The European Union’s member states commitment to
Human Security within ESDP

Case studies: Ireland and Czech Republic

Master thesis
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Introduction

In 2001, Kofi Anan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, spoke the following words about two old opposite concepts, war and peace: “We must <…> broaden our view of what is meant by peace and security. Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

This statement was directed towards world leaders, academics and public and spoke about a fairly new concept: Human Security. Although Human Security originates from 1994, the discussion about this concept reached its zenith about a decade later. Shortly after the speech by Kofi Anan, several academics and researchers gathered around to form a Human Security Study Group (HSSG) in London. The goal of the group was to write a document that would argue in favour of a Human Security doctrine to be implemented as an overarching framework of ideas for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - the third European Union (EU) pillar. Their efforts will form the basis of my thesis question. The HSSG focused on ESDP missions performed from 2000 - 2005. First, the HSSG developed a set of six (in the final edition) basic Human Security principles. Their starting point was that the current EU international missions and common views within the CFSP / ESDP are to a large extent conform to their Human Security principles. Second, they based their conclusion on a rather limited number of case-studies, looking only at the performed ESDP missions, and not at the key-actors of ESDP: the EU member states.

The member states of the Union control CFSP / ESDP and in such respect also determine if a Human Security approach will be implemented as a doctrine in this third EU pillar. This statement is derived from the liberal intergovernmentalist theory, which will be explained in more detail in chapter 1. The HSSG studied multiple ESDP missions where the six Human Security principles where to some extent present. The assumption I make, derived

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4 See Annex: A for a list of ESDP missions studies by the HSSG and a complete list of ESDP missions that have been taken into account for this thesis.
from the liberal intergovernmentalist theory as explained in chapter 1, is if Human Security principles are present in ESDP missions, they should be also present within the EU member states, at least in their foreign policy. Because the member states determine the outcome of the most outspoken form of ESDP, civilian-military missions, the Human Security principles are top-down implemented by the EU member states in the ESDP missions. However, if only a small group of EU member states share the Human Security principles, will the idea of a Human Security guided framework for ESDP be feasible? Therefore, the aim of this thesis will be to find out: To what extent are the Human Security principles present within and determining the EU member states policy on European Defence and Security Policy?

As the ESDP is a fairly new policy framework, in contrast with the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other international organizations focussing on civilian-military missions with possible Human Security related ideas integrated in their policies, it is chosen as the central object of research in this thesis. Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters, the exact role of the ESDP in the international civilian-military mission arena has not yet been determined by the EU member states. Therefore, the study conducted and the suggestions presented by the HSSG are interesting to analyse and need to be tested on their feasibility.

In chapter 1, a short introduction on the European integration debate will be given and then the liberal intergovernmentalist theory will be discussed. The liberal intergovernmentalist theory consists of three integration phases. These three phases are: policy demand, policy supply and supranational cooperation. Each of these three phases will be explained in detail with an emphasis on the CFPS pillar. The goal of this chapter is to explain that EU member states are the primary forces of European integration within the CFSP. The HSSG report on Human Security as an overarching framework for ESDP missions looked at the civil-military EU missions. By assuming that these civil-military EU missions are lead by EU member states, the Human Security principles which the HSSG found in these ESDP missions are therefore imported by the EU member states, at least in their foreign policy. The primacy of the EU member states in these ESDP missions and the presence to a certain extent of Human Security principles in these ESDP missions, allow me to give an answer to the thesis question.

In chapter 2, the Human Security concept will be discussed in the first two parts of the chapter. The first part introduces the central value of Human Security, that of human rights. The second part of chapter 2 discusses the disputed concept of Human Security, as there are
many doubts about its feasibility as a useful academic tool and as a practical way to conduct policy in foreign and defence matters. In the third section of chapter 2, the HSSG report will be discussed and its six Human Security principles will be presented. In the final section of chapter 2, Human Security and ESDP are applied to the liberal intergovernmentalist theory. The goal of this chapter is to analyse possible relationships between Human Security and ESDP within the three phases of the liberal intergovernmentalist theory.

In chapter 3, two quantitative analyses will be conducted. The two questions of this chapter are to see if there is: 1) a statistical significant relationship between the EU member states policy towards ESDP and the six Human Security principles as presented by the HSSG? 2) a combination of Human Security principles which is the most feasible for EU member state policy to be used in ESDP?

Before both questions can be answered, the dependent variable (EU member states policy towards ESDP) and the independent variables (the six Human Security principles) have been translated into measurable variables. The dependent variable, or outcome variable, was measured by analysing the level of ESDP commitment of an EU member state using two indexes. The independent variables, or explanatory variables, were measured using several other indexes and databases. How this was done will be explained in first section of this chapter. For the first question a multiple regression analysis has been conducted, using a mathematical model of the thesis question.

For the second question a fairly new measurement method has been used: the Fuzzy-set method. This method will be explained in section 1 and in more detail in section 3 of chapter 3. In short, this method allows me to rank EU member states according to their level of Human Security principles present within their national foreign and defence policy. Moreover, using the Fuzzy-set analysis also provides possible combinations of independent variable (the six Human Security principles) that have the highest coverage in explaining the dependent variable (the level of ESDP commitment of an EU member state). This Fuzzy-set method has been rarely used for questions such as my thesis question; therefore this test in itself is also experimental and the usability of this method is thus heavily dependent on my selection of measurement indicators of the dependent and independent variables. Nevertheless, such an experimental approach is able to give some new interesting insights, such as a more random selection of case-studies.

In chapters 4 and 5, two case-studies are conducted. The selection of the two case-
studies is determined by the outcome of the Fuzzy-set analysis in chapter 3. Two cases, the most positive case (Ireland) and the most negative case (Czech Republic) were selected as case-studies. More case-studies would have been preferable, yet due to space limitations only two could have been selected. In these case-studies, two EU member states will be analysed on their Human Security principle merits. Moreover, where their ESDP commitment cannot be explained by the Human Security principles, other national and international incentives are discussed. Using Moravcsik’s theory gives tools for finding these explanations and incentives of EU member states policy on ESDP. Each of the three phases will give a clear insight on the policy demand of national preference formation, the policy supply of interstate bargaining, and the supranational cooperation of institutionalisation. This last phase is the most difficult to analyse because the ESDP is fully intergovernmental. Therefore it is necessary to analyse these three phases on a governmental level. Moreover, some forms of institutionalisation do slowly emerge, e.g. with the formation of EU battle groups or with the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA). According to the liberal intergovernmentalist theory the thriving factor for the institutionalisation within the ESDP are the EU member states.

In short, the outcomes of the regression analysis, the fuzzy-set method and the two case-studies are able to measure to what extent the Human Security principles are present and determining within EU member states policy regarding ESDP. The liberal intergovernmentalist theory will now be discussed, as the key-actors of ESDP will be the main level of analysis in this thesis.

Chapter I: European Union integration

1.1 Debate

The debate in the 1990ies on the integration process of the European Union can be roughly divided between two major theories: liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.\(^5\) The latter theory argues that the supranational institutions of the EU have been the driving force behind further European integration process. The former theory states that it has been the member states who allowed, after a bargaining process, that further integration will take place. Yet both theories conceive preferences as economic, either from transnational interest

groups and supranational actors or the member states. Moreover both theories focus on distributional bargaining among interest groups, either at supranational level or at a national level.6

This paper examines an intergovernmental pillar of the EU, a pillar where only the EU Council has full authority on all matters. Alongside the theoretical debate on the European integration, a discussion is taking place between the members of the EU Council on the strategic direction of the EU CFSP / ESDP, in particular on the use of the European Security Strategy (ESS) within the CFSP / ESDP pillar.7 This discussion is ongoing since the establishment Maastricht Treaty of 1993 and mainly deals with the extent of integration of foreign and defence policy; whether to keep power with the sovereign national states (nationalists’ position) or transfer the national foreign policy increasingly to the European Union within the CFSP / ESDP pillar (supranationalist’s position). This discussion is for example strong between member states who favour a more supranationalist approach (Belgium, the Netherlands, but also Germany) and those member states who favour a more intergovernmental approach for the EU CFSP (United Kingdom, France, Denmark).8 Where the non-EU countries and international organizations already view the EU more or less as one block, the EU is trying to conform to this image and meanwhile keeping its member states assured that their sovereignty in the field of foreign and defence affairs will not wither.9 For the analysis of the European integration process the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism as written by one of its most proponent authors, Andrew Moravcsik, is used. He published in 1998 a book which explains the liberal intergovernmentalist view on European integration.10

The core idea of his book is that the integration process adheres to three successive stages: “patterns of commercial advantage, the relative bargaining power of important governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments”. 11 In short, when

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9 E.g. with the establishment of the position of President of the EU Council, currently held by Herman van Rompuy and the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, currently held by Catherine Ashton.
11 Ibid., p. 3.
preferences between states converge, integration advances.\textsuperscript{12} Moravcsik argued ten years later in a paper more or less the same position about the EU integration, but he has been able to structure his ideas more comprehensible and calls his theory the New Synthesis. He reformulates the three stages of EU integration, but the essence of the three factors remains the same: interdependence and the nature of national preferences, asymmetries and the nature of interstate bargaining, and the credibility of commitments and institutional delegation.\textsuperscript{13} In the next section each of these three stages of the New Synthesis will be explained in relationship with the CFSP pillar. In chapter 2 the New Synthesis theory will be linked with the concept of Human Security and ESDP.

1.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism

1.2.1 Policy Demand

The first stage of EU integration which Moravcsik mentions deals with interdependence and the nature of national preferences of EU member states. The underlying idea here is that national governments assist and promote the preferences of powerful national producers within the present domestic policy process. According to Moravcsik, the main factor that made European governments create alike policy across a wide range of issues was the interdependence between industries in Europe. Technological and economic trends, as well as exogenous shocks, dictate the EU integration.\textsuperscript{14} Although Moravcsik mainly focuses on the economic forces of integration, he is unable to come up with a new vision on the integration within the realms of foreign and defence affairs. As he mentions in his book *The Choice for Europe*, predictions about variation across issues and countries in the CFSP pillar follow another explanation.

This explanation is called the *Geopolitical Ideas and Interest: Security Externalities*, which is contrary to the explanation which Moravcsik champions: *Political Economic Interests* as main force of integration. He contests the core element of the *Security Externalities* explanation, which states that economic integration is not an end in itself, but a

\textsuperscript{12} The definition Moravcsik uses for *national preferences* when he explains national preference formation: *an ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes, often termed “states of the world”, that might result from international political interaction. Preferences reflect the objectives of those domestic groups which influence the state apparatus; they are assumed to be stable within each position advanced on each issue by each country in each negotiation, but not nearly across negotiations, issues or countries*. Ibid., p. 24.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 159-162.
means to manipulate “high politics”. On the other hand, Moravcsik states that Security Externalities are a part of EU integration and are therefore an inevitable aspect of analysis. The variation across issues and countries within the CFSP pillar vary as a function of “ideological commitment to federalism or perceived politico-military threat.” These are two important factors for predicting / analysing the convergence of national preferences. The national preferences can be derived across five dimensions of national preference formation: the pattern of preferences across countries, across issues, timing, domestic actors and cleavages, and the domestic policy discourse. These five dimensions of national preference formation will be discussed in-depth in the case studies, where they are used as a tool for analysis.

1.2.2 Policy Supply
The second stage of EU integration focuses on interstate bargaining in relationship to the asymmetries between states. The intergovernmental view assumes transactions costs low relative to the gains of reaching an agreement, due to high availability of information for all parties, which in turn places state preferences and power as the “decisive determinant of specific agreements.” Interstate bargaining takes place in a non-coercive environment where states have to agree unanimously on issues and will vote against an agreement if via unilateral policies a better result can be achieved. The negotiation process of Moravcsik’s intergovernmental bargaining theory follows the Nash bargaining solution. In short, the Nash solution prescribes that “governments would split the utility gains relative to their respective alternatives to agreement. A rational government will reject any agreement that leaves it worse off than the best alternative and, having set a floor, participants than split the gains, acting under pressure to avoid the possibility that exogenous events might lead negotiations to collapse, leave each with nothing.” Due to asymmetrical interdependence between states, which is the level of determination of a state to achieve a certain goal based on its national stable preference, each state has a certain bargaining power.

Moravcsik describes three determinants of interstate bargaining power. The first

16 Ibid., table 1.2.
17 Ibid., p. 33-35.
20 Ibid., p. 62.
determinant is that of unilateral alternatives where the state with the best alternative and with the lowest relative value that it places on an agreement compared to others, has the best bargaining power. Here the threat of non-agreement or the use of a veto is the “most fundamental source of bargaining power.” The second determinant is that of coalition alternatives where a government should not only consider unilateral alternatives, but take into consideration that those other governments might join alternative coalitions. Exclusion is a natural result of this game, which is threatening if the coalition has negative externalities for non-members. This might result in a shift of policy towards more cooperation. The third determinant is that of issue linkages where several governments negotiate over a variety of different issues with different preferences on the different issues. Here bargains between participants are sealed, with possible “domestic losers as they create net benefits” for the deal.

These determinants are relevant for the CFSP pillar where decisions have to be taken unanimously, where cooperation between member states are frail, and where unilateral and coalition alternatives are widely available. An example of a unilateral alternative is a weapon deal between two countries outside of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export. An example of a coalition alternative is the option of not participating in the EU battle groups like EU member states Denmark (is member of NATO) and Malta are doing. Yet, the two given examples do indicate that there is already some general agreement on extensive cooperation within the CFSP pillar. The relevant aspects of policy supply within the CFSP pillar will return in the case studies.

1.2.3 Supranational Cooperation
The third stage of EU integration which Moravcsik mentions deals with the credibility of commitments and institutional delegation. The future is uncertain and governments, once the negotiations have led to an agreement in the EU, are careful in pooling or delegating powers. It is logical that once an agreement is reached, subsequent negotiations about details, such as pooling and delegation of powers, are easier and less costly than the initial negotiation. According to Moravcsik pooling and delegation are most likely to occur in issues where all involved parties enjoy high gains, “distributional conflicts are rare, and where there is

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21 Ibid., p. 63.
22 Ibid., p. 63-67.
uncertainty about future decisions.”

Pooling and delegation are mainly found in specific issue-areas. If a country expects a qualified majority coalition or support from supranational actors and it is in favour of integration; it will most likely support delegation and pooling.

The variation between countries on pooling and delegations is assumed by Moravcsik to be based on the level of federalism within a government. Federal governments should favour delegation and pooling, while nationalist countries and parties should oppose them.

Another aspect of pooling and delegation is that when it is institutionalized it is often kept away from democratic control, in order to secure autonomy and neutrality for the “future promulgation or implementation of rules despite national opposition.”

These evasive manoeuvres are achieved by “nesting specific decisions inside a set of larger decisions reached by unanimity” and thus focus on the legitimacy and credibility of common policy.

For the analysis of Human Security principles present in the policy of EU member states on ESDP, the liberal intergovernmentalist theory provides not only an explanations on how integration takes place in three phases, but also underlines the primacy of member states within the EU integration process regarding policy formation. The three phases are used to analyse in two case-studies the commitment level of two EU member states regarding the ESDP as an outcome of six Human Security principles. Where the Human Security principles do not provide for a sufficient coverage of the outcome, other explanations will be presented using Moravcsik’s theory and alterative explanations as described by Moravcsik.

Chapter II: Human Security

2.1 Human rights as central value

In the previous chapter a brief sketch was given on the debate on the EU integration process. Alongside this debate, national governments argue on the extent to which CFSP should become supranational or remain fully intergovernmental. The ESS document is one of the current outcomes on the discussion in which direction the CFSP should develop. The ESS document, alike to many CFSP / ESDP issues, relate to a large extent to national and regional

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25 Ibid., 70.

26 Ibid., 76.

27 Ibid., p. 76-77.
security challenges, such as: terrorism, illegal arms trade, organized crime, and state failure. These security challenges and the accompanying debates leave out an essential element of security: individuals and their approximate social interactions within their communities. Of course, the EU is renowned amongst its international counterparts to be one of the major proponents on human rights issues with e.g. the Council of Europe, yet it remains a secondary issue if compared to other interests as becomes clear when reading the European Security Strategy (ESS). Repeated efforts undertaken by proponents for a more coherent CFSP, including more emphasis on human rights issues within the CFSP, including more emphasis on human rights issues within the CFSP. Some of these efforts are visible in the ESS (2003), and in the Lisbon Treaty (2007, Article 10a).

In 2004, the Human Security Study Group (HSSG) with researchers from different institutions and universities finished a report which proposes a ‘Human Security Doctrine’ for the Union and to be taken up by the EU and its member states to be somehow added to the Constitutional Treaty (2003/2004). In 2007, after the Finnish presidency of the EU (2006) requested for a review on ESDP and Human Security, the HSSG fine tuned their earlier work and almost purely focused on the six principles of Human Security which they deemed necessary for the EU ESDP. These six principles will be later on discussed. The HSSG defines Human Security as the “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”, which “are both essential to people’s sense of wellbeing and their willingness to live in peace.” In spite of this simple and broad definition of Human Security, it is a heavily contested concept as will become clear in the next section. After discussing the Human Security concept, the HSSG report 2007 and the six principles, all will be discussed in relationship with the integration of Human Security in the CFSP pillar.

29 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 3.
2.2 The disputed concept of Human Security

On the concept of Human Security there is no consensus on its exact definition. There are roughly two groups who think fundamentally differently about the Human Security approach. The first group (including the HSSG) follows a broad definition of Human Security, which includes physical security or ‘freedom from fear’, and social-economic security or ‘freedom from want’. This group stays loyal to the original idea of Human Security as it was published in 1994 by the United Nations in the Human Development Report.³⁴

The second group defines Human Security as more narrow and only looks at the physical security of individuals and their communities. They believe that it is unnecessary and undesirable to securitize social-economic issues. It is unnecessary because social-economic issues already have their own working area in development studies. It is undesirable due to the fact that security studies become unworkable as a result of the enormous extra amount of variables which have to be included in security analyses, which makes it harder to find relationships between variables. Next to these two academic critiques, the narrow Human Security proponents argue that it is also impossible to come up with a grand strategy which deals with all aspects in the real world as advocated by the broad definition adherents.³⁵

Where do the different groups agree upon in defining a Human Security approach? There is at least consensus on the need to shift from national orientated security policy towards policy that also focuses on viable threats for individuals and their communities. The need for this shift can be explained by our increased awareness of international change (due to faster financial, communication and travel opportunities), which affects national borders and perhaps obsolesces sovereignty as we know it now in the future.³⁶ At least it is already contributing to a shift in our thinking from pure national orientated security issues to security issues affecting both a larger and a smaller scale of security.

Another point on which both camps, the narrow and broad Human Security adherents, seem to agree is the fact that securitizing an issue means that it is given prior interest in policy, and if you would securitize everything then nothing would be prioritized anymore.³⁷ The United Nations Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP, 1994) argues that seven fields

³⁷ Owen, T. (September 2004), 373-387.
should be included for an effective Human Security approach. These seven fields of security are: environmental, economic, food, health, personal, social and political security. According to the narrow definition proponents seven fields are too much to handle. Yet, if studied separately and well measured to the extent in which a certain threat in a certain field is affecting the vitality of human lives, one could get more grip on what to securitize and what not. For example, a possible measurement to check if there is a threat for individuals in a certain region concerning their food security, one could look at their kcal/day intake. If this kcal/day intake is below a certain threshold than this region could be prioritized and given extra assistance in order to restore food security for the individuals living in the region.

Within International Relation (IR) studies, proponents of this individualism shift are mainly found within the individualistic/idealistic corner of IR, as in the Liberalism paradigm and to some extent in the English School and amongst modern constructivists. In 1986, John Vincent argues that “the right of the individual to be free from starvation is one human right on which all states can agree despite their ideological differences.” This key message is one of the reasons why international laws on human rights have been established. The broad definition of Human Security emphasizes this threat, that there is not only threat to the physical wellbeing of human during wartime, but also during peacetime. Moreover, even during peacetime there can be a security problem for the wellbeing of individuals and their communities, not only derived from internal or external aggression, but also from economical and other factors harming basic human rights.

Governments are increasingly open to external pressure to adhere to international human rights. In 1949, the Council of Europe (CoE) was established to promote amongst its member states several issues such as human rights, focusing mainly on civil and political human rights. From 1989 and onwards, the CoE also included social, cultural and environmental aspects as matters of concern. Since 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty established the CFSP pillar, human rights have been on the agenda of EU external policy multiple times. Several recent unified EU actions, be it policy wise e.g. when the International Criminal Court (ICC – which has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity) was strengthened by the EU as the ICC needs to be adhered to by EU candidates;

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38 Ibid., 387.
or be it political statements towards human rights related problems such as in Myanmar, Uzbekistan, the Russian Federation and Pakistan, where the EU was advocating during ministerial meetings that the domestic human rights in these countries should be in line with international standards. The EU member states, as key-actors of CFSP, in their foreign policy have put human rights on their agendas. Political statements and the strengthening of existing and new international and regional human rights institution are part of the EU external action. For the concept of Human Security as advocated by the HSSG, the primacy of human rights is the fundamental principle. The question is if this principle and the five other Human Security principles are the actual thriving factors of ESDP commitment and policy of EU member states. Before the subsequent chapters will try and give an answer to this question, in the next section the HSSG report will be discussed. In this report the Human Security principles are presented which the HSSG recommends to be implemented within the CFSP pillar and especially in ESDP missions as an overarching framework.

2.3 Madrid Report 2007

The HSSG chose for Human Security as the guiding approach for possible future external policy because it encompasses essentially that what the EU is already doing and its ambitions. The Study Group which presented their report in Madrid to Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, gave their Human Security vision an own set of principles. This set of principles gives substance to a Human Security approach for the EU and serves “as an operational methodology to guide and evaluate EU international operations.”

The principles, six in total, are being applied by the HSSG on EU international operations, both civilian as well as military in character. These missions are carried out under the EU flag and mandate, yet it is still up to the individual member states whether or not they provide troops and other means in order successfully fulfil a mission. The new Lisbon Treaty stipulates in Article 28c:3 that member states “shall make civilian and military capabilities

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available to the Union for the implementation of the [CFSP]”, but in the next sentences the article indicates: “Those Member States which together establish multinational forces [e.g. UN missions] may also make them available to the [CFSP].” The word may indicates that it is voluntary for a member state to provide troops specifically for CFSP tasks. As theorized by Moravcsik, it is when state preferences converge and establish an agreement, integration is taking place. The increasingly importance of the Acquis communautaire and joint practice between EU member states indicate converging state preferences. To what extent Human Security is playing a role into this ‘convergement’ within the CFSP pillar will be examined upon in the next few chapters.44

Where the HSSG uses the six principles of Human Security to analyze EU international operations, I will apply these six principles on the core actors of ESDP, the states. This I do because I think that the EU CFSP might be influenced from external actors and ideas, but the EU member states are still the decisive actors who dictate idea and policy formation.45 Thus, if Human Security wants to be a viable approach for an EU grand strategy, the six principles the HSSG uses for a Human Security approach should be recognized in the behaviour and preferences of the member states. How I operationalize the six principles will be explained in the next chapter. First, the six principles will be presented and subsequently related to the New Synthesis of Moravcsik and ESDP.

2.3.1 The six Human Security principles

The six principles as defined by the HSSG are presented in the next section. Although these principles are disputed, as the concept of Human Security is also heavily criticized, I will not give comments on the definitions, as it is not the aim of the thesis to question the principles themselves, but merely test for their influence on EU member states policy regarding ESDP.

The primacy of human rights

The first principle according to many Human Security approach adherents deals with the primacy of human rights. It is the fundament for the initial idea of Human Security and for the other principles. Human rights should be respected by individuals, communities, states and the different forms of regional and international organizations. The HSSG sees respect for

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44 combination of conversion and engagement
human rights as the main challenge in CFSP and especially in ESDP matters. “Civilian and military initiatives should prioritise the protection of civilians … refers to both physical and material protection, that is economic and social as well as civil and political rights.”

That the protection of human rights is difficult to achieve during EU international missions becomes clear in the HSSG case studies. In these five case studies on different EU missions several problems are indicated: different views on which human right issues should be dealt with, different views on what type of law should be used and implemented (international law, European law or Sharia), opposition from non-cooperative locals (e.g. Hamas, Israel), insufficient mandates (e.g. no jurisdiction to control abuses by Congolese police).

**Legitimate political authority**

During CFSP / ESDP missions a legitimate political authority should be created. This means that the new political authority is recognized “legitimate locally and within the international community as a whole”. This new political authority could encompass local, state and international participants. The EU should assist the new authority in its political forming process and “it must assist in the promotion of law and justice as well as the authority’s ability to guarantee material wellbeing.” For the EU this would require UN-SC approval in some cases if they are participating in the political forming creation process. This happened for example when the EU civilian police and justice mission EULEX (Kosovo) in 2008 was approved by the UN-SC.

**A bottom-up approach**

A bottom-up approach means not only to include the goal to “win hearts and minds” and to get a better understanding of the root causes of the conflict, but also to stimulate the involvement of vulnerable groups, such as women and children. This is an often overlooked principle as becomes clear from the HSSG case studies. Critique on this bottom-up approach principle that it is not truly bottom-up, because it is a top-down actor (the EU in this case) which implements such the goals of a mission, is justified. Therefore another term should be given to this principle, such as: local civilian involvement. However for the sake of

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47 Ibid., p. 16-17.
48 Ibid., p. 9.
49 Ibid., p. 9.
consistency with the HSSG report, the term given by the HSSG will be used in this thesis as to describe local civilian involvement during ESDP missions.

**Effective multilateralism**

This principle is related to legitimacy as the EU has to work in the framework of international law and in cooperation with all of the different actors participating in a conflict or post-conflict zone. The HSSG states that: “Effective multilateralism is what distinguishes a Human Security approach from neo-imperialism.” From two of their case studies (Aceh and DRC) it becomes clear that the EU and its member states are able to create a good multilateral policy in cooperation with regional actors, which increased EU credibility and legitimacy among the local population. In the two other case studies (Palestine and Lebanon) one party dominated the multilateral approach (the USA in Lebanon and Israel in Palestine) which hampered EU efforts in creating an effective institutional coordination. The HSSG suggests that the EU “could be more bold in asserting its presence in multilateral engagements”.

**An integrated regional approach**

This principle refers to the fact that in some cases outsiders should not only look within the borders of a certain state, but also look at neighbours of the affected state where similar problems or causes for the conflict can be found. A good example of an integrated regional approach advocated by the EU (yet not adhered to by all of its member states) is the case of the Palestine conflict. The EU would like to involve regional actors, such as Syria and Egypt, in the peace process, while other outsiders, such as the USA under the subsequent G.W. Bush administrations, were reluctant to take on a more integrated regional approach.

A bad example of an integrated regional approach, or one could better say a complete lack of such an approach, is the current EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau. The legal basis between the EU and Guinea-Bissau does not make any reference to regional cooperation or concerns. Meanwhile, there are several actors within neighbouring countries of Guinea-Bissau which have and still are influencing the country’s security sector. An ESDP based on

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52 Ibid., p. 9.
53 Ibid., p. 20-21.
54 Ibid., p. 18.
the HSSG Human Security approach would include in the Guinea-Bissau case also a strong emphasize on an integrated regional approach.

**Clear and transparent strategic direction**

This principle is self explanatory and supplements to the previous five principles. A clear legal authorization is needed for EU mission, as well as transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. Policy makers and EU security units should closely cooperate and the former should have ultimate control over the operations. The HSSG suggests that “EU external engagements should be led by civilians.”\(^{57}\) In about all HSSG case studies the EU mandates where to restrictive for the mission executives, as these restrictions “compromised the effectiveness of the mission and its human security impact.”\(^{58}\) Moreover, the case studies show that institutional incoherence between EU agencies and the different preferences by the Council, the Commission and the member states, contributed to a lack of clear political direction.\(^{59}\)

### 2.4 Human Security and ESDP applied to the New Synthesis

The Human Security principles were applied by the HSSG on EU external operations, but can also be applied on EU member states policy regarding ESDP. It is after all the EU member states who conduct most of the operations within the ESDP framework and are the prime actors that decide whether or not further integration within this framework will take place. If a Human Security approach is successfully to be implemented as a grand strategy for the ESDP, then the member states should be willing or are already accepting the six principles of the Human Security approach. As discussed earlier, the New Synthesis developed by Moravcsik divides the EU integration process in three stages. In the final two chapters, two member states are subsequently analyzed following this New Synthesis theory on EU integration. First however, each of the three stages of the Moravcsik’s EU integration process will be linked up with ESDP and Human Security, because Moravcsik’s theory mainly deals with the economic integration and only little with foreign and security integration.

#### 2.4.1 Policy Demand

The EU member states have full sovereignty over their foreign and defense policies, yet this does not mean that close long term cooperation is not taking place and is undesirable, as for

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\(^{57}\) Albrecht, U., et al. (November 2007), 10.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 19.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 20.
example neo-realist Kenneth Waltz does argue. Moravcsik stipulates that “ideological commitments to federalism or perceived politico-military threat” are thriving forces of the variation across issues and countries within the CFSP pillar.

The “ideological commitment to federalism” of a country does not correlate with any of the six discussed Human Security principles. Even EU member states with a strong federalist commitment, such as Austria, Belgium and Germany, do work together with questionable regimes that do not respect e.g. human rights or international law. The level of federalism is an internal choice on how the internal government and political units are organized and does not relate to the way in which a country pursues its foreign policy. The gap between national and foreign policy of an EU member state is often wide. Therefore, a federal state which has basic human rights guaranteed in its domestic law system, does not automatically e.g. support the primacy of human rights in its foreign policy or prefers to work under the auspices of the United Nations and international law.

In the EU integration context, Moravcsik states that “governments of ‘federalist’ countries and parties should favour consistently delegation and pooling, whereas governments of ‘nationalist’ countries and parties should oppose them – independently of substantive consequences of cooperation.” The issues of pooling and delegation within the ESDP will be discussed in the section concerning supranational cooperation.

The “perceived politico-military threat” as a thriving force of the variation across issues and countries has several variants which Moravcsik briefly discusses. The first view originates from the neo-realists and stresses the balance of power theory. In this view European integration took place in order to counter the growing military power of the Soviet Block. Perhaps some arguments can be given in favour of this view, yet for the current European integration process, the balance of power idea seems to have become obsolete. To who does the European Union has to balance itself against in military terms?

The second view is a combination of realist and ideational elements and stresses that EU integration is taking place to “bolster the power and autonomy of Europe in a world dominated by superpowers.” Here the European states are balancing economically against other superpowers such as Japan and the USA. The ideational elements in this line of thinking argue that “historical memories” move EU states towards each other. This view seems to be

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62 Ibid., p 30.
more viable than the first view for the current European integration process because it offers more reasons for why European states should cooperate.

The third view, institutionalist, treats integration as a regional arrangement, in order to arrange a collective security with the aim to prevent conflict among the European member states. The theory behind this view is that integration strengthens “shared economic interests, bolster information flows, generates shared ideological norms, and imposes international institutional control over critical state activities.”

The final view is bases on ideational liberal or liberal constructivist theory and emphasises “the relative strength of ‘European’ and ‘nationalist’ ideologies among elites and populations”. In short, this view looks at the historic notion of how countries perceive each other based on the others nationalist politic traditions, wartime experiences, colonial legacy, and proximity to an enemy. Moravcsik concludes that he treats these four views as “mutually supportive” in explaining a part of the variation across issues and states.

The level of variation across issues and countries within the CFSP pillar thus depends to a certain extent on the level of “ideological commitment to federalism or perceived politico-military threat.” Are member states regarding the violations of human rights around the globe as a political-military threat? In the EES (2003) violation of human rights is not specifically classified as a political-military threat, nevertheless it is mentioned as a concern in the Unions third key-threat: regional conflicts. These regional conflicts “... impact on European interest directly and indirectly. Violet or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights.”

Moreover, the Union declares in the Lisbon Treaty in several articles (e.g. article 2.6) that in its external operations shall contribute to the protection of human rights.

2.4.2 Policy Supply
Where “ideological commitment to federalism or perceived politico-military threat” are factors which can help to explain the different national preferences of EU member states, the negotiating process between states is the next essential step in the EU integration process. This interstate bargaining takes place in an asymmetric states system where each member

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63 Ibid., p. 31.
64 Ibid., p. 31-32.
65 Ibid., p. 33.
state attaches different values to different issues and has various leverage powers to achieve its negotiation goals. Moravcsik describes three determinates of interstate bargaining power: unilateral alternatives, coalition alternatives and issue linkages.

An ESDP strategy based on a Human Security approach, if there are enough states which support such a grand strategy, will have to undergo the policy supply step in order to get there. States that are in favour of a Human Security approach or conform to the six HSSG principles will likely face states that have other ideas on how the CFSP framework should develop based on their national preferences. In the next chapter the availability of Human Security within EU member states test will tested using a quantitative research method. From here the six principles of the HSSG Human Security approach will be measured as well to see which principle or combination of principles is most prominently represented within the EU. This key-principle or set of principles could then be used by states that favour a Human Security approach to persuade the more reluctant states. As it is the aim of this paper is to look to what extent the Human Security principles are available in the member states, it is beyond the analytical scope of the paper to discuss a possible interstate bargaining process. In the case studies the focus will be on what the selected member state represents and its attempts to negotiate its preferences with other member states since 1991 when the ESDP framework was established.

2.4.3 Supranational Cooperation

During the negotiation process states discus not only the direction and content of EU foreign strategy, but also bargain about how an agreement will be institutionalized. For the creation of a Human Security strategy as core for the ESDP, both pooling and delegation are options on how agreements could be institutionalized. Whether states chose for pooling or delegation, there is a significant chance that national opposition in certain countries will oppose to either one of the two forms of institutionalization. Between 70 and 60 percent of the public in Slovakia, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, and Belgium tend to trust European institutions; meanwhile the EU institutions are less trusted in the United Kingdom (25%), Italy (41%) and Austria (40%). In the latter states opposition might oppose to the pooling and delegation of powers, while in the former states voices might raise in favour of both. Moreover, the public opinion between member states is divided on the relative importance of foreign and defense

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affairs for the European Union compared to other Union affairs such as finance and energy. Where the public in Malta (3%), Spain (5%) and United Kingdom (7%) find it important for the EU to focus more on foreign and defense affairs, the percentage of people in Finland (23%), Lithonia (19%), the Netherlands (18%), Romania (15%) and Estonia (15%) is much higher. In these latter member states the public seems to put considerably more value to an EU with a stronger focus on CFSP matters.68

Public opinion and national opposition can be important for member states in to what extent they would favour pooling and delegation of Human Security tasks. Like Moravcsik notes in his work, often when pooling or delegation has been institutionalized it is often kept away from oversight mechanisms with the purpose to secure autonomy and neutrality for the implementation of the rules. One way to avoid strong national opposition is to nest specific details of an agreement, such on how to commit and arrange institutional delegation, into a larger set of agreements which was reached by unanimity.69

In respect to the CFSP pillar, pooling and delegation are limited; most of the agreements within this pillar are still firmly in the hands of the sovereign powers. Nevertheless, pooling of powers as a result of agreements is becoming increasingly important within the CFSP. An example for this increased pooling of power can be found with the agreement on the creation of EU Battle Groups, where it is up to governments to pool up with a few others into Battle Group and when necessary assist the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) with its tasks.70 Delegation of powers within the CFSP pillar is more logical in this framework because governments have concerns about compliance by others with certain agreements. This is for example the case in the attempt to establish a more robust version of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export. Some governments, such as Germany, are stronger proponents of EU-wide arms export control while other governments, such as France, are less interested in stringent arms export rules. The deal struck was the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export, which is a moral document on how EU member states should behave, but leaves the enforcement of these moral principles in the hands of the national governments. Germany could agree with this delegation as it knew that other countries were not yet ready to apply stringent rules on arms export and was unwilling to bare all costs of pooling. The costs

of pooling are higher if not all parties are willing to participate. Therefore delegation of the enforcement of the moral principles was left to governments instead of pooled into an EU institution.

An ESDP based on Human Security principles as described by the HSSG, or unified action by EU member states, seems a long way off. Discussion about if such an approach for the EU is feasible or not is still ongoing and alternative strategies may be more successful. Nevertheless, the HSSG stated that the principles of Human Security are in line with what the goals of the EU are and what many of its member states attempt to comply with. In the next chapter the six Human Security principles are quantitatively tested as independent variables on their level of availability within the EU member states in relationship to the extent in which the individual member states actively participate in ESDP missions, which is the dependent variable. The outcome of the quantitative test will give a first answer if the claim by the HSSG is correct and to what extent the Human Security principles are present and determine the EU member states policy regarding ESDP.

Chapter III: Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Human Security and ESDP

3.1 Methodology

While within and between EU member states the phases of policy demand, policy supply and supranational cooperation take place, national preferences are the thriving forces of these phases. To test whether the aforementioned six Human Security principles are present within the EU member states and to what extent, a so called fuzzy-set logic has been applied on each individual member state. The fuzzy-set logic is used for it allows the use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) when the variables (both the dependent as well as the independent variables) take more than two values. Fuzzy-set takes into consideration both qualitative status (e.g. a principle is present or not) and variation by level (e.g. a principle is to a large extent present or not). The method gives an insight into the patterns of causal necessity and sufficiency, which then can be expressed in set-theoretic terms.

For this test I have used Excel (for data storage), STATA (for significance testing) and

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71 This dependent variable is corrected for each individual member taking into account their military capabilities.
fsQCA (for the causal combination testing). For the selection of the independent variables (the six principles) and how they are measured I have used the following four databases and indexes: SIPRI-missions database, the Global Militarization Index, the United Nations law collection and the World Bank Governance Matters Index. Before the independent variables can be measured, a solid dependent variable had to be established.

Initially the idea was to rank all EU member states by their support for supranationalism regarding CFSP / ESDP and take this result as the dependent variable. However, finding appropriate ways to measure the level of supranationalism was hampered due to the following reasons: the current EU encompasses twenty-seven members, of which 10 joined in 2004 and 2 others, Bulgaria and Romania, joined in 2007. The best qualitative and quantitative data to establish the support for supranationalism came from the work conducted by FORNET. However, the data was not uniform, a much smaller number than the twenty-seven members was analyzed and the data originated from 2003. Even complementing this data with other sources was not sufficient enough to establish a good estimation for the level of supranationalism present within the EU member states. I could have used more uniform data from 1996, when also several quantitative and qualitative studies of the Intergovernmental Conferences 1996/1997 were written, yet a large part of the current EU members would have been left outside the analysis. Therefore the idea to use the level of supranationalism as the dependent variable was abandoned.

How could one then measure the current level of an EU member state’s involvement in ESDP matters? For this I have turned to the individual participation of EU member states since 2004 in ESDP missions. Using the SIPRI-database, I have counted for twenty-five EU member states their total number of hits in the SIPRI database. For each EU member state a number of hits appeared, which does not represent the exact number of EU civil-military missions it conducted, but it represents the number of contributions over years which a

73 www.fsqca.com
74 FORNET - a European Foreign Policy Research Network - represents the first formal attempt to structure and co-ordinate a network of researchers across Europe focusing on foreign policy governance. http://www.fornet.info/
76 Excluding Bulgaria and Romania as they joined very recently and thus have a very low number of participation, because they have not been in the same position as e.g. the other new members who joined in 2004, to contribute to mission due to a lack of EU commitment and other factors. SIPRI. (n.d.). SIPRI - Multilateral Peace Missions. Retrieved June 2009, from SIPRI Conflict database: http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_Internet/
member contributed in total to EU missions. For example: from the SIPRI database, 42 hits appear for Austria using the aforementioned limitations. The real number of military missions for Austria will be much lower, e.g. 15, but due to the fact that the SIPRI database counts missions twice or even more often depending on how many years they lasted, including the specific member state’s commitment, a much higher number is returned.

The number of missions then was corrected for each member state by its capacity for military operations. Otherwise smaller member states would have been automatically underrepresented in the data. For the correction I have used the Global Militarization Index, developed by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). The BICC developed this index in 2009: “The GMI represents the relative weight and importance of the military apparatus of a state in relation to society as a whole. Militarization is defined, in a narrow sense, as the resources (expenditure, personnel, heavy weapons) available to a state’s armed forces.” In Table 1 the results are presented. A high GMI number indicates a high level of militarization.

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Table 1. EU member states commitment in ESDP missions since 2004 in years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Au</th>
<th>Be</th>
<th>Cy</th>
<th>Cz</th>
<th>Dk</th>
<th>Es</th>
<th>Fi</th>
<th>Fr</th>
<th>Ge</th>
<th>Gr</th>
<th>Hu</th>
<th>Ir</th>
<th>It</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of ESDP missions since 2004</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMI 2007</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Lv</td>
<td>Li</td>
<td>Lu</td>
<td>Mt</td>
<td>Nl</td>
<td>Pl</td>
<td>Pt</td>
<td>Sk</td>
<td>Si</td>
<td>Sp</td>
<td>Se</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ESDP missions since 2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMI 2007</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Au = Austria Be = Belgium Cy = Cyprus Cz = Czech Republic Dk = Denmark Es = Estonia Fi = Finland Fr = France Ge = Germany Gr = Greece Hu = Hungary Ir = Ireland It = Italy Lv = Latvia Li = Lithuania Lu = Luxembourg Mt = Malta Nl = Netherlands Pl = Poland Pt = Portugal Sk = Slovakia Si = Slovenia Sp = Spain Se = Sweden UK = United Kingdom.

In the next sections the measurement method of the six Human Security principles will be explained and subsequently how the fuzzy-set membership scores are given to the EU members. Between brackets the notation is given as used for the mathematical model of the thesis question on page 33.

The primacy of Human Rights \( (X_{hr}) \) is measured by checking how many UN Human Rights Treaties have been ratified by the individual EU member states. There are 24 treaties examined.\(^78\) For ratifying a treaty, a member state receives a full membership score of 1. Some member states have signed a treaty, but not yet ratified it or have amended the treaty with exceptions for themselves; they receive a membership score of 0.5. If a treaty was not signed at all by a member state, the member state received a membership score of 0. The logic for selecting this parameter for the first Human Security principle is straight forward: if a

member state ratifies a larger number of universal Human Rights treaties, it is more committed to uphold universal Human Rights than a member state that ratifies a smaller number of treaties.

**Legitimate political authority (Xla)** as an explanatory variable has been measured by using the World Bank “Governance Matters 2009” index. The World Bank uses six indicators to measure variety of governance. For this Human Security variable, one of the six World Bank indicators was selected: Voice and Accountability. Voice and Accountability is described by the World Bank as “the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.” The reason to choose this indicator to measure the Xla variable is that when an EU member state scores high on this World Bank indicator, it is internally inclined to follow the idea of legitimate political representation as stipulated by the HSSG. A member state that has a high Voice and Accountability score due to its domestic policy regarding legitimate governance, it will more likely pursue a similar external policy in ESDP matters.

**A bottom-up approach (Xbu)** is measured for all EU member states by looking at a certain kind of EDSP missions where high interactivity was required with local civilian institutions such as human rights groups, local police, churches, the judiciary and other local society actors. These types of missions are new for the EU and therefore only 10 missions could be selected. The EU council website for CFSP and the SIPRI database have been used to see which member states participated in these bottom-up missions. Security Sector Reform (SSR), Rule of Law and police missions have been taken into account due to their specifics of training local civilian actors (such as police) and close interaction with the local populations other than in combat missions where insurgents, terrorists or other violent actors are the primary target of concern. The percentage of “bottom-up missions” in which a member state participated was put into relative proportions to the total percentage of EU missions a country had committed itself to, because the number of “bottom-up missions” was taken from the total

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29
number of EU missions over years for the member state. This score was then adjusted with the Global Militarization Index.

**Effective multilateralism** (Xem) is measured by marking how many times an EU member state has conducted a military operation under: a) the authorization / authority of the United Nations and/or the European Council, b) a coalition of sovereign states, a so called ad-hoc coalitions, where multilateral operations are also conducted, yet not supported by an effective mandate from an international body and /or international law framework.\(^{82}\) The justification for the selection of this parameter lies within the definition of this Human Security principle made by the HSSG: “…related to legitimacy and means a commitment to work in the framework of international law, alongside other international and regional agencies, individual states and non-state actors”\(^{83}\) The SIPRI conflict database has been used, where all EU, UN (Group A) and ad-hoc coalition missions (Group B) for the 25 EU member states have been marked. The ratio between group A missions and Group B missions was corrected with the Global Militarization Index.

An integrated regional approach / focus (Xrf) was examined by analyzing six ESDP missions in which about all EU member states participated. One by one each ESDP mission was analyzed for its success or failure to implement an integrated regional focus. Each ESDP mission received a score, and so did each member state that participated in that particular mission. The criteria for whether an ESDP mission was a success or failure are based on the conclusions of the following case-studies: EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), EU Police and Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT), EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EU Police Mission in Kinshasa, EU monitoring mission Ache, and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories.\(^{84}\) These case-studies analysed the positive and negative aspects of an ESDP mission including analysis on the use of an integrated regional focus during the ESDP


mission. Where their conclusion was mainly positive on a mission regarding this principle, the mission was reward with a full membership score.

Clear and transparent strategic direction (X<sub>et</sub>) as an independent variable was measured by analyzing the influence of national parliaments on ESDP matters, with specific focus on military operations. For this an extensive report published by the scholars at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) was used as the main source. They distinguish between 5 types of parliaments in proportion to their influence on military matters. The choice for this measurement follows from the reasoning as stipulated by the HSSG that the following factors are necessary: clear and legal authorization, transparent mandates, a coherent overall strategy, and that all EU external engagements should be led by civilians. In EU countries where parliaments have an high influence in the decision making on defence matters, these countries fit the closest to the factors which the HSSG has given for this independent variable. When parliament is able to discuss and co-decide on military missions, the discussion will be more “public”, thus more transparent and possibly supported by a larger faction of the parliament. However, this does not mean that high parliamentary involvement means a better coherent overall strategy and / or that missions are automatically led by civilians. Because this Human Security variable is broad, a simple selection had to be made between the factors of this variable.

3.2 Analysis of results

The results of the previous sections are displayed in table 2. In the second column the score of each EU member state its CFSP / ESDP commitment is presented. In the subsequent six columns the Human Security principles are listed. The hypothesis is that the six Human Security principles found in a member state have a positive relationship to the level of ESDP commitment by a member state.

Applying the fuzzy-set logic on the causal and the outcome variables, they receive a fuzzy-set score 1 (full membership), 0 (full non-membership), or any number between 0 and 1

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(partial membership). For example: if Germany ratified of all EU member states the most UN Human Rights laws, then Germany receives a fuzzy-set score of 1; while France ratified the least amount of UN HR laws, it receives a fuzzy-set score of 0. Meanwhile, the Netherlands and Italy score average, they ratify 5 out of 10 and 6 out of 10 UN HR law, and would receive a fuzzy-set score of 0.5 and 0.6. Instantly one can observe that some EU member states (Germany > Italy > the Netherlands > France) are individually faster or more concerned with the ratification of UN HR law than others. The questions then are: what does this mean? Why is this? And what national policy causes this different behaviour?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Fuzzy-set membership scores of EU member states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESDP commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
mi = \frac{vi - \min(v)}{\max(v) - \min(v)}
\]

Where \( mi \) is the fuzzy-set membership score of the individual country, \( vi \) is the raw values of the variable for the individual country, and the \( \max(v) \) and \( \min(v) \) are the maximum and minimum values to be found in the overall list of countries for that variable. The formula is explained by Koenig-Archibugi, July 2003.
To what extent the ESDP commitment is explained by the six Human Security principles overall is found using STATA’s multiple regression analysis.

This question is written in a mathematical model:

\[ Y(\text{commitment}) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{hr} + \beta_2 X_{la} + \beta_3 X_{bu} + \beta_4 X_{em} + \beta_5 X_{rf} + \beta_6 X_{ct} \]

The regression analysis shows in Table 3 that the variables “Legitimate Political Authority” and “Effective Multilateralism” are insignificant in explaining ESDP commitment. The explanatory variables account for 53 percent of the variation in outcome. Following from this is that a large part of the ESDP commitment is caused by other factors than the six Human Security principles, which is not a very awkward outcome. As Moravcsik already states in his theory, a multitude of factors play a role in the formation of CFSP. The report from the HSSG accounts only for the ESDP missions, which as expected, explains only partially the level ESDP commitment by EU member states. However, the statement which the HSSG stipulates in its report that Human Security as an overarching approach would be desirable for future ESDP missions because it is already what EU member states are doing, is only partly correct.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model Y(commitment)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xhr</td>
<td>0.281*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xla</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xbu</td>
<td>3.075*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.758)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xem</td>
<td>-2.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.678)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xrf</td>
<td>0.318*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xct</td>
<td>-0.289**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.3 Fuzzy-set analysis

The obtained results from the previous section show a mediocre explanatory power to the extent in which Human Security is present within the EU member states policy on CFSP / ESDP. The next section displays the results from the Fuzzy-set analysis. For this, all of the six Human Security variables were included again, including those who were not sufficient. The reason for this is because in the used formula on page 30 all independent variables were put together, while in a different formula (e.g. excluding one variable) an insignificant variable might become significant due to the high standard errors. The fuzzy-set analysis will test the six variables for their necessity and sufficiency in explaining the dependent variable. For this I have used the software “fuzzy set / Qualitative Comparative Analysis” developed by Professor Charles C. Ragin and others.

The necessity test analyses if a variable is necessary for explaining the dependent variable. Which means that the fuzzy-set membership scores for all cases of the dependent variable has to be lower than or equal to fuzzy-set membership scores for all cases of the independent variable. From the given data in Table 2, the result is that none of the variables are necessary for the outcome.

The second test checks for possible combinations of independent variables that could be sufficient in explaining the ESDP commitment variable. For a combination of variable to pass the sufficiency test, for all cases the fuzzy-set membership scores of the independent variables have to be lower or equal to the outcome scores. The result is that there was no combination found that passed the sufficiency test. However, two possible combinations (solutions) received a high consistency score, which indicates close relationship between the combination and the outcome, yet not high enough to pass the test.

The first combination has the highest consistency score (0.86) and is a complex solution: $xhr^*\sim xla^*\sim xbu^*\sim xem^*xrf^*\sim xct$. The second combination also has a high consistency score (0.85) but is a parsimonious solution (less is better): $xrf^\sim xct$.

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90 The symboles used: * stands for the logical and, combination where the lowest score is taken, reasoning the “weakest link” principle . ~ stands for Negation, which is the opposite of a variable. (1-membership score).
The complex and parsimonious solutions both depend heavily on the variables show in the parsimonious solution. This solution is shown in a graph on page 36. The only difference between parsimonious solution and the complex solution is that the UK is on the diagonal line instead below it, which explains why the consistency score of the complex solution is a little higher. The combination of the Human Security principles “regional focus” and negated “clear and transparent strategic direction” seems to be the best combination in explaining the ESDP commitment of an EU member state. In short, this means that a EU member state with a regional focus in its ESDP missions and little involvement of national parliaments in ESDP military missions, contributes proportionally the most to ESPD missions.

As the HSSG indicated the “primacy of Human Rights” as the fundamental principle of a Human Security approach in ESDP matters, it is worth looking at its result. The principle of “primacy of Human Rights”, in complex combinations, is only found when it has been negated. This indicates that member states which have ratified the least amount of UN Human Rights treaties are more likely to commit themselves to ESPD missions. Other motivations, such as some of the other Human Security principles or totally different explanatory variables, seem to play a more significant part in the reason why EU member states commit themselves to ESDP.

\[\text{~xhr*xl}*~xbu*~xem*~xct \text{ with a consistency of 0.83 and ~xhr*xl}*~xbu*~xem*~xrf*~xct \text{ with a consistency of 0.75.}\]
Based on the multiple regression analysis and the fuzzy-set analysis, the Human Security principles are to a mediocre extent present within the EU member states policy on ESDP; the Human Security principles are to a low extent determining the EU member states policy on ESDP.

These outcomes from the regression analysis and the fuzzy-set analysis are not in line with the statements made by the HSSG on Human Security in their report. As Moravcsik writes in his work that certain factors play a role in the CFSP / ESDP integration, the outcome that the HS principles are only to a low-mediocre extent present and determining the EU member states policy regarding ESDP, does not come to a full surprise. Nevertheless, to fully investigate to what extent these HS principles are present and determining the EU member states policy regarding ESDP, two case-studies will try to unravel the HS principles in the two
cases and look at other factors, using Moravscik’s theory.

Although more case studies would have been preferable, due to space limitation only two could be selected. First, Ireland is analysed for it received the highest membership score in the fuzzy-set analysis. Second, the Czech Republic will be analysed because it does not fit into the parsimonious solution, which don’t fit into the parsimonious solution, the lowest ESDP commitment score. Ireland is known for its political neutral position within defence matters and has the lowest military expenditures within the EU. The Czech Republic recently joined the EU, is one of the more economically developed new EU member states and a NATO member.92

Before the two case studies are presented, two final differences derived from the level of ESDP commitment need to be given: 1) Ireland’s GMI score is 153 (lowest of all EU member states) and Czech Republic’s GMI is 297 (average). 2) The number of ESDP missions in years (from SIPRI database) since 2004 for Ireland is 47 (average) and for Czech Republic 29 (below average). The final Fuzzy-set scores are available in Table 2. Using Ireland and Czech Republic as qualitative addition in chapters 4 and 5 to the quantitative analysis of chapter 3, I can indicate to what extent the Human Security principles are present within and determining the EU member states policy on ESDP.

**Chapter IV: Case study Ireland**

As a relatively small and geographically isolated country, Ireland joined the European Community in 1973 at the same time as Denmark and the United Kingdom. The Irish government has mainly been dominated by three political parties; Fianna Fáil (affiliated with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), Fine Gael (affiliated with the European People’s Party) and the Labour Party (affiliated with the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats). In the debates between these and several smaller political parties ESDP matters have always been an important issue. For Ireland, a traditional neutral country, most of the domestic actors favour to uphold this neutrality as not to join any defensive alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, several political parties, including the ruling party Fianna Fáil, are in favour an active role for Ireland in ESDP missions.93

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93 Ibid., p. 211-222.
The next section will discuss the policy demand on ESDP matters in Ireland. Not only political parties play a formative role, but also the public opinion, the defence industry and various other actors participate in the first phase of Moravcsik’s theory: policy demand. What is the position which Ireland takes regarding military missions under the EU flag? And what is their view on human security in general and as an overarching framework for ESPD? Once set, the policy demand by Ireland is translated by its representatives in Europe in policy supply, which will be discussed in the second section. What is the bargaining power of Ireland? Could Ireland form a coalition within the European Council with likeminded member states or will Ireland’s neutrality withhold it from doing so? Finally, how would ESDP cooperation based on Human Security principles take place according to Ireland? Does Ireland favour supranationalism or intergovernmentalism; favour pooling or delegation of resources within the ESDP?

4.1 Policy Demand
Recall from the first chapter that this phase of Moravcsik’s theory was mainly focussed on economic forces of integration and therefore to a large extent unable to explain the position of member states on CFSP. Moravcsik uses various other theories, denominated under the term Geopolitical Ideas and Interests: Security Externalities. The variation across countries and issues within the CFSP pillar vary as a function of “ideological commitment to federalism or perceived politico-military threat”.94 Beside these explanatory variables, the case studies will also encompass the six Human Security principles as handled in chapters 2 and 3.

4.1.1 The Irish debate: neutrality
In Ireland the nature of the discussions on ESDP matters is quite open and sharp between proponents and opponents. A good example is the initiative called “The National Forum on Europe”, where a huge database of newspaper articles and reports on political debates are posted. Moreover, there has been a stimulus to involve younger voters by organizing debates and school competitions.95 Another example of open debate is provided by “The Institute of International and European Affairs”, which focuses more on providing a forum in Ireland on these matters for corporate networking.96 However, an open and sharp debate does not mean

that the outcome of it will be in favour of European integration. Referendums play a crucial role in Irish politics. Two referendums, the first one on the Treaty of Nice in 2001 and the second one on the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008, questioned the ability of EU and Irish leaders, who were in favour of the treaties, to inform and persuade the no-voters. The role of Ireland in EDSP missions was not the most important aspect of the discussion on the Treaty of Nice; however, fear of no-voters on loosing Irish neutrality was the third most important reason for voting no in the referendum. The Irish government had to make explicit statements about the Irish neutrality, which it did at the Seville European Council meeting in 2002. In this national declaration Ireland underlined the following key-principles:

- Ireland’s primacy to the United Nations on matters of international security and peace.
- Ireland’s commitment to CFSP, including humanitarian and crisis management.
- Ireland’s participation in CFSP does not prejudice its traditional policy of military neutrality.
- Ireland is not bound by any mutual defence commitment, nor is it in its plans to contribute to the development of a European Army.
- Ireland will hold a referendum on any future Treaty which would involve Ireland departing from its traditional policy of military neutrality.
- Ireland’s participation in any military ESDP mission will require the approval of the “triple lock”: 1) the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, 2) the agreement of the Irish Government and 3) the approval of Dáil Éireann (Irish parliament).

However, this declaration and other efforts were not enough to soothe the majority of the no-voters’ fear on loosing the Irish neutrality in the 2008 referendum with the Treaty of Lisbon. In newspapers analysts describe the ill-informed fears of Irish voters; such as a woman stating that “their children would be drafted in a pan-European Army”. Especially Sinn Fein (a

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left-wing nationalist political party) campaigned hard against the Treaty for it “draw Ireland into the EU’s common security and defence structures.”¹⁰¹ The outcome of the 2009 referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon was positive for the European integration process. The reason for this change from no to yes is likely caused by the economic opportunities Europe offers during the financial crisis.¹⁰² Moreover, during the re-negotiations (which will be discussed in the next section) Ireland was able to underline its neutrality position and keeping the ESDP under strict intergovernmental control.¹⁰³ These changes in the Treaty and the debates between government and opposition parties on how Irish neutrality is safeguarded are likely to have influenced the public to vote in 2009 in favour of the Treaty of Lisbon.

4.1.2 ESDP missions

While the general public is concerned on keeping Ireland neutrality intact, that same public seems to desire active Irish involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, be it under UN, NATO or EU flag. An extensive research conducted in 2004 clearly shows this robust support by the Irish public for Irish participation in such missions. For example, the outcome shows that 56 percent favours peacekeeping while 33 favours a shift to more peace enforcement missions. Moreover, 71 percent of the respondents support NATO-led operations with Irish involvement such as in Bosnia.¹⁰⁴ According to the public, Irish neutrality should be maintained which does not collide with a continuation of Irish active involvement in peacekeeping missions.

In August 2006, a questionnaire on the willingness to dispatch troops to Lebanon under UN flag shows that 66 percent of the Irish public favours Irish involvement. To put this number into perspective: Swedish public gave the largest support with 67 percent, German public was less enthusiast with a support of 37 percent, while Austrian public showed least support, only 30 percent of the public were supportive in sending troops to Lebanon under UN flag.¹⁰⁵ This small poll seems to be in line with the outcome of the 2004 research on

the support for Irish peacekeeping missions. But where in all this is the concept of Human Security reflected?

For the Irish public the key issues are neutrality and their supportive attitude towards peacekeeping and alike missions. The political parties in Ireland are aware of this strong position of the public. As discussed earlier, Human Security offers some sort of justification for governments to participate in a military operation. When human rights are at stake and a peacekeeping mission is conducted by multiple countries under a UN approved mandate, public opinion is more willing to support a mission than when these “bonus” reasons for a mission are absent.106

Ireland has proven to be active and concerned in matters of Human Security and related issues. For this outspoken position two factors are to be looked upon: 1) Ireland’s active participation in UN/EU peacekeeping and alike missions is contradicted by its low expenditure on national defence and military development, 2) and its membership in the Human Security Network. What is the historical development behind these two factors? And how do they relate to Human Security?

The first factor can be divided into two parts; in respect to the other EU member states Ireland takes part in many ESDP missions, which seems to be impossible due to the second part: Ireland spends the least amount of money on military expenditure and development as a share of their GNP within the Union. This could mean two things: Ireland is free riding on the expenditures of other member states; or Irish real military expenditure is high enough to cover the costs resulting from the ESDP missions. Although Ireland participates in many missions, it has limited itself in a White Paper on Defence (2007) that overall deployment of personal on overseas UN-authorised missions shall not be more than 850 people at any given time.107 Moreover, the Irish governments spends about €1 billion each year on defence and contracts with the Irish defence industry, which is 0.5 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP).108 This Irish defence industry is rather small, with an estimated worth up to €3 billion annually for Irish business (data from 2008).109 Another historical neutral country within the

EU, Sweden, has a far bigger defence industry with an estimated value of €5 billion annually (data from 2005). Thus, being neutral in defence matters (high politics) does not imply that an EU member state will have a small defence industry (economics).

With approximately 850 people (plus additional material) at any given time on overseas duty, the lowest defence budget in the EU and a small defence industry, but a participating in many different ESDP missions, a study on the burden-sharing during ESPD missions between all EU member states would be helpful to bring member states policy and actual commitment in tune with one another. The conclusion of such a study might fit the outcome of in-depth studies on burden-sharing of UN peacekeeping missions. In these studies it is concluded that larger countries (by GDP) are increasingly accounting for the expenditures of peacekeeping missions in contrast with the smaller countries. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Ireland will increase its defence spending within the forthcoming years due to its weak financial position and domestic opposition to an increase of the defence budget.

The second factor of Irish active participation in Human Security related matters is its membership of a rather small group of states, the Human Security Network (HSN). The HSN states itself as “a unique inter-regional and multiple agenda perspective with strong links to civil society and academia.” The members of the HSN are discussing Human Security issues as described by the UN on various levels, where the annual ministerial meeting is the summit of the HSN. Moreover, each year a different member is the chair and with it responsible for the HSN public statements such as in the UN Security Council. Ireland took the chair position in 2008 and focussed as chair on gender-based violence in the world. However, the actual work and contribution of the HSN on Human Security related policy is rather small. Little has been written about the work of the HSN; expect what some of the

113 The Network includes Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and South Africa as an observer.
states themselves provided on their website or on that of the HSN. Their primary achievements were several speeches during UN General Assembly, which are available on the HSN website. The role of Ireland within the HSN is even more difficult to trace back. The aforementioned document on the goals set during the Irish chair in 2008 was one of the very few public documents. In contrast, Slovakia during its role as chair provided with some more details about its goals and methods. Based on what has been found, Ireland did participate in the HSN, within the HSN it took played a modest role, while the HSN itself achieved little in promoting the ideas of Human Security.

4.1.3 Human Security principles

Being a member of the HSN does not imply, based on the results presented in chapter 3, that a EU member state (Austria, Ireland, The Netherlands, Slovenia and Greece) involves itself actively in ESDP missions but does perfectly fit in the subset solution presented in chapter 3 (see graph on page 36). This subset solution where two Human Security principles are used, regional focus and the negated clear and transparent strategic direction, as the four other principles will each be shortly discussed for Ireland. The six Human Security principles as tested in chapter three will be divided in two groups, the first group will be discussed as a part of the policy demand in Ireland, and the second group will be discussed as a part of the policy supply analysis of Ireland. This division has been chosen due to the nature of the measurement of the six principles, some being only orientated on domestic policy (e.g. primacy of human rights measurement was done by checking the number of ratified UN Human Rights treaties), while others involve the interaction with other member states (e.g. button-up approach where the measurement took into account several specific ESDP missions involving multiple EU member states).

The primacy of human rights as a measured principle scored 0.3 for Ireland, which is below average European wise. For the measurement I looked at the number of UN human rights treaties ratified by Ireland compared with all other EU member states. This principle as an explanatory variable in the formula (see page 30) is significant at a 90 percent confidence interval for explaining the outcome variable. Why is it that Ireland, which proclaims to be a strong proponent of UN human rights, scores below average in this measurement? The explanation for this can be found in the ratification system of Ireland. This ratification system is based on the common law tradition of waiting to ratify a treaty until there are reasonable grounds for believing that domestic law and practice are in line with the content of a treaty.
As a country with a common law tradition, it has also a dualist system whereby international agreements, to which Ireland becomes a party, are not automatically incorporated into domestic law. Not only the Irish government has to sign the treaty, also the Oireachtas (Irish parliament) has to approve the treaty before it becomes part of the domestic law.\textsuperscript{116} Although Ireland is often one of the EU member states that support new human rights treaties, it is due to its law system that actual ratification is rather slow compared with EU member states that do not wait for domestic law and practice to even out with a treaty.

The Human Security principle of Legitimate Political Authority was measured by using the World Bank’s indicator on “Voice and Accountability”. The multiple regression analysis calculated that this principle was not significant in explaining the outcome variable. However, as Ireland scores with a membership-score of 0.8 fairly high among the EU member states, it could explain the liveliness of the Irish debate on its neutrality issue. As has been described in the previous sections, this debate between pro-Europeans and more conservative forces such as Sinn Fein and the Green Party, it gave the government a strong direction in which way it should formulate Irish demands during the renegotiations on the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, Ireland is committing itself to a large extent to peacekeeping missions instead of peace-enforcement missions, as one may recall, need the approval of international and local bodies which is contrary to peace-enforcement missions where local approval is not needed.\textsuperscript{117} As the Irish public strongly supports peacekeeping over peace-enforcement missions and the Irish parliament has to approve these missions, this second Human Security principle is to a large extent present within Irish foreign and defence policy.

The Human Security principle of Effective Multilateralism was measured by analyzing the ratio in which a member state had operated either within a large coalition of countries with a UN and/or EU approval, or within an ad-hoc coalition where only several countries did participated without any formal international approval. Similar to the previous Human Security principle, this principle was also not significant. However, Ireland received a full membership-score of 1 for this principle. Because only military operations since 2004 were taken into account, this data might shift when a larger time span is analyzed. Nevertheless,\textsuperscript{116}


Ireland seems also over a longer time span to be one of the EU member states that only occasionally involves itself in ad-hoc coalitions (since 1990 only three times; Germany four times, while the Czech Republic, the UK and France participated 10, 19 and 32 times in ad-hoc coalitions). Thus, Ireland selects its UN and ESDP missions on a number of criteria, and one of them seems to be that a broad coalition with international approval is required. The Human Security principle where legitimacy and multilateral cooperation alongside other international and regional agencies are prerequisites for military missions to commence seems to be strongly adhered to by Ireland.

The Human Security principle of clear and transparent strategic direction as described by the HSSG was rather broad, therefore only a part of the principle was tested. The outcome as presented in chapter 3 shows that Ireland has a strong parliament in matters of military affairs. The aforementioned limit on the number of troops which can be sent on overseas duty was put into place by the parliament. Moreover, in article 15(-6) of the Irish Constitution, states that:”The right to raise and maintain military or armed forces is vested exclusively in the Oireachtas.”

This Human Security principle was tested as significant at a 90 percent confidence interval, with a fuzzy-set membership-score of 0.8 for Ireland. Surprisingly, the negated outcome (1-0.8=0.2) was needed for the parsimonious and complex solution. This implies that a strong parliament is not stimulating a member states to commit to ESDP missions. Despite a strong vote by the Irish parliament on military operations, Ireland is participating above average when it comes to ESDP activity. However, in both the parsimonious and complex solution, the explanatory variables are not for all cases a subset of the outcome variable. Therefore, little statistical evidence, based on both solutions, can be given on the presence of this Human Security variable within Ireland. To conclude, the influence of the parliament on overseas ESDP missions is strong, but does not hamper Irish ESDP commitment.

With no perceived political-military threat and due its neutrality demanded by the public, Ireland keeps its focus on peacekeeping rather than participating in ad-hoc coalition or actively participating in peace-enforcement missions. The peacekeeping missions are largely supported by the public and opposition parties. These missions are to a medium extent based on the primacy of human rights, require a triple lock in order to maintain its neutrality and

create legitimacy (see section 4.1.1), and follow a multilateral approach. The next section will look into the policy supply phase of Irish ESPD commitment; analyzing among other things Irish negotiation during the Lisbon Treaty, Irish military commitment in EU context and the remaining two Human Security principles.

4.2 Policy Supply

4.2.1 Irish bargaining power

Ireland is one of the many smaller EU member states, but quite unique in its neutrality principle within the Union. The policy demand by the Irish public and the largest political parties seem to be in favour of an active Irish ESDP commitment and upholding most of the six Human Security principles, as long as the ESDP remains an intergovernmental body with no “forced” accession for Ireland in any form of defence institution. The fears by the Irish public on losing its neutrality played a significant role in the no-outcome at the Nice Treaty referendum in 2001. Nevertheless, Ireland was granted a country specific protocol on defence policy guaranteeing its neutrality, which the Irish voters accepted in the 2002 at the second Nice Treaty referendum.120

During the no-vote by the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, the neutrality principle played a less important role. Nevertheless, Irish Prime Minister Brian Cowen demanded from the Council that the Irish neutrality and its guarantees on defence issues would be entrenched in the treaty. The other EU leaders were surprised by this demand from Cowen, as they initially where focussing on writing a Council statement that would mention Irish neutrality and its guarantees on defence. Moreover, the negotiations about the exact content of the guarantees were still ongoing. Cowen stated at the summit that he would not leave until the Irish special rights would be anchored in a protocol. Der Spiegel, a German Political magazine, describes this Irish demand as pure blackmail, because the EU leaders had little choice but to accept the Irish terms.121 Another no from the Irish public would hamper the EU integration process even further.

At these critical moments in the current ratification system within the EU, the Irish example shows that even small countries can seriously increase their demands if they have a

certain leverage to use. The Irish leverage was its national ratification process, which requires a referendum for each EU treaty. Prime Minister Cowen needed a document to take away any negative sentiments and fears concerning a possible lose of Irish neutrality. For the other EU member states a negative outcome in the Irish second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty would have increased their own domestic opposition against the treaty. Germany and the Czech Republic at that time still needed to ratify the Lisbon Treaty as well.

In spite of the Irish position against any further integration of ESDP in which they should take part, the Irish EU presidency in 2004 presented a new CFSP institution: the European Defence Agency (EDA). The purpose of this Agency is to improve the military capacities of participating states so that they can better support “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crises management, including peacemaking”. The opposition parties in Ireland raised big concerns about the establishment of the EDA, expressing the same fears as they had with the two referendums in 2001/2002 and 2008/2009. According to Ben Tonra, Jean Monnet Professor of European ESDP at the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, the fears as expressed by the opposition groups are unfounded. Tonra argues that Ireland will benefit from its participation in the EDA. By sharing technological development and purchases of equipment, governments could spend less on defence (no duplication of work). Within the EDA each member state can still use its veto on whether it will participate in a certain project or not.

If Ireland would opt-out in institutions such as the EDA, but also in ESDP missions, like Denmark, it will lose leverage in other policy areas. In order to upkeep the Irish external position regarding peacekeeping missions, it needs to take part in European defence plans. It is better to be one of the designers than being left outside. This logic seems to be used by the Irish government and still is when it has to defend Irish participation in institutions such as the EDA. Moreover, French European Affairs minister Pierre Lellouche proposed in September 2009 the establishment of an EU defence budget similar to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). He asked “Why do three member states (UK, France and

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123 Ibid.

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Germany) contribute up to two-thirds of military expenditures of the 27 member EU
members?¹²⁶ Such a change in the EU budget would require the support of each member
state, but this is unlikely to happen given that neutral EU states such as Ireland, Austria, and
Sweden would probably oppose to such a decision.

Cooperation within the EU with other political neutral member states is for Ireland one
way to stop other countries in their plans to establish a supranational EU body regarding
defence or the creation of a defensive alliance. On the “positive” side of cooperation within
the EU on ESDP matters, Ireland is participating with several EU member states in the EU
battle groups. In January 2008, Ireland joined a battle group with Sweden, Finland and
Norway (negotiated an opt-in to participate, even though it is not an EU member state).¹²⁷
Within Ireland opposition raised its voices for it questioned the legal status of the EU battle
groups as the Irish government neglected the triple lock mechanism (approval of the UN
Security Council). Nevertheless, Ireland contributed 150 soldiers to this battle group (total
size 2.200, Sweden contributing 1.600 troops) and showed that it is in principle willing to
actively contribute to some form of EU defence institutionalisation, as long as it happens
voluntarily and with the option to withdraw its forces.

4.2.2 Human Security Principles
The Irish bargaining power can not only be derived from the points described in the previous
section, but also from the Irish above average EDSP commitment as presented in chapter 3
and table 2. The bottom-up approach principle was measured by marking the number of
bottom-up missions a member state participated in, which was corrected for it military
capability to conduct ESDP missions. The regional focus principle was measured by
analyzing a number of ESDP missions in order to establish to what extent each mission was
successful in adhering to that Human Security principle. Not all EU member states
participated in each ESDP mission, and therefore an EU member state that participated in
ESDP missions that adhered strong to the Human Security principle received a high
membership score of the principle. As these missions are the accumulation of domestic
discourse and interstate bargaining, I decided to analyze them at the end of the policy supply
phase.

For the Human Security principles, a bottom-up approach and regional focus, Ireland

Concept and the Nordic Battlegroup: http://www.sweden.gov.se/sh/d/9133/a/82276;jsessionid=a1Cr-JF98ROf
received a full-membership score (1) and an above average membership score (0.6). For the bottom-up principle ten ESDP missions were analyzed (as I could regard ten of the recent EDSP missions as being bottom-up). Ireland participated in four of them, but as a total share of the ESDP missions, Irish participation in bottom-up missions was relatively high compared to other EU member states. With the military capability correction, Ireland received the highest score. However, as a Human Security principle, the bottom-up approach was not existing in the complex solution (only as a negated variable) and in the parsimonious solution. Therefore, as an explanatory variable to measure to what extent this principle is available within the EU is of little power. Within the Human Security concept of the HSSG it is one of the six fundamental principles, but it plays a rather small role in actual ESDP missions.

On the other hand, the regional focus principle does play a strong role in the outcome of both the complex and in the parsimonious solution. ESDP missions that successfully involved regional partners and issues have been as a whole more successful as those missions that were unable to involve these regional aspects. Ireland received only an above average membership-score, unlike Lithuania that received the full-membership score of 1. Together with the principle of clear and transparent strategic direction, advocates of the Human Security principles, for example members of the Human Security Network, should utilize these two principles the strongest. Together with the other two significant variables, they give the most explanatory power for a member states ESDP commitment.

The bargaining power if Ireland wishes to continue to emphasize the importance of human rights and peacekeeping over ad-hoc coalitions and power related interests (e.g. the Iraq 2003 invasion and subsequent troop deployment of 37 countries) has to come from an alternative coalition within the EU. Such a coalition could include other political neutral member states or the Nordic battle group members, where also neutral Sweden takes part in. Another coalition within the EU to promote Human Security principles would be a closer cooperation between the EU members of the Human Security Network. Each of these coalitions would fit in both the complex and parsimonious solution.

4.3 Supranational Cooperation
The current ESDP framework has, in the light of the Irish neutrality principle, been developed sufficiently. Ireland cooperates in the EDA, the Nordic battle group and commits itself to

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ESDP missions, but does so under certain conditions which Ireland has been able to get anchored in the Lisbon Treaty. Supranational cooperation in spirit of Moravcsik’s theory seems undesirable by the Irish public and several of its political parties in matters of CFSP and ESDP. The dominant political parties have taken this opposition into account during their negotiations with other EU member states. In return, the dominant political parties in government have taken some steps towards enhanced cooperation within the CFSP / ESDP framework, such as the participation of Ireland in the EDA and in the Nordic battle group. The Irish government has achieved a limited autonomy from its citizens by adding for example in 2002 and 2009 the “neutrality” protocols to the EU treaties. Moreover, the government was able, without much internal resistance, to participate in the Nordic battle group. These small but significant efforts from Ireland indicate Irish willingness to continue within Europe even in matters of defence and security. The negotiations about the direction of the ESDP are ongoing and the outcome is uncertain, but Ireland would most likely try to keep the ESDP as it is, with a stronger preference for the Human Security principles than the next case-study.

- Primacy of human rights is guaranteed in EU law and practice
- Effective multilateralism always takes place under the auspices of the United Nations
- Human Security principles play to a large extent a role within ESDP
- Every member state retains its veto right in so that CFPS / ESDP remains an intergovernmental EU pillar with some pooling of resources.

These assumptions are based on the results of the quantitative analysis in chapter 3, where in the Irish case most Human Security principles are to a large extent present in their foreign and defence policy. The qualitative analysis has shown that Ireland favours cooperation where peacekeeping plays a predominant role, with a strong regard for human rights and a key-role for the United Nations. Furthermore, the subsequent Irish governments have indicated that they are willing to participate in defence and security efforts within the Union. However, they are limited by their domestic neutrality mandate, which forces them to keep the ESDP development in a rather slow pace. The current government does not desire deeper integration, but certainly would like to commit itself to more pooling of resources (e.g. in battle groups or within the EDA in order to benefit from lower research costs) as opposed to several of the larger opposition parties (Sinn Fein and the Green Party).
Chapter V: Case study Czech Republic

In contrast to Ireland, the Czech Republic is surrounded by fellow EU member states, is not politically neutral, has a rather large defence industry and is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Especially Czech’s membership of NATO and what role it should have compared with the ESDP is dividing the political parties, several governmental departments and the public between Atlanticist and Europeanists. These debates will be discussed in the policy demand phase. Furthermore, the role of the Czech defence industry, the position of human rights, Czech’s participation in ESDP missions and the six Human Security principles shall be discussed. The next phase will analyze the Czech position on ESDP during the negotiations in 2003-2004 as the Czech Republic was on its way to become an EU member. Moreover, the latest views on the Czech Republic performance on ESDP and Human Security during its EU presidency in the first six months of 2009 will be examined. Finally, a conclusive statement will be presented on the preferences of the Republic regarding the current state and future of ESDP and Human Security.

5.1 Policy Demand

After the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the peaceful split with Slovakia in 1993, the Czech Republic lost one of its policy flagships: a strong defence industry. Reforms were ought to be necessary in this industry. No longer was it needed to arm an entire Communist bloc against the NATO. Moreover, economic liberalization forced uncompetitive business to go bankrupt. With the prospect of joining the NATO and the EU, pressure from these organizations and from liberal domestic movements, stimulated the Czech Republic further to modernize their own armies, uphold to UN weapon embargo’s and limiting the export of defence equipment.129 Clearly a shift in the nineties occurred in the Czech Republic concerning their geopolitical ideas and interests.

In 1999, NATO membership for the Czech Republic offered for the defence industry new opportunities. The army is being down-sized but modernized and made fit for NATO and EU military operations. The current Security Strategy of the Czech Republic was presented in 2004 by the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Vladimír Špidla from the Czech Social Democratic Party. From this document it becomes clear that the Czech government is

pursuing certain different goals than Ireland.\textsuperscript{130} Where Ireland emphasizes the importance of UN approval for combat missions and the primacy of human rights, the Czech barely mentions these two aspects in their security strategy. However, the Czech do have separate Human Rights department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the foreign policy document of 2008 considerably more notice was given on Czechs position the protection of human rights. Here the authors note that the Czech Republic’s international image regarding human rights will be enhanced by contributing to several UN, EU and OSCE commissions: “the country’s image abroad as an active support of observance of human rights and support for democracy”.\textsuperscript{131}

5.1.1 The Czech debate: NATO and ESDP

The national debate between de political parties on ESDP and human security related issues can be classified as tamer than in Ireland. There is less public discussion on these issues as in Ireland the government has made little attempt to stimulate the establishment of public forums and alike discussions platforms.\textsuperscript{132} Nevertheless, difference of opinion is strong on the role of the ESDP and NATO. In the preceding years of Czech EU membership a majority of Czech political parties viewed the development of the ESDP as positive and a natural stage in further developing of European CFSP integration. Especially the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSDP - affiliated with the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), who led several governments, is positive on ESDP/ CFSP ambitions of the EU. Their position can be explained by the foreign policy preferences during the 1990s (proponents of joining the EU) and the fact that ESDP was brought about by left-wing governments in the EU. This supportive position towards ESDP is supported by the Christian Democrats (affiliated with the European People’s Party) and several smaller liberal parties.\textsuperscript{133}

On the opposite spectrum are the euro-sceptic parties, such as the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS – affiliated with the Movement for European Reform) with Czech’s current President Václav Klaus as one of the more reluctant leaders in the EU. The ODS


declared in the Prague Declaration alongside with other center right political parties from Central and East Europe, that the party is a strong proponent of NATO primacy within Czech Republic and Europe.\textsuperscript{134} It is important to know which political party is ruling in Czech, because this determines what position the Republic will take in matters such as foreign and security policy. Beside the political parties’ cleavage, this same cleavage is found between two governmental departments as well. On one side is the ministry of defence, which is traditionally orientated towards NATO because the NATO structure is better known with a proven military record and a stable institutional platform for guaranteeing Czech security interests. The defence ministry is tepid towards ESDP commitments because it requires a new approach and interferes with the Target Force Goals in the NATO defence-planning framework.\textsuperscript{135} NATO operations require other capabilities and resources than ESDP missions, which was of some concern in 2004 when Czech joined the EU. In contrast with the defence ministry, the department of foreign affairs is more in favour of participating in an EU defence structure.\textsuperscript{136} Despite some opposition from political parties and an adjusting department of defence, the Czech Republic did commit itself to several ESDP missions.

5.1.2 ESDP missions

In chapter 3 the level of Czech’s ESDP commitment was given with a membership score of 0.3. Although this is a rather low score compared to the other EU member states, of the ten new members that joined the EU in 2004 only Poland contributed to more ESDP missions than the Czech Republic. The Czech lost a major part of its defence industry and downsized its military spending in the 1990’s, which resulted in becoming one of the lowest militarized countries of the EU (ranked 6\textsuperscript{th} overall, 2\textsuperscript{nd} after Malta of the 10 new member states).

The resources the Czech contributed to their ESDP commitment are “double-hatted”, which means that they are ready for NATO as well as EU operations. Czech national preferences on ESDP and NATO are that it would like to see as little duplication as possible and this translates into the desire to intertwine defence planning processes in NATO and in the EU as much as possible. The Czech Republic sees the EU merely as a multilateral actor

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
which should specialize itself on crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation. In line with these national preferences, the Czech decided in early 2009 to form with Slovakia, the Czech-Slovak EU battle group to conduct when called upon ESDP missions. Moreover, a second Czech contribution to an EU battle group is planned for in 2012 together with Austria and Germany.

The ESDP missions with Czech involvement have mainly focussed thus far on the Balkan region and Eastern Europe. The Czech is more lukewarm towards EU missions in Africa, although they did participate in one. The Security Strategy confirms this position as it is written that “security and stability - especially in the Euro-Atlantic area” are of primary interest. This is in contrast with Ireland, which contributed, also outside the ESDP framework, to more military missions in e.g. Africa. The Czech Republic seems more willing to follow the interest of the United States of America (USA), while e.g. Ireland relies on the UN where to conduct military operations. This regional preference of the Czech partially explains its low score of 0.3 on the Human Security principle of effective multilateralism. In the next section four out of the six Human Security principles will be analyzed again following the same method as in the Irish case-study.

5.1.3 Human Security Principles

The primacy of human rights is the first principle which the HSSG composed and was tested here in chapter 3. The membership score of 0.8 for the Czech Republic was above average. Why is this? To a large extent the outcome of the score can be explained by the civil law system which is active in the Czech Republic. This civil law system, contrary to the Irish common law system, codifies law as soon as it has been approved by parliament. Before one would conclude that the type of law system completely determines the outcome of the membership score for this Human Security principle, one should note that several cases argue against such a conclusion. For example Belgium (0.4 membership score with a civil law


system)\textsuperscript{142}, Luxembourg (0.5 membership score with a civil law system)\textsuperscript{143} and other continental EU member states with a low membership score for this principle. Therefore other explanatory factors play a role in the outcome of this principle. In the Czech case two issues can be indentified: the transition of the judiciary from the communist system to the EU system and second, Czech domestic human rights violations against e.g. the Roma minority population.

The transition of the judiciary from one system to another was needed in order for the Czech Republic to become a candidate (1996) and a full (2004) EU member state. The European Commission (EC) described the Czech judiciary as a part of the accession reforms that needs “significant attention” or “continuous attention”, which is relatively strong critique on the state of judiciary.\textsuperscript{144} The advantage for the Czech Republic e.g. over Belgium or Luxembourg is that during their transformation process they could fix existing flaws and adapt to international and European law more rapidly than the older law systems as e.g. present in Belgium and Luxembourg.\textsuperscript{145}

The domestic human rights violations mainly focus on police violence and use of excessive force, violence and discrimination against women and children, skinhead violence and discrimination against Roma, Romani children continue to be sent to special remedial schools at disproportionate rate and the Czech Republic is used for trafficking of persons.\textsuperscript{146} According to Amnesty International the government of the Czech Republic is behaving inactively to solve these discrimination problems of the Roma population.\textsuperscript{147} On the other hand, recent Czech governments were and are proliferating themselves as adherents of international human rights as was discussed earlier. These efforts were under taken during the

\textsuperscript{144} Šlosarčík, I. (October 2002). Reform of the Judicial System of the Czech Republic and the Accession to the EU. \textit{Europeum}, 1.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid. p. 3.
Czech EU presidency in 2009, however with mixed results.\textsuperscript{148}

Thus, although the Czech Republic scores relatively high on this Human Security principle, a closer look reveals that transitional work had to be done to meet EU standards and that some domestic human rights violations continues to take place. Moreover, the safeguarding of international human rights within the ESDP or UN framework are not Czech primary security preferences as was noted in the previous section, this in contrast with Ireland.

The Human Security principle of Legitimate Political Authority was tested as insignificant in explaining the outcome variable of ESDP commitment. The Czech Republic received a membership score of 0.4, which is below average when compared to other EU member states. A part of this low score can be explained due to a lower level of civilian participation in political debate than e.g. in Ireland. The Czech debates on human rights, ESDP and other Human Security related issues are minor compared to the Irish debate on these issues. Governmental stimulations for on civilian participations in debates are lacking and the public seems less enthusiastic for peacekeeping missions, even when a mission is in geographical areas such as the Balkans. An old study from 1998 conducted by Štefan Sarvaš of the NATO Research Fellowship for Democratic Institutions, shows that 50 percent of the Czech population was in favour of Czech participation in peacekeeping missions such as in former Yugoslavia, meanwhile 41 percent was against it and 9 percent was undecided. The majority of opponents belonged to the demographic groups of: older people over 60 (54 percent), living in towns populated over 100 thousand (52 percent) and respondents supporting the political left (65 percent). A possible explanation for this reasonable large opposition against peacekeeping is that a considerable part of the public does not understand the moral dimension of peacekeeping missions and participation in them is considered first of all an issue of international prestige of the Czech Republic.\textsuperscript{149} Moreover, old sentiments against Western influence in Eastern affairs could play a role as well for the elderly and leftish voters.

Although the Czech Republic has since 1998 contributed considerably more to peacekeeping missions, there is not a more recent study on Czech public support for


peacekeeping missions. Thus, due to Czechs low score on the domestic dimension of this Human Security principle, it is unlikely that Czech involvement in ESDP missions would emphasize on active participation of local actors, which is one of the pillars of the Human Security principles as stipulated by the HSSG.

The third Human Security principle, Effective Multilateralism, has been discussed in a previous section on the national preference of the Czech regarding the NATO and EU when it comes to the overall level of security and defense matters. The Czech membership score for this principle of 0.3 could be explained to a large extent by this NATO preference. Relative to other EU member states, the Czech have involved themselves more often in ad-hoc coalitions outside the EU and UN. This is regarded as incompatible with the HSSG definition of this principle: legitimacy derived from the framework of international law and cooperation with all of the different actors participating in a conflict.\textsuperscript{150} Not that NATO does not take this international legitimacy into account, but for its military operations it doesn’t require UN approval nor local approval; while UN missions do require international approval and EU missions heavily rely on invitation from local authorities or on an UN mandate.

The final Human Security principle discussed under the policy demand phase is the clear and transparent strategic direction principle of the HSSG. The Czech Republic received a membership score of 0.5. When translated to the study conducted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the membership score equals to a type 3 classification of parliamentary powers on defence matters. The influence of the Czech parliament on ESDP missions is that it cannot veto it ex ante, but can terminate it ex post.\textsuperscript{151} The Czech constitution stipulates in article 43 paragraphs 4 and 5, that it is the government who can initially decide on the participation of Czech forces on aboard mission, while in article 43 paragraph 6, the veto ex post is granted to the parliament.\textsuperscript{152} This given fact and the previous mentioned domestic demand on debates regarding ESDP, human rights and human security which are relatively non-existent when compared to Ireland, conclude that the transparency level is rather low. In order for ESDP missions to follow this Human Security principle, a sufficient level of transparency and debate are required in order to establish a

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clear and transparent strategic direction for a mission. Therefore, the Czech would not put this Human Security principle for ESDP missions on their priorities list.

Now the domestic demand phase has been explored, the subsequent questions are raised: which parts of the demands can be issued by the Czech on European level? What are Czech’s leverages? Who are their possible coalition partners? What have the Czech been able to achieve during their EU presidency on ESDP and Human Security matters? However, first the negotiations of Czech accession to the EU and will be elaborated upon.

5.2 Policy Supply

The presence of both NATO and EU’s ESPD in Eastern Europe in the area of defence and security issues caused in many new EU member states debates on the exact role of both intergovernmental organisations. At the end of the 1990’s the role of CFSP / ESDP played an irrelevant role for the new EU members, and preference was given towards membership of NATO as the guardian of their security interests. Nevertheless, the EU offered more than just policy regarding security and defence issues. The Czech position during the EU accession negotiations on matters of ESPD did not play any significant role. As all other new member states, the Czech agreed to commit themselves to the common foreign and security policy and defend these common positions in international fora.

5.2.1 Czech’s bargaining power

The Czech welcomed new ESDP initiatives and actively takes parts in these, such as the EU battle groups and the EDA. Although, it opposed French plans for the EDA in directing the defence acquisition to an EU level, setting clear preferences for an EU budget and more bureaucracy. More importantly though for the Czech Republic was the Berlin Plus arrangement. In 2002 this arrangement was established as a package of arrangements between NATO and the EU. This arrangement fits Czech’s national preference of an EU-NATO relationship which is as transparent as possible and built on complementarity of both

organizations. Czech policy supports practical approach, focused on capabilities rather than institutions.\textsuperscript{157}

It is likely that the Czech Republic will passively observe the development of any change within the CFSP-pillar as long as it does not compete with their NATO preference. In this, they have coalition partners in all sorts. For example, the classic group of Atlantics (e.g. United Kingdom, Netherlands and France to some extent) within the EU are on the same line as the Czech Republic. Another coalition group within the EU can be formed with the new EU member states, with which Czech shares a common communist past and thus specific security interests, such as on the question on how to deal with Russian influence domestic matters. Lukas Pachta, a political analyst at Europeaum, an EU policy think-thank in Prague, stated in an interview that current Czech president Václav Klaus is being influenced by Moscow.\textsuperscript{158} To what extent Moscow is still influencing Czech foreign policy is outside the scope of this thesis. However, if even the slightest pressure from Russia on former Soviet Republics is likely to influence to some extent the national position on matters, it would contribute to the explanation on why the Czech Republic, but also Poland, were quite sceptic on the Lisbon Treaty.

Czech’s bargaining power is not stronger or weaker than Irish bargaining power, because in the end all EU member states share an equal vote on CFSP / ESDP matters when policy is presented at the Council. Nevertheless, Czech does have more alternative coalitions, not necessarily within the Union, but outside the EU it has a strong contemporary partner in the NATO and a simmering relationship with Moscow.

\textbf{5.2.2 EU presidency}

The end of Czech’s EU presidency June 2009 is labelled by Piotr Maciej Kaczynski, research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, as a moment when “a deep, collective sigh of relief was breathed by many in the EU institutions in Brussels.”\textsuperscript{159} Kaczynski’s indicates several lessons learned from the Czech EU presidency. The main comment was that the Czech goals were as ambitious as that of their predecessor (France),

while it was politically, administratively and policy wise unable to fulfil these goals. The goals of the Czech Republic did not include any advancement on matters of CFSP / ESDP, except for a successful election during their presidency of the High Representative for CFSP, which did not happen.

Johann Herz, analyst for the European Security Review magazine, describes Czech presidency’s role in the development of ESDP as “safe, discrete and cautious”. Herz presents the same cause for this passive attitude of Prague as Kaczynski. Moreover, Herz compares Czech’s presidency with theoretical realism: ESDP was not Prague’s priority, but they would support on-going activities from previous presidencies.

Although the general tenor of the presidency was bleak, Prague did achieve several smaller successes. So did they put considerable effort in the promotion of the EU Civilian Headline Goals 2010, engaged in debate on civilian capabilities within the ESDP, and as discussed in the previous section of this case study, human rights issues were promoted, although with a mixed result. These attempts and the continuation of several ESDP, such as the SSR missions in Guinea-Bissau, do fit within the description of the HSSG Human Security principles. Two Human Security principles, the bottom-up approach and regional focus, will now be addressed.

### 5.2.3 Human Security

In contrast with Ireland, the Czech Republic does not rely on Human Security principles as much in their defence matters nor in policy negation with others and in coalition forming. This is also reflected by the membership score of 0.3 which the Czech received for the bottom-up approach principle. Two of the missions in which Czech did participated were in the Balkans, a region of strategic preference, one mission in Afghanistan, where NATO strongly is represented. The last bottom-up mission of the Czech took place in the Palestine area, which does not directly seem to fit in Czech’s support for NATO operations or fit their regional preference on security issues. However, Czech is one of the strongest supporters of Israel and with the USA also strongly involved in peace-negotiations between Israel and the

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160 Ibid.
163 This was already accepted to a large extent by all EU member states, thus their success was rather slim.
Palestinian Authorities; Czechs participation could well be explained as a part of their preference to support certain regions in the world.165

The overall contribution in ESDP missions is also considerably lower than the contribution of Ireland which in combination with the higher militarization level, explains the membership score. The Czech Republic former actions and appearances during its EU presidency have shown that it prefers to use its military capabilities for NATO operations. As NATO is also somewhat involved in missions where the bottom-up approach is used, the actual membership score for this principle could be slightly higher. However, within the ESDP framework, the Czech seem to be willing to promote the civilian aspects involved in missions, but prefers to keep the military necessities in store for UN or NATO operations.

The Human Security principle of regional focus is one of two variables used in the parsimonious solution (together with clear and transparent strategic direction). Czech’s membership score is 0.6 which is slightly above EU average. It is however not the determent variable for the Czech position on the graph of page 36. However, one thing could be mentioned about the Czech in relationship with this principle. The modest score reflects that Prague has been participating in several missions in where the principle of regional focus has been utilized. Although it is impossible to establish the exact policy supply of Czech in these missions, it is worth noting that the security strategy of the Republic is also strongly regional focussed. The security interest in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and their special relationship towards Moscow determine to a large extent the foreign and security policy of the Republic. With the arrival of NATO and EU membership, a shift in foreign and security policy did occur. Nevertheless, in contrast with Ireland and several other member states, regional focus stays on the agenda as top priority.

5.3 Supranational Cooperation

The final phase of Moravcsik’s theory deals with supranational institutions, which if the Czech could design the basic document for CFSP / ESDP, the chance would be bigger that they will include supranational features than if the Irish would design such a document. The reasons given for this statement are threefold: 1) no neutrality issue, 2) ESDP is regarded as to fill a specific civilian-military nice while NATO provides support for Czech’s main security issues, 3) and the public opinion in Czech is one of the most supportive in the Union

In a recent Eurobarometer survey, 85 percent of Czech public support the development of ESDP, which is one of the highest in the EU. The support for CFSP by the public is on the EU average of 68 percent. This high degree of public support for CFSP / ESDP is out of line with the ruling party ODS which is an opponent of a stronger ESDP, with President Václav Klaus as a more modest euro sceptical within the ODS. Therefore, in the hypothetical case that CFSP / ESDP would become a supranational institution within the EU, legitimacy and credibility of common policies would be bigger when the ODS would not be the ruling party, because it does not reflect the domestic public opinion.

The extent in which Human Security principles would play a role, based on the statistical analysis preformed in chapter 3, would be of a lesser importance when Czech would draft the basic document outlining the future of CFSP / ESDP. This also reflected in the current strategic preferences of the Czech Republic, a rather weak performance during its EU presidency on advocating human rights and a passive attitude towards ESDP in general. In short, the following points would describe the current view of on the ESDP by the Czech Republic:

- Ambivalent towards ESDP on the issue of ESDP being intergovernmental or with some supranational features.
- ESDP will not overlap the NATO tasks, but should specialize as a niche institution on civilian-military operations.
- Pooling of resources rather than delegation of resources.
- Human Security principles play to a small extent a role within ESDP.
- Regional focus most dominant principle, be it limited to certain regions and actors.

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168 E.g. losing control over EDA budget
Conclusion

It can be concluded that the Human Security principles as stipulated by the HSSG are to a mediocre extent present within the EU member states policy regarding ESDP; the Human Security principles are to a low extent determining the EU member states policy on ESDP. This conclusion stands in contrast with the statement from the HSSG that the Human Security principles are common practice during ESDP missions and are in line with the goals set by the EU member states regarding ESDP.

The conclusions derived from the multiple regression analysis show that there is only a 53 percent correlation between the six Human Security principles and the outcome variable. Moreover, two out of the six principles are not significant in explaining the outcome variable: “Legitimate Political Authority” and “Effective Multilateralism”. The parsimonious and complex solutions were derived from the fuzzy-set analysis and are the best combinations of variables capable to coverage the outcome variable: ESDP commitment. The parsimonious solution, which has an 85 percent coverage score between its independent and dependent variables, was selected in order to determine which two case-studies would be analysed. The parsimonious solution consists of two independent variables: “regional focus” and “negated clear and transparent strategic direction”.

The EU member states as principal actors of ESDP, as expounded by Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmental theory, show a large variety to what extent they fit in the outcomes of the fuzzy-set analysis; with Ireland as the best match (highest coverage score in the parsimonious solution) and the Czech Republic as the worst match (lowest coverage score in the parsimonious solution). These two EU member states were selected as case-studies.

The six Human Security principles, which were tested in the quantitative analysis of chapter 3 and in the case-studies of chapter’s 4 and 5, are:

- The primacy of human rights, which is regarded by the HSSG as the first principle and is considered as the main challenge in ESDP matters. Without emphasize on human rights during ESDP missions, the concept of Human Security would be shallow, for Human Security is all about the paradigm shift from a primary focus on national state defence towards a larger emphasize on a broad of range of seven security issues (environmental, economic, food, health, personal, social and political security) threatening the daily lives of civilians and their communities. However, this first
The principle does not show up in the results of the conducted quantitative and qualitative as being a determinant factor in EU member states policy regarding ESDP. Nevertheless, this first principle does appear to be present to a mediocre extent in the EU member states, especially in the case-studies it became apparent that at least some EU member states (e.g. Ireland) are more concerned that there has be a focus on human rights during ESDP mission than others (e.g. Czech Republic).

- The principle of “legitimate political authority” emphasizes that local, state and international participation in an ESDP mission should be prioritised. The new political authority is recognized both locally and within the international community as a whole. The multiple regression analysis indicates this principle as being insignificant. As a result of the Irish constitution and the strong debate regarding ESDP, this principle was to a large extent present and determining in Ireland. Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic this principle was less prominently available and determining policy due to among other things Czech’s lukewarm domestic debate regarding ESDP and Czech’s reasonable large opposition against peacekeeping missions.

- The principle of “a bottom-up approach” emphasizes the use of local civilian actors during ESDP missions. Although the principle is analysed as significant in the mathematical model, it does not return in the parsimonious solution. In both of the case-studies, this principle was not found in actual policy. Although, the Czech have pursued during their EU presidency the EU Civilian Headline Goals 2010 and contributed to other debates on civilian capabilities within ESDP, the necessary military capabilities for ESDP operations are kept in store for NATO or UN missions rather than used for ESDP missions when compared with all other EU member states.

- The principle of “effective multilateralism” emphasizes that the EU has to work in a framework of international law with the authority of the UN Security Council, and in cooperation with all of the different actors participating in a conflict or post-conflict zone. The multiple regression analysis indicates this principle as insignificant in explaining the outcome variable: ESDP commitment. However, this principle is strongly resounded in Ireland, again due to its constitutional arrangements regarding ESDP, while the Czech Republic scored significantly lower due to their preference to
participate in NATO missions, which is regarded as being able to work fully outside any UN Security Council approval and the framework of international law.

- The principle of “an integrated regional approach” or “regional focus”, emphasizes that outsiders such as the EU and its member states should not only look within the borders of a certain state, but also look at neighbours of the affected state where similar problems or causes for the conflict can be found. This principle was one of the two variables which contribute to the parsimonious solution, thus being an important explanatory variable. For both Ireland as well as the Czech Republic, successful emphasis on regional aspects of an ESDP mission have proved more successful than when a regional focus lacked. While Ireland in itself does not restrict itself to certain regions in the world for ESDP missions, the Czech Republic clearly states that it focuses on specific areas, which are: the Balkans, Eastern Europe and NATO operations.

- The principle of “clear and transparent strategic direction” emphasizes that a clear and legal authorization is needed for EU missions, as well as transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. For this broad definition a selection was made, focusing on the transparent mandates within ESDP matters by looking at the parliamentary influence on ESDP missions. This principle proved to be in a negated form the second variable present in the parsimonious solution, and therefore one of the two most important principles. In the case-studies it appears that the Irish parliament has an important vote in the use of military forces, while in the Czech Republic the powers of parliament are minor when compared to other EU member states. Moreover, a strong parliament does not hamper military ESDP mission. Finally, due to the relative high Irish ESDP commitment and the strong parliamentary powers regarding ESDP matters, the Irish parliament is in general in favour of ESDP missions. The public opinion in both EU member states regarding ESDP and “soft” peacekeeping missions are in line with the general positions of the parliaments.

Utilizing the parsimonious solution, proponents of Human Security would be able to generate optimal support for the development of civil-military missions within the ESDP based on Human Security principles. Another conclusion can be drawn from the fuzzy-set solutions: there have to be more variables at work in explaining the commitment of EU member states
towards ESDP missions (outcome variable) than just the six Human Security principles.

As Moravcsik’s theory was used to explain the primacy of EU member states within ESDP integration, the theory also provided explanations on why there is variation across issues and countries within the CFSP pillar, namely due to different positions regarding the ideological commitment to federalism or perceived politico-military threat. Moreover, Moravcsik describes European integration in three stages: policy demand (national preference formation), policy supply (interstate bargaining) and supranational cooperation (institutional delegation). In each stage different actors are playing a role, but the governments of the EU member states are the decisive actors. In the two case-studies, Ireland and the Czech Republic, each of the three stages were analysed to see to what extent Human Security principles are present and determining the policy regarding ESDP of the two EU member states. As the quantitative analysis already indicated that the Human Security principles are unable to explain to a large extent the ESDP commitment of the two EU member states, other explanatory variables are dominating the position of the EU member states regarding ESDP.

The major differences in the first phase, policy demand, regarding both the Human Security principles as well as other explanatory variables between the two cases are:

- The intensity of the domestic debate on the role of ESDP within the Union:
  - Strong debate in Ireland, diverse number of actors contributing to the debate such as media, researchers and public forums aside the political parties.
  - Lukewarm debate in the Czech Republic, small number of actors contributing to the debate, mainly governmental institutions and political parties, media attention is rather low.

- Domestic cleavages about ESDP between the ruling political parties:
  - Weak cleavages in Ireland.
  - Strong cleavages in the Czech Republic.

- Public opinion in support of:
  - Ireland: EU / UN peace-keeping missions, human rights, neutrality
  - Czech Republic: ESDP, regional preferences, NATO.

- Parliamentary powers regarding ESDP:
  - Ireland: Triple-lock system, strong parliament.
  - Czech Republic: medium powers parliament.

- National Security preferences:
- Ireland: neutrality, UN approval, strong presence of human security principles.
- Czech Republic: NATO, regional preferences, bleak presence of human security principles.

The second phase of Moravcsik’s theory, policy supply, shows fewer differences between the two cases in regard to the Human Security principles and other explanatory variables.

- **Leverages:**
  - Ireland: active role during neutrality negotiations, in favour of upholding veto in all ESDP matters, national referendums.
  - Czech Republic: passive role on ESDP matters, in favour of upholding veto in all ESDP matters; although to what extent these and other positions are expressed, is strongly dependent on which political party is governing.

- **Contributions in regard to ESDP and Human Security:**
  - Ireland: high ESDP commitment, cautious in EDA, active role in the EU battle groups and passive member of the Human Security Network.
  - Czech Republic: average ESDP commitment, cautious in EDA, active role in the EU battle groups.

The final phase of Moravcsik’s theory, supranational cooperation, was somewhat outside the scope of the thesis, as there is currently no formal supranational ESDP. However, with the arrival of the EDA, battle groups and increased EU operations outside Europe, resources are being more often pooled and in rare cases delegated. The six Human Security principles will not be the main motivators for ESDP integration and nor will they be implemented as an overarching framework for ESDP missions. For future ESDP missions, some of the key-elements of the Human Security principles are surely to be used, such as an increased use of regional focus during missions, yet other explanatory variables will determine the EU member states policy regarding ESDP.

The fuzzy-set method is a useful tool in ordering a multiple number of variables and generates certain combinations of variables which are sufficient and necessary in explaining an outcome variable. In this thesis, my expectation was to find Human Security principles to be present and determining to a large extent the ESDP policy of the EU member states, but had be revisited due to the fuzzy-set analysis. The fuzzy-set method in itself is unable to explain the wider context of variables; therefore case-studies are needed. The case-studies
have given a better insight on the actual motivations of two EU member states for their ESDP commitment. Whether these findings also would have surfaced without the fuzzy-set method, the answer would be probably yes. Moreover, for a good study, all of the 25 cases should be analysed. It is here where methods such as the fuzzy-set method, but also the multiple regression analysis, give a compact view of possible directions for researchers to look at.
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Annex: A

This list shows the 21 ESPD missions since 2003 as described on the European Council website. These missions are all found in the SIPRI database, which was used to measure the dependent variable of the thesis question. Moreover, the ESDP missions which the HSSG analysed in its Madrid report are marked with a *.

2003

**Concordia**: military operation, using NATO assets in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (fYROM).

**EUPOL- Proxima**: Police Mission in the fYROM, assisting the efforts of the Government of fYROM to move closer towards EU integration.

**ARTEMIS**: military mission, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 contributing to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo.

**EUPM (BiH)** Police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina: monitoring, mentoring and inspection. Refocused in 2006 to support the police reform process, develop and consolidate local capacity and regional cooperation in the fight against major and organised crime.

2004

**Althea**: military mission to Bosnia Herzegovina.

**EUJUST THEMIS**: 1st Rule of Law Mission, to Georgia to support Georgian government with reform to the criminal justice system.

2005

*AMM Aceh* (Indonesia) monitoring mission: to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement, set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) including decommissioning of GAM armaments and relocation of armed forces.

*Eupol Copps* Palestine: to provide enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.

**EUPAT** former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: police advisory team, successor to PROXIMA (qv), monitoring and mentoring local police on issues including border policing, public peace and order and accountability, the fight against corruption and organised crime.

**EUBam Rafah** Palestine: to monitor operations of the Israeli border crossing point.
EUJUST-Lex Iraq: to provide professional development opportunities to senior justice officials and demonstrate best practice in rule of law.

* **EUPOL Kinshasa** DR Congo (now EUPOL RD Congo): to monitor, mentor and advise the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) and police reform.

**EUSEC DR Congo** advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security

**AMISS II** Darfur, Sudan: civilian and military components to ensure effective and timely EU assistance to support the AMIS II enhancement.

**EU Border Assistance Mission** Moldova and Ukraine: training and advice to support capacity building for border management and customs, to prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud.

**2006**

**EUFOR RD Congo**: military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process.

**2007**

**Eupol Afghanistan**: mentoring, advice and training for civilian police at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces.

* **EUPT Kosovo**: planning to ensure a smooth transition between tasks of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and other areas.

**EUFOR TCHAD/RCA**: military operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic.

**2008**

**EU SSR Guinea-Bissau**: the mission provides advice and assistance on reform of the security sector in Guinea Bissau in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy.

**EUNAVFOR Somalia (operation "Atalanta")**: contribute to the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme and the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.