‘In the eye of the beholder: A Constructivist and abolitionist analysis of variation in the practices and policies of Nuclear Deterrence’

MA THESIS.

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Abstract

Since the early Cold War a number of states have sought and successfully obtained nuclear weapons. In doing this states have justified their actions through the prism of deterrence. This thesis argues that this is a falsehood and that there are much broader issues at play here. Furthermore this thesis argues that due to the psychological nature of deterrence it is an inherently vulnerable to human agency. In so being the practice of deterrence is inherently flawed. Using a constructive narrative this thesis lays out the dangers posed by deterrence and it argues that abolition is a more useful policy option for states pursuing security needs.

Key Words:
Abolition, Anarchy, Cold War Nuclear, Constructivism, Critical Theory, Deterrence, Europe, France, Proliferation, Security, UK, US, USSR,
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Dedications:

The past year spent away from home has been one of joy and happiness, however this has been tempered by the passing of a number of family and friends of whom I wish to dedicate this work in memory of. The last of these was my grandmother Agnes Farrell without whom I would not be here today, sadly in the past year she outlived two of her children, Barney and Fran Farrell, and her grandson John Meade, all sadly missed.

I wish to further dedicate this work to the memory of a friend and my academic mentor Mr John Bradley late of the Dept of History NUIM, all throughout my undergraduate years John was a continuing source of support and friendship and beyond he was a source of great humour, I am privileged to have had the opportunity to learn from such a sage and noble human being, humanity is lesser with his passing.
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Myth has it that the classical figures of Sisyphus and Atlas donated the seed of their loins to humanity in order to produce a strain of humanity immune to the drudgery, banality and sheer thanklessness of all tasks put to them, the only evidence to support this, is found in the person of Dr. Anjo Harryvan, who in undertaking this supervision was handed a task of Canutian proportions. I wish to thank him for his help and for his wonderful lectures and advice. I also would like to note that failure to adhere to his guidance and any failings in this work are mine and mine alone.

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Dermot Nolan,

August 2015.
Declaration of Candidate:

I, hereby declare that this thesis, “In the eye of the beholder: A Constructivist abolitionist analysis of variation in the practices and policies of Nuclear Deterrence.” is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name of Candidate: Dermot Nolan.

Signature of Candidate: Dermot Nolan.

Date: 15 August 2015.
**Introduction:**

Sir Humphrey: With Trident you could obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe.

Hacker: I don’t want to obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe!

Sir Humphrey: It’s a deterrent.

Hacker: It’s a bluff.

Sir Humphrey: Yes, but they don’t know that you probably wouldn’t.

Hacker: They probably do.

Sir Humphrey: Yes, they probably do know that you probably wouldn’t. But they can’t certainly know.

Hacker: They probably certainly know that I probably wouldn’t.

Sir Humphrey: Yes, but even though they probably certainly know that you probably wouldn’t, they don’t certainly know that, although you probably wouldn’t, there is no probability that you certainly would!\(^1\)

The quote above taken from *Yes Prime Minister* the classic British 1980’s political satire may seem an unusual means of opening a master thesis, but it is indicative of the paradoxical logic within the theories of nuclear deterrence.\(^2\) This fictionalised discussion is representative in microcosm of the key themes of this work. These include nuclear danger, rhetoric and realities of deterrence, perception of nuclear states and the *longue durée* of this issue. Implicitly it underlines the constant need to justify what the most absurd means of states conducting international relations, by threat of mass murder.\(^3\)

Nuclear Deterrence has forced distrust, discord and alliance, amongst states, this continues today. As a policy option it is justified by the suggestion that it has brought peace and stability to the international system.\(^4\) Conventional wisdom suggests that maintaining

\(^1\) Anthony Jay, and Jonathon Lynn, writ., Lotterby, Sydney dir. 'The Grand Design' *Yes Prime Minster* (9

\(^3\) This is particularly pertinent to the nuclear deterrent of smaller states which lack the physical means to build in a level of flexibility to do allow for the imparting of a scale of harm across the spectrum of violence from tactical to strategic, this is seen by some as leading to essentially a race to the top of the escalation ladder, For a discussion of this see; Malcolm, Hoag, 'Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No.2 (January 1963) pp.286-298. See Also Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy, Thinking War From Antiquity to the Present*, (Cambridge 2010) pp.381-2, Heuser gives a succinct analysis of why nuclear strategy that employs the absolute destruction of an enemy in revenge can be seen as warfare taken to absurd extremes.

stockpiles of Nuclear Weapons in Western Europe during the Cold War prevented a Soviet takeover of the continent. That this did not happen, furnished policy makers and strategists with a belief that the international community had become ‘good at deterrence’ however, there is little evidence to support the idea that the Soviets had actually wanted to take over Western Europe. These are but a few of the numerous myths regarding Nuclear Deterrence that have taken hold since the end of the Cold War. However, both give lie to the notion that deterrence is a simple matter of threatening to inflict massive damage on an opponent in the event war. This has lead to a reduction of international politics, especially between the great powers, to the politics of threat in which nuclear annihilation was the trump card in interstate relations.

Although this is an oversimplification of the issue, it serves to underline the notion that rather than seeking cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence has allowed states to hold the international system hostage at times of crisis and whilst this is something that may be no longer obvious, it is a policy option that is still wielded today by states in periods of crisis, this can be seen in the North Korean use of their nuclear weapons programme as a means to extort cooperation from the rest of the world. More subtly, in Vladimir Putin’s recent reminder to the world, that the Russian Federation is still a nuclear power.


5 This is a view put forward by many authors without much consideration for the veracity of the claim. For example it has been acknowledged by none other than Winston Churchill that by allowing the basing of US Air Force nuclear capable B-29’s in the UK during the early 1950’s served to make the UK the only US counterforce target that the Russians could reach with the aircraft available to it at the time. In Churchill’s words the UK had become ‘the only bull’s eye on the target’. See Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, Britain the US and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance 1952-1959, (Groningen 1993), p.9. It is interesting to see that amongst the copious sources consulted for this work only a small few were critical of this view, for example see Ward Wilson, ‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’, Non Proliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, (November 2008), p.421. See also Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein in Ken Boot et al, Security and Statecraft, (Cambridge 1998), p.71.


8 Adam Withnail, ‘Vladimir Putin to Add 40 Ballistic Missiles to Russian Arsenal in 2015’ The Independent, (16 June 2015). Taken from The Independent newspaper website:
Rather than taking a parsimonious reductionist view of Nuclear Deterrence as taken by realist thinkers, this thesis will lay out that in its theory and policy it is too wide and varied, and too dangerous to remain untested. This is not a recent observation, Robert Jervis, examined this in the mid 1970’s, acknowledging the shortcomings of deterrence theory as something that was not measurable accurately. In order to understand this, Nuclear Deterrence should be considered a dismal science akin to economics in the sense that it cannot ever be fully or rigorously tested in a situation that could produce empirically viable results which could confirm or denounce its utility as a policy option. As Raymond Aron once noted ‘pure deterrence was a fragment of truth stretched to absurdity’ i.e. whilst policy analysts can war-game and tinker with theoretical aspects of Nuclear Deterrence, there is no guarantee that this will bear fruit in crisis. This leads to a scenario where policy options are based upon speculation and guesswork. Due to its speculative nature there is in Nuclear Deterrence theory a constant requirement to ensure that all these theories are seen to be credible, this quest for credibility has been at the core of nuclear policy-making since the early 1950’s and as it stands there seems to be no unanimous answer to this question of what credibility looks like in practice. Because of this constant quest it can be stated that deterrence in the nuclear field is an unknown quantity. Thus this thesis will demonstrate through the search for credibility borne out of an inability to properly test the concept, it


9 Keith B. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Kentucky 1996) pp.50-64. Payne here gives instances of the inability to actually test Nuclear Deterrence, he notes that during the 1980’s the deployment of the new MX missile system was driven by ‘little more than gut feeling’ or that Mutually Assured Destruction and Minimum Deterrence, rather than being derived through hard scientific study seemed to be driven ‘intuitively’. The failure of empirical testing is also supported by Nina Tannenwald and Richard Price, in Katzenstein et al, The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identities and World Politics (New York 1996) pp.115-117. And furthermore Michael Quinlan a senior UK defence secretary acknowledged that the strength of the first UK deterrent the RAF ‘V Force’ was arrived at by little more than guesswork and ‘gut feeling’ as to what was appropriate for the task of deterring the Soviets. Quinlan in Solokoski, Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction and its Origins and Practice,(Washington 2004), p.264.


has constantly evolved and as such has meant vastly different things to different people and continues to do so today.

In explaining this; this work will follow a critical and constructivist approach which will provide a means to analyse the identity and interest of nuclear actors. This work will follow the basic preposition that as an untested and moreover a practically un-testable concept it imbues international relations with risks that are not commensurate with possible gains.
Importance and Relevance of this Work:

‘Ignorance Is Bliss’\textsuperscript{14}

Writing a thesis on the role of nuclear deterrence in international relations twenty-five years after the fall of the Soviet Union may strike some as something of an anachronism. Yet, as noted in numerous sources the threat posed by nuclear weapons has not disappeared it has, in the words of Jonathon Schell merely gone underground.\textsuperscript{15} It has become a case of out of sight and out of mind, hence the opening quote of this section.

It is worth considering that whilst many in the West consider the contemporary security implications of the growth of Islamic Radicalisation or the migration crisis currently ongoing in the Mediterranean to be of a greater threat; and which might focus the mind more immediately. These can be argued as cases of availability heuristic which is a cognitive bias fed by the ease of recall of a particular event.\textsuperscript{16} To put another way the judgement of probability of an event or threat is shaped by exposure to information pertaining to the threat. Therefore, constant reports regarding Radical Islam have raised the awareness and with it a fear that this may impact on individual lives in a way that is not commensurate with the facts. This is fed by populist media and political elites manipulating topical international issues for domestic gain, for example UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s recently asserted that militant Islam as the struggle of the present generation.\textsuperscript{17} Whilst there is no attempt to diminish the threat by Islamic radicalisation, it is patently incorrect to assert that the threat posed by Islam is greater than that posed by nuclear annihilation. And it is this capacity for annihilation that nuclear weapons possess, which makes nuclear weapons a much more important issue for study.

\textsuperscript{14} This is the subtitle of \textit{Foreign Policy}'s March-April 2015 edition, which was almost exclusively focussed on the threat posed by nuclear weapons.


\textsuperscript{16} Daniel Kahneman, \textit{Thinking Fast and Slow} (New York 2011) pp.131-149.

\textsuperscript{17} Frances Perraduan, ‘David Cameron, Extremist Ideology is the Struggle of our Generation’, \textit{The Guardian}, (20 July 2015).
Using critiques of securitization espoused by Ken Booth, a short analysis of the comparison of a topical issue of today: Islamic Radicalisation and the so called Islamic State and one that has been mostly forgotten or ignored: Nuclear Deterrence is enlightening when teasing out the nature of a threat. The key differences between the two are of scale and reach and impact, firstly, as can be seen the Islamic State within its own communities struggles to establish dominance. This can be seen in the coalition of predominantly Muslim countries actively engaged in conflict with the so called Islamic State, and without its communities the scale of Radical Islam is quite limited. Furthermore, whilst Islamic State has been successful in obtaining recruits in far flung parts of the world such as Australia it is limited by resistance from within and without its own community. Finally where it has been able to reach out and operate beyond its hinterland, the impact of activities when measured for impact are actually more limited than newspaper headlines would suggest. In contrast, nuclear weapons are capable of reaching all points on the globe in a time that is counted in minutes and in the event of such a scenario the impact will be devastating and enduring.

The above is an example of an elective danger, where the choice is that between securitizing a genuine threat to survival (nuclear weapons) or a threat to local order (Islamic radicalism). Ken Booth suggests that the fact that this choice exists is in itself a privilege because the referent object here (the British state) has the availability to choose how it deals with these issues. Thus, by its very possibility to choose the British state is secure, whereas Syria, or Iraq for example have no such choices in this respect, and hence are insecure. To take a horizontal view of this notion; that absence of choice equates insecurity then the vast majority of states of the world are insecure in the nuclear sense because through self-exclusion from the ‘nuclear nine’, they have been denied input into the operation of these states nuclear arsenals. This provides another set of problems; namely whether states should develop additional nuclear arsenals and increase proliferation, therefore ameliorating their security issues. This idea is without pedigree, Kenneth Waltz suggested that the spread of nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect could provide

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impetus towards regional stability in places such as the Middle East and North Africa.\textsuperscript{20} However, unless, all states were to become involved in the nuclear field, the perpetuation insecurity from the absence of choice will continue.

Normatively speaking due to the social cost, environmental damage, increased potential for misuse a Waltzian horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms is clearly something that should be remain as abhorrent. Thus the issue security becomes one of securitization, in which the less serious threat is given a credence that is not commensurate to the sum of its parts. Booth has taken umbrage with the concept of securitization as it allows things to occur through a skewing of the divisions between security and survival. This stems from the idea that the state as social constitution is possible to ‘secure’ whilst at the same time keeping ones populace and the state (in the nuclear sense described above) insecure. As Booth notes, security is a life determining concept, thus as a state is not a \textit{de facto} living thing and that security it is determined by the individual. Therefore in the dyad above, Radical Islam is capable offering life (albeit a politically unpalatable on to many) and thus security whereas nuclear weapons are not.\textsuperscript{21}

This work does not suggest that nuclear weapons have been completely forgotten; however they have been overlooked and often removed from political discourse.\textsuperscript{22} The World Economic Forum shows in its annual report on threats to the globe it ranked Weapons of Mass Destruction as the third most impactful risk.\textsuperscript{23} This category includes nuclear weapons, but in its report these have been contextualised as terrorist or rogue state actions, rather than all out nuclear exchange of the type envisioned during the Cold War. However it has also been assessed as the second least likely risk. However, if a nuclear event were to occur on any scale from terrorist to full interstate exchange the result will certainly be immense carnage.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{21} Kenneth Booth, \textit{A Theory of World Security} (Cambridge 2007) pp.102-105,


\textsuperscript{24} For a vivid if somewhat poetic vision of what whould happen in the event of a thermonuclear explosion over a city such as New York, see Jonathan Schell, \textit{The Fate of the Earth} (Stanford 2000) especially pp.45-55. For a
In moving away from the problems posed by what is essentially a cognitive bias, nuclear weapons have two unique characteristics that make them worthy of investigation. Firstly, nuclear weapons present an existential threat to humanity i.e. they have the capacity to eliminate all of humanity regardless of one’s location, colour, or political persuasion. Secondly, and as far as this work is concerned more importantly, unlike other existential threats such as natural disasters or disease or the oft pondered asteroid strike, nuclear weapons are well within humanities ability to control. Consequently humanity has, barring some tragedy on an intense magnitude concrete the ability to do something to protect itself from this menace.

Thesis and Methodology.

‘This is my truth, now tell me yours’.
-Aneurin Bevan.25

‘How can I know that an order I receive to launch my missiles came from a sane president?’
-Maj. Harold Hering USAF.26

As inferred above, this work has at its heart a thesis that using Critical and Constructivist reasoning it should be possible to argue that Nuclear Deterrence is to borrow Alexander Wendts famous phrase ‘what states make of it’.27 Simply put, Nuclear Deterrence viewed critically can be seen as a policy whose application is variable, suggesting it is lacking scientific rigour, which has been adapted to local circumstance for purposes normally beyond strict deterrence. Because of this variation it is arguable that the concept is flawed. Thus the key research question of this work is- How does constructivism help explain Nuclear Deterrence and its role in international relations.


26 Quoted in Ron Rosenbaum, How the End Begins, the Road to Nuclear World War III (London 2011) p.31.

27 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States make of it. International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2. (Spring, 1992),
It follows that if Nuclear Deterrence is flawed, then questions arise surrounding what is it that practitioners gain from this policy? This is the first sub-question that this work seeks to answer. Ostensibly, the key argument here should be state security, however as will be seen below this is not always the case. This leads to the second of the sub questions- in what way does nuclear deterrence affect the security of states and people? In shedding light on potential answers for these questions this work will avoid dealing with these issues in a linear fashion, following the example set by Nicholas Onuf, it is felt that they are better answered in an emergent ‘in medias res’ fashion, which will feed naturally into the main argument of this thesis.28

The use of the word ‘argue’ as used above was chosen consciously over the word ‘prove’ as it is impossible to test in a real world scenario whether Nuclear Deterrence works, thus it cannot be proven. For example Stephen Van Evera, made the assertion in 1984, that any move from the deterrence concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), would lead to a 1914 type situation, where the likelihood of war amongst the powers was almost certain.29 This view is somewhat myopic and selective. It ignores the fact that for the 100 years preceding 1914 interstate wars in Europe were rare and limited. It is probably worth reminding that this period of stability was not underlined by a Nuclear Deterrent. It has also been challenged by the fact that since the end of the Cold War, MAD has fallen from favour, and still a quarter of a century later there has been no major interstate conflict anywhere in the world.

Furthermore arguing that Constructivism can be used to ‘prove’ something in the rigorous concrete sense runs counter-intuitive to the logic of its ideational fluidity and what Edward Kolodziej calls the ‘limitless malleability’ found at the heart of the theory.30 Therefore this

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28 *In Medias Res is the Latin term for ‘in the middle of things’ which is a literary device for introducing a story that is already in train. It’s use here is to avoid a chronological debate and to tease out issues in a more natural manner. Nicholas Onuf, *Making Sense Making Worlds, Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* (New York 2013) p. 4.


thesis will be argued through traditional constructivist concepts based on ideas rather than empirics. This falls in line with the idea that a constructivist narrative should not become a regurgitation of statistical data.\textsuperscript{31} A simple argument for this is held in the words of the economist Aaron Levenstein that ‘statistics are like a bikini, what they reveal is suggestive, what they conceal is vital.’\textsuperscript{32}

Whilst this may be seen as introducing ambiguity to the work it should not be seen as such, rather it should be seen as a nod to the importance of interpretation. This view is partly driven by what is best seen as a bias toward an English School, normative approach to International Relations theory (IR).\textsuperscript{33} This harks back to the notion that IR is more art than science. This is also sits better with the concepts at hand than a positivist hard science approach as would typically be seen in approaches from US or non-English speaking theorists.\textsuperscript{34} Considering that this work revolves around meaning and identity, which are the sources of the variation mentioned above it does not suggest that there no quantifiables here.\textsuperscript{35}


\textsuperscript{32} Interestingly finding the actual origins of this quote have been fruitless, numerous books and websites attribute this to Levenstein, yet none, provide an actual source.

\textsuperscript{33} For the purpose of this work the practice of interstate relations will be noted as international relations. The academic theorising thereupon will use the abbreviated as ‘IR’.

\textsuperscript{34} See, Buzan Barry and Little Richard ‘Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About it’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, (2001) pp. 19-39. Both Authors lay out various reasons that international relations have been over taken by too many very specified sectoral interests and what purpose might be served by seeking out a more normative approach to the field. In the same vein as John Maynard Keynes when he said that those who dismiss theory become merely a ventriloquists dummy for some long dead scribbler, I fell that this is a noble suggestion and thus this thesis will work to a normative conclusion. For additional discussion on why taking normative approach to IR see Benjamin J Cohen, The transatlantic divide: Why are American and British IPE so different? Review of International Political Economy, Vol.14 No.2 (2007) p.212. Cohen gives an interesting insight into the roles of normative and positivist theorising in IPE and IR. And why there is a need for not only positivist theorising.

\textsuperscript{35} Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge 2003) pp.117-171. Morgan offers a detailed insight into the failings of attempting to understand Nuclear Deterrence in a rational scientific sense. He also makes the argument that whilst critiques of the rationalist theoretical approach to Nuclear Deterrence tend to offer no alternative theory, see pp.167-8. The question arises here, why should they? If the effectiveness of deterrence cannot be measured accurately what does humanity gain from such action? This can only be seen as the justification for a policy that if fails could see the end of humanity. Clearly a more attractive alternative to
In the nuclear realm, there are many; such as nuclear stockpiles, delivery systems: missiles, aircraft, submarines etc, but the function of these turn on the question of identity. For example whether they be UK or North Korean to use Wendt’s example matters as much if not more than how many they are, thus the meaning of such are not quantifiable in a rigorous sense has meaning in the political sense. Evidence in support of the value of meaning and variation over time can be seen in Wendts example above, which he made in his 1999 work, *Social Theory of World Politics*, here he posited that five North Korean missiles were of greater threat to the US than five-hundred possessed by the UK, this was not the first time that he contextualised meaning through the lens of nuclear weapons. In his seminal essay 1992 ‘*Anarchy is what States Make of it*, he used the exact same analogy, only this time the missiles were Soviet. Whilst this can be brushed aside as meaningless, it is unlikely that an international scholar of such standing would make a casual use of states to indicate threat. Another possible inference that could be used to explain the transition from Soviet to North Koreans, can be seen that through the 1990’s the Russian Federation was engaging with the US in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative. This programme saw the US provide funds to aid the reduction of former Soviet stockpiles, and in doing so, brought US and Russian politicians and nuclear weapons experts closer than at any time during the Cold War, Korea in contrast remained alone and aloof.

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Complimenting this view is the work of Langdon Winner whose article ‘Do Artefacts Have Politics?’ suggested that society should look past reducing objects to their founding social forces and be more attentive to their characteristics as these give them their meaning. He suggests that failing to do this would suggest that objects in and of themselves are meaningless.\(^{39}\) However following this logically, mere possession of objects would bestow the owner no value, however this is obviously not the case, objects and technologies can bestow a meaning inadvertently, such as the use of railroads and telegraph in the bringing of technological and social revolutions beyond their original purpose, alternatively they can be inherently political, of which nuclear weapons are the most extreme example, because they possess the capacity for our elimination, as Winner notes inherently political technologies remain as such for their entire existence.\(^{40}\) Therefore, as long as they remain, they will be driven primarily by political considerations not strategic.

In supporting the practice of placing primacy on meaning over empirics this work will use counterfactuals to give expression to some of the key ideas here. As Edward Kolodziej notes the use of counterfactuals allow for the expression of the creative and reflective capacities of human agents, which shaped by particular social and cultural paradigms providing said agent with a gamut of potential viewpoints, it is this which gives the constructivist approach its credence additionally it helps explain the variation.\(^{41}\)

To give this assertion a less abstract and more contemporary grounding, it is possible to use the reference to Putin made earlier. The context of this was a Russian reaction to heightened tensions from sanctions and pressure from the West regarding perceived Russian intransigence on its western borders. This was an announcement from Putin that Russia was to put another 40 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM’s) into service. Upon casual glance this seems an incredible increase, but a little digging is enlightening, according to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR) and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) the current Russian arsenal that is strategically deployed i.e. ready to launch as opposed to being in storage, or waiting dismantling is in the region of 890-1050


\(^{40}\) Ibid, p.132.

The addition of new ICBM’s would add approximately 120 warheads to this. Whilst this represents an addition in the region of 10% to the Russian ICBM arsenal, it does not count the additional SLBMs or air delivered weapons such as free fall bombs or Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM’s) currently in service. The ICBM arsenal alone has a ‘throw weight’ i.e. the amount of explosive force it can throw, in the region of 603 megaton’s, the additional ICBMs will increase this by approximately 16 megatons, which amounts to an additional 2.65% increase in destructive force. When contextualised thus, it becomes apparent that this is in effect a small increase. What has been omitted in the analysis of Putin’s announcement is that the Russian military whilst it has been undergoing a modernisation. This will see the withdrawal of all Soviet era systems from the nuclear arsenal, which will result in the removal of 175 missiles and 739 warheads. Obviously this will not take place overnight, but it remains that even if replaced on a 1 to 1 basis, there is no likelihood of these weapons having a qualitative or quantifiably impact on the concept of Nuclear Deterrence.

Explaining the latter asks the reader what to make of these figures, this presents an interesting thought exercise, which makes thinking upon Constructivist and Critical lines regarding Nuclear Deterrence a sensible if not obvious option. Using the example above for context, if it is taken that the Russian arsenal was only to grow, the incremental nature of this growth does not equate to a serious quantitative improvement. Additionally, the qualitative improvement gained from these missiles is un-measurable, because in order to measure this, they would need to be actually used in a real scenario i.e. in conflict. In this situation they would be deemed worthless because their deterrent function would have

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43 Figures based on upper end of the capabilities of the Rs 24 Yars missile which is the most modern Russian missile capable of carrying 400kt payload shared amongst 4 warheads. See Kristensen and Norris (2015) p.86.


failed. Finally the true value of these missiles is not so much in their quantifiability, but rather their meaning, this was expressed in the way that their introduction was framed. Instead of being empirically accurate, Putin, merely mentioned that there would be an introduction of 40 new missiles within the year, and nothing about the removal of the Soviet systems. This was taken up with aplomb by western media framing it as further evidence of Russian antagonism. However what this episode highlights is the fact that it is not the empirics of nuclear weapons but rather the ideational hold that they have on imagination and politics that matters most.

In attempting to address the issues raised above this work will lay out the theoretical foundations of both constructivism and deterrence and it will apply three key short case studies dealing with the constructivist view of US, French and The United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrence policies during the first two decades of the Cold War i.e. 1945-1965. This timeframe is useful as it ensures that the cast of characters is not too diverse, this will highlight the variation amongst a small group of states and statesmen at a time when Nuclear Deterrence was in its infancy.

The US perspective is important because the US in the field of Nuclear Deterrence has a number of features that make it unique. Firstly unlike all the other nuclear powers it is the only one to have obtained nuclear weapons during wartime, where overt justification was deemed obvious and unnecessary and due to wartime restrictions regarding secrecy the first time they were made known was through use, and this use seemed only natural. Hence it is also the only power to have used them in anger. And finally as the only Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) to exist prior to the evolution of Nuclear Deterrence as a policy option it has undergone an interesting transition from overwhelming willingness for use to a stated position of non-use the words of US President Harry S. Truman are indicative of this-

‘Let there be no mistake about it, I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never held any doubt that it should be used’


Later Truman was to have a change of mind stating that the atomic bomb was-

‘not a military weapon, it is used to kill unarmed women and children and unarmed
people, it is not for military uses, we’ve got to treat it differently to cannons and rifles and
ordinary things like that’.  

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Considering that nuclear weapons were considered early on as the natural extension of
military forces there continues to exist controversy regarding the motives behind the
dropping of the bombs on Japan these have provided the source of continued historical
speculation for the past 70 years, with two schools of thought emerging. The first,
suggesting that the bomb was dropped to coerce the Japanese into surrendering, the
second that it was to serve as a warning to the Soviet Union in relation to any possible
future misdeeds.49 If the latter is so then it would qualify as the first act of deterrence.
However the very fact that debate and doubt exists over what was the decisive driving
factor, in what is one of the seminal moments in both military and political history only
serves to underline the thesis of this work.

Theoretically the purpose for taking the US as a viewpoint is to allow this work to utilise
Wendt’s concept of the ‘three logics of anarchy’.50 This approach whilst somewhat state-
centric will allow the reader to see clearly the role played by identity and interest, in three
different dyads concerning the same topic. This will clearly indicate the variation thesis
outlined above. Furthermore with the shifts of time from the Cold War, to the so-called
Second Nuclear age it will become obvious that there is internal variation within the actors
themselves. This further undermines the rigidity of the concept of deterrence and the state-
centric view of the three logics of anarchy will highlight the situation in three different but
specific contexts.

To ensure that the work obtains contemporary relevance a final section will serve as a
survey of the post Cold War nuclear environment; indicating the changes in what has

48 Harry S. Truman q.i in David S Donough, Nuclear Superiority: The New Triad and the Evolution of Nuclear

49 For a detailed discussion on the debate around the reasons why the bomb was dropped see Beatrice Heuser,
The Bomb; Nuclear Weapons in their Historic, Strategic and Ethical Context (New York 2000) pp.1-34 See also.
Richard Crockett, The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1945-1991,

become known as ‘the Second Nuclear Age’. The focus herein will be Europe; the primary reason for this will be that in the key issues have been, proliferation in the Middle East and Asia and the potential for future terrorism. These have been covered in immaculate detail by numerous scholars, whilst Europe for so long the *primus inter pares* of geo-strategic thinking has taken a backseat. However, considering the variation thesis offered herein, Europe continues to offer unique insights into the constructivist argument at the heart of this work. This is especially true when considering the arguments for keeping weapons in Europe straddle both national and supranational divides as well as those of the NWS and non-NWS camps.

Finally as a nod to the fallacy of relying on material capabilities as the sole indicator of state power there has been provided in the appendix a series of maps showing combat radius of the European deterrents as they existed in the 1950’s -60’s and today.

**Literature Review:**

In teasing out the state of play regarding the validity of Nuclear Deterrence this work has drawn of a wide array of sources. This has been necessitated by the fact that this work attempts to deal with a number of competing ideas and concepts. It also draws on two distinct sets of theory: Critical and Deterrence, and one mode of social inquiry: Constructivism. Due to the variety of sources and potential sites of sources this literature review will in essence skim over the main works that helped get this work to its conclusion. A point worth noting is that whilst the array of sources is quite varied, the traditional division between primary and secondary sources has largely been eschewed in favour of a more interpretive division, for example; Lawrence Freedman’s *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* if read as a history fits into the secondary source category, whereas if it is read as the work of a deterrence theorist, which is entirely appropriate given Freedman’s work with the UK government, it fits the mould of a primary source, and throughout this work this particular example is used as both. Thus the reader is advised to decide for themselves how they feel the sources are utilised.
In delving into the Critical Security School this work has drawn heavily on the work of Kenneth Booth, most notably his works *A Theory of World Politics* and *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* have been instrumental in the writing of this book, this has been built upon with the work of Bill McSweeney whose work *Security, Identity and Interest* has been incredibly useful when coming to the work of thinking critically upon the various approaches to securitization. In addition to this the work of Robert Cox in his *State, Social Forces and World Order* has rounded out the key works of this school. However, the key problem with these works is that they are overly abstract thus is necessary to add works with a bit more grounding.

Moving to Constructivism, the most important sources have been Nicholas Onufs, *Making Sense, Making Worlds, Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* and the earlier work *World of Our Making, Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, these have helped lay the ground work for a conception of Constructivism that was built upon through the use of Alexander Wendts *Social Theory of World Politics*, from which this work derives one of its key analytical tools. Whilst these have given the work its overall ideational conception Barry Buzan and Lene Hansens work, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* and Peter J Katzenstein’s *Cuture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics* provides the proverbial bridge between the study of Constructivism and Nuclear Deterrence. This has been supported by Nina Tannenwalds, *The Nuclear Taboo* and Jacques Hymans excellent work *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy* these provided an even deeper level of explanation to this work and in some ways were the spark that initiated this particular research topic. However the key failing within these works was the fact that neither of them deal with deterrence theory in its own right, Tannenwalds dealings with why states do not use their weapons is quite insightful, but does not explain why they are continually justified in existence. Hymans, on the other hand explains why there are only a handful of NWS’s but does not go into detail on the sustaining rationale behind nuclear weapons- deterrence theory.

In terms of deterrence this was most difficult topic to cover as the literature straddles numerous countries and a number of decades of in-depth intellectual rigour. The most
important scholars here have been Lawrence Freedman who’s revised work *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* has been of great value as a starting point for investigation. This was further built on by Richard Rhodes nuclear tetralogy which supplied breadth and depth to the field of nuclear weapons, their development and the politics that guided them. In terms of building on these foundations the work of the RAND corporation has been of great value in obtaining sources from the so-called golden age of strategy, to the present with the availability of the classic works of Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling from the past to Austin Longs; *Deterrence, From Cold War to Long War* these have all been instrumental in deciphering the work of international Nuclear Deterrence. In addition to these the archives of *Foreign Policy*, and *Foreign Affairs* the International Institute of Strategic Studies journal, *Survival*, and its *Adelphi Papers* series in addition to the European Union Institute for Strategic Studies archives and *Challiot Papers* series have all been indispensible in bringing to light scholars both public and academic on both sides of the nuclear divide which have been of great use in the development of this paper. In addition to this sources from various bodies such as the UK Ministry for Defence and NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly and its various committees have provided a level of unadulterated source material.

A number of other authors who’s work played secondary parts in the formation of this thesis include Colin S Gray, Keith Payne, Stephen J Cimbala and Sverre Logaard are worthy of direct mention because of the role they have played in contextualising the nuclear age in the post Cold War world. Finally the work of Gareth Evans et al, in *Nuclear Weapons State of Play 2015* and the Federation of Atomic Scientists for its archive must be acknowledged as representing the most up to date analysis that this work has been able to draw on.
The quote above extracts lyrics from 'Old Man Atom' a Vern Partlow song written in 1945 and made famous by Pete Seeger in 1949. The lyrics which predate the concept of Nuclear Deterrence highlight the saliency of the idea that neither state-centricity nor technological rationalism can adequately deal with the threat from nuclear weapons. Furthermore, these lyrics suggest that the problem with nuclear weapons is not one that can be dealt by individual nations, rather that is for the entire world to deal with. The internationalising of politics and social issues is something that has long pedigree within IR, as E.H Carr noting as far back as 1939 that social ends could not be limited by national frontiers and that politician’s in the modern world would need to take into account ramifications of their politics in a transnational sense. Whilst Carr, who has since become synonymous with the Realist school of thought within IR, suggested that this view of the transnational social world was Utopian. It has since become a core tenet of the Critical and Constructivist views.

Furthermore, with the advent of nuclear weapons and the ability to reach the entire world, it has become necessary to view the world in such globally integrated terms, as Partlow succinctly noted- ‘The atom’s international, despite of hysteria, flourishes in Utah and also Siberia’. In other words nobody can obtain a monopoly of the sources of atomic power. With the global nature and the complexity of the problems inherent here, it becomes apparent that the dominant theoretical approaches to IR are inadequate to the task set out

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54 Vern Partlow, q.i. Friedman, p.101.
in this work. Thus this has led to the selection of more ideationally fluid theorising as espoused by the Critical Theory and Constructivist camps.

Because this work seeks to interrogate the concept of Nuclear Deterrence and the role which it plays in international relations, it finds itself in the domain of Grand Strategy. This is the region where the realms of politics and military strategy overlap. This overlap has been considered important by such notables as Henry Kissinger who stated that the separation both would lead to two competing fields overtly focused on sectoral issues, i.e. the military would become focused only on military force and politics to short term politicising of issues rather than long term goals to the benefit of all. It is therefore essential to have a single unifying theory that will firmly address all of the issues arising from each of these arenas, or risk being entrapped in the modern equivalent of what Ken Booth called the ‘Cold War Straitjacket’. Booth noted that during the Cold War, theorising the world led to very fixed views of the East and West, and suggests that the Iron curtain whilst physically imprisoned those in the East, had an imprisoning effect to various degrees on Western mind especially in culture, politics, psychology and strategy. Thus to avoid this it is necessary to take a larger view of how deterrence effects the world, rather than the nation state which is oft its referent object. However it is worth noting that this work does not intend to discard the canon of theories of deterrence and nuclear strategy themselves, rather a brief overview will be provided to sketch a backdrop for the political and international dimensions of this field.

Avoiding the pitfalls of a theory that sees the world as fixed and immutable Critical Theory offers one option that allows freedom and flexibility because of its desire for emancipation. This allows for explanation of change in the international system that are not state-centric because at this level the realist assumption of the primacy of the state is held hostage to the sometimes competing and sometimes complimenting interests of the civil bureaucracy, the political elites and the higher echelons of the specific nation’s military apparatus, interestingly one of the best insights to this is Graham Allison’s work *Essence of Decision*,


56 Henry Kissinger q.i. Ibid,p.5.

this dissection of the Cuban Missile crisis highlights the degree to which competing interests within a state, driven by competing institutional cultures with variations in interpretation of a situation which can act in a manner that may not be in the states best interest. Thus, to avoid this it is not only optional to be theoretically fluid it is essential. In order to achieve this, this work has drawn from the fountainhead of both theories outlined above. The use of the singular here is due to the fact that Constructivism is generally seen as an offshoot of Critical Theory and is evidenced by the use of Critical approaches by many in the Constructivist camp in their analysis of world events.

Giving the matter serious consideration the choice of theory has been driven primarily by the fact that both these modes of thought deal with ideational issues as their key object of study, whereas the traditional theoretical schools tend to be more focused on the role on states and institutions. What is of interest here is not the state nor the international system, but how variation in the use of Nuclear Deterrence is engaged with over space and time and further necessitating a theoretical grounding which allows the removal of the rigidities of the traditional modes of thinking within International Relations.

Because Realism and Neo-Realism become hung up on the material capabilities and structures of the international system the focus is on objects that are quantifiable in a certain sense, this could be seen in such areas as International Political Economy where economic performance is a metric of a states capabilities it could also be seen in military balances. Whilst boots on the ground or throw-weights of ballistic missiles can be counted, their effect cannot. The failure of such rationalist thinking can be seen during the Vietnam War, where US military planners tried in vain to conduct their operation through a scientific and rationalist approach, emphasis was placed on tangibles such as numbers of sorties flown, tonnages of bombs dropped and bodies counted in contrast to this the Vietnamese fought their conflict along ideological lines where the end goal was not driven by rationalised number crunching but by a long term cultural objective. What this aside tells


us is that purely rationalist approaches to international situations (both political and military) are no guarantee of success.

Liberalism and its Neo-counterpart like Realism are also hung up again on capabilities and in addition to this there is a consideration of the roles of institutions.61 As can be ascertained liberalism differs from realism in its ability to bring in other actors. This is somewhat more fitting for this work as both liberalisms involve institutions and economic interdependence, both themes that have inherent roles to play in the limiting of nuclear proliferation. This can be best seen in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the raft of other nuclear weapons control treaties, which attempt to limit the spread of weapons. The NPT in a sense reinforces the insecurities of non-nuclear weapon states as it sees states voluntarily opt out of the privilege to choose that comes with being secure, this is not something that can be explained by realist nor liberalist thought, rather it is something that can be explained by a the normative power of the public opinion. 62

Directly inverse to this are states who also obtain weapons for purposes of power and status regardless of their utility to the state. Possibly one of the most egregious examples of such came from the Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1965, when he declared ‘even if we have to eat grass, we will make a nuclear bomb. We have no other choice’.63 This suggests that the Pakistani state in accordance with the logic set out in the introduction is a state that was insecure and has taken the necessary action to correct this. This statement followed defeat to India during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, whilst it is a rousing piece of rhetoric, it highlights one of the problems of realist political thought, namely that the state is put a head of the individual to a level that is inhumane, and as North Korea currently shows, well beyond the pale in regards to standards and norms of human decency.


61 See Ole Holsti, Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers, in Charles W. Kegley, Controversies in International Relations Theory, Realism and The Neoliberal Challenge (London 2002) pp. 35-67. See Also Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading 1979).

62 Tannenwald and Price, in Peter Katzenstein et al, p.113.

Seeking weapons that are at odds with a states requirements is not exclusive to poor or emerging states, after all French General Edmond Jouhaud questioned the necessity of the French desire for a deterrent by questioning how it was useful in relation to the Algerian crisis that France was heavily involved in at the time. The question he posed was quite simple- ‘can atomic bombs help pacify Algeria’. The answer to this, could of course be yes, by atom bombing Algeria, it would be pacified, although the normative and practical costs to France would likely be tremendous because in no way would this response be seen as being a proportionate response to anti-colonial activities therein.

Considering why states may or may not seek to obtain nuclear weapons Jacques Hymans demonstrates the NPT and its sister treaties are not the prime deterrence to states obtaining nuclear weapons. Moreover the NPT and its sisters have been argued as an attempt of the nuclear powers to maintain the status quo. In this regard neither Realism nor Liberalism can explain why then these states continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent. Hymans work, and his concept of the ‘National Identity Conception’ (NIC) go a considerable way in support of this thesis. The NIC concept is the tool that Hymans argues explains why states obtain or abstain from going nuclear. In brief Hymans, argues that a state leader with particular NIC which is a psychological conception of his or her state (after all the original Iron Lady, Indira Ghandi, was one of his case studies) would be more or less likely to go nuclear. This has had a profound impact on this work as it adds additional weight to the argument that deterrence is what we make of it.

What should becoming clear is the use of a constructivist approach in IR can be considered flexible enough to offer real insight into the variance of Nuclear Deterrence the world over. However, it should be noted due to their preponderance within the field it is fair to say that both Realism and Liberalism as the dominant discourses are not completely void of explanatory powers, thus it must be noted here that from time to time this work will stray close to positions espoused by both camps.

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66 Ibid, p.222.

67 Ibid, pp.30-55.
Viewing the matter historically, since 1945, the world has seen a growth and decline of the number of nuclear weapons; it has also seen a growth, decline and further growth of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). These twin facets of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are both legacies of the Cold War and symptoms of an international system that has failed to move itself on from coercion as a tool of foreign policy. Key to this view of international relations is the Nuclear Deterrence concept. This concept is often argued as the basic driving force for the obtaining and maintaining of nuclear forces, force postures and inter-state relations the world over. Though, returning to Hymans hypothesis, it is probably more accurate to state that deterrence is the justification for such actions.

The concept of deterrence was succinctly captured with eloquent simplicity in the 1964 satirical classic Dr. Strangelove, as being ‘the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear to attack’. Of key interest here is the word ‘art’ which suggests that deterrence is not something that is verifiable in an empirical manner. This is a theme that this work will return to again and again. In considering deterrence slightly differently Nina Tannenwald and Richard Price offer an alternative where deterrence is contextualised as a means of ‘dissuading an adversary from doing something that it may want to do’. Relating to the nature of interpretation and variation this definition is interesting because it is also ambiguous; this can be seen in the use of the verb ‘may’ thus suggesting possibility, which is not a certainty, thus further underlining the reliance on interpretation.

Continuing this line of thought, deterrence as a simple concept has not travelled with equality throughout the nuclear armed world. This is because of the need to identify the intentions of an unknown entity, which in realist terms is the state as a black box, where the only empirics, the ‘known knowns’ to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, are the material capabilities of the state. However even these can be misconstrued and in some cases

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69 Stanley Kubrick, Terry Southern, Peter George, Dr. Strangelove, Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. Screenplay, Adapted from the Novel ‘Red Alert’ (Culver City 1964) p.32.

70 Tannenwald and Price, in Peter Katzenstein, et al, p100.
deliberately so, as was the case during Rumsfeld’s first term as US Secretary for Defence. 71

However, in order for capabilities to be transmuted into a threat they must be supported by an intention, it is this, the human element which is most open to interpretation by the other state, this can in certain cases lead to what amounts to the invention of a foe to act as a focal point for deterrence. 72

Because Nuclear Deterrence has varied from time to time and place to place, to such a degree that it could be argued that the whole is a case of all things to all men and, worse off, because of this variation it is arguable that there exists in practice no pure form of Nuclear Deterrent and likewise is also a paucity of evidence of the effectiveness across the range of historic and extant examples of deterrence, this makes following Ronald Reagan’s dictum of ‘trust but verify’ a frightening, if not an impossible prospect. Explaining how such unproven systems can be justified or in how the interpretation of threat is re-evaluated over time confirms that a view of deterrence based on Constructivist and Critical analysis, which supports the argument that due to its variation and the paucity of evidence to support its effectiveness that Nuclear Deterrence can be seen as a fallacy which is not only massively costly in terms of investment and potential danger to humanity it is also an irresponsible means of underlining foreign policy.

Taking inspiration from Wendt, this work is openly teleological in that it will work towards a specific end point, which is the argument that abolition is a safer and more sensible foreign policy as opposed to Nuclear Deterrence. 73 This might strike the reader as being un-academic but unlike Wendt this work does not posit that this telos is inevitable but rather

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71 This relates the so-called ‘Team B’ analysis of CIA intelligence estimates in the Gerald Ford Administration. Team B, was a hand-picked group of neo-conservative ‘analysts’ including Richard Perle, Richard Pipes, Edward Teller, Paul Wolfowitz and Paul Nitze. The purpose of this team was to offer competitive counter-analysis of the CIA’s own findings, which often led to the suggestion that the CIA was misleading the president and that the Soviet threat was much more severe than the intelligence estimates would suggest. The alarmism caused by what was essentially a politically appointed interest group is attributed to being one of the leading causes of Reagan’s rearmament and the tumult in US-Soviet relations coinciding with the end of detente. For a detailed account of Team B. See Richard Rhodes, *Arsenals of Folly, The making of the Nuclear Arms Race* (New York 2007) pp.102-138.


73 Alexander Wendt, ‘Why A World State is Inevitable’ European Journal of International Affairs, Vol.9 No.4, (December 2003) see pp.497-499 for a historical background on the use of Teleology in political science. See pp.502-514 for a the modern use of such an approach.
that it represents a practical alternative to the policy of Nuclear Deterrence. Thus it is arguable that being impartial in regards to political matters is somewhat naïve and dishonest, the words of Robert Cox are enlightening here; ‘Theory is always for something and for someone’.74 To put another way, Edward Kolodziej notes that traditional methods of theory may limit social inquiry oft for self motivated reasons.75 This will be seen later with the analysis of individual states practices within the field of deterrence. Wearing its bias on its sleeve so to speak, this thesis does not intend to suggest that attempts at objectivity will or should be ignored, rather it will follow the facts in as much as the facts can be followed. However, as E.H Carr noted, facts are not impartial in and of themselves, rather they turn on the question of interpretation.76

Interpretation lies at the heart of constructivist political thought and the biggest challenge in dealing with a topic as complicated as Nuclear Deterrence is being able to ensure that the analysis of what is taken as fact is indeed fact. In working out the intricacies of a Constructivist analysis will allow this work to go beyond traditional realist and neo-realist assumptions of state interests and balances of power, all of which are interesting concepts but all would lead to the suggestion that once the genie is out of the bottle it would remain out. Rather, the Constructivist view that those things in the world that have meanings, have only the meanings that we give them; suggests that we can change the meanings of these things.77 And as will be seen the meaning of deterrence can and does and will continue to change as situations and identities and interests change.78

It is the focus on change that is the second key element in making a Constructivist approach to Nuclear Deterrence the logical choice for investigation and analysis. As, noted by Alexander Wendt, Constructivism is not a theory, it is however a mode of social enquiry, thus it allows the user to investigate society and societal change in a manner that is more flexible and less dogmatic than more traditional state bound approaches. Furthermore for Constructivists the use of prevailing assumptions within dominant IR theories with their rigid

complexes of identities and interests, and the assumption that behaviour has predicted trajectories is self-fulfilling and thus acts as a brake on honest intellectual inquiry.\(^\text{79}\) It has been noted that because of its willingness to look abstractly at ideas rather than take things as a given Constructivists are more able to explain changes in the structure of society and the international system in a way that other analytical methods cannot.\(^\text{80}\) The most common example of this is the failure of both schools of realism to explain the end of the Cold War.\(^\text{81}\) Explaining why the system that at times was supposedly stabilised by Nuclear Deterrence had come suddenly unstuck in a manner both fortunate and unpredicted offers a large field for a constructivist critique of deterrence. In addition; continuing attempts to justify nuclear arsenals in the post Cold War period shows that the constructivist elements of deterrence are alive and well.

A brief summary of the cases where this constructivist view of deterrence is at play can be seen in numerous instances such as the US tilt towards pre-emptive deterrence, its Global Precision Strike programme which seems to blur the lines between conventional and nuclear uses of force, it can be seen in the maintenance of NATO’s nuclear sharing and enduring stock pile in Europe, it can be further and most dramatically seen in the support of former Warsaw Pact members of NATO who seek to obtain protection from the very entity which a quarter of a century ago threatened them with annihilation.\(^\text{82}\) This latter point highlights the fluidity of interests and identity in international politics which supports the constructivist view that because reality is a social construction and therefore not grounded in an immutable way that change is inherently possible. However, this is not to suggest that change is something that is easy or swift to achieve, but rather it can and does happen.\(^\text{83}\)


\(^{81}\) Ibid, p.61.


Nuclear Deterrence Theory: Cultivating an Appearance.

‘Deterrence is a process of influence’
- Stephen Cimbala.

‘At times appearances are as important as reality if not more so.’

‘It is reasonable to comment that the primary, possibly the sole, function of nuclear forces was to deter, and that therefore issues of nuclear strategy were all but irrelevant.’
- Colin S. Gray.

Theorising nuclear weapons is something that should be considered a primarily strategic task, and something therefore left to military leaders. However, due to their destructive nature, and the material costs involved obtaining a nuclear deterrent is something that has high status internationally. This short overview intends to tease out some of the key issues in deterrence theory and to contextualise them historically thus making clear the political aspects that will be referred to in the case studies below.

To define deterrence is no easy task, however there have been numerous quotes utilised in this work attempting to do so. Cimbala’s quote above is possibly the most useful in terms of this work as its very ambiguity strikes at the core of the issue under investigation. ‘Influence’, can be seen as being a neutral term in contrast to the use of enmity in the quote taken from Dr. Strangelove above, it imparts neither menace nor amity but retains a flexible quality that can be used for both. Because of this, it is quite useful as it can be applied to all three case studies below. For example, the US can be seen as influencing the Soviets in an unfriendly manner with their forward basing of troops in Europe and their development of a credible deterrent structure based around a nuclear triad of ground, sea and airborne

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85 Dwight Eisenhower q.i Jan Melissen, *The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, Britain the US and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance 1952-1959*, (Groningen 1993) p.82. The context of this quote surrounds the utility of providing THOR missiles to the UK as a stopgap in the development of the UK’s own nuclear force, however the THOR missile was considered next to useless from any practical perspective. But it was of a perceived political imperative that the US supplies the UK with a weapon for even the most tokenistic of purposes.

delivery systems. Whereas regarding the UK, US influence was used to invite alliance and unity through the use of nuclear cooperation.\(^{87}\)

Strategically speaking Nuclear Deterrence theory serves one simple goal, to ensure the security of the state. The role of the state is of vital importance here for due to their complexity no other entity as of yet has obtained the capability to launch a nuclear weapons programme. What is more only the territorial state has the scale required to make nuclear targeting necessary.\(^{88}\) The basic proposition here is that one must have something large enough and valuable enough to ensure that the expense of obtaining or utilising nuclear weapons is justifiable; hence the nation state is the key unit for deterrence. However in echoing Thomas Schelling, some states are not worth a bomb.\(^{89}\)

A counterfactual contextualisation of this is somewhat enlightening e.g. it would be considered inconceivable for Belgium to seek to obtain nuclear weapons in order to compel or coerce Luxembourg due to its lack of size or population or access to any major strategic advantage. Although, it may however, be considered justifiable for Belgium to seek nuclear weapons to seek advantage against a significantly stronger foe, e.g. Germany or France, or a peer-rival such as the Netherlands.\(^{90}\) These both of these latter cases might be considered sensible for they could pose a threat to Belgium are of a scale commensurate with the costs of developing a nuclear deterrent and all have in the past had military designs on her territory. In terms of utility what is key here are the requirements of scale for going nuclear, i.e. the target must be considered worthy of such exertion in hence Colin Gray notes that

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\(^{89}\) Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (Yale, 1966) p.20.

\(^{90}\) It might be understandable to consider the idea of a Belgian deterrent as non-sense, however it is not as far-fetched as it may seem, for example French Minister for Foreign Affairs Philip Auger once suggested that six countries in the world would develop nuclear weapons, the US, USSR, UK, France, Canada and Belgium. See Hymans, pp.18-28. See also Bradley Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order*, (Cambridge, 1994) p.114. Furthermore the UK govt under Churchill considered Belgium over France as a more natural ally for its nuclear cooperation on the continent. Jan Melissen, *The Struggle For Nuclear Partnership* (Groningen 1993) p.18. All of these authors argue that the feeling that Belgium would develop its own nuclear force was due to vulnerability exposed by Nazi Occupation; and by availability of nuclear materials from the Congo, then a Belgian Colony. Whilst Belgium went on to begin an indigenous nuclear energy industry it did not pursue nuclear weapons. For discussion of US placement of nuclear weapons in Belgium to undermine calls for a Belgian deterrence. See also, Shaun Gregory, *Nuclear Command and Control in NATO*, (London 1996), pp.20-25.
‘no organisation with a ‘home address’ should ever put a nuclear power in a position where it feels desperate’ thus as noted so far the only entities capable of such are the territorial state.  

If as argued by statesmen below that a sovereign nuclear deterrent is essential to the state then why did Belgium fail to develop its deterrent? The most straightforward answer to this is because it did not need to, this is because in the immediate post war, US protection and with it Nuclear Sharing appeared to solve many of its security problems.

What should become apparent from this is that deterrence is based on a calculation of risk. This risk manifests itself in relation to prospective damage incurred by an opponent. However, one means of mitigating this damage is to obtain a deterrence of one’s own. Here matters become extremely complicated and somewhat unreliable, because they involve attempting to understand what an adversary takes as valuable. For a simple example, Pierre Gallois the French nuclear theorist advocated a deterrence policy where a state should give the impression that it would go nuclear early in a crisis. This would it was hoped, be successful in demonstrating that the cost of engaging in use of force would quickly escalate to such a level that would render such a policy option unfeasible.

However this method of deterrence by maximum punishment is not as straightforward as it may seem. In order to go ugly early, a state must have material resources to ensure that its actions are capable in fact of generating the necessary level of damage. This is also reliant upon a detailed understanding of the opponent’s value system. Somewhat ironically Gallois’ theory of deterrence has been noted by many as something that was not something that France as a small power with limited nuclear resources could realise within its own means.

This was however, less of an issue for the UK, because the UK conceptualised its deterrence policies as an integral part of NATO’s defence of Western Europe, thus in essence the UK


was able to obtain nuclear status without the same acrimony that was meted out to France.\textsuperscript{94}

So what can be assumed here is that in order to have a nuclear deterrent that is justifiably worth the costs, it must be equal to or greater than what it intends to deter.\textsuperscript{95} This leads to a situation where the largest of states such the US or Russia required massive varied arsenals to ensure all potentialities from the tactical to strategic were covered. In order to achieve this, and with this a complex doctrine that avoids or attempts to limit a French styled race to the top. In a sense a complex deterrence of this sort can be seen a search for proportionality, and is best seen in the example of the doctrine of Flexible Response which replaced the doctrine of Massive Retaliation.

Before moving to discussion of Flexible Response it is worth pausing for a moment to differentiate between the French concept of \textit{dissuasion pure et dure} (deterrence pure and hard) and the US doctrine of Massive Retaliation, the former would see a state go nuclear from the very outset of conflict, driven by the fear that a small state could never compete with the conventional strength of a larger state.\textsuperscript{96} This theory maintains one massive flaw, in that if it failed the smaller state would be completely annihilated, whereas its limited nuclear capabilities would be no guarantee that the same would be true for the attacker. Hence in terms reminiscent of Herman Kahn, a stronger nuclear power might actually be capable of winning a nuclear war.\textsuperscript{97} Ironically Kahn has become something of a pariah amongst abolitionist who see his rational approach to winning in a thermonuclear war as reducing the fear of deterrence and making war more likely. To play devils advocate with regard to obtaining a nuclear deterrent it is arguably best practice to engage in trying to ensure that the only guaranteed outcome of the failure of a deterrent is not the complete


elimination of its polity, again however, there is no way to effectively predict how such events would play out.\footnote{John Baylis supports the notion that fighting a nuclear war in the event that a deterrent failed would be a difficult prospect because of the uncertainty of such a situation and the fact that all attempts at war fighting doctrine have lead to ambiguity and a mishmash of postures. q.i Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy, (Cambridge, 2010) 371. For more on this see Jonathon Garthoff, in Kenneth Booth et al, Statecraft and Security, (Cambridge 1998) pp.64-65.}

Massive Retaliation whilst similar to Gallois’ theory differed in material capability to anything the French could muster, it was designed to do maximum harm to the aggressor at the first instance of conflict nuclear or otherwise, unlike, the weak to strong approach professed by Gallois, Massive Retaliation was underlined by a material capacity to inflict total damage on any state in the world, whereas in weak to strong deterrence the damage inflicted upon a smaller state would not be commensurate with the potential for damage in the larger state.\footnote{Bruno Tertrais, in Henry D Sokoloski, Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction and its Origins and Practice, (Washington 2004) pp.72-74.} This assumption was based on an estimation of how much damage an adversary was willing to accept in relation to the damage it could inflict, a prospect known as proportionality equivalent to the stake.

Though similar in concept both doctrines were hamstrung by inflexibility, France, because she was perceived to have no other option in the event of a large scale Soviet attack, the US because of alliance commitments which could see the US engage in full scale nuclear exchange over issues outside its vital interests. What is obvious here is the nature of the inflexibility inherent in pure deterrence, i.e. any action would equal maximum action and hence costs and benefits may be disharmonious.\footnote{Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy, (Cambridge 2010) p.359.} Furthermore, Massive Retaliation and dissuasion pure et dure were of dubious credibility after all if a massive retaliation was required; it had to be achieved with by means that survived the initial trigger thus these need a built in survivability i.e. the capacity not to be destroyed in an initial attack.\footnote{Philip H Gordon, A Certain Idea of France, French Security Policy and The Gaullist Legacy, (Princeton 1993) pp.40-42 for a description of France’s weakness within the nuclear field.} This lead to the requirement of the ‘Nuclear Triad’ this is a system of air, land and sea-launched systems which make nuclear targeting uncertain, thus increasing the danger of

retaliation. However, obtaining such a system is massively costly and may negatively impact on a state’s economic health.

In opposition to simple deterrence of the Cold War, is a much more contemporary example, this sees Israel fearing weapons programs from Iraq and Syria in the recent past, and with Iran at present, what is interesting regards the Israeli case is that up until very recently it had to focus on deterring these three states. This makes for a complex deterrent environment and thus makes costly any attempt at deterrence. Inversely however, Israel is incredibly vulnerable due to its lack of territorial depth, therefore it has obtained a status as a ‘one bomb state’ i.e. whilst deterring Iraq or Syria prior to their own implosions would, due to their size, have required a large number of weapons and a means of ensuring their delivery, in addition it would require a number of weapons in reserve. However a state attacking Israel could do much more critical damage with much less capability. However, it must be remembered that any state wishing to destroy Israel must be willing to sacrifice large portion of the Palestinian population and its territory, this latter point again highlighting the factors that complicate deterrence.

This brief outline should provide insight into the problems of applying Nuclear Deterrence theory to practical purposes. Crucially however it ignores the moral ambiguity that is inherent in deterrence theory. The reason for this is that nuclear deterrence constructed through scientific and pseudo scientific means, is oft presented in a manner that suggests clinical and cold analysis based in fact, yet as Michael Walzer notes, this is mis-description. This allows for the pursuance of policies of threat that would not be followed if they had a


104 For a detailed overview of the Israeli nuclear dilemma see Avner Cohen, in Mehran Kamrava, ed. The Nuclear Question in the Middle East, (London 2012) pp.189-225. By comparison the UK defence White Paper of 1957 suggested that it would take approximately ten hydrogen bombs to ensure that the UK ceased to function as a political entity.
contextual basis in the real world, it is worth quoting Paul Ramsey’s definition of deterrence in detail as it lays bare the moral questions ignored by theorists.

‘Suppose that one Labor Day weekend no one was killed or maimed on the highways; and that the reason for the remarkable restraint placed on the recklessness of automobile drivers was that suddenly every one of them had discovered he was driving with a baby tied to his front bumper! This would be no way to regulate traffic even if it succeeds in regulating it perfectly, since such a system makes innocent human lives the direct object of attack and uses them as a mere means for the restraining the drivers of automobiles’ (Emphasis in original).  

This situation is clearly something that no statesman would ever consider anything but abhorrent. Yet considering a human population as a justifiable target is the approach set out in the Massive Retaliation or Hard and Pure theories of deterrence and they achieve this in a manner that is for all intents and purposes invisible, hence there is no moral or political dilemma for policy makers, and thus it is a cheap policy option. A point that is worth remembering when political or strategic analysis attempts to abstract human populations into a single corporate entity, is that behind this type abstraction are human beings whose lives are held up as the cost of political activity and failure.

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The Three Logics of Anarchy:

‘And all good people agree
And all the good people say
And nice people like us are we,
And everyone else is they
But if you cross over the sea
Instead of over the way
You might end by (think of it) looking on we
As only a sort of they!
-Rudyard Kipling

Having briefly contextualised deterrence in practice the purpose of this section is to in brief detail introduce the core methodological and analytical concept of this work, which is Alexander Wendt’s ‘three logics of anarchy’. These logics provide an interesting methodological framework through which it is possible to contextualise both the international relations aspects of Nuclear Deterrence and the Constructivist argument that these things are changeable. Whilst Wendt put forward these three logics of anarchy primarily as a mechanism for critiquing the dominant theories of IR, the division inherent within provides a useful method of inquiry into the world of Nuclear Deterrence.

The three logics themselves are labelled after Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Immanuel Kant, hence they cover the range of interaction from enmity in the Hobbesian sense, through rivalry in the Lockean sense and finally friendship in the Kantian sense.

For the case studies to follow each of these anarchies will be explored through a dyad of states, e.g. in Hobbesian terms the relationship between the US and the USSR will be explored and as will be shown, this is a system characterised by enmity between the two powers where mutual distrust and violence of both the structural and symbolic types are utilised to justify acts that would not be in either states interests if viewed from a purely rational point of view. A simple example of this is the collapse of the Soviet economy at the

106 Rudyard Kipling, ‘We And They’ Taken from Debits and Credits, (London 1926, reprint 2006).


108 For a brief introduction to these concepts, see Christine Agius, in Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, (Oxford 2010) pp.60-61.
end of the Cold War, because of its pursuance of an arms race with the US. This was not only a problem in the Soviet Union; there was a similar cost in the US with the failure of Lyndon Johnsons, ‘Great Society’ initiative due to the costs of the conflict in Vietnam and pursuing an atomic build up to ensure parity with the Soviets.

In Lockean terms the relationship between France and the US will be investigated with relation to the French deterrent and the tension over the US role in Europe. This is probably the most interesting case as it sees a middling power take its own course for reasons that are entirely realist; yet in the context of the early Cold War period and the supposed threat posed by the hordes of conventional Soviet forces awaiting to conquer Western Europe, French opposition to the US and its nuclear umbrella can be seen as not being in the best interest of the French people or its state. Because of its insistence on playing by its own rules and deciding on what it felt was the best course of action the French case holds an interesting quality which is missing in both other examples.

Finally the Kantian relationship between the US and the UK will be explored with special emphasis regarding the US support of the UK deterrent. Whilst these make interesting case studies, it should be noted that in no single case does the logic of anarchy play out to its logical consequence. For example, the USSR and the US never actually came into physical conflict in the true Hobbesian sense and the US and France were only rivals in Europe and not the world over furthermore, France was well aware of the importance of maintaining US involvement in Europe as a bulwark against the Soviets. Finally despite the ‘special relationship’ the US and the UK were not completely in harmony at all stages of the Cold War, the most prominent example of this was tensions over the Suez and later the UK refusal to assist in the Vietnam war.

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From an empirical perspective the fact that there is lee-way in all three cases may make it easy to disregard the use of Wendt’s anarchies, but as highlighted by the abundance of IR theories available to scholars; IR theory is something of an intellectual ‘Sex panther’ after the fictional aftershave from the film Anchorman, in that ‘60% of the time it works all the time’.\textsuperscript{113} To put this less flippantly, no single theory can adequately explain the international system in totality or with true accurately, because if it did, there would be need for only one. This latter point gives Constructivism or any other alternative theory for that matter, the room to seek an explanatory niche within the canon of IR theory, but it also suggests that they should work in a complimentary fashion to the dominant theories which is something Wendt acknowledges in developing his theory.\textsuperscript{114} Furthermore it serves as additional justification for non-rationally based theoretical perspectives.

In accounting for the lack of an overall fit Wendt provides three degrees of cultural internalisation, which go a long distance in explaining the variation in the anarchies. These are the cultures of coercion, interest and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{115} Each of these it is argued manifests itself in the way that states act in relation to one another. The first degree of internalisation exists where a state feels compelled to act out of fear of force, this could be seen in Bhutto’s suggestion that Pakistani’s would eat grass rather than forgo membership of the nuclear club. Second degree internalisation comes from newly emerged states who will act in accordance with international norms from a perspective of their interests rather than a belief in those norms; this can be seen as an opportunity cost of being a member of the state system.\textsuperscript{116} Finally, the third degree emanates from states who genuinely buy into the state system as the sole legitimate mechanism for states to do business. States who act outside of the norms of this system are seen by members of this system as a pariah. This legitimacy driven form of internalisation can be seen in nuclear non-use by the nuclear nine. This is primarily driven by the negativity that would come from other member states in the event of a violation of this norm. Another example of this is the censure that nuclear states

\textsuperscript{113} Ackerman, Tom, et al. Anchorman the legend of Ron Burgundy. DVD DreamWorks Home Entertainment, (Los Angeles 2004).

\textsuperscript{114} Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of World Politics (Cambridge, 1999) p.246.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid p.265, 271 and 275 respectively.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid p.272.
such as France received for engaging in nuclear tests in the 1990’s.\textsuperscript{117} In summary the cultures and logics outlined briefly here all highlight that nothing is quite what it seems and international politics relies heavily on the interpretation and perception of those that are considered to be ‘other’ which should make clear the purpose of quote by Kipling at the outset of this section.

A Hobbesian Relationship? The US and Russia.

‘Science has brought forth this danger:
But the real problem is in the minds and hearts of men’
-Albert Einstein.\textsuperscript{118}

Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Spain, and Russia, if asked to pick which of these states never fought a war against the US it may be interesting to discover that the answer is Russia, although this does not include the minimal involvement of the US on the side of the White Russians in the Russian civil war. What is the point of this aside, the reader might ask, the answer is quite simple. Unlike the following two case studies, the relationship between the US and the USSR during the Cold War is completely anomalous. This is because neither of these states had anything to fear from one another for the duration of their histories nor was there a history of ambivalence nor distrust. In fact they had more often than not been allies in international events; and until very recently they had been allies for the second time in a struggle against German ambition. If ever a study was suited to a constructivist narrative, this must be it.

What is suggested here is that in the early period post the Second World War there had been a colossal shift in the meaning of the USSR to the US and vice versa. This shift was to manifest itself in a prolonged period of tension and distrust that sustained the most egregious arms race in the history of humanity. Furthermore for the first time in history the relationship of two international powers, both of who it is worth noting were located on opposite sides of the world and were to serve as the backdrop for the entire international system.\textsuperscript{119} In addition to this the US was to confront the USSR in places that were historically of marginal interest.\textsuperscript{120} For example the US contribution to European politics in the 1920’s was to withdraw its forces and ignore its institutions and return to its idyllic isolation.\textsuperscript{121} As for US involvement in Korea, prior to the outbreak of conflict this was largely an unknown backwater. Yet, in terms of early Cold War strategy it was to be seen

\textsuperscript{118} Albert Einstein q.i. Beatrice Heuser, \textit{The Evolution of Strategy} (Cambridge 2010) p.351.

\textsuperscript{119} Richard Crockatt, pp.15-37. Here Crockatt supports the idea that the US and USSR had little reason to fear one another historically.


vital enough that the US would commit vast manpower and secondly consider nuclear action therein.\textsuperscript{122}

It might be considered unnecessary to detail the relationship between the US and the USSR during the Cold War given the fact that libraries have been written on the topic, however this section will serve an illustrative purpose for these concepts to be laid out when explaining why constructivism was the best tool for explaining the variations in application of deterrence theory. From a Hobbesian perspective the relationship of the two powers is quite obvious but like all theories discussed it is not pure. For example, neither wished to see the existence of the other ended to such a degree that it took concrete steps to do so.\textsuperscript{123} In contrast whilst there was violence inherent in the super power system it was mostly peripheral, and when not it was symbolic.\textsuperscript{124}

It would be easy to say that this was due to deterrence, but with investigation this rings hollow. Firstly one that is oft overlooked in international relations, the US and Russia, historically have had no quarrel with one another, though the Cold War changed this, this thinking was echoed in the thinking of the Italian physicist Enrico Fermi when he asked ‘where would they fight?’\textsuperscript{125} Of much more significance for the main part of the period under investigation, it was impossible for either to reach other except through conflict in Europe. The problem inherent here is what would either side gain from a general war in a Europe already laid waste by war. This is a question that is impossible to answer, but it is possible to surmise that the costs would be tremendous. However, if one considers the state of Europe, it becomes clear that unless either side was to engage in a grab of territory then its interests would not be served by armed conflict.


\textsuperscript{124} The symbolic nature of this violence can be seen in the raising of tensions and the promotion of arms races designed to provoke response and to the large propaganda campaigns on both sides. For examples of both in action see Philippe Borgois, ‘The power of violence in war and peace Post-Cold War lessons from El Salvador’ \textit{Ethnography} Vol.2 No.1 (2002), See also Pierre Bordieu, \textit{Distinction, A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste}, (Harvard, 1984), pp.244-257. Bordieu expresses the meanings of violence based upon judgement and social conditioning that is inherent in all human beings, this he also explains is pressed through group dynamics. Finally see Peter Lawler in Paul Williams, \textit{Security Studies, An Introduction}, (New York, 2010), pp,83-85.

In explaining the reasons that neither side could engage the other at home can be explained by the paucity of nuclear stocks, and reliability of delivery methods that were available to the states. In other words, whilst the bomber might get through the chances of it; a, carrying something useful; b, being completely effective were not guaranteed by the technology available in the early cold war period. Of course this would change as time progressed but at the outset of this period deterrence could not explain why the two sides remained apart.

In utilising the US-Soviet relationship during the early Cold War, it becomes obvious that there is a wide range of variation amongst US planners and politician’s about what to do regards the perceived intentions of a hostile Russia. The firm belief that the Soviets were overtly hostile has its origins in George Keenan’s warnings from the USSR, in his ‘Long Telegram’ and his anonymous ‘X’ article. However, there had been inklings beforehand with Walt Lippman as far back as 1944 suggesting that there was no way to actually prove or disprove that the Soviets were as hostile as the West suggested. The practical effects of this ambiguity were the initiation of the so-called ‘Truman Doctrine’ and its policy of Containment, this policy saw the US attempt to suppress the spread of communism across the globe. Doctrinally it has been argued that this was a result of US attempts to view the world in a black and white sense, to use Dean Acheson’s phrase to view the world in a matter ‘that was clearer than the truth’.

Being clearer than the truth turned out to be a lot more complex in reality. This could be seen in the stream of international crises of this period, the First Berlin crisis best remembered for the airlift of 1949, the Korean War of 1950-53, the Second Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

For example the leading US long range bombers of the period, the nuclear modified B-29 Silver Plate and the more modern version the B-50 did not have the range to reach the USSR from the US. The B-36 on the other hand had the range but not the reliability as evidenced by its short service life. Whereas the USSR was reliant on the TU 4 which was as reversed engineered B29 unable to reach the US from Russia. For more details see Rhodes, The making of the Atomic Bomb, pp.680-681. See also Philip S. Meilinger, Bomber the Formation and Early Years of Strategic Air Command, (Alabama, 2012). pp, 339-343. In addition to this the US through NATO deployed a number of IRBM systems, most notably THOR, in the UK, Greece, Turkey, Germany, and the Low Countries. This system was considered to be unreliable and soon obsolete.

For an interesting debate of the efficacy of coercive bombing see Robert Pape, Bombing to Win. (Cornell, 1997). See also, Harvey M. Sapolsky in Sokolski et al, pp.129-130.


1962. In each of these there was a level of understanding and misunderstanding between the powers; and with these came the raising of tensions.

However in order to continue to view the US-Soviet relationship from a constructivist perspective it is felt that the Korean example is most useful in teasing out the Hobbesian nature of the US-Soviet relationship and the ideational fluidity therein. There are a number of reasons for this, primarily the Korean War, unlike either Berlin or Cuba resulted in open conflict. Second to this the when viewed through a Cold War realist lens, it seems the causes of the conflict are straightforward, that of one ideology over another, yet from a constructivist perspective it becomes clear that the two powers were involved in what was essentially a conflict of their own creation. In explaining this it must be remembered that the root cause of the conflict was the unhappiness with division and the aspiration to nationalism denied by Japanese and later US and Soviet occupation these fed to the desire on both sides of 38th parallel to re-unite the two Koreas.131

This division was itself unnatural and a product of superpower suspicion emerging at end of the Second World War. The defeat of Japan was the event that brought both the US and Soviets onto the peninsula and which led to the magnifying of an artificial local dispute into one with massive global consequences. As Max Hastings put it ‘Seldom in the course of history has a nation been as rapidly propelled as Korea from obscurity to a central place in the world's affairs as Korea’.132

It is the emergence from obscurity here that is of key importance, for this is what gives weight to the application of constructivist thought in this context. Korea, which was divided into two separate states with competing ideologies was at the very periphery of both US and Soviet interests at the time of the outbreak of the conflict. In fact it was the very peripheral nature of the peninsula that seems to have been one of the leading causes for the North’s invasion of the South.133 The US having had no interest in the region developed almost overnight a feeling that the peninsula was worth a significant cost in blood and treasure. This should be seen as staggering, considering Acheson’s acknowledgement as late as 1949 that Korea was not a vital interest of the US.134 To explain this it is necessary to look at the emergence of two Korean states which was then a very recent occurrence;

133 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (London 2007) p.42. Gaddis argues that whilst Stalin had been hesitant in giving his support to a North Korean invasion, but had had a change of heart in 1950 as he felt it would give him a means of expanding global confrontation with the US. However, Richard Crockatt challenges the view that Stalin acted without consideration and notes that he was very wary of the fact that the US had maintained forces in nearby Japan, see Fifty Years War, pp.100-102.
this made it analogous to the US-Soviet relationship in that it was without historical precedent. Where it differed however was in the fact that whilst there did exist an ideological separation between the two; they were firstly in close proximity to one another and probably more significantly both had a justifiable interest in the conflict about to unfold. Whereas due to distance and inability to get to reach another the US and USSR were able to pick and choose the place of their confrontations.

The about turn in the US appraisal of Korea was to have immediate consequences for the US for the first time in the post war period the US found itself in what Booth would have called an elective danger, this is especially true when considering actual US interests in the region were dubious at best. Russia on the other hand has had historically been interested in the region.135 What Korea did for the US was to confirm that the communist threat as it saw it was truly global and in Acheson’s black and white terms the US would have to assume the mantle of the good against evil in the ideological struggle unfolding. To explain why the US saw the Soviet Union in such terms it is necessary to consider the US view of the role of Leninist-Marxism in US policy analysis of the USSR. This fed a cycle of distrust where the fear of a perceived spread of communism was seen by some as the source of US anti-communism.136 This fear of global communism had domestic implications for the US with the internalising of the need to engage the communists to such a degree that it led to the rise of a ‘national security state.137 This fits with Wendts conception of internalisation, interestingly it is possible to argue that the US in dealings with the Soviets in the international level, sets itself in the third degree of internalisation, where it is not was not fear, but legitimacy in the eyes of the ‘Free World’ that provided explanation for its interventions.138

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137 Ibid, p.65.

138 In supporting this assertion is worth quoting at length the position of the National Security Council National Security Council, ‘NSC 68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security’ : *A Report to the President Pursuant to the President’s Directive of January 31, 1950*, (April 14, 1950). “The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: " . . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, “with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor“
However, domestically it seems that first degree internalisation was the driver of the US view of the Soviets. This can be seen in the red-scares of the late 1940’s and early 1950’s.

If Garton’s assertion is correct that the national security state was a manifestation of the internalisation of the confrontation with the Soviets, then this segues neatly with Austin Long’s argument that the role of nuclear deterrence was to prevent the national security state becoming the garrison state. In other words, not only is deterrence politically cheap in the sense laid out by Walzer earlier, it is doubly so when it provides a means for defence that does not require mobilisation of the population.\textsuperscript{139} However it must be noted that this was still not cheap in any sense.\textsuperscript{140} Whilst it may be impossible to measure the depth of anti-Soviet feeling in this period, it is telling that a defence expenditure of such magnitude in peace time would be acceptable.

In recapping the discussion regarding the US and USSR in terms of deterrent, it can be seen that in the four times that both sides confronted each other non resulted in nuclear exchange, a basic example of this is telling, during the two earliest crises (First Berlin and Korea) the US had monopoly and vast preponderance over Soviets and their allies.\textsuperscript{141} Yet, in both cases this meant little in dissuading activities that raised tensions. In other words nascent attempts at deterrence failed to curtail Soviet behaviour that was antagonistic to the US.\textsuperscript{142}

In closing this chapter it is worth noting that the in some way the enemy image and Hobbesian nature of US-Soviet relations mirror the recent debates on nuclear deterrence and proliferation, with some contemporary commentators suggesting that the US should have utilised its monopoly to maximum advantage by engaging in a pre-emptive nuclear war\textsuperscript{143}. One which would it is presumed the US would win. However, the historical problem with this was that in the immediate post war period US stockpiles were paltry for want of a better description. To put this into concrete numbers 300 in 1950, and it is questionable if these could have been delivered accurately and effectively as

\textsuperscript{139} Austin Long, \textit{Deterrence from the Cold War to the Long War} (Santa Barbara 2008) pp.17-23.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid p.29. Long shows that in 1953 US defence spending reached its post –war peak of 14% of GDP.

\textsuperscript{141} From a pragmatic perspective the value of the US monopoly has been subject of some criticism based upon the actual importance it imparted upon the US especially because of the fact that the actual employment of of the monopoly would have served to highlight the true weakness of the US i.e. by the time the Soviets had developed their own bomb the US arsenal was inadequate to the task of destroying Russia. See David S Donough, ‘Nuclear Superiority, ‘The ‘New Triad’ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy’, \textit{Adelphi Papers}, No. 383, (IISS London 2006) pp.6-18.


they were free fall bombs to be delivered by bomber aircraft.\textsuperscript{144} And today as Tannenwald notes there would need to exist a willingness to escape the norm of abhorrence regarding nuclear use.

**Lockean Rivalry: Deterrence, The US and France in Europe.**

‘A great state without nuclear weapons does not command its destiny’.\textsuperscript{145} -Charles De Gaulle.

‘If you do not possess the atomic bomb, You are nothing in international negotiations’.\textsuperscript{146} -Pierre Mendes-France.

In dealing with the Lockean anarchy discussed earlier this section will deal with the emergence of a French nuclear capability as a means to rival US influence over Western Europe in the early Cold War. The French case represents the most complex of the three cases to be dealt with. This stems from French attempts to remain independent within the US nuclear umbrella from attempts to reassert its leadership in the world, and from US attempts to formalise a workable defence doctrine that would include all western nations including Germany, much to France’s chagrin. To integrate the Germans into Western Europe would allow for a defence of that could see an attempt at conventional defence before an all out nuclear onslaught on the Soviets. The problems inherent here will become clear below.

During the early Cold War period Western Europe was held in thrall by the spectre of potential nuclear holocaust. It was also a time when the guarantor of security in Europe was the US, who through an early monopoly and then preponderance in nuclear power should have expected to maintain amongst its allies, a relatively unchallenged hegemony over


\textsuperscript{146} Piere Mendes-France, q.i. Henry Solokolski et al, p..54.
Western Europe in the spheres of security and defence. As will be seen this was not the case.

France in the post-war era challenged US dominance in Europe because of a fear of a resurgent Germany and a lack of faith in US security guarantees and a desire to regain a lost status. In keeping with deterrence and the variation of its meaning the French concept of deterrence was initially contextualised as a means of preventing parity between France and Germany, who by the mid 1950’s had been allowed rearm on the promise of Konrad Adeneaur that the Federal Republic of Germany would renounce weapons of mass destruction. However in a short passage of time, overt fear of Germany was replaced with what could be considered a belated fear of the Soviets, and as will be shown this is helped to build rebuild bridges between the US and France.

If military superiority over Germany was the initiator of the French decision to seek nuclear weapons the second can be seen as the attempt to balance US and UK leadership of Europe. The quotes opening this section clearly embody the key element of this aspect of the French drive to atomic attainment. This being the nature of the impact on the states prestige and with it how much pull it could obtain in the realm of international politics. This was manifested in the striving of the French political military and scientific elites to put France back at the top table in world politics, a place they felt that was rightfully hers. 147

The problem for France is that the historical record was not entirely clear on whether France in a world of super-powers belonged. This seems to have been shared by the US and the UK, although, the latter of whom should be seen in the same light as the French. To put flesh on this assertion it is not unfair to suggest that France’s claim to greatness was one that in the early to mid parts of the Cold War was resting upon dubious foundations. This holds true especially when viewed historically. Since 1871 the French had been on the back foot in terms of its international greatness, this is furthered by what could be called ‘the hat-trick of humiliations’ suffered from 1940 to 1960, a period that saw it’s complete defeat and occupation by Nazi Germany, it’s expulsion from Indochina, and it’s withdrawal from

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147 For an interesting overview of the role of France’s civilian nuclear technological prowess as an indicator of the prestige of the state see Gabriel Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity After the Second World War (London 2009) in particular see pp.21-55.
Algeria. Each of these events would be fairly expected to critically undermine a states prowess and self confidence in the way that US failure in Vietnam or the Soviets in Afghanistan did. The depth of this loss of confidence would be minimal as these were events underlined by the limits to coercive power across distances, whereas France suffered humiliation abroad, in its near abroad and at home.

The French defeats abroad can be seen in light of realist theorist John Mearsheimer attribution to the dilution of power over distance to what he calls ‘the stopping power of water’ which suggests that no world power is truly a world power in the complete sense. Although is something that is not exclusive to realists, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, discuss this in their work ‘Regions and Powers’ which posits that regional security is dependent on local powers and not so much on those of a global nature. The problem for France was that its first defeat since the Second World War came at the hands of the Viet Minh, their spectacular defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, had two key outcomes.

First it served to sow the seeds of doubt about the US and its willingness to help its allies. This was to have a large impact on the French desire to seek nuclear deterrence. Digging into this is a little is enlightening. Throughout the siege, the United States Air force provided airlift and strike aircraft flown by French pilots Although the US drew the line with actually becoming involved in the fighting, that is until Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault and General Paul Ely went to the US and suggested a possible use of atomic bombs in lifting the siege, this it seems was given consideration in the US but for a number of reasons this


operation came to naught. The failure of the US to aid the French in this respect was put paid to French faith in US guarantees. What can be seen from this example is the disharmony between vital interests. The French, considered a defeat in Indochina as a mark against the nation. Whereas the US saw using nuclear weapons in Asia, for the second time in a decade with equal disdain.

The second implication was the inspiration of a nascent liberation movement in Algeria which was due to its place as a ‘departement’ of France was considered part of the metropole. Loosing this could be seen as a loss of part of itself. Whilst this has lesser ramifications for the French attempts to seek a nuclear weapon, it would necessitate the removal of French atomic test sites from Reggane in the Sahara, to Murarao in the Pacific which would bring it into tension with Australia and New Zealand later on.

With these two examples it can be seen that in the immediate post-war period that France did not explicitly fulfil the description of a neither regional nor global power. Thus France to regain its international states needed something to redress its failings. Hence seeking to go nuclear was an obvious choice. With this in mind it is accurate to consider that Mearsheimer, Buzan and Little’s theories hold water in the conventional military sense. But, if a state is to be seen as willing to forgo the myriad consequences of a nuclear release, then distance, depending of force structure . i.e whether weapons are deployed by missile or manned aircraft, then distance is of little consequence. Therefore seeking a nuclear striking force, France would go a considerable distance in redressing this doubts about its role in the world thus restoring Frances perceived greatness.

In the process of achieving its goal of nuclear power France had been the beneficiary of extraordinary fortune in possessing a President and a political class who believed in a view of France that could lay claim to be European equivalent of American exceptionalism. This

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152 For details of this plan known as ‘Operation Vautour/Vulture in which the US Air Force would use nuclear weapons to aid the French garrison besieged at Dien Bien Phu, see Fall, pp.300-314. See Also Hymans, pp.93-96. For US military use of Dien Bien Phu as an example of the justification of tactical nuclear use see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, The US and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge 2007) pp.135-136. From reading of these sources and others it becomes obvious that one of the reasons that the plan even in its conventional design was not put into practice was that the effort required (200+ Aircraft plus numerous aircraft carriers,) to save what was from the outset an untenable French position both in the hills around Dien Bien Phu, and in the political landscape of Vietnam in general, did not fit with US interests in the region.
was manifested most overtly in the person of Charles De Gaulle, who has been seen as possessing an unbending intransigence which guided France to a position on the UN Security Council and a role as a major player in Western Europe’s emerging security apparatus. However to heap praise exclusively on De Gaulle would serve to miss the point that one man cannot a kingdom make, this is especially true of the French Fourth Republic, which was characterised by a constellation of short lived governments.

Ironically this state seen as a ‘political basket case’ by Dwight Eisenhower managed to begin an autonomous independent atomic development programme in the early 1950’s. In being able to achieve this Bruno Tertrais, suggests that the Fourth Republic, was initially exemplified by minimum political and maximum technocratic orientation regards its nuclear policies. In other words French nuclear scientists went to work without any particular direction early on. However, this was not the case in the aftermath of failure in Indochina when the decision to develop the bomb was reached. De Gaulle upon his accession to power for the second time in 1958 acknowledged the French realisation of its nuclear ambitions both civil and military was a nationally driven project rather than one driven by a clique of a few men.

Fitting in with the key ideas of this thesis is that initially the French military had no interest in nuclear weapons as they felt that France had no need for them in the superpower confrontation that was then ongoing, furthermore some felt that the US fear of Soviet attack was grossly over exaggerated. Questions of how this came to be will be answered below.

The relationship between France and the US especially during the early parts of the Cold War is something of great interest because it does not represent a cut and dry example of

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interstate relationships.\textsuperscript{158} The US who in the aftermath of the Second World War was both the financial and military guarantor of security in Europe could have been forgiven for expecting that states who were beneficiaries of its largesse would align themselves to the US view regarding its approach to international relations between the states a position shared by none other than France’s leading strategic theorist, Andre Beaufre.\textsuperscript{159} However this has not been the case for US-Franco relations from the end of the Second World War. Yet France struck forth on a course for a fully independent nuclear force, independent in structure maintenance and doctrine. France’s divergence from the US and consequently NATO’s lead in Europe cannot be explained by one factor, rather it is a conglomeration of numerous parts all of which combined to give France a unique outlook and position amongst Western states.

The particular French world view shaped by a view of itself as a world power would become a source of tension in her dealings with allies, most notably the US where attempting to establish a level of influence commensurate with the France’s self image, clashed with a US view of a state freeloading off US protection. Whilst this judgment may seem austere, it has been argued that France was bequeathed the opportunity to follow the policy routes that it did because of the protection of US extended deterrence.\textsuperscript{160} This whilst not fitting with the theory of nuclear security adapted from Booth earlier it does somewhat conform to the idea that choice is a product of security. However, this does not explain why France was antagonistic towards the US especially in relation to such a vital matter as state security.

In explaining this it is worth considering the failures beset by France in the earlier twentieth century and the psychological impacts brought about by these. The biggest fear felt by France in the immediate post war period was not the Red Army surging across the Fulda Gap, but rather a failure to control resurgence of Germany.\textsuperscript{161} In establishing its credentials as a great power France attempted to control through the development of a European

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{158} Jacques Hymans, \textit{The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy}, (Cambridge 2006) p.90.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Jacques Hymans, \textit{The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy}, (Cambridge 2006), p.92.
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based security organisation. This organisation the European Defence Community (EDC) was designed to restrain a resurgent Germany and to provide for the defence of Western Europe without undue reliance on the US. However the EDC failed because in order to prevent Germany from becoming a nuclear state the writers of the EDC treaty involved a caveat stipulating that non member of the EDC could produce more than five hundred grams of fissile nuclear material. For France this had two complicating factors, firstly it meant that Europe was reliant on the US for nuclear guarantees, secondly that it would not be able to obtain a primacy of the FRG because although the treaty prevented the Germans from obtaining nuclear materials, it did likewise for France.

This latter problem was reversed in short order with Adenauer declaring that a rearmed Germany would forgo weapons of Mass Destruction. Although this went a considerable distance in allaying French fears it did not go far enough, and so France continued to develop its nuclear deterrent. Interestingly in Fearing a resurgent Germany, France seems to have forgotten that the US had stationed huge numbers of troops near the intra-German border, it is unlikely that these troops would have been forced to stay in barracks if the French fear of a backslide into chaos became a reality.\textsuperscript{162} Yet, this could also be interpreted as indicative of the level of distrust the French had in US guarantees and an expression of France’s view of the dubiousness of conventional forces.\textsuperscript{163}

This short study has shown that the French did not quite seek the bomb in order to deter an enemy, but rather because due to US patronage, they were offered an element of security within a US hegemonic framework, which ironically they undermined by seeking out their own path, which when done provided the state a low level capability for much of the cold war.

\textsuperscript{162} Tony Judy, \textit{Postwar, A history of Europe since 1945} (London 2006) p.245.

Kantian Deterrence: The UK and the US

‘States do not have friends, They have interests’
- Colin S. Gray

‘As long as you can start World War III, They have to listen to you’
-Alexander Macmillan, Earl of Stockton.

Turning to the UK and its quest for deterrence this section will show that of all the power relationships in the early Cold War the UK-US relationship was by a considerable margin the most amicable. Indicative of this was that during the research for the three logics it was a considerably easier task to find works on US Russian enmity and US-French ambivalence than it was to find sources on UK-US amity. What is truly interesting about this is that due to language difficulties this search for sources did not delve into French or Russian language sources. Whilst this is explainable by the fact that French intransigence had a bigger impact on NATO and the defence of Western Europe than did the UK quest for a deterrence, and its impact on its relationship with the US.

Unlike France the United Kingdom emerged from the Second World War with its national dignity intact. It had stood alone against Nazi tyranny for nearly two years, but it also sustained a military apparatus that saw 9 million men under arms. It saw itself call upon the men of its colonies and dominions to help defend its interests the world over. These had two key effects, firstly was to help wreck the economy, and second to cause secessionist stirrings amongst the natives of the colonies who felt that they had paid the price for their independence. These two themes made it obvious to the UK that it was no longer the world power that it had been perceived to be prior to the outbreak of the war; thus was the international context for the UK entering the Cold War.166


165 Alexander MacMillan the Second Earl of Stockton q.i D. R. Thorpe, Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan, (London 2010) p.396. MacMillan as grandson of the Prime Minister Harold MacMillan was due to the early death of his father bequeathed a close relationship with his grandfather Harold. This led to him being present as a young boy to classified deliberations during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The quote above was the explanation given to him by his grandfather on the essential nature of the UK deterrent. Inherent here is the political and diplomatic nature of such a system. What is latent is the sheer ambiguity of such a purpose, questions of who they are, and why they should listen are quietly omitted from this definition. For example should the US listen because the UK now had sophisticated technology that may be of use to them in their own projects, or should the Soviets listen because the UK could potentially do them some harm. Questioning such definitions as can be seen throughout this work lead to uneasy answers about the true purpose and validity of nuclear deterrent.

166 John Darwin makes the case that at the international level the Cold War’s emergence coincided with a reversal of roles for the UK and the US, with both gradually moving in opposite directions to their historical
More pertinent was the fact that the UK had through its experience of the Blitz and the Buzz-bomb attacks the UK entered the nuclear age with an inescapable sense that the security that had previously been afforded by its status as an Island nation had been quickly and ruthlessly removed. This gave UK politicians and military minds an acute sense of vulnerability. There is a sense of irony in the UK’s sense of vulnerability which was in a sense laid bare in the interwar years by then Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, who in arguing at the Geneva disarmament conference in 1932, made his now prophetic remark that ‘the bomber would always get through’. If a bomber could not be stopped, then the missile would be positively unmolested. In realist terms these make it only natural that the UK would endeavour to seek deterrence as a means to ensure its survival; and one could be forgiven for thinking such things. However as with all in politics the UK’s key purpose for seeking its deterrent was not in fact to ward off super power aggressors, but rather it was to attract the protection of one, as Lawrence Freedman indicates the UK proponents of deterrence did not make a case for the deterrent based on strategic logic as would be imagined but rather in a political economic framework.

A key driver for this was UK fears that it had lost its wartime bond with the US and with it the diminution of its international influence. This came in the aftermath of the US Atomic Energy Act also know as the McMahon Act of 1946 which prohibited the sharing of atomic knowledge with persons outside the US. This act borne out of fears of communist infiltration and foreign agents, would be proven somewhat justifiable in short order with the arrests of the US communists Ethel and Julius Rosenberg and more pointedly the German Born British physicist Klaus Fuchs, all of whom had given atomic secrets to the Russians, allowing for the speedy development of a Russian bomb. Whilst the post-war communist witch hunts of the McCarthy era make it seem justifiable for the

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seeking of an American only atomic programme, this would never have had its origins if not for a stellar cast of international scientists and diplomats most of whom had links to the UK.  

Prior to the passing of the McMahon Act, the US had relied on a constellation of international scientists in order to achieve its goal of obtaining the Atomic bomb. Of great importance in this was the role played by the UK, firstly in by encouraging émigré European scientists to Travel to the US and then by sharing of technology from its own nuclear project which was in the earlier parts of the war significantly more advanced than the US. This loss of shared knowledge on nuclear weapons led Prime Minister Clement Atlee to initiate a UK nuclear weapons programme, which at its heart had not a strategic purpose of deterrence but the political purpose of rekindling the UK-US relationship.

The problem for the UK was as much economic as it was strategic. This can be seen in light of the UK post-war economy which was in tatters, and in which an election was won on the basis of the campaign slogan, ‘Jam Tomorrow’. This was a country seeking to right itself in the world. With this in mind Atlee knew that whilst the UK had the technical knowhow to obtain a bomb, the ability to develop it en mass, and with a delivery system that would make it a considerable deterrent was something that would be beyond the scope of his budgetary constraints. This point again raises the issue at which a state seeks to ensure its security through the provision of basic services or the provision of ‘security’ in this case Atlee’s compromise was a willingness to trade off nuclear sovereignty in order to obtain the means which with the UK could become a nuclear power. In this she would be a much reduced one, and obviously unable to act with the full spectrum of independence, this would not come to fruition until long after Atlee left office.


173 It is worth noting that under US extended deterrence the trade off for security over sovereignty was not unique to the UK, McNeil argues that it applied to all the nations of Western Europe. William McNeil, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago, 1982) p.366.

174 This can be seen in the fact that the first UK nuclear weapon was tested in 1952. See Graham Framelo, Churchill’s Bomb (London 2013) pp.381-382. Interestingly Framelo praises Churchill for the development of the bomb. However not only did Attlee and his labour government initiate the independent programme he was castigated by Churchill and the conservatives upon their return to power for the expenditure on the programme. See Roseberg in Gaddis et al, Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb, Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945, (Oxford 1999) p.199. See also Quinlan in Sokolski Getting MAD, (Washington 2004) p.246. What all of
Whilst Attlee was responsible for initiating the UK independent deterrent its fruition was overseen by three further Prime Ministers, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden and finally Harold MacMillan. Of these it is probably the tenure of Anthony Eden, which is the most important; and not for reasons of that one might suspect. Eden oversaw the nadir of UK-US relations in this period, which was the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. This crisis it was felt by Eisenhower was caused by the dismissive attitude of US congress to its allies in Europe. In an attempt to address the underlying causes that led to the crisis and in order to prevent the UK from undertaking any such further operations without consultation Eisenhower felt it was necessary to reignite the previous bilateral cooperation. A key field for this was nuclear; hence post Suez saw repeal of the McMahon Act, with certain provisions towards which states could receive information. This also coincided with the Premiership of Harold MacMillan, who was to oversee success in rebuilding the UK-US relationship he was to succeed in obtaining Thor IRBMs for the Royal Air Force in the late fifties. From the perspective of the argument of this paper, the Thor issue is quite interesting. This is springs from the meaning of the deal. The Thor IRBM system was considered to be near obsolete by the time it entered service. Furthermore due to its lack of range it was of little more than symbolic value to both the US and the UK (See fig.1). Due to the lack of clear utility from the Thor missile system, there exists something of an irony in that first operational Thor squadron; 77 Squadron of the Royal Air Force bore the motto; Esse potius quam videri translating as ‘To be, rather than seem’.

Of much more significance the obtaining of an agreement at Nassau in 1962 for the purchase of the Polaris SLBM for the Royal Navy, was to be significant for the UK for two key reasons; firstly unlike Thor, Polaris being submarine launched it is inherently mobile, this meaning it could be sailed to a location significantly closer to the USSR thus enhancing the UK’s striking capability. The second key feature of the Polaris system lies in the fact they were autonomous, this is to say unlike the Thor

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177 Jan Melissen, *The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, Britain the US and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance 1952-1959*, (Groningen 1993) pp. 101-118. One of the spectres hanging over Thor was its short range, its vulnerability due to its fixed locations its nature as a liquid fuelled missile hence it had a reaction time of more than fifteen minutes.

system, Polaris was not under dual-key control.\textsuperscript{179} In other words the UK’s deterrent would be independent in effect if not in practice.

It must be noted that the scope of this cooperation was limited by UK capabilities and understandings of the requirement for the defence needs of the UK first and its allies in Europe second, that is to say that when the US began serious cooperation in providing material support to the UK it was borne in mind that what the UK could actually contribute overall was negligible.\textsuperscript{180} This highlights the non-strategic aspects of Nuclear Deterrence and again pushes the argument into the sphere of politics. Summarizing this chapter it can be that there are at play here a version of the Kantian logic, this is expressed by a UK desire to seek nuclear deterrence in order to rebuild a previous relation.\textsuperscript{181} This is in somewhat antithesis of the idea of deterrent. In an attempt to explain this it is possible to state the UK exhibited examples of second and third degree internalisations.

The second degree internalisation here was manifested in the fact that obtaining a deterrent was not something that was necessary for the UK, instead it was pursued out of interest. The interest at stake was the potential for the UK to fade into international obscurity. From the perspective of third degree internalisation, the UK could be seen as legitimising its endangering of its territory by the emplacement of US weapons of dubious practicality. This was set within the context of an international struggle against a common enemy.

\textsuperscript{179} It is probably important to differentiate dual-key launch form the two man launch mechanism. Dual-key systems refer to system of joint control by the USAF and the RAF. The Thor IRBM system was dual-key in that to operate it the UK government and the US Government had joint control and therefore the independence of the system for the purpose of UK deterrent was limited. See Shaun Gregory, \textit{Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons, Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response}, (London 1996) pp.21-22. See also Michael Quinlan, \textit{Thinking About Nuclear Weapons Principles, Problems, Prospects} (Oxford 2009) pp.118-119. The two man rule, on the other hand was a USAF missile launch procedure with presented a physical means to prevent the launch of a missile by a lone individual. See Eric Schlosser, \textit{Command and Control, Nuclear Weapons, The Damascus Incident and the Illusion of Nuclear Safety}, (New York 2013) pp.63-64. For an account of US airmen developing a means to overcome this see Ron Rosenbaum, \textit{How the End Begins, The Road to a Nuclear World War III}, (London, 2011) pp.158-159.


The Second Nuclear Age.

‘Deterrence is of course an old policy, a carryover from the Cold War, The argument put forward is that because deterrence worked then, It will still work today and should not be abandoned.’

-Jonathan Schell

If the world were truly as stage then the end of the Cold War would be the deus ex machina of international relations. Here was a situation that nobody could have predicted and which in very short order shook the current system to its foundations. This imparted new light onto the relations between states, best evidenced in the profusion of intellectual endeavours to explain it. Gone were the old animosities, and were the driving rationales for defence and security of both East and West. Instead there was an unexpected stability that allowed room for manoeuvre on the deterrence front. Yet, as would be seen the same reasons were wheeled out to justify continued existence of these systems.

The previous chapters have focussed upon the variation of deterrent practices and meanings within the units that made up the international system of the Cold War; as was seen the purpose for pursuing a deterrence in each case hinged upon factors outside the strategic. This chapter will address briefly the change in that system itself and the meaning of deterrence therein. This is important because it brings the work into the contemporary period. The Second Nuclear Age coincides with the post Cold War period; 1991-the present has brought an era of interesting contrasts, first to note is the lack of peer competition amongst superpowers, in fact for most of this period there has been a rapid decline in arms stockpiles by both the superpowers and the European middling powers.

Empirically speaking the fact that has been possible to halve and then quarter the world’s nuclear arsenal and yet still retain sufficiency in regards a deterrent speaks volumes for the


over-exaggeration of military and political elites who formulate and seek to justify such programmes.\textsuperscript{185} Whilst this can be argued with arguments regarding the need for redundancy and survivability it still suggests that there was an element of fumbling in the dark regards the design of individual nation’s deterrents.\textsuperscript{186} To express this differently, one of the great successes of the post Cold War period has been this massive reduction in arms, it is argued that this was possible due to the fact that international tensions had been relaxed. Whilst the idea of a reduction in arms is a comforting notion, when contextualised in the light of decreased tensions as it is here it presupposes that the material effectiveness of weapon systems are somehow effected by the political intricacies of the world, this harking back to Langdon Winner; is obviously not the case.

Acknowledging the great strides in the world of disarmament in the past quarter century, it would be naïve to think all is rosy in the garden, in the past two decades there have been three new members to the nuclear club, India and Pakistan, both in 1998 and North Korea in 2006.\textsuperscript{187} In addition to these the fear of further proliferation to states such as Iran, and potentially to terrorist organisations these are the key areas of growing concern for the international community. In dealing with the first of these issues it seems that diplomatic dialogue may be able to provide a solution. However at the time of writing it is too early to say how the P5+1 talks will actually effect Iran’s nuclear programme. The second issue here, that of terrorism, is another challenge altogether, it is questionable if it is possible given the complications of deploying nuclear weapons though some say that it is possible to do so.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{185} For a passionate discussion of the morality and profound futility of maintaining such vast stockpiles see Jonathan Schell, The Unfinished Twentieth Century, (New York 2003) pp.36-37.

\textsuperscript{186} Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now, (Cambridge 2003) p.252. Morgan supports this view with the argument that the post Cold War period disarmament under START I was possible because of the sheer number of excess weapons which were designed for overkill.


\textsuperscript{188} See Frank Barnaby, How to Build A Nuclear Bomb, And other Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London 2002), pp.110-117. See also S. Paul Kapur, in T.V.Paul et al,(Chicago, 2009) p.109-130. Both of these authors give discussions on the possibility of terrorist uses of nuclear weapons, Barnaby discusses the ease of manufacturing such a weapon, Kapur however makes the suggestion that whilst not beyond the realms of possibility the difficulty in doing so is not trivial.
The larger problem in this respect is how to deter such an act from happening, it would seem that there may be no way of deterring such action however interdiction and police work seem to offer the potential to mitigate this.\textsuperscript{189}

Whilst a discussion of nuclear terrorism may seem out of place here it must be borne in that such concerns raise important questions about deterrence theory and the role of nuclear forces in the present. After all; nuclear weapons in Europe at present whether they be UK, French or US are all the by-product of a by-gone era, designed built and conceptualised to engage with an enemy that no longer exists, they remain in place in order to serve strategic and political goals that made sense to a security environment that has lapsed into the past.\textsuperscript{190} Whilst there has been considerable attention paid to their ongoing role it has been seen that the utility of such weapons is effected by their possession an enduring element of dubiousness. This is epitomised by the search for continuing relevance which has led into some worrying corners. Most worrying of these is the US concept of pre-emptive counter proliferations that would see the use of nuclear weapons to counter nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{191} The problem here is a blurring of the lines between nuclear and conventional and the potential erosion of the taboo. This could lead to a situation where a non proliferation operation would seemingly justify the use of a nuclear weapon to prevent a state from gaining its own deterrence. However it is difficult to say at present whether or not the US will continue it thinking in this direction.

Kapur suggests that in the nuclear terror sense that deterrence can be achieved by ‘hardening’ the nuclear supply line, i.e. increasing security in all elements of the nuclear material supply chain. In supporting this view but at a much more general level see Richard English suggests that the terrorist threat is something that will have to be gotten used to, and that the best means of dealing with it is to avoid military responses. See Richard English, \textit{Terrorism How To Respond}, (Oxford 2009) pp. 142-143. For examples of the cultural problems with deterring terrorists see Michael Burleigh, Blood and Rage, A Cultural History of Terrorism, (Bury St Edmonds, 2009). pp490-498.
\textsuperscript{190} Colin S Gray, \textit{‘The Second Nuclear Age} (Boulder 1999) p.7.

At present the existence of stability has removed the worry of proliferation in Europe. It has been argued that has been kept in check by through the NATO nuclear sharing initiative.\textsuperscript{192} Through this programme are 180 nuclear weapons kept in various airfields in Europe, all of which are B61-10 gravity bombs, these are intended to be parcellled out to NATO members in the event of a general crisis.\textsuperscript{193} This might on casual observation seem a sensible act seeing as it would enhance continuity of deterrence, but with minimal scrutiny it is easy to see that operationalising these weapons is problematic. First; this policy suggests that in the event of heightened tensions, there would be a loosening of the binds of nuclear non-proliferation. Apart from the risk of uncontrolled escalation and the potential for damage inherent therein, this would do irreparable damage to the NPT as it would instantly create five new illegal NWS. This is in direct contravention of Article IX of the treaty which states that only states that have detonated a nuclear weapon by 1 January 1967 were legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{194} Though, the arbitrariness of this cut off point highlights Wendts point about anarchy in a succinct manner i.e. allowing the P5 to maintain their nuclear arsenals at the expense of the rest of the world, in addition three of these (UK Fr and US) maintaining a policy that will allow for the overruling of a piece of international law they themselves initiated.\textsuperscript{195}

The second problem here is that delivering these weapons involves complex logistical efforts on behalf of the allies. Numerous problems arise here first of all is the fact that this policy rides on the sharing of free fall bombs, these unlike ballistic missiles cannot make their own way to their targets, thus they need to be carried by aircraft. This is further problematic because the aircraft tasked with carrying out this mission have barely the range to reach outside the borders of the EU from their home base thus there is a need for allied


\textsuperscript{195} Interestingly this point is something that makes extended deterrence contradictory as it is suggested that it could be used to counter-proliferant. Yet, it has the potential to be such a point that is missed by David Yost, see ‘Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO’ International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (2009) pp.760-761.
aircraft to perform in flight refuelling (IFR) which it is worth recalling from earlier this is something that is in short supply in Europe. In addition to IFR the burden of delivering these weapons is complicated by the need to provide suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) operations. That is of course if NATO wishes to bomb something other than the European Union (See fig.3). This remark should not be seen as flippant, but rather a critique of the folly of maintaining a nuclear stockpile based solely upon air delivered gravity bombs designed to be delivered by aircraft possessing less than the minimal range by which to reach any meaningful targets. From a military perspective this cannot be seen as anything other than absurd, especially when there are much more effective means available. An analogy of the folly of this can be found in the grounding of the UK V-Force in the 1960’s when it was acknowledged that Russian airspace would be massively contested in times of conflict; thus diminishing the probability of success and consequently the utility of aircraft deployed weapons.

What can be gleaned from the above passage is that these weapons are of dubious value in any practical sense, with some commentators suggesting that no military commanders ever considering their use as feasible. The lack of direct utility that these weapons give military commanders leads to a question of purpose, to this end the answer is both political and military. By placing these weapons in the joint possession of NATO member states the US is sending discrete political signals that they are committed to the protection of Europe in event of a general crisis. It is also suggested that by having such high profile weapons, NATO is imbued with a level of cohesion that would be lacking if the removal of such a tangible symbol of the transatlantic alliance were to occur. It has been argued that without this tangible sign of US commitment to Europe would potentially present the

199 Bruno Tertrais, Nuclear Policies in Europe, Adelphi Papers, No.327 (IISS London 1999) p.13. Tertrais suggests that the cohesive power of the Enduring Stockpile comes from the fact that it requires Alliance wide support to ensure that it remains viable. This provides roles for non nuclear members. For example of how this plays out on a practical level see Kristensen and Norris, ‘Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe 2011’ Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, Vol 67, No 1. (January 2011) pp.68-70.
beginning of a decline in US interest in the security of Europe.\textsuperscript{200} However the tangibility of this symbol is debatable as noted by Bruno Tertrais- ‘the presence of US weapons in Europe has gone so unnoticed that journalists and even the EU Parliament have suggested that they have been withdrawn’.\textsuperscript{201} In one sense this confirms Schells assertion that the Cold War had gone underground, though this might not be as benign as it may seem. Trine Flockhart argues that there has been a concerted effort on behalf of members NATO to quietly ensure that these weapons receive little or no attention. Profoundly this includes being kept absent from the Strategic Concept.\textsuperscript{202} This she explains is due to the ambiguity that members feel towards nuclear weapons and their desire to keep on good terms with the US, most importantly to maintain the status quo. This further supports the assertion that when it comes to deterrence a capacity for cognitive gymnastics is most virtuous. Additionally it is reminiscent of Kolodziej’s warning about using traditional world views to prevent honest self inquiry.


\textsuperscript{201} Tertrais, (1999) p.21.

Conclusion:

‘In the arts of life, Man invents nothing,
but in the arts of death he outdoes nature herself.
This marvellous force of life is a force of death:
Man measures himself by his weapons’. 203
-George Bernard Shaw.

This work set out to use a constructive and critical narrative to analyse the variation in the Nuclear Deterrence theories practices and policies of the US France and the UK. The main driver for this was to highlight the fact that the traditional focus on empirics and positivism in this field; have obscured the reality of Nuclear Deterrence and lead to a belief that it is something that whilst not necessarily easy to do, is something that is inherently understandable and furthermore something that is translatable from situation to situation. This gives the impression that once an understanding of Nuclear Deterrence is obtained it becomes something a foolproof policy option which is not the case. It is necessary here to state that whilst it is obvious that no policy option is of itself foolproof in anyway. The difference between most policy options and Nuclear Deterrent is that the failure of the former does not possess the capacity or the scale to end all life on earth and it is this that feeds the view of this work abolition is a more sensible policy option for states over deterrence.

Whilst this may be considered a subjective position it is worth remembering Booths distinguishing of survival and security from earlier as well as Cox’s declaration on the purpose of theory. In the choosing of an abolitionist course the state runs the risk of defeat in conventional war. However this is not a state of affairs that is necessarily final. France essentially lost three conventional wars consecutively in less than a century before obtaining its nuclear arsenal and is still here to write its own history. 204 The same applies to China and to a lesser degree the USSR. As this work showed that the very objects of which an empirical analysis might be based upon are themselves open to interpretation interrogation. It has been argued that a Nuclear Deterrent will only be effective if there is a level of intersubjectivity between the actors on the deterrent stage. This can be applied to the three variations discussed above. As could be seen, in the US-France case for example, the US never tried to deter France from its pursuance of deterrence because there was a level of intersubjective agreement between the two that the purpose of the French deterrent was partially to restore national pride and to add to the defence of Western Europe.

203 George Bernard Shaw q.i. Framelo, Churchill’s Bomb (London 2013) p. xvi.

204 As noted earlier France was defeated in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, During the First World War, France suffered heavily and was on the brink of collapse in 1917, see James Joll, Europe since 1870 An International History, (London, 1990), pp, 214-215. And Finally defeat and occupation at the hands of the Nazi’s.
Instead of being driven by the purely by the need for security Nuclear Deterrence has been shown here to be very much a Thucydidean rather than a positivist concept. To explain this it; has been show that deterrence because ostensibly it is a mechanism to remove fear it is driven largely by the ancient motivators of human agency including those espoused by Thucydides: fear-honour-profit; and not by a particular set of scientific laws. What should be clear is that none of these has universal applicability or primacy; instead all work in various ways depending on the context. What they attest to is the human agency involved in the processes that guide and maintain deterrence, although, it should also be clear that there is a part to play in justifying the system. This is in the realm of convincing the populace that is expected to pay for and thus be protected by; that this is a worthy investment. However, even this is not universal as was evident in the references to Pakistan and North Korea.

In summary this thesis has shown that Nuclear Deterrent in theory and practice and its justification have varied widely across the case studies above the key explanatory factor for this has been the human element. Bearing this in mind it is worth noting that because there is no possible way to effectively account for this; all deterrent policies are inherently fallible. The acknowledgment of this fallibility and the potential scale for disaster inherent therein, makes the case for abolition clear.
Appendix: A

In the above image Red is the maximum range for V Force of manned bombers. Blue: Thor missiles assigned to RAF under joint control. This map makes it clear that the UK Strategic Deterrent had the ability to attack Moscow, but did little to deal with the Strategic Depth of the USSR. Whilst this may seem a casual observation, it must be noted that many important cities lie outside of the reach of UK deterren, thus making an independent action on behalf of the UK a very dubious option. It is easy to imagine that with warning the USSR would be able to maintain Continuity of Government from an alternative city such as Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Izhevsk or Samara, without going east of the Urals. ²⁰⁵

This map shows the range of action for nuclear capable aircraft and missiles available to France in the early Cold War. Green indicates maximum range for S2 IRBM based at Saint Cristol in the Plateau De Albion. This became operational in 1971. Red, Blue and White Circles represent the maximum combat Radius of Mirage IV strategic bomber aircraft from its most eastern bases. This aircraft became available in 1964. And was only leg of French Triad for the first 7 years of the Force De Dissuasion. This image makes clear the fallacy of the tous azimuths philosophy. Furthermore to engage in a counter-value attack on Russia in line with pure and hard deterrence, French aircraft would need to control skies in Eastern Europe. This is not a prospect guaranteed by neither France nor NATO.

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206 Image adapted from the website www.freemaptools.com, with additional information regards bases and aircraft from Federation of American Scientists website- www.fas.org
Figure 3. Combat radius of NATO Nuclear Sharing Aircraft from home bases 2014. 207

Legend: Blue- Belgian Air Force (F16), Green- Dutch Air Force (F16), Yellow- German Air Force (Tornado IDS), Red- Italian Air Force (Tornado IDS). Turkey is omitted as it is not an EU Member State This map shows the current disposition of the US ‘Enduring Stockpile from its bases in the EU. This map shows that if NATO wishes to use the enduring stockpile the only part of Russia it threatens is Kaliningrad, unless there is a wide provision of In Flight Refuelling, however this is something that has been identified as an area of great concern for both the EU and NATO. 208 The dubious utility of these weapons outlined above make the idea that they would ever be used a massive counterfactual as there are more effective means of doing so.

207 Adapted from the website www.freemaptools.com The US Air Force F16 Datasheet. Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 Datasheet and Kristensen and Norris ‘US Nuclear weapons in Europe’. Legend: Blue- Belgian Air Force (F16), Green- Dutch Air Force (F16), Yellow- German Air Force (Tornado IDS), Red- Italian Air Force (Tornado IDS). Turkey is omitted as it is not an EU Member State

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