Making the 'unknown' 'known':
The logics of securitization, risk and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism

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Introduction

In the winter of 2014/2015 it became clear that over a million people was on its way to Europe. This migration trend affected governments throughout the whole continent, but it also affected the European Union (EU). It is well known that there is a long history of migration from war areas and lesser developed countries to Europe, but the amount of people that was trying to cross the Mediterranean was now up to the point that national governments were calling out to stop this migration movement. At the same time these national governments were calling for a stop, many people died at sea and that is how the concept of the European migration crisis emerged. It was a crisis for both the migrants as for the receiving governments. The EU had problems with managing this situation as it became clear that there was disagreement between the member states about which policy would be suitable to handle this crisis. The most outspoken countries were Germany and Hungary and whereas Angela Merkel welcomed migrants to enter Germany, Prime Minister Orbán of Hungary proposed to build a wall around his country to keep the migrants out. Because of the outspoken comments and behavior of Prime Minister Orbán, this work will focus on the Hungarian treatment of refugees in 2015 as an attempt to discuss Securitization and Risk logics at play, but especially to grasp the zoo political character of this policy.

Hungary is a landlocked country with 10 million people lies at the external border of the EU, which has a long history of foreign occupation. Therefore the history and the geography of Hungary is important and could say many things about the reason they show an anti-immigration attitude. However, the object of analysis here is not only Hungary’s history and geography, but rather the logic behind Hungary's approach towards irregular migrants at their borders. Although migration policy is a complex field which touches upon many subfields, the main focus of this work will be on the connection of migration and the idea of security, or the so called migration-security nexus. The migration-security nexus is a concept that has been discussed by a large degree in the literature in the fields of International Relations and International Sociology. As many scholars in IR have connected the migration field to security, it was drawn into the world of ‘military’ discourse and it was mostly securitization logic that identified this development. An interesting development is that the scholar Vaughn-Williams stated that migration was also drawn into a so called 'humanitarian' discourse.
By using a case study this work will illustrate that a tension is present between Hungary and the European Union (EU). However, an even closer analysis will show that it is not so much the global governance as such Hungary is opposing, but rather the idea of liberalism as a way of governing. The idea behind this can be illustrated by three types of logic that illustrate different aspects of governing processes. First of all securitization logic is seen as not necessarily associated with liberalism. The other two logics, risk and zoo-political logic are associated with liberalism. If you can consider human rights at the center of liberal values, it could be said that risk and zoo-political logic are driven by liberal values and human rights. This work will make sense of these different types of logics by placing them in the context of Hungarian migration policy in 2015.

The main question of this work is how the Hungarian migration-security policy in 2015 is to be considered as being characterized by securitization, risk logic as well as zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic. In order to make sense of this, the first chapter illustrates a contextual history. The first chapter therefore seeks to understand how Hungary’s history and geography helped shaping Hungary’s present migration policy. It also looks at the political developments in Hungary and the measures of governance that resulted from these developments. Furthermore, a connection has been made between Prime Minister Orbán’s migration policy and a phenomenon called State Racism, a phenomenon that explains racism in a way that a nation is imagined as a race. Subsequently, the second chapter will try to find out how the aforementioned three different types of logic could be understood in a way that they make sense for the Hungarian case. They will be analyzed from the idea of the migration-security nexus that is mostly dominated by securitization logic, but in which risk logic is also present. Important for this work is the addition of the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism as a logic which places the idea of how we view human rights in a perceived context of a human-animal binary. In other words, in contrast to securitization and risk logic that are driven by an anthropocentric ontology, zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism includes the human perception of its kind in a world that is not ontologically isolated from the animal category but rather the presence of a co-existential way of living. Although this logic does not answer the more specific questions about desired outcomes for political programs, it does extend the theoretical scope in order to grasp the complexity of the migration-security nexus in a context of humanitarian discourse and policy. The relation to liberalism in this logic is also focused on the influence of International Organizations and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO's) that promote human rights and other liberal values. Therefore, in the third chapter, the Hungarian case will illustrate how certain zoo-political techniques in some cases can be used to make 'unknown' populations 'known' and therefore controllable and governable. Moreover, it will illustrate conclusions about where and how a certain logic comes into play is based upon categories as present in the scheme of Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014). Their scheme was originally focused on a distinction between securitization and risk logic that explained threat, referent object, management aim and temporal direction. This work however, included the ontologically different type of zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism in order to give a more inclusive illustration about the migration-security nexus. The outcome of the scheme in this work shows a pattern in which the Hungarian policy is more leaning towards securitization logic but it is certainly not limited by it. This is clearly shown in the fourth chapter which is illustrated as a historic oversight of 2015 in which a distinction has been made between a period 'before the construction of the fence' and a period 'after the construction of the fence'. This work states that the discourse of the Orbán government shows a growing tendency towards risk and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism after their economy and society were 'secured'. The final chapter is an illustration of securitization, risk and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism in which securitization is the dominant logic. The politics that result of this illustration will be discussed in the ultimate chapter. As the title of this work suggests, there are several logics behind certain techniques to make something 'unknown' 'known'.

The outcomes and results of this work will be contributing to the aforementioned line of reasoning to stretch our understanding of governing through the migration-security nexus with a special focus on migration policy of Hungary in 2015. A debate on using 'liberal' techniques or to securitize migrants instead is an overarching debate in which this work will not make any claims on what one should do, but rather how one could look beyond the current debate. The scheme of Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014) and its categories allow us to look closer to the governing process and will be a relevant tool to understand the relations between 'liberal' and so called ‘illiberal’ techniques better. The addition of the zoo political dimension to this scheme will give a better understanding of how different logics work and when they come into play and when they do not. This allows us to explore the limits of our knowledge on the aforementioned logics, the migration-security nexus, the relation between them and how to look beyond.
Methodology

Central to this exploratory study will be an in-depth discussion of the theoretical origins of this migration-security nexus. A comparison of securitization logic, as described by some scholars that are considered as to be part of the Copenhagen School, and the more on liberalism focused logics of risk and the zoo political, as described by authors like Michel Foucault, Ulrich Beck, Niklas Luhman, Jacques Derrida and Nick Vaughan-Williams. This work will illustrate how the Hungarian migration-security policy in 2015 is being characterized by mostly securitization logic but also as the logics of risk and the so called 'zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism' as identified by Jacques Derrida (2009) and coined by Vaughan-Williams (2015). The focus of this work will also be on the categories of the scheme based on Grounded Theory (GT) as produced by Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014) to distinguish between the logics of securitization, risk and the zoo-political empirically and it will be observed by a qualitative content analysis of documents of Amnesty International, UNHCR and most importantly, the website of the Hungarian national government.
Chapter One: Hungarian border policy in 2015

Ever since the Second World War, the countries on the European continent have been building on the idea of a European Union, thereby mainly focusing on economic cooperation, to enable peace in Europe. Not isolated from this context, in 1951, the Geneva Convention related to the status of Refugees was signed and originally focused on European Refugees, displaced by war and the Holocaust, to ensure that they were given asylum. Unforeseen but undeniably true, in the beginning of 2015 it became evident that the largest group of migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers since the second world war are entering Europe from countries like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iraq, but also from Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Gambia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kosovo, and Albania, all with different motives. According to the UNHCR, the level of forcibly displaced people in 2015 reached the highest level since the second world war as well (UNHCR 2015). This enormous increase of flows of people was and is challenging the EU at the highest level, but it is also putting pressure on national governments of the Member States, especially countries like Greece, Spain, Italy and Hungary which are located at the external border of the EU. As many boats filled with people capsized in the Mediterranean, migration in this part of the world received much attention by global media and ever since it has been framed as the European Migrant Crisis. Whether these people are being called ('illegal') migrant, refugee or asylum-seeker does make a big difference and to define these categories is in fact a very important aspect of the politics that produce the logic behind the migration-security nexus. Something that will further be dealt with in the further coming chapters.

Because people who migrate, due to technologies, these days are well informed and aware of dangers and risks, alternative routes to enter Europe have become more 'popular' and large groups of people started to enter Europe through the Turkey-Greece passage. As Macedonia and Serbia are not EU countries, the first country they would enter inside of the EU was going to be Hungary. The border control agency of the European Union, Frontex, reported in May 2015 that over 7,000 people crossed the border between Serbia and Hungary in April 2015, compared to 900 people in April 2014. It became a case that would be of symbolic importance for the EU and therefore the Team of the University of Central Europe called Hungary a 'particularly interesting case for assessing asylum policy', because of the impressive risen amount of people entering the country.
The Schengen Zone

An extra dimension to Hungary's migration policy is caused by rules and regulations of the aforementioned Schengen zone. In 1985 the Schengen agreement was signed by the most of the EU Member states and it means that today most of the EU Member States have agreed that their country now is part of an area where border checks between their borders are abolished, and that instead the checks will be done at the external border of the Schengen area. It also means that countries with borders at the external borders of the Schengen area are responsible for the border control enforcement and other migration related areas. Important for the sub-categories of migrants and refugees is that in the Dublin regulation, first signed in 1990, it was stated that the Member States where migrants and refugees enter the Schengen area should have them apply for asylum in their country and take their finger prints as a means to make this 'unknown' person to be 'known' and therefore governable. As a consequence, the rule is that if this person continues to travel onward through the Schengen area, the state that identifies this person, should send this person back to the first state the person entered. To combat irregular migration together, Frontex, the organization that defends external borders of the Schengen area, was created and institutionalized in 2005. By creating categories of regular and irregular migration, the Schengen regime already places emphasis on people as if they were not only to belong (or not) in the Schengen area, but also as if they were to pose a threat (or not) to the external border of the Schengen area.

EU Policy and Law

In the Geneva Convention Related to the Status of Refugees in 1951 and the associated Protocol in 1967, the right of asylum was assured. However, it was not until 1999 that the regulations around asylum processes were codified and harmonized in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Furthermore, the Dublin regulations, at latest updated in 2013, illustrates the dilemma on which country is responsible for which asylum procedure. It is exactly under the Dublin regulation that the Member State where the person that is looking for asylum first enters the EU is responsible for this person's asylum procedure. From the beginning the Dublin regulation was criticized by the Member States at the external border of the EU, being Malta, Spain, Italy and Greece. Therefore the Dublin regulations have been contested and fought against at the highest European court (Central European University
Furthermore, softly speaking, it is recognized in the literature that the outcome of the harmonization of asylum policy and the implementation in the Member States of the EU is very much contested. Hungary in this case is among the Country where harmonization of this type of policy is mostly contested and rather than focusing on human rights, Hungary in 2015 focused on the 'military' challenge it has found itself to be in. It therefore seems that it is a switch of Hungary from typical 'liberal democratic' policy to 'illiberal policy'.

**Hungary and Prime Minister Victor Orbán**

Professor of Economics at Harvard and fellow Hungarian, János Kornai in his essay *Hungary's U-turn: retreating from democracy*, emphasized this focus, although using slightly different language to describe this process and focusing more on the internal democratic process (Kornai 2015). By stating that in Hungary the “executive and the legislative branch are no longer separate” and that “both are controlled by Prime Minister Orbán”, Kornai described the retreat of basic structures and the presence of features of authoritative leadership still within the context of a democracy (Kornai 2015). As Victor Orbán in 2010 won the elections and his coalition “won 68 percent of the seats in the unicameral parliament”, for the present situation it means that Orbán's current coalition (called Fidesz) would be large enough to change any part of Hungary's laws or constitution (Kornai 2015).

Consequently, Kornai describes the current Hungary as a 'power pyramid' in which people find themselves in a country with an extremely centralized government administration, in which there is constant 'harassment of civil society', a monopoly for 'near to Fidesz companies' and 'reliable' people that are close to Orbán. This group of people has most impact on the important decisions for the country and according to Kornai their presence is even dominant in public organizations that should be the organizations that monitor the executive and legislative branches like the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office and the Fiscal Council (Kornai 2015). Furthermore, Kornai called the state of Hungary under the regime of Victor Orbán an autocracy. The state of Hungary in his opinion is very much comparable to Vladimir Putin in Russia. The idea Kornai has is that Orbán is not copying Putin but shows many similarities to Putin's autocratic way of governing. In order to give a better insight in the internal process of the state of Hungary the focus of János Kornai was logically more focused.
on the institutional structure of the country and already an interesting introduction in the state apparatus of the Orbán government. However, considering answering the question whether liberal values play a role in his policy or governance in the field of the migration-security nexus, the focus will now be turned to the debate around Hungary's national identity.

Keeping the remarks of János Kornai in mind, the aforementioned policies have been related to changing laws, but not directly to the implementation of law, whether European or Hungarian. Whereas there was already a concern for internal matters as discussed by János Kornai, the Central European University Team in their report on Hungary showed their concerns for Hungary's policy towards migrants and asylum processes. As the Orbán government launched an extreme anti-immigration campaign in June 2015, they were one of the European governments that wanted to suspend the Dublin regulations immediately and already in January 2015, the administration threatened to build a wall along the border with Serbia. The reason for pointing out exactly the Hungarian-Serbian border had to do with the fact that this border crossing became more and more attractive to people that wanted to avoid the dangerous Central Mediterranean Route (originally most of them entered the EU via Malta or Lampedusa in Italy). In fact, this route became the major 'migration hub' during the summer of 2015, although 80% of people seeking asylum, continued their way north within the period of ten days (Hungary Helsinki Committee 2015). At first the Orbán government seemed to try 'normal' political tactics to keep the people out. This was done by for example staring an anti-immigration campaign in Hungary, or rejecting a European burden-sharing quota, but mostly, by the suspension of the implementation of the Dublin regulation. These practices, internationally speaking, can still be considered as hardly norm-breaking measures, but definitely at odds with EU human rights standards and therefore liberal values.

Furthermore, politicians close to Victor Orbán used the, by the EU categorized, migrants and refugees as scape goats and started a discourse of a so called 'Hungarian National Identity' (Central European University 2015). Victor Orbán himself as a reaction on the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 stated that “immigration only brings pain and threat to the people of Europe: therefore, immigration must be stopped...this is the Hungarian position” (Orbán by UNHCR 2015). Many similar reactions by Orbán and nearby politicians followed, using comparisons of Hungary with a refugee camp in their discourse (Orbán UNHCR 2015). On
June 23rd the so-called Visegrád group countries (consisting of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary), were the only Member States in the EU to reject the mandatory quota system, demanding a distinction between international refugee and economic migrants (Central European University 2015). This obviously meant that the Visegrád group wanted further categorization of people that were trying to get into the EU. Their message was that they would not cooperate. Subsequently, Orbán announced that it would suspend the consequences of the Dublin regulations. Hungary's minister of the interior justified this action by stating that “any asylum seeker coming from Syria or Afghanistan filing an application in Hungary must have crossed the borders of at least four countries, likewise illegally, before submitting his or her application to the Hungarian Immigration Authority” (Central European University 2015). Subsequently, Prime Minister Orbán announced that “Hungary will build a four-meter high fence on the border with Serbia to keep out illegal migrants” (UNHCR 2015). Prime Minister Orbán also added that the policy changes should be aimed at “arresting, detaining, deporting and forcing migrants to work” (UNHCR 2015).

Taking these reactions together, Orbán's rhetoric and actions seem to point out a case of emergency in which Hungary needs to be protected against a real threat. By highlighting the 'Hungarian National Identity' he used (not always explicitly but mostly implicitly) the old contradictions of Christian and Islamic Europe in his discourse and this also explains how Orbán and his group of loyal followers position their population as if it is under threat. The discourse used by Victor Orbán, in which migrants pose a threat to Hungary's population seems to fit very well into the phenomenon that Michel Foucault called State Racism a phenomenon in which a nation is imagined as a race.

Victor Orbán and the Hungarian border barrier

In June 2015, the Hungarian government stated that the EU was not performing well and proved “too slow to act” and that, as there was an 'influx of migrants' entering Europe during the ongoing European migrant crisis, there was a need for strong actions. Therefore, they started the construction of a fence along the border with Serbia and it took until September 14 for it to be ready. As the Prime Minister of Hungary stated that their task was nothing more than to register them, they could do so at the checkpoints at the border. In the end, the border fence was 175 kilometers long and 4 meters high. Finally, the border is deployed by 950
soldiers and the costs were around a 100 million dollar. More importantly, there were two
detention camps constructed in order to control the detained migrants and later on more would
follow. Although there have been many protests by migrants and refugees, there was no
possibility for contesting the barrier and the detention centers they were placed in. Moreover,
Hungarian police fired teargas and rushed forward into the crowd in which women and
children were present (Amnesty International 2015). As mentioned before, the idea that fits
the logic of this discourse and subsequent measures is what Foucault famously called State
Racism, a phenomenon that explains not racism in a way that a nation is imagined as a race.

**Michel Foucault and State Racism**

It was in 2003 that the 1976 lectures of Michel Foucault at the Collège de France were
translated into the English language and it is in Society must be defended that the phenomenon
'State Racism' was coined. Among other, Mark Kelly (Kelly 2004) in his article used this
concept of bio political racism from the 1976 lectures to present an “exegesis of Foucault's
concept of state racism” and using a case study of Australia to illustrate a turn to nationalism
based on the interest of a nation as an “economic and demographic entity”. This was in
contrast to the more traditional idea of ethnic type of racism. Therefore, Kelly mentions “a
race struggle which results in the idea of the nation as a race, of a people which is racially
homogeneous, for which internal and external others are dangers.”

Kelly mentions two lineages that have emerged since the nineteenth century, as identified by
Michel Foucault. The first is the one that “denies inherent conflict in and basic to society in
favor of a conflict between societies and its enemies” (Foucault 2003). The second is
characterized by an analysis of Michel Foucault through Nietzsche, affirming the presence of
a “primacy struggle as the internal dynamic of every society” (Foucault 2003). It is exactly
from this combination that Foucault determines that State Racism and its discourse is
“intimately connected with the emergence of biopolitics, one of the two great technologies of
power in the modern epoch” (Kelly, 2004) with the other being discipline. It is therefore that
according to Michel Foucault, State Racism makes its entrance when the government needs to
justify its actions and breach of the social contract it knows it cannot break. The government
therefore needs to find a way to relieve itself from this responsibility and “kill or let die”,
mostly focusing on the last. By calling it “indirect murder”, Michel Foucault identified that
this situation creates a greater risk for some people, for example not belonging to the population that they otherwise would be exposed to. The problem in the migration-security nexus is that people considered as illegal migrants are not being considered as part of the population and therefore “it is the population as such that needs to be defended”, according to the logic of Victor Orbán and his regime. The ultimate part of this chapter therefore illustrates the concrete measures that came out of the Hungarian border policy in 2015. This work divides the measures and policy in two parts because the nature of the policy deviated after the replacement of a minister that was responsible for exactly this border security policy and the second period in which the border barrier was finished and a different type of discourse has been expressed from the Orbán government.

**Excluding Policy and a Border Fence**

On September 21st 2015, Amnesty International stated that Hungary violates human rights of refugees by 'blocking their access to a meaningful asylum on its territory' by building a fence along the border with Serbia. Furthermore, the Orbán government amended a law, in which the entry of 'illegal' migrants and refugee’s shifts responsibility away from the regime, the possibility for claiming asylum in Hungary has been reduced to nearly zero. According to Amnesty International this law is in opposition with made international and European agreements and made Amnesty International and many NGO's ring all alarm bells. Furthermore, on September 15th the Hungarian government ordered the construction of a border fence, sealing of its border with Serbia and making it impossible for any person to cross the border (Amnesty International 21 September 2015). As a consequence, in order to analyze the broader picture of Hungarian border policy, this work will focus on official discourse from the website of the Hungarian government in the coming chapters.

**Managing Detention Centers**

On December 1st 2015 Human Rights Watch announced that the new border regime (since a new minister of security was installed and the border fence was finished), has made it its priority to detain 'vulnerable asylum-seekers and migrants' in poor conditions. Based on visits
to five detention centers, Human Rights Watch determined that 'two detention centers hold asylum seekers pending decisions on their applications' and 'three hold both rejected asylum seekers and people convicted of irregular border-crossing, all awaiting deportation either to their countries of origin or a transit country' (Human Rights Watch 1 December 2015). As a consequence, in order to analyze the ultimate part of Hungarian border policy, this work will focus on both Hungarian discourse coming from the Orbán government as well as official discourse coming from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch with a special focus on detention centers.

In sum, this work identifies two periods in the Hungarian border policy in 2015. The first period was the 'warning' period in which the Orbán government built up their discourse as if it were to be inevitable to impose drastic measures like imposing laws that criminalized migrants and refugees, building a border fence along the Serbian and Croatian border and constructing detention centers for migrants and refugees in order to either, deport them or detain them in very poor circumstances (Amnesty International 2015).
Chapter Two: Logics of Securitization, Risk and the Zoo-political

In order to explain the origins of the specifics of *State Racism* and the reason why Victor Orbán speaks of a militant invasion towards the Hungarian population, a brief explanation of the general migration-security nexus will be laid out. Subsequently, emphasis will be placed upon the distinction between the logic of securitization and the more liberal-focused risk and zoo-political logics. To conclude, a brief comparison will be made between some central aspects of the different types of logic. This should give some more insight in how the current theoretical foundations in the migration-security nexus could be understood.

**The Migration-Security Nexus**

From the moment the Lisbon treaty was signed in 2006, a symbolic 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' was the framework under which the EU migration policy would function. Furthermore, a larger debate concerning the connection between migration and security emerged after the 9/11 attacks in the United States and it is broadly accepted in the media and literature that the securitization has become more apparent and maybe even a *leitmotif* in critical security studies (Aradau 2008: 35). Under the logic of securitization as laid out in the article of Mutlu and Leite called *Dark Side of the Rock: Borders, Exceptionalism, and the Precarious case of Ceuta and Melilla*, the Schengen zone is to be seen as an “intensified institution that represents the coupling of migration and security, creating two kinds of borders, open and closed and two kinds of subjects, regular and irregular”. Mutlu and Leite in their article illustrated the existence of these subjects by stating that for the irregular migrant its border experience is mostly characterized by fences, guards, cameras, sensors and towers. The experience of the regular traveler however, is only characterized by the visit of an “immigration counter and a rubber stamp on the passport”. These experiences illustrate how the irregular migrant is categorized as how Foucault would describe *State Racism*.

They continue by stating that it is dependent upon “object location”, “historical context” and “geographical context” what the definition of security practices entails. Practices that are based upon the subject of separation, the function and the location of the specific border and that would provide for the definite outcome of the nature of a border-crossing experience. The
focus on object location, historical context and geographical context give away a direction of theorizing that puts emphasis on the specific rather than the generalizing idea of border-crossing as a uniform experience. It is exactly this notion that they emphasize upon when they speak of “intersubjectivities of border crossings differing from one port of entry to another”. In order to find out which logic is driving the specific case of Hungary's border management one therefore needs to pose the question how these situated intersubjectivities are determined that define the regime structure and, in other words, which logic the regime eventually follows when and how.

Interestingly, Mutlu and Leite make the choice to reject “Agamben's analysis of the legal void and the resemblance of that political space to camp” and rather argue that “the geographical location and the historical relations that are embedded in the specific context of a given border define the practiced governmentalities of that border”. Subsequently, the decision to, without hesitation, dive into the critical discourse and policy analysis associated with the Copenhagen School's approaches, this work takes a step back of this specific analytical logic and first explores the alternatives to this securitization approach. Therefore, an analysis of both securitization as well as the logic of risk and the zoo-political shall be the subject of analysis, to reach new in-depth understanding of theoretical foundations in the context of border-management and the migration-security nexus. Consequently, the work follows the idea of Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014) that “often in-depth discussion of the theoretical origin of the migration-security nexus is neglected”. In order to select definitions of the different logics, when it comes to securitization it is the Copenhagen School of security studies that is mostly used to illustrate the migration-security nexus, conceptualizing security as a speech act. Ole Weaver (2000) described this speech act as central to three aspects: A) a securitizing actor B) who designates an existential threat C) in order to legitimize the use of extraordinary means. The securitization logic therefore has three characteristics that say something about how the migration-security nexus is being understood. However, as Niemann and Schmidthäussler mention, there has been a so called 'liberal turn' in the literature in the last decade that might understand the migration-security nexus from different aspects and theoretical foundations. From their point of view it is “another logic, the logic of risk”, in which security phenomena sometimes fit better (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014). A third logic, which is not considered by Niemann and Schmidthäussler, but could be appropriate to follow is a more new, radical and underdeveloped view at governing security processes.
especially in the case of the migration-security nexus. This logic builds upon the same biopolitics on which risk in the Foucaultian sense of risk is built, but rather extends this logic to the idea of the zoo-political. In contrast to the securitization logic, the last two are mainly focused on liberal governance. Therefore, instead of speaking of analyzing a securitizing actor, who designates an existential threat in order to legitimize the use of extraordinary means, the reference point of investigation might be more focused upon typical liberal practices of governance which show more flexibility towards the means of reaching the ends of their governance. Thus, by following the structure of their analysis but also by keeping in mind that the case study of Niemann and Schmidthäussler as well as the to be mentioned case study of the zoo-political, was about the migration-security nexus in the context of the EU in general and that this work puts the main focus on the specific Hungarian case of 2015, the second part of this chapter will give an illustration of all three logics to give an idea about what the main aspects of all three logics entail and how they might contribute to an in-depth discussion of the theoretical foundations of the migration-security nexus.

**The logic of securitization**

It was under the radar of scholars like Buzan, Weaver and Booth that redefinitions of the security concept were made. After the fall of the Iran Curtain, it were those same scholar that put these political and academic redefinitions in practice. Parallel to this development a new approach emerged with a special emphasis on looking at how security discourse and the extension of non-military issues evolved. This approach has made its way into the field of security studies step by step (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014). As most of the literature puts its focus on one of the three schools within this approach, this work shall follow suit and base its reference of securitization upon the so called Copenhagen School of securitization. The reason that this work is using the Copenhagen school is because both Mutlu and Leite as well as Niemann and Schmidthäussler pointed it out as the most influencing school in the field of securitization logic.

Therefore, as aforementioned, the focus of this work will be on the characteristics this school of thought points out. As the influential scholar Ole Weaver stated:
“Security is the speech act where a securitizing designates a threat to a specified referent object ad declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off.”

In other words, discourse about migrants and refugees shape the actions implemented by a state or authority. By following this line of reasoning, Niemann and Schmidthäussler define something as securitized when the 'relevant audience' accepts 'breaking norms', making the security agenda a very powerful tool to prioritize certain matters (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014: 8). According to them, this logic entails that they can criticize directly from two important aspects of security policy. The first aspect is about the question whether things should be framed in the first place. This has to do with the idea about what one can know. Subsequently, the second is about the question whether maximum security is possible in the first place. This question is more related to the question what exists or, in other words, what is possible? As many of these securitization scholars believe securitization is a speech act, it therefore can be de-constructed and de-securitization.

Securitization in this sense is a way to avoid military thinking and acting and most importantly, to avoid the so called ‘othering’ (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014: 9). An interesting concept of what Ole Weaver calls “social security” is strongly related to the migration-security nexus and in contrast to the case study of the general EU policy, the case of the Hungarian migration policy can be analyzed from the notion of this concept, because in contrast to the EU, Hungary is a nation-state and there is a (created and shared) Hungarian identity with a stable core. The analysis from the point of 'social security' will be better explained in the coming chapters.

As securitization can be seen as a type of logic that helps us understand much discourse about the present, a management of the future seems to be rather absent. Niemann and Schmidthäussler highlight the contrast of securitization and risk logic by stating that risk logic entails a “precautionary principle and future orientation of action” (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014: 9). The logic of risk therefore seems to focus on aspects of discourse that securitization is not focused on and it is exactly the comparison of different types of logics that could bring to us new insights in how to govern, in other words, make the 'unknown' to be 'known'.
The logic of Risk

While it is widely accepted in the literature that Knight (1921) has made an essential distinction between known and unknown uncertainties within the context of risk, it was Michel Foucault who first spoke of a so called 'dispositive of security' that governments needed to defend liberal freedom. According to Foucault, governments think that this liberal freedom is in “constant danger and should be defended by liberal governance constantly” (Foucault 2007). By stating that liberalism cultivates danger, Foucault emphasizes that liberalism needs permanent risk and ‘insecurity’ (Foucault 2007). Building on these statements of Foucault, it is through the extensive knowledge of the scholars Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhman that this work tries to give an always too short and incomplete, but framed insight in the meaning of risk-literature for the migration-security nexus.

The late sociologist Ulrich Beck viewed risk as a phenomena that is characterized by A) low probability but with devastating consequences, B) impossible to control, C) by modern societies (or so called 'risk societies'). For Beck, risks are caused by dangers that are produced by civilization itself and all kinds of risks together have caused a certain 'logic of prevention'. Furthermore, Beck emphasizes the strong belief of people that risks are in fact future events that will become real and they maintain risks as long as people believe this is true. Therefore risks need to be staged and even though the aforementioned people think that by certain implemented policy that at that moment their situation is safer, it is very much irrelevant according to Beck (Beck 2007: 29-30). The focus of the people, instead, is on preventive action, staged by so called security actors. Moreover, this specific kind of preventive action is turned into 'normalized' political action and this is how risk becomes a very effective security dispositive, although it might not be the most appropriate form of political action at that specific time and moment.

For Niklas Luhman most emphasis lies upon the idea that risk is about accountability of the self. The reason for this is that for Luhman, risk is about the idea of decision-making of the internal, whereas threat, in contrast, is about the accountability of an external factor. Subsequently, Luhman states that this goes together with the idea that risk is very much about rational management and maybe even about control (Luhman 1993). Central to the idea of Luhman about risk is that in practice traditional ideas about “power, assertiveness and stamina
are being replaced by insurance, participation, and consensus strategies, which later prevents ascribing individual responsibility”.

Niemann and Schmidthäussler in their analysis build on the idea of Aradau and Van Munster that risk is about the “quest for knowledge and management” (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014). Therefore, they conclude with the statement that risk is “active prevention of catastrophe” and putting this into practice by “governing what appears to be ungovernable”.

It is therefore the idea that risks have to be produced that stands out of this literature. Whether it is the modern or the liberal that should be defended, there is consensus that risk has an internal origin that has to be governed with a flexible, though preventive orientation. Moreover, risk literature is relatively new when it comes to the migration-security nexus and therefore risk logic will be analyzed within the context of Hungarian migration policy in 2015 in the coming chapters.

The idea that both securitization and risk logic can illustrate a better understanding of security discourse is broadly accepted in the literature. However, the migration-security nexus is a different one because it involves a phenomenon that cannot really be seen as isolated from security discourse and this phenomenon is called 'humanitarianism'. This work puts a special emphasis on the need to grasp the logic of discourse within the migration-security nexus from this so called 'humanitarian' logic. In the conclusion of their article, Niemann and Schmidthäussler acknowledge that in the context of EU policy a distinction between a risks oriented preventive logic and a more 'reactive' type of Securitization makes no difference for the answer to the question how to grasp the migration-security nexus. Instead they propose a 'humanitarian' logic that would define “concrete referent object and emphasize protection, fundamental rights and norms” (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014: 9). The logic of zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism as coined by Nick Vaughan-Williams is a first step in that direction.

**The logic of the Zoo-political: Neoliberal Humanitarianism**

As a scholar with a specific interest for post-structuralism, Nick Vaughan-Williams in March 2015 published an interesting article about “some irregular migrants” that are “being animalized” ( Vaughan-Williams 2015). As with the, mostly considered sociological, concept of risk, the idea of animalization is considered as a “specific spatial technology of power that
neither 'Foucaultian biopolitics' nor 'Agambian thanatopolitics' – two prominent frames mobilized within critical approaches to border security and migration – can adequately grasp” (Vaughan-Williams 2015; Foucault 2007; Agamben 2005). Vaughan-Williams states that the reason why these dominant frames cannot grasp it is because of their lack of explaining our imagination of what we call the man-as-species relation to the animal. His main argument against Foucault's biopolitics therefore is the focus on the anthropocentric and therefore only the man-as-species as an isolated category. The main argument against Agamben's thanatopolitics is similar but rather in a way that it is limited to the idea of what Agamben calls the homo sacer, or the human that is condemned to bare life. To explain this, if one is condemned to bare life one runs a far greater risk of dying than another human. Vaughan-Williams goes even further and borrows the concept of the 'zoo-political border', a 'spatial-ontological device', which tries to make 'irregular' and thus 'unknowable' populations 'knowable' and therefore governable by emphasizing the, what he calls, the 'bestial potentiality' of human beings. The core of his research is focused on how this zoo-political logic: (Derrida 2009) “operates as a constitutive outside of humanitarian discourses, the application of human rights, and the citizen as the 'proper' human subject in spaces of animalization across Europe”.

 Vaughan-Williams states that border security and migration management of the EU have become neoliberal and that their general policy towards these fields are also following a certain humanitarian logic, because the EU does in fact shows itself “concerned with the well-being of populations”. Therefore the connection with Foucaultian biopolitics seems to be an obvious one, because it was Foucault who stated that due to the emergence of new forms of knowledge in the 18th century (being biology, epidemiology, demography and statistics), the idea of biological life (Zoë) was absorbed by the idea of the basics of state power (bios) (Foucault 1978). From this point of view the idea of sovereign power diminished in importance and, instead, he mentioned in his works that sovereign power split into disciplinary power and bio power (Foucault 1978: 136; 2003: 241) and whereas disciplinary power was focused on the individual human body, the idea of bio power was focused on populations, or man-as-species (Foucault 2004: 247). According to Foucault this change implied a very important change from 'the right to take life and let live', to 'make live and let die' (Foucault 2004: 247). As mentioned in the first chapter, this 'let die' part is produced by the idea of State Racism. The biggest consequence of this notion, is that according to
Foucault, from this moment there was a separation between life that seemed to count as humanity and life that was seen as different and a risk to the population as a whole (Foucault 2004: 254-261). Vaughan-Williams emphasizes that the idea of Foucaultian bio power does analyze what is 'at stake' but remains insufficient to uncover certain spatial technologies of power (or what he calls 'dehumanization') at work. However, it brings up questions about what animalization exactly is and why it might assist in producing border policy and related activities. Central to this question is the relationship between border practices, sovereign power and the human-animal distinction.

Vaughan-Williams in his article defines animalization as:

“a powerful and recurring discourse – understood as an assemblage of linguistic and material phenomena – that structures many 'irregular' migrants testimonies of their embodied encounter with diverse aspects of EU(ropian) border security at various sites – particularly, though not exclusively, in the context of contemporary spaces of incarceration”.

In other words, animalization can be seen as a tool that categorizes 'irregular' migrants as if they were told that they are not part of humanity but rather part of the category of the animal or at least something outside of humanity. Pointing out that the ‘apparent disparity’ between humanitarianism as practiced by EU policy and animalization in most of the literature is explained by the rhetoric versus reality debate, Vaughan-Williams rejects this effort of explanation due to the limitations of its ability to frame key aspects. The main critique from this point of view is that it rests upon, rather than contests the terms on which the practices of animalization are constantly being justified (Vaughan-Williams 2015). The problem with it is that critiquing these practices than becomes a difficult thing and therefore we should rather turn to 'alternative critical resources' to grasp the logic behind animalization. According to Vaughan-Williams, animalization would therefore not only 'problematize neoliberal humanitarian rhetoric of migrant-centeredness', but also challenge a more 'positivist reading of bio political forms of governance'. These forms of governance would then be directed at governing well-being, health and to 'improve' the population.

Another explanation of the politics is provided by the Italian scholar Giorgio Agamben (1994, 1998, and 2013). The so called thanatopolitics of Giorgio Agamben are mainly concerned
with the omission of responsibility of states that should live up to their role of protector of human rights. In Agamben his point of view, sovereign power is bio political in the sense that it relies on so called bare life. This is something that he calls neither Zoë nor bios, but rather 'a threshold of articulation' between both (Agamben 2013: 66). In his work *The Open* (2004) Agamben supports that the foundation of man-as-species is determined by the ever present idea that the human and the animal are a separated domain. Agamben in his work therefore reintroduces 'humanity' as an 'anthropological machine' that produces the 'divisions and caesurae' necessary for man's self-reproduction (Agamben 2004). He thereby mentions two logics of this anthropological machine: 'above all the slave, the barbarian and the foreigner, as figures of an animal in human form as well as the human as the 'neomort', or vegetative life (Agamben 2004: 37). However, in the eyes of Vaughan-Williams this does only explain 'life that is separated from itself' but 'neither animal life nor human life' (Agamben 2004: 38).

His main question is therefore rather focused on 'which forms of life are produced by the anthropological machine as being worthy of counting as human in the first place'. Thus, Agamben seeks to go beyond Foucaultian biopolitics to determine how the human-animal distinction conditioned possibilities to draw more limits within the category of the human – in other words, what Foucault referred to as State Racism. However, according to Vaughan-Williams, Agamben only begins to describe 'what is at stake in the contemporary animalization of 'irregular' migrants. Of course, taking into consideration that it concerns here a context of detention centers in Europe and outside of Europe. One argument behind this statement is that Vaughan-Williams titles Agamben's work as reductive and therefore “limits the scope of his investigations into the relationship between animalization, sovereignty and biopolitics”. In contrast, a so called 'sustained and open-ended engagement with that relationship' would be provided by the work of French scholar Jacques Derrida that coins a zoo political critique of biopolitics. It is in *The Beast and the Sovereign: Volume 1* (2009) that Derrida deals with the human-animal distinction in a way that it has always been essential and a foundation when it comes to conceptualizing and operationalizing sovereign power. The explanation of Derrida is therefore very much aimed at explaining why the human-animal distinction is put down very simplistic and reductive with the goal to 'categorize different forms of life' to establish a hierarchy in which the human or anything that falls under the idea of humanity has priority. To illustrate this, Derrida insists one has to understand this human-
animal relationship very well and must also look at the onto-political work it has created and produced.

In order to make this clearer, Derrida states that the cruelest or most 'inhuman violence' has been performed against life that has not been considered as part of the human domain (Derrida 2009: 108). This is why, 'thou shall not kill' is an only concerned with life that falls within the 'proper' domain of the human and therefore, under human rights (Wolfe 2012: 9).

Furthermore, Derrida states that animalization is not external, but rather intrinsic to the logic of sovereign power. By illustrating that the animal, while being excluded from the political, still has its own and 'proper' place and identity in the polis, Derrida gives an idea about how animalization excludes and redefines identities. However, when the sovereign is being tested against concepts like proper/improper and human/animal, it is considered as: 'the most brutal beast who respects nothing' (Derrida 2009: 19). Derrida therefore speaks of the auto-deconstruction of the line between the human and the animal. This idea that the animal is excluded, but always comes back in the picture when sovereignty is discussed is the core of Derrida's critique on the biopolitics as used by Foucault and Agamben. Zoë and bios therefore are closely related to the limit between the human and the animal and as this limit is not natural it is political and connected to belonging, exclusion and therefore sovereignty. Derrida therefore states that due to the threshold, Zoë and bios are not necessarily a different thing, which means that Zoë, the 'simple act of living associated with the animal', has always been influenced by bios, being the idea of the basics of state power. Subsequently, this logic entails that the Foucaultian frame according to Derrida, makes no sense as there cannot be a 'modern entry of Zoë into bios', because they have always coexisted. Likewise, the 'differentiation' made by Agamben would not make sense either as this needs to be based upon an earlier distinction, which according to this logic is not there and so has never been there. Therefore, it would make little sense to search for a beginning of biopolitics, neither to deny novel aspects of political life nor to reject the idea of bio power in total, but rather to redefine bio power as an “arch-ancient thing and bound up with the very idea of sovereignty”, absolutely related to 'bestial moves' that categorize and therefore include and exclude animalized subjects. In order to push the limits of the current Foucaultian and the Agambian bio political paradigm, Derrida therefore emphasizes to go beyond the anthropocentric idea of understanding life and to use the term 'zoo-power' as a way of grasping the threshold between the human and the animal. In
this sense, man is produced by zoo-power and is essentially 'zoo-political' if one follows the logic of Aristotle on what is 'proper' about man (Derrida 2009: 349).

Vaughan-Williams suggest that the zoo-political critique of Derrida identifies certain spatial technologies of power that produce spaces of sovereign power with an anthropological agenda, in other words, producing them for the sake of humanity. Subsequently, he makes a connection with 'irregular' migrants by using his case study of testimonies of these people and emphasizes the animalizing effects of the discourse within detention spaces, producing a distinction between the 'improper' or 'irregular' migrant and the 'proper' or 'regular' citizen-subject. Following this logic and according to Vaughan-Williams, Derrida's critique reaches beyond the 'rhetoric' versus 'reality' debate, but rather investigates how neoliberal humanitarian logic is used as a tool to produce zoo-political spaces and distinctions between subjects. Tracing the history of the zoo, the zoo in zoo-politics since the nineteenth century, represents a space that is used to produce as much information as possible and therefore, make 'unknowable' populations 'knowable' (Gereili and Tazziloli 2013). An example of this making 'unknowable' populations 'knowable' is short-term disease surveillance of 'irregular' migrants, rather than 'treatment of chronic illnesses' (Euro surveillance 2011: 4). Subsequently, this means that the zoo-political critique is a tool to enable critique beyond the analysis of border security policies up to the critique on them itself. That does not mean that human rights have proved to be useless, but rather that the concept of 're-humanization' is a concept that will reproduce the logic upon which the violation of these rights is built. Therefore, the critique on neoliberal humanitarian discourse, focused on 'irregular' migrants, is aimed at the role it plays in immobilizing 'unknowable' populations and make sure that they become 'known'. The analysis of this neoliberal technique of power can give refreshing insights in the field of analyzing the migration-security nexus. Whereas not explicitly named as a security tool, the idea of zoo-political animalization can be seen as relevant to the migration-security nexus in a way that it follows the same logic as risk. It does in fact seem to share the characteristic that is has to be produced. However, in contrast to the idea of risk, it has a more indirect approach towards the idea of catastrophe. Therefore, one should rather take one step back in the categorization of governance and understand the idea of neoliberal humanitarianism as a zoo-political technique of power, rather than as a tool of governance in general. This means that it is indeed just like the logic of risk and securitization and it is therefore that in the next chapter it will be placed side by side with risk and securitization.
The explanation of the zoo-politics has illustrated an analysis in which EU border management and detention centers can be criticized. However, this next chapter shall include the case study of this work, being the Hungarian border policy in 2015. Including the zoo-political logic of animalization in the scheme of Niemann and Schmidthäussler, will give fresh insights in the comparison of theoretical foundation of the migration-security nexus. Therefore, the next chapters will illustrate how the logic of securitization, risk and the zoo-political can be analyzed from the point of view of the four categories of the scheme of Niemann and Schmidthäussler: the analysis of threat, referent object, management aim and the duration of measures and finally, the temporal direction of action. The analysis based upon these four aspects of the migration-security nexus will provide insight in the extraordinary policing practices of the Hungarian state apparatus in 2015.
Chapter three: The Niemann and Schmidthäussler scheme and research design

Case study and (temporal) delimitation

The coming chapter will use the scheme of Niemann and Schmidthäussler that they built on Grounded Theory (GT) to illustrate how the Hungarian border policy can be viewed from the three logics of securitization, risk and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism. As mentioned in the second chapter, the focus of this third chapter will be on people that are framed as 'irregular' migrant populations and external border control. The temporal frame of study will be the period of 2015 in which Victor Orbán has been Prime Minister of Hungary.

Methodological framework and operationalization

It is the characteristic of having both inductive and deductive elements in the analysis that made this work follow the methodological framework of Grounded Theory (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014). As the order characterized by first research and present theories, than adding data and subsequently evaluation of the findings, the idea is to sample events that are important for the categories and their dimensions (Straus and Corbin 1990: 176; Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014). However, in contrast to the work of Niemann and Schmidthäussler in which they wait for the moment when the 'categories are theoretically saturated', this work does not have that luxury and draws from less samples and therefore does not have the aim to wait until this particular moment. Instead, a more limited selection of samples than is common in Grounded Theory (GT) is being used to give an insight in the comparison of the three logics in the context of Hungarian border policy in 2015. As was the case for Niemann and Schmidthäussler, it is by a qualitative content analysis that recorded communication like official discourse from both NGO's like Human Rights Watch as well as the Orbán administration will be analyzed with the aim to discover underlying patterns and processes. As the website of the Hungarian government shows many useful articles, speeches and statements made by the Orbán regime, this is identified as the heart of the current national border regime with obvious national interest instead of other interests. The description of the regime by NGO's like Human Rights Watch will give an insight from the interest of
'humanity'. Moreover, the analysis based upon the categories of threat, referent object, management aim and the duration of measures and finally, the temporal direction of action, will provide for a distinction between the three logics of securitization, risk and the zoopolitical.

Some more information will be given about the driving rationale behind the policy-making of the Hungarian border regime in 2015.

The category of threat is an interesting category for the case study at hand because it directly illustrates differences between the different logics. In the analysis of Niemann and Schmidthäussler if influence is perceived as a concrete threat, it implies that there is securitization logic at play. If, however, there is a more diffuse influence in the discourse, it would indicate risk logic. As a third addition to this scheme, a zoo-political techniques, would rather imply that there would be not really a direct lead to a threat, but a risk that the subjects to this technique will belong to humanity, will not be directed to their 'proper' place in the polis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the zoo-political as identified by Derrida, is not necessarily a direct risk technique, but rather a tool that shares the idea with risk that it has to be produced. However, in contrast to risk, which is strongly related to probabilities, devastating consequences, the idea of control and modernity, zoo-political techniques would, within the context of the migration-security nexus, base their categorization upon 'proper' places and therefore isolated and limited places in the sight of the sovereign. Reversely, it is the 'irregular' migrant that is at risk, or threatened to be subjected by zoo-political techniques and therefore runs the risk of being excluded of humanity. Furthermore, the 'origin of threat' is seen as a subcategory of threat and the question whether that comes from the internal or the external determines the difference between securitization and risk and zoo-political logic. As self-inflicted causes of threats characterize risk and zoo-political techniques, the threat that is coming from the external is closely related to securitization logic. Within the case study of Hungary the self-inflicted threats could come from decisions made by the Hungarian government. The threats that are external in this case study could refer to 'irregular' migrants as such or reversely, traffickers that poses a threat to the lives of the migrants.

The category of 'referent object' might be even more clear in illustrating the differences between the logics. As the referent object is something that is definitely negatively impacted and/or definitely benefits from proposed measures, it is a category of analysis that is referred
to directly in the discourse. If this object is the key feature which someone is trying to protect, like an economy, population or identity of a country, this would seem to imply the presence of securitization logic through a speech act. However, if this object is in more or less degree absent, this would imply risk logic. As zoo-political logic is more closely associated with State Racism, which could apply for both, as there does not need to be a stable core of identity or other type of concrete referent object, nor a necessity of any kind with liberal governance.

Subsequently, three sub-categories of management will be discussed briefly. The 'management aim', is trying to grasp the object that is being acted against. Therefore, in risk and zoo-political logic, the dangers becomes 'governable', thus becomes a management process, whereas securitization logic presents dangers as ‘uncontrollable and thus needs to be eradicated’ (Beck 2007; Corry 2010: 16-17). Also, the duration of the management will be placed in a sub-category. This means that when action is made long-term, risk logic and the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic are present. In the case of risk logic this might entail 'sustainable partnerships with other countries'. In the case of securitization actions directly aimed at reaching a goal and therefore very much short-term oriented. A third sub-category is the nature of measures of the management. This third sub-category of management is focusing mainly on the conventionality of the actions of management. Whereas in the case of risk logic and the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic, the actions are characterized by normalized politics. In the case of risk logic this entails practices like risk analysis, reports, adherence to international obligations, and surveillance’. (cf. Van Munster 2009: 10). In contrast, in securitization logic, norm-breaking actions like the violations of laws and international obligations and involving force are implemented shortly and justified.

To conclude, the 'temporal direction' category of Hungarian border policy will be analyzed. A very important aspect of securitization in the context of temporal direction is the central point of the will to maintain the status quo. It is very much reactive in a way that actions are created as a response to dangers and threats. Niemann and Schmidthäussler have stated that actions can be for example, 'help mechanisms for Member States that are currently endangered'. A very important example of this in the case study is the Hungarian border barrier of which the construction has started on 16 September 2015 and, subsequently, finished on October 2015.
In contrast, risk logic is very much focused on the future. According to Rasmussen, “Risk is the consequence of an action, which has yet to materialize” (2001: 293). According to this idea, risk has very much a preventive aspect to it in which it is far from relevant whether it will ever materialize. Therefore, risk is about managing the future, it follows a logic which tries to prevent future catastrophe. This is mainly expressed in 'intelligent' measures like pooling of resources, reducing pull factors to enter rich countries and reducing push factors for migration in poorer countries. Importantly, in the case of risk logic it is not the actual, but rather the potential which is essential in its actions and/or measures. Therefore, 'potential harmful events' replace 'existential threats' as associated with securitization logic. Finally, the logic of zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic does not say very much about temporal spaces except the fact that, like in risk logic it produces new distinctions and spaces of sovereign power which last in the future. However, as it lacks the strong relation with control, as do risk and securitization, the idea of a temporal direction is rather indirect present, as is the first category of threat.

As do Niemann and Schmidthäussler, this work would like to highlight the importance of the realization that concepts of risk, securitization and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic have been the subject of different approaches and observations. Therefore, it is important to not reject, but still be modest about the modest patterns and tendencies analyzed by this explorative research.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Indicator/Logic</th>
<th>Securitization</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Unambiguous, existential, 'actual' threat, external origin</td>
<td>Varying degree of concreteness and gravity, internal origin</td>
<td>Varying degree of concreteness and gravity, internal origin, indirect presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent Object</td>
<td>Unambiguous</td>
<td>Different degree of concreteness</td>
<td>Different degree of concreteness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management aim, management duration</td>
<td>Eradication, temporary/short-term, exceptional/norm-</td>
<td>Governance, institutionalized/long-term,</td>
<td>Governance, institutionalized/long-term,</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Temporal Direction (of action)</th>
<th>Management nature of measures</th>
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<td>Response to contemporary situation; status quo orientation; reactive</td>
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Jorrit Saaltink s1641859: Making the 'unknown' 'known': the logics of securitization, risk, and the zoo-political
Chapter Four: Hungarian Discourse

A selection of eight documents concerning the discourse of Victor Orbán will provide an insight on the situation of Hungarian border policy in 2015. As an answer to the structure of the aforementioned scheme, this chapter will give an oversight of how Orbán built up his rhetoric towards the measures he and his regime have taken.

May 2015

As mentioned earlier, Victor Orbán and his regime already received so much critique, first on his internal policy and later also on his foreign policy. However, as a Member State of the European Union Hungary did not have the luxury to simply ignore the comments coming from humanitarian organizations, media, fellow heads of state and even more strongly his compatriots in the European Parliament. Therefore he engaged in the conversation:

“Please allow me to refrain from responding to contributions from Hungarian Members of the European Parliament, because I would not like to turn this event into a petty Hungarian squabble, or to present our country in such a light. I shall now simply acknowledge that Hungarian Members of the European Parliament have attacked their own country here today, and that furthermore one person even went so far as to suggest that the European Union should withdraw funding from Hungary because the country does not deserve it. May that be on their consciences” (Prime Minister 2015a).

The latest acknowledgment illustrated the fact that Victor Orbán did not back away from the discussion of what represents his country. In this statement it became undoubtedly clear that Victor Orbán is the one that decides who or what Hungary is and that even critical Hungarian members of the European Parliament can become the ‘enemy of the state’. He then continues:

“One speaker mentioned illiberal democracy. There is no time to elaborate on this here. I would merely say that, in my view, at the time of the 2008 financial crisis liberal organizational principles at work in the economy and in society failed; this is why we are in the crisis that we find ourselves in today” (Prime Minister 2015a).
A very clear message was displayed here about the idea of liberalism. As mentioned in the previous chapters, Victor Orbán has presented himself as an opponent of liberalism, a very bold statement in a time which is characterized by a mainly 'liberal' based world regime and even more boldly if one considers that he does seem to want to engage in cooperation with other developed economies. Moreover, he even uses the economy as an example how liberalism has failed during the financial crisis of 2008. However, he does deny any accusation of a lack of democracy or the fact that he would be an autocrat. Prime Minister Orbán felt there was nothing wrong with drawing in question the ‘lenient policy’ coming from Brussels.

June 2015

In an interview about the current situation of Hungary the subject of the European Union Orbán came back on critiquing the idea of liberalism:

“The way of thinking of leading European groups has up to now been determined by the idea of the so-called 'liberalism' (though this term is a simplification). Recently this concept has faced enormous challenges. One of those challenges has been its own weakness; this appeared just at the time of the financial crisis” (Prime Minister 2015a).

The effect of these words is that he builds an anti-liberal narrative around his anti-immigration discourse. This distracts from the critique he receives from humanitarian organizations, media fellow heads of state and compatriots in the European Parliament and rather justifies the measures he was preparing at this very moment. Subsequently, on July 13 he starts building the fence along the border and shortly after his government passes a law that criminalizes most migrants and refugees. Moreover, numbers of migrants and refugees at the gates of Europe are skyrocketing and in the European Parliament the idea of a mandatory quota system was discussed. In addition, Angela Merkel announced the welcome for refugees that were fleeing the war in Syria.

September the 1st 2015 until September the 15th 2015
Victor Orbán stated on the third of September 2015 that the 'European Migrant Crisis' now meant an absolute uncontrollable situation. Instead of calling it a 'refugee problem' he referred to 'an ever mounting wave of modern-era migration'. He also mentioned that trafficking has become a “lucrative business enterprise for dangerous and unscrupulous criminal gangs”. But still, instead of calling EU policy dangerous or a threat to Hungary, he called it 'misguided' in order to remain communication with the rest of Europe. By thinking 'with' the other European leaders he stated that: “Common sense declares that one can only create order among conflicting considerations if one sets up a clear order of priority”. Another priority for Hungary is the Schengen area, by Orbán considered as one of Europe's greatest achievements. Justifying his extreme policy of building a border fence, he calls on Spain as country in a similar situation. Orbán stated that Hungary cannot do anything more because they are overwhelmed by the large amount of people that are passing their borders. Orbán subsequently used military language in a way that their border fence is a 'line of defense'. By elaborating on the imposed a consultation on immigration, he called upon the principle of democracy and that 'eighty-five percent of them said that the EU failed' in this respect and that he was speaking in the name of the people. Shockingly he added the idea that most of them are Muslims and that it will become hard to keep Europe 'Christian'.

On the 4th of September 2015, in a response to the developments in Brussels and Berlin, Orbán was very outspoken on the possibilities of cooperation:

“And as far as I can see, the European Union still fails to understand that our only chance of satisfying our citizens' legitimate demands and desire for security is by protecting our borders. Today we must concentrate all our strength on this. Indeed any statement or proposal which diverts attention away from this makes us weaker. Europe needs to be strong now, as the worst possible combination of qualities is to be both rich and weak” (Prime Minister 2015a).

Once again Prime Minister Orbán connects a failing policy to a liberal policy of open doors and thereby justifies his policy as 'not failing'. He even calls the failing liberal policy 'weak' and rejects any other explanation that does not go along with closing the borders. The pattern of justification of norm-breaking begins to unfold. As a response to the proposed quota system he replies:
“How could a quota system be a solution? Would it stop people at the border? Would they not come in larger numbers? Would there be fewer migrants as a result? The truth is that Europe is being threatened by mass migration on an unprecedented scale” (Prime Minister 2015a).

His tone, however, remained cooperative by using words an 'irresponsible' towards the current 'claims to be compassionate' approach of the European Union and it is in the same interview that Prime Minister Orbán introduced the new episode of policy:

“Therefore, on 15 September the Hungarian government will create a new situation: I hope that we succeed in adopting these changes in Parliament today. There will be a week for migrants to prepare for a new situation in which they cannot enter Hungary illegally – an information campaign will be launched tomorrow, using flyers, videos and various media.

Up to now they might have succeeded entering illegally, as we had 175 kilometers of unguarded border, a 'green border' without any physical barriers: but that situation no longer exists, and we shall enforce new rules after the 15th (Prime Minister 2015a).

Once again, claiming to be speaking on behalf of the people about the situation around the Keleti Railway Station, Prime Minister Orbán stated:

“You can imagine what the people who live in that area must be thinking when they send their children off to school in the morning. There are risks of infectious diseases, and a mass of migrants who are unwilling to cooperate and are increasingly aggressive” (Prime Minister 2015a).

He then even claims to be speaking on behalf of 'the European people':

People are worried and concerned – not only in Hungary, but in the whole of Europe. They feel that the leaders they have elected are not in control of the situation; but it is the duty of a leader – once they have accepted a mandate from the people to govern – to represent the interests of the people, to make decisions (at times difficult ones), and to ensure above all that their electors continue to live in safety” (Prime Minister 2015a).
In sum, it is by now quite obvious that the justification of this barrier on behalf of the safety of the people that hints at securitization logic as mentioned in the previous chapter. However, the idea discourse in which Prime Minister Orbán mentions the 'risk of infectious diseases' and 'aggressive migrants' as possible threats for the Hungarian and even the European population hints also at risk and even more, zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic. The reason for this is that Prime Minister Orbán is not only framing them in a securitizing way, but is also categorizing them as if they were aggressive and contaminated beasts. This short analysis of discourse therefore already gives away that the discourse of the Hungarian regime is not be captured by simply one logic, but rather a combination of several.

In an interview at September 13 Prime Minister Orbán engaged into the subject of refugees and why also they are being rejected. By stating that they should go back and that they are not coming from war zones. Instead, he stated:

“These people are not coming to Europe because they seek safety, but because they want a better life than that in the refugee camps.

They want to live a German live life, or perhaps a Swedish life. The standard of living they could have in Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary or Austria is not enough for them. On a personal level I can understand that, but the fact is that there is no fundamental right to a better life, only to safety and human dignity” (Prime Minister 2015b).

**From the 15th of September onward**

On the 15th of September, Orbán responded to the Austrian decision to build a fence along its border with Slovenia to 'control' the 'influx of migrants' and straight away emphasized that this policy was an outcome of democracy. Furthermore, he highlighted the fact that in Hungary from this moment 'illegal' crossing of the border fence would become a crime which means prison sentence or expulsion. Directly changing his tone from military to 'normalized' political language he stated:

“We are not sealing the hermetically, but we simply seek to enforce the laws which have always been in force.” (Prime Minister 2015c)
This 'normalization' of language seemed to imply a change into a more moderate discourse, however, this was not the case. Subsequently, when the last step of Orbán's extraordinary, norm-breaking policy was made, after closing the border with Serbia, not accidentally, Orbán, on September 16, released his ideas about a 'liberal identity in crisis'. From this moment his discourse was aimed at the bigger picture and the long-term vision of the European Union. By calling the 'spiritual-ideological' era of the last two decades 'liberal blahblah' he tried to provoke sentiments aimed at his 'counter-ideology' in order to deviate from the human rights denying policies he just implemented. As, according to him, this so called liberal blahblah was coming to an end, he called upon his own principles of nationalism and Christianity to succeed this 'unfortunate' episode. His so called liberal crisis was the perfect deviation from obligations to human rights and he even tried to reach for more sentiments by stating that it was his firm believe that in Europe it is no longer possible to live in prosperity while “seeing ourselves as good in a liberal way”. This deviation of what is being perceived as good and what is not can be seen as a clear attempt to justify his norm-breaking policy. It is however not just the rejection of the fact that he is not doing something wrong that is reflected in his discourse, but also the bold attempt to change the norms that he is breaking. According to Orbán, the European right is suffering from exactly this idea that they should conform to some extent. It is however at the end of his statement that he comes down to the core of what he aims to achieve. It is the attempt to break Christianity and liberalism down in four sentences that should give him the moral win instead of the defeat.

Therefore he justifies the construction of his border barrier and the criminalization of migrants and refugees by the following:

“Christian identity sets out an order of importance: first and foremost we are responsible for our children, then for our parents, then our place of residence followed by our homeland, and only then comes everything else. As we know, a liberal is responsible for the whole world, because they are a good person and everything that happens around the world is painful for them”.

It is exactly here where he tries to impose a hierarchy of priorities that is not taken seriously by the liberal. The liberal, which is 'responsible for the whole world', is therefore presented as
the naive European leader who lost its connection with the people and is not really taking 'responsibility' for its people. According to Orbán, the illustration of just this action is the protection of the European borders and the protection of its 'ethnic and cultural composition'. An interesting strategy unfolded during this interview where Prime Minister Orbán promoted himself as the protector of European ethnicity and culture by demonstrating an example that the rest of Europe could follow.

**November 2015: 'Europe is being invaded'**

At the World Science Forum on November 4th Prime Minister Orbán stated that:

“What is happening, what will happen and what we allow to happen has significance beyond the borders of Europe or Western civilization. Behind the processes a new map of a cultural, world power and global economic realignment is unfolding, and this map could involve changes with far-reaching consequences – including armed conflicts”.

Therefore, Orbán emphasized that the whole world should take its share and that is how to 'manage' the situation. This change in scale and temporal direction has been a clear change in Orbán's discourse, but does not necessarily imply a change of logic. However, some elements, like for example temporal direction, does seem to imply a change of securitization to a more 'managerial' risk logic.

Finally, as a response to the Paris attacks in November, he stated that the attacks are a logical consequence:

“There was not a single police chief in the whole of Europe who would not have said that the question was not whether an act of terrorism would occur, but when and where it would. Because nothing that is happening can have any other outcome. This was obvious. We cannot defend ourselves, and not a single European leader can defend themselves, by saying that some information was not available. This is because the problem and the troubles inevitably spring from the nature of immigration: people from war zones are pouring into our world of peace and unregulated and uncontrolled manner.”
This is where Prime Minister Orbán takes up his military discourse again but than for the European as a whole.
Chapter Five: Empirical Findings of the Logic of Securitization, Risk and Zoo-political Neoliberal Humanitarianism and a discussion on Liberalism

This chapter will be divided in the four categories as identified by Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014). An important thing to mention is that every category will be structured by the discourse of Orbán and a 'counter-discourse' to highlight the complex situations that have to be governed within the context of the migration-security nexus. Taken together, the four categories as identified by Niemann and Schmidthäussler give a context which eventually shows a pattern of pro- and contra-liberal discourse. Therefore the end of this chapter shall conclude with an analysis of this discussion on liberal values.

Threats

Discourse of the Orbán administration

Niemann and Schmidthäussler typify risk logic as associated with pronunciation 'support for return and readmission' although 'without pointing at a particular threat demanding precisely this response' (Niemann and Schmidthäussler 2014). An example in the case study of Hungarian border policy shows that Orbán is rejecting this logic, namely by opposing a proposed quota system which would oblige Member States of the European Union to take in at least the amount of migrants that is decided upon in Brussels. Victor Orbán’s response therefore is:

“The problem – the number one problem – with this whole quota idea is that we do not know how many people we are talking about. We do not know how many of them will come; if we do not protect our borders, tens of millions of migrant will keep coming” (Prime Minister 2015a).

Relating back to the aforementioned concept of 'societal security', as threat is identified as central for securitization logic, Victor Orbán does speak of a threat in a way that they are threatening the composition of the population:
“I repeat: there is unlimited supply. And one morning we could wake up and realize that we are in the minority on our own continent” (Prime Minister 2015a).

Subsequently, using the term 'occupying' and 'without our even noticing' gives away a strong relation with securitization logic:

“I personally believe in a Europe, would like to live in a Europe, and would like my children to live in a Europe and in a Hungary which is a continuation of the one thousand-year tradition maintained by our parents, our grandparents and our great-grandparents. This could change: they could occupy Hungary – something not unprecedented in our history – or they could introduce communism. But the profile of our population could also change slowly, by degrees, without our even noticing” (Prime Minister 2015a).

Furthermore, 'trafficked goods and persons attempting to cross the border', from Orbán's point of view are existential threats, which can only be tackled by being blocked or eliminated as is the case with securitization logic. He does not explicitly say that the threats are uncontrollable dangers, but by stating that they 'do not work with us' the control would rather be outside of Hungary, for example in the hand of the European Union or more powerful states (Prime Minister 2015a). Moreover, from Orbán's point of view 'illegal' migration is by far the most common danger by stating that 'undocumented border crossings and irregular stay of third country nationals' are the most common danger. This has been taken to another level of gravity when a law was passed to make 'irregular' migrants prohibited and make sure they would be sentenced to jail. However, the ultimate step of framing people that were trying to cross their borders as a threat was executed when a border fence was placed at the Hungarian-Serbian border. On September 15, the border was fenced of and it became impossible for migrants to pass the border between Serbia and Hungary as Hungary refused to see 'illegal' migrants turned into 'legal' citizens. This refusal would hint at zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic if the polis, which Derrida discussed, were to be Europe as a whole. In that case one could be able to discuss this very action as an attempt to animalize 'irregular' Migrants in a large area between Greece and Hungary. In that case what Foucault (2000) famously referred to as 'all the members of the community of the governed' would be
consisting of a continent as a whole and non-EU states like Serbia and Macedonia would be considered as states that were governed by Brussels and had the function 'as if they were a landscape of zoos in Europe'. This, however, is beyond the scope of this work and as in this case study 'all the members of the community of the governed' are restricted to the sovereign state of Hungary, the refusal of accepting 'an influx of migrants' because they pose a threat to the population would be a speech act of securitization (Prime Minister 2015a). In the discourse of Orbán therefore, as associated with securitization logic, migrants coming from Serbia and Croatia are framed as being an immediate threat or a threat to the population 'without our even noticing'.

In addition, rather than identifying them as being at risk of being exploited, Orbán rather describes them as a cause of danger (to society). Subsequently, in contrast to EU discourse as mentioned by Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014), the discourse Orbán only speaks of migrants as if they were a threat, not as if they were a referent object as well.

An example in which risk logic could be at play is when Orbán in an interview advises its people not to live with Muslims in their country and therefore, not to accept international or European obligations because the risk of not being able to decide upon this might become too big:

“I believe that we must respect the decisions of countries which have already decided that they wish to live with large Muslim communities: the decisions of countries such as France or Germany. We cannot criticize them – this was their decision. But we, too, have the right to decide whether we want to follow their example or not. I, for one – and this is my personal opinion – would advise the Hungarian people not to follow suit. Now we are still able to decide not to follow their example. If we do not keep our wits about us now, later on this will not be a matter for deliberation: it will be a fait accompli which we are forced to live with.”

The discourse of Orbán concerning threats therefore shows a tendency towards securitization logic with samples of risk logic to continue in making his point.

*Human Rights Watch Discourse*
In the conclusion of their article, Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014) admit that certain categories of migrants cannot be grasped by securitization, nor risk logic. Therefore, this work will also focus on the discourse of Human Rights Watch, as their official statements say something about the 'humanitarian' logic Niemann and Schmidthäussler proposed. Moreover, the aforementioned zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic is analyzed within the context of detention centers in Hungary. An important aspect of the detention centers is that they are meant to function and be justified only in a situation of exceptional circumstances, according to Lydia Gall, Balkan and Eastern Europe researcher by Human Rights Watch (2015). This notion reveals a logic in which there has to be presence of an immediate threat as mentioned by Niemann and Schmidthäussler. Only than the detaining of vulnerable people can be justified.

Furthermore, the notion of detention centers as a threat for migrants and refugees as such once again hints at zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic. However, the response by Human Rights Watch does as well, basing their arguments of critique upon human rights as formulated within the context of the United Nations. Therefore, in contrast to the discourse of Orbán, Human Rights Watch states that migrants and refugees that have already crossed the border and detained in detention centers are only a mere victim of the detaining system and that the threat therefore is reversed. It is in fact the state of Hungary that is threatening the people already located inside of the state of Hungary by either deporting them, which would hint at risk logic, or animalizing them in zoo-like places, which would hint at zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic as described by Derrida (2009) and Vaughan-Williams (2015).

In sum, there seems to be a divide in logic within the category of threat. Whereas Victor Orbán speaks of an influx of migrants as if they were an immediate threat, the discourse of Human Rights Watch speak of the detaining system as a mostly vague and context dependent threats for the migrants and refugees. This means that in the category of threat, Orbán seems to follow the speech act of securitization and Human Rights Watch seems speak about risks for migrants, but which can be explained better by the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic as these threats could be governed and integrated in every-day practice. Concerning the source of threat, as was the case in the analysis of Niemann and Schmidthäussler, the logic of security nor risk can grasp this. In contrast, the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic
does explain the source as an internal problem. According to this logic, the perception of the threshold between Zoë and bios produces a humanitarian logic which categorizes and creates hierarchy within 'humanity'. Therefore, the detaining of 'people' has been produced by this internal threshold we as 'humans' produced.

Referent Object

Discourse of Victor Orbán

Looking at the discourse of Orbán, the 'cultural and economic composition' of Hungary is at stake and therefore the referent object. Once again, the idea of 'societal security' gives us an explanation about why this is rather a notion that fits the securitization logic more than the risk logic. The idea of Victor Orbán is that the culture and wealth, supposedly built up over thousand years is under attack. Therefore one could argue that it is not the people themselves who are under military attack and that this means that the referent object is described to vaguely, however, if one looks at the consequences and the actions necessary to prevent it, One still has to conclude that it is a speech act of securitization that Orbán portraits.

Discourse of Human Rights Watch

However, from the perspective of 'humanity' it is argued that it is the migrants who are the referent objects. Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014) in their analysis highlight two types of migrants that are seen as referent objects threatened by 'not self-inflicted' dangers. It concerns here regular migrants and unaccompanied minors. Whereas there is no document found in which Hungary officially claims to protect 'legal' migrants from, for example, other EU Member States, it is the group of unaccompanied minors that is being highlighted as referent object by Human Rights Watch. After having interviewed 81 detainees, nine of them, being minors, claimed to have been denied the category of unaccompanied minor:

“In late October, 2015, Human Rights Watch interviewed nine youth in the Bekescsaba and Nyírbator asylum detention facilities who said they were between 14 and 17 years old and whose appearance strongly suggested that they were under 18. All nine said that they had told
staff they were unaccompanied children, but staff failed to take the steps necessary to properly assess their ages.” (Human Rights Watch 2015)

“Omar (pseudonym), an Afghan youth, said: “I told them (Hungarian Officials) am 16. They told me I was lying.... Police then took me to a doctor and removed my T-shirt. The doctor just looked at me and said that I am an adult. After this, they brought me here (Bekescsaba).” (Human Rights Watch 2015)

“Tahir (pseudonym), another Afghan youth held in Bekescsaba, told officials that he was 17 but had been subjected to a cursory assessment in which a female medical professional took a quick look at him and determined he was 20.” (Human Rights Watch 2015)

Therefore, these minors are menaced by external threats which, according to Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014) include, ‘inadequate legal provision, traffickers and smugglers’. This implies that according to the logic behind their scheme, risk logic is at play. However, animalization of these minors is an explanation as well, and maybe even better, as their 'proper' place in the Hungarian 'polis' is in the zoo-political camp.

In sum, similar to the category of threat, the referent object (Hungarian culture and welfare) are immediately and directly threatened by the ‘irregular' migrants in the discourse of Orbán.

Vaguer in the discourse of Human Rights Watch in which irregular migrants, refugees and the special category of unaccompanied minors, are the referent objects. In the case of Hungarian culture and welfare as a referent object, risk logic would seem to be 'logical' logic to follow. However, it is exactly justifying of extraordinary protection measures, which characterize the discourse of Victor Orbán. Therefore, once again, it is rather the speech act of securitization which seems to be more present than risk logic. 'Irregular' migrants as referent objects in the discourse of Human Rights Watch are not responsible themselves for the risk they face and threatened by external threats. Therefore, it is clear that this discourse also supports securitization logic, as ‘irregular' migrants are clearly positioned as threatened. Even clearer is the position of refugees and unaccompanied minors that are detained by the Hungarian government.
Management Aim

The category of management aim shows a similarity in both the discourses at hand. Far from positive and broadly connotated aims, the Hungarian government has very clear and narrow goals. Furthermore, there is a very clear reason given about why Hungary rejects European cooperation and solidarity and instead reaches for extraordinary measures like border fencing, criminalizing refugees and migrants and creating detention centers. Therefore, the policy that seeks to keep out as much migrants and even ‘Muslims’ out of Hungary for the sake of their culture and welfare, is a very clear example of securitization logic. In opposition of international obligations and compliance with fundamental laws, Orbán rather criticizes these in an official statement in which he claims that the ‘there is a liberal identity crisis’ (Prime Minister 2015b), giving once more the clear example how he rejects liberal logic like that of risk and the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism. Hence, Victor Orbán does not (like Human Rights Watch) emphasize respect for individual (migrant) rights. This omission of respect for their individual rights fits once again into the emerging securitization pattern.

The rather norm-breaking measures, like constructing a border fence and criminalizing migrants and refugees, imposed by the Hungarian government speak the language of securitization logic, not the conventional language of risk. Taking these two measures, neither zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic explains the management aim. Instead, the lack of everyday political practice like cooperation with other countries and rather the violation of fundamental rights, illustrates a language of securitization logic.

Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014: 25) state that, in the context of management aim, it depends upon the ‘scope of conventional political practice’, whether, there is securitization or risk logic at play. Victor Orbán and his government have shown rapid expansion of measures with a short-term view. They militarized their border and criminalized migrants and refugees as if they were threats that would indicate eradication of Hungarian culture and welfare. The aim of its policy was directed at managing the future in a preventive way, but very much militarizing as well. Furthermore, the measures are twofold in a way that building a border fence and the criminalization of migrants and refugees is an example of an aim of the
eradication of migration securitization logic, but the detention centers are rather aimed at managing the situation and therefore reducing the 'threat' of 'irregular' migration.

**Discourse of Human Rights Watch**

Normative critique made by Human Rights Watch uncover lack of attention for unaccompanied minors, poor circumstances in detention centers and people with psychosocial and physical disabilities. This exclusion of what Human Rights Watch considers as basic human rights, seem to be a combination of extreme measures, which is related to securitization logic and exclusion of people of 'humanity' and thereby giving them there 'proper' place in the 'polis'.

In sum, as goes for the management aim of Hungarian border policy in 2015, securitization logic is very much dominant, although it must be mentioned that accents of risk and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic can be identified as well. A distinction can be made between two periods of time. The first period, in which the Hungarian government is announcing its measures against an 'influx of migrants' that are 'threatening' Hungarian culture and welfare. The second period is characterized by the post-border-fence period in which a new policy has been implemented with a special emphasis on detention centers. Whereas the first period can be identified as a short-term management production, aimed at eradication of migration, the second period can be seen as a period in which long-term management becomes a priority, associated with (poor) surveillance and employment of technology, but with lack of respect for human rights. Therefore, the both periods can be seen as dominated by securitization logic, but, especially in the second period, elements of risk and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic come into play.

**Temporal Direction**

The temporal direction of Hungarian border policy in 2015 is characterized by both mainly preventive elements.

**Discourse of Victor Orbán**
However, about the general trend can be said that: “they could occupy Hungary – something not unprecedented in our history – or they could introduce communism” and “we do not know how many of them will come; if we do not protect our borders, tens of millions of migrant will keep coming” (Prime Minister 2015a). This emphasizes the tendency to prevent, associated with risk, rather than to react, associated with securitization logic. In contrast to the three earlier categories therefore, it seems that the category of temporal direction is rather risk-related.

**Discourse of Human Rights Watch**

In addition, Human Right Watch in its criticism did not reveal any reactive elements either. It are rather preventive measures like poorly detaining, blocking access and criminalizing people that they criticize.

**Concluding this Chapter: Liberal Governance that respects Human Rights is declining in Hungary**

Taken together all the conclusions on whether securitization, risk or zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic is at play, a pattern of distinction unfolds between the so called 'liberal turn' logics of risk and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism and on the other hand the securitization logic. Victor Orbán in one of his statements speaks about the 'crisis of the liberal identity' in which he tries to create an internal struggle that supposedly exists inside of the European Union. States like Germany and France, which he frames as 'immigration' countries allegedly are trying to take care of every person in the world by opening the borders for all people entering the continent of Europe. This reaction on a statement of Merkel in which she stated that refugees from the war of Syria are welcome in Germany was without a doubt a sneer in the direction of countries that are inspired by liberal foundations. However, the theoretical foundations of these ideas lie in a justification of his own policy which is norm-breaking, extraordinary and criticized heavily by humanitarian organizations.

As Haddad puts it in the book: *Governing the world? By Routledge*:
“refugees who flee outside these borders become anomalies in the state system – because they can no longer count on the protection of their own state, they need some other form of protection which can only be provided through international cooperation” (Haddad 2008: 69).

In addition, Helton emphasizes it even stronger (2002: 7): “we care about refugees because of the seed of fear that lurks in all of us that can be stated so simply: it could be me”.

These so called liberal statements, based on biblical principles, show an interesting insight in the case of Victor Orbán's speech on 'the crisis of liberal identity'. As he puts it boldly: "a liberal is expected to care about the whole world as everything that is wrong with the world hurts him”, adding directly that his party is Cristian an nationalistic, would take care of refugees, but draws the line with the current situation. It is without any hesitation or vagueness that Orbán calls these 'liberal states' like Germany and France weak. However if there would be any moral call or principle that is descended from Christianity and integrated into the fabric of liberal values, it is the very idea that you should not do to another what you do not want this other to do to you. Therefore, Orbán's attack on liberal values on behalf of Christian values auto deconstructs. It is therefore not only the liberal values he rejects, but his own Christian values as well as a means to frame migrants, refugees, and even all Muslims that are trying to reach Hungary from Serbia or Croatia in securitization logic to justify his own policy.

Victor Orbán's government therefore has shown to be a-liberal but a-moral although his moral seems to be built on nationalism and loyalty to compatriots. The different outcomes in the categories of the Niemann and Schmidthäussler scheme have shown that his government is also weak, because it is clearly in need of cooperation with the other EU Member States. The EU however gives him a platform to be a counter-voice against the so called liberal democracies that do accept plurality of their society in order to live up to their liberal duties. The Orbán administration governs through securitization logic and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic, but does this not only through their own state apparatus but also through the European Union by performing as some sort of leader of an anti-immigration alignment of EU member states. Therefore, the louder Orbán screams that liberalism is in crisis and the more success he will have in his country with this statement, the more popular it will probably
become in other Member States. Liberal governance therefore is under pressure in Hungary, but it might become under pressure in all of the European Union.
Conclusion

In the five chapters of this work an illustration of the complexity of the migration-security nexus has been unfolded. In the first chapter the historical context of the mass migration has been drawn. The context has intentionally been framed from a larger to a smaller picture. The reason for this has been that the European Union largely influenced the decisions made by its member states and therefore the extraordinary nature of the measures Hungary took have been highlighted once more. By placing the Orbán government in relation to democracy, human rights and finally its norm breaking decision to build a border barrier has shown many similarities to what Michel Foucault called State Racism. Furthermore, the divide of 'military' discourse in the period before the barrier and a 'humanitarian' discourse and measures after the barrier introduced the presence of different types of logic. Subsequently, in the second chapter the academic debate of the migration-security nexus has been introduced and three identified types of logic have been introduced as well. The first logic, securitization logic, has been introduced as a logic that puts its emphasis on framing and speech acts of security phenomena. In other words, phenomena that can be de-constructed and de-securitized in order to deviate from military thinking and acting. However, Risk logic as explained by Niemann and Schmidthäussler rather puts the focus on the notion of liberalism and the idea that it always needs risk and insecurity. Even more so than securitization logic, risk logic puts this into practice by “governing what appears to be ungovernable”, in other words making the 'unknown' to be 'known' with an emphasis on managing the future. Important for this work has been the addition of the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism as a logic which places the idea of how we view human rights in a perceived context of a human-animal binary. In other words, in contrast to securitization and risk logic that are driven by an anthropocentric ontology, Zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism includes the human perception of its kind in a world that is not ontologically isolated from the animal category but rather the presence of a co-existential presence. Although this logic does not answer the more specific questions about desired outcomes and political programs to get to these outcomes, it does extend the theoretical scope to even slightly grasp the complexity of the migration-security nexus in a context of humanitarianism. The relation to liberalism in this logic is rather focused on the influence of International Organizations that promote Human Rights and other liberal values. The Hungarian case illustrated how certain zoo-political techniques in some cases are used to make 'unknown' populations 'known' and therefore controllable and governable. Thirdly, this
work has intended to methodologically illustrate conclusions about where and how a certain logic comes into play, based upon categories as presented in the scheme of Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014). The scheme was originally based upon a distinction between securitization and risk logic only that explained threat, referent object, management aim and temporal direction. This work however, included the ontologically different type of zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism in order to give a more inclusive illustration about the migration-security nexus. Another difference between the original scheme of Niemann and Schmidthäussler and the one that has been used in this work is that the original was aimed at EU migration policy in general, whereas this work is rather focused upon Hungarian policy, obviously never isolated from the EU policy. The outcome in the scheme in this work shows a pattern in which the Hungarian policy is more leaning towards securitization logic but it is certainly not limited by it. This is clearly shown in the next chapter which is a historic oversight of 2015 in which a distinction has been made between a period 'before the construction of the fence' and a period 'after the construction of the fence'. The discourse of the Orbán government shows a growing tendency towards risk and zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism after their economy and society were 'secured'. The final chapter illustrated a mixture of Securitization, Risk and Zoo-political neoliberal humanitarianism in which Securitization has shown to be the dominant logic. However, as this chapter does not only analyze the discourse of the Orbán government but rather the 'interplay' between this specific discourse as well as the 'counter-discourse' of NGO's like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, it has become more evident that the clash between 'liberal' and 'non-liberal' values keeps both actors hostage in a narrative on who should be responsible for what as opposed to how can this complex situation be governed. It ultimately brings up the question whether the focus on liberalism by Victor Orbán is not rather a technique to deviate attention away from its responsibility towards its partners in an alarming situation. The politics behind this rationale have been discussed. As the title of this work suggests, there are several logics behind techniques to make something 'unknown' 'known'.

The question that goes beyond this managerial question is what produced the knowledge that made is conclude what is to be labeled 'unknown'? Are we only to subject or domesticate people in order to make them 'known' or can we admit that we are limited to these techniques by history and should we move beyond this type of governance to really respect humans as
we perceive them in the context of human rights? That is why the importance of identifying the different logics that are at play is so high and the case of Hungary is just one small element that could extend this understanding. However the last question went beyond the scope of this work and therefore the main question of this work is only focused on how the Hungarian migration-security policy in 2015 is to be considered as being characterized by both Securitization, Risk logic as well as Zoo-political Neoliberal humanitarian logic.

In order to understand this, the analysis of this work has revealed that risk logic – which focuses on unspecific threats, pointing at 'irregular' migration in general in order to create long-term improvement of an anticipated future event or flow of events, characterized by normalized measures and a strategy to gradually create a change of norms, that are paradigmatically present – does not sufficiently grasp Orbánian discourse, nor the discourse of Human Rights Watch in 2015. Instead, the dominant logic to a lesser extent is grasped by zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic, which deconstructs the threshold between Zoë and bios in order to reveal how people that are trying to cross the border in Hungary are being categorized, placed in a system of hierarchy and subsequently, detained in order to become animalized as if they were in a zoo. However, the most dominant logic at play must be that of securitization logic, which is 'focused on concrete threats and referent objects to justify implementation of exceptional, short-term measures'.

In contrast to the outcome of the analysis of Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014: 27), this work did not engage in the 'rhetoric vs. reality debate'. Therefore, it remains modest about what it reveals about day to day practices, however, it does identify some features of day to day practices in Hungary, based on what is explained by the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic in the context of detention centers. In contrast to Niemann and Schmidthäussler their idea that Boswell statement: “while securitization might be applied to legitimize implementation of security practices, public legitimation is not always a precondition, since there is a substantial scope for action within administrative agencies, independent of public scrutiny”, (Boswell 2007: 593) implies that we cannot make well founded statements about the nature of policy in every day practice, this work, building on the work of Vaughan-Williams illustrated that it can be possible. In contrary to a connection between the migration-security nexus and control oriented, exclusionary policies, this work
does not want to go that far and rather sees a rebellion against the 'liberal turn' very much present in “EU’s governance through risk” (Van Munster 2009: 143-145).

If a comparison could be drawn with the Ceuta and Melilla border fences at the border of Spain and Morocco, one could say that the policy is similar. Also, the discourse of Orbán is directed in a way that securitized practices like detention, forced deportation and the refusal of entry are no exception to global border management. The idea of borders after all is as Mutlu and Leite put it: (2012: 38) “borders represent an exceptional space in the sense that we are vulnerable to the gaze of the state at border crossings, stripped of our most basic rights and freedoms”. As the Schengen area already imposes a distinction between 'regular' and 'irregular' migrants, the Hungarian policy increased this categorization in a way that this vulnerability is turned into an immediate threat.

Furthermore, 'irregular' migrants, refugees and unaccompanied minors, have been treated according to different type of logics. This analysis also suggest that the Hungarian government made an effort to distinguish between different motivations for migration and different treatment of respective migrants. In contrast to Niemann and Schmidthäussler, however, this analysis has captured the categories of unaccompanied minors and the people maintained in detention center by the zoo-political neoliberal humanitarian logic, which grasped the referent objects in question and does not emphasize protection, fundamental rights and norms, but rather critiques how we animalize forms of life that are presumed to be part of 'humanity' but are being excluded to have their 'proper' place in the 'polis'. This work, therefore, adds a dimension to the scheme of Niemann and Schmidthäussler, which tries to grasp the different types of logics that are active in the field of the migration-security nexus. These different logics can give a better insight in both the field of International Relations as well as the practice of Global Governance, even if it might be aimed against the idea of 'liberal' Global Governance.

Finally, questions like, why would theoretical foundations matter in the first place and should they be seen as an ontological given or should they be challenged, have indirectly been discussed by this work. It is not clear whether Global Governance will be driven by liberal values as the concept of security constantly struggles with the liberal values as such.

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However, it is clear that the humanitarian actors in the world also have a role to play in this governance process. Therefore it would be an interesting challenge from the perspective of IR scholars to dig deeper into the theoretical foundations of mass migration processes and other management processes that require both a national and international dimension. The time that Nazi Germany and Russian Communism were the only illiberal forces in the world are far behind us now. Therefore, the idea of a world that needs to be governed by liberal governance is not something that is a natural given. The case of Hungary and its migration policy has shown that there is not so much a binary of 'illiberal' and 'liberal' democracies anymore, but that there is a more subtle difference between both. It has illustrated that although it could be framed as an 'illiberal' democracy it does seem to follow 'liberal' techniques to govern complex situation like the migration process in 2015. IR and the practices that might result from the field in the future might and probably should be able to stretch its ethics from which its critique on 'illiberalism' results. In order to take steps into the direction of this more open approach in which more types of logics are used to identify what is going on and should be done this work has tried to give a modest contribution to this larger process in IR and beyond.
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