BUILDING BACK BETTER?

The influence of political survival on the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in Haiti

Linda van Happen
Van Cuijkstraat 68a
5555 ED Valkenswaard
S1983059
+316 - 15123740

Supervisor: Prof. H. W. Hoen
DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “Building Back Better? The Influence of Political Survival on the Effectiveness of Humanitarian Aid in Haiti,” is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name
Linda van Happen

Signature
Linda van Happen

Date
July 15, 2015
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I. List of acronyms

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<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community Secretariat</td>
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<td>CEPR</td>
<td>Center for Economic and Policy Research</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IHRC</td>
<td>Interim Haiti Recovery Commissions</td>
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<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organizations of American States</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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1. Introduction

The number of conflicts – internationalized, intrastate, interstate and extrasystemic – decreased after 1993 from 53 - the highest number of conflicts since 1946\(^1\) to 33 conflicts in 2013.\(^2\) The number of natural disasters, however, is rising. According to the emergency disaster database EM-DAT, the total number of natural disasters reported each year has been steadily rising in recent decades. Even though the natural geologic disasters, such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, landslides and avalanches have remained steady in recent decades, the number of the so-called hydro-meteorological disasters such as droughts, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods and typhoons has been increasing over the past decades.\(^3\) Due to the decline in international conflicts and the increase of local conflicts after the end of the Cold War, the majority of the humanitarian aid today goes to the people affected by local conflicts, usually intrastate conflicts, and natural disasters.\(^4\)

After he witnessed war crimes in the Battle of Solferino, Henri Dunant and others established the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863. The humanitarian principles neutrality, impartiality and autonomy of the ICRC were recorded in the Geneva Conventions, forming the core of international humanitarian law (IHL). The basis of humanitarianism is the duty to alleviate humanitarian suffering unconditionally.\(^5\) “Famine, disease, poverty, people suffering in conflict zones or under oppressive regimes, need and should not happen: and if such events do occur, we should act to minimise human suffering. It is this belief in a common humanity and the universality of human condition that gave rise to the concept of humanitarianism,” according to Madalina E. Nan.\(^6\) The Geneva Conventions are accepted by all countries in the world. The principles of the Red Cross were never more accepted than now. And there were never more humanitarian aid agencies than now. They constitute a ‘humanitarian community’ which operates in ‘humanitarian spaces.’\(^7\) The classical

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\(^1\) [Link](http://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/UCDP/2009/Graph%20Conflicts%20by%20Type.pdf)

\(^2\) University of Uppsala, *Department of Peace and Conflict Research* (website), [Link](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/)

\(^3\) Live Science, (website), [Link](http://www.livescience.com/414-scientists-natural-disasters-common.html)


The definition of humanitarian space is ‘the physical area secured by international humanitarian law in which humanitarian actors are at liberty to perform needs assessments to distribute aid and oversee its proper use, and to directly contact and interact with people in need, based on humanitarian principles.’

When the ICRC was established, it provided relief to the wounded soldiers on the battlefield; nowadays, however, 90 out of the 100 war victims are civilians and almost all wars are civil wars in which rebels, insurgents, civil militias and separation movements are fighting instead of armies of different countries. Then the question arises how the ICRC principles can still be applicable to the different situations in these humanitarian spaces which also became the battlefields. It is difficult for humanitarian organizations to remain neutral, independent and autonomous when they are at the mercy of the belligerents. Around 1989 and the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the nature of conflicts changed and with that also the position of humanitarian organizations. The number of humanitarian organizations exploded.

The significant increase in the last two decades in frequency and intensity of natural disasters and complex emergencies lead to a rapid transformation in the policy of international humanitarianism. This caused a significant expansion of humanitarian assistance to a broader and more complex field of rehabilitation work – instead of the narrow set of basic relief activities carried out by the small group of relatively independent actors under the leadership of Henri Dunant it once started with. Moreover, the ‘traditional’ humanitarian aid by the humanitarian organizations – the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) - and governments and the perception of its character are changed by a growing diversity of actors in the field, such as various profit agencies, governmental and non-governmental armed forces. This transformation has created an extensive variety in the standards in the area of humanitarian aid and in some cases it led to increasing uncertainties about the quality of the humanitarian response that was provided after emergencies and the accountability of those responses.

Humanitarian disasters such as the genocide in Rwanda – when, according to some evaluations by NGOs, an average of sixty percent of the distributed supplies were stolen by militias - forced humanitarian agencies to rethink their role and the traditional relief assistance

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10 Ibid, p. 15.
11 Ibid, p. 15.
which was based on providing shelter, food and basic health care. They needed to reflect on how they perceived their own role and accountability in the humanitarian arena.\(^\text{13}\)

Besides the variety of international legal codices that were already established such as IHL, international human rights law (IHRL) and the humanitarian principles, the Code of Conduct was written as a set of guiding principles for organizations involved in humanitarian activities in 1994.\(^\text{14}\) The code seeks to ‘safeguard high standards of behaviour and maintain independence and effectiveness in disaster relief. In the event of or armed conflict, its clauses are to be interpreted and applied in conformity with international humanitarian law. It is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of organizations accepting it to maintain the standards it lays down.’\(^\text{15}\)

Moreover, humanitarian organizations launched the Sphere Project in 1997 with the common aim to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to the constituents, donors and affected populations.\(^\text{16}\) The project established the Sphere Handbook Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response which is ‘one of the most widely known and internationally recognized sets of common principles and universal minimum standards in life-saving areas of humanitarian response.’\(^\text{17}\)

Next was the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative in 2003 which sought to reaffirm the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality neutrality and the independence in the financing of humanitarian assistance – the initiative was widely accepted by donor governments.\(^\text{18}\)

Furthermore, in 2005 at the Second High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness it was recognised that aid could and should be more effective. At the forum, the Paris Declaration was established in order to base development efforts on first-hand experience of what does not work and what works with aid. The Declaration formulated five central pillars for aid: ownership,


\(^\text{14}\) International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Resource Centre (website), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/64zahh.htm

\(^\text{15}\) International Committee of the Red Cross (website), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm

\(^\text{16}\) The Sphere Project, The Sphere Project in Brief (website), Assessed April 13, 2015, http://www.sphereproject.org/about/

\(^\text{17}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{18}\) The Overseas Development Institute, Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles in Practice (website), http://www.odi.org/publications/5764-good-humanitarian-donorship-principles-practice
harmonisation, mutual accountability, alignment and managing for results.\textsuperscript{19} The declaration establishes a series of specific implementation measures and a monitoring system which can be used by humanitarian agencies to evaluate progress and to guarantee that donors and recipients will hold each other accountable for their commitments.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, in 2005 the United Nations (UN) hosted the World Summit at which participants coined the concept of ‘new humanitarianism,’ which would go through major changes from classical humanitarianism according to Madalina E. Nan.\textsuperscript{21} New humanitarianism was designed to be a new humanitarian order which was intended to be more politically based as the international community would be held responsible for the protection of vulnerable populations in this new order.\textsuperscript{22} This new humanitarian order authorises intervention while recognizing the limits of sovereignty, specifically in the case of failed and weak states, and promoting the international norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The R2P framework views sovereignty not as a state privilege, but as an international responsibility of states. As a consequence, the framework implies that if a state fails to meet their responsibilities to protect its populations from harm, the international community has the obligation to intervene.\textsuperscript{23}

With the increasing natural disasters, the humanitarian budget also had to increase to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected people and to address the different needs in humanitarian aid. And it did. Humanitarian assistance occurs when regional or local crises prompt international action to alleviate human suffering. In contrast to development aid, humanitarian aid is defined by its short-term focus and the immediacy of intervention. The field of humanitarian aid continues to expand; in 2010, donors gave approximately US$ 127 billion for humanitarian and developmental activities in countries all over the world, which was approximately US$ 90 billion more than in 1960 and US$ 66 billion more than in 1980.\textsuperscript{24}

Moreover, in 2010 major natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan had wide-ranging effects on the collective humanitarian response: the international overall spending increased with 23 percent over the previous year to a total of US$ 18.8 billion. As a consequence, new governments and private donors were drawn in and military actors were involved in responses

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
on a large scale. However, not only the international overall spending increased; the gap between met and unmet needs also widened from 28.8 percent of the needs unmet in 2009 to 37.0 percent of the needs unmet in 2010. Furthermore, of the total humanitarian aid in 2010, 88.6 percent went to 45 states which were categorised as ‘fragile.’ Moreover, 39 countries receiving aid had been affected by conflict for five or more years in the last decade. They collectively received US$ 10.7 billion. Large volumes of international humanitarian aid are spent each year in places where people are acutely vulnerable to crises; where high proportions of the populations live in poverty; where violent conflict is common; where states are fragile; and where natural disasters happen.

The overall rising trend in international humanitarian aid to recipient countries masked a number of shifts present in the traditional distributions of international humanitarian funding in 2010. The US$ 3.1 billion dollars of humanitarian funds channelled to Haiti after the earthquake by states was a drastically higher number than the amounts which are typically received by an affected country – it was more than double the amount ever received by the largest recipient. In total, Haiti received 7.5 billion Euros after the earthquake. Furthermore, in each year since 2001, approximately one-third of the total humanitarian aid was distributed amongst the top three recipient countries. In 2010, however, almost half of the total amount was channelled to the leading three recipients with Haiti receiving 25 percent and Pakistan 17 percent of the funds. Despite the overall growth in humanitarian aid spending, there were some clear ‘losers’ due to the change in the distribution of the funding. Among the fifteen countries which experienced the greatest reductions in humanitarian funding by volume, only five noticed an improvement in their humanitarian situation; the other ten all experienced greater difficulties in their fund raising within their UN funding appeals than in 2009.

While there are many principles, initiatives and projects on humanitarian action which NGOs and donor governments signed and should implement and the funding for humanitarian aid continues to increase, the debate about the effectiveness of humanitarian aid is ongoing. According to Joost Herman, many humanitarian crises over the past fifteen years have been characterised by elements such as ‘deliberately blocking access to victims, disguising political

26 Ibid, p. 4.
27 Ibid, p. 4.
goals in humanitarian terminology, making humanitarian space an insecure environment for
aid-workers and aid recipients alike, abusing aid and exploiting aid agencies for political
goals.”

A hundred and fifty years of a steady creation of principles and norms for the benefit
of a secure space exclusively for humanitarian agencies have seemingly led to a
degree of inflexibility and rigidity in dealing with contemporary challenges to
humanitarianism and humanitarian space with the aim of providing effective aid to
those who are in need.

International humanitarianism faces the following challenges in the twenty-first century
according to Herman:

- an increase in the need for humanitarian aid worldwide due to the higher number of
  natural disasters and conflicts;
- a substantial rise of ever growing disrespect for IHL specifically and IHRL in general;
- elevated levels of insecurity for both donors and recipients in the humanitarian space;
- nonetheless, expanding numbers of (self-proclaimed) humanitarian actors and agencies,
  particularly non-governmental actors, with seemingly humanitarian agendas but in fact
  much wider-focused;
- ‘unstable financial parameters as a result of volatile global economic developments’;
- nevertheless, the levels of political and military interference with humanitarian action
  are increasing.

The new order of humanitarian aid has caused interventions which cannot be completely
controlled anymore and might have unforeseen consequences. These consequences might entail
inefficient use of humanitarian means and materials or even an extension of the conflict.

According to Herman the main aim of IHL has become threatened; it is not yet evident anymore
that the behaviour of warring parties can be regulated as a result of applying the humanitarian
principles readily in a physically outlined humanitarian space.

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31 Joost Herman, “International Law and Humanitarian Space in the Twenty-First Century: Challenged
Relationships,” in *Humanitarian Action: Global, Regional and Domestic Legal Responses*, ed. Andrej Zwitter,
Christopher K. Lamont, Hans-Joachim Heintze, and Joost Herman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), p. 11.
36 Ibid, p. 20.
After the Cold War, crises became more complex, chaotic and chronic, especially in weak or failed states. The prevalence of interstate – a conflict between two or more states - and intrastate – a conflict between armed group representing the state and one or more non-state groups - conflicts had great effect on humanitarianism. Herman described four effects for their consequences on IHL and the humanitarian principles. Firstly, the importance of the role of state power and ideology has declined in the case of intrastate conflict. Secondly, the distinction between warring parties and civilians has faded considerably due to the nature of internal conflict. Thirdly, - and as a consequence of the former – the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and autonomy have been eroded by the declining distinction between the warring parties and civilians. Originally, only soldiers outside the fight and civilians not participating in the conflict were entitled to receive humanitarian aid. The principle of this distinction has always been based on the presupposition of well-organised states and authorities. However, this concept does not apply to the complex internal conflicts. Lastly, the differentiation between a situation of peace and a situation of conflict seems to have dissolved.37

The effects on the changing nature of conflict forced the humanitarian organizations to evaluate the relevance and impact of IHL and the humanitarian principles.38 Furthermore, the so-called politicisation and militarisation of aid had direct effects on international humanitarian law. Governments and their military apparatus have increasingly influenced the field of humanitarian action. However, NGOs have also politicised and militarised the domain of humanitarian action.39 The politicisation of humanitarian aid has been facilitated by the growing number of organizations in the field. Many organizations have ended up financially and strategically encapsulated by government donors due to the organizations competing for funding and governments actively engaged in conflict areas based on their political interest.40

Another effect present in humanitarian aid is that the scope and nature of humanitarian action and its organizations is widening due to various reasons. Amongst these reasons are the increase in humanitarian organizations, the competition for projects which yield a lot of international media attention, the rights-based approach to humanitarianism, and access to government funding.41

38 Ibid, p. 22.
39 Ibid, p. 22.
41 Ibid, pp. 26-27.
Another phenomenon which became present in the late 1980s and 1990s is that governments have become the main donors to humanitarian organizations which created dependency amongst these organizations. This dependency displays itself in, for example:

- ‘using it as leverage for either buying off the necessity to officially act and being confronted with dissatisfied voters at home (Chad);
- or trying to contain the effects of conflicts in situ, making sure that refugee spill-over would be prevented by well-supported refugee camps in the conflicts zones itself (Sudan);
- or, in return for financial support, imposing strategic choices on organisations (high-profile disasters like Haiti 2010 rather than forgotten crises such as in Uganda) and making demands on the receiving organisations for political goals in conflict areas in which states had intervened (Afghanistan).’

Madalina E. Nan states that “over politicisation of aid, including all the dangers stemming from it, continues to be the ‘Achilles’ Heel’ for humanitarianism.” Furthermore, Mohammed Haneef Atmar declares that “political expedience of the donor states has determined the purpose, extent and type of ‘humanitarian response’ rather than human needs alone.” He illustrates this statement by the cold war period in Afghanistan, when it received the highest per capita in aid up to then and the donors were willing to accept a 40 percent of wastage of their provided humanitarian aid. Other sources reported that only 20 to 30 percent of the aid reached the intended beneficiaries. Moreover, the West only supplied aid in the resistance-controlled areas of the country while completely ignoring the communist-controlled areas. Furthermore, when Russia withdrew from Afghanistan, the budget of humanitarian aid dropped rapidly despite the ongoing human suffering.

Another problematic element in humanitarian action is the lacking of accountability and legitimacy. The distance between what recipients need and what relief agencies provide is widening. The organizations have repeatedly pledged to improve their relief work by

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establishing more equitable partnerships and systems of accountability; however, these promises were mostly empty ones.46

When reviewing the literature on the natural disaster in Haiti and the international humanitarian response, it becomes clear that most of the literature is written by international organizations and international non-governmental organizations. Most of the accountability literature on the humanitarian operations in Haiti was produced by the practitioners and academics have paid less attention to the subject.47 The international organizations and NGOs are predominantly positive about their work and the current situation in Haiti. For example, the American and British Red Cross have an overview with information about what the organizations have done in Haiti and how many people are helped by the Red Cross. The American Red Cross is stating ‘five years after the earthquake, donations to the American Red Cross have improved the lives of millions of Haitians by making them safer, healthier and more resilient.’48 The British Red Cross has their own “success overview” on Haiti.49

The UN stated in their Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010: Situation, Challenges and Outlook that a weakened Haitian government – overwhelmed by the international response - was unable to take charge of coordination of relief efforts. However, they reported that the government stood up – step by step – to demonstrate its leadership in coordinating the international response.50 In contrast, Kathie Klarreich and Linda Polman reported in their reportage ‘The NGO Republic of Haiti’ that less than one percent of the international humanitarian funds were received by the Haitian government, barely more than the government of the Dominican Republic which hardly even felt the earthquake. Haitian NGOs fared even worse than the government, receiving only 0.4 percent of the international donor funds. Furthermore, Klarreich and Polman state that both the Haitian government as the Haitian people were mostly excluded from their own recovery.51

Diana Manilla Arroyo wrote about the accountability and responsibility of INGOs in post-earthquake Haiti. She conducted a review of the literature written about the earthquake

48 American Red Cross, Haiti Assistance Program (website), Assessed April 9, 2015.
http://www.redcross.org/what-we-do/international-services/haiti-assistance-program
49 British Red Cross, Haiti: The Big Picture (website), Assessed April 9, 2015.
http://webapps.redcross.org.uk/haitiearthquake
50 United Nations, Minustah (website), Assessed April 9, 2015,
51 Kathie Klarreich and Linda Polman, The NGO Republic of Haiti, The Nation (website), Assessed April 9, 2015.
http://www.thenation.com/article/170929/ngo-republic-haiti#
and found a gap ‘in the analysis of accountability of INGOs to affected populations (downwards accountability) as opposed to accountability to donors (upwards accountability).’⁵² For her article, she conducted a review of personal accounts and communications with humanitarian workers of various organizations who worked in Haiti between 2010 and 2012. Moreover, she identified both documents published or distributed by humanitarian practitioners or academics concerning accountability debates in general as well as to the earthquake response in Haiti in specific.⁵³ Furthermore, earthquake response evaluations published between 2010 and 2013 in English were examined. Arroyo comes up with three key findings in her review about accountability and responsibility: 1) insufficient information from the NGOs to the affected Haitian people; 2) irregularities and cases of abuse in the providing of humanitarian aid; and 3) the interests of the Haitian population was not included in the design and implementation of the humanitarian response.⁵⁴

This thesis will research the effectiveness of the humanitarian aid provided in Haiti in the period of 2010-2014 based on humanitarian principles and standards. As stated above, governments, international organizations, NGOs and small humanitarian organizations responded to the natural disaster that affected Haiti on January 12, 2010. In total, 7.5 billion Euros were pledged to Haiti after the earthquake, but was all the money spend in Haiti? And if so, was it spend in an effective manner? With US$ 18.8 billion spent in 2010, international humanitarian aid is an economy on its own, but there are little accountability mechanisms in place to check the effectiveness nor the responsibilities of the international organizations or the NGOs. Furthermore, as stated above, humanitarian aid is experiencing a politicization, which means dependency on government donors by the affected people of conflicts or natural disasters. The donors are more and more able to dictate what humanitarian aid is needed and focus on projects with a great visibility. The UN stated that the government of Haiti had an important role in the humanitarian aid, but was there a genuine partnership between the government, which only received one percent of the funding, on the one hand and the NGOs and donor governments on the other? Therefore, with the funding for humanitarian aid still increasing each year and the growing politicization of humanitarian aid by government donors implementing their interests instead of the interested of the intended beneficiaries of the aid, it

⁵³ Ibid, p. 113.
⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 117-118.
is important and relevant to research whether this politicization of aid was also present in the humanitarian relief efforts carried out in Haiti.

The main research question of this paper is: To what extent did the incentives for providing aid for policy concessions according to the theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith cause the ineffectiveness of the humanitarian aid provided in the period of 2010-2014 in Haiti?

In order to answer this question, the paper is divided in three chapters. The first chapter will answer the following sub-question: what were the specific aspects of the given international humanitarian aid in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010? In this section, a short overview of the history in Haiti will be provided and what exactly happened in Haiti on January 12, 2010. Furthermore, the international humanitarian response of international organizations and international non-governmental organizations will be discussed. There will be no difference made in humanitarian aid and the aid for the reconstruction of Haiti as many projects merge from the first phase into the second phase.

The second chapter will answer the sub-question: what does the theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith implies about policy concessions in return for humanitarian aid? This section will explain the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith about the role of politics in humanitarian aid. Moreover, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith will be positioned in the current literature on humanitarian aid and their model will be positioned in the debate on humanitarian aid.

The third chapter will answer the sub-question: do the elements of the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith on policy concessions in return for humanitarian aid apply to the humanitarian relief efforts carried out in Haiti after the earthquake? In this section, the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith will be applied to the humanitarian aid provided in Haiti. The theory will be applied to both the receiving country Haiti and to the one of the key donors, the United States of America (USA). The essential elements of the theory will be applied to the provided humanitarian aid in Haiti to research if the theory can be proven right. It will be analysed if the interests of politicians are being perceived as more important than the interests of the victims. Furthermore, the benefits of the NGOs and their existence will be explained. Again, no difference will be made between the humanitarian aid and projects focuses on the reconstruction of Haiti. Lastly, a conclusion will be given.

When trying to answer the main question, the theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith that links aid allocations with the survival of political leaders will be used. The model they offer ‘proposes that aid giving and getting is a strategic process in which donors
purchase policy support from recipients who use at least some of the assistance to ensure that they are securely ensconced in power.\textsuperscript{55} According to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith:

Aid is not expected to be received by countries whose leaders do not naturally favor policies that are important to the donor. Nor is aid expected to flow to countries whose leaders cannot afford politically to adopt the policies sought by a prospective donor. Rather, aid is expected to flow to countries whose leaders do not inherently support the policies of a prospective donor but are willing to back those policies in exchange for aid sufficient to improve their political and economic welfare relative to survival prospects for the recipient states’ leaders in the absence of aid.\textsuperscript{56}

The fundamental feature of this model is that the leaders of both the donor and the receiving country make aid and policy concessions with a view to how they influence political survival.\textsuperscript{57} According the Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, leader of both states do not take decisions to improve the welfare of their people, unless it simultaneously supports the survival of leaders in office.\textsuperscript{58} When greatly simplifying the model, it would hold that ‘aid from country A to country B elicits pro-A policies on behalf of country B, and therefore, aid is a form of political coercion.’\textsuperscript{59} Humanitarian aid thus becomes a manifestation of national interest for both parties. Aid transfers, however, only take place when they are in the interests of both leaders, although the welfare of the donors is often more improved than the recipient’s.\textsuperscript{60}

It speaks for itself that with discussing the above mentioned three aspects of the international humanitarian response in Haiti not everything will be covered. However, these three are important for the debate about the effectiveness and accountability in international humanitarian response and in the response in Haiti in specific. Therefore, I have chosen to discuss these three aspects in my paper about the effectiveness of the international humanitarian response in Haiti.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, p. 254.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, p. 254.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, p. 254.
2. Haiti: an overview of the history and international response

2.1 History
To be able to apply the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith to the humanitarian aid provided in Haiti after the earthquake, an overview of the natural disaster and its impact will be given. A short overview of the history will be provided, followed by a review of reports released by NGOs about their work in Haiti and an analysis of scholars and journalists writing on the humanitarian aid in Haiti. The international response after the earthquake will thus be discussed to establish a clear image of who provided aid in Haiti and in what way in order to be able to apply to theory to the humanitarian aid in a later stadium.

Firstly, a short overview of the history of Haiti. In 1803, Haiti declared itself independent after being colonized by France. In 1825, France demanded a compensation of 150 million francs for the loss of property by French plantation owners and for the loss of Haitian themselves, i.e. for the right to be masters of their own body since Haitians were the most valuable assets of France in the Caribbean. Haiti agreed to pay the indemnity in exchange for the recognition of France. Haiti had to borrow the money from French banks. These repayments led to several financial crises in the country, to privations and to the inabilities to develop domestically and to have political stability, as presidents entering and leaving sometimes biannually. The debts were finally paid off in 1947.

France, however, was not the only nation which led Haiti down the path to become a failed state. In 1909, American financiers started their occupation of Haiti, when the National City Bank acquired a stake in Haiti’s Central Bank and built a railway to extract Haitian resources and export them to the USA. In 1915, the USA started their occupation of Haiti without any real excuse; Haiti was unstable, but it had been unstable for years. The occupation served to keep American interests safe while they controlled the country. The Marines pulled out in 1934. These years of occupation had great effect on the Haitian society as the racism and segregation enforced by the US Marines directly led to the rise of the black-power rhetoric used by François “Papa Doc” Duvalier as he rose to power. François Duvalier and his corrupt son and successor Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier came to power and laid the basis on which Haiti would develop as a failed state.61 “Haiti today is a creation of the world, its failures often purposefully molded by outsiders, though almost always in collusion with the Haitian elite, who

stand to profit from these failures,” according to Amy Wilentz.\(^\text{62}\) The food dependency and food crises in Haiti began when their political leaders agreed to open the markets and lower the import tariffs. When the USA began dumping their rice on the Haitian market, rural people left to the capital because rice-cultivators could no longer survive in the countryside.

Haiti has been governed by the Duvalier family for over 30 years. First by François Duvalier and then by his son Jean-Claude Duvalier. In 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was the first freely elected president of Haiti. However, he was overthrown within a year after his election. Aristide was re-elected in 2000. He decided to abolish the army, because his government was legitimate and he did not have to rely on violence. Washington never forgave Aristide for this decision and organized an international cut-off of aid to Haiti, while in the meantime channelling tens of millions of dollars into the opposition and therefore toppling the government of Aristide. He was overthrown for the second time; while the Duvaliers, violating free speech, human rights and fair elections, were not overthrown for more than 30 years in the shadow of the USA. The Haitian governing elite has always been carefully organized to be incompetent to allow for corruption. It exist to feed those politicians who cave in for outside interests, according the Wilentz. She states that ‘the United States has treated Haitian governments as, at best, rubber stamps for US policy, American businesses working in Haiti, and Haitian-run businesses friendly to American interests.’\(^\text{63}\) Haitian presidents could only be installed with the approval of the USA and presidents who seemed to put the interests of the Haitians first were removed from office.\(^\text{64}\) The current president of Haiti is Michel Martelly, called ‘another puppet of the United States’ by Wilentz. According to her, his victory was engineered with the collusion of the USA, the UN and the Organization of American States due to his pro-business stance.

Since June 2004, the UN is present in the country with the United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti (MINUSTAH). The mandate of the mission is to ‘restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s Government institutions and rule-of-law-structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights.’\(^\text{65}\)

A last element adding to ‘being a failed state’ is the overwhelming presence of NGOs, usually foreign-based. Even before the earthquake, an estimated 10,000 organizations were present in the country; while most are not regulated of give any accountability to the

\(^\text{63}\) Ibid, p. 232.
\(^\text{64}\) Ibid, p. 232.
government of Haiti on their projects and programs. They substitute their services for the services a government should provide. A report of the World Bank on their programs in Haiti from 1986 to 2002 stated that ‘the outcome of the World Bank assistance programs is rated unsatisfactory (if not highly so), the institutional development impact, negligible, and the sustainability of the few benefits that have accrued, unlikely.’

All these elements summed up above make Haiti a failed state according to Wilentz. The country survives because of the huge diaspora in other countries who sent money back the Haiti. Unless changes in international behaviour will take place, Haiti will not be able to turn things back around states Wilentz. As stated in the introduction, crises became more complex, chaotic and chronic, especially in weak or failed states. Thus, Haiti was already a weak and failed state before the earthquake, because of an unstable political regime and a large interference of other countries in the government of Haiti. The country was unstable and the government did not have the control it should have plus it did not carry out the tasks it should carry out as a sovereign state. When the earthquake hit Haiti, the government was not in the position to control the influx of international humanitarian organizations and to control the relief efforts executed by them. It became another opportunity for other countries to interfere in Haiti as will explained below.

2.2 The international response after the earthquake
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0- magnitude earthquake devastated the country, killing more than 220,000 people and leaving 1.5 million people homeless. The earthquake is being described by the Inter-American Development Bank as “likely to be the most destructive natural disaster in modern times.” After the earthquake, the international community immediately supported an enormous effort, sometimes estimated more than US$ 12 billion in relief and recovery aid - in comparison, the Gross Domestic Product of Haiti was 5.5 billion Euros in 2009. On January 19, the Security Council endorsed to increase the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts. Moreover, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations set up relief

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efforts. At the beginning, the organizations spoke about respecting the needs and input of the Haitian people. On March 31, at the International Donor Conference “Towards a New Future for Haiti,” donors pledged to distribute US$ 5.3 billion for Haiti’s recovery over two years. “The donors also agreed to work in partnership with the Haitian government to adhere to the principles of aid effectiveness and good humanitarian donor ship and to build on lessons learned.” They established the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC); after Bill Clinton who was the public face of it as the co-chair and was confident that “Haiti will recover and will build back better.”

When reviewing the reports of the NGOs which carried out relief efforts in Haiti, they mostly perceive their activities in a positive way. As the American Red Cross is stating in their five-year update report ‘millions of Haitians are safer, healthier, more resilient, and better prepared for future disasters, thanks to the generous donations to the American Red Cross.’ In total, the organization collected US$ 488 million which they spent or made commitments to spend for projects and programs. During the five years of their presence, 4.5 million people are reached with their projects and programs, amongst other 4.2 million people benefiting from hygiene promotion activities and 3.5 million people benefiting from cholera prevention and outbreak response services according to the American Red Cross.

The Clinton Foundation reports on its website that it has raised US$ 36 million for Haiti since 2010 for relief funds as well as projects focusing on supporting Haiti’s small and medium businesses, enhancing education, improving livelihoods, and exploring the nexus of energy, agriculture, and environment. Today, the Foundation focuses on creating sustainable economic growth in four priority sectors of tourism, apparel/manufacturing, energy, and agriculture.

Oxfam states that they carried out activities in the area of the provision of clean water, shelter and basic sanitation and providing daily hot meals to community canteens. In the first three months, they reached 300,000 people with their projects. Also, Oxfam reported they saw the opportunity to help Haiti reconstruct a more equitable future for all its people. In their five-year after report, they state that they are noticing positive efforts of the Haitian government in

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72 Ibid.
74 American Red Cross, Haiti Earthquake Response (website), http://www.redcross.org/images/MEDIA_CustomProductCatalog/m42240166_Haiti_Five-Year_Update_FINAL.pdf
75 Ibid.
76 Clinton Foundation, Clinton Foundation in Haiti (website), https://www.clintonfoundation.org/our-work/clinton-foundation-haiti
taking a leading role in the recovery process, and noticing the need for including Haitian civil societies organizations, communities and citizens in the process of reconstructing a better future.  

Save the Children also sums up in their Haiti Earthquake: Five Years On: Results and Lessons Learned about their programs and projects implemented in Haiti. With all their recovery and relief programs they have reached over one million Haitian adults and children. In the report, their programs are summed up in the fields of: shelter and supplies, safer construction and risk reduction, food security and livelihoods, health and nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, education, and child protection. In the report, a financial review of the earthquake response is provided, but the report lacks to state how many donations were collected.

Thus, on top of the funding donor governments pledged on the conferences, the NGOs raised a lot of money as well. When reading the reports of these organizations, the believe arises that millions of Haitians are helped with their programs and projects and that the gross of their donations are spent on humanitarian aid in Haiti. Their reports, however, lack to be specific about the executed programs and about the specific financing for these programs. Moreover, there is a lack of responsibility on the importance of the programs, if these programs were prioritized by the Haitians and partnerships with the Haitians are also not reported. Therefore, the NGOs try to establish a positive image about their humanitarian work in Haiti, but questions appear about the responsibility and the accountability of these organizations; about the full spending of their funding; and about whether the interests of the Haitians are taken into account by the implementation of their programs. A different image of the success of the relief efforts develops when reviewing the articles and reports of scholars and journalists.

When in October 2010, the relief efforts were still carried out by the international organizations; a cholera epidemic erupted and infected nearly half a million Haitians within the first year. The Nepalese contingent of MINUSTAH is being named as the potential source of the outbreak. The epidemic has killed more than 8,000 people and infected over 670,000.

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78 Save the Children, Haiti Earthquake: Five Years On (website), p. 6-12, http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9b00-df91d2ebea7a%7D/HAITI-EARTHQUAKE-FIVE-YEARS-ON.PDF
79 Ibid.
the outbreak of the cholera epidemic has been poor. Haiti has always known water as a scarce resource, and the scarcity is one of the reasons that the cholera could spread so easily through the population. Despite the rapid spread of the disease, less than half of the requested US$ 175 million by the UN came through. To prevent the spreading of the epidemic, NGOs including the British Red Cross and UNICEF launched a large awareness campaign stressing the importance of good hygiene. During the epidemic, they relocated displaced Haitians to places lacking hand-washing stations and showers. Moreover, a year after the outbreak of cholera only twelve percent of the camps had hand-washing stations, and only 7 percent of the camps surveyed by the UN had access to clean water. Of the 12,000 latrines needed for a proper hygiene in the camps, only 4,579 - 38 percent - were functional.\(^\text{81}\) And the cholera epidemic is still spreading through the country.

At the peak of the humanitarian response, more than ten thousand agencies were present in Haiti; one organization for every nine hundred people. The consequence was chaos: competition between the organizations, a lack of coordination and responsibility, and double work being done.\(^\text{82}\) Furthermore, the agreement to work in partnership with the Haitian government failed to materialize. From the beginning, IOs and NGOs largely followed their own agenda, ignoring the government and civil society of Haiti. In the first period after the earthquake, only one percent of the donor funds available for emergency assistance was channelled to the government, barely more than the funds the government of the Dominican Republic received, which hardly even felt the earthquake. Even worse off were the Haitian NGOs with receiving only 0.4 percent of the donor funds available. Of the total funds that were available for the relief efforts, almost two-thirds remained in the bank accounts of the NGOs, the UN, the World Bank, etc.\(^\text{83}\) And the money that was available to spend on reconstruction efforts, often failed to be spend on projects that met the people’s needs.

25 percent of the civil servants of Haiti lost their lives during the earthquake and only two out of 27 government buildings were still standing.\(^\text{84}\) As stated above, only one percent of the donor funds available was channelled to the government of Haiti, most probable because the government was perceived as weak and corrupt by the donors. According to a World Bank

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\(^\text{82}\) Maite Vermeulen, Is de Aardbeving het Beste wat Haiti Ooit is Overkomen? *De Correspondent* (website), https://decorrespondent.nl/2297/is-de-aardbeving-het-beste-wat-haiti-ooit-is-overkomen/100082587-470f4ae8


\(^\text{84}\) Maite Vermeulen, Is de Aardbeving het Beste wat Haiti Ooit is Overkomen? *De Correspondent* (website), https://decorrespondent.nl/2297/is-de-aardbeving-het-beste-wat-haiti-ooit-is-overkomen/100082587-470f4ae8
study from the mid-90’s, most donors were reluctant in that period to channel funds to the government of Haiti because they feared that the implementation efficiency and effectiveness would have been decreased. These concerns were not entirely unfounded and most probably they were still dominant at the time of the earthquake. The government of Haiti has a history of weakness and corruption, which is in large part a legacy from its colonial past and neoliberal present. Since the end of the reign of terror from the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has known more than a dozen of heads of state, a couple of coups and military regimes and a UN stabilization mission. Moreover, in 2014 Haiti ranked 161 out of 175 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. The humanitarian agencies assumed that when the donor funds were channelled to the government, it would not have been spend effective.

“Yet, faced with a government that many felt had been too badly decimated to lead a successful recovery effort, the international community certainly had other choices than to ignore it completely. At the very least, it could have found ways to engage the Haitian people in decisions about the country’s future,” according to Kathie Klarreich and Linda Polman.

According to Haitian policy analyst Jocelyn McCalla, international NGOs should have integrated Haitians in the relief efforts from the beginning to establish more Haitian ownership in the recovery. Haiti is now more dependent on international charity with their leaders begging for money as a first reflex, even when they claim otherwise. The Haitian government is now further weakened; high educated Haitians will work for the NGOs, not for the government. As a consequence, ministries do not have control over the sectors falling under their responsibility. For example, 80 till 90 percent of the health care and the education are in private hands. The thousand NGOs that are present in Haiti are realizing the responsibilities of the government. Even though the Haitian government could not absorb all the donor funds that were available to organize and lead to recovery efforts - because of the absence of enough well-educated civil servants, well-trained police officers etc. – international organizations should have put more into building that capacity. The only way to do that is to take the government seriously. Peter

85 Maite Vermeulen, Is de Aardbeving het Beste wat Haiti Ooit is Overkomen? De Correspondent (website), https://decorrespondent.nl/2297/Is-de-aardbeving-het-beste-wat-Haiti-ooit-is-overkomen/100082587-470f4ae8
87 Maite Vermeulen, Is de Aardbeving het Beste wat Haiti Ooit is Overkomen? De Correspondent (website), https://decorrespondent.nl/2297/Is-de-aardbeving-het-beste-wat-Haiti-ooit-is-overkomen/100082587-470f4ae8
89 Ibid.
90 Maite Vermeulen, Is de Aardbeving het Beste wat Haiti Ooit is Overkomen? De Correspondent (website), https://decorrespondent.nl/2297/Is-de-aardbeving-het-beste-wat-Haiti-ooit-is-overkomen/100082587-470f4ae8
de Clercq, the humanitarian coordinator of the UN in Haiti, cited the words of the president of Somalia:

Yes we are corrupt, yes we are incompetent, and yes there is a lot of lawlessness. But there is only one Somali government, and if you do not treat us as a government, we will never become a government.  

De Clercq believes the same goes for Haiti and Haitians believe the same. In 2010, Haitian members of the IHRC wrote a letter to commission chairs Bill Clinton and then Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive complaining being left out from the activities carried out by the IHRC nor having time to read, understand or analyse to projects submitted. Their complaints were to a great extent disregarded. A spokesman of one of the largest UN organization in Haiti even admitted that the claim of the international organization to play a supporting role and let the Haitian government take the lead in the reconstruction effort was a lie.

Considering the severity of the earthquake and the functionality of the Haitian government, no one expected perfect recovery efforts. Roughly 300,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged and 1.5 million people were left homeless or displaced. In May 2010, Haitians demonstrated for the resignation of Rene Préval, president at the time of the earthquake. On November 28, 2010, Michel Joseph Martelly was elected as his successor, more on the basis of his popularity as a singer and pop star than for his reconstruction plan. According to Camille Chalmers, a Haitian economist, the recovery effort has been so poorly managed that Haiti is being left weaker than before the earthquake, because they did not benefit and were not involved in the relief efforts and the way the money was spent.

Human rights activist Antonal Mortime, executive secretary of the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations, stated that the humanitarian aid which was provided in the aftermath of the earthquake actually contributed to a weakening of the state and local organizations. Many agencies funded ill-planned projects with little oversight or accountability, leading to a waste of money and most likely not contributing to the long-term development of

91 Maite Vermeulen, Is de Aardbeving het Beste wat Haiti Ooit is Overkomen? De Correspondent (website), https://decorrespondent.nl/2297/is-de-aardbeving-het-beste-wat-haiti-ooit-is-overkomen/100082587-470f4ae8 Translated from Dutch.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
Independent audits have revealed that the groundswell of international assistance efforts, ranging from missionary aid enterprises to ad hoc home building projects, have operated with little coordination, despite efforts by the United Nations OCHR, along with an international coordinating body, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, to centralize the distribution and deployment of recovery funds.”

In the article of Bill Quigley and Amber Ramanauskas Haiti: Where is the Money?, the authors state ‘most of the money went to outside governments, international aid agencies, and big, well-connected non-governmental organizations. Some went to for-profit companies whose business is disasters. And a lot of the money that was put up has not yet been spent.’ Furthermore, they acknowledge that Haitians, whether through the Haitian government, Haitian NGOs, or Haitian companies, had no control over the spending of the donor funds. Regardless of the almost total lack of control, it will be likely that the failures of the relief efforts will be blamed on the Haitians themselves. Quigley and Ramanauskas expect that ‘Haiti will be blamed by the international community despite poor planning, poor execution and the siphoning of funds by international NGOs and private companies.’

Three years after the earthquake, 80 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and the country knows an unemployment rate of 40 percent. Moreover, 357,785 Haitians still live in one of the 496 tent camps throughout the country.

Therefore, to state that the relief efforts carried out by the international humanitarian organization were not as functional as they could or even should have been is an understatement. Haiti was almost completely taken over by donor governments and the humanitarian agencies as only one percent of the donor funds was channelled to the government and the organizations did not have to give any accountability or transparency about their activities. Many organizations have still not spent all of their funds in Haiti, while less than half of the appeal of the UN for the response to the cholera outbreak was met. It seems strange that organizations are not spending their money when it is mostly needed as for example to combat the cholera epidemic; they state that they have reserved that money for their reconstruction projects. However, knowing that many Haitians still live in tent camps lacking proper sanitary

95 Michelle Chen, “How Humanitarian Aid Weakened Post-Earthquake Haiti,” The Nation (website).
96 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
and hand-washing stations, it seems that a great part of the funds did not end up at the right place. The statement by the UN that they would only have a supporting role in the humanitarian aid and the reconstruction funds through the IHRC turned out to be a lie as the government was completely put offside.

3. Theory: humanitarian aid and political survival

As the above parts explain, the politicisation of humanitarian aid is growing and becoming more important. Thus, the political process in humanitarian aid is getting more important. Moreover, Haiti is known as a failed state as stated above and conflicts in those states have become more complex, chronic and chaotic. Haiti has known a long period of foreign interference in its government and receives humanitarian aid for a long period. These elements of politicisation of aid in combination with a failed state with a lot of foreign interference, makes it that a theory is needed about politics in conjunction with humanitarian aid. Therefore, the theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith is chosen as it links aid allocations with the survival of political leaders.

The theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith aims to answer four questions that are posed about foreign aid: “(1) who gives aid? (2) how do donors determine how much aid to give? (3) who gets aid? and (4) how much aid does each recipient get? To answer these questions, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith derived a theory which links aid allocations with the survival of political leaders.\textsuperscript{100}

As stated by Herman and Atmar, humanitarian aid is become more and more politicised. Moreover, the interest of donors seem to be more important in the present humanitarian field than the interests of the supposed beneficiaries. Another important element in present-day humanitarian relief efforts is the visibility of the donors in the projects and programs set up by the international aid agencies. And the donor governments, which do not donate funds without bringing their interests on the table. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith modelled the elements on the increasing politicization of aid which are described in the introduction into a theory about linking policy concessions in return for humanitarian aid. Therefore, this theory is chosen to research the extent of politicisation of the given humanitarian aid in Haiti after the earthquake.

With the elements that Bueno de Mesquita and Smith explain in their theory, it will be assessed whether or not the interests of the donors were perceived as more important than the interests of the affected Haitians.

When reviewing the literature on the article of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, a new strand of literature is described by Amanda A. Licht on the link between aid and leader survival which is highly reliant upon the model of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith according to her.\textsuperscript{101} Both the selectorate theory and the aid-for-policy model by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith are used by scholars as a basis to form new model for their research. Licht’s theory shares two fundamental assumptions with the selectorate theory and cites both the articles of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith during her article.\textsuperscript{102}

Daniel Y. Kono and Gabriella R. Montinola also state their understanding of political survival is informed by the model of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith. The model provides the basis for their analysis in the article Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both? The model of selectorate theory is the starting point for their research, but more articles of both are cited during their article.\textsuperscript{103}

Thus, the article of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith is used as a reference point for research on the survival of political leaders on combination with receiving or providing foreign aid. Furthermore, Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions is cited often as key source of literature on the dominance of political motives in determining bilateral aid flows\textsuperscript{104} and on foreign aid increasing the likelihood of a democratic transition.\textsuperscript{105}

When reviewing the literature on foreign aid, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith found that it is clearly divided along two dimensions: aid as an instrument of national policy and aid as an instrument of humanitarian concerns. Morgenthau argued that aid is unlikely to amend social and political conditions in recipient countries. In the research of McKinlay and Little, donor interests appear to dominate recipient needs. They found that while some aid might be provided to alleviate poverty and suffering, most aid is not distributed to the poorest states; neither does humanitarian aid make an effective end to poverty or promoting development. Maizels and Nissanke argue that whether aid is bilateral or multilateral has influence on the degree of

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid, p. 62.
humanitarian motivation. Burnside and Dollar found that aid allocations are not strongly influenced by the quality of development policies, but aid in conjunction with good development policies lead to better economic performance.

Although the literature to date has assessed the empirical evidence carefully, there was not yet a general theory which explained aid giving and getting. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith constructed a model that helps sort out the fundamentals of aid while also leading to testable hypotheses. The model proposes that “aid giving and getting is a strategic process in which donors purchase policy support from recipients who use at least some of the assistance to ensure that they are securely ensconced in power. In this view, aid is expected to flow to countries whose leaders do not inherently support the policies of a prospective donor but are willing to back those policies in exchange for aid sufficient to improve their political and economic welfare relative to survival prospects for the recipient states’ leaders in the absence of aid.”

In their theory, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith establish two political institutions: the “selectorate” and the “winning coalition.” The latter is ‘the set of people whose support is essential to keep a leader in office.’ The former is ‘the pool of potential supporters from which these essential backers are drawn to form a winning coalition.’ These two institutions outline the desirability of trading foreign aid for policy concessions. The model presumes that aid transfers are made between a potential donor, state A, and a potential recipient, state B. Decisions are not made by the states, but rather made by the leaders of the states, in this case AL and BL.

The selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al is used to model the political competition within each state. This theory establishes that three political institutions affect leaders. These institutions are the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate and the winning coalition. The nominal selectorate, also referred to as the interchangeables, are those who have some influence in choosing the leader of the nation, those who may vote. The real selectorate, also referred to as the influentials, are those who act on their influence, thus those who cast a vote. The winning coalition, also referred to as the essentials, are those whose support is essential to keep the leader in office, thus those who actually vote on the chosen leader. The fundamental proposition in the theory is that the primary goal of those who are in power is to remain in power. To remain in power, leader must maintain their winning coalition. The leader

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will be likely to use private goods to remain in power when the winning coalition is small, as in an autocracy. When the winning coalition is large, the leader will be likely to use public goods to content the coalition, as in democracies.\textsuperscript{110} In the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith on foreign aid for policy concessions used in this thesis, a distinction between the nominal selectorate and the real selectorate is not made. The selectorate implies the set of people who have a potential say in who is to be the leader.\textsuperscript{111}

Assumed in the model of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith is that the two nations have policy differences. ‘In particular, the citizens from nation A would benefit from a policy concession from nation B. AL, the leader in nation A, can use aid transfers to buy such a policy concession from nation B.’\textsuperscript{112} If BL accepts the aid-for-policy deal, then the aid is transferred. Aid transfers will add to the resource base of BL but at the cost of a policy concession. Subsequently, BL decides on implementing the agreed policy concession and AL and BL become subject to domestic political competition. The fundamental element of the model is that ‘leaders make aid and policy decisions with an eye to how they influence political survival.’\textsuperscript{113} Improving the welfare of the people is not the reason for taking ruling on aid-for-policy decisions, unless coincidentally this benefits survival simultaneously. When a large winning coalition is present, promoting public welfare is compatible with enhancing the survival of the leader. In contrast, when a small winning coalition is present, there is a disconnection between the policies that promote the public’s welfare and those that enhance a leader’s survival.\textsuperscript{114}

Moreover, of importance for the model is the credibility of BL’s willingness to implement to policy concessions proposed by AL. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith assume that ‘if leader BL agrees to deliver pro-A policy in return for aid but reneges after receiving the funds, then BL is said to lose her integrity. Once leader BL loses her integrity, she is deemed untrustworthy by the current and future leaders in nation A, who refuse to offer her any future aid. However, the loss of integrity and the removal of future aid are attached to the dishonest leader and not to the nation she represents. If the dishonest leader is disposed, then nation B is again eligible for aid since its new leader arrives with her integrity intact.’\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{110} Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow (2003). \textit{The Logic of Political Survival}.


\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, p. 255.
As stated above, political leaders have public goods and private goods to reward supporters. Policies with a high component of public goods provide rewards to all citizens of the nation. Private goods are transferred to members of the winning coalition only. In reality, no policies present purely public or private goods.\textsuperscript{116}

‘The key insight from the model is that aid-for-policy deals improve the welfare of the leaders in the donor and recipient states. Improved welfare for leaders, however, does not necessarily imply improved welfare for their citizens.\textsuperscript{117} On the contrary, in recipient states the welfare of the average citizen will generally decrease by receiving aid.’\textsuperscript{118}

For the leader of the recipient state to accept the aid-for-policy deal, the leader’s prospect of political survival must be improved. The leader will use some of the additional resources gained through the aid to compensate her coalition for implementing the pro-A policy. The pro-A policy will generally be disliked by the coalition of nation B.\textsuperscript{119} If a leader will be deposed, a challenger is relabelled as the incumbent of the state and a new challenger will be selected – from an indefinite pool of challengers.\textsuperscript{120} In general, the challenger has less to offer to the coalition than the incumbent has. However, when aid is offered, the total resource pool for nation B increases and thus the challenger can make better offers to the coalition than before the aid. Therefore, the incumbent is forced to spend more than before the aid was offered, which will generate a higher level of welfare for her coalition. The advantage for the incumbent of BL is that she does not need to spend all the aid on the coalition; some extra resources will be left for her own disposal.\textsuperscript{121} When the nation has a small winning coalition, those outside the coalition in the recipient country are generally made worse off by foreign aid. These political systems are the most likely to receive foreign aid. As stated above, the aid brings some increase in rewards, because BL must spend a part of the rewards on her supporters to avoid her challenger taking over. When the winning coalition is small, most of the additional compensation is in the form of private goods in which people outside the winning coalition do not share in. As a consequence, the welfare losses resulting from pro-A policy for those outside the winning coalition will likely not be compensated by the improvement in government-provided benefits which is aimed at the winning coalition. Moreover, aid supports the survival of BL in a small winning coalition system whose enticement makes it improbable that she will

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, p. 270.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, p. 256.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, p. 270.
implement effective public policy. Thus, citizens of the recipient nation will not only experience pro-A policies they disapprove, their political order will also retain in office supported by the foreign aid giver, AL. Therefore, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith assume that ‘aid donors are unpopular among the general public in many recipient countries. Indeed, this dislike is most intense when a small coalition leader receives a large amount of aid because a large amount of aid is indicative of the implementation of a policy especially distasteful to the citizens in B.’

The distribution of rewards in nation A is different. Generally, aid donation improves the welfare for citizens in the donor country – if it did not, AL would not make the aid-for-policy deal. The improved policy in nation B improves the welfare of those inside and outside the winning coalition in nation A, although those inside the coalition gain somewhat less than those outside the coalition. Namely, the latter only sacrifices some internal public benefits in return for external public benefits while the former gives up both private and public goods which could have been purchased with the resources given to aid.

‘Receiving aid is most likely to improve the welfare of citizens in large coalition systems.’ Namely, the majority of the received allocated resources are assigned to public goods instead of the incumbent keeping the resources for her own projects. Aid given to such a political system is the most likely to advance economic growth and enhance social welfare. On the contrary, in small coalition systems provided aid is disproportionately received by the leader and the supporters in the winning coalition in the form of private goods. Little of the aid promotes growth and development.

Political reform needs to precede economic development to promote development. Thus, an emphasis on enlarging the winning coalition size in political systems around the world is the most effective manner to alleviate poverty. Political leaders in large coalition donor countries usually do not perceive that goal as consistent with their survival incentives. Their survival depends on providing welfare for their supporters and not providing welfare for the citizens abroad. Public goods that their citizens value are far more easily bought from a small coalition system than public goods from a large coalition democratic state. Exceptions are if ‘the policy goals in the donor state are furthered by enhancing growth in the recipient states or

123 Ibid, p. 270.
124 Ibid, p. 270.
125 Ibid, p. 280.
126 Ibid, p.280.
the citizens in the donor state really care about promoting growth abroad, then leaders in donor states promote their political survival better by buying policy from autocrats then they do by pushing for the institutional reforms necessary for effective development.\textsuperscript{129} Thus, aid often undermines democratic reform attempts. The theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith paints a depressing picture about the effectiveness of foreign aid for alleviating poverty around the world.\textsuperscript{130}

When applying the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith to the humanitarian relief efforts which were provided in Haiti after the earthquake, the focus will be on three specific elements, namely on the political processes in both the donor as the recipient countries, on public versus private goods distributed during the projects, and on the welfare of the elites versus the welfare of the people.

In their theory Bueno de Mesquita and Smith state that aid-for-policy deals are being made between the donor and recipient countries. In other words, a donor government will only provide aid to another country if itself benefits as well. Considering it may be difficult to find specific policy concessions made by Haiti to receive aid from donors as they only received one percent of the funds, the focus will be on looking for the benefits the donors got by providing aid to Haiti and to find out in what way they might have profited from distributing aid after the earthquake.

Furthermore, the theory clearly states that the welfare of the elites benefits more from providing aid and the policy concessions which are connected to this aid than the welfare of the people, especially in the receiving country. Therefore, while describing the projects and programs implemented in Haiti it will be analysed whether these projects improved the welfare of the people or the welfare of the elites.

As explained by the theory, public goods are used to reward all citizens while private goods will only reward specific persons. When there is a large winning coalition present in a country, the leader will most likely use public goods to reward this coalition. In an autocracy with a small winning coalition private goods are used by the political elites to content their coalitions. While Haiti is a democracy, there is a political elite present in the country backed by foreign governments. Therefore, it will be analysed whether the political elites in the donor and recipient countries or the international organizations especially distributed private or public


\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. p. 281.
goods to the Haitians. When especially private goods are distributed, it is likely to be used to reward the political elites in Haiti.

Therefore, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith proposed a theory which links the survival or political leaders with aid allocations. The fundamental element of the model, according to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith is: “leaders make aid and policy decisions with an eye to how they influence political survival.” 131 The political leaders of both the donor as the receiving government use funds or policy concessions to ensure political survival or satisfying their winning coalition. Three elements are chosen from this theory to apply to the humanitarian aid in Haiti. By examining these specific elements of the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, it will be determined whether or not this theory is applicable to the humanitarian aid provided to Haiti after the earthquake in 2010.

4. Case study: aid-for-policy deals in return for humanitarian aid in Haiti

After the earthquake, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) made an appeal based on the global assessments of needs conducted in the country or subject to the overall coordination of the UN OCHA. According to the appeal, US$ 1.5 billion was needed for the recovery operations. While only 69 percent of this appeal was funded, the overall funding for the humanitarian response was more than met with total funding of US$ 3.3 billion by states.132

To understand the dynamics of the provided humanitarian aid in Haiti, one has to understand the relationship between the state, private donors, implementing partners, and local subcontractors. The lines of accountability easily become blurred because donors often have multiple implementing partners for their projects, who have multiple subcontractors or agencies, which liaise between the NGOs and the beneficiaries. While these actors state that they are committed to transparency, monitoring and accountability in the humanitarian regime, it has not always been clear who provided or received funds from whom.

Both state and non-state actors were important in the funding of the humanitarian aid provided to Haiti after the earthquake. The two biggest state donors and most interested in Haiti,

both politically as economically, were the United States (USA) and Venezuela. Together they promised the lion’s share of the reconstruction funds, more than US$ 1.8 billion, though in 2012 they have only spend 24 percent (US$ 223 million) and 30 percent (US$ 278 million) respectively. As of July 2010, only four countries had disbursed their full promised funding, namely Australia, Brazil, Estonia and Norway. One of the reasons for this is that donors are not obligated by an overlooking body to fulfil their pledges and the donors are allowed to change their pledge. When states change or do not fulfil their pledge, they are not disciplined nor any media attention is given.

Venezuela was also one of the key donors after the earthquake. The country was ‘the first country to respond, became the first country to forgive Haiti’s foreign debt and pledged more than the US, EU or World Bank at the UN Donor Conference in New York.’ In December 2011, President Martelly told in an interview: “the cooperation with Venezuela is the most important in Haiti right now in terms of impact, direct impact.”

4.1 Benefits received by donor governments

The United States of America was also one of the key donors after the Haiti earthquake. The USA has been one of the most important donors to Haiti even before the earthquake. For example, before the earthquake the USA had a dual food aid coordination system, with one part led by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for American NGOs and implementing partners and the other part led by the World Food Programme. However, both before the earthquake as afterwards the funding of the USA was only minimally funded through the UN coordinated system, and was largely dictated by the donor’s own priorities and mapping of humanitarian needs.

Immediately after the earthquake, the USA allocated US$ 379 million in aid and sent 5,000 troops. In total, the USA allocated US$ 1.642 billion for relief efforts and US$ 1.140 for reconstruction efforts and sent 22,000 military members to Haiti. It was quickly discovered that of the US$ 379 million of the initial funding, most money was not given directly nor even, in some cases, indirectly to the country.

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134 Ibid, p. 115.
For example, the Associated Press reported that 33 cents of these US dollars for Haiti were actually given back to America by reimbursing themselves for their military presence. From every US dollar, as stated above, less than one cent went to the Haitian government. Furthermore, 42 cents of each US dollar was channelled to private and public non-governmental organizations like Save the Children, World Food Programme and the Pan-American Health Organization.\textsuperscript{138}

In August 2010, the US Congressional Research Office stated that the USA planned to fund governmental agencies of the USA with US$ 1.5 billion for relief and disaster assistance funding for Haiti. ‘Of this amount, $655 million was allocated to the Department of Defense; $220 million to the Department of Health and Human Services to provide grants to individual American states to cover services for Haitian evacuees; $350.7 million to USAID International Disaster Assistance; $150 million to the US Department of Agriculture for emergency food assistance; $96.5 million to the State Department Contributions to International Peacekeeping Operations; $45 million to U.S. Coast Guard Activities; and $15 million to the Department of Homeland Security for immigration fees.’\textsuperscript{139} Furthermore, the Center for Economic and Policy Research analysed 1490 of the contracts awarded by the US government and found that only 23 of these contracts were awarded to Haitian companies. A total of US$ 194 million was awarded to contractors by the US government; of this amount, only US$ 4.8 million went to the 23 contractors above-mentioned – about 2.5 percent on the total. On the other hand, US$ 76 million was received by contractors from the Washington D.C.-area – 39.4 percent of the total. Of those contracts that were awarded to Haitian companies, only the elite benefitted. For example, Haiti’s top reconstruction planning official, who partly owns the largest concrete company in the country and thus collects extensive benefits from the international rebuilding programs. Another was the Minister of Tourism who heads the commission for the reconstruction of Port-au-Prince and other areas destroyed by the earthquake, but also owns a share of the only company in Haiti which produces ready-mixed concrete. Therefore, the local elites pursue their own interest by their political power.\textsuperscript{140}

Illustrating this is the following; less than a month after the earthquake, the American Ambassador Kenneth Merten sent a cable titled “THE GOLD RUSH IS ON” as part of his


\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

report describing the situation to Washington. The document also revealed that the President of Haiti met with former General Wesley Clark who was representing InnoVida Holdings LLC – a Miami-based company that builds foam core houses – for a sales presentation. Another example is Lewis Lucke, who was a high ranking USAID relief coordinator, he met twice with the Haitian Prime Minister immediately after the earthquake in his USAID capacity. After the meetings, he quit his job at USAID and started to work for a Florida cooperation Ashbritt with a salary of US$ 30,000 per month. Ashbritt worked together with a Haitian partner to lobby for disaster contracts. Lucke stated that “it became clear to us that if it was handled correctly the earthquake represented as much an opportunity as it did a calamity.” Soon after starting at Ashbritt, the company and its Haitian partner were granted a US$ 10 million no-bid contract. According to Lucke, he was instrumental in securing another US$ 10 million contract from the World Bank and another small contract from CHF International for Ashbritt. The relationship between Lucke and Ashbritt ended in court however, when Lucke sued the company and its Haitian partner for nearly US$ 500,000 in bonuses for the contracts he had helped them get.

Another example is the reimbursement of Florida. The US military evacuated critically injured Haitians to hospitals in Florida, but only after officials formally asked for the US to pay some of the medical costs of care. Ultimately, Florida was granted more than US$ 5 million in Haiti relief funds for helping Haitians.

The Rolling Stone published an article on a New York based consulting firm named Dalberg Global Development Advisors which was awarded a US$ 1.5 million contract. According to the briefer of the group, “Dalberg’s team had never lived overseas, didn’t have any disaster experience or background in urban planning... never carried out any program activities on the ground, and only one of them spoke French.” Despite this, the company was assigned the task of assessing a specific land area where the USA wanted to create new communities to relocate Haitians from Port-au-Prince. After the assessment, USAID reviewed the company’s work and found that “one of the sites they said was habitable was actually a small mountain... It had an open-minded pit on one side of it, a severe 100 feet vertical cliff, and ravines...it became clear that these people may not even have gotten out of their SUVs.”

142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
When looking at the promised funding of the USA, in May 2011 only 20 percent (US$ 184 million) of the US$918 million allocated by US Congress for the Haiti Reconstruction Fund had been obligated. Moreover, nearly two years after the earthquake of the special funds for infrastructure reconstruction activities less than one percent has been spent by USAID and the US State Department. Furthermore, a report of the United States Government Accountability Office stated that only 12 percent has even been obligated.\textsuperscript{145} Thus of the money promised for funding the humanitarian response only a small amount was actually spent in Haiti. And the money that was spent in Haiti, most went to the benefits of Americans and American business instead of the supposed beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{146} The examples displayed above show that the interests of the Haitians did not have priority as the most money is gained by American NGOs and companies.

An example of the politicization of the process of humanitarian action in Haiti after the earthquake can be found in US$ 8.6 million joint contract between the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance with the private companies CHF International and Project Concern International for the removal of debris in Port-au-Prince. CHF International is an international development company and politically well-connected; PCI is an international aid group. CHF’s political connection is formed by its board secretary, Laura Fitz-Pegado, who is a partner with the Livingstone Group LLC. The Livingstone Group is specialized in lobbying and government relations services and is headed by Bob Livingstone, former Republican Speaker-designate for the 106\textsuperscript{th} Congress. Laura Fitz-Pegado also has a political link since she was appointed by President Clinton to work at the Department of Commerce. Moreover, she served on the Obama for President Campaign as a member of the foreign policy expert advisor team. Rolling Stone stated in one of their articles that CHF has two spacious building in Port-au-Prince to work in and maintains a brand new fleet of vehicles.

Furthermore, the reconstruction of homes has been exceedingly slow. After the earthquake, 100,000 homes had been completely destroyed and another 200,000 homes were severely damaged. As a result, 1.5 million people were left homeless. International humanitarian organizations provided hundreds of thousands tarpaulins by May 2010, three-and-a-half months after the earthquake. These tarpaulins were constructed at a rate of 7000 per


\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
month, while few homes are being repaired. The need of permanent homes was still present more than two years after the natural disaster. \(^{147}\)

In April 2011, the USAID Office of the Inspector General examined in an audit the efforts of building transitional housing. The result was that only 22 percent of the target number of USAID was actually built, while some of these buildings were even substandard. From their total budget of US$ 138.6 million for providing shelters, only US$37.8 million has been spent on January 1, 2011. USAID awarded unsolicited non-competitive proposals to international organizations; the largest contracts were allocated to World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, and Cooperative Housing Foundation International.

According to the UN humanitarian officer in Haiti, Nigel Fisher: “the NGOs have still something to respond to about their accountability, because there is a lot of cash out there. But what about the $1.5 to $2 billion that the Red Cross and NGOs got from ordinary people, and matched by governments, etc.? What’s happened to that? And that’s where it’s very difficult to trace those funds.”\(^{148}\)

Not only the USA have largely pursued their own interests in their humanitarian efforts, but the international humanitarian efforts have also been characterized by bypassing the Haitian government and channelling the funds through international public and private NGOs. As stated above, at the International Donor Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti donors agreed to work in partnership with the Haitian government to adhere the principles of aid effectiveness and good humanitarian donorship and to build on lessons learned. At this conference, they pledged to launch a ten year rebuilding programme for Haiti. They refused, however, to commit specific amounts of funds or plans until their concerns regarding mismanagement and the ability of the government of Haiti were resolved. Thus, they made commitments to work in partnership with the government, but not until their concerns were resolved while lacking to set up projects to solve these concerns. At the conference, experts suggested to let the UN channel all the donor funds and closely tracking it. At a succeeding conference in March 2010, donors pledged to donate US$ 5.3 billion over two years and a total of US$ 9.9 billion over three years or more. The money was banked at the World Bank and would be distributed by IHRC, co-chaired by Bill Clinton and Jean-Max Bellerive. As a consequence, all the Haitian governmental bodies

\(^{147}\) Ibid.

were effectively bypassed by this construction. At July 2010, Bill Clinton reported that only 10 percent of the pledged donor funds were actually given to the IHRC, which was supposed to exist for eighteen months only beginning on April 21, 2010. An article by the Miami Herald stated in July 2011, that of the US$ 3.2 billion in projects which were approved by the IHRC only five of these projects had been finished for a total of US$ 84 million.  

The funding of the international community followed generally the same pattern as the spending patron of the USA. The UN Special Envoy for Haiti reported that of the funding ‘34 percent was given back to the donor’s own civil and military entities for disaster response; 28 percent was given to U.N. agencies and non-governmental agencies for specific U.N. projects; 26 percent was given to private contractors and other NGOs; six percent was provided as in-kind services to recipients; five percent was given to the international and national Red Cross societies; and one percent was provided to the government of Haiti.’ Furthermore, in the first UN appeal for funding not one Haitian NGO was included. In the second appeal, four-tenths of one percent of the funding was attributed to Haitian NGOs.

Furthermore, the international community did not commit itself to the pledges it made. The European Community has pledged US$ 294 million of which they only disbursed US$ 97.2 million, Canada spent US$ 55.3 million out of US$ 375 million, and France disbursed only a quarter of the US$ 30 million assigned to the HRF.  

Moreover, the structure within the IHRC did not function as agreed upon. The IHRC was supposed to have an equal number of international and Haitian members for voting purposes, to provide the President of Haiti with the authority to veto any decision within ten business days of notice, have a performance office and audit with expedited authority to issue titles to land, and barring presidential veto. After the eighteen months of existence, the power and existence of the IHRC was supposed to dissolve and be transferred to the Haitian government. The functioning of the IHRC received critique from different players in the field. Firstly, the twelve Haitian members in the IHRC complained about a lack of communication between the members. Bill Clinton responded by agreeing that more communication was needed but he needed the Haitian members to be more supportive of the IHRC. An example illustrating the

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150 Ibid.
152 Ibid, p. 117.
feeling of the Haitian members is the meeting that continued in December 2010, while the co-chair and Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive was absent. Secondly, a senior international aid official stated: “behind closed doors, the feeling of the Haitian government was this was just another foreign group they’d given permission to come in and take over the country. But what could they do? The Haitian government knew it didn’t have the capacity to tackle this reconstruction on its own.” Thirdly, Oxfam criticized the IHRC by stating that the commission neither had the staff not the technical capacity to lead the reconstruction efforts in Haiti.153

In May 2011, the USAID Government Accountability Office presented an audit which deemed the IHRC ‘not fully operational.’154 At the time of this audit, only 30 percent of the total donor pledges were approved for projects. Furthermore, the analysis reported that the IHRC failed to fund the projects which were prioritized by Haitians. Examples are the funding for agriculture and debris removal; while the Haitian government estimated that equal funds for both were needed, the IHRC approved seven times more funding for agriculture programmes. Moreover, road construction projects of US$ 680 million were approved by the IHRC, although the Haitians thought US$ 180 million was sufficient. The other way round approved the IHRC only US$ 113 million for rebuilding and improving the government institutions of Haiti, while the government of Haiti itself identified a need of more than US$ 800 million. Therefore, the IHRC was approving projects which did not prioritize the needs of the Haitians and did not provide the assistance mostly needed. The problem identified was that the IHRC did not have the power to order donors and organizations which projects or programs to fund nor could it convince donors to work in certain areas in which work was highly needed such as debris removal. After the mandate of the IHRC expired at the end of October 2011, little is heard from the commission or from the money that was not spend yet.155

As stated above, the American Red Cross declared to have reached 4.5 million Haitians with their projects and programs. In total, the organization collected US$ 488 million which they spend or made commitments to spend for projects and programs according to the report on their website.156 According to Bill Quigley and Amber Ramanauskas, specific details on

154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 American Red Cross. Haiti Earthquake Response (website), http://www.redcross.org/images/MEDIA_CustomProductCatalog/m42240166_Haiti_Five-Year_Update_FINAL.pdf
either spending the money or making commitments on relief and recovery efforts are unclear. In August 2011, the American Red Cross had spent less than half of the money it raised for humanitarian efforts in Haiti. Making a comparison: in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the American Red Cross raised US$ 200 million for relief efforts, while only having 15 people in Haiti before the disaster; Partners in Health raised US$ 40 million within weeks while it had 5000 people working in Haiti pre-earthquake. Most of the funding raised for relief efforts in Haiti went to U.S.-based aid groups. Although much of this funding was spent on buying food and other necessities for Haitians, it was for a large part bought from American companies, including highly subsidized rice growers whose products undermine local producers and thus driving them out of business. Another example of a benefit for the donor government.

The USA and international humanitarian organizations thus profited clearly from providing aid to Haiti. However, the aid-for-policy theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith was not for the first time applicable to Haiti. Under President Clinton, Haiti was pressured to lower its longstanding tariffs on imported food from 50 percent to about three percent. The USA reacted with dumping cheap, subsidized surplus rice on the Haitian market, officially for humanitarian reasons but in this way it could dispose a product which was unsellable on the domestic market. The Haitian leader who approved this was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first freely elected president, who was overthrown less than a year after the election. In return for the acceptance of the lower import tariffs, Clinton returned him to power. The policy caused unrest and chaos in the countryside and it destroyed Haitian rice farming; while being largely self-sufficient in this staple in the 1980s, Haiti was importing 80 percent of its rice in 2012. Today, Haiti is the second largest US rice importer in the world. Moreover, the percentage of locally produces rice consumed in Haiti has decreased from 47 percent to fifteen percent. As a consequence, American rice companies make billions of profit each year through the government subsidies, while Haitian local producers go bankrupt. As formulated by Paul Farmer:

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If anyone had a real cause for complaint, it was—and still is—the Haitian people themselves, so long excluded from any meaningful discussion of their fate. To a list of grievances spanning at least two centuries, they added the inability of state and non-state providers to ensure basic succor to those in great need, in spite of the larger presence of humanitarians and NGOs.\footnote{Oliver Cunningham, “The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of ‘Building Back Better,’” The Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies 4, (Summer 2012): p. 112.}

The benefits for the food industry of donors were thus being exploited before the earthquake; however, after the earthquake the donors continued the exploitation of the foreign food aid. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, foreign food helped to alleviate the needs of the displaced people and victims of the natural disaster. The long-term effects, however, were damaging to Haitian producers and suppliers. With the lower priced imported rice for example, such as ‘WFP rice,’ ‘American rice,’ and ‘Miami rice’ the local economy stagnated. The consequence was that local economies could not rebuild their independency after the earthquake and went out of business. Between January and June 2010, USAID exported 214,000 metric tons of food to Haiti, which prevented local producers to sell their staples. If the humanitarian regime had put Haitian interest above their interest they would have bought food from local producers. Instead, these parallel market structures that arose with foreign food with which they could not compete forced Haitian producers out of business. Once again, the humanitarian organizations did not involve local decision makers in their decision-making and program implementation.\footnote{Ibid, p. 110-111.} Therefore, it is certainly debatable whose self-interest was best served by the food aid in Haiti, whether it were the donors, implementing NGOs or the victims of the natural disaster. What is certain, however, is that the American food industry and the international partners have capitalized on the opportunities present in Haiti, which stands in contrast with the idea of humanitarian aid and the needs of the affected Haitians and their opportunities to promote local recovery, development and rehabilitation.\footnote{Ibid, p. 112.}

In instances were Haitians were authorized by local ownership of response and recovery there were successes obtained. The project with the most success was the Ushahidi platform which is an open-source crisis mapping software that uses social media and mobile phone technology to communicate emergency needs and locations. The platform made it possible for affected Haitians to communicate their whereabouts and needs in order to receive aid. When Ushahidi was compared to other available systems it was found that it ‘vastly outperformed
traditional intel’ and that ‘there was evidence that this technology saved countless lives by mapping over 2,500 incidents in the first 25 days.’ Furthermore, the Haitian diaspora in the USA helped to translate messages written in Haitian Creole which helped to ensure quicker response times. As a last example is the crises map of Haiti which was established mainly via Haitian input and was described as ‘the most comprehensive and up-to-date map available to the humanitarian community.’

The cooperation between NGOs in Haiti was limited for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there were too many organizations present to effectively coordinate nor could the quality of the organizations be assessed or if the organizations even existed. Secondly, a lack of transparency was present. Donors pose restrictions and limitations on NGOs as their implementing partners to which they have to adhere. These standard operating producers are institutionalized in all the frameworks on humanitarian aid and thus may obstruct harmonization at the local level as it did in Haiti. As a result, many organizations worked in the same sector. The consequence was program duplication and a lack of coordination and harmonization in the provided humanitarian aid. Thirdly, there was a lack of accountability in combination with transparency. Traditionally, humanitarian agencies employ moral imperatives which exempts them from critical analysis. However, when audits were performed on the projects and programs executed by the NGOs they discovered a lack of recovery and development. For example, no mechanism existed to control where the money was spent as implementing organizations felt little pressure to reveal their spending publicly. There was no guarantee that their money actually went where it was supposed to go in Haiti. The fourth element was the role of bureaucracy in Haiti. Normally, during a humanitarian response the bureaucracy ensures transparency and accountability, but in the case of Haiti it contributed to slow and inflexible project implementation because of the government which did not function properly and could not handle the influx of NGOs. Too often, relief, recovery and development projects do not address local needs and thus become unused projects representing the gap between perceived and actual needs. The situation in Haiti highlighted a normative contradiction in the humanitarian regime, namely the fact that humanitarian agencies had to compete and collaborate at the same time.

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164 Ibid, p. 113.
166 Ibid, p. 118.
167 Ibid, p. 119-120.
The above examples illustrate that one of the key donors, the USA, certainly has benefitted from the aid provided to Haiti with the contracts awarded to the American NGOs, companies and ministries. Moreover, the American food industry profited from the change to dump it surpluses on the Haitian market under the mask of ‘food aid.’ However, not only the USA profited from the humanitarian aid as the other international organizations followed the same pattern. Another similarity is that they lack transparency about where the money is that they did not spend. Moreover, the IHRC that was supposed to be a partnership between the Haitians and the international community did not function and left the Haitian government out of the decision-making process.

4.2 Welfare of the elite versus welfare of the non-elite

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith state in their theory about the welfare of the elites versus the welfare of the people that the elite usually makes sure it benefits from the aid-for-policy concessions. When looking at this element in the case of Haiti, it has to be taken into account that elections were supposed to take place a month after the earthquake. Important is that President Préval would not run again for president and that the winning coalition was thus likely to change, which is an significant element for the welfare of the elite. The president would most likely not use the humanitarian aid to satisfy his winning coalition for the possible aid-for-policy deals as the coalition would be different after the elections and probably not support his political party.

The general election was originally scheduled for February 28, 2010, but was postponed after the earthquake. As a consequence, President Préval extended his presidency, while the entire lower house and one-third of the senate were no longer sitting due to the postponed elections. The parliament was thus ceasing to exist as a government body and the power was concentrated in the hand of the president, the IHRC and the prime-minister who was a co-chair in the IHRC. It was perceived by the Haitians as if the running of the country was now out of their hands and that Préval sold the country to foreign powers, while the IHRC was violating Haiti’s sovereignty. Haitians were protesting in May 2010 to demand the stepping down of President Préval and calling for the return of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. At the postponed elections, however, numerous political parties were excluded from participating, among which Fanmi Lavalas, Aristide’s party and the largest party in the country.168 The Center

168 Center for Economic and Policy Research, Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch (website), http://www.cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/haitian-protesters-concerned-for-democracy
for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) stated that ‘allowing for the return of Aristide could increase the legitimacy of the government and help bring together the various actors in the reconstruction effort. In addition, it would be a positive single that when elections do proceed they will be inclusive and fair.’ Nonetheless, this would be unlikely as foreign aid to political parties is problematic. In many instances, U.S. aid has often been used to strengthen political parties and specific candidates more favourable to U.S. interests. In Haiti, the USA employed aid to undermine the period of Aristide.169

Elections were scheduled for November 28, 2010 as the government and the international backers were convinced that elections should take place despite the outbreak of cholera and more than one million people still homeless. Several articles state that the elections are flawed. The Los Angeles Times reported that the Obama administration will support the flawed elections anyway. While President Obama condemned the fraudulent elections in Burma a month before the elections in Haiti, Dan Beeton of the LA Times stated that Obama should equally be determined in condemning it. In Burma, the exclusion of political parties in the elections was cited as a major concern by Obama administration officials, while this did not seemed a problem in Haiti as the USA was financially supporting the elections with at least US$ 13 million.170 At the election date, nineteen presidential candidates were approved by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), while a number of other candidates were blocked from running without real justification. Neither the US, Organization of American States (OAS) nor any other major international actors has condemned the CEP’s decision to exclude candidates.171

People living in the tent communities expressed their opinions before the elections declared to be ‘outraged at being asked to go out and vote when they are without real shelter and have little or no access to basic services.’ Furthermore, other residents stated that priority should be dealing with the cholera epidemic instead of elections and that none of the candidates have presented real proposals on building the country back better.172 Moreover, many Haitians were not able to cast their vote as they lost their identity card during the earthquake and did not

169 Center for Economic and Policy Research, Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch (website), http://www.cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/haitian-protesters-concerned-for-democracy
173 Ibid.
yet receive a new one; consequently, voter turn-out was not high.\textsuperscript{174} On November 28, Reuters reported that twelve of the presidential candidates demanded the vote to be cancelled, claiming widespread fraud which is a setback to the credibility of the UN-supported elections.\textsuperscript{175} The day after the election fifteen of the candidates demand the elections to be annulled, while official election observers remain as the OAS and Caribbean Community Secretariat (CARICOM) remain quiet.\textsuperscript{176} Mark Weisbrot, co-chair of the CEPR, stated after the elections:

The ‘election’ in Haiti shows once again how low Washington’s standards are for democracy in countries that they want to control politically. And there is no doubt who is in charge there. There is a government, to be sure, but since the elected government in 2004 was overthrown, and even more since the earthquake, it is the “international community” that calls the shots – Hillary Clinton’s code for the U.S. State Department.\textsuperscript{177}

Only an estimated 22.3 percent of the Haitian cast their vote in the elections as many people did not have their identity card yet after the natural disaster and due to twelve parties were arbitrarily excluded from participating in the election including the most popular political party. Moreover, in the review of the elections by the CEPR irregularities and errors were found. For example, the CEPR found that almost twelve percent of the tally sheets were either never received by the CEP or were secluded due to irregularities. Furthermore, more than eight percent of the tally sheets were irregular which means that in total tally sheets representing more than 22 percent of the votes were invalid.\textsuperscript{178} These numbers are higher than stated by the OAS.\textsuperscript{179} While almost three-quarters of Haitians did not vote and irregularities and errors were present during the election, the OAS decided to go to a runoff with former first lady Mirlande

\textsuperscript{174} Center for Economic and Policy Research, \textit{Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch} (website), http://www.cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/election-live-blog
\textsuperscript{175} Center for Economic and Policy Research, \textit{Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch} (website), http://www.cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/election-live-blog
\textsuperscript{177} Center for Economic and Policy Research, \textit{Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch} (website), http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/illegitimate-election-is-a-setback-for-haiti
\textsuperscript{179} Center for Economic and Policy Research, \textit{Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch} (website), http://www.cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/will-the-oas-note-all-of-these-election-irregularities
Manigat and the popular singer Michel Martelly. Martelly, however, did not finish as second in the election but as third. According to Weisbrot, the OAS, nevertheless, decided to change the results instead of organizing a new election so that Martelly would go to the runoff instead of Jude Celestin, who was the government candidate. The difference between Martelly and Celestin was 0.3 percent after a recount of the OAS which was too small to make a distinction between the two candidates given the sample size and variance according to Mark Weisbrot. He states the decision appears to be a political and not a professional one. The party of Celestin stated it pulled Celestin back from the elections. Eventually Michel Martelly won the runoff and became president of Haiti. Since President Préval did not run in the elections and his party was unpopular in the period before the elections, he probably knew that the winning coalition would change as another presidential candidate was most likely to win the elections. With this change in presidents and the limited funds channelled to the government of Haiti, it is hard to make statements whether the winning coalition benefitted the most from the humanitarian aid in Haiti.

4.3 Distribution of public goods versus private goods

In their theory Bueno de Mesquita and Smith state that in authoritarian regimes the leader will most likely use private goods to content his winning coalition; in democracies the leader will most likely use public goods. After the earthquake, the Haitian government did only receive one percent of the funding and thus could not dictate where the majority of the funding was spent on neither could it hold back a large part of the funding for its winning coalition. Moreover, as described above, elections took place eleven months after the earthquake causing a change in presidents and its winning coalition. It is hard to discover where the funding that was given to the Haitian government was spent on. Nonetheless, since most of the funding was spent by international organizations, NGOs and donor governments, the element of private and public goods of the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith will be applied to the projects and programs of these organizations. As stated above, a great part of the money was not disbursed in the first year, and a great part of the money that was disbursed was not spent.
In the first year after the natural disaster the organizations mainly focused on disaster relief and emergency assistance; after the first year the agencies started to focus on the rebuilding of Haiti.

As above stated, it is hard to assess whether the government of Haiti has used especially private goods after the earthquake for its winning coalition. It is evident, however, that many public goods are not in place yet. For example, only half of the highways is a hard surfaced road and when it rains the roads turn into dirt roads. Even the hard surfaced roads know holes that are as deep that people drown in them. Moreover, the government of Haiti does not collect garbage and no sewer system is in place.\textsuperscript{182} According to Nigel Fischer, the deputy special representative of MINUSTAH, the agencies are delivering aid in Haiti, but they are doing the tasks that the government of Haiti should be doing. The government of Haiti is not in the position to tell the donors where to spend the money on as they are financially dependent on the donors. As long as the government of Haiti does not have some control over what the NGOs do in the country, hospitals, schools, roads and public institutions will remain broken and neglected\textsuperscript{183} or in private hands.

Thus, many public goods are absence and are not established by the government. It is difficult however to discover whether the government has used their funds for private goods for their own winning coalition and because most of the funding was not channelled to the government, the distribution of private and public goods by international organizations and NGOs will be assessed instead, by means of researching specific projects of these organizations or governments.

The first project is the relocation of refugees from one camp to another. Sean Penn was running a refugee camp for internally displaced people on a golf course. Nearly 60,000 people had migrated to the camp establishing an overcrowded city. One night, a heavy rainstorm turned the golf course to mud. Hereafter, Penn turned to Lt. Gen. Ken Keen, commander of the U.S. military’s Joint Task Force Haiti which was helping in the relief efforts after the earthquake. The Army Corps of Engineers was assigned by Keen to come up with a drainage plan. The consequence of implementing this plan, however, was that some 5,000 refugees had to leave the golf course. After meeting with both U.S. and Haitian officials, it was agreed that the refugees had to be relocated to an area called Corail-Cesselesse, some nine miles north of the

\textsuperscript{182} Maite Vermeulen, Is de Aardbeving het Beste wat Haiti Ooit is Overkomen? De Correspondent (website), https://decorrespondent.nl/2297/Is-de-aardbeving-het-beste-wat-Haiti-ooit-is-overkomen/100082587-470f4ae8
capital, which was seized by the Haitian government. The officials believed the area to be secured and less prone to flooding than the camp on the golf course.\(^{184}\) Keen stated: “It wasn’t the ideal circumstance, but it was safe. Given the choice of living in a riverbed that was surely going to be flooded or being safe in Corail, it was a decision made out of necessity.”\(^{185}\) Penn had to explain the situation to the Haitian living on the golf course. Some of the refugees’ leaders had gathered, but they were suspicious of Penn believing him to be in a conspiracy with the elite of the country who were trying to evict the refugees from their land. They assumed the relocation plan of Penn was a prelude to a larger, mandatory exodus.\(^{186}\) Penn explained to the leaders that the refugees did not have to leave because of the wealthy landowners who wanted their land back, and illustrated the drainage plan and the necessity of the ditches; otherwise, thousands of people might die in a flood or mudslide. Penn claimed that ‘each family that agreed to move to Corail would get US$50 courtesy of the American Red Cross, and a hygiene kit. They would also get shelter, food rations, clean water, free medical care and a school for their kids. And they would be first in line for jobs in Korean-owned garment factories that the Haitian government pledged would soon be built in the area.’\(^{187}\)

Within days, thousands of the refugees had agreed to move to the Corail camp. On April 10, 2010 the first group of refugees left the golf course to Corail, their departure was escorted by UN peacekeepers. When they arrived, however, the area turned out to be as vulnerable to the elements as the golf course. Their new homes, white tents set up on the gravel, were hot and insubstantial; three months after their arrival, hundreds of these tents were blown away in a windstorm. Moreover, in the camp there were no markets, no schools, and the closest hospital miles away. There were no jobs as the Korean factories were not even built, and they would not be built for months or even years. The refugees were abandoned.\(^{188}\)

Oxfam had signed up to build the latrines and provide water to the camp, but their employees were shocked on arrival at the camp. A spokeswoman for the organization stated that she had no idea how the camp was selected and that it was done very last minute as they had to set up the structure within a week.\(^{189}\)


\(^{185}\) Ibid.


\(^{187}\) Ibid.

\(^{188}\) Ibid.

\(^{189}\) Ibid.
No one in the State Department or in the Haitian government seemed to take the responsibility for the relocation or for the rationale behind it after the move. A UN official stated: ‘I’ve yet to see any evidence that proves that anyone was in more danger on the golf course than they would have been anywhere else – though everybody in Haiti thinks they were. What the move proved was that it’s possible to ‘save’ 5,000 people if you say they’re in a dangerous situation and put them in what you call a safe situation. It was the most grotesque act of cynicism that I’ve seen for some time.’

Penn also admits that the choice to set up a new camp for 5,000 people at Corail was a problematic one. He realized, after touring the area, that the newly selected site was vulnerable as well. However, he claimed not having a choice as he had an emergency situation at the golf course and the Corail-area was selected as an emergency-relocation area. Moreover, he states that they were betrayed with the relocation as the international agencies had assured them that ‘Corail was a safe place to live, and that shelters would be built within three months.’ However, the shelters were only finished a year later and the promised hospitals and factory jobs were not present as it turned at that Corail did not have enough capacity to deliver water to the garment manufacturers who were promised to the refugees would settle there. The promise of the jobs at the garment factories had another consequence: one year after the earthquake more than 100,000 people had moved to Corail in the hope of getting a job. People were illegally selling plots of land for about US$ 1,000 a plot.

Nowadays, Corail is one of the ten largest cities in Haiti as well as the largest camp. According to Schindall, the spokeswoman for Oxfam is Coral post-earthquake Haiti in a nutshell, people living in an instable state, without safe shelter and not knowing what the future will bring them.

Another example of how NGOs did their work in Haiti is described by Katrine Klarreich and Linda Polman. The village Léogâne, only nineteen kilometres of the earthquake’s epicentre was destroyed by the disaster and tens of thousands of its inhabitants died. After the earthquake, it quickly became a hub of NGOs. Joseph Philippe, an official of the Municipal Civil Protection Committee of Léogâne stated: ‘In the Republic of NGOs, Léogâne is the City of NGOs.’ The NGOs arriving in Léogâne were mostly driven by donor objectives instead of by the need of

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191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
the victims of the earthquake. As the village of Léogâne was completely flattened, the residents needed new, safe houses on dry land; instead they received ‘square boxes in the middle of a flood plain.’

The village sits at the crossing of three rivers. While a sustainable drainage system and shoring up the river bank was thus needed to prevent flooding from happening again, none of the NGOs was willing to work on it. The agencies argued that these projects were not part of their plan nor where they had raised money for. The only organization which helped to reinforce the river banks was the Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation that set up a project which reduced the risk to flooding with fifteen percent, helpful but not enough. Phillipe explained: ‘the irony is that all the projects that the NGOs did put money into will get washed away in the floods that will come. The NGOs will continue to finance projects in underdeveloped countries in an underdeveloped way.’

According to Klarreich and Polman, housing is the best example of the ‘undeveloped’ approach to the recovery efforts in Léogâne. As stated above, the village was flattened by the earthquake and 80 to 90 percent of the houses were destroyed, leaving tens of thousands residents homeless. Various organizations were involved in the rebuilding of the city - amongst which Habitat of Humanity, CARE, and the Spanish Red Cross – pledged to build 28,560 transitional shelters. These temporary structures are meant to last two to three years to bridge the divergence between emergency housing and permanent housing.

The structures of these transitional shelters are usually haphazard and inferior and thus not meant to house people for years. Moreover, they intended for rural rather than urban environments as they are usually too large for the plots in cities, are not made of recyclable materials, not appropriate for unsafe living conditions present in those countries, more expensive than admitted by the NGOs and built in places where the people did not have land tenure security. The last element is the fault of the government, according to Priscilla Pelphs, one of the chief authors of *Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: A Handbook for Reconstructing After Natural Disasters.* Most of the shelters built in Léogâne are not suitable for housing a family and certainly not meant for a longer period as the example of CHF International will illustrate. This organization, which receives a great part of its budget from USAID, also built shelters in the village. ‘It were tentlike structures made from wooden or steel

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195 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
frames lined with rice-sack siding.\textsuperscript{198} CHF International built 1,700 of these transparent and deteriorated shelters in Léogâne. A spokesman of CHF International said he was ‘genuinely sorry to hear that the plastic has not always lasted as well as it is meant to.’\textsuperscript{199}

The IRCR reported on the delivering of temporary sheltering by the international agencies that it was more based on supply than on demand. The organization decided to provide temporary shelters to the homeless after the earthquake instead of repairing the damaged houses or provide rental support. They based their methods on ‘their previous know-how, supposed ease of implementation, outcome control, liability concerns and/or visibility,’\textsuperscript{200} i.e. visibility to donors.

As stated above, the government has not implemented public goods for the people of Haiti, but these projects were neither of the interest of the international agencies. For example, one year after the earthquake less than five percent of the rubble was removed.\textsuperscript{201} Neither the government nor the NGOs set up projects to improve the infrastructure or built a sewer system.\textsuperscript{202} One of the reasons for not doing such projects is the absence of visibility with these projects. When organization are setting up tents for refugees, the organization can make it clear that these tents are provided by them, which is lacking when you are improving the infrastructure in a country. Nevertheless, the above examples make it clear that, while the organizations were not interested in providing public goods, they were mainly driven by their donor interests. The agencies did not assess what was needed in the region they were working in or what the Haitians believed was needed, but they worked on the basis of visibility to the donors and the world and their previous know-how, which can be done as long as there is no mechanisms in place which controls transparency or accountability. Aid workers have failed to create genuine partnerships with and accountability to local populations.\textsuperscript{203}

Therefore, the total funding for the humanitarian aid greatly exceeded the appeal of the UN, which means that more money was available for providing emergency aid and the reconstruction of Haiti than estimated. With enough funding present, one can easily state that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{198} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{200} Kathie Klarreich and Linda Polman, The NGO Republic of Haiti, \textit{The Nation} (website), Assessed April 9, 2015. http://www.thenation.com/article/170929/ngo-republic-haiti#
\item \textsuperscript{201} Center for Economic and Policy Research, \textit{Haiti Relief and Reconstruction Watch} (website), http://www.cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/relief-and-reconstruction-the-year-in-review-part-1
\item \textsuperscript{202} Maite Vermeulen, Is de Aardbeving het Beste wat Haiti Ooit is Overkomen? \textit{De Correspondent} (website), https://decorrespondent.nl/2297/Is-de-aardbeving-het-beste-wat-Haiti-ooit-is-overkomen/100082587-470f4ae8
\item \textsuperscript{203} Michael Barnett and Peter Walker, “Regime Change for Humanitarian Aid: How to Make Relief More Accountable,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015): p. 131.
\end{itemize}
the humanitarian response was not as effective as it could have been. There was a lack of 
partnerships between Haitians and the NGOs, only a small amount of the funding went to the 
Haitian government and Haitian NGOs, the response to the outbreak of cholera was inadequate 
as the appeal for funding was not met and the refugee camps did not have enough sanitary 
stations and proper hand-washing stations. Moreover, many international organizations do not 
have spent all of their funds raised for Haiti, while many Haitians still live in temporary houses 
and the infrastructure in the country is not fully repaired as well, to name a few examples. Many 
projects that the international community did focus on did not take the interests of the Haitian 
people into account, or some were constructed in a way that they already have to be rebuild or 
will not survive the next natural disaster.

With regard to the elements as the private versus public goods, the self-interests of the 
elites and the political interests of the donor countries, one can state that they were partly 
applicable to the situation of humanitarian response in Haiti. Both the donor governments as 
the international humanitarian organizations showed self-interest in the way they spent their 
funding as projects with great publicity were chosen over the non-visible projects. Moreover, 
when there was a need to spend money on the fighting of the cholera epidemic, the organizations 
kept their money on the bank accounts because it was intended for the long-term reconstruction 
of Haiti. However, it was more difficult to research the element of private versus public goods 
as both were present in the emergency aid and in the reconstruction efforts and problems arose 
in the distributing of both goods. The same goes for the elites versus non-elites as the political 
elites were difficult to establish because of the elections that took place eleven months after the 
earthquake.

5. Conclusion

Since the number of local conflicts and natural disasters are still increasing, the importance of 
humanitarian response is still present. Humanitarian aid, however, has known important 
changes in the last decades. It changed from the foundation of the ICRC and the Geneva 
Conventions which laid down the basis of humanitarianism as the duty to alleviate humanitarian 
suffering unconditionally to an economy on its own. These changes were forced by 
humanitarian disasters such as the genocide in Rwanda. These disasters demanded 
humanitarian agencies to rethink their role and the traditional relief assistance they provided.
Moreover, they needed to reflect on their accountability and responsibility in the humanitarian arena. The international organizations came up with different codes and initiatives on providing humanitarian aid to improve their role in providing humanitarian aid in conflicts and after natural disasters. However, these principles and norms have led to a degree of inflexibility and rigidity in dealing with challenges present in humanitarianism. The main aim of humanitarianism has become threatened because it is not evident anymore that the behaviour of the parties in the conflict can be regulated by applying the humanitarian principles. Crises have become more complex, chronic and chaotic, especially in weak or failed states.

An important change in humanitarianism is the politicisation of humanitarian aid. Governments have increasingly influenced the field of humanitarian action. This politicisation has been facilitated by the growing number of humanitarian organizations in the field, because many organizations have ended up financially and strategically caught by government donors due to the organizations competing for funds. Moreover, the donor governments are actively engaged in the conflict areas based on their political interest. This dependency of organizations on donor governments displays itself in, for example, buying off the necessity to officially act or imposing strategic choices on organizations in return for financial support.

Furthermore, the lack of accountability and legitimacy is another problematic element in humanitarian action. The difference between what recipients of aid need and what relief agencies provide is widening. The agencies have repeatedly pledged to improve their humanitarian work by establishing more equitable partnerships and systems of accountability; however, these promises seem to be empty ones.

Haiti is perceived as a failed state and as stated above, crises have become more complex and chaotic is failed states. Therefore, when Haiti was devastated by an earthquake on January 17, 2010, no one expected a perfect recovery mission. The funding for the recovery efforts was sufficient as a sometimes estimated US$ 12 billion was raised. Moreover, more than enough organizations were present in Haiti after the natural disaster. When reading the reports of the organizations present in Haiti for providing humanitarian aid, a positive image arises about their implemented projects and programs; while studying the reports and articles of scholars and journalists one develops a different image about the successes of the implemented projects. To name a few examples: not enough funding was available to combat the cholera epidemic which spread across Haiti, there was a lack of partnerships between the international organizations and both the Haitian government as the Haitian population, and houses have to be rebuild after only a couple of years due to improper materials used during the reconstruction efforts.
Due to the development of politicisation in humanitarian aid, the theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Smith was chosen to apply to Haiti. Their main statement is: providing and receiving humanitarian aid is a strategic process in which donors purchase policy support from recipients who will use at least some of this aid to ensure that they are securely situated in power. To operationalize this theory of the humanitarian aid provided in Haiti, three specific elements were chosen to focus on. These three elements are: 1) the benefits for the donor governments in providing humanitarian aid; 2) public versus private goods distributed during the projects; and 3) on the welfare of the elites versus the welfare of the people.

The focus of the first element was on the benefits the donors got by providing aid to Haiti. The USA was one of the key donors to Haiti after the earthquake and already present in the country as an important donor before the earthquake. In this role as donor, it already pursued self-interest by making policy concessions with the Haitian government on lowering import tariffs. The consequence was that the USA could dump its surplus of rice, but the official statement was providing Haiti with rice for humanitarian purposes. In return for this policy concessions, the then president of Haiti, Aristide, was returned to power after he was overthrown. After the earthquake, this dumping of food surpluses by donors for ‘humanitarian purposes’ went on.

Another example illustrating the self-interest of the USA in providing aid is that 33 cents of every US dollar spend on ‘humanitarian aid for Haiti’ was channelled back to the USA by reimbursing themselves for their military presence. Furthermore, 42 cents of every US dollar was given to private and public NGOs, but Haitian NGOs only received 0.4 percent of the funding thus the money was given to foreign NGOs. Moreover, only 1.5 percent of the contracts awarded by the US government were given to Haitian companies, while the main part was awarded to US companies. Of those contracts that were awarded to Haitian companies, only the elite of the country benefitted. Examples of the politicisation of the provided humanitarian aid also can be found in the awarding of contract to organizations by the US government. For example, the joint contract between the USAID and the private companies CHF International and Project Concern International which have political ties.

The functioning is the IHRC is another example. This was a unique opportunity for the USA/international community and the Haitians to work together on the reconstruction of the country. The recovery efforts were supposed to be Haitian-led, the commission was co-chaired by a Haitian and an American and there was an equal number of Americans and Haitians in the board. As stated above, the functioning of the IHRC was not as agreed upon. The Haitian government was circumvented, they did not agree on projects prioritized by the Haitians, and
the Americans in the board did not communicate properly with the Haitians in the board. Moreover, when the mandate of the commission expired, only five projects were finished and a great part of the money was not disbursed or spent yet. Agreed was that after the expiration of the IHRC, the power would be transferred to the Haitian government, but this did not happen either. Thus, the establishment of the IHRC was another instrument of the US government to control the humanitarian aid efforts in Haiti as the Haitian government was bypassed by the construction, there was little coordination and communication between the two sided in the board and the meetings went on without the presence of the president of Haiti. Furthermore, the USA promised to allocate billions to humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts; however, the majority of the money was never spent.

While it is hard to state that direct policy concessions were made by the Haitian government in exchange for the aid provided by the US government - because of a lack of evidence - it can be stated that the US government clearly benefitted from providing aid. Even though the donor funding was money of the US government, by reimbursing itself for its services, such as the military and the extraction of wounded Haitians, the US government gave the money directly back to its own citizens. Moreover, a great part of the funding went to American NGOs and contractors and thus paid for the loans of many Americans. The earthquake in Haiti actually provided a lot of employment in the USA. Moreover, the USA portrayed itself as one of the key donors to Haiti, but the question is if they really are one of the key donors because the majority of the promised money was never spent on humanitarian aid for Haiti. In the political process of humanitarian aid, the US government thus made sure its own citizens benefitted from the aid. This coincides with the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith who state that aid donation generally improves the welfare for the citizens in the donor country. Not every USA citizens saw its welfare improve, but with the employment the humanitarian aid provided many Americans might have benefitted from the aid. The Haitian elite benefitted from the aid by receiving the few contracts which were awarded to Haitian as they were the owners of these companies. This makes it very plausible that this element of the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith is applicable to the humanitarian aid supplied by the USA to Haiti.

The second element of the welfare of the elites versus the welfare of the non-elite is more difficult to establish in the case of Haiti, because of the elections that took place in November 2010. With the alteration in presidents, the winning coalition also changed. Elections were scheduled to take place in February 2010, but were postponed due to the earthquake. President Préval did not compete in the elections and thus knew that his winning coalition
would disappear. Moreover, only one percent of the funds was channelled to the Haitian government and thus was the opportunity to channel the funding to his own winning coalition small. Therefore, it is harder to establish that the elite of the country benefitted more from the funding for humanitarian aid than the non-elite did. Although, the contracts that were awarded to Haitian companies did provide employment for the elite as the contracts were assigned to the companies of the elite. Moreover, local famers were driven out of business by the food aid provided by donor governments and organizations who dumped their food surpluses on the Haitian market. Thus, there are examples illustrating the welfare of the elite benefitting from the humanitarian aid and the welfare of the non-elite decreasing from the aid, but it is hard to derive a conclusion on these examples.

The third element of public good versus private goods is also harder to apply on the Haitian government as they could neither provide many public goods or private goods with their limited funds. The government did not provide many public goods as many roads are still not functional and health care and educational are mainly in private hands. Therefore, two projects implemented by international organizations were analysed. Both public goods as private goods were provided by the projects, but both projects knew a lot of difficulties and the main factors driving the organizations turned out to be visibility and self-interest instead of the interests of the affected Haitians.

All in all, the theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Smith cannot be applied on the humanitarian aid provided to Haiti after the earthquake without any adaptions. One of the reasons for this is the limited funding the Haitian government received from the donors. When applying the elements from the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith to Haiti, certain elements became very plausible such as the political processes Bueno de Mesquita and Smith describe that go together with channelling humanitarian aid to a country. Despite the absence of demonstrable policy concessions, it can be stated that the donors itself also benefitted (greatly) from providing humanitarian aid. The elements of public goods versus private goods and the welfare of the elites versus the welfare of the non-elites are somewhat harder to demonstrate in the case of Haiti.

While the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith is only limited applicable to the humanitarian aid provided in Haiti, this does not prove the theory wrong. Haiti is only one example of provided humanitarian aid after a natural disaster or conflict. As stated above, the theory is not fully applicable to Haiti because the government received only a small amount of the funding. Often, a country that is heavily affected by a natural disaster or where a conflict prevails, is – partly – dependent on humanitarian aid. Some countries are dependent on aid even
if they are not hit by a natural disaster or when there is no conflict present. When the government of these countries are supported with humanitarian aid by donor government it is more likely that the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith will apply. When the government of an affected country or a weak of failed state receives direct aid from a donor government there will most probably be aid-for-policy concessions according to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith. While this could not be proven in the case of Haiti after the earthquake, it could be proven with the aid Haiti received from the USA before the natural disaster; Haiti lowered the import tariffs in return for humanitarian food aid. Therefore, it is plausible that the theory could be applied to other instances of providing humanitarian aid by donor governments to other governments.

When the theory of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith can be applied to other cases of humanitarian aid, it has implications for the debate about effectiveness of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid is based on the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence; however, as proved in Haiti with the humanitarian aid before the earthquake and likely to be the case in more countries, humanitarian aid is used by donor governments to secure its own interests. Even though the humanitarian principles were reaffirmed in the Good Humanitarian Donorship, it seems that, with the politicisation of aid, the interests of donor states are becoming more important in providing humanitarian aid. Thus, the ethics of humanitarian aid change as the interests of the donor government become more important, if not as important as, the interests of the receiving government. This is also applicable to the NGOs as they attach great importance to their own interests. They collected more funding than they could spent in Haiti and did not put the interests of the Haitians first. Therefore, the principles and ethics of humanitarian aid are changing.
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