formal central state’s reach by conducting state-centric SSR necessarily requires the state to either enter into a power-sharing agreement with non-state bodies or to reduce the power of non-state actors with violent means. Sedra argues that replacing these informal structures with more formal and central state-based ones can undermine public support and cause backlashes as well as an even higher degree of insecurity (Sedra 2010). Therefore, the state is delegitimized further and the space for civil society to participate in an endogenous process of building legitimate state structures becomes even more restricted.

However, SSR can contribute to fashioning a state in a way that acknowledges the socio-political dimension and the need to establish political legitimacy. In the words of Anna C. Patel, this requires SSR to strengthen the integrity of the security system, promote its legitimacy and empower citizens, in order to transform a general system into one that both respects and promotes human rights (Patel 2010). As Sedra claims, SSR should be approached in a human-centric way, focusing on the security of citizens rather than governments and regimes (Sedra 2010). Law points out that without an effective security sector, the state will be unable to provide the secure environment that is required to realize human security goals. Similarly, unless guided by a human security perspective, SSR risks producing a security sector that is not accountable to those it is supposed to serve and that can act oppressively towards them (Law 2005).

Some scholars criticize this approach, claiming that is built on the idea of “liberal peace”, that human security may prevent all conflicts (Lawrence 2012). However, by adopting human security as a guiding framework, SSR can contribute to creating an environment that is more secure, allowing citizens to interact freely and become involved in the state-formation process. Consequently, the “legitimacy approach” enables civil society to create the kind of state structures citizens want to accept, ensuring that those institutions also have political legitimacy.

3. State-building and Security Sector Reforms in Afghanistan

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the implementation of the Security Sector Reforms in Afghanistan by international donors from the 2002 Bonn conference until the 2006 London conference. This chapter concentrates particularly on the role of the Bonn Agreement in the reform process and its results. The central question of this section is “To what extent has the SSR approach been successful in Afghanistan?”. The Afghan security sector reform process largely focused on
Kabul, keeping the less accessible parts of the country out of the process. It is argued that lack of coordination between donors, lack of a clear reform strategy and ignorance of ownership of the reforms by society hindered the achievement of successful results from the reform process.

3.1. Bonn Process

After the 9/11 terror attacks, the Bush administration and its coalition allies began the global “War on Terror” with “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan in October 2001 (Murray 2011). The international community, with some of the key Afghani figures opposing the Taliban, organized the “International Conference on Afghanistan” in the German city of Bonn in December 2001 in order to decide how to organize the country’s future. The conference resulted in the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” – also known as the “Bonn Agreement” – as a road map for building the new Afghanistan. Additionally, the international community and Afghan representatives in Bonn agreed to benchmarks for the establishment of the basic institutions of a sovereign democratic state, including a transitional government, a new constitution, presidential elections by September 2004, and parliamentary and local elections by October 2005 (Murray 2011).

One of the important achievements of the conference was the establishment of the United Nations Assistant Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to contribute to security and state-building in the country. The UN and international donors chose a so-called "light footprint" approach to the intervention in Afghanistan. Consequently, UNAMA did not have a strong leadership or coordinating role during the Bonn process. Priority, at least on paper, was given to the Afghan government. Reconstruction and reform efforts in different sectors would be ensured through cooperation with the relevant ministry and corresponding lead donor nation (Murray 2011). Before, during and after the Bonn conference, many factional leaders of the Northern Alliance managed to maneuver themselves into positions of power within key ministries. Generally, the first phase of reforms in Afghanistan, from 2002 until 2007, was characterized as a multiple leadership system. The consequence of this power-sharing and maneuvering continued to have adverse effects.

The political arguments for the "light footprint" approach were convincing. The UN's experience of state-building suggested that national leadership and local ownership was preferred. However, advocates of the light footprint approach underestimated the extent to which professional leadership and institutional capacity had eroded during decades of conflict. Consequently, the light footprint approach created a state-building process with few checks and balances and with many conflicting, donor-driven, development agendas (ICTJ April, 2009). The lack of coordination and an overall strategy also resulted in development initiatives focusing largely on the capital city, Kabul and
regional capitals, while less accessible areas remained without major development. This focus on Kabul and on the regional capitals has been particularly prevalent in the area of institutional reforms, including governance and reforms in the security sector (ICTJ April, 2009).

At a Group of Eight (G8) conference in Geneva in 2002, the major international donors who were involved in Afghanistan agreed to conduct SSR and introduced a “lead nation” approach. The G8 nations were identified as lead nations for reforms in the security sector. The EU and its Member States positioned themselves well as lead nations in the area of security sector reforms: Germany became the lead on police reforms, Italy became the lead on justice reform and the UK became the lead on reforms in counter-narcotics. Disarmament, mobilization and the reintegration of former combatants into society was led by Japan. And finally, the US became the lead on military reforms (Sedra 2006). However, it quickly became apparent that the lead nation approach did not ensure coherent policy coordination for the various sectors -which in turn contributed to a complete lack of policy-making for cross-sector reforms.

3.1.1. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants (DDR)

One of the important objectives of the first phase of Afghanistan’s SSR process was the disarmament of ex-combatants and their re-integration into society. Although Afghanistan could be described as an arms repository –containing, according to the report of Small Arms Survey (2003) between 1.5 and 10 million small arms and light weapons– the disarmament aspect of the project, with the exception of efforts to canton heavy weapons, was largely symbolic. The major goal of the DDR program was to demilitarize Afghan society and to help its transition from a war to a peace economy through the demobilization of ex-combatants and their reintegration into civilian society (Sedra 2006).

With the aim of supporting the Afghan government to undertake the DDR process, in February 2003, the Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) was launched by UNDP and Japan, the lead nation in the DDR process. The ANBP concentrated on the Afghan Military Force (AMF), the assemblage of factional militias that previously formed the Northern Alliance (Sedra 2006). According to estimates of the Afghan government and ANBP, more than 100,000 combatants were eligible to enter the disarmament process. After one year of the disarmament process, the ANBP could lower this figure to 50,000 (USIP 2011).

The first ten months of the DDR process was characterized by disorganization. Several factors, including insecurity, the lack of consensus amongst key commanders, and inadequate support of the
Afghan Ministry of Defense created an environment that was problematic for DDR (USIP 2011). The process achieved concrete results in the autumn of 2004 because of two major factors. The first factor was the approval of the Political Parties Law in October 2004 by President Karzai, which provided a powerful incentive for armed groups with political ambitions to comply with the program (ICG 2005; 6). This law prohibited political entities from having military organizations or affiliations with armed forces. The second important factor was the deepened engagement of the US in the process, applying pressure on recalcitrant commanders to comply on the eve of the October 2004 presidential election in Afghanistan (Sedra 2006). The shift in the US approach, which had previously been characterized by obstructionism and indifference, was calculated to boost Karzai's electoral fortunes and address the deteriorating security situation (Sedra 2006). According to the ANBP reports, as a result of the disarmament and demobilization part of the project, 61,012 ex-combatants had been demobilized, resulting in the collection of 36,571 light weapons by July 2005 (ANBP 2006).

After completion of the disarmament and reintegration phase, the Afghan government with ANBP began to launch the next demilitarization process in early 2005, targeting irregular militia forces (Sedra 2006). According to ANBP estimates, there were around 1,870 illegally armed groups in Afghanistan, including tribal militias, community defense forces, warlord militias and criminal gangs—comprising 129,000 militiamen (ANBP 2006). Targeting low-risk armed groups, the government launched the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program in 2005. The primary goal of this program was to cooperate with low-risk armed groups to encourage them to disarm voluntarily (Sedra 2006). While the DDR program had achieved tangible reforms, there are still significant problems that need to be solved. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) survey shows that there were more than 7200 armed members of criminal and self-defense groups in 2014 (The Taliban and Al-Qaida not included) (USIP 204). The other problem is reintegration of the disarmed ex-combatants into Afghan civil society. For a large part, the ex-combatants were kept out of the reintegration process because of low attention from international donors and a lack of capacity and political will from the Afghan government (Sedra 2010). As this thesis does not aim to discuss the DDR process in Afghanistan further in the next chapters, it is worth noting that the DIAD project was followed by the establishment of the Program Tahkim Sulh or Strengthening Peace Program (SPP), which began in 2005 and ended in 2010 with the start of the ongoing Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) (USIP 2014). The next sections aim to discuss the Afghanistan SSR process from 2002 until 2006 with the implementation of the four dimensions of SSR identified by Wulf (2000) mentioned above.
3.1.2. Political Dimension
The Afghan constitution promulgated in 2003 endows the executive body with firm control over the security sector and accords the legislative branch an important oversight role. However, neither branch of government has the requisite capacity to fulfill those mandates and scant donor attention has been dedicated to rectifying the situation (Sedra 2006). The UK government assistance to the Afghan Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the secretariat of the National Security Council, was the single significant donor-sponsored program that sought to address the political dimension of the process. The ONSC was mandated to provide security-related policy advice to the executive body and serve in a coordination and oversight capacity for the security structures. The body was also envisioned to act as a government focal point for the SSR process, addressing the prevailing ownership deficit (Sedra 2006). However, the unwillingness of the related ministries and donor states to fully recognize the authority of the ONSC, along with significant problems of capacity, prevented it from fulfilling its designated role.

3.1.3. Economic Dimension
As discussed above, one of the core goals of the SSR process is to establish self-sustaining structures, without external dependency. However, from the outset, little attention was dedicated to the fiscal sustainability of the Afghanistan reform process. In the fiscal year 2004-05, security expenditure equaled 494 percent of domestic revenue and 17 percent of GDP (World Bank 2005). According to the Afghan National Development Strategy, even if the government met its target of raising domestic budgetary revenue to 8 per cent of GDP by 2014, which was by no means assured, it would not be able to sustain such expenditure (ANDS 2013). When international assistance to the security sector inevitably decreased in the following years, the Afghan government would be left with a security apparatus that it could not afford (Sedra 2006). However, it did not offer a course of action to address this looming crisis, and by 2006, the international donors had to take corrective action.

3.1.4. Institutional Dimension
The bulk of international support for the Afghan SSR process was dedicated to building the institutional capacity of the sector. A breakdown of this support shows disproportionate attention paid to strengthening the capabilities of the security structures. According to the World Bank’s country-focused information papers, between the fiscal years of 2002-03 and 2004-05, 88 percent of all funding to the sector was channeled to the military and police reform programs (World Bank
2005). This overwhelming emphasis on the security structures necessitated important trade-offs in the process, depriving funding to its soft security elements, most notably judicial reform, which received only 3 percent of the overall funding allocated in the same period (World Bank 2005).

An in-depth examination of the judicial and police reform pillars of the SSR agenda, overseen by Italy and Germany respectively, demonstrates the gaps in the SSR approach by Europe. In the police reforms, the Germans sought to reform existing police structures and personnel rather than follow the US example with the Afghan National Army (ANA) (Sedra 2006). The core accomplishment of the German Police Project was the rejuvenation of the Kabul Police Academy, re-opened in 2002, which trains commissioned and non-commissioned officers. While an important achievement for the long-term development of the police, it failed to address the most pressing problem posed by the mass of poorly paid, predominantly illiterate, factionalized and untrained rank-and-file policemen throughout the country. Moreover, the Germans failed to invest adequate resources to undertake structural and administrative reforms in the Ministry of Interior, exacerbating systemic corruption within the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Sedra 2006).

The US became involved in the process in 2003, ostensibly to rectify existing gaps and infuse it with new momentum. Its establishment of eight police training centers across the country greatly accelerated the pace of training, bringing the total number of trained police officers up to 55,000 by the end of 2005. It became clear in 2005 that the improvement in the quality of the police that emanated from the US training project, the majority of whom graduated from a two-week Transition Integration Program, was marginal and had little impact on altering existing patterns of police behavior. According to the German Government, it contributed 70 million Euro from 2002 to 2005 (Government of Germany 2006) whereas the US allocated $862.2 million up to 2006 (US Government Accountability Office 2005).

The judicial reform processes supported by Italy were widely perceived as the laggard of the SSR agenda. Conditions in the justice branch were dire. It lacked physical infrastructure such as court houses, law libraries and office buildings, trained jurists were in short supply, salary levels were dangerously low and corruption was rampant. Some important achievements had been made by the end of 2005, including the reform of some core legal statutes, the training of over 500 judges and prosecutors, and the rehabilitation of the court facilities in key parts of the country. However, public faith in the formal legal system remained exceedingly low (Sedra 2006). According to the national poll conducted by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) in 2005, 65 percent of respondents had little or no faith in the judicial system, viewed as corrupt and under the thumb of
local warlords (Sima Samar & Nader Nadery 2005). The majority of the Afghan populace still looks to informal justice mechanisms, traditional and communal, to adjudicate cases and resolve problems.

From the outset of the reform process, local ownership was treated more as a burden than a requirement by the Italians. The problem of achieving a common strategy for reforms amongst the three permanent justice institutions – the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and the Ministry of Justice – prompted the Italians to unilaterally undertake the strategic planning in Rome and implement projects with minimal input from local actors. The US’ aggressive involvement in the process in 2004, while providing a significant infusion of resources, augmented the coordination crisis. The US and Italians differed significantly in their reform visions, a by-product, to a large degree, of their differing legal traditions (Italian Justice Project 2006). Such divisions hindered the formulation of a common strategy for the reform process.

3.1.5. Social Dimension
One component of the SSR model that was conspicuously missing from the Afghan security sector reform agenda was the promotion of civil society. With the exception of assistance provided to the AIHRC from different international donors, little work has been done to foster civil society involvement in the security sector, or to raise awareness among the general populace of the role and responsibilities of the security structures in a democratic polity (Sedra 2006). With the legitimacy of the security apparatus tenuous in different parts of the country, due to the deep legacy of security force repression and criminality over the past three decades, a civil society component is crucial for the reform process. However, none of the lead international donors have included robust civil society components in their reform projects (Sedra 2006).

3.2 Lessons Learned from the Afghan SSR Experience
While there have been some successful achievements in the Afghan SSR process following the Bonn conference, there have also been numerous shortcomings.

First of all, the lack of a practical framework for the reform process and a clear reform strategy have had a corrosive impact on the operationalization of the model. No needs assessment was conducted to inform the structure of reforms at their outset in any of the individual pillars of the reform process. As mentioned above, the ONSC was mandated after its creation in 2002 to undertake a threat assessment to feed into SSR strategy. However, the threat assessment was not completed until 2006, and as of March 2006 a SSR project had yet to be completed (Fatima Ayyub 2009). As well as this, the reform efforts of donors were largely based on a superficial understanding of the local context.
Secondly, the highly politicized and factionalized character of the reform sector has complicated efforts by the international donor community to cultivate Afghan ownership of the reform process, rendering it largely donor-driven. The Bonn Agreement facilitated the takeover of the political apparatus by a single ethnic-based faction of the Northern Alliance, the Panjshiri Tajiks. Some of the significant actors in this group, most notably the first Minister of Defense Marshall Fahim, proceeded to work around local actors rather than with them (Sedra 2006).

Thirdly, the focus of reforms was on the expansion of the state’s coercive capacity, rather than advancing the model’s governance aims. The most visible expression of this hard security orientation is the disparity in funding allocated to the security force training and equipment programs as opposed to judicial reforms and civil society and local actor engagement.

Moreover, coordination deficits among the wide array of foreign and local stakeholders engaged in the reform process undermined reforms. The absence of a coordinating branch to establish linkages between the five SSR pillars (military, judicial, police, counter-narcotics, disarmament) and ensure process-wide coherence contributed to the “stove-piping” of the reform process.

Finally, the US had expanded its influence over the reform process – by the beginning of 2006, as mentioned above, the US was the leading funding donor for three of the five pillars and was delivering significant levels of assistance to the remaining two pillars. Creeping US control over the SSR process had begun to resolve many of its inconsistencies, however it also created new coordination problems and exacerbated the process’ securitization, as its objectives had been distorted to coincide with those of the war on terror.

Consequently, this study has identified some successful achievements of the reform process led by international donors, particularly in institution building, however, in general, the process was characterized by many shortcomings. There was a lack of a practical framework for reform processes and a clear reform strategy in the Afghan SSR agenda. The process remains hindered by the lack of coordination between donors and focusing largely on the capital, Kabul kept the less accessible areas out of the reform process. At the same time, international donors failed to take into account the institutional (in)capacity of the Afghan government and the lack of professional leadership in such processes. One more important problem in the Afghan SSR process was the lack of ownership of the reform process by the Afghanistan government and local society. For successful SSR programs, it is necessary that they be owned and internalized by the targeted country or society. Despite both the Bonn and London agreements stressing the ownership of reforms by Afghan society, the current
situation shows that the local ownership process did not achieve its goals in Afghanistan. The Bonn process was characterized by completely donor-driven reform processes.

The Bonn process came to an end with the establishment of the new Afghan parliament in December 2005. In January 2006, Afghan government representatives and international donors met in London to sign the Afghanistan Compact, which outlined benchmarks for state-building from 2006 to 2010 (ICTJ April, 2009). The Afghanistan Compact process focused on areas marginalized during the Bonn conference, including reforms in the security sector and rule of law, and donor coordination problems. The next, final chapter will focus on the Afghanistan Police Reforms from 2006-2010. The primary goal of the next chapter is to discuss US and European approaches to Afghan police reform and to answer the central research question.

4. Afghan Police Reform

The previous chapter briefly discussed the Afghan security sector reforms following the Bonn conference. This chapter will discuss the second phase of the Afghan SSR particularly concentrating on the Afghan Police reforms as a case study. This part of the thesis will highlight the EU and US approaches to these reforms. Specifically, in this chapter discussions go around: How have EU and US efforts affected Afghan police reforms? It is argued that, while the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) aims to provide training for Afghan police and reflects a human-centric understanding by focusing on the security of humans, the rule of law and accountability, the US-dominated mission is state-centric and aimed at the creation and protection of state institutions.

4.1. Police reform and militarization

Before jumping to the practical policies of the Afghan Police reforms, it is worth discussing the militarization of police, which is directly relevant to the Afghanistan police reform case. According to Cornelius Friesendorf and Jorg Krempel (2011), the quality of police work has an important impact on the legitimacy of a state. This is because the police are in daily direct contact with people and therefore more visible than soldiers. Public trust in the police provides the preconditions for the latter to establish effective human security. However, the police are sometimes unable to provide protection of citizens against crime and violence, particularly in post-conflict societies when the police are often the source of insecurity (Friesendorf & Krempel 2011). According to the OECD, which played a leading role in devising the concept of SSR, the police are a service provider of the
public (OECD 2007; 172). The police are subject to the law and should be accountable to the public. Their tasks should be clearly identifiable and verifiable, and they should prevent crime by working closely with the society.

The civilian police principle implies the separation of police and military duties. Well trained and equipped police, who work closely with the society and use a minimum of force have better opportunities for building confidence (Friesendorf & Krempel 2011). Compared to the police, the military is the institution which uses the maximum degree of force. However, the military has very little everyday contact with civilians due to being stationed in barracks. Moreover, the police unlike the military, can secure and present evidence that can be used in court.

The separation of police and military duties is especially important in post-conflict societies. Generally, the police in such states are often militarized, biased and responsible for violations of human rights. Demilitarization and democratic control of the police are essential factors in order for them to be accepted by the population. As Friesendorf and Krempel (2011) argue, a civilian approach and a clear separation of duties are prerequisites for winning public trust.

However the separation of police and military duties is problematic in post-conflict states due to gaps in security. On the national side, these gaps occur when the police do not provide effective and unbiased security, as in Afghanistan (Sedra 2010). In other cases, such as in Kosovo, there are no longer any official security forces (Friesendorf and Krempel 2011). Moreover, members of the international community that are engaged in the SSR process, do not usually send their civilian police forces to post-conflict states after the end of war. Additionally, even if they send their civilian police forces after the end of war, those forces do not always have the capabilities to take effective action against war criminals, criminal groups, illegal intelligence services, self-security forces etc. This means that, in the first phase of engagement in the reform process, the international military forces are under pressure to perform police and police-like duties (Sedra 2010).

Furthermore, according to Peter Kraska (2007; 504), there are several indicators of the militarization of police which have been used by the international community in the post-conflict reform process. For example, material indicators include military weapons and technology, cultural indicators are military-like language and a military style, organizational indicators are the establishment of military-like commando structures and finally operational indicators include the participation of police forces in high-risk missions. The last indicator was relevant in Afghanistan. The ANP had been participated in many high-risk counter-terrorist operations with ALP (Sedra 2006). Additionally, the actors engaged in the reform process may encourage the militarization of the police
in conflict-torn states through militarized training and armaments programs. This process was widely experienced in the US-lead police reform process in Afghanistan, especially as part of ANP training, which will be discussed later.

Thus, as Friesendorf and Krempel (2011) argue, the functional need to close security gaps clashes with the principles of civilian police work. By militarizing the police, actors engaged in the reform process may reduce the risk of security gaps. However, if militarization dominates civilian police work, public confidence can be lost as a result of the disproportionate use of force. Additionally, the militarization of the police sends conflicting signals to society and thus, risks the credibility of the reform process.

4.2. The London Conference and Afghanistan Compact

As mentioned above, the Bonn conference was one of the first significant steps in the Afghan state-building process. Additionally, in 2002, international donor conferences took place in Tokyo and Geneva with the aim of coordinating and financing the international effort. In January 2006, the Afghan government, the United Nations (UN) and the international community met in London and as a result of consultations between them launched the Afghanistan Compact.

The Afghanistan Compact was a mechanism to coordinate Afghan and international efforts over the following five years. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) was established to provide overall strategic coordination of the Afghanistan Compact (Feilke 2010). The JCMB is composed of 7 representatives from the Afghan government and 21 representatives of the international community. The Board was co-chaired by the Senior Economic Advisor to the President and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan (Feilke 2010). This program ran for a period of five years from April 2006 to February 2011. The specific objectives of the JCMB included the following:

- to provide high-level political support for the Afghanistan Compact
- to provide direction to address important issues of coordination, implementation, financing for the benchmark marks and timelines in the Afghanistan Compact and any other obstacles identified either by the Afghan government or the international community.
- to report on the implementation of the Compact to the President, National Assembly, UN Secretary General, the international donors and public (UN Security Council 2006).
4.2.1. Afghan National Development Strategy
One of the major outcomes of the London conference was the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The international donor community agreed to support the Afghan government’s development strategy and the Afghan government took responsibility for the development process in order to achieve its national interests (Feilke 2010).

The ANDS was an Afghan government medium-term development program that set out the social, economic, security and governance agendas for Afghanistan for the next five years. As mentioned above, the primary goal of this chapter is to discuss the Afghan Police reforms. With this in mind, it is worth noting one of the core pillars of the ANDS: Internal Security and Law Enforcement, which was most important for the police reforms.

4.2.2. Dubai Conferences for International Police Reform Coordination
At the invitation of the US Embassy in Kabul, two conferences of police experts working on the Afghan Police took place in Dubai. These were strategic level conferences, which aimed to improve the coordination of the police reforms on the ground and to minimize problems regarding the police system (Sedra 2006). It is worthy to stress that, the conferences followed each other on Afghanistan state-building and SSR process which stressed same goals and objectives, such as coordination between international donors, shows that all engaged actors to these process, especially nation states followed their national interests in the reform process and did not agreed their lead nation position with others.

In April 2006, the Dubai-I conference took place and set the basis for a new method of international coordination. At the Dubai-II conference the 26 participants from 12 countries and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) agreed on a structure for closer cooperation. A significant outcome of the conference was the idea of an International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) that was to harmonize the international efforts regarding the advancing of the Afghan police. But for various reasons this model never worked well. Because of a lack of coordination between the participating actors and insufficient staffing, the IPCB could not achieve its main goals.

4.3. The EU- A Human Security Approach to the Afghan Police Reforms
Since 2007, the EU’s involvement in the reform process in creating an Afghan police force which is integrated and supported by civil society with a focus on human rights and literacy has reflected a human-centric conception of SSR. Due to the comparatively low financial resources and small
number of delegated European police officers the strategy, however, is overshadowed by the US approach.

As mentioned above, Germany took the lead nation role in the Afghan Police reforms. It is worth noting that police development assistance had already been provided in Afghanistan by the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the German Democratic Republic in the 1960s and 1970s (Bayley & Perito 2010). During the intervention of the USSR a Soviet police system was introduced, which was built on a two-track system of career officers and short-term officers who served in the police force instead of completing military service (Bayley & Perito 2010). Due to the shortcomings in the reform process the EUPOL was set up and became the “lead nation” in the police reform process in order to provide support for the German effort with officers from other member states (T. Behr 2012). The primary goal of the EUPOL is to support the Afghani Government in taking responsibility for strengthening the rule of law, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement system (EUPOL 2010). Or in the words of an EUPOL officer, the goal is “transforming a green into a blue police”, thus, turning a militarized police force into a community police force in which decision makers are accountable to local people (Weigand 2013; 25).

In order to achieve its goals EUPOL provided training programs which were funded by the EU or national governments, particularly by Germany and the Netherlands. The core pillar of the EUPOL mission is training for high-ranking police officers and train-the-trainer programs which address issues such as conflict management and media relations. According to EUPOL reports, more than 4,000 officers attended a course at the “Police staff college” up to July 2012 (EUPOL 2012; 2). Additionally, literacy courses were offered by the German development organization Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), which could be attended voluntarily on a part-time basis by Afghan police (GIZ 2012). Moreover, EUPOL aimed to transform the units of particular police districts from extractive into servicing police units by introducing principles of community-based policing with extra training and mentoring in order to achieve a “police service” (EUPOL 2012; 2). The mission realized this program, for instance, in Kunduz, Bamyan and Mazar-e Sharif. A third pillar of the EUPOL Afghanistan mission is the rule of law, addressing a demand brought forward by civil society institutions. The Coordination of Police and Prosecutor (COPP) project was supposed to offer training for Afghan police officers and prosecutors with the aim of increasing cooperation and the coordination of procedures (EUPOL 2012; 2). Additionally, the EUPOL mission aims to produce some TV programs, such as crime stories, to explain how police work and build trust by presenting typical police tasks like dealing with corruption and domestic violence (EUPOL 2012).
Consequently, the European approach to the Afghan Police reforms has resulted in some successful achievements with a focus on human security, rule of law and accountability, which SSR programs aim for. Though the EUPOL was an important step towards achieving human security with a low budget, the well-funded American approach has predominantly shaped the Afghan police force.


The engagement of the US in the Afghan Police reforms is an example of the implementation of a state security approach. Due to its priority of fighting terrorism, the US is predominantly interested in stabilizing the existing state institutions of Afghanistan, subordinating the focus on accountability as well as how the underlying power relations affect the people. Thus, the police reforms are approached in a technical way with a focus on extending the capacity of the forces by providing weaponry and training the police officers.

Due to the slow progress of the reform process and the fact that Germany did not train low-ranking police officers, the US started an additional police training organization called “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) for building and training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANS) in 2003. According to the special report of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), as a result of this program, 20,000 police officers had been trained by 2004, achieving a total number of 71,147 trained officers by 2007 (USIP August 2009). However, quality standards of the trained officers were much lower than compared to the German program. Most trainees were selected without vetting and received a five-week training course by untrained English-speaking instructors of the private security company DynCorp with poorly trained interpreters (USIP August 2009). Due to the problem of illiteracy most of the officers could not perform basic police tasks such as writing reports (Bayley & Perito 2010; 21). In 2009, the CSTC-A was integrated into the US-dominated NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) as a part of the NATO military command structure, with the aim of uniting the training components of all states conducting police reforms besides the EU (USIP August 2009). As a result of these efforts, the number of ANP officers had increased to 149,642 by March 2012 (Livingston & O’Hanlon 2012; 6) so that there were 491.92 ANP officers per 100,000 population, which is one of the highest rates in the world and well above the mean of 341.8 (Harrendrof & Smit 2011; 135-136). However, the quality of the policing training and quality of the graduate police officers still has to be questioned.

The primary goal of the NTM-A is to increase the capability of the Afghan security structures in order to gradually hand over lead responsibility for the security of Afghan society (NATO 2010; 1). The major mechanism for training the officers of the ANP has been the "Focused District
Development" (FDD) program in which all officers are withdrawn from a certain district at a time for a two-month training program (Friesendorf 2011; 85). During this two-month training program, the officers receive new weapons such as 9mm pistols, AK-47s, light machine guns as well as RPGs. Additionally, training regarding community and democratic policing as well as domestic violence and women's rights is neglected in this program and replaced by military training (Friesendorf 2011; 86). This approach to building the ANP can therefore be summarized as a militarization approach, creating a paramilitary police force.

With support from the US, in 2010 the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was created, which is meant to consist of "village watch teams representative of, and accountable to (....) local communities that seek to defend themselves against the insurgents" (NATO 2010; 2) in order to "compensate for pitfalls in the ANP" (NATO 2010; 2). It is worth noting that the idea of community policing is not new in Afghanistan, as it has been a tradition in certain parts of the country. So called "arbakai" – which means "guardian" or "army"– are a tradition which was imported to the Pashtun south-eastern region of Afghanistan during the Ottoman period, when only old men who could not work anymore joined the arbakai and ensured the security of communities (Weigand 2013; 28). After the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 lots of local strongmen in the south-east re-created arbakai forces to fill the power gap (Schmeid & Karokhail 2009; 320). The US supports this approach and can be considered the main driver in establishing a countrywide local police force as a counter-insurgency force and as a means of their exit strategy, to create stability in rural areas and hand over control of security to Afghans (HRW 2011; 4). Even though the Afghan government has a target of hiring 10,000 police officers for the ALP, the US approved funding for 30,000 people (HRW 2011; 4). Usually, these local police officers receive weapons and three weeks’ training, however, no understandable directives about their power and rights exist and they are only accountable to the local commander (HRW 2011).

Consequently, US-led police reform process is mainly militarized the police to fight against terrorism and protect the Afghan state and its structures. The engagement of society in reform process neglected and accountability of the security structures undermined.

4.5. The Afghan Police- Ensuring whose security?
With the aim of understanding the ideas of the Afghan people on the police reforms, the International Center for Transnational Justice (ICTJ) held meetings with Afghan people. According to the ICTJ reports, the majority of respondents expressed concern about the lack of commitment of the Afghan government to promote transparency and accountability in the reform process, particularly in police
reforms (ICTJ 2009; 13). It was also articulated that police training had not been adequate and had failed to address capacity issues. Regarding the ANP, concerns were raised about sustainability due to the military's dependence on expensive hardware (ICTJ 2009). Some of the respondents were also critical of the Afghan government's role in the reform process, highlighting shortsighted political decision-making and corruption as key concerns (ICTJ 2009).

The newly created ALP was perceived even more critically than the ANP. Even though arbakai are acknowledged as a part of the Afghan tradition in certain regions, the transfer of this custom to other parts of the country with different cultures and values was not supported (Weigand 2013). The ALP was seen as a way for warlords to increase their power and receive weapons for free from the government rather than as a responsible body ensuring the security of the Afghan community (Weigand 2013).

As a result, the Afghan police can be characterized as a force which is contributing negatively to human security rather than ensuring it. According to a survey by the Asia Foundation, 56 percent of Afghans questioned say they fear for their personal safety in their local area, while 22 percent claimed they or someone in their family became a victim of crime in the past year (The Asia Foundation 2011; 27). These are especially high rates considering the bias that surveys are generally conducted in safer areas. Moreover, insecurity was seen as the biggest problem in Afghanistan by 38 percent of the respondents (The Asia Foundation 2011; 23). This perceived insecurity in Afghanistan is not only caused by "insurgents" or "anti-government" elements but also government structures, which are responsible for a large number of the crimes and human right abuses reported.

4.6. Discussion

The analysis of literature on state-building through SSR in Afghanistan shows that the Weberian approach to the state-formation process is problematic in the context of post-conflict societies, as newly-created state institutions might lack political legitimacy and are unlikely to be fixed in society. In theory, more holistic choices are on the rise which concentrates on more endogenous processes of rebuilding state structures. However, there has not yet been any thorough analysis of how SSR as the core instrument of state-fashioning can actually contribute successfully and what the impact of a human or state security focus is. Thus, this part of the thesis aims to answer the central research question “How can security sector reforms contribute to state-building in Afghanistan?”.

In the second chapter, this thesis tried to answer the central research question from a theoretical perspective. It has been argued that SSR can contribute to fashioning a state in a way that acknowledges the socio-political dimension and the necessity of creating political legitimacy.
Additionally, as Sedra (2010) claimed, SSR should be approached in a human-centric way, focusing on the security of citizens rather than government structures and regimes. Moreover, in this section the contribution of SSR to state-building will be analyzed through the case of the Afghan Police Reforms.

The Afghan police reforms are a good example of the conflict between the concepts of human and state security in the context of SSR, as they had a negative influence on the success of the SSR process by focusing primarily on the security of the state and state institutions instead of human security. While US attempts focused on constructing a police force which can be used to protect existing or co-created state structures and fight insurgents who are perceived as the enemies of these institutions, the European approach has the opposing goal of forming a police force that is accountable towards the Afghan nation rather than local strongmen or foreign troops. Additionally, the US approach of training the police force in counterinsurgency together with the military means that the distinction between the police and military in Afghanistan is blurred. Yet these state bodies were not constructed by Afghan society but from outside, according to strict timetables and blueprints in order to quickly fashion a stable and democratic-looking state structure, achieving goals which are determined by the local politics of foreign actors (Theros & Kaldor 2011; 36). As discussed above, scholars such as Holsti (1996), Kaldor (2009) and Lemay-Herbert (2009) claim that institutions that are embedded in society have political legitimacy. But, in the case of Afghan Police reform, the views of the society and the creation of political legitimacy were largely ignored in the reform process. The protection of these institutions is in the interests of foreign actors and the Afghan elite but not of Afghan society (Kuovo 2009). As argued by Coning (2013) and Scheye (2008), where security sector reforms are imposed by foreign actors or driven by the self-interest of elite groups, they have very low resonance with the everyday experience of people at the community level. In the case of Afghanistan, a gap between society and the state has developed, as society perceives the state as an alien body and the ruling government as a puppet of outside (international) actors. The state’s security structures have developed in line with those actors’ interests and ideals, and they do not reflect Afghan society. This situation means that the Afghan police reforms are unlikely to achieve positive changes for Afghans (Kuovo 2009).

The state security approach which is mirrored in the narrow concentration in police training on fighting, and the development of the ANP as a paramilitary counter-insurgency unit increase the extractive and oppressive nature of the state. The US support for the founding of the ANP glaringly presents a clear danger of the depoliticized approach which emerges from a state-security focus. In this case the rearmament of non-state bodies is encouraged without questioning their political role.
within the state while aiming at stabilizing the state and fighting terrorism. At first glance the local police force does not look like a typical Weberian institution although its creation surely reflects a focus on performance which seems to totally ignore political legitimacy. In the long run, this kind of power sharing is likely to be destabilizing because it gives warlords an upper hand to suppress the people in the areas they control where they keep fighting for power after the withdrawal of the international support military. For this reason, it shows that this power sharing only manages to be a short term stabilizing factor that only temporarily keeps the central state together. Therefore, this perceived negative behavior of the police and their security role further delegitimizes the state in Afghan society. Moreover, the dominant focus on state security also causes a lack of human security in Afghanistan, limiting the secure environment for civil society to become involved in a state-building process. Thus, ongoing concentration on state security is in danger of contradicting the successes achieved and harming the process of building a legitimate Afghan state from the inside.

A human-centric security approach to the police reform process could allow a more positive influence of SSR on the state-formation process. The Afghan police could create a secure space for such a process to take place. The first significant step for this requires less militarized training and design of the ANP in order to create a police force that the population is not afraid of. As Sedra (2010) argues, successful SSR aims to provide an accountable security system for local people. However, increasing the number of police officers is not sufficient and can even result in the opposite of what is intended, as having more armed people reduces perceived security in Afghan society (Weigand 2013). Rather, as Anderson (2012) argued, the quality of the police officers has to be increased by better training, with a focus on human rights and community policing. Higher salaries are important for lower-ranked officers in order to reduce their reliance on bribes. The survey by ICTJ clearly describes the situation of the Afghan police system. According to the survey, the majority of respondents stated that the Taliban is not the main problem in Afghanistan today. The lack of credible governance structures and corruption and criminality within the Afghan police forces were perceived as much more pressing concerns (ICTJ2009; 13). While the EUPOL mission tried to introduce an effective salary system during the reform process, it is too small to achieve lasting change on a bigger scale. In order to enable SSR to contribute to successful state-formation in Afghanistan, the role of the European mission could be extended by a large degree.

As mentioned above, scholars of the “institutional” approach to state-building, such as Fukuyama (2004) and Rotberg (2004) focus on the administrative capability of the state and the ability of the state apparatus to affirm its authority over society. In the case of the US-led ALP project, it is clear that the ALP was seen as a means for warlords to increase their power and receive weapons for free.
from the government instead of ensuring the security of Afghan community. However, collaboration between society and police forces could further a human-centric concept of reforming the Afghan police. As an example, in 2007 the Afghan civil Society Forum Organization (ASCFO) introduced a neighborhood committee in a district of Kabul, in order to reduce child prostitution (Weigand 2013).

As mentioned above, for scholars such as Baker (2010), Donais (2008), and Nathan (2007), successful SSR programs require the engagement of civil society in the reform process and ownership of the results of the reforms by local community. If SSR programs are not locally owned, the existing or newly-created security institutions, processes and policy of reforms will not be able to respond to the needs of society. In the first and second phases of the reform process in Afghanistan the engagement of society in the state-building process was neglected. While both the Bonn and London agreements stressed the ownership of reforms by Afghan society (Sedra 2010), donors engaged in the reform process paid less attention to the local needs of society.

Moreover, if the Afghan people had the choice to become involved in the state-building process, the existing or newly-created Afghan state institutions, particularly police structures could look different. As Theros and Kaldor (2011) argue, Afghan people do not oppose the existence of a state and do not reject democracy but are critical of the Western model and want institutions that include the traditions, religion and culture of the society. They describe a legitimate Afghan state as an independent, Muslim state, providing minimal services without interfering in the daily life of the people and acting as an agent between local groups (Theros & Kaldor 2011; 10).

In sum, while the EU assists in ensuring security for the Afghan people its efforts is limited due to the comparatively low funding and number of training stuff. In contrast, the US is the major actor of the state-centric security approach providing a training which barely concentrate on weaponry and paramilitary trainings of the ANP.

**Conclusion**

After the end of the Cold War, the threat of new wars and global terrorism led Western states to increase their engagement in building state institutions in developing or failed regions of the world. In the early 2000s the concept of state-building and its instrument, Security Sector Reforms (SSR), had already become a core element of development, defense and foreign policy. The international community engaged in this process primarily concentrated on building state institutions through
reforms to security structures in post-conflict states. The internationally-driven post conflict reconstruction and state-building process in Afghanistan is a good example of state-formation efforts. Thus, concentrating on the role of SSR in post-conflict state-building process, this thesis sought to analyze the Afghan state-building process through SSR by international actors. At this point, it is important to note that a series of surveys by local and international research centers, a substantial amount of literature by scholars who focus on state-building and SSR problems, and the current situation in the country show that internationally-driven stabilization and state-building efforts in Afghanistan have not been successful.

More specifically, the first chapter of this thesis focused on analyzing theoretical approaches to state-building. IR scholars have discussed state-building from different perspectives. With the aim of explaining these debates, this paper particularly concentrated on the "institutional" approach, which is strongly influenced by the Weberian sociology of the state and legitimacy, and the "legitimacy" approach, which characterize the state as a socio-political entity. The aim was not to discuss one specific question, but to analyze the ideas of the "institutional" and the "legitimacy" approach and highlight the core arguments of both sides. It has been observed that, by isolating the state and state-building from society, the institutional approach regards the state primarily as a bundle of governmental structures. For the institutional approach, a weak state is a political entity that lacks the institutional capacity to implement and enforce policies, and state-building implies the creation of new policies or the reconstruction of existing ones. It has been observed that institutional approach scholars primarily focus on creating Western-type rational-legal institutions which extend the state's capacity of public good delivery and promise legitimacy by improved performance. Scholars of this approach describe legitimacy as a key condition of government and a means for it to exercise authority over society. As an alternative to this approach, the "legitimacy" approach has been discussed. While the institutional approach scholars focus on security apparatus and state structures, the “legitimacy” approach describe the state as a more socio-political unit. Regarding state collapse, "legitimacy" approach scholars claim that state collapse not only implies institutional collapse, but also the collapse of the central authority. In other words, state weakness is first and foremost a legitimacy crisis. Discussing the state-building process in post-conflict states, it has been argued that, where state-building is driven by foreign actors, the construction of Weberian states is problematic because they mainly focus on creating state structures that are not accepted or supported by society. As an alternative to this approach, the establishment of an environment where the security of citizens is ensured, and their active participation in state-building process has been achieved. Consequently, this process does not seek to discourage externally led state building efforts in cases
of state collapse, neither does it strive to encourage that the military and police forces be ignored. Instead, it seeks to emphasize the necessity to concentrate more on the socio-awareness of state building interventions.

Following this, the second chapter of this thesis focuses on the role of SSR as a basic instrument of the state-building process. As this chapter aims to answer the central question of this research project, the discussions and analyses are organized to answer the theoretical part of the question. It therefore asks: how can security sector reforms contribute to state-building? The first section of this chapter discussed the dimensions of the SSR process. The political dimension of SSR includes democratic, civilian oversight of the security structure with the aim of good governance. The economic dimension is concerned with the security structure’s consumption of resources, stressing the sustainability of reform process. The institutional dimension focuses on the structure of the security sector and the institutional separation of the different forces and institutions. Finally, the societal dimension involves the actual guarantee of citizens’ security. The second section of this chapter actively engaged the discussions of state-centric and human-centric SSR process. The current international state building efforts through SSR is focused on building and securing state institutions, rather than human security. However, it has been argued that, without ensuring substantive local ownership of SSR projects, security sector institutions will not be accountable or responsive to the needs of the local community and will, therefore, lack public confidence and trust. This would leave the state vulnerable to renewed outbreaks of conflict. Additionally, security sector reforms are imposed by foreign actors or driven by the self-interest of elite groups. They are therefore likely to have little resonance with the everyday experience of people at the community level. Consequently, as a concrete answer to the central research question, it has been claimed that, SSR can contribute to fashioning a state in a way that acknowledges the socio-political dimension and the need to establish political legitimacy. SSR should be approached in a human-centric way, focusing on the security of citizens rather than governments and regimes.

The third chapter sought to discuss the implementation of the Security Sector Reforms in Afghanistan by international donors from the 2002 Bonn conference until the 2006 London conference. The purpose of this chapter was to discover to what extent the state-building process through security sector reforms has been successful in Afghanistan. It has been argued that the lack of coordination between donors, the lack of a clear reform strategy and the ignorance of ownership of the reforms by society hindered the achievement of successful results from the reform process. While some successful results were achieved in the reform process led by international donors, particularly in institution building, disarmament, and demobilization, the process was in general
characterized by many shortcomings. There was a lack of a practical framework for reform processes and a clear reform strategy in the Afghan SSR agenda. The process remains hindered by the lack of coordination between donors and focusing largely on the capital, Kabul kept the less accessible areas out of the reform process. At the same time, international donors failed to take into account the institutional (in)capacity of the Afghan government and the lack of professional leadership in such processes. One more important problem in the Afghan SSR process was the lack of ownership of the reform process by the Afghanistan government and local society. For successful SSR programs, it is necessary that they be owned and internalized by the targeted country or society. Despite both the Bonn and London agreements stressing the ownership of reforms by Afghan society, the current situation shows that the process and its results were not owned by Afghan society.

Finally, the fourth chapter of this thesis focused on the second phase of the Afghan SSR process, particularly focusing on the Afghan police reforms. The EU and the US efforts to Afghan police reforms have been analyzed. More concretely this final chapter of the thesis aimed to an answer to: How have EU and US efforts affected Afghan police reforms? It has been argued that, while the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) largely participated in police training programs and focused on the human-centric security concept of SSR, the rule of law and accountability, the US-led police reform process had mainly militarized the police to fight against terrorism and protect the Afghan state and its structures.

The overall argument presented in this thesis is that the Afghan police reform confirms the negativity of SSR’s focus on state security in the long run with regards to state formation because it mainly fulfills the interests of the elite and foreign actors hence leaving the local population disgruntled. This approach further reflects a Weberian understanding because of its bias towards the use of rational-legal state structures as a means of gaining legitimacy and improving performance. Furthermore and of paramount consideration is the fact that the approach totally ignores the fact that institutions also need political acceptance for them not to be viewed as a Weberian façade. However stronger focus on human security in SSR process on the long term can contribute to successful state-building as it can create an environment where people engage in building institutions which are supported and accepted by society. However, as mentioned above, this thesis presents only one way of state-building through SSR. Future research should therefore concentrate on the role of SSRs in development. This would be a fruitful area for further work to analyze other contexts different from Afghanistan also considering possibly more successful examples of SSR and state-building.
Bibliography

Anderson, M. "Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War" London: Lynne
Ball, N. et al., 2003. “Governance in the Security Sector”.In: van deWalle, N., Ball, N.,


Cooper, N. & Pugh, M. "Security Sector Transformation" pp.19-24


Doyle, M., 1953 "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs", *Parts I and II, Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12


Retrieved at 23/07/2015


Kukathas, C., 2008. A Definition of the State. Available at: http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hunt/A%20Definition%20of%20the%20State.htm 26/07/2015


Skocpol, T., 2008. Bringing the State back , In: Retrospect and Prospect, *Scandinavia Political Studies,* 31(2),630-648


Wulf, H., 2004 "Security Sector reform in developing and transnational countries" Bergof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management