You are not welcome in our tolerant society

The tug-of-war for the support of an imagined European community by AFA and Pegida
ABSTRACT

Antifaschistische Aktion (AFA) and Pegida are two opposing protest movements that both strive to exclude an Other from an imagined community. Even though both movements are diametrical opposites of each other, they both use similar discursive strategies to mobilize their respective publics and to imagine both the in-group and the out-group. In this thesis a Sociocognitive Approach (SC) to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is adopted in order to shed light on the discourse production and processing on both sides. Both right-wing (Pegida) and left-wing activists (AFA) appear to be moving towards 'Europeanism' as one of the driving forces for the mobilization of their respective publics and as form of self-identification. This implies that this phenomenon of 'Europeanism' is not specific for either side of the political spectrum, but might be considered to be a more widespread shift: with opposing ideologies and attitudes implicitly and explicitly addressing an imagined international or global community. This thesis provides a concrete example that can be used as a starting point to further dissect the underlying mechanisms and linguistic manifestations of discourse production and discourse processing.

Keywords:
AFA, Pegida, imagined communities, mobilization, Critical Discourse Analysis, Sociocognitive Approach, Twitter, Facebook, Europeanism, Globalism, Social Media, demonstration, counter-demonstration, Other
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INTRODUCTION

“You are not welcome in our tolerant society”. The meaning of such a slogan can differ completely depending on the public, the context or even the presupposed ideals and values of the addressee. It is remarkable how eight words can make a such a difference depending on how the mind shapes its meaning. This is a purely hypothetical slogan, but it would serve as a fitting motto for two diametrically opposed protest movements: the anti-Islam and anti-immigration movement Pegida and the anti-fascism and anti-racism movement Antifaschistische Aktion (AFA).

It is a time in which Europe's relatively open borders are being contested from the outside and from within. These developments have revitalized political debates and civic engagement regarding immigration and the refugee crisis. This is exemplified by the fact that the migration issue has been labeled as the greatest social and political theme of 2015 as was “reflected in the nature of the political activism and extremism”, according to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD).1

The refugee crisis and increase in terrorist attacks in Europe - for instance in Paris, Nice and Brussels - have added fuel to the fire that heats debates and confrontations between movements like AFA and Pegida and discussions about these topics in general. These confrontations have not solely taken place on debate platforms but have also been taken to the streets by both movements: resulting in numerous demonstrations and counter-demonstrations.

These verbal and non-verbal confrontations between anti-immigration movements like Pegida and anti-fascist movements like AFA, make one wonder how these two opposing groups motivate their respective publics to get out on the street to demonstrate. Especially since both sides appear to claim that “our” society is at stake without the need to explicitly specify who are part of the in-group and the out-group. This presupposes that there is a shared knowledge amongst certain individuals of communities that can be addressed by using specific discursive strategies and that can be used to shape and mobilize that community. This has led to the following research question: How do AFA and Pegida apply discursive strategies in order to mobilize their respective publics?

The following subquestions will be answered in order to find an answer for the main research question:

- How do both movements construct their addressed imagined community?
- How do both movements mobilize their respective publics?
- How are social media used with respects to this mobilization?

This thesis will aim to evaluate how discursive strategies and the underlying prerequisites that give meaning to the hypothetical eight-word slogan, are used by both Pegida and AFA in order to mobilize their respective publics. This is done by analyzing texts that both protest movements have published on their respective websites and social media channels.

Analyzing the discursive strategies that are used to give meaning to such a slogan will contribute to a better understanding of the underlying cognitive and social processes that are used and abused by both sides to contribute to their respective causes. The aim of this is to unearth the inherent fallacies of those strategies and to reflect on potential broader trends that are related to these discursive strategies. Doing this will provide the tools to cut the rope that both sides are pulling on in this tug-of-war for the support of an imagined community. This will ideally not only help in understanding the complexity and underlying mental mechanisms that give meaning to the language that is used by two antagonistic protest movements, but it hopefully also facilitates an understanding of how this language manifests itself and how presupposed knowledge gives meaning to otherwise ‘meaningless’ words.

Thereby this thesis will not only contribute to the social debates immigration and the refugee crisis, but also to debates about populism and the role of pluralistic voices in a democracy. Besides these societal aspects, this thesis could potentially be incorporated in a more interdisciplinary approach to critical discourse analysis about topics such as immigration: ideally combining research fields from linguistics, journalism studies, history, sociology, psychology and perhaps even biology.

The first chapter of this thesis will provide background information about AFA, Pegida and the context that is essential to understand the motivations of both movements. In order to provide an adequate discourse analysis it is important to have a detailed and complete comprehension of the circumstances that have facilitated the discourse production. The paradox of tolerance will be illustrated by using a variety of news sources that are relevant
for this topic and context.

In the **second chapter** an overview of some key theoretical concepts will be given. This section will include a brief recap of concepts such as the *public sphere*, *imagined communities* and *mobilization of publics*. These concepts will be illustrated by reviewing some of the recent relevant research that has been done in these fields.

In the **third chapter** there will be an elaborate description of the underlying mechanisms and theoretical fundamentals of the *Sociocognitive Approach (SA)* to *Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)* as advocated by discourse analyst Teun van Dijk. Reflecting on the cognitive and social element of this approach will help in producing a more meaningful discourse analysis. In the subsequent sections a comprehensive discourse analysis will be provided, followed by concluding remarks based on that analysis. The limitations and potential for future research will form the closing segments of this thesis.
1. THE PARADOX OF TOLERANCE

'No Islam, just freedom'. This is the slogan of a campaign that was launched by Pegida in honor of International Women's Day 2016.² The slogan is accompanied by an image of an uncovered woman's leg.³ The woman in the picture is wearing a red stiletto heel shoe, which she uses to trample a Quran. This image implies that Islamic beliefs don't have a place in a society that is made up of self-determining individuals who have the freedom to decide how revealing they want to dress in public. Or in other words: the freedom to express Islamic ideals and beliefs is contested by Pegida in order to defend a society that values the freedom of expression and self-determination.

The left-wing protesters of Antifaschistische Aktion (AFA) on the other hand claim to defend a similar society from movements such as Pegida. AFA deems the anti-Islam statements of Pegida to be intolerable, as is exemplified by AFA's campaign #laatzenietlopen.⁴ The Dutch phrase “laat ze niet lopen” can literally be translated to “don't let them walk”, but can also be interpreted as “don't let them escape”. This campaign's aim is to prevent Pegida protesters from expressing themselves in public. AFA doesn't tolerate a movement which they view as having an intolerant attitude. Both AFA and Pegida exemplify the paradox of tolerance, a concept initially coined by philosopher Karl Popper in 1945:

> Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.⁵

1.1 The actors: Pegida vs AFA

Pegida is an abbreviation for Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, which can be translated to Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (the Occident). This anti-Islam movement was founded in October 2014 in the East-German city of Dresden and has quickly gained support across Germany and Western European countries.

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² International Women's Day is on March 8th.
This quick rise in popularity might be attributed to the weekly protest marches that first brought Pegida to attention. Pegida’s initial weekly protests lead to a climax in the form of a 25,000 people anti-Islam protest march in Dresden a few days after the terror attack on the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*.6

Pegida doesn’t associate itself with the extreme right and the AIVD has described Pegida and like-minded movements as “in principle peaceful, nationalist groups opposed to the current influx of migrants and to what they see as Islam’s growing influence in the Netherlands”.7 Even though they are not described or associated with traditional neo-Nazi and extreme right by the AIVD, it is stated that “the far-left protests against it [Pegida and like-minded movements] brought support from that [neo-Nazi and extreme right] quarter nonetheless.”8

These far-left (counter) protests that are referenced here were organized by movements such as AFA. These counter protests were even more popular than the Pegida protests: with the counter protesters outnumbering the Pegida protesters at possibly every planned Pegida demonstration.9

Like Pegida, AFA has roots in Germany. AFA was originally founded in 1932 as a counter-movement against the rise of Nazism and fascism. The movement was dissolved during the Nazi regime, but was reinstated during the late 1980’s and it now has branches in multiple countries such as Sweden, the United Kingdom, Italy and France. The Dutch division of AFA was founded a few years later in 1992. The main motto or slogan of the Dutch division of AFA is “Fighting fascism since 1992”, as can be seen in the subtitle of their website.10

The AIVD has described AFA as being part of “left-wing activist and extremist groups, with a number of anarchist elements and, most notably, AFA expressing particularly militant opposition.”11

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1.2 **The case: Demonstration on the 6th of February 2016**

When Pegida branches and sympathizing movements from all over Europe signed the 2016 Prague Declaration on the 23rd of January in 2016, they encouraged their public to answer a call to action and participate in a joint, simultaneous international demonstration. The representatives of the different Pegida branches stated the following in this declaration:

> We are determined to protect Europe, the freedom of speech and other civic freedoms as well as our way of life together.\(^\text{12}\)

Quickly thereafter (on February 2, 2016) a counter-demonstration was announced by AFA to take place four days later in Amsterdam. This announcement was published in four languages (Dutch, English, German and Spanish) on their Dutch website. The following text was taken from the English text that was published on the website of the AFA counter-campaign “Laat ze niet lopen”:

> Make noise, drown them out, block them, and show them in uncertain terms [sic] that they’re not welcome! Not in Amsterdam or elsewhere in Europe.\(^\text{13}\)

AFA’s counter-campaign was so successful that Pegida had to cancel their demonstration. Pegida got the impression that the local law enforcement could not maintain the public peace and their (Pegida’s) safety, and therefore chose to cancel their walk through Amsterdam.\(^\text{14,15}\)

The demonstration was initially relocated on request of the municipality of Amsterdam to take place on the square near the Stopera, this was described as a “former

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12 [http://www.pegidanederland.com/images/pegidecl.jpg](http://www.pegidanederland.com/images/pegidecl.jpg). The website was saved as pdf-file on April 10, 2016. The full text can be found in appendix 2.

13 [http://laatzenietlopen.blogspot.nl/2016/02/english-german-spanish-translation-of.html](http://laatzenietlopen.blogspot.nl/2016/02/english-german-spanish-translation-of.html). The website was saved as pdf-file on April 10, 2016. It is worth mentioning here that the English translation made by the author of this blog post made an error in leaving out the word “no” in the sentence “show them in uncertain terms”. The original Dutch sentence (“laat zien dat ze niet welkom zijn!”) can also be translated as “show them they’re not welcome”.


Jewish ghetto” by AFA as will become apparent in a later chapter of this thesis.\textsuperscript{16} Though during the demonstration it was determined that the march would have to take place somewhere else after a suspicious package had been found near a gathering of Pegida protesters.\textsuperscript{17} The relocation would have taken the Pegida protesters through a crowd of counter-protesters and that made local law enforcement and Pegida decide to cancel the demonstration.

1.3 The aftermath: criticism on the mayor and the press

In the aftermath of this demonstration, Pegida representative Edwin Wagensveld expressed harsh criticism on Amsterdam mayor van der Laan, claiming that local law enforcement was unable to guarantee Pegida’s safety and guarantee the freedom of expression and speech.\textsuperscript{18}

Supporters on both sides of this conflict also accused mainstream media reporters of subjective reporting about the demonstration. Journalists were intimidated and verbally assaulted via social media like Twitter and Facebook. A journalist of RTL Nieuws who was reporting on the Pegida demonstrations was verbally assaulted by an opponent of Pegida after the reporter Tweeted that the Pegida protesters were protesting “very civilized”. The credibility of the journalist was openly questioned by opponents of Pegida and the reporter was accused of “working for an agency that is the successor of Adolf Hitler’s press agency”\textsuperscript{19}.

A news reporter of the NOS became the center of attention on the Twitter page\textsuperscript{20} of Pegida Nederland, with her photo posted online by one of Pegida’s supporters in an attempt to name and shame the reporter. Alongside with this photo a public apology was demanded of the reporter, who supposedly did not report objectively enough and distributed lies about Pegida.

Both are examples of strategies aimed at the discrediting and silencing perceived unjust or incorrect news reports by fanatic supporters of both AFA and Pegida. The second example has an additional layer of what can be considered as intimidation in order to silence...


\textsuperscript{19} http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/columns/column/geert-gordijn/ongemakkelijke-observaties. The website was saved as pdf-file on April 10, 2016. It is included as appendix 4.

\textsuperscript{20} https://twitter.com/PegidaNederland/status/699728427004403712. Website was saved as pdf-file on April 10, 2016. It is included as appendix 5.
a dissonant voice. This has implications regarding the freedom of speech and the concept of an idealized Habermasian public sphere in which there is room for rational discussion and in which pluralistic voices are included and not excluded.
2. THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND IMAGINED COMMUNITIES

It is hard to discuss a topic about competing protest movements that partake in verbal and non-verbal confrontations without saluting Jürgen Habermas and his concept of the public sphere. The public sphere is a concept that Habermas originally coined as early as 1962. He initially envisioned it as “a realm in which something approaching public opinion can be formed.”

It can best be viewed as an idealistic imagined entity in which rational critical debate is supposed to take place. The confrontations between AFA and Pegida area quite a departure from this ideal.

In the following paragraphs a description of the changes to the ideal of the public sphere, as envisioned by Habermas, will be given. With the recent digital revolution resulting in the rise of social media it can be argued that the access to information and debate platforms have increased and therefore have a potential effect on the concept of the public sphere. These aspects and other considerations will be reflected upon in the following paragraphs.

2.1 A transformed public sphere

Habermas’s initial notion of the public sphere was an idealistic envisioning of a climate in which public accordance and decision making would be achieved through rational debate and consensus. Though the concept of the public sphere has become widely recognized as the corner stone for a wide arrange of research fields, it has also been criticized for its unrealistic idealization of the bourgeois public sphere.

Nancy Fraser criticized the notion of the (bourgeois) public sphere by stating that subordinated social groups (minorities, women, gays, people with a differing ethnicity), were excluded from the public debate in the Habermasian public sphere. These social groups were not included in the idealized rational debate that was said to take place in the coffeehouses and salons. Fraser introduced the term (subaltern) counterpublics to describe alternative publics whose could arguably expand the discursive space of the public sphere.

Counterpublics arise due to exclusion from a dominant public. It can be argued that counterpublics are in a continuous struggle for power with a dominant or mainstream public.

22 Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." Social Text no. 25, (1990)
and in some cases a competing counterpublic.

Chantal Mouffe coined an alternative to the Habermas ideal of rational-critical debate and consensus, by describing a concept she named *agonistic pluralism*. She theorizes that it is impossible to reach a consensus via a rational debate without exclusion. In her model of agonistic pluralism consensus is not pursued, since “every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power and that always entails some form of exclusion.”

With this statement she wants to argue that deliberative democracy will always strive to create a unity when it comes to conflict and diversity by aiming for a consensus. Such a consensus might not always do justice to the dissonant voices, potentially silencing the minority in favor of the majority. There is a delicate balance that needs to be kept in mind here. If a “hypertrophy of its democratic side” occurs, the minority rights will be blown over. This has been defined as the “democratic disorder known as *populism*” by Marc Plattner. A broader definition of *populism* is given by Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis Pappas, in which they define populism as “an 'ideology' that splits society into two antagonistic camps, the virtuous people and some corrupt establishment, effectively pitting one against the other.”

Instead of antagonism in which there is an enemy, there should be agonism between adversaries wherein the other does not need to be eliminated, according to Mouffe. She states it is the task of a functioning democracy to facilitate this transformation. It has been argued by academics like Zizi Papacharissi that this idea of agonism has been a foreshadowing of “modes of political expression that have been popularized through the Internet” in the form of for instance vlogs, blogs and social media. Papacharissi has been critical of the relevance of the public sphere as well and proposes to look at the concept as a “metaphor that suggests a mode and ideal for civic participation and interaction, as Habermas originally intended”. She elaborates on this by theorizing that “online media, including the Internet, could host a virtual sphere or revitalize the public sphere.”

Since Habermas coined the original concept of the public sphere, there has been a significant change in the way in which the information flow is controlled. The printed media,
radio and television are still important as gatekeepers for the distribution of news but civilians have gained additional tools to consume, distribute and discuss information via the Internet. In this concept of a transformed, though still idealistic, public sphere the accessibility of information and discussion is theoretically without limits. Everyone with an Internet connection can gain access to information at any given time of the day, if those websites are not blocked for civilian use as is the case under some regimes. This information can then be shared, discussed and elaborated upon within the network of these news consumers. One of the earlier points of criticism with regards to Internet and the ideal of the public sphere, was that not all individuals have the means to be able to gain access to an Internet connection. Though more recent studies seem to indicate that the number of people with an Internet connection has increased significantly, especially in developed countries, making this a less significant point of criticism.28

Some scholars have also argued that greater access to information, does not necessarily lead to a more politically engaged public or advancement towards the idealistic public sphere.29 Social media however might be considered as tools that can be used to reinvigorate this civic engagement. Scholars like Larry Diamond have called social media “liberation technology”. With this he meant that this technology has the capacity to “empower individuals, facilitate independent communication and mobilization, and strengthen an emergent civil society.”30 These liberating features are partly due to the fact that it can be argued that there is less potential for mainstream media, politicians and the elite, to dominate the distribution of information, since social media bypass those classic gatekeepers of news distribution.

It seems excessive to have to explain what social media are since Facebook alone has had more than 1 billion (1,000,000,000) users since August 27, 2015.31 It is useful however to look at some of the characteristics of social media as those can be useful in the analysis of discourse processing and the mobilization of publics. A general description of social media has been phrased “to include a variety of Internet-based tools that users engage with by maintaining an individual profile and interacting with others based on a network of

Social media are, at the core, tools for individuals to access and distribute information via the Internet. Facebook can for instance be used to share, like and comment on news and current events. It can also be used to form (public and private) groups. Twitter lacks this feature but its use as a source and distributor of news and information should not be underestimated. Different social media platforms can be connected with each other if users share, or link, content between them. This can be seen as a catalyst for (digital) interactions between consumers of news and information. These kind of connections can be considered to be vital in the global spreading of information and can facilitate social relations between individuals from all over the world: contributing to a feeling of global citizenship and belonging to a community without national borders.

2.2 Imagined communities and the Other

The imagined community is a concept that was originally coined by Benedict Anderson to theorize and reflect on definitions of nations and nationalism: “It [the nation] is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” The imagining of such a national community is facilitated, in part, by continuous covert forms of nationalism. This is the concept of banal nationalism, as was first coined by Michael Billig in 1995. Banal nationalism can best be illustrated by the famous example of the national flag on public buildings. Such a flag is a constant reminder of the fact that we are part of a nation. This nation is continuously represented by symbols such as a national flag and the language that is used by its inhabitants. These reminders are so omnipresent that we’ve stopped to consciously register them as a reminder of nationalism.

With these concepts Billig and Anderson have contributed to a constructivist approach to the academic field of research about nationalism: in which nations are considered to be mainly constructed in the minds of language users, rather than based on geographical location. While Anderson’s concept of imagined communities was originally aimed at nations and the roots of nationalism, it has been adopted in broader research about communities and

group identity as well. The processes of (group) identity formation and the imagining of communities can be reflected upon by examining the discursive elements used in these processes, as those processes must be made public in order for an imagined community to be created. This is described by Robert Asen as the "processes of imagining about people they regard as similar to and different from themselves, and the processes and products of the collective imagination are accessible to others".35 This publicness can be expressed in instance language, myths and symbols and are not necessarily limited to the borders of specific countries.

The European Union (EU) is a significant example of an international community, of which the unity is mentally constructed. It is noteworthy that the foundation of such a shared identity can be the consequence of politically motivated individuals as is illustrated by Monica Sassatelli. “The idea of Europe as the foundation of an identity is stimulated by the EU’s search for instruments of legitimization.”36 Explicitly stating that “if the corpus of European culture is sufficiently promoted and protected, a European consciousness will naturally emerge.”37 Sassatelli further argues that a discursive strategy (unity in diversity) is applied in order to gain support from citizens in European countries, though what 'Europe' mean remains “contentious”. Stating that “its positive connotation can sustain both its conflation with the EU and a critique of the same”.38

Another research, by Karin Creutz-Kämppi, reflected on the imagining of Europe as a source of ones identity as well. She analyzed Finnish media that reported on the debate surrounding freedom of expression, after the Muhammad-cartoons39 were published in Denmark. Creutz-Kämppi argues that “the nation seems to be of less importance as a source of identification”, and that Europe has been given “the role of an entity where one's own and the right values and traditions are to be found.”40

One might define this as 'Europeanism', although other scholars have named this general process cosmopolitanism or globalism and presented it as an alternative to national

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37 Ibid., 440.
38 Ibid., 446.
identities. "It [cosmopolitanism] requires a simultaneous movement of transcending the cultural and political limits of nations and nurturing solidarity and commitment to universal values. Although national cultures divide, a cosmopolitan consciousness integrates by emphasizing commonality over difference."41 This implies that this specific imagined community contains some common ground regarding social norms that the community members can recognize and identify with. This kind of identification can be "constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group" according to Stuart Hall.42

An imagined community is not only constructed by shared characteristics or shared values, it in part gets “its distinct form and substance when it is mirrored against the idea of an outer collective."43 Or as Stuart Hall put it: “identities are constructed through, not outside, difference.”44 For these differences to take shape, more-or-less clearly defined boundaries for the in-group and the out-group must be imagined. These boundaries are part of a process that is referred to as Othering. This is perhaps best described by Nikolas Coupland: “What we can call Othering is the process of representing an individual or a social group to render them distant, alien or deviant. It is the construction of an out-group (‘out-grouping’), a process of social exclusion or marginalization.”45

The effect of an acknowledged Other on identity formation has been described by multiple scholars, and it’s link with globalism is eloquently described by Alev Çınar: “Globalism ... imagines a nation into existence simultaneously with a global order, on which a particular identity is projected that acts as the backdrop against which it places itself so as to define for itself a distinct and unique place and identity.”46 This can also be described as the creation and maintenance of an identity in relation to, what she describes as, a “global-Other”. Comparing and ranking this global-other to your standards becomes a way of self-identification. The relevance of an out-group (Other) for the group norms of the in-group (Self) is that “norms are not fixed properties of social groups; they are context dependent and

fluid representations that best capture the group in the context of other groups.”47 With this information it can be argued that an imagined community gets its identity, partly, from distancing itself from an out-group, and that the norms of these groups can be flexible depending on the context.

2.3 Mobilization and social media

An imagining of a community leads to a “deep, horizontal comradeship” which can be argued to be effective in mobilizing a public according to Anderson.48 The construction of a socially shared knowledge is vital in this process. Another key player in the mobilization of publics is “the identification of an enemy, the definition of a purpose and an object at stake in the conflict.”49 Having dealt with both concepts in the previous paragraphs, this will be a good time to further elaborate on the mobilization and motivation of publics and the role of social media on these processes.

Social media in general are considered to have a significant potential in the mobilization of publics, since they allow for a “greater flexibility to actively engage in the public sphere.”50 Social media possess the same mobilizing features that are considered to be inherent and unique to the Internet in general, such as the fact that information is freely available every hour of every day, but they have some additional features that make them suitable as mobilizing forces. These kind of features are called affordances, or the “characteristic of actions that a technology enables through its design.”51 When it comes to the mobilization of a public, certain individual characteristics (individual agency) have to be considered such as socio-economic status and motivation. Besides that there needs to be reflected on the structures “facilitating the spread of information and motivation of individuals to participate (mobilizing agency”).52

It can be argued that social media influence both the individual agency and the

52 Ibid
mobilizing agency because it has facilitated a new communication structure and form. In this new form of communication it can be argued that it is easier for individuals to engage and participate in formal and informal political discussions, due to the low threshold for participation. Furthermore it can be argued that users of social media platforms can be presented with information they were not actively seeking for. The 'news feeds' on social media and messages from friends and followers are potentially filled “with incidental cues and information about political issues that could result in greater engagement.”

It has further been hypothesized that younger people may be turning away from conventional citizen participation - such as registering as a member of a political party – and are moving into the direction of a more personalized and engaged participation: with elements such as “digital networking, volunteering and consumer activism.” Larger digital networks have been shown to be related to a higher level of (online) civic participation.

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3. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) offers interpretations of the meanings of texts, instead of quantifying textual features and deriving meaning from that. A fundamental assumption in CDA is that textual meaning is constructed through an interaction between producer, text and consumer. Reflecting on this will contribute to an understanding of the meaning of the articles that are posted on the websites of Pegida and AFA (“Laat ze niet lopen”) and help to answer the main research question: How do AFA and Pegida apply discursive strategies in order to mobilize their respective publics?

For this thesis a Sociocognitive (SC) approach to CDA will be used. The SC approach to CDA is linked to Teun van Dijk’s view on CDA, as is reflected upon by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer in their review of different methodological and theoretical approaches regarding CDA. This approach is based on the following assumption:

Social actors involved in discourse do not only use their individual experiences and strategies, they rely mainly upon collective frames of perceptions, called social representations. These socially shared perceptions form the link between the social system and the individual cognitive system, and perform the translation, homogenization and coordination between external requirements and subjective experience.56

The focus for CDA in this approach should be on linguistic markers such as rhetorical figures, coherence and word order. CDA is not so much a research method as it is a way of thinking about discourse from a critical perspective. Van Dijk states that CDA scholars are interested in “the way discourse (re)produces social domination, that is, the power of abuse of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse.”57

3.1 The three dimensions of the Sociocognitive (SC) approach to CDA

Van Dijk has compared texts and the interpretation of texts with icebergs: most of the meaning of a text is not determined by what is visible on paper but by what is assumed,

presupposed and implied in the text. The words and sentences are the top of the iceberg but the most prominent part of it is hidden beneath the surface. In order to reflect on the meaning of a text and what gives a text its meaning, it is essential to evaluate the underlying mechanisms that are involved in the interpretation and production of discourse. The Sociocognitive approach to CDA, keeps three elements in mind that are strongly connected to each other: the cognitive component, the social component and the discourse component. These three components will be presented in the following paragraphs.

**The cognitive component:**

The best way to illustrate the cognitive component is by the following, oversimplified but meaningful, schematic overview of one of the theories about discourse production, interpretation and processing. The overview is presented in **figure 1** and explained in the subsequent summary.

![Figure 1. Overview of discourse production, interpretation and processing.](image-url)
1. Language is initially processed in the Working Memory (WM) by analyzing the discourse in relation to underlying personal mental models. A mental model is a subjective representation of an event in the Episodic Memory (EM), which is a part of the Long Term Memory (LTM). The EM is the part of the memory where “our personal experiences are represented.”\(^{58}\) These experiences are unique to every individual language user. Two different types of mental models are considered with regards to *discourse processing*: a situation model (semantic) and a context model (pragmatic). Any given discourse is interpreted as being *coherent* “if the recipients are able to construe a mental model for it.”\(^{59}\) The *production of discourse* starts with a selection of information of the in the situation model under control of the context model.

2. The situation model is the starting point for the processing of language, at least with regards to its semantic interpretation. It represents what a discourse is about: interpreting what is explicitly expressed and what is implied by weighing in *shared knowledge*. Situation models represent the objects, persons, events and actions a discourse is about.”\(^{60}\)

3. Context models define how *appropriate* a discourse is in any given situation and control what information of the situation model can be communicated and how this should be done. A story about the same experience can differ based on who the recipient is and in what *genre* (e-mail, conversation, lecture) a discourse is produced. The story you tell your boss about what happened on last Friday’s party might significantly differ from what you tell your co-worker. This *appropriateness* is determined by the *knowledge device (K-device)* which is represented in the Semantic Memory (SM) on the one hand and the spatio-temporal settings, identity of the participants and aims on the other hand.

4. Context models are connected to a K-device which “regulates the complex management of *common ground* shared by the participants.”\(^{61}\) This K-device is constantly processing whether information should be explicitly expressed, or if it can be assumed that the information is known by the addressed public. Journalists don’t

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\(^{59}\) Ibid., 52.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 52.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 54.
have to write that bombs explode and kill people whilst reporting about a bombing. The fact that bombs explode is presumed to be general knowledge and shared by an epistemic community. Knowledge is multi-modal. A car for instance is a vehicle, but this is an abstract description of what it actually is: it is something you can feel, see, hear and touch. All recent and past experiences with cars can influence your knowledge about cars. If you have been in a car accident in the past this experience will have an influence on what you think about cars.

5. Socially shared knowledge is supposedly shared by a whole community, whilst attitudes and ideologies are only shared by members of specific social groups. These groups can only develop specific beliefs (attitudes and ideologies) if they have “generic sociocultural knowledge in common with the whole community.”\textsuperscript{62} An attitude about abortion for instance, whether it is pro-life or pro-choice, presupposes a shared knowledge about the concept of abortion. It are the different ideologies that shape the attitude from this socially shared knowledge. Ideologies and attitudes are thought to be schematically organized, containing elements like: a spatio-temporal element (time, place), participants (identities, self, other), actions or events and finally goals (aim of a movement or political party). Both attitudes and ideologies largely influence how we interpret and produce discourse.

\textit{The social component:}

The interplay between society and cognition became apparent in the previous paragraphs. It can be argued that socially shared knowledge has an influence on individuals, but the same is true for communities, groups and organizations. One could reflect upon the discourse production on a micro-level and on a macro-level, and whilst reflecting upon the latter it would be essential to include a reflection on power and domination. These can be defined as “a specific relationship of control between social groups or organizations.”\textsuperscript{63}

On a macro-level it can be interesting to evaluate how dominant groups control what information is communicated and how this relates to the dominated group. These kind of macro-level discourses can be implemented or replicated at the micro-level (individuals of that group) through the mechanisms described in the previous section. Discourse has a

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 92.

central role when it comes to the investigation of domination, macro-level societal problems and the cognitive mechanisms underlying these processes due to its effect on the mind of the addressed language-user.

The discourse component:
In SCA six steps of analysis⁶⁴ are proposed that can be used – when applicable – to analyze the discourse of a communicative event:

1. Analysis of semantic macrostructures: reflecting on the overarching theme, macropositions and subjects. The overall themes serve as a starting point for the analysis.

2. Analysis of local meanings: reflecting on deictic words, vocabulary, the choice of words and their implications. This also incorporates elements of presumed prior knowledge and an evaluation of how a supposed urgency is communicated.

Examples:
- **Deixis**: They, we, us, them, you, here, there.
- **Vocabulary**: use of military terms, use of conflict terms
- **Sentence structure**: use of the imperative mood

3. Analysis of ‘subtle' formal structures: reflecting on more subtle ‘less consciously controlled' indicators of underlying meanings. Such as structuring of the texts, grouping of terms.

Examples:
- **Structuring of texts**: the way in which a text is built and structured. Conscious and subconscious choices with regards to the structuring of texts can be helpful in order to investigate discourses.
- **Grouping of terms**: certain terms may be, consciously or unconsciously, grouped together and therefore influence the way in which a text is made sense of by its

4. Analysis of global and local discourse forms or formats: reflecting on how an overarching discursive strategy is found on a global (entire text) and local level (choice of word).

5. Analysis of specific linguistic realizations: such as the use of hyperboles, litotes and other figures of speech and linguistic elements. These specific linguistic features can be used strategically for instance when describing an Other or to motivate a public to come into action.

6. Analysis of context: an evaluation of the conditions that have facilitated this discourse. This is an analysis that is aimed at shedding light at the knowledge that needs to be present in the minds of the language users in order for a discourse to be appropriate and make sense.

These steps of analysis will help answer questions about how both Pegida and AFA construct the imagined community and how they construct an Other. Other potential discursive strategies can be characterized as well by using this approach to CDA. This will help to answer the main research question of this thesis. The following primary sources will be analyzed initially:

- “Pegida Nederland”\(^{65}\): The Prague Declaration was adopted by the Dutch branch of Pegida in order to mobilize a public for the European-wide demonstration on the 6\(^{th}\) of February.\(^{66}\)
- “Laat ze niet lopen”\(^{67}\): An article on AFA’s 'laatzenietlopen.blogspot.nl' regarding the demonstration that was announced by Pegida. In this article a counter-demonstration

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\(^{65}\) Full text can be seen in Appendix 2 as well since the website was saved as a pdf-file on the 10th of April, 2016. [http://www.pegidanederland.com/road-of-pegida-nederland/idemo-amsterdam/default.html](http://www.pegidanederland.com/road-of-pegida-nederland/idemo-amsterdam/default.html). Accessed on 10th of April.

\(^{66}\) Pegida initially also created a Facebook event regarding this demonstration. This post was deleted from the Pegida Facebook page before I had a chance to take screenshots of the Facebook event itself.

\(^{67}\) Full text can be seen in Appendix 3 as well as the website was saved as a pdf-file on the 10th of April, 2016. [http://laatzenietlopen.blogspot.nl/2016/02/english-german-spanish-translation-of.html](http://laatzenietlopen.blogspot.nl/2016/02/english-german-spanish-translation-of.html). Accessed on 10th of April.
is announced, which their addressed public is mobilized for. This article was also shared via the Facebook page of AFA Amsterdam.

3.2 Overarching themes and macropositions

The six steps of analysis in the SCA to CDA start off with a reflection on the semantic macrostructures or macropositions that are present in the texts of both AFA and Pegida. These overarching themes will be used to structure and present the additional steps of analysis. In the first phase leading up to this research I found four general and common themes in both texts: urgency, a European-wide relevance and shared history, threatening Others, and freedom of speech. These themes are heavily interlinked and have overlapping aspects with regards to their discursive manifestation in the analyzed texts. In the first step of this analysis the overarching themes and the macropositions of both AFA ($M_{\text{AFA}}$) and Pegida ($M_{\text{Pegida}}$) regarding these themes, will be reflected upon. This will serve as a starting point for the rest of the analysis. The further, more in-depth analysis, will be presented in the following chapter and will be illustrated with representative quotes from both movements' texts.

$M_{\text{AFA}}$: A common history is referred to in order to address and create a sense of commonality. Nazism, fascism, the holocaust and the Second World War are referenced. The article is translated into four languages hinting that its aim is to reach an international public. Protests in neighboring countries are referenced as well.

$M_{\text{AFA}}$: An Other is described as being a threat to society. Previous Pegida demonstrations and other right-wing demonstrations are referenced to in order to exemplify this threat. The elements summed up in $M_{\text{AFA}}$ are a part of the presupposed threat as well, as will be elaborated upon in the next sections.

$M_{\text{AFA}}$: There is a call for action - an urgency - that demands a mobilization of a public. The demonstration of Pegida needs to be thwarted to prevent the spread of racist and fascist ideology. AFA supporters are spurred on to attend the counter-

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68 The text itself was translated by the (anonymous) author or authors into English, German and Spanish. I will initially investigate the original Dutch text as this is my native language and compare this version with the English translation. I will use the author's translation (English version) whenever examples need to be incorporated into this thesis. Using the author's translation will prevent my own discourse from potentially 'contaminating' the implied meaning of this text during the translation process.
demonstration and come into action.

**M_{AFA4}:** The limitations to the *freedom of speech* are being contested. Pegida and right-wing protesters in general, or so is argued by AFA, have abused freedom of speech to facilitate Islamophobia and racism. The right of Pegida to express themselves is being contested.

**M_{Pegida}:** A *common history* is addressed by referencing a shared Western civilization that is claimed to be represented and defended. This text explicitly references common European roots. This implies this is an issue that transcends Dutch national borders, therefore an *international* approach is presented. The signatories of this text state to be representatives of different European nations.

**M_{Pegida2}:** An *Other* is described as being a threat to society. Islam is stated to be “conquering” Europe.

**M_{Pegida3}:** There is a call for action - an *urgency* - that demands a mobilization of a public. Therefore a joint demonstration is announced by Pegida to take place on the 6th of February 2016.

**M_{Pegida4}:** The limitations to the *freedom of speech* are being contested. Pegida claims to defend the freedom of speech alongside other “civic freedoms”. For the freedom of speech to be in need of defending, it must be contested.

These macropositions will be analyzed in order to answer the subquestions, which in turn will help to answer the main research question. The first two macropositions will help in answering the first subquestion: *How do both movements construct their addressed imagined community?* Building on this understanding, the third and fourth macroposition will contribute in answering the second subquestion: *How do both movements mobilize their respective publics?*

Following the analysis of the first two primary sources there will be a discussion about the use of the social media *Facebook* and *Twitter* by both AFA and Pegida. This will be a limited discussion because it has proven difficult to compare both movements with respects to their use of social media. Both AFA and Pegida had, at the time of the demonstration, Facebook events in which the demonstration (and counter-demonstration) was announced. Though Pegida removed this event from their Facebook page a short while after that event,
leaving no trace of it.

Though both sides do use both platforms to address their respective publics and by reviewing their social media pages with the events surrounding the demonstration of the 6th of February, we will get a better perspective of what their overall motivational strategies are and how social media can be used for the goals of both camps. This will help in answering the final subquestion: *How are social media used with respects to this mobilization?*
4. ANALYSIS

The layout of the following chapter, which as the title of this chapter suggests, contains the analysis of the texts that were used by Pegida and AFA to mobilize their respective publics. The first step of this analysis was already done by identifying the macropositions that were summarized in the previous chapter. These macropositions will serve as the mold in which the linguistic part of the discourse analysis will fit. In the first four sub-chapters an overview of the linguistic elements of the discourse that is produced by both movements will be given. This can be seen as steps 2, 3 and 4 of the six steps of analysis. In the fifth sub-chapter the ways in which social media (Facebook and Twitter) are used by both camps will be briefly analyzed. This will contribute to the contextual analysis that will follow in the sixth sub-chapter. This final part of the analysis will combine the fifth and sixth step of the discourse analysis as described in the previous chapter.

4.1 Common roots, Europeanism and imagined communities

Both AFA and Pegida appear to address an international public or claim to represent different European nations. In order to be able to effectively address such an international public there must be some shared knowledge about recent and historical European events which both sides can make use of in order to mobilize their publics. The following two text fragments are good examples of the discursive strategies that are used by both AFA and Pegida in this regard.

AFA: “The extreme right-wing Pegida wants to come together in Amsterdam to spread its racist ideology. They will gather in the former Jewish ghetto that got decimated during the Second World War.”

Pegida: “We refer to our common European roots, traditions and values as well as the historic alliances of our nations. We are prepared to risk our freedoms, properties, jobs and careers and maybe even put our lives at stakes, as it was done by the generations before us.”
Analysis of local meanings:

AFA's references to a shared common history could not have been any clearer aimed at drawing parallels with the Second World War, the holocaust and Nazism. In the first two sentences of their call-out they explicitly mention the “extreme right-wing”, the “former Jewish ghetto” and the war itself. The part about the description of the location is particularly interesting here. The square near the Stopera where the demonstration took place is a common place for public demonstrations. The choice to explicitly mention the history of this neighborhood, formerly known as “Jodenbuurt” or “Jewish neighborhood”, is meant to appeal to the commonly shared knowledge about the Second World War. The linguistic manifestation of these World War II references are obviously present and their meaning is unambiguous. These references become even more interesting though when they are placed in the context of their aspired effect on group identity and community formation, which will be reflected upon in a subsequent section. The fact that Pegida protesters from Germany, Belgium and Poland are mentioned in the text itself (not shown in the fragment) seems to imply a broader European relevance. This is also seen in the sentence: “Show them they’re not welcome. Not in Amsterdam or elsewhere in Europe.”

The links with Europe are explicitly mentioned in Pegida's Prague Declaration as well. In the first sentence it is stated that “the thousand-year history of Western civilization” is threatened through “Islam conquering Europe”. This thousand-year history is an interesting choice of word since it implicates a shared European history that has been around for a thousand years. This can either be an attempt to signify a long period of time or it is a reference to events that happened about one thousand years ago (the Crusades). At the very least it gives the impression of a united Europe with a shared history. The signatories subsequently introduce themselves as representatives of different European nations who refer to common European roots, traditions and values and historical national alliances. They are determined to “protect Europe” which they will “not surrender to our enemies”. It is striking that nine out of the thirteen sentences of the Prague Declaration start with “we” and that nine out of the thirteen sentences contain the word “Europe” or “European” at least once.

Analysis of 'subtle' formal structures:

It is noteworthy that only the English and Spanish version of the AFA's article explicitly mention Europe as a “society” in which Pegida is not welcome. The German version of the
article has a slightly different version in the introduction of the text: “eine europaweite Kundgebung”. This can be translated as “a European-wide demonstration”. The Dutch version of this article does not contain the word “Europe”, but it does contain a section in which previous demonstrations that have taken place in Germany, Belgium and Poland are referenced just as the other versions of this text. The fact that Europe is not explicitly mentioned in the Dutch version might be nothing more than an editorial inconsistency. A similar inconsistency can be found by comparing which Dutch cities are mentioned in the four versions of this text. The Dutch and German version only mention Amsterdam and Rotterdam, whilst the English and Spanish version also include Apeldoorn.

Perhaps one of the most striking things about the presentation of the Prague Declaration was the event that took place after the representatives of the participating right-wing movements signed the Prague Declaration. The representatives signed the document and concluded with a united chant: “We are Fortress Europe. Wir sind Festung Europa.” These representatives come from Slovakia, Estonia, Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Poland and the Czech Republic. This kind of chant brings up associations with a sports team at best, and an army at worst. They manage to present their message in a semi-formal way by choosing for this format. The title of the document on its own, the Prague Declaration, brings up associations with international declarations and declarations of independence. This is reinforced by the fact that all representatives sign the declaration. By signing this declaration Pegida and their like-minded collaborators seem to want to express a devotion to live up to the content of the declaration.

**Analysis of global and local discourse forms or formats:**

The references in AFA’s text presuppose a shared knowledge of and contempt for the horrors of the Second World War. It is safe to assume that “you” don’t want to be associated with Nazism, Hitler or the holocaust. Knowledge of these historical events and their reprehensible nature are implied to be part of some form of cultural inheritance in the addressed international public. AFA also states that “hundreds of people took to the streets to express their anger about a racist march through their streets”. This further contributes to the overall aim: convincing the reader that he or she is part of a community that shares common values and a way of life that condemns racism, fascism and intolerance. “You”, as a reader, are not

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alone in this supposed fight against “right-wing extremism”. “You” are a part of a larger community that has a responsibility to protect the common values of that community. Though this community is never specified or defined, it is nonetheless imagined in the minds of the address public. The international approach, noticeable by the three translations of this text and the content of the texts, is meant to strengthen the feeling of comradery and unity but it also has a more practical aspect. By speaking directly to an international public, in a multitude of languages, AFA attempts to mobilize as much people as possible. They even offer to find a place to sleep for anyone who wants to join the demonstration, but who doesn’t have a place to sleep in Amsterdam. This is a strategy that is meant to inspire a sense of togetherness and solidarity.

A similar imagined commonality regarding norms and values can be found in the Prague Declaration in which the following is written: “We refer to our common European roots, traditions and values”. These roots are not specified in this text, nor are the shared traditions. What is specified though, is what the representatives claim to fight for: “freedom of speech and our way of life together”. Freedom, sovereignty and civic liberties seem to be the basis of what the addressed public should defend, and therefore what they should commit to. This is the common ground for Pegida’s addressed public. This indicates that there is an imagined community that shares these values and that this community is being threatened by a dissonant community that doesn’t share these values. The word “we” is mentioned ten times in this text and nine out of the thirteen sentences in this text, start with “we”. Pegida’s text is overloaded with terms like “us”, “our” and “together” in order to create a sense of commonality and comradery. It is noteworthy that Pegida attempts to imagine and address a community that contains an anti-establishment attitude and an attitude that is aimed at conserving culturally shared European values. It is an imagined community that is “determined to protect freedom of speech and our way of life together” from those who try to impair this. Even if the risk of protecting those values is supposedly very high. At the same time it is a community that wants to end the “corruption, chaos and moral collapse that is brought by “the rules of global elites”. In both cases a large part of the self-image is derived from what it is mirrored against.

### 4.2 The Other

In the previous sub-chapter a brief analysis was given of how both Pegida and AFA attempt to
imagine a community with shared beliefs and common values. In addition to describing this commonality, it can be observed that both movements define a clear antagonist or Other. The Other can be discursively used to describe a risk to ones own community, beliefs and ideals. The following text fragments illustrate how both AFA and Pegida describe their version of the Other.

**AFA:** “Pegida is a German extreme right movement that pretends to be a group of concerned and upstanding citizens. However, appearances can be deceiving. Pegida claims to be against violence, while creating a space for violent racists and neo-nazis to come together and attack people.”

**Pegida:** “We will not surrender Europe to our enemies. We are prepared to stand up and oppose political Islam, extreme Islamic regimes and their European collaborators.”

**Analysis of local meanings:**
The occurrence of deictic words in both texts is very abundant. AFA uses words like “they”, “them”, “its” to position Pegida as an opposing force. With their explicit and implicit references to the Second World War, AFA defines Pegida’s otherness and the significance of this presumed threat. Terms like “facade”, “pretends” and “deceiving” are used by AFA to describe Pegida as a wolf in sheep’s clothing. In other descriptions in this text, Pegida is consequently linked to violence (“assault”, “attack”), racism and Nazis. With all these descriptions it is clear that AFA wants to inform their public that the Pegida protesters are a threatening group of Others that should be associated with violence and racism instead of and that one should not be deceived by their appearance of concerned citizens.

Pegida is just as outspoken about their self-declared enemies in the Prague Declaration. Political Islam, extreme Islamic regimes and “their” European collaborators are the proposed opponents of the “thousand-year history of Western civilization”. This declaration highlights the high risk that is associated with these Others such as the end of civilization and “our way of life”. The choice of words in the first paragraph of the Prague Declaration brings up associations with a military invasion. This is supported by the later statements about alliances of nations and the protection of borders. In addition to this threat
from the outside, Pegida also speaks out against the rule of the European and "global elites": stating that "their" rule has only brought poverty, unemployment, corruption, chaos and moral collapse.

Analysis of 'subtle' formal structures:
AFA makes a direct link from Pegida to Nazism, fascism and/or racism in twelve out of the thirteen sentences that contain the word “Pegida”. This illustrates what the emphasis of their text is: Pegida is ought to be depicted as being ideologically and morally comparable to Nazi’s and fascists. It is striking that references to the holocaust (“Jewish ghetto that got decimated”) are grouped in the same sentence as a deictic term (“they”) referring to Pegida.

Pegida's Prague Declaration on the other hand can, as a whole, be associated with for example declarations of independence. With its signatories representing those who claim to be a part of, and defending, the in-group and their opponents belonging to the out-group or conspiring with the out-group.

Analysis of global and local discourse forms or formats:
AFA predominantly points their finger at the Other, whilst Pegida seems to mainly attempt to increase solidarity and a feeling of togetherness. Both are aimed at excluding, distancing and distorting a representation of the Other as outsiders. Thereby seeking to widen the gap between the in-group and the out-group. The linking of terms like Nazism, fascism, racism and references to World War II to Pegida, is a strategy that is used by AFA to indicate that Pegida is made up of morally reprehensible participants. Furthermore AFA indicates that Pegida consists of violent racists that is going to try to “spread their racist ideology”. The use of the term “spread” in this context brings up associations with a virus or disease.

For Pegida the imagined Other is two faced or at the very least contains two elements. On the one hand there's political Islam and Islamic regimes and on the other hand the European political elite that collaborate with Islamic regimes. The first aspect is viewed as a conquering force in what might best be described as a clash of civilizations. This is a part of the strategy to gain support for Pegida’s demonstration and cause in general. Describing such a clash contributes to distancing an out-group from the dominant group. This is done by using ill-defined and vague terms with regards to cultural norms and values and by subsequently claiming that these values are being threatened. The second aspect is an anti-
establishment attitude that is also associated with certain populist political parties such as the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders. In this case it is more specifically an antipathy against the European and global political elite. This is an interesting attitude since Pegida is addressing an international European community whilst simultaneously distancing themselves from the European political elite that can be associated with the biggest symbol of European unity: the European Union.

4.3 Urgency & mobilization

To illustrate the way in which both AFA and Pegida attempt to mobilize their public, the two following text fragments were analyzed. These fragments will help to demonstrate the theme of urgency and mobilization which is closely related to the previous theme of the Other.

**AFA**: “*Laat ze niet lopen* is calling on you to resist against this extreme-right gathering. Come to Amsterdam that day and take action against the racists from Pegida! Don’t let them walk!”

**Pegida**: “Being aware of the fact that the thousand-year history of Western civilization could soon come to an end through Islam conquering Europe, we ... declare the following. We will not surrender Europe to our enemies. We are prepared to stand up and oppose political Islam, extreme Islamic regimes, and their European collaborators.”

**Analysis of local meanings:**

AFA makes use of imperatives in the entire text as is illustrated by the following examples: “Stop Pegida”, “make noise”, “take action”, “block them”, “don’t let them walk”. The use of these imperatives indicate a call to action. The addressed public is supposed to become an active participant instead of a passive reader after reading this text. AFA explicitly calls on its public to come into action and that “ignoring them [Pegida] is not an option anymore”. With these statements they mobilize their public. It is striking that AFA’s text suggests that Pegida has been ignored in the past, as this is mentioned multiple times, but that “you” can’t turn a blind eye to “them” anymore. By directly addressing their public, AFA attempts to motivate and engage the addressee.
Pegida on the other hand states that the “thousand-year history of Western civilization could soon come to an end” in the first sentence of their Prague Declaration. The urgency in this sentence could hardly be any clearer. The call for action is highlighted once more in a subsequent sentence in which it is stated that “it is about time to end this”. According to Pegida, action needs to be taken right away in order to prevent an invasion of Others or even the end of Western civilization. The authors of this declaration express their determination to demonstrate and to “risk their freedoms, jobs and lives” for this cause. Thereby they once more emphasize the necessity for action.

**Analysis of ‘subtle’ formal structures:**

The original “call-out”, as AFA call it, is in Dutch but the text is translated in English, German and Spanish as well. The translations deviate from the original text by adding a paragraph at the bottom of the text. In this section an international public is addressed by AFA: “If you want to come to Amsterdam and need a place to sleep, contact AFA Amsterdam and they will try to set you up”. This highlights the *implied urgency* of the counter-demonstration since it appears AFA wants to gather as many people as possible (including participants from other Western European countries) to attend the counter-demonstration. These potential foreign participants are specifically addressed by including these three translations. In AFA’s text it is also emphasized that it is of vital importance to prevent Pegida from “spreading their racist ideology” and that a student and immigrant area of Leipzig was attacked in a previous Pegida demonstration. The fact that Pegida is associated with violence and racism, is another attempt to signify the urgency of the counter-demonstration.

The Prague Declaration that Pegida presents to their public symbolizes a shared determination by like-minded movements from multiple European countries. It is a document that is supposed to come across as a determination to protest simultaneously in multiple countries. It can be seen as an invitation to the addressed public to subscribe to the content of the declaration itself and to come into action by joining the planned demonstration. It is noteworthy that the supposed adversary is not only Islam (“political Islam and extreme Islamic regimes”) but also their European collaborators (“the political elite”). The fact that these two are grouped together is an example of why the signatories of this declaration feel that “it is time to end this”. This *anti-establishment attitude* is linked to poverty, unemployment, corruption, chaos and moral collapse by the authors of this
Analysis of global and local discourse forms or formats:
The strategy that AFA uses to motivate their public to come to the counter-demonstration, can be seen by their use of terms that can be associated with violence. The supposed urgency of the counter-demonstration can be reflected upon by evaluating the choice of word to describe the Pegida demonstration. AFA describes the Pegida protesters as “extreme right-wing hooligans” and “armed neo-Nazi’s”. They are accused of intimidating residents and of being “violent racists”. By using terms that can be associated with hooliganism and violence, a threat is imagined that is supposed to motivate AFA’s public to act and join the counter-demonstration. The associations with the Second World War and Nazi’s were referenced in the previous sub-chapter and it can be argued that these references are the main source of the perceived threat level.

Pegida also makes use of the threat of a supposed enemy to mobilize their public. In the Prague Declaration it is implied that an enemy is at the doorstep (the borders of Europe) and that direct action is of vital importance. The use of words that can easily be associated with conflicts and war indicate that there is a looming threat that needs to be kept at bay. Words like “conquering”, “enemies” and “betrayed” all suggest that there is an upcoming conflict. On the other hand they use words like “protect”, “duty” and “alliance” to indicate that action can and needs to be taken to defend ourselves and Western civilization.

4.4 Freedom of expression
The final major theme that is present in both AFA’s and Pegida’s texts is a freedom of expression and the implied and explicit limitations to this freedom. The following two fragments stand out in both texts.

AFA: “By abusing the right to free speech and demonstration, right-wing extremists create a free space for the glorification of racism and Islamophobia. This freedom is just a facade for the intimidation of residents in the city where they are gathering.”

Pegida: We are determined to protect Europe, the freedom of speech
and other civic freedoms as well as our way of life together.”

**Analysis of local meanings:**

AFA clearly states that Pegida “abuses their right to free speech and demonstration” as Pegida creates a space for the “glorification of racism and Islamophobia”. Because of this AFA instructs its public to block and overwhelm the Pegida protesters so that their message can not be heard by others. This is part of a strategy that opts to silence the Other, as AFA argues that Pegida uses freedom of speech as a facade for intimidation. AFA explicitly states that even though groups like Pegida might be considered to be a fringe group, they will only remain on the periphery of society if they are “drowned out”.

Pegida in turn explicitly states that freedom of speech is at risk, though this is not aimed at AFA but at the Others that are described in the previous sub-chapter. Pegida and their like-minded signatories express their dedication to defend freedom of speech and other civic freedoms. With this they insinuate that the Other is a threat to freedom of speech. It is also mentioned in this declaration that the signatories are prepared to risk their “freedoms” and lives. With this statement they imply that it might be considered dangerous to speak out like this, thereby Pegida attempts to highlight the validity of their claim that freedom of speech is being contested.

**Analysis of ‘subtle’ formal structures:**

The name of AFA’s initiative “Laat ze niet lopen”, in Dutch literally means “don't let them walk”. It can also be interpreted as a statement imploring the reader to refrain from letting them escape or slip through the net. These statements contrast the right of assembly, demonstration and petition whilst simultaneously appealing to these same rights by requesting participation in a counter-demonstration. The right to free speech and demonstration are linked to intimidation and racism by AFA, thereby they attempt to legitimize their strategy that is aimed at silencing Pegida.

The Prague Declaration on the other hand can be seen as an invitation to its addressed public to subscribe to the same statements as the signatories of this declaration: symbolizing an outstretched hand instead of the hand-gestured stop sign of AFA (as described above). A declaration like this can have associations with historically more well-known declarations such as the United States Declaration of Independence. Additionally freedom of speech is
coupled to other, not explicitly specified, freedoms, “our” way of life, traditions and values. The fact that Pegida implies that Islam is threatening freedom of speech is heavily hinting at controversies such as the Muhammad-cartoon commotion and the suppression of women’s rights in Islamic countries, at the very least when compared to European countries. Speaking ill of deities or other theological heavyweights for instance doesn’t have as much impact on the speaker in Europe as it does in countries with Sharia-law.

**Analysis of global and local discourse forms or formats:**
Stating that Pegida abuses their freedom of speech to glorify racism and linking this to intimidation is a reminder to the *paradox of tolerance*: should we as a society set limitations to freedom of speech if that freedom can be used to express morally reprehensible opinions? And if so, what is freedom of speech if one can put arbitrary limitations on it? These are questions that will not be answered in this thesis, nor is there any work with the answers to these questions. It can definitely be argued that AFA is aiming to silence a voice that they deem unacceptable, it is the name of their initiative (Laat ze niet lopen). This is done by associating freedom of speech, or at least expressions by movements such as Pegida, with violence and racism.

Pegida on the other hand is strongly expressing that freedom of expression is being contested from the outside of the community, and potentially also from within by opponents such as AFA. Freedom of speech and the “other civic freedoms” that are mentioned are obviously phrases with a positive connotation. By implying that “you” risk the chance of being limited to these kind of freedoms, Pegida aims to gain support from every European citizen who values these freedoms, this can be seen as main motivational driver for Pegida’s addressed public. Pegida wants the reader of this declaration to feel like these rights are being contested and that action needs to be taken in order to protect these rights.

4.5 *The role of social media*
In the days leading up to the demonstration of February the 6th a Facebook event was created by AFA to bring the demonstration (and counter-demonstration) to the attention.⁷⁰ On these kind of Facebook events, social media users can express their potential interest in the event and discuss main and side-issues in the comments. It is also possible to share the event, or

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invite additional people to the event by sharing post within the social network. It can be put into question how many of the online “participants” will actually show up offline to join in a demonstration however. The Facebook page of AFA Nederland has 2,783 ‘likes’ at the moment of writing this thesis. The Facebook page of their campaign “Laat ze niet lopen” has 1,892 Facebook users who pressed the ‘Like’-button. These numbers are small compared to the Facebook page of Pegida Nederland which has 22,420 people who ‘Like’ their page at this moment. Based on the number of 'Likes' one would expect a large number of participants in the Pegida demonstrations, though there were only a few dozen participants in the Amsterdam protests.

On the page of this specific Facebook event both the organization and interested Facebook users shared information about the events surrounding the demonstration, thereby making use of the interactive opportunities that arise with this social media platform. One user inquires if he can get a ride from someone since he wants to come over to Amsterdam from Belgium. Another user shares a link that will redirect anyone who clicks on it to an overview of shops in Amsterdam that sell stadium horns, which in turn can be used to “drown out the Pegida protesters”. A third user posts pictures of a huge banner that he made on which a stop sign (with the text “Stop Pegida”) and a text that welcomes refugees, is visible. These three examples are illustrative of the mobilizing potential of social media and specifically Facebook. The involved potential participants use the page to discuss current events, spread the news and to motivate others to join in the counter-demonstration. The potential of social media to mobilize publics is further illustrated by the fact that AFA’s initiative “Laat ze niet lopen” published a map of the streets surrounding the demonstration and a time schedule on their blog\footnote{http://laatzenietlopen.blogspot.nl/2016/02/update-stop-pegida-in-amsterdam-kaarten.html. The website was saved as pdf-file on October 29, 2016. The full text can be found in appendix 6.} and their Facebook page a few days prior to the demonstration in Amsterdam. This can be seen in figure 2.\footnote{https://www.facebook.com/events/154176079488986/permalink/155336881656122/. Accessed on October 37.”}

![Figure 2. Screenshot of the Facebook page of ‘Laat ze niet lopen’ (footnote 72).](image-url)
Besides this information AFA also recommends the use of Twitter hashtags (#lznl and #nopegida) and inform their public that AFA will make use of a liveblog of the event on their website.\textsuperscript{73} With this AFA stimulates their followers to use social media and perhaps even more important: they stimulate their followers to consume and distribute information that is published by AFA. Even though AFA stimulates the use of social media, they also implore their public to think about what they publish online and to pay particular attention to be conservative with posting photo’s and video’s of themselves and their peers online. This is advised in order to prevent any incriminating information from leaking out and to prevent their “fellow demonstrators from danger”. Furthermore a phone number is provided of a group\textsuperscript{74} that will help and advise protesters if they are arrested. In addition to this they also provide the contact information of an affiliated lawyer’s firm. AFA also provides tips about what to do if one of the AFA protesters gets arrested (“don't accept any other lawyer than ours”, “don’t declare anything without consulting our lawyer”). The fact that it is explicitly mentioned that participants might get arrested, implies that AFA expects some of the protesters to cross the boundaries of what is tolerated by local law enforcement. It can even be interpreted as a form of condoning this kind of behavior, since they offer legal assistance if an AFA protester gets arrested and provide tips that can be used if law enforcement officials are encountered.

Besides these Facebook events other general tactics are used by AFA to inspire participation in demonstrations and to incite an interest in this social issue. A sub-branch\textsuperscript{75} of AFA (AFA Den Haag) for instance sent out a Tweet to express a sense of international solidarity against Pegida, this can be seen in figure 3. By including hashtags such as

\begin{center}
\textit{Figure 3. Screenshot of the Twitter page of AFA Den Haag (footnote 75).}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{73} http://www.laatzenietlopen.nl/. Accessed on October 29, 2016.
\textsuperscript{74} http://arrestantensteungroep.org/. Accessed on October 29, 2016.
#nopegida, #Amsterdam, #Praha, #Talinn, #Dresden and other cities, they aim to address a larger (international) public. This is most likely done in order to generate as much attention as possible for the counter-demonstrations and to inspire a sense of solidarity (which is explicitly mentioned as well) amongst an imagined European community. It is a telling example of the analysis from the previous sub-chapters, in which a transformation from nationalism to Europeanism was described.

In a Tweet by @laatzenietlopen that can be seen in figure 4, it is mentioned that Pegida representative Edwin Wagensveld propagates violence against the left-wing (AFA’s public) “fascists”.76 This is one of the tactics that can be observed in the Tweets that are sent out by AFA and their campaign 'Laat ze niet lopen'. AFA inspires a sense of urgency and danger in an attempt to mobilize their public by associating the Pegida protesters with violence. This discursive strategy can be observed throughout the majority of the texts that are published by AFA with regards to Pegida: there is a supposed imminent threat that needs to be kept at bay. This is perhaps best illustrated by an image that was posted online to announce the rescheduled demonstration a few weeks after the event of the 6th of February.77 The picture that was used in this Tweet can be seen in figure 5.

In this image we see a man with a dark skin tone punching a white, seemingly bald, cap-wearing man. In the background additional stereotypical “skinheads” are visible: bald-headed white men dressed in black bomber

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jackets accompanied by an unsmiling facial expression. It is noteworthy that the face of the man who delivers the punch is blurred, whilst the skinheads remain entirely recognizable. The image of this man punching the skinhead (associated with the more extreme right-wing movements) glorifies violence against “racists” and “Nazi’s”. The image is accompanied by a text which states the following: “Stop Pegida. Racists, get lost. Amsterdam free of Nazi’s.”

Pegida also uses makes use of the possibilities of social media to inspire solidarity and to mobilize their addressed public. It is worth mentioning that Pegida made use of a comparable event page that was distributed via their Facebook page, but it is impossible to still compare this event to the event initiated by AFA since Pegida removed their created event from their Facebook page a few weeks after the demonstration. The data had not been secured at that time, but it can be demonstrated that Pegida still makes use of similar events for upcoming demonstrations. The event pages are used in a similar fashion as described earlier: there is room for interaction between the users themselves and the organization. Since there is no source material available anymore on their Facebook page with regards to this demonstration, a more in-depth analysis will be provided about the Twitter page of Pegida Nederland.

Twitter account @PegidaNederland has sent out twenty Tweets between 5 and 7 February: a range from a day before the demonstration in Amsterdam until the day after the demonstration. It is remarkable to notice that the Twitter account @Laatzenietlopen sent out four times as many Tweets, to be specific, in the same time frame. Of these twenty messages, two Tweets can directly be interpreted as an invitation to join in the demonstration. Nine Tweets were remarks, photos and videos by Pegida that addressed the counter-demonstration and the supposed violence that was used by the counter-demonstrators. All other Tweets sent in this small sample, were reactions addressed to Twitter users who posted critical comments about Pegida.

In a Tweet that was sent a day before the demonstration, Pegida addresses its public to join in the demonstration to fight for a country “that’s free of Islam”. In a discussion with a disagreeing Twitter user, Pegida further elaborates that “we don’t pay taxes or work everyday,

79 https://www.facebook.com/pegidanederland/events/. The website was saved as pdf-file on October 29, 2016.
80 The full text can be found in appendix 7.
82 https://twitter.com/search?f=tweets&vertical=default&q=from%3APegidaNederland%20since%3A2016-02-05%20until%3A2016-02-07&src=typd&lang=en. Advanced search option on Twitter.
for the well-being of fortune hunters and *rapefugees* who don’t contribute anything*"*82, as can be seen in figure 6. This is a statement that addresses both the imagined Other (fortune hunters, refugees, strangers) and the imagined community that is supposedly represented by Pegida: the hard working, tax paying citizens of the Netherlands. It can be argued that Pegida spends a significant portion of their Tweets on addressing and maintaining their construction of the Other and on trying to get their addressed public to sympathize with Pegida’s self-attributed duty as protector against this Other. This self-attributed duty as protector becomes even more apparent in a Tweet that was sent out a day after the demonstration in Amsterdam, in which they state they are “here to stay, and will continue this fight with you.”83 This Tweet can be seen in figure 7.

It is therefore striking that Pegida also often positions itself as a *victim* instead of a protector. A few days after the demonstration in Amsterdam, Pegida Tweeted that they were “threatened and bombarded with stones, fireworks and smoke-bombs despite the 700 police agents that were present.”84 Another example is the fact that the police received a warning about a bomb threat, which resulted in the forced scattering of a gathering of Pegida protesters. It is implied by Pegida that this bomb threat was staged by Pegida’s opposition in order to thwart their

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Another part of their strategy to position themselves as victim, is to incriminate their opponents or anyone who is critical about Pegida. On the day of the demonstration Pegida Tweeted about a “socialist attacking a journalist” and that “the lying press [or Lie press; in Dutch: Leugenpers]” won’t report about such an attack. With this statement it is implied that the (mainstream) media are biased and have a political agenda which leads them to keep silent about certain events or observations. Another way in which critical voices are incriminated can be seen in a Tweet that is shown in figure 8. This Tweet which shows a still (screenshot of a video fragment) in which a well known left-wing activist (Frank van der Linde) is shown with his right arm in the air, supposedly doing a Hitler salute whilst infiltrating the Pegida demonstration in an attempt to incriminate Pegida.

This Tweet has two functions. On the one hand it incriminates a notable opponent (Frank van der Linde) and on the other hand it implies that the opponents are infiltrating Pegida demonstrations in order to sabotage them (Pegida). It must be made clear that there is no sign of a Hitler salute in the original video footage. In that footage you just see a man who is bringing his right arm in the air to make a fist. If you pause the fragment at the correct time however, before the hand is clenched into a fist, you see what Pegida claims to be a Hitler salute.

One last interesting aspect about Pegida’s strategy to mobilize their public is that it appears that Pegida has assimilated multiple social issues and added them to their cause in an attempt to gain additional support. A banner that they have been using recently shows a wide range of social issues. This implies that if you have the same stance as Pegida on one of these

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88 http://www.pegidanederland.com/asdemonstratie/default.html. The website was saved as pdf-file on October 29, 2016. The full text can be found in appendix 8.
social issues, you probably also align with them with regards to the other issues. Which obviously is not necessarily the case, but it does make an appeal to a larger audience possible. The banner show the terms “Nexit”, which is a variant on Brexit (the departure of Great Britain from the European Union) that took place in 2016. Another one of the terms is “Stop ritual slaughter”, which would appeal to everyone who is against ritual slaughter and the suffering that is inherent to this kind of butchering. The most prominent example of a “side-issue” however, at least for Dutch citizens, is that of “Black Pete”. Pegida Nederland explicitly mentions they want to keep Black Pete, which should appeal to a more conservative and patriotic part of the Netherlands. The character Black Pete is the helper of Sinterklaas (the Dutch version of Santa Claus) and is highly controversial in the Netherlands due to him being painted black, with big red lips, a curly wig and golden round earrings. An increasing amount of Dutch citizens consider this to be a racist residue of slavery, which in turn has led to a counter-movement who claim it is not racist but part of “our” culture. The social debate about Black Pete, and if he is the face of a harmless tradition or a living reminder of slavery, has intensified in the 2010’s. The fact that Pegida assimilates the Black Pete-debate into a bigger debate about national culture (with Pegida also including the immigration and refugee issues) is symptomatic for their strategy to appeal to a community with a tendency for patriotic attitudes.

4.6 Analysis of specific linguistic realizations & context analysis
There is a similarity between both protest movements: both address a European community that is imagined by juxtaposing a sense of shared norms and values to that of an out-group. What makes these both protest movements differ from each other are the implicit and explicit references that are used by both sides to appeal to the presupposed knowledge that is present in the minds of the recipients of both publics. In this section the merits of the presupposed knowledge will be reflected upon.

The threat of the Pegida protesters, as implied by AFA’s text, is based on historical associations with Nazi’s and acts of violence that occurred during previous demonstrations. The aim of this analysis will not be to dismiss these acts of violence, but to investigate how the perceived threat is constructed in the text and in the mind of the addressed public. AFA’s text is filled with explicit and implicit references to Nazi’s and Hitler. The aim of this is to convince the addressed public that Pegida protesters share similarities with Nazis, fascists
and racists. This addresses a socially shared knowledge of a European community, by referencing what can be considered to be common knowledge in Europe: the holocaust, the Second World War and Hitler. This is done in order to fill in a presumed knowledge gap that exists about Pegida in the minds of the addressed. Since Pegida is a relatively new protest movement it is feasible that their exact ideals and thoughts are relatively unknown. AFA fills this gap by making explicit comparisons with the extreme-right, Nazi's and racists. By referencing the arguably darkest pages of modern European history AFA appeals to the emotions of their public. Knowledge of these historical events and their reprehensible nature are implied to be part of a form of cultural inheritance in the addressed international public. To be sure that AFA’s public doesn’t brush off Pegida as just another populist movement, AFA aims to convince their public that Pegida is made up of violent Nazi's and that they need to be silenced in order to prevent horrors like the holocaust from happening ever again. It can be argued that these references are not based on reality, but that is not the main point that has to be made here: the fact that these associations are made, functions as the incrimination of an Other and with this the Other is put at a distance from the in-group.

It is noteworthy that Pegida does incorporate the Swastika in some their banners, though they use the Nazi-symbol as a way to distance themselves from associations with it. The logo can for instance be seen in a rubbish bin accompanied by the logo’s that are used by AFA, IS and the Kurdish PKK. Pegida therefore acknowledges the fact that associations with Nazism are being made by their opponents and certain media outlets. It is also noteworthy that the extreme-right Dutch Peoples Union sees Pegida as false friends who are part of a “Zionistic complot” that “even show anti-Nazi flags”. This can be interpreted as a sign that Pegida should at the very least not be classified under classical notions of neo-Nazi movements, and it can be argued that Pegida can best be classified as a right-wing populist movement.

According to Pegida there is a supposed oncoming conflict between two civilizations. Pegida introduces this clash of civilizations by referring to a “thousand-year history of Western civilization”. This is later specified by adding that they [Pegida] refer to “common European roots, traditions and values”. Referring to common European roots, traditions and values is based on an assumption that the addressed public has some knowledge of these

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traditions. Common European roots can reference to a period that ranges from the ancient Greeks to a post-World War II Europe. It is up for debate how many, if any, traditions and values are shared throughout European countries. This can also refer to a wide range of concepts such as a Judeo-Christian ethical tradition and the Enlightenment. The mentioning of the thousand-year period is interesting as well. This might just be Pegida’s way of indicating that Western civilization, which is never clearly defined by Pegida but more on these types of vague descriptions later, has been around for a very long time. It is also a possibility however that this is a reference to the Crusades which started more-or-less a thousand years ago in the late 11th century. The Crusades would be relevant from Pegida’s point of view as a reminder of the most memorable push-back against an Islamic invasion in Europe. It can be observed that these concepts are intentionally kept vague, and this vagueness has a function: “it [vagueness] can be used to attribute negative characteristics to outgroups or to represent the ingroup as a victim of the outgroup”.91 Additionally this vagueness can help Pegida in addressing a large public that they claim to represent, without ever specifying whose and what ideals, thoughts or beliefs they protect.

The Others themselves are purposefully kept vague as well: “political elites”, “political Islam” and “extreme Islamic regimes”. The political elite probably refers to European politicians like German chancellor Angela Merkel who originally introduced a so-called open-door refugee policy in Germany. This would be in conflict with Pegida’s thoughts on immigration since they explicitly state that they want to protect the “borders of their country and their right to decide which immigrants to accept and which not to accept into their country”. Juxtaposing themselves against these “political elites” is part of an anti-establishment attitude that is adopted in order to appeal to Pegida’s addressed public. An anti-establishment attitude is also considered to be a characteristic of populist movements such as the Dutch PVV of Geert Wilders. This kind of anti-establishment attitude is in line with a “general loss of confidence in the political system”, as has been described by Jörg Michael Dostal with regards to the sudden rise of Pegida in Germany in the last few years.92 Combining this observation with the impact of certain current events such as the increase of Muslim terrorist attacks in Europe and the rise of IS in Syria and Iraq since 2014, and it

becomes clear that there is a potential breeding ground for the imagining of an out-group that is threatening an in-group.

Recognizing the emerging attitudes that become apparent in the discourse of both Pegida and AFA can be telling of their underlying organizational ideologies. Ideology can be defined as the beliefs, ideas and ideals of social groups, their interests and their relations to other groups. Ideologies are expressed and shaped in discourse and can affect a multitude of related attitudes. Ideologies and attitudes are shared only by specific groups, whereas social knowledge is shared by a significant part of a community. Evaluating the group-specific attitudes contributes in explaining how these groups relate to other groups and if there is an indication of power abuse or domination.

In this specific case it can be argued that both movements seek to exclude an Other from “our community”. Thereby effectively seeking to silence a voice they deem intolerable. With this they strive to dominate their version of the Other. By highlighting the threat of an Other, be it “violent Nazi’s” or “extreme Islamic regimes and the political elite”, both movements express the need to work together in order to protect the in-group from this outside threat. This is a strategy that is aimed at inspiring solidarity.

Both sides are notably vague about who is a part of the community that is supposedly threatened, but this vagueness is functional since it is a way to address a larger public. This public subsequently needs to be convinced that there is no time for nuance: action needs to be taken immediately to keep “our” society safe. The Other is to be excluded from joining the in-group. They are not welcome in the tolerant society and community that is imagined by both protest movements.

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CONCLUSION

Analyzing both AFA's and Pegida’s online and offline texts leads to an answer on the main research question: How do AFA and Pegida apply discursive strategies in order to mobilize their respective publics? It can be argued that both movements share certain similarities in their approach to mobilize their respective publics.

Both movements address and claim to represent an imagined European community that is being contested by an out-group. This out-group in its turn is a group that should be prevented from speaking out or from joining the in-group. The Other should not be tolerated. By inspiring a sense of international commonality and solidarity via offline and online communication, both movements attempt to mobilize their respective publics into action: striving to exclude an imagined out-group.

It is noteworthy that both right-wing and left-wing activists appear to be moving towards 'Europeanism' as one of the driving forces for the mobilization of their respective publics and as form of self-identification. This finding supports and elaborates on existing literature like the research that was done by Karin Creutz-Kämppi in 2008, in which she argues that the nation and nationalism are becoming of less importance when it comes to identification and group formation in debates surrounding the European Islam-debates.

The results from this thesis imply that this shift to 'Europeanism' is not specific for either side of the political spectrum, but might be considered to be a more widespread shift: with opposing ideologies and attitudes implicitly and explicitly addressing an imagined international or global community. The case study from this thesis provides a clear example of the development and manifestation of discourse production and processing through opposing beliefs, attitudes and ideologies. These beliefs can only be developed if the members of the addressed group have a sociocultural knowledge in common with the other members of that community.

This shared European history and commonality is used by both protest movements, albeit in different ways, to discursively imagine an in-group through self-identification and an out-group by juxtaposing an Other against this in-group. This is in accordance with previous research like that of Alev Çınar from 2010 in which she described the creation and maintenance of an identity in relation to, what she describes as, a “global-Other”. Comparing and ranking this global-Other to your standards becomes a way of self-identification and
isolates an in-group from an out-group.

This is an observation that is expanding on existing literature like that of Monica Sassatelli who argued that the concept of a shared European consciousness would emerge if a European identity would be promoted and protected by those who are politically motivated to maintain this image of a European community. Identifying how this European community is imagined on two sides of the political spectrum is significant because it supports the concept that an imagined international community is becoming more prominent. This provides new insight that can be used to reflect upon major world events such as the seemingly paradoxical prominence of patriotic populist anti-EU movements in Europe who seek support and solidarity from their congenial European neighbors.

This phenomenon might spark a wider range of new research in which subjects related to an imagined international community can be investigated by multiple research fields or an interdisciplinary approach that combines the historical, linguistic and psychological aspects of this topic. Furthermore this thesis provides a concrete example that can be used as inspiration to further dissect underlying mechanisms and linguistic manifestations of discourse production and discourse processing, especially when it comes to topics that fuel the political debates and dominate the public debate.

This is particularly relevant on a more ideological level in which the sense and nonsense of the discursive strategies that are used by protest movements on both sides of the political spectrum can be identified. Even though it can be argued that both protest movements address a larger international community and are moving beyond the borders of nations and nationalism, the addressed community is still based on a conflict-oriented world view in which self-images are primarily defined by describing what the community is not. There is a hope however that a transformation from nationalism to 'Europanism' is a step towards 'globalism' and a dedication to pursue universally shared values: focusing on commonality over differences.
FUTURE RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS

It needs to be acknowledged that the analysis that was used in this research has its limitations. A Sociocognitive Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis is ideally an interdisciplinary approach that builds on sociology, social psychology, biology, linguistics and historical research fields. It is outside the scope of this thesis to incorporate a complete understanding of all these fields into one thesis, though my background as a Biology student does spark my interest in such an interdisciplinary approach. Ideally this kind of analysis is done by researchers who are either schooled in one of the research fields that are mentioned before, or who can let academics from other fields join in on their research.

In this thesis I have briefly looked at some aspects that usually are outside the scope of journalism studies in order to shed a light on discourse processing and interpretation. The analysis itself is primarily inspired by literature that was written by Teun van Dijk, though I must address the fact that his approach is not the only approach that could have been adopted for this kind of research. There is not one approach to Critical Discourse Analysis that can be considered to be the best, though I am convinced that the Sociocognitive Approach is especially useful in this kind of scenario. It provides insight into the way in which our minds give meaning to language. This is in my opinion essential to incorporate if one wants to look at discursive strategies. It would also be fascinating to delve deeper into the underlying mechanisms that facilitate the interpretation of discourse.

Another limiting factor for this thesis is the fact that the administrators of the Facebook page of Pegida removed the event page for the demonstration that was studied in this thesis. This made the social media analysis harder to do and more difficult to compare to their AFA counterparts. The use of social media and websites by similar movements becomes increasingly interesting with regards to the international aspects that were addressed in this thesis due to the potential of these media to reach an international public. A future research might want to put the focus primarily on the use of social media regarding the imagining of international publics.

As a whole this thesis can be used as a starting point for additional research about international communities. If I can contribute in any way to an interdisciplinary understanding of the complexity of discourse production and processing with regards to the imagining and mobilization of international publics, then I will view this thesis as a success.
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Appendix 1: Pegida campaign slogan: “No Islam, just freedom”
Appendix 2: The 2016 Prague Declaration
PRAGUE DECLARATION

Being aware of the fact that the thousand-year history of Western civilization could soon come to an end through Islam conquering Europe, and the fact that the political elites have betrayed us, we, representatives of different European nations, declare the following:

We will not surrender Europe to our enemies. We are prepared to stand up and oppose political Islam, extreme Islamic regimes, and their European collaborators.

We are prepared to risk our freedoms, properties, jobs and careers and maybe even to put our lives at stake, as it was done by the generations before us. It is our duty to future generations.

We refuse to submit to the Central European government. The rules of the global elites have brought only poverty, unemployment, corruption, chaos and moral collapse. It is about time to end this.

We fully respect the sovereignty of European nations and the right of the people of every European country to govern their matters as they see fit.

We esteem as sacred the right of the citizens of every European country to protect the borders of their country and their right to decide which immigrants to accept and which not to accept into their country.

We refer to our common European roots, traditions and values as well as the historic alliances of our nations. We are determined to protect Europe, the freedom of speech and other civic freedoms as well as our way of life together.

We will manifest this determination by our participation in a joint demonstration which will take place in many European cities on February 6, 2016.

[Signatures]

[Names]
Appendix 3: Blog post on the website laatzenietlopen.nl: “Stop PEGIDA deze zaterdag in Amsterdam”
DINSdag 2 FEBruARI 2016

Stop PEGIDA, deze zaterdag in Amsterdam!

"EngliSh, German & SPaniSH TRANSLATiOn OF THE CALL-OUT
BELOW THE JUMP"

Op zaterdag 6 februari wil het extreem-rechtse Pegida in Amsterdam op het plein van de Stopera (in de voormalige joodse concentratie-buurt waar in de oorlog duizenden Amsterdammers zijn weg gevoerd) samenkomen om daar hun racistische en neo-fascistische gedachtegoed te verspreiden. 'Laat Ze Niet Lopen' roept op je te verzetten tegen deze extreem-rechtse bijeenkomst. Kom ook naar Amsterdam en laat je horen tegen de racisten van Pegida! Laat Ze Niet Lopen!

Pegida is een van oorsprong Duitse extreem-rechtse beweging die zich graag voordoet als nette en bezorgde burgers. Maar schijn bedriegt, op eerdere Pegida demonstraties in Utrecht en Rotterdam brachten Pegida aanhangers de Hitlergroet en vielen ze anti-racisme activisten en omstanders aan. Ook bleek de demonstratie grotendeels te bestaan uit rechtseextremisten en neo-nazi's uit Duitsland, Vlaanderen en Polen. Ook het groepje Nederlandse Pegida demonstranten bestond bijna geheel uit bekende neo-nazi's. Pegida zegt geweldloos te zijn maar creëert wel de ruimte voor gewelddadige racisten en neo-nazi's om bijeen te komen en mensen aan te vallen. Bij de laatste Pegida demonstratie in Leipzig kregen ze meer dan 1,500 neo-fascisten en extreem-rechtse hooligans op de been en trokken er 250 gewapende neo-nazi's een spoor van vernieling en geweld door de plaatselijke studenten en migranten wijk.

LaatZei NietLopen.nl, een initiatief tegen racisme, roept op om de ruimte voor het extreem-rechtse Pegida op zaterdag 6 Februari aanstaande zo klein mogelijk te maken en zelf actie te ondernemen tegen de komst van rechts-extremistische actievoerders. Fluit ze uit, overstem ze, blokkeer, laat zien dat ze niet welkom zijn! Negeren is geen optie, Pegida zal hoe dan ook aandacht krijgen en hun racistische gedachtegoed proberen te verspreiden.

MELDPUNT OVERLAST
EXTREEMRECHTS / NVU

Heb jij in je gemeente stickers, flyers of andere propaganda van (bijv.) de neonazistische Nederlandse Volks-Unie (NVU), PEGIDA, ID-verzet of Voorpost gesignaleerd? Laat het ons weten. Bedankt!

WAT DOET LAAT ZE NIET LOPEN?

Filmpje ook op Vimeo te zien.

STEUN LAAT ZE NIET LOPEN!

Doneren

BLOGARCHIEF

► 2016 (31)
  ► april (2)
  ► maart (11)
  ► februari (11)

tijdlijn #Iznl stop Pegida
Amsterdam 27 feb (geslo... 
Infopunt & actiekaarten / info-
punt & action maps...
Laatste info stop PEGIDA
Amsterdam/ Last info stop...
Vrijheid van meningsuiting
Door het recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting en demonstratie te misbruiken, creëren de rechts-extremisten een vrijplaats voor de verheerlijking van racisme en islamofobie. Die vrijheid is slechts een façade voor het intimideren van de bewoners van de stad waar in zij samenkomen.

Protest!
Bij de eerdere bijeenkomsten van Pegida kwamen honderden mensen de straat op om hun woede over de racistische optocht door hun straten te uiten. Soms wordt extreem-rechts als marginaal weggezet. Extreem-rechts blijft alleen marginaal door hen te overstemmen, een weervoord te geven en een massaal tegengeluid te laten horen. Negeren is geen optie meer.

Het is verstandig om www.laatzenietlopen.nl in de gaten te houden voor het laatste nieuws over de Pegida demonstratie en tegenacties. Ook kan je 'Laat Ze Niet Lopen' volgen op Twitter en Facebook. In de aanloop naar, en op de dag van het tegenprotest voorzien wij in de laatste informatie, kaartjes van de omgeving en infostructuur.

Kom 6 Februari in actie tegen Pegida en stop de opmars van extreem-rechts! Laat Ze Niet Lopen!

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6-2-2016 Stop the racist, Europe-wide, PEGIDA gathering in Amsterdam

On Saturday February 6th, the extreme right-wing Pegida wants to come together in Amsterdam to spread its racist ideology. They will gather in the former jewish ghetto that got decimated during the second world war.

'Laat Ze Niet Lopen' is calling on you to resist against this extreme right gathering. Come to Amsterdam that day and take action against the racists from Pegida! Don’t let them walk!

Pegida is a German extreme right movement that pretends to be a group of concerned and upstanding citizens. However, appearances can be deceiving. At earlier Pegida gatherings and marches in the Netherlands in Utrecht, Rotterdam and Apeldoorn Pegida supporters made the Hitler salute and attacked anti-racist activists and bystanders. The majority of the demonstrators appeared to be right wing extremists from Germany, Belgium, and Poland. The group of Dutch Pegida protestors was composed almost entirely of known Neo-Nazis. Pegida claims to be against violence, while creating a space for violent racists and neo-nazis to come together and attack people. At the last Pegida
demonstration in Germany in Leipzig more than 1,500 neo-fascists and extreme right-wing hooligans attended and over 250 armed neo-nazi’s attacked the student and immigrant area of town in an organised and pre-planned assault.

LaatzeNietLopen.nl, an initiative of AFA-the Netherlands against racist demonstrations and gatherings is calling on you to make the space for the extreme right Pegida as small as possible on February 6th, and to take action against the arrival of extreme rightwing activists in town. Make noise, drown them out, block them, and show them in uncertain terms that they’re not welcome! Not in Amsterdam or elsewhere in Europe.

Ignoring them is not an option. Pegida will get attention anyway and will try to spread their racist ideology.

Freedom of Speech
By abusing the right to free speech and demonstration, rightwing extremists create a free space for the glorification of racism and islamophobia. This freedom is just a facade for the intimidation of residents in the city where they are gathering.

Protest!
At earlier Pegida actions, hundreds of people took to the streets to express their anger about a racist march through their streets. The extreme right in the Netherlands is sometimes viewed as merely being a fringe group. The extreme right will only remain on that fringe though if people consequently drown them out and speak out against them. Ignoring them is not an option anymore.

It is a good idea to keep an eye on www.laatzenietlopen.nl for the latest news about the Pegida gathering and counter actions. You can also follow ‘Laat Ze Niet Lopen’ on Twitter and Facebook. Leading up to and on the day of the counter-protest, we will provide the latest information, maps of the area and an infrastructure.

If you want to come to Amsterdam and need a place to sleep, contact AFA-Amsterdam and they will try to set you up.

Take action against Pegida on February the 6th, and stop the march of the extreme-right! Don’t let them walk!

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Am Samstag, den 6. Februar, will die rechtsextreme PEGIDA in Amsterdam eine europaweite Kundgebung organisieren um ihr rassistisches Gedankengut zu verbreiten. Laat Ze Niet Lopen (“Lass sie nicht laufen”) ruft zum Widerstand gegen diese rechtsextreme Veranstaltung auf. Komm auch und setz dich ein gegen die Rassisten von Pegida! Lass sie nicht laufen, no pasaran!

LaatZeNietLopen.nl, een Initiative tegen Rassismus, ruft jeden auf, den Raum voor de Rechtsextremen van PEGIDA am 6. Februar zu klein wie möglich zu halten. Pfeif sie aus, überstimm sie, blockier sie und lass sie vorallem merken dat sie nicht willkommen sind! Sie ignorieren kommt nicht in Frage, denn PEDIGA wird in jedem Fall Aufmerksamkeit erregen en ihr Gedankengut versuchen te verbreiten werden.

Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung
Unter Missbrauch des Rechts auf freie Meinungsäußerung en des Rechts auf Versammlungsfreiheit erschaffen die Rechtsextremisten Raum für die Verherrlichung van Rassismus en Islamophobie. Diese Rechte benutzen sie nur als fadenscheinige Rechtfertigung um die Bewohner der Stadt, in der sie sich versammeln, einzuschüchtern en zu bedrohen.

Protest!
Manchmal wird Rechtsextremismus als marginales Problem abgetan. Rechtsextremisten blijven aber nur ein marginales Problem wenn man ihnen entgegen tritt en man massig Gegenstimmen hören lässt. Über Rechtsextremismus hinwegsehen ist keine Option mehr. En so gingen schon während früheren PEGIDA-Märschen hunderte Menschen auf die Straße um ihren Wut über die rassistischen Kundgebungen zu äußern.

Ob PEGIDA wirklich die Zustimmung erhält um auf dem Dam ihre Manifestation te halten of ob sie eine Ausweichmöglichkeit zugewiesen bekommen is im Moment noch nicht sicher. Wir raten also, sich auf laatzenietlopen.nl auf dem Laufenden zu halten, oder sich auf de Facebook- bzw. Twitter-Seite von Laat ze niet lopen zu informieren. Vor und während des Gegenprotests versorgen wir euch auch mit aktuellen Infos, Karten van de Umgebung en weiteren.
Schlafplätze können in gewissem Ausmaße auch organisiert werden. Wenn PEGIDA europaweit mobilisieren kann, können wir das schon lange.

Werde also am 6. Februar aktiv gegen PEGIDA und stoppe den Aufmarsch der Rechtsextremen. Lass sie nicht laufen!

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Paremos al grupo racista PEGIDA a su llegada a Amsterdam!

El sábado 6 de Febrero, el grupo de extrema derecha Pegida quiere hacer una marcha desde la Plaza Dam con el objetivo de propagar su ideología fascista. “Laat Ze Niet Lopen” hace un llamamiento a la resistencia contra este grupo, manifestándose en su y boikoteando su marcha. No les dejemos marchar!

Pegida es un movimiento de extrema derecha alemán que se presenta como un grupo de ciudadanos concienciados y preocupados, sin embargo las apariencias engañan. Pegida ya ha organizado marchas anteriormente en los Países Bajos; en Utrechet, Rotterdam y Apeldoorn se presentaron con saludos nazis y ataques racistas a los viandantes. La mayoría de sus componentes son simpatizantes de la extrema derecha de Alemania, Bélgica y Polonia. El grupo holandés de Pegida está compuesto casi enteramente de conocidos neo-nazis del país. Pegida dice estar en contra de la violencia, pero perpetúan ataques violentos. En la última manifestación de Pegida en Leipzig acudieron más de 1.500 neo-nazis y simpatizantes de la extrema derecha alemana, muchos de ellos armados y atacaron los barrios de estudiantes e inmigrantes de la ciudad en un ataque planeado.

LaatzeNietLopen.nl, quiere abrir una iniciativa junto a AFA-Paises Bajos para frenar la próxima manifestación de Pegida el día 6 de Febrero y hacerles saber que sus ideas no son bienvenidas en Ámsterdam, ni en ningún lugar de Europa. Ignorarles no es una opción. Pegida conseguirá la atención de los ciudadanos y medios de comunicación, e intentarán propagar sus ideales racistas.

LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN

Bajo el amparo del derecho a la libre expresión, estos neo-nazis glorifican el racismo y la islamofobia. Esta supuesta libertad es solo una fachada para la intimidación y la violencia en contra de los residentes de las ciudades en las que se manifiestan.

MANIFIÉSTATE

En las primeras manifestaciones de Pegida, cientos de personas tomaron las calles para expresar su rechazo a las marchas racistas en
las ciudades. La extrema derecha en los Países Bajos es vista como un pequeño grupo aislado, pero solo seguirá siéndolo mientras haya personas que se manifiesten públicamente en su contra. Ignorarlos no es una buena opción.

Se desconoce por el momento si las autoridades permitirán la manifestación de Pegida delante del monumento nacional a los caídos en la Plaza Dam o se hará en otro lugar. Continuaremos informando de las últimas novedades en www.laatzenietlopen.nl o en el perfil “Laat Ze Niet Lopen” de Twitter o Facebook, así como mapas del área e infraestructuras de la zona.

Si quieres venir a Ámsterdam y necesitas un lugar para dormir contacta AFA-Amsterdam e intentaremos ayudarte.

Actúa contra Pegida el 6 de Febrero. Paremos la marcha de la extrema derecha. No les dejemos marchar!

GEPLAATST DOOR LAATZENIETLOPEN.NL OP 22:45
Dit aanbevelen op Google
ZATERDAG 6 FEBRUARI 2016

Pegida’s haat duidelijk niet welkom in Amsterdam, Mokum #kwaminverzet!

Terwijl een grote massa Amsterdammers van alle achtergronden een meer traditionele protest demonstratie hielden bij de Dokwerker op het nabij gelegen Jonas Daniel Meijerplein besloten honderden mensen directer in verzet te komen tegen de poging van het extreem-rechtse PEGIDA om zich te manifesteren in de hoofdstad.

De neonazi’s van het aan het Blood&Honour netwerk gelieerde DTG probeerde als eerste passerende tegendemonstranten en de op een nabijgelegen terras borrelende F-Side te provoceren en werden op hun wenken bediend. Elders in de stad waren het Poolse en Duitse nazi’s die de confrontatie zochten met passanten met een Arabisch uiterlijk en eensgezind door omstanders duidelijk gemaakt werden dat zij, en dit soort gedrag, niet welkom waren in Amsterdam. Ondertussen zorgden vele creatieve prikacties, spandoek “banner drops” (in de directe omgeving van de Stopera en op het Centraal Station) en massale druk op de ME linies er voor dat de demonstratie van PEGIDA niet alleen niet kon beginnen maar dat zelfs na slechts één uur alle extreem-rechtse demonstranten in GVB bussen de stad al weer uit werden gebracht door de politie.

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tijdlijn #lznl stop Pegida Amsterdam 27 feb (geslo... Infopunt & actiekarten / info-point & action maps... Laatste info stop PEGIDA Amsterdam/ Last info stop...
Laat Ze Niet Lopen is trots op en dankbaar voor de vele mensen die vandaag letterlijk hun vrijheid en gezondheid op het spel hebben gezet om een bijeenkomst te voorkomen die nooit had mogen plaats vinden. Immers zoals een oudere demonstrant opmerkte; “de laatste keer dat fascisten onder politiebegeleiding deze buurt afsloten was het om de laatste bewoners af te voeren naar een vernietigingskamp”. Wij kunnen alleen maar hopen dat, als de burgemeester zo nodig groepen willen laten manifesteren wiens expliciete doel is om al de vrijheden van anderen te willen afnemen, niet gebaseerd op hun handelen maar op zaken als hun afkomst of kleur, dat dit weer net zoals in het verleden op een winderige uithoek in het havengebied gebeurt.
Laat ze niet lopen! - protesteer tegen extreem rechtse demonstraties! Pegida's haat duidelijk niet welkom in Amsterdam, Mokum #kwaminverzet!

http://laatzenietlopen.blogspot.nl/2016/02/pegidas-haat-duidelijk-niet-welkom-in.html

Tenslotte, wees vanavond voorzichtig, er zijn nog steeds groepjes gefrustreerde nazi's en fascisten in de stad op zoek naar wraak. En vanzelfsprekend vergeten wij de vele mensen niet die vandaag door de politie zijn opgepakt terwijl ze hun morele plicht tegen het heropkomend fascisme vervulden. Alle arrestanten ogenblikkelijk vrij!

Toen niet, nu niet, nooit meer fascisme!

#LaatZeNietLopen

bron: oog op amsterdam

hooligans, bekende fascisten en neo-nazi's. Wil je ook wat doen tegen extreem rechtse demonstraties hou deze blog dan in de gaten. Hier kun je lezen wat voor tegenprotesten er worden georganiseerd elke keer als extreemrechts de straat op gaat. Laatzenietlopen.nl is een campagne van AFA (AntiFascistische Actie)

Volg ons en wordt vrienden op onze social media:
facebook.com/laatzenietlopen.nl
twitter.com/laatzenietlopen
laatze-nietlopen.hyves.nl
youtube.com/laatzenietlopen
vimeo.com/laatzenietlopen

MIJN VOLLEDIGE PROFIEL WEERGEVEN

ZOEKEN IN DEZE BLOG

Tweets by @Laatzenietlopen

(1/2)Gisteren #Pegida #denhaag. Openlijke neonazi-symbolen niet bestraft door politie + toegelaten door organisatie
Laat ze niet lopen! - protesteer tegen extreemrechtse demonstraties! Pegida's haat duidelijk niet welkom in Amsterdam, Mokum #kwaminverzet!

http://laatzenietlopen.blogspot.nl/2016/02/pegidas-haat-duidelijk-niet-welkom-in.html
Appendix 4: Column on Dutch news website rtlNieuws.nl: “Ongemakkelijke observaties”
Geert Gordijn is verslaggever voor RTL Nieuws.

Ben je een fascist als je constateert dat antifascisten zich misdragen? Als ik reacties aan mijn adres op Twitter mag geloven wel. Kennelijk zijn sommige observaties ongemakkelijk.

In Amsterdam werd gisteren gedemonstreerd tegen de opvang van asielzoekers door anti-Islambeweging Pegida. Een aangekondigde demonstratie waar een vergunning voor was gegeven. Die vergunning was er ook voor een anti-Pegidademonstratie, een paar honderd meter verderop en twee uur eerder. En dan was er nog een derde demonstratie, waar geen vergunning voor was. Ook anti-Pegida, maar ik zag er niet veel van dezelfde gezichten als bij de 'officiële' anti-bijeenkomst.

Die derde demonstratie was een spontane samenkomst van mensen die vinden dat Pegida een fascistische, racistische club is die het recht niet heeft om in Nederland te demonstreren. Zij gingen zo dicht mogelijk bij de Pegida-demonstratie staan en werden door een overmacht aan ME'ers op afstand gehouden.

"Er is zelfs iemand die meent dat mijn observatie is ingegeven door het feit dat RTL onderdeel is van 'de nazaten van het persbureau van Hitler'"

Over hoe gevaarlijk of ongevaarlijk Pegida is voor de Nederlandse maatschappij kun je discussiëren, maar dat was niet waarvoor ik gisteren in Amsterdam was. Ik was er namelijk om verslag te doen. Van de eerste (anti-Pegida)bijeenkomst bij het standbeeld van de Dokwerker. En daarna van de Pegida-demonstratie en de aanwezigheid van tegendemonstranten bij het stadhuis.


Een observatie die me op Twitter het verwijt opleverde dat ik het gedachtegoed van Pegida kennelijk 'beschaafl' vind. En, toen ik op deze kromme redenering niet in ging, het verwijt dat ik weggijk voor extremisme. Er is zelfs iemand die meent dat mijn observatie is ingegeven door het feit dat RTL onderdeel is van 'de nazaten van het persbureau van Hitler'.

"De taal die door antifascisten werd uitgeslagen was een stuk grover dan die van de Pegida-aanhangers"

Dat Pegida-aanhangers zich beter gedragen dan de tegenpartij is eerder in Utrecht door een collega ook al geconstateerd. Mijn eigen observaties: de taal die door antifascisten werd uitgeslagen was een stuk grover dan die van de Pegida-aanhangers. Ik heb zelden zo vaak het woord 'kanker' als verwensing horen roepen. Natuurlijk gingen de commentaren in het Pegida-kamp ongetwijfeld ook...
verder dan 'Kaas is de baas' en ' Isis krijg de tyfus', waar ik over twitterde. Maar wat ik ook hoorde bij Pegida: de herhaalde megafoon-oproep aan de aanhangers om zich niet te laten provoceren en het beschaafd te houden.

Misschien zegt het genoeg dat onder de 20 arrestanten die gister werden opgepakt meer mensen uit het anti-kamp waren dan uit het Pegida-kamp. En misschien spreek je ook wel boekdelen van de Pegida-demonstranten uiteindelijk in bussen moesten worden afgevoerd omdat ze aan alle kanten omsingeld waren door antifascisten van wie de politie niet vertrouwde dat ze het geweldloos zouden houden.

Appendix 5: Twitter page of Pegida Nederland: Leugenpers
Zonder excuses vanuit @nos, zullen wij duidelijk laten blijken dat bij volgende demo deze Leugenpers niet welkom is!

natasja @natasja_dankers
Zo zo mevrouw Karin Albers van de leugen pers waar blijft je excuses @PegidaNederland # we wachten....

Alfred Kok @AlfredKok1 · 16 feb.
@PegidaNederland @NOS @natasja_dankers is @karinalberts (met t) trouwens

infidelhatesharia @infidhatesharia · 16 feb.
@PegidaNederland @NOS @natasja_dankers vuile bitch, vast een linkse rakker!!

natasja @natasja_dankers · 16 feb.
@PegidaNederland @NOS het zou de @NOS sieren als ze excuses maken...tijd voor de waarheid 🤦‍♂️
Appendix 6: Blog post on the website laatzenietlopen.nl: “Update - Stop PEGIDA in Amsterdam”
DONDERDAG 4 FEBRUARI 2016

Update stop PEGIDA in Amsterdam (kaarten, info, etc)

*ENGLISH TRANSLATION + PRINT OUT MAPS AFTER THE JUMP*

PEGIDA heeft van de burgemeester uiteindelijk het plein voor de Stopera (gemeentehuis/opera) aan de Amstel-zijde toegewezen gekregen. Zij mogen hier van 15.00 tot 17.00 samenkomen. Op de PEGIDA website vragen ze hun deelnemers om om 14.30 al te verzamelen omdat ze verwachten dat er na 15.00 niemand het plein meer op mag. De verwachting is dat veel Pegida deelnemers met de metro zullen komen of hun auto zullen parkeren in de parkeergarages nabij de IJ-tunnel.

De brede burgercoalitie tegendemonstratie "Vluchtelingen welkom, racisme niet!" mag van 13.00 tot 15.00 op het zeer nabij gelegen Jonas Daniel Meijerplein (de Dokwerker) manifesteren.

De gemeente heeft aan bewoners in de buurt per brief gecommuniceerd dat er gedurende de demonstraties “door de Mobiele Eenheid een permanente linie zal worden gevormd” (waarschijnlijk ter hoogte van het Waterlooplein/Blauwbrug en bij de fietsbrug van de Stopera richting Staalstraat).

#LaatZeNietLopen heeft vanaf 12.00 een informatie punt in de kelder van boekhandel Het Fort van Sjakoo, hier kan je informatie krijgen over de actuele situatie, kaartjes van de arrestanten steun groep (AG). Het informatie punt vind je op de Jodenbreestraat 24 tegenover de Theaterschool/naast het Rembranthuis. Mocht de politie de toegang tot het info punt afsluiten zullen indien nodig reserve locaties worden gecommuniceerd via de infotelefoonlijn en de social media.

Het nummer van de infotelefoonlijn gedurende de dag is 06-26 68 86 41, realiseer je dat dit niet alleen een nummer voor informatie van #LZNL naar jou toe is maar ook voor informatie van jou naar #LZNL en je mededemonstranten, geef informatie

MELDPUNT OVERLAST EXTREEMRECHTS / NVU

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WAT DOET LAAT ZE NIET LOPEN?

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MEER INFORMATIE  IK SNAP HET

Doneren

BLOGARCHIEF

▼ 2016 (44)
► oktober (2)
► september (4)
► augustus (1)
► juni (4)
► april (4)
► maart (11)
▼ februari (11)

tiidlijn #lznl stop Pegida Amsterdam 27 feb (geslo...
Infopunt & actiekaarten / info-point & action maps...
die jij hebt en misschien belangrijk is dus ook door aan ons. Hou de communicatie wel kort en bondig en ga er vanuit dat de politie mee luistert. SMS waar mogelijk, dit houdt de lijn vrij en komt altijd aan.

Gedurende de dag houden wij een tijdslijn bij op http://www.laatzenietlopen.nl en op twitter via @laatzenietlopen, als jezelf twittert, gebruik de hastags #lznl en #nopegida. Denk goed na over wat je wel en wat je niet op internet zet, ook wat betreft foto’s en video. Breng je mededemonstranten niet in gevaar, ook als de door hun gekozen actievorm niet de jouwe is.

Gedurende de dag (en indien nodig de dagen na zaterdag) is ook de Arrestanten steun Groep (AG) bereikbaar, zij geven ondersteuning aan mensen die gearresteerd worden en zorgen voor de communicatie tussen arrestanten en de buitenwereld. Als je ziet dat mensen gearresteerd worden of als je vermoedt dat je vrienden zijn opgepakt, neem dan met hun contact op.

Hun nummer is 06-42 41 34 96 en ook bij hun geldt, hou de communicatie kort en bondig zodat de lijn zoveel mogelijk vrij blijft, noem geen namen over de telefoon of wat mensen gedaan zouden hebben. Meer informatie op http://arrestantensteungroep.org/ en via info[at]arrestantengroep.org

Mocht je onverwacht gearresteerd worden, vraag dan naar een advocaat van het kantoor Jebbink Soeteman Advocaten, zij zijn bereid je te verdedigen. Hun nummer is +31 (0)20 53 53 390 Accepteer geen advocaat van de piketdienst, alleen je eigen advocaat van dit kantoor, wat de politie je ook probeert wijs te maken. Verklaar niets tot je je advocaat hebt gesproken!

In de avond is er een demonstratie tegen vrouwenhaat/seksueel geweld vanaf 20.00 op het Spui waar wij alle mensen van harte willen aanmoedigen aan deel te nemen. Aanleiding voor deze demonstratie was een gepland wereldwijd evenement van beruchte antifeministen op onder meer deze locatie, deze gaat dankzij de aangekondigde demonstraties niet meer door, de protest demonstratie echter wel!

Tevens zijn er in de avond meerdere culturele activiteiten in de stad, extra aandacht willen we graag besteden aan het benefiet voor de Koerdische strijd tegen het IS/DAESH fascisme en de dictatoriale Turkse overheid in het Spinhuizen. Adres en tijden vindt je op de #LZNL actiekaart.

Let goed op elkaar,
Laat Ze Niet Lopen!

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Update stop PEGIDA in Amsterdam (maps, info, etc)

The mayor gave PEGIDA in the end permission to gather in front of the cityhall/opera house located on the Waterlooplein at the Amstel canal side. They can meet there from 15.00 till 17.00. On the PEGIDA website they request their members to gather already at 14.30 because they expect that after 15.00 no one will be allowed to enter the square. The expectation is that many Pegida members will come by subway/metro or will park their cars in the parking garages near the IJ-tunnel.

The broad civilian coalition counter-protest “refugees welcome, racism not!” can demonstrate from 13.00 until 15.00 on the very nearby (500 meters) Jonas Daniel Meijerplein. This is the location of the monument for the anti-nazi strike of 1941.

The city communicated towards the people living in the area that a “permanent riot police line” will be formed throughout both demonstrations, this will be probably be around the Pegida location.

The number of the info telephone during the day is +31 6 26 68 86 41, do realise this is not only a number for you to get information from us but also to give information to us and your fellow activists. So contact us also if you see or know stuff, we should know maybe too. Keep the communications short and to the point and assume the cops are listening in too. SMS when possible, this keeps the line free and always arrives even if the line is busy.

During the day there will be a live ticker on http://www.laatzenietlopen.nl and on twitter through @laatzenietlopen. If you twitter yourself, use the hashtags #lznl and #nopegida. Use your brain about what you decide to share online, especially when it comes to pictures and video.
Do not endanger your fellow activists, even when their choice of tactics is not yours.

Saturday, and if necessary the following days is also the Support group for Arrested activists (arrestantengroep or AG in Dutch) in action, as the name implies they give support to arrested activists but also to those left on the outside. If you see someone getting arrested or are missing friends and suspect they are arrested, contact them.

Their number is +31 6 42 34 96 and also with them; keep communication short and to the point so the line stays free, do not mention names or what people might have done or are accused of over the telephone. More information you can find on http://arrestantengroep.org (here you can also find an brochure about Dutch foreigner detention) and through info[at]arrestantengroep.org

If you do get arrested ask for a lawyer of the firm Jebbink Soeteman Advocaten, they will defend you. Their number is +31 20 53 53 390. Do not accept a lawyer from a different firm no matter what the police tries to tell you, Do not make any statement to the cops until you spoke to your lawyer!

In the evening there will be a demonstration against misogyny/sexual violence at 20.00 on the Spui square that we encourage everyone to attend. This demonstration was called to counter a worldwide event by anti-feminist creeps. The event

the Kurdish people in their fight against the fascism of ISIS/DAESH and the dictatorial Turkish government. Location and time can be found on the action-map.

Keep each other safe,

Laat Ze Niet Lopen! (No Pasaran!)
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**MEER INFORMATIE**  **IK SNAP HET**

**you can pick up these maps also for free at the info-point**

GEPLAATST DOOR **LAATZENIETOPEN.NL** OP **17:58**

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Nieuwer bericht  Startpagina  Ouder bericht
Appendix 7: Facebook page Pegida (events): “Pegida Nederland voor het behoud van”
PEGIDA Nederland voor het behoud van onze cultuur

DEMONSTRATIE - 13 NOVEMBER -14:00 UUR - DEN HAAG

VOLGENDE MAAND

NOV
13 Pegida Nederland voor het behoud van onze cultuur
Zo 14:00 · 43 gasten

Maurice Meijer vindt de video Augmented Reality Brings Your Printed Photos to Life van Virtuality leuk.
Anne Eggens vindt de foto van Rene Reif leuk.
Dorothea Jensma heeft op de video van DWDD gereageerd.
Mahaut Dufour vindt BIM 2016 leuk.
Karim Kwint heeft een herinnering gedeeld. 1-jarig jubileum
Aranka De Jong heeft haar evenement gedeeld met de groep Groningen Online Market. Kom straks gezellig rondkijken tijdens de tweedehands kledingverkoop!
Jasper Venema vindt de video Mexico 2015: Bottas and Raikkonen collide van F1 leuk.
Alex van der Weij heeft gereageerd op de reactie van Melissa Schild.

Daphne Drenth
Jennie Steegstra 9m
Eric Fisherman
Pieter Slotweg
Frank Huurman
Janneke Visser
Daniëlle Suur
MEER CONTACTEN (5)

Anne Eggens
Appendix 8: Website Pegida Nederland: “a.s. Demonstratie”
A.S. DEMONSTRATIE

NIEUWS NIEUWS NIEUWS NIEUWS NIEUWS

We zien je graag op 13 november!

meer info binnenkort over locatie, tijd etc.

Samen sterk voor ons vaderland!
Wij zijn trots om Nederlander te zijn!

Twitter: @PegidaNederland
Website: www.pegidanederland.com
Facebook: www.facebook.com/ pegidanederland

Pegida Nederland voor het behoud van onze cultuur

Demonstratie - 13 November - 14:00 uur - Den Haag