The Cosmopolitan Identity: a Search for its Foundations, Conditions and Implications

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Declaration

I, Aafke van Welie, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled *The Cosmopolitan Identity: a Search for its Foundations, Conditions and Implications*, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the List of References. I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed .................................................................

Date .................................................................
Preface

Right now, I am not completely sure if my thesis is finished. But how could one ever know if a thesis is finished? In theory I could work another year on it. Today it just seems the time to hand it in and let it go. Since the end of the first semester of the Master programme Euroculture I am participating in, I was supposed to think about a thesis subject. The grand potential subjects of Orientalism, Eurocentrism and cosmopolitanism passed my mind. Even though I have been reading on these topics for more than a year now, it was not until two months ago that I managed to narrow and structure the rebellious collection of potential ideas in my head. However, I would not have managed to formulate a thesis statement without the guidance of my supervisor Dr Ine Megens. I am very grateful for her clear suggestions on formulating the thesis questions, inspiration on the subject, and patience as well as assistance with my unpredictable style of writing a thesis. Furthermore, I very much appreciate the academic encouragement and insights I received in the second semester from my second supervisor, Prof. Dr Czesław Porębski.

Moreover, I am thankful to my boyfriend Jurek, who constantly was as positive as one could possibly be about my ability to write a thesis, and encouraged me to apply for Euroculture in the first place. I would also like to show appreciation to my parents for supporting me throughout my whole academic career, as well as for letting me stay at their house and spoil me for this last week of writing. Furthermore, I thank my Euroculture classmates, for the cheering comments I received on the social networking site Facebook.

On the whole, I am very grateful that I have been able to participate in the Master programme Euroculture. Because of the international and challenging academic character, it has been a very stimulating educational experience. The programme also enabled me to make friends from all over the world. In addition to that, being a Euroculture student allowed me not only to study at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands, but also to spend time at the Jagiellonian University in Poland and the University of Pune in India. It has been amazing to spend a semester in Krakow, which is the most beautiful city in the world according to me, as well as to meet the most wonderful people and experience the unfamiliar in India. To make a long story short, I can say that being a Euroculture student made me a true cosmopolitan!

Aafke van Welie,
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Introduction

In many academic books and articles, election campaigns and general media such as newspapers, magazines or television shows, Europe is characterized as a cosmopolitan civilization. Depending on the source, this attribution can have very diverse connotations. To me it seems that in the current debate, cosmopolitanism is mostly related to cultural exclusivity. For example, the popular Dutch rightwing member of parliament Geert Wilders argued in an interview that Dutch people, who according to him value the cosmopolitan ideals of freedom and equality, cannot coexist with people who profess the so-called fundamentalist religion of Islam. (Pek) In an edition of the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad, a journalist argued that Turkey should never become a member of the European Union, since the European values of Christianity, democracy and Enlightenment are in his view incompatible with Turkish culture. He believes that due to the Islam and Turkey’s distinctive history, Turkish people generally have a lack of tolerance, are single-minded and appreciate authoritarian leadership. (Segers) In their book Rethinking Europe, the social scientists Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford characterize European culture as secular, liberal and aware of other cultures. They therefore suggest that a cosmopolitan identity would work well as an integrating characteristic for the European Union. (51-56; 72-77) In his article The Clash of Civilizations? the political scientist Samuel Huntington declares that the enlightened, rational inhabitants of the Western world could never peacefully live together with the fundamentalist and undemocratic Muslims, who however recently in big numbers migrated to Europe. He hence predicts the ‘clash of civilizations’ in his essay. (30-35)

On the one hand, this all sounds as if Europeans should be lucky to have a cosmopolitan identity. The descriptions of equality, freedom and tolerance seem very noble and positive. On the other hand, in some of the examples, this so-called liberal and respectful European identity is propagated at the expense of Islamic cultures, which seems contradictory. Because, in my view it is inherent to the definition of an enlightened cosmopolitan citizen, to respect people from other cultures beforehand. The accounts above furthermore describe specific European ‘traits’, by which they seem to imply that Europe historically developed in isolation from Turkey, and that the territory of Europe as a whole encompasses one singular culture. However, it seems questionable to me if both Europe and people from Western culture in general are as cosmopolitan as is suggested here. If one for example looks at the crusades, colonialism, inquisitions and wars in European history, a cosmopolitan element seems distant. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism is often seen as an ‘elite’ concept (Isin and Wood 92-97), which would imply that it is not as wide-ranging as understood here. Therefore, I am very interested in the exact origin of the concept of cosmopolitanism. Because my
academic interests mostly revolve around the individual level, I chose to specify my research further in that direction. Hence, my core research question is to find out what the conditions for a cosmopolitan identity are.

My method for answering this query, is to explicate the potential relationship between cosmopolitanism and individual identity in all possible ways. Therefore, the concept of cosmopolitanism will be clarified through a philosophical, historical and sociological account. In order to give a nuanced as well as complete explanation, I chose not to limit myself to one theory but use various authors writing on the subject, from different disciplines.

This main question will be answered in various steps and chapters. The first chapter will give a general conceptual explication of the cosmopolitan identity. In this chapter various philosophical and sociological approaches to the cosmopolitan, a historical account of cosmopolitanism, the relation between globalization and cosmopolitanism, ideas about class and cosmopolitanism and a theory of identity will be outlined. The second chapter is less theoretical and has various case studies as its subject. Some general statistical findings as well as a selection of collectives and individuals from a variety of cultures and classes, will be examined in order to find potential cosmopolitan identifications. Finally, the third chapter is an analysis, which attempts to clarify the cosmopolitan identity from a social constructivist perspective. In the conclusion, I will analyze and structure these diverse approaches to cosmopolitanism. At last, I hope to give an exact definition of the cosmopolitan identity on the individual level, and find out whether cosmopolitanism is as distinctively European as the authors above seem to suggest. Another aim for this thesis is to integrate, structure and classify previous research on cosmopolitanism. Therefore, I will try to unravel the differences between various accounts, integrate the results of case studies in a theoretical framework and attempt to connect diverse approaches to cosmopolitanism.

A renewed exploration of cosmopolitanism, which attempts to integrate various theoretical frameworks, is in my opinion very relevant. The concept is first of all regularly portrayed as particular to people with a Western cultural background, as some of the accounts above argued. Secondly, cosmopolitanism is often seen as a potential integrating identity for the European Union. Therefore, most of the examples I will give and historical situations I will explore, are situated on European territory. Hence, I think this subject of research is very appropriate as an addition to the current debate on cosmopolitanism, identity and European citizens.
Chapter 1

A Conceptual and Normative Exploration of the Cosmopolitan Identity

In this first chapter, my central aim is to clarify the theoretical concept of cosmopolitanism in relation to identity on the collective as well as the individual level. This will be done through the analysis of various philosophical, historical and sociological accounts of cosmopolitanism. The starting points for this analysis are two different approaches to cosmopolitanism, historical cosmopolitanism in Europe, the cosmopolitan space, potential cosmopolitan citizenship and an abstract theory on identity. At the end of this first exploration, I hope to have found a sound theoretical basis for the cosmopolitan identity on the individual level.

1.1 Two approaches to cosmopolitanism

In literature on the concept of the cosmopolitan identity, two dominant approaches to cosmopolitanism are manifested. These are the ideological notion of cosmopolitanism versus a descriptive approach. In this first section, both will be explained briefly.

1.1.1 Ideological cosmopolitanism

The ideological notion of cosmopolitanism is manifested in a principle of feeling connected to humanity as a whole, in contrast to for example only one’s family or nation. This idea was articulated by the Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes, in his statement, “I am a citizen of the world” instead of restricting himself to the standard image of a Greek high status male confined to the polis. Diogenes as well as his Stoic followers argued that the place where one was born is accidental. Therefore differences in nationality, class or gender should not function as a boundary between people, so they thought.

Furthermore, the famous philosopher Immanuel Kant articulated a cosmopolitan ideal in his moral philosophy, in the principle of the Kingdom of Ends, which is a variation of his well-known Categorical Imperative. The Kingdom of Ends means that one should honor the dignity of every living human in every decision one makes. To achieve this ideal, one should always act upon reason instead of emotions, because decision on the basis of pure rationality will always lead to just results according to Kant. (Isin and Wood 120; Nussbaum 1-7; Szerzsynski and Urry 462)

Finally, in her essay Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, the American contemporary philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues in favor of a cosmopolitan education, which should be
incorporated in American high schools as well as in the United States’ foreign politics. This would enable Americans to learn more about themselves, solve problems which require international cooperation, recognize moral obligations to the world and finally let them make a consistent argument for human rights by appealing to humanity as a whole and not just restricting themselves to American citizens. Therefore, she can also be seen as an advocate of ideological cosmopolitanism. (Nussbaum 4-6)

In his book *Cosmopolitan Vision* the sociologist Ulrich Beck describes ideological cosmopolitanism as *philosophical* cosmopolitanism. According to him, it is characteristic that this kind of cosmopolitanism is a *conscious and normative choice* of elite thinkers such as philosophers and other academics. It is also an active concept, because it is established with the goal of *imposing* a cosmopolitan order on the world. Another attribute of ideological cosmopolitanism is that it is deliberately established by *individuals* instead of derived from empirical findings. It can be seen as a mindful philosophy which originated in the minds of persons who saw themselves as actively *belonging* to humanity as a whole. Finally, ideological cosmopolitanism is *idealistic* in that it seeks to actively pursue an ethical goal for humanity. (Beck 21)

1.1.2 *Descriptive cosmopolitanism*

In contrast to ideological cosmopolitanism, there is the more neutral and descriptive cosmopolitanism. This is a mere explanation of historical as well as contemporary overlaps of local, national and global occurrences and processes. The definition of descriptive cosmopolitanism in this thesis is mostly derived from the following books and articles: *Globalization – The Human Consequences* by Zygmunt Bauman, *The Cosmopolitan Vision* by Ulrich Beck, *The World is Flat* by Thomas L. Friedman, *Identity & Citizenship* by Engin F. Isin and Patricia K. Wood, and finally *Cultures of Cosmopolitanism* by Bronislaw Szerszynski and John Urry. Bauman is an Emeritus Professor in Sociology at the universities of Leeds and Warsaw. He has written an extremely impressive number of books which greatly contributed to debates on globalization, culture and human geography. Beck is a German sociologist. He is a Professor of Sociology at Munich University and the London School of Economics. In *The Cosmopolitan Vision* he makes clear by the use of examples that the world has become increasingly interconnected and interwoven. He therefore argues that descriptive cosmopolitanism is real and that people should consequently have a cosmopolitan instead of national or local outlook on daily life. Friedman is an American journalist and writer. He is strongly in favor of economic globalization. In *The World is Flat* he describes the developments that made the world more global and therefore ‘flat’. In *Identity & Citizenship* the sociology professors Isin and Wood analyze the sociological dimensions of postmodernism and globalization. They both work at
York University in Toronto. Finally, the sociologists Szerszynski and Urry, based at Lancaster University, attempt to find a cosmopolitan civil society in *Cultures of Cosmopolitanism* through empirical research.

When it comes to descriptive cosmopolitanism, all of these authors agree that this concept became significant because of the occurrence of global processes, or *globalization*. Globalization causes the world to become more interconnected. In the last quarter of the previous century, global processes occurred more rapidly and more often. Examples are the legal as well as illegal free movements of goods, services, migrants, tourists, intellectual property, human or animal diseases and organized crime. These processes do not restrict themselves to national or continental borders and boundaries. Therefore, they slowly cause national restrictions to have less influence than before. But global processes facilitate the movement of national and local elements as well. Examples are the existence of transnational immigrant communities across the world, the presence of Turkish food in Germany, the spread of African music in the United States or the organization of Brazilian carnival in the Netherlands. The combination, intersection, migration and overlapping of the endless variety of national, local, ethnic and religious elements by means of global processes consequently creates an *inclusive cosmopolitan space*. In the approach of descriptive cosmopolitanism, this space is depicted and analyzed. (Beck 79-82; Friedman 3-51; Isin and Wood 91-97; Szerszynski and Urry 461-466)

Another element of descriptive cosmopolitanism is the reactions to the blurring of national borders. NGO’s, transnational immigrant communities, terrorists and environmental activists operating on a global level usually have in common that they embody reactions to globalization and the cosmopolitan space it creates, which could be neutral, positive or negative. However, when one’s actions are the result of some cosmopolitan influence, it does not necessarily mean that one encompasses a cosmopolitan identity, because individuals may not always be aware of the cosmopolitan character of their actions. Descriptive cosmopolitanism however can encourage people to act beyond the borders of their nation state. This for example occurs when one operates for a local goal with the desire to pursue this in a global space as well. This can be the case with environmental activists, representatives of trade unions, people promoting a specific religion or migrants demanding attention for a particular locality. (Isin and Wood 154; Kennedy and Roudometof 18-20) It can also be the case with terrorists. Even though Al Qaeda might seem local in its ideologies by operating against *Americanization* or globalization, and in favor of for example freedom for Palestine or a specific strand of Islamism, its mode of organization is close to resembling a globally operating multinational or NGO. Also, its means as well as ends stretch across a transnational space, in contrast to terrorists operating on the national level such as the IRA or the ETA. Furthermore, Al Qaeda’s backcloth philosophy is derived from a fusion of European, Asian and
Islamic philosophical and religious elements. All in all, this makes Al Qaeda a very cosmopolitan organization. (Beck 112-113)

Beck characterizes the formation of these cosmopolitan actions on the global level as a passive side effect of global processes, perhaps like a spillover from the global economy. He argues that descriptive cosmopolitanism is inescapable and indeterminate, but difficult to theorize. (20-22) In my opinion, this implies that it might be easy to operate on the cosmopolitan level without thinking about cosmopolitanism, or possessing a cosmopolitan identity. However, it could be that various representations and variations of cosmopolitan individuality exist, and that these could also encompass a more particular cosmopolitan identity, based on for example human rights or ecology. These identity related assumptions will be explored in the rest of this chapter.

1.2 Historical indications of ideological as well as descriptive cosmopolitanism in Europe

Far back, there are various indications of ideological as well as descriptive cosmopolitanism to be found in Europe.¹ These can be briefly illustrated by one of the thoughts behind early European cosmopolitanism as well as some examples of historical interlinks and agreements beyond the national and local.

1.2.1 Christendom and the Republic of Letters: ideological cosmopolitanism in history

Besides the Greek Cynic Diogenes and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, European history reveals more signs of the cosmopolitan ideal. An example is the concept of Christendom, which served as a binding factor in Europe since the concept of Europe as such came into discourse. Even though several different languages were spoken and some states already acquired a kind of ‘national’ character as early as the 10th century, a common basis in Europe was yet one shared religion. An additional cosmopolitan religious element was the wish to ‘spread’ this religion over the world by means of for example crusades, trade connections or traveling monks. (Rietbergen 120, 145, 212, 255) Later, the elite of Europe slowly created their own cosmopolitan ideology, which originated on the basis of Christendom, but slowly merged with specific ways of scientific, philosophical and artistic thinking. According to Rietbergen in his book Europe – A Cultural History, this is the basis of what we now define as ‘the European culture’. (151)

¹ Due to restrictions in time and space I will limit myself to Europe when giving historical examples of cosmopolitanism.
Another interesting manifestation of a fusion of European culture and cosmopolitanism is the Republic of Letters. From the 16th century until the beginning of the 19th century academics, writers and students made tours around Europe, or traveled to Europe’s largest and most important universities. Through letters and meetings between them, a community of academics – or the Republic of Letters – came into existence. Members could join regardless of their nationality, mother tongue and religion. They communicated in the at that time ‘cosmopolitan2 languages’ of Latin, French and later Italian. Letters were shared with fellow academics and knowledge was diffused easily.

This seems like an interesting manifestation of a cosmopolitan ideal, but it was only the elite who was able to participate in this republic. The poor were very busy with labor and therefore had no time to care about travel or debate. Moreover, most of them probably never even learned the practice of writing. (Rietbergen 297-313) Therefore, in my opinion it seems that the elite of the Republic of Letters embodied only a limited component of cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitans of the republic spoke various languages, traveled a lot and were intellectual. But they only moved around in the small space of the elite. Regional, national and local variations, languages or dialects and the culture of the peasants remained largely unknown to them. So perhaps their historical lifestyle contained a cosmopolitan element, but only a restricted element, lived ‘above’ the social spaces of the common people as well as limited to the geographical area of Europe.

1.2.2 Connections, interlinks and cooperation: descriptive cosmopolitanism in historical Europe

Apart from this consciousness of cosmopolitanism in Europe there are some historical examples of real connections, interlinks and cooperation between nations and continents. These examples might give more objective information than the ideal image of for example the Republic of Letters, but it will, due to the large scale and communal character of descriptive cosmopolitanism, explain less about people’s identity and self image.

An example is the line between Europe and Asia Minor, or in recent discourse, the EU and Turkey. This boundary has been more permeable in history than is often thought. Various books, articles, movies and debates describe it as a fault line between Christian and Islamic civilization, characterized by violence for 1,300 years (for example Huntington 22, 31). Also politicians like the French president Sarkozy as well as the Dutch member of parliament Wilders, who I shortly named in my introduction, have always insisted the incompatibility of Europe and Turkey. However, more than

2 However still European.
conflicts, there have been alliances, trade and cultural exchanges connecting both sides of the boundary. An illustration of this is how European medical practice and theory benefited a great deal from knowledge received by Islamic scholars. Also, it were Islamic intellectuals who translated and commented upon Plato’s and Aristotle’s texts, to preserve them for the future. Furthermore, Arabic literature and poetry deeply influenced Europe; some originally Arabic tales are even claimed as European folk tales. Moreover, European trade and mathematics were revolutionized by Arabic numerals, which were much more convenient to work with than the old Roman system. Finally, a common Greek and Near East effort in astronomy and the earth sciences caused an amazing Islamic advancement in nautic instruments, technology and astronomic maps which was of great benefit to European countries as well. (Howe 46; Rietbergen 113-114) This proof shows that a line which is often perceived to function as an age old border between different cultures, turned out to be quite porous. However, the argument can be taken to a broader – and indeed more cosmopolitan – level when tracing ‘typical’ products or cultures. For example, so-called ‘typical’ European phenomena like the printing press, gunpowder and the compass are not as exclusively European as they seem. From these three creations, it is said that only printing independently originated in Europe, but that it had been independently invented in China before that as well. It is however striking that Europe benefited from, and ‘used’, all these creations after their ‘export’ to Europe, in order to explore and colonize many other parts of the world. (Rietbergen 212-215)

Furthermore, in their daily life, many Europeans take vegetables such as the tomato and potato, and means of pleasure like cocoa, tobacco and coffee for granted. These crops were however only added to the Europeans’ daily diet after 1492, when various European powers started colonizing the America’s. Tobacco and cocoa were for example given by the Aztec ruler Montezuma to Portuguese explorers when they returned to Portugal. And around 1550, Spain introduced the potato which was exported from Peru. After that, it took until the 18th century for the potato to integrate as a nutritious substitute for the grain most people then consumed. The tomato was also an Aztec ‘invention’ and taken to Europe by the Spanish, where it soon became a so-called essential element of the Southern European kitchen. (Rietbergen 245-249)

These brief examples are in my opinion a clear demonstration of the historical presence of descriptive cosmopolitanism. They also form evidence against the image of a unique European culture developed in isolation from Turkish culture, as was implied by the journalist in the introduction when he characterized European culture as cosmopolitan versus Turkish culture as restricted and local. Beck moreover argues that the mixing, intermingling and permeating of cultures has always been the historical standard, but since the rise of the nation state has been portrayed as an exception. (68) It is clear that nations and continents have always influenced each other throughout the centuries. However, people’s sources of identification have not always linked to
historical realities, due to ideological influences. The cultural role of the nation state and globalization in this process will be explored in the next section.

1.3 Identity and citizenship

1.3.1 The nation state and its recent monopoly on identity

In their monograph Citizenship & Identity, Isin and Wood identify citizenship as

“both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual’s membership in a polity.” (Isin and Wood 4)

This means that citizenship always entails a mutual association between a cultural as well as a political status. However, people’s way of identifying themselves and their idea of citizenship continuously changed through history. An important factor in this has been the sovereignty of the nation state and its connection to nationalism. Since the 17th century, sovereign modern nation states have been taking shape. They became autonomous on their territory and governed by their own set of laws. During the 18th century, a feeling of nationalism developed in these ‘newly created’ states. Since then, citizens started to identify with their nation. Important factors which encouraged the creation of nationalism were, amongst others, the development of a national education system with unified narratives as support, invented traditions, a single language, a good functioning infrastructure to interconnect the nation and a national currency. In for example the national education system, education was made accessible for the masses instead of the elite, with the goal to reach the entire population. Teaching, official documents and state information were expressed in one national language. History was rewritten and taught in the national system as well. Also, one dominant religion was advocated. National traditions were even invented with the goal of establishing a shared framework of unification for the citizens, such as the Dutch tradition of Sinterklaas. Finally, people were supposed to derive their identity from deliberately created national values such as a mentality of hard work, motherhood or the will to fight for one’s nation. In these processes, local languages and religions were suppressed. According to Rietbergen, the deeper reason behind nationalization was the ‘controllability’ of space and people. Unity leads to more national cohesion and peace, whereas difference causes internal trouble. (Isin and Wood 91-93; Rietbergen 330-332) Isin and Wood even state that since the 18th century nation states ‘colonized’ everyday life in most places of the world. This is proven by the fact that since then, individuals are
mostly identified by fixed criteria such as birth and nationality, as well as state-run documents like passports and citizenship certificates. It seems that all these identifications have been shaped in the framework of the nation state. (Isin and Wood 4)

The nation state still makes a strict distinction between those who ‘belong’ and those who are aliens, refugees, tourists or temporary workers to the polity. Most of the latter groups are subjected to restrictions concerning immigration, naturalization or simply the right to enter. Issues concerning how many of these aliens ought to be accepted, what their rights should be and whether they should ever be ‘naturalized’ often turn out into fierce debates. Even though there are many forms of government ranging from democracy to dictatorship and oligarchy, most of them use such a concept of citizenship. Historically seen, there has always been a tension between one’s rights and duties, there have been class conflicts and the definition of citizenship has always been subjected to change. But Isin and Wood argue that the national institution as such has lasted very long. (Isin and Wood 4-6; Thomas) Obviously, in most parts of Europe this is the case. However, I think that in other parts of the world such as Africa, Latin America or East Asia, the concept of citizenship perhaps has very different connotations than Isin and Wood imply. In for example various nations which have been artificially constructed by their European colonizer, the concept of citizenship has been imposed on the people living in the area. This coercion of a European concept of nationality and citizenship has caused many conflicts and frictions in these territories. An example is the random design of various African countries and the many tribal wars and violence this has led too. (Rietbergen 392-393; Sen 86, 174) Finally, in most countries the concept of citizenship has recently been disrupted by various occurrences relating to globalization and cosmopolitan reality. These developments will be listed in the next sections.

1.3.2 The fading borders of the nation state and the fragmenting power of globalization

Since the last quarter of the 20th century, the sovereignty of the nation state has been increasingly challenged by globalization, and as a consequence the solid status of citizenship, which used to be connected to this sovereignty, is challenged too. The term globalization refers to various developments, and is in my view able to function as an important component of the all-embracing descriptive cosmopolitanism, because of two reasons. First of all, globalization refers to an increase in economic movements of for instance commodities, people, crime, ideas, investment, technology and disease across national borders. This has the effect that many national economies are slowly forced to integrate into a wider international economy. Secondly, it signifies the rise of international and supranational institutions, which function above and beyond the framework of the nation state. These institutions can partly be seen as a reaction to economic globalization and partly as a response
to political occurrences. Due to the world wide and inclusive character of these institutions, this rise very much contributed to descriptive cosmopolitanism. (Isin and Wood 91-97) In my opinion, this rise is a point in history where the formation of ideological cosmopolitan institutions as well as the occurrence of descriptive cosmopolitanism coincide. The institutions were first of all established because of political and economic developments on a level beyond the national. Apart from this, many of these global institutions have a normative character, often based on ideological cosmopolitan sentiments.

According to Beck, the end of the Second World War was the main starting point for the foundation of global institutions. When the war ended and Europe realized the tragedy and horrors that were committed, something very cosmopolitan occurred. Beck even argues that,

“The rise of a realistic, politically effective cosmopolitanism (discernible in a whole series of key institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union, the International Court, the World Bank, NATO, the OECD, etc.) should be understood as a genuinely unintended side effect of Hitler and National Socialism – in other words, of the insane German pursuit of racial purity and all of the moral, political and psychological ravages it wreaked.” (Beck 69)

As a consequence, the Second World War encouraged the rise of global institutions and enforced nation states ubiquitously to become more restricted in their power. (Beck 69-70) Furthermore, the end of the Second World War forced Western European nations to give up their colonies and therefore caused many nations, worldwide, to finally become independent. (Rietbergen 432) However, I have a doubt towards the significance Beck attaches to the aftermath of the Second World War concerning global institutions, since such establishments were already taking shape after the First World War, simultaneously with an attempt to confine the power of nation states. Examples of these developments are the peace Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and its resulting League of Nations. The latter had its largest coverage in the period between 1934 and 1935. It strove for disarmament, human rights, the combat of global poverty and solving conflicts between nations, which seems to lean very much towards ideological cosmopolitanism. (Trueman)

Another important influence for the development of cosmopolitanism, according to Beck, is the postcolonial movement. Beck states that the discourse of postcolonialism disrupted various historical Eurocentric elements such as a feeling of superiority as well as political and cultural forgetfulness. Postcolonialism gave rise to the idea that there are other cultures who should be treated as equal and not as subordinate to European cultures. Furthermore, it changed the notion of an exclusive European self, based on a ‘primitive’ other, and opened up a space for an expanded as well as more cosmopolitan national. (Beck 69-71)
Various authors argue that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was an even more decisive moment for global processes. The fall made practices such as free consumption, migration, tourism and the flow of information accessible to a large group of people. (Friedman 51-59; Isin and Wood 91; Szerszynski and Urry 464) Obviously, this was a real breakthrough for Europe, but people in for example Africa or East Asia might not have been able to take part in the spaces this fall opened up at all. Therefore, in my opinion it seems Eurocentric to emphasize the importance of the fall of the Berlin Wall as much as these authors suggest. However, this occurrence could perhaps have a more symbolic cosmopolitan meaning, for example by treating it as a representative moment for the rise of personal as well as economic freedom in a particular area.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the flows of globalization described above caused an ever increasing gap, especially in the Western world, between the still predominantly national polity versus increasingly global economy to come into play. The latter was very free and unregulated, whereas the former still tried to govern by all sorts of rules and regulations. According to Bauman global flows are controlled by a multinational elite who possesses a great deal of economic, political and cultural power. Much of this power is then ‘pulled away’ from the increasingly fragmented nation state. The capital controlled by the elite is furthermore not tied to any soil, but situated in global space. Members of the elite usually operate independent from each other, and also from the local territory in which the companies they control are located. These individuals are investors, professionals, shareholders, consultants and informational workers. Their home is usually a cosmopolitan city like New York, Hong Kong or London. Since no community or solid organization is in power of the totality of globalization, Bauman states that “nobody is really in control”. (Bauman “GZ” 6-27; 55-66) In my opinion, this seems as if economic globalization is something that overcomes most people, instead of being a conscious choice, except for perhaps Bauman’s multinational elite who is ‘in control’.

1.3.3 The unifying but simultaneously stratifying power of globalization: communication and mobility

Besides economy and international or supranational organizations, globalization also encapsulates human relations across nations. Their focus can be professional, ethnic, cultural or lifestyle-related. The formation of these relations has been eased throughout history by developments in communication and mobility.

There has been an enormous increase in international and national communication through telephone and the digital exchange of information on the internet. This has been made much easier by the use of small, electronic devices like mobile phones or laptops. Friedman calls these devices
personal steroids. (Beck 93; Friedman 185-187) According to Friedman, everybody who owns one of these devices can make it possible to live in a “digital, mobile, virtual, and personal” (Fiorina quoted by Friedman 187) mode within minutes. Furthermore, because of these steroids and the technological advances that come with them, it is now very easy to share music, data, movies or images through the internet. (189-191) This makes clear that there could be a large cosmopolitan community of likeminded music or movie lovers on the internet. However, the sharing of files could still be an individual practice; all these people who download the same movie or song can choose to watch it alone, or only discuss and view it with their local friends or family. In my view this would mean that these global networks are only used for convenience and have less of a meaning for one’s identity.

However, another digital advance is used for actual global interpersonal connections. This is the practice of making very affordable long distance phone calls through the internet. This technology enabled companies to rigorously cut their communication costs, and relatives or friends living scattered across the globe to keep in touch easily. Another such device is the use of video conferencing in meetings. The TV screens represent people who could be anywhere as if they were physically present at the venue, which makes international meetings or conferences a lot less costly and time consuming.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there has been a large improvement in the use of wireless devices. With personal steroids, one can share, manipulate and shape digital data with anybody from almost anywhere at very fast speeds. What is significant is that one’s social and professional environment seem to expect people to possess such a device, in order to for example be reached anytime anywhere, or to be able to keep up with the newest market developments. (Friedman 189-196) In my opinion, this implication vividly explains how large-scale and digital our daily life has gotten, and how ‘normal’ this feels to many people. Also, it appears as if our life has accelerated a great deal in the last thirty years. If one wants to keep up with the rest of humanity, in many countries one has to live in a much higher ‘gear’ than one’s parents and grandparents ever did. However, because of financial and social restrictions, not everybody is able to keep up with this new tempo. The people who are not able to keep up with the current speed of professional as well as daily life, are consequently excluded from a very significant global space. Hence, they will only have ‘value’ for national or local places. According to Bauman it is currently however only the global space which is significant when it comes to the production of meaning, the social elite or well-paid professions. Therefore he argues that the ones who are not able to keep up and participate in the global space are ‘redundant humans’. ("GZ" 21; “LT” 30)

Consequently, in my opinion it seems as if most people either have or lack the ability to participate in the global space and will simply act with the skills they possess, in an attempt to
adequately ‘function’ in contemporary society. Therefore, it seems as if globalization overcomes most people on a community or group level since many humans will feel drawn to live up to the social as well as economic standards in their community. Only for a few, it will be a deliberate individual choice to take part in global activities, which I will come back to later.

Apart from this revolution in communication, many developments occurred concerning mobility. There has been a huge increase in tourism and diverse forms of migration, such as permanent migration, legal as well as illegal labor migration, asylum seekers and foreign student exchanges. (Beck 93)

However, this mobility is usually differentiated by class. In Globalization – The Human Consequences, Bauman describes how the rich and poor are both mobile, but in very diverse ways. Firstly, there are the ones who are ‘in control of globalization’, earn their money in global jobs or have found a suitable global lifestyle in any other way. They usually have the financial as well as social ability to move around as they want. A vivid illustration of this statement is made in Bauman’s quotation of Agnes Heller, when she is speaking to a wealthy employee of an international law firm who masters five different languages and owns three apartments, all on different continents. (“GZ” 72)

“She constantly migrates, and among many places, and always to and fro. She does it alone, not as a member of a community, although many people act like her ... The kind of culture she participates in is not a culture of a certain place; it is the culture of a time. It is a culture of the absolute present. Let’s accompany her on her constant trips from Singapore to Hong Kong, London, Stockholm, New Hampshire, Tokyo, Prague and so on. She stays in the same Hilton hotel, eats the same tuna sandwich for lunch, or, if she wishes, eats Chinese food in Paris and French food in Hong Kong. She uses the same type of fax, and telephones, and computers, watches the same films, and discusses the same kind of problems with the same kind of people.” (Heller quoted by Bauman, “GZ” 90)

In contrast to this rich and mobile elite, Bauman describes poor people who neither have the means nor freedom to move this way. Consequently, the poor are supposed to live confined to places with a very local and underprivileged character, like rural villages or urban ghetto’s. However, sometimes they do want to travel, for example with the goal of economic migration, just to see the world or to imitate the elite. Or they might not even want to take a trip but could be ‘forced’ to move by being driven out of their localities through hunger, poverty, war or discrimination. Yet, when they attempt to move somewhere better, they often are not very welcome and must pass endless border controls such as passport and visa checks in any case. If they arrive illegally, they always risk being sent back to their backward areas. Despite this, large groups continue to try, often by paying a large sum of
money to an agent and in unsafe conditions, like crossing the Mediterranean Sea in small, unstable boats. ("GZ" 76; 86-92)

The condition of these poor does however not stay completely hidden in the Western world. Another development which contributed to the development of a cosmopolitan space, the media, broadcasts worldwide issues of famine, war or discrimination to be observed by a wide public. According to Beck, when the media broadcasts the situation of the poor, it forces people to think about themselves and the other citizens on the globe. Also, it could foster the creation of global communities and let the item be put on national as well as international political agendas. (Bauman "GZ" 76; Beck 35-36)

1.3.4 The fading borders of the nation state and the unifying but simultaneously stratifying power of globalization: global communities

Global communities in general can be based on norm formation, political action, ethnicity, culture or lifestyle, amongst others. They can often also be identified as cosmopolitan because they are usually built up out of intersecting, crossing and overlapping global, national and local elements. The means of communication are typically global, but the specific goal or identification of the members, such as ethnicity, political action or lifestyle, can be either global, national, religious or local. A global community is formed by the ones who identify with issues in a similar way, connect with each other and want to act upon it.

In the introduction of their anthology Communities across Borders, the sociologists Paul Kennedy and Victor Roudometof group global communities in five different types. First, there exist ethnic global communities which are tied to the homeland, such as Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands or Germany. Second, there is the old ethnic migrant diaspora, with usually only symbolic ties to the homeland, such as Greek immigrants in the United States or Italians in Canada. Both are known to be strongly assimilated in society. In their diaspora, local ties are therefore decoupled from the territory of origin. These first two examples of global communities are very old. They have existed long before globalization but do benefit from global means of communication such as internet phone calls or satellite television. Their existence is mostly shaped by group culture instead of individual decisions, and their goal is usually to provide cultural and ethnic companionship.

Furthermore, there are communities who revolve around one lifestyle, such as a specific kind of music, a celebrity or a sport. People who network on the internet because of these interests, are selecting a personal 'virtual neighborhood', instead of simply coping with their actual neighbors. If their celebrity of choice is not in the picture anymore, or if they decide to enjoy sports instead of music, they are free to choose a different neighborhood. They greatly benefit from global means of
communication, but sometimes such communities do restrict themselves to a particular area or state, due to limits in language or the extent to which the object of their lifestyle is known. Also, it is usually an individual decision to take part in such a community. The goal of their membership is usually convenience, pleasure or company.

Fourth, communities related to politics and norms are manifested by the creation of NGO’s and ethnic, sexual and racial associations. These flow across, above and beyond the borders and boundaries of the nation state. (Isin and Wood 91-97) Examples of these communities are people who identify with global, national or local injustices such as sweatshop labor, the problem of famine or the international arms trade. In my opinion, the ability to perceive injustices on a global level exhibits affinity with ideological cosmopolitanism. When acting in accordance with this identification, these people use NGO’s, international associations and supranational organizations. (Isin and Wood 91-93; Kennedy and Roudometof 2, 11, 20-22; Sen 124; Szerszynski and Urry 462) What is significant, is that these communities are usually formed by individuals who realize the potency of the global space. Also, for many members it will be a deliberate individual choice to take part, instead of being guided by collective culture.

At last, there are professional communities. These are based on the occupation of the joined individuals and have the main goal of providing service to their clients. Such global communities mainly exist for convenience by exchange of information or skills. (Kennedy and Roudometof 20-22)

Beck identifies the formation of these communities as transnationalism. Transnationalism fosters the formation of global communities, networks and organizations by individuals ‘from below’ in contrast to economic globalization, which influences people by economic power ‘from above’. (81)

1.3.5 The fragmentation of the nation state and the concept of identity

Another important element in relation to the issues discussed in this chapter is the abstract concept of identity. In times of globalization there is much influence of global political, economic and social developments on people’s identity. In this section, these developments are viewed as something which influences people’s general identification process collectively.

As described earlier, an identity influenced by nationalism is usually seen as a unified identity, embedded in the culture of a country and perhaps also a civilization or continent. People who share their nationalistic identity are drawn to derive their self image from a mostly common foundation. However, in times of cosmopolitan influences, this does not seem so plausible anymore. Stuart Hall, a famous scholar in cultural studies, argues that recent and historical developments and practices like globalization influenced, fragmented and even tore apart the settled character of many cultures and populations. As I implied earlier, living at a greater speed and using digital means of
communication are now a very common affair. According to Hall, identities are at present more an issue of quick personal development in a changing environment than just ‘being’ in a stable, fixed surrounding like a local village ruled by the church. Most people’s identity is now developing in changing times, around specific institutions, with short term goals in mind due to the influences of globalization. (3-5) Now it might seem as if humans are simply the victims of undirected global flows. However, in my view, people who do realize the potency of the global space and perhaps possess enough social or financial capital, amongst other factors, do have global possibilities and choices. The possible relationship between being privileged and a global identity will be explored later.

1.3.6 Globalization as a component of inclusive and overarching cosmopolitanism

Derived from the above, it can be seen that global developments greatly influenced the previously solid status of the nation state. Because of immigration, the formation of global communities and the uprooting of the traditional concept of identity, the personal attachment to the nation state is declining. Global media open up a cosmopolitan world to citizens: suddenly one can view images from for example slavery on coffee plantations in Brazil on the daily news, discuss this with people who could be from anywhere on the internet and then check with a local NGO if one’s coffee beans are fair trade. Furthermore, the multinational professionals, financial managers and others who deliberately take part in globalization and are aware of its potency, perhaps even form a ‘global upper class’, separated from the national. (Isin and Wood 7) However, I think that global attachment in general will vary by region, nation and culture. This potential variation will be explored at the end of this chapter as well as in the next chapter.

The rise of globalization moreover, does not mean that nationalism entirely ceased to function as an identity marker. Because of globalization, loyalties are sometimes transferred to other areas than the nation state, such as transnational immigrant diaspora’s, lifestyle communities or environmental groups. However, in a global society the local and national could also function as a source of identification. As a consequence, the particular elements for one to derive and form one’s own identity are endless. One could for example emphasize one’s global identity by meeting international friends on the network website Facebook or donating money for a distant locality which is hit by an earthquake. Then, by voting for a party in the national parliament one’s national identity will be stressed. Finally, one can accentuate one’s local identity by speaking a local minority language or deliberately purchasing locally grown groceries. Depending on the context, all these identities can be ‘lived’ by the same individual. Consequently, the combination of all these elements and identifications creates a cosmopolitan space. This shows that descriptive cosmopolitanism and its
Identifications do not replace a national identity, but include it as an option into an array or web of endless possible global, regional, national and local identifications and perspectives.

This makes clear that cosmopolitan practices and issues are not exclusive or distinct. They are a combination of diverse cultural practices. Cosmopolitanism originated from within the regional, national, ethnic, religious, local or global. But the combination and overlap of these various levels of position, no matter if they revolve around identity, cultural background, or everyday life, create a cosmopolitan atmosphere. Because of globalization, national societies might split and become fragmented. The national is for example forced to transfer various economic and political areas of control to international as well as supranational institutions. However, the transfer of these loyalties to other areas, in combination with the rise of global communities as a reaction to this, causes an inclusive cosmopolitan society to arise. (Beck 73-77; 83)

This statement connects to the finding that even economic globalization, as an ‘ingredient’ of cosmopolitanism, is often inclusive as well. For example, when talking about globalization, opponents often refer to a supposedly simplifying or neo-colonizing Americanization or McDonaldization. When looking closer at these phenomena, however, it is shown that typical American products, like the television show Dallas or McDonalds’ fastfood, are often either intentionally or unintentionally adapted to local circumstances when launched elsewhere. In their project on Americanization and globalization, the researchers Liebes and Katz showed that the way television is acknowledged largely depends on the culture of viewers. The investigators examined viewers from Arab, Israeli, Russian and Japanese cultures which all viewed Dallas, but appreciated it very differently. The way this American show was received seemed to be highly influenced by the watchers’ cultural prejudices, images and stereotypes. Furthermore, multinationals like McDonalds often rigorously alter their products in order to assimilate it to a specific cultural context. (Beck 85-86) This is for instance demonstrated by the fact that most of McDonalds’ products in the Netherlands contain meat, and that the traditional Dutch snack named kroket has been fused with the American food culture by the creation of a McKroket at the fastfood business. On the other hand in India, where a large amount of the population is vegetarian, McDonalds’ selection contains hardly any meat and usually comes as a variation on typical Indian dishes, like the Aloo Masala burger.

1.3.7 Beck’s risk society

According to Beck, one of the most important developments leading towards the cosmopolitan space, is the concept of the risk society. In its turn, the risk society is an effect of globalization. Some developments inherent to globalization have led to the creation of worldwide risks such as ecological disasters, terrorism, and economic crises. On the basis of awareness of global risks, counter
movements are formed, a global police network is set up and global political and normative communities are taking shape. Also, people’s space of daily experience changes because of global risks. An example is the territory of our emotional imagination when it comes to ecological disasters or famine in the Third World. These are brought into our lives by radio, television and internet. The cosmopolitan character of these risks and the awareness of them, sometimes resulting in political action and cultural clashes, show that national boundaries lost much of their old solid status. Therefore, Beck argues that descriptive cosmopolitanism in the form of social, political and economic global risks and countermovements on local, national and global levels, is real.

However, many people’s identification does not coincide with cosmopolitan reality. Since the 17th century, the nationalization campaign of European states imposed a national identity on people. The national has consequently been viewed as a legitimate norm for identification, belonging, caring and political action. Because this has always conditioned people into a ‘national mode of thinking’ it is hard to leave the national paradigm, even when the national is fading due to global influences. Also, some people are frightened by the eroding borders of their familiar nation state and declining exclusivity of local cultures, and feel the need to put up old borders again. For example when they see the decline of national power, or when former national companies become divisions of multinationals. The reaction to this can be seen by the rise of the political right in Europe and aggressive attachment to old loyalties and identities. In this process, a specific image of European or Western culture is created and defended towards influences from ‘outside’. In general, people oppose globalization because they are scared and do not understand the process, or because they feel it is an illegal or disloyal annoyance to the old nation state order. This human faith in the familiar is consequently expressed by the need to close off ‘their’ culture or nation state. (Beck 1-14; 110-112) However, these counter movements are usually set and executed in a cosmopolitan space, like discussions about the presence of Muslims in Europe or the terrorist attacks on the twin towers. In this cosmopolitan space of risk and conflict, global, national and local interests intertwine.

These counter reactions, however, show how people are often still ‘stuck’ in the conceptual framework of the nation state, despite the cosmopolitan reality. This framework needs to be reshaped according to Beck. Therefore, he pleads for a ‘conceptual reconfiguration’ of the national to the cosmopolitan space. The main idea behind this outlook should be a ‘reflexive awareness’ of the cosmopolitan space, in order to have an idea of cosmopolitan possibilities and the ability to better deal with problems which accompany the real cosmopolitan situation. (1-3; Grande quoted by Beck 68) This reflexive awareness could in my opinion be a very important component of a cosmopolitan identity, since it stands for a consciousness of cosmopolitan influences as well as affinity with the cosmopolitan space and affairs, as opposed to a national exclusive mode of thought. I will come back to this at the end of this chapter.
Because of global unregulated flows of goods, services, crime and people, national societies split, disintegrate and lose much of their governmental power. Therefore, Beck also expresses the need for global organizations to regulate issues on the global level. This would be the creation of universal institutions or perhaps even a global government. (99-127) By this statement, in my view Beck remarkably unites ideological and descriptive cosmopolitanism in his attempt to establish worldwide tolerance and regulation from an ideological cosmopolitan viewpoint, because of the existence of the cosmopolitan space. Or in other words, he attempts to establish a normative solution to a complex but real problem.

1.3.8 Banal globalism

A potential encouragement for a cosmopolitan society that could even function as ‘the backbone of the cosmopolitan space’, is banal globalism\(^3\). This concept originated in the article *Cultures of Cosmopolitanism* by Szerszynski and Urry. Banal globalism consists in global symbols such as images of the earth, which seem to parallel national flags but suggest a *universal perspective* on issues like current affairs. They are mainly used at the beginning of news broadcasts. Other images of banal globalism are of global mobility, actions with significance for the global community, corporate images and iconic figures such as people, animals and locations. These figures are symbolized as representing the entire earth and considered to have *civic* meaning according to Szerszynski and Urry. A similar kind of this symbolic banality is manifested on television, which makes the globe a part of people’s everyday life but does not necessarily influence people’s identity. (464-470)

It is interesting that banal globalism is, in Szerszynski and Urry’s work, viewed as having a civic undertone, since civic elements connect to identity and citizenship – or in other words attachment to a polity. But what would a cosmopolitan polity look like? And what would be the cultural practices and idea of rights versus duties in this polity? In my opinion these are complicated questions and they necessarily require a solid definition of the cosmopolitan space. Though, there could be an infinite amount of definitions, since the cosmopolitan space is an endlessly changing concept with very diverse representations.

In my view banal globalism could however perhaps function as a fixed backcloth of attachment to this evolving cosmopolitan polity, and in that way foster the creation of a cosmopolitan civil society. When watching a CNN broadcast, a globe is permanently on the screen and the agency has reporters from all cultures based all over the world. It is even said that Ted Turner, the founder of CNN banned the word ‘foreign correspondents’ from broadcasts and that

\(^3\) This concept is derived from the idea of banal nationalism as established by Billig, which describes the symbols that help to establish the identity of nations, while using ordinary national differences. These are for example flags, anthems, sports heroes or national holidays. (Billig)
therefore all CNN’s correspondents are defined as international. (Hannerz 305) Furthermore, when one sees a polar bear as a symbol of a campaign, connotations to global warming and environmental protection often arise. But I personally wonder if this is necessarily a cosmopolitan feeling. It could also just evoke a ‘CNN feeling’ or an ‘ecological organization against global warming’ feeling. All the effects of globalization described in this chapter so far seem to imply that a major process is taking place, but give no indication of a common consciousness of cosmopolitanism. In most cases it still seems to overcome people. But some people do deliberately decide to identify with cosmopolitanism. Who they are and why they act upon cosmopolitan motives, will be explored in the rest of this thesis.

1.4 The conditions for descriptive cosmopolitanism

Various conditions for cosmopolitanism have been derived from the literature used in the previous section. Most of them are indications of the descriptive cosmopolitan space. The majority of these conditions are social, political and economic developments. These influence societies through for example economic liberalization, international organizations or migration. In my opinion these descriptive conditions generally seem to ‘overcome’ people. When classified, they can be grouped in universal versus particular conditions and historical versus temporal conditions. However, in some circumstances conditions could lead towards deliberate cosmopolitan sentiments. These conditions can be organized in positive versus negative cosmopolitanism, according to me.

1.4.1 Universal versus particular conditions

First of all, there is a distinction between general, universal conditions and conditions which are more specific for groups or individuals. The universal conditions are a requirement for about all other conditions. In other words, these are the meta-conditions which ‘make it all possible’. The most important universal condition is the accessible global space, as a reality as well as a symbol. The interconnectedness as well as accessibility of the global space is one of the backbones of the entire cosmopolitan existence. Another universal condition is the mixing and mingling of cultures by using national, ethnic, local or religious elements. The cosmopolitan space can only exist through the integration of various cultural, economic and identity-building elements. Furthermore, the selective way in which this integration occurs is a third universal condition. Everybody who takes elements from the cosmopolitan range, either deliberately or not, uses these diverse elements in a way she finds either just, convenient, beautiful, academically fruitful, or simply ‘cool’. A final universal
condition is *ind individuality* as well as the uprootedness of identity. Because there usually is no solid church or nationality one can take as a leading thread in this case, this is a very personal activity.

Specific conditions can be practically anything. These are the cosmopolitan *components* which are used in daily life. They can range from religion, citizenship, language, minority status, information and interests, to what one is able to consume. Their availability increases every day. Various elements, objects and identifications of daily life could all be derived from different cultures, religions or backgrounds. By engaging in different activities, various levels of identification are emphasized. For example, when one speaks in a local minority language with relatives, a local identity is emphasized. When one reads the international headlines on CNN, one’s global concerns are expressed. Finally, when campaigning for a national political party, a national attachment is uttered.

### 1.4.2 Historical versus contemporary conditions

The second difference is between historical conditions and contemporary conditions for the cosmopolitan space. Historical conditions lead to the creation of most of the other conditions. This causes them to have a meta-character, like the universal conditions. One important historical condition is *ideological cosmopolitanism*. The traces of Diogenes’ and Kant’s philosophy are still seen as for example international institutions’ inspiration. In some political or normative transnational communities, this influence can also be found. Furthermore, as explained earlier, the *aftermath of the Second World War, postcolonial movement and fall of the Berlin Wall* can also be categorized as historical conditions. Moreover, *economic globalism*, its trade flows and its spillovers to areas of policy and counteraction is also a historical development. Another historical element which connects to economic globalism is the *revolution in communication*. Finally, the *increased mobility* of the average human also contributed to the development of the cosmopolitan space.

Temporary conditions are subjected to economic, social and political changes. Even though there is a basic framework to be found, their shape can vary through time. They firstly consist of the concept of *banal globalism*, a range of symbols and concepts representing the global identity. A second manifestation of these temporary conditions are *global community- and group-formations*.

### 1.4.3 Positive versus negative cosmopolitanism

A third distinction exists between *positive* and *negative cosmopolitanism*. The different parts can also be formulated as conditions. The distinction stems from Beck’s thoughts. With positive cosmopolitanism he means a mindful attempt of *norm-formation in a global space*, which resembles
ideological cosmopolitanism. Here one can think of groups taking action for global peace, or non-violent religious organizations. Since these groups feel drawn to aid people in other parts of the world, it can be said that *openness to other cultures* (Szerszynski and Urry 468) is another facet of positive cosmopolitanism.

Negative cosmopolitan on the other hand is, according to Beck, stimulated by anger over *global situations* that are regarded to be unbearable to the world, like perceived Americanization or global warming. Norms and rules are also formed in negative cosmopolitanism, but these are formed in a pessimistic way, by a specific understanding of global crises and threats. (23) These norms and rules are acted upon by for instance anti-globalists or terrorists. Also people who experience a great deal of fear of global risks sometimes choose to participate in negative cosmopolitanism.

This distinction is partly related to an interesting fourth distinction, which I would like to name here as well. It is also brought up by Beck in his monograph *Cosmopolitan Vision* and revolves around the difference between *despotic* and *emancipatory cosmopolitanism*. When the cosmopolitan ideal is exhausted and extended in a negative way, it can let humanity commit severe crimes to other humans. This can be done through a reaction on globalization or as an ideal in itself. The ideology of national-socialism for example contains a clear despotic though cosmopolitan element. In contrast to despotic cosmopolitanism, emancipatory cosmopolitanism equals ideological cosmopolitanism in its emphasis on positive norm formation and freedom for humanity. (45)

Now various conditions which can contribute to the creation of a descriptive cosmopolitan space have been identified. However, in my opinion it is not clear whether these necessarily influence *individuals* to establish a cosmopolitan identity. In order to find out how this works, in the next section the concept of the individual in relation to cosmopolitanism will be explored further.

### 1.5 Defining the cosmopolitan identity in theory

#### 1.5.1 Possibilities for a cosmopolitan identity

In their article *Cultures of Cosmopolitanism*, the scholars Szerszynski and Urry give a clear definition of what cosmopolitan citizenship should, according to them, be like:

“... an intellectual and aesthetic stance of ‘openness’ towards people, places and experiences from different cultures, especially those from different ‘nations’. Cosmopolitanism involves the search for, and delight in, the contrasts between societies rather than a longing for superiority or for uniformity.” (Szerszynski and Urry 468)
A striking element of this definition is that it embodies a conscious individual decision as well as an ideological element. Therefore, in my opinion it particularly seems to concern ideological cosmopolitanism. Descriptive cosmopolitanism, as in a cosmopolitan space which ‘overcomes’ people, seems to have no necessary connection to this definition.

The above named scholars also discuss various problems which could occur with a cosmopolitan identity. For instance that the construction of a cosmopolitan identity is done at the expense of local people, who are then viewed as the ‘other’. As a consequence, these locals are seen as narrow-minded, backward and bound to their territory. (Szerszynski and Urry 469) This is an interesting potential difficulty. In their definition, Szerszynski and Urry define a cosmopolitan identity by its ‘openness’. But somebody who holds stereotypes of local people does not seem very open to me, which hence would exclude her identity from being cosmopolitan in my opinion. This difficulty matches my criticism about the view which characterizes European culture as cosmopolitan versus a supposedly narrow-minded Islamic civilization. This argument has been cited in the introduction where it was held by Wilders, a Dutch journalist and Samuel Huntington, when they attempted to define European culture as superior, but indeed did this at the expense of other cultures.

Furthermore, a cosmopolitan who is exclusively defined by openness seems limited in my view. Because, what about environment activists who are concerned about global warming? Should the particular environmental view automatically exclude such a campaigner from cosmopolitanism? A solution to this ‘limited cosmopolitan identity’ difficulty might be that cosmopolitan identifications could be defined in various possible modes, as in the writing of Isin and Wood. They define three examples of cosmopolitan citizenship. These are urban, technological and ecological citizenship. Urban citizenship is to be found within a network of cosmopolitan cities such as London, New York or Tokyo. The elite urban citizens residing there have diverse nationalities, encompass power because of their profession and live separate from the local underclass. The power people in such a cosmopolitan city have is not derived from the state but from global networks. The businesswoman whose life I quoted in section 1.3.3 on Bauman’s work, would fit perfectly in this ‘mode’ of cosmopolitanism.

Technological citizenship refers to computer-mediated communication on the internet. The personal ‘steroids’ Friedman defined play a large part in this. The technological citizen has an enormous freedom of opinion and communicates with a very diverse group of people, always mediated by the web. The internet does not restrict itself to geographical boundaries and therefore undermines many possibilities of the nation state to control its citizens. However, not everybody can become a technological citizen, due to social as well as financial limits on the use of the internet.

Finally, the ecological citizen identifies with bioregions or ecosystems instead of nations, which both go beyond the boundaries of the traditional state. She uses the means of transnational
NGO’s or international regimes to address environmental problems, which also operate across national borders. (Isin and Wood 97-122)

These three examples show how, according to Isin and Wood, a cosmopolitan identity can be manifested in various ways. But I personally doubt if somebody who restricts herself to the elite is a ‘real’ cosmopolitan. And what about a focus on global ecology? Is that also restrictive, or would it only be a variety? The exact definition of the cosmopolitan space could give salvation. But the concept ‘cosmopolitan’ could be a compilation of an endless variety of local, national and global elements, which makes a singular definition problematic. The fundamental questions raised in this paragraph will be answered throughout the rest of this thesis.

1.5.2 A cosmopolitan identity on the individual level

This section is about the ability for individuals to deliberately possess a cosmopolitan identity, in contrast to global movements influencing communities as such. In section 1.3.7 I introduced the concept of reflexive cosmopolitanism. According to Beck, this is the ‘reflexive awareness of the cosmopolitan space’. When one is conscious of the cosmopolitan space, it is easier to abandon the outdated national outlook, so he argues. Consequently, the life of a reflexive cosmopolitan suites actuality and reality. Beck furthermore explains that all the elements in the life of a cosmopolitan should be able to ‘fit’ into a coherent whole. To illustrate this, he describes a Danish businessman he once met and asked whether he was a cosmopolitan. The individual replied to Beck that he felt cosmopolitan, since he felt at home in most countries of the world when he was away on business trips, speaks English fluently and always tries food from a range of different cultural traditions. However, the man did recently join a movement in support of a more restrictive immigration policy in his home country Denmark. He did this because of his personal belief that the immigration of people from outside the European Union into Denmark should stop. The deeper reason behind this was his idea that Denmark is now ‘full’. Hence, Beck argues that this individual is not a cosmopolitan, or might at best be an exclusive cosmopolitan, since his xenophobic belief concerning immigrants does not ‘fit’ in an inclusive cosmopolitan framework. (1-5)

In Szerszynski and Urry’s definition, openness is the essence of a cosmopolitan identity. Isin and Wood connect the idea of identity to the concept of potential cosmopolitan citizenship. Since boundaries between nation states are fading, citizens are able to identify with other institutions such as NGO’s, transnational communities and international institutions. Furthermore, Kennedy and Roudometof focus on the role of group and community formations in a global space, like immigrant diaspora’s or lifestyle communities.
Personally, I think that Beck’s reflexive awareness of the cosmopolitan space, or in other words an affinity with the cosmopolitan situation, and Szerszynski and Urry’s openness towards the world are very relevant conditions for the possession of an individual cosmopolitan identity. But how would such cosmopolitan affiliations fit in a general, abstract theory of identity?

In this section I would like to use Amartya Sen’s concept of a layered identity. Amartya Sen is an influential economist as well as a philosopher. He won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1998. In his book *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*, he defines identity by two separate characteristics. According to Sen, having an identity is firstly the ability to belong to different membership groups, such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, general interests, love of a particular kind of music, group of friends and so on. For every person, this selection will be composed of different elements and it will always be arranged in a very specific and selective way. The only thing a person needs to do is make a rational decision on the relative importance of her plural identifications, which is the second aspect of having an identity. (Sen 19) For example, somebody might be on her way to a job interview. Because she does not have many chances for employment due to the current economic crisis, it will be important for her to make a good and organized impression. However, when she is driving there, she may see a drowning child. Because she loves children and values human life in general, she feels a moral obligation to save the child. But this will make her late and look very wet and messy on her job interview. Whatever she will decide, a rational choice will always reflect her personal identity which is manifested in her loyalties and individual priorities.

According to Amartya Sen, the illusion of destiny is the opposite to a plural approach of identity based on rational choice. The illusion of destiny approach to identity is based on the idea that one’s identity is fixed and characterized by assigned attributions in relation to for example culture or gender. These attributions are often stereotypical. In this approach to identity, a person is always inextricably bound up with a specific singular identity. An example is the essentialized national identity. A Dutch person might, in the illusion of destiny, for example be seen by others as wearing clogs, eating lots of cheese, uneager to spend much money and blond. This sounds like innocent stereotyping, but the implications can be much more severe. When people use the illusion of destiny approach to identify themselves, by using for example their nation or their religion, they neglect the significance of rational choice. Sen himself uses the example of a Hutu laborer from Kingali. Due to conflicts in his area, the Hutu laborer is pressured to see himself only as a Hutu and be violent to Tutsis. Because of this pressure, he is not able to see that he is also a Kingalian, Rwandan, African, laborer and human being. Only when realizing his plural identity, this laborer will be able to act in a rational way according to Sen. The same could count for many terrorists, members of
extreme rightwing parties or fascists. What they have in common, is that they have an *essentialized* image of themselves as unique. But by doing this, according to Sen, they miniaturize the varied plural identity of human beings into one attribution, and leave no room for signs of similarity between all humans. Even worse, the illusion of destiny approach could possibly be used as an excuse to be violent such as the case of the Hutu laborer. In general, rationality will hence encourage a lot less hostility than the illusion of destiny. But even if one is inescapably seen as predominantly Frisian, Jewish, Muslim or female, it is still up to the individual to decide how much value she attaches to this identity, relative to the other categories she belongs to, according to Sen. (xxi; 3-6)

It seems as if a cosmopolitan identification could easily be ‘incorporated’ in this selection of Sen’s layered identifications as a separate layer. One could for example be citizen of the Netherlands, study organic chemistry, be a member of a socialist political party, have an awareness of global opportunities and ‘use’ the interconnectedness of the world in order to be a foreign exchange student in Sweden. However, it is not clear if this person would necessarily have a cosmopolitan identity. Perhaps she never interested herself for any location beyond Europe. Or she might dislike being in a foreign country very much and feel very homesick for the Netherlands. This proves that being involved in cosmopolitan circumstances is not enough for a cosmopolitan identity, which brings me back to Beck’s businessman. Even though he moved around in cosmopolitan space in various ways, his identity did not ‘fit’ into a coherent whole. This makes clear that there should be *coherence* between layers of identity in order to possess a cosmopolitan identity, which goes further than a single cosmopolitan layer.

The main point of Sen’s *Identity and Violence* furthermore, is that all people are members of the *human race*: a collection of rational creatures with plural affiliations. Because everybody is so different and can have diverse identifications, this is the only common denominator among all people to be found. Sen pleads for respecting the plural affiliations of others and acknowledging every human’s rationality for the sake of peace. This respect for differences and prudence is neglected when distinctions between humans are narrowed for the sake of categorizing people, as in the illusion of destiny. (16-17; 119)

What I find striking about Sen’s concept of the human race, is that he now leans towards ideological cosmopolitanism of a philosophical kind, which could be compared to that of Kant or Nussbaum described in section 1.1. Sen seems to imply that, when every human uses his or her rationality, we will be free from narrow-mindedness and violence. Because we should respect that everybody is different, a cosmopolitan identity will consequently not be found in one common trait, identification or aspect. Instead of this, the cosmopolitan identity will be located in the *apriori acknowledgement* that all humans’ plural identity and the ability to choose rationally, should be respected. When people realize this, the world will be more peaceful according to Sen’s theory.
In my opinion, Sen’s ideal parallels Kant’s ideological cosmopolitan version of the *Categorical Imperative* I referred to in section 1.1. The approaches have in common that they urge people to act rational and respect the rationality of others in advance. Another assumption of both approaches is that every human is equal. However, what both seem to lack in my opinion, is appreciation of the context one acts in, or in other words, the embeddedness of a person’s identity. Therefore, they not only seem to assume that every human is equal, but also that all humans can potentially think in an identical way. But I think that social, cultural, economic, political and perhaps even natural factors influence the way a person reflects and considers. For example, if one never learned to use skills based on reason but has always been conditioned to act upon religious arguments, it might be logical for her to become a suicide bomber. What is also striking, is that when somebody moves to an unlike context, it might be inevitable to be predominantly viewed in terms of the ‘unusual’ or ‘different’ aspect of her identity, even if she prefers other identifications. This could for example happen in the case of migration. An interesting case study of this is to be found in the article ‘How Other People See You, It’s Like Nothing That’s Inside’: The Impact of Processes of Disidentification and Disavowal on Young People’s Subjectivities by the scholars Gill Valentine and Deborah Sporton. They interviewed young Somali refugees residing in Great Britain on their identity.

In the theoretical part of their article, Valentine and Sporton state the importance of a situated identity. This implies that one’s identity construction does not take place in isolation but is always influenced by particular contexts in one’s life. It is for example influenced by the different spaces one moves in such as one’s home, nation or cultural diaspora.

When asked about identification in the interview, most of the refugees acclaimed to be British because they live in Great Britain, speak English and share interests and everyday life with many other British teenagers. However, when they are out in public, they feel that their claim to Britishness is often rejected. This is proven by discriminatory comments. The teenagers are for example regarded as black, Muslim or refugee. The refugees deal with this ascribed identity in diverse ways. For example, they refuse to be signified as ‘black’ since they themselves equate the term ‘black’ with people from African Caribbean descent. Hence, they think they are mistaken for such a person. But being ascribed ‘blackness’ sometimes is also felt as a ‘cool’ or ‘masculine’ attribution by them. Some of the Somali boys and girls even act upon this attribution as a consequence.

Furthermore, the identification of the adolescents largely depends on the specific Somali clan they descend from and how they entered Great Britain. Some of them first stayed in a different country before entering such as Italy or the Netherlands. In the article it was reported that the girls who entered Great Britain after staying in the Netherlands often have a hard time. They are even stereotyped as ‘loose girls’ because of the absence of a large, controlling Somali community in the...
country. In an interview the 18 year old Zeinab reports that in the Netherlands she could freely move around in public spaces, in the clothes she chose to wear. However, in Great Britain there are always people around checking on her. To avoid gossip about her and her family, she decided to become more religious, wear a headscarf and behave more discrete in public.

The specific place the Somali refugees are in Great Britain, also largely influences their identification. In public spaces they usually ‘act’ British, but in places where there is a large presence of members of the Somali community they feel more limited and controlled. Also, some parents feel such an importance for their children to identify as a Somali that they established ‘home rules’ such as speaking Somali at home. Hence, the home will be a very different cultural space than any public space for most of the youth. Some of them wear different clothes at home than when they are out or even lie about their activities outside. (Valentine and Sporton 735-744; 746) These examples explain the importance of the context and place in which a potential identity is situated. In my opinion it shows that a rational self-definition is not always achievable, and that sometimes only limited identifications are possible depending on context.

Another part which plays a large role in the identifications of Somali youth is being Muslim. Valentine and Sporton explain the relevance of an Islamic identity for the youth in the last section of their article. When conducting their research, they found out that most of the refugees identified themselves primarily as a Muslim. Their race, ethnicity or interests as sources of identification came second to this religious identity. The main reason behind the importance of their Muslim identity was that it *overcomes* and *embraces* all the other identifications they opted for. The global and overarching presence of the Muslim community, or the *Umma*, enables a stable, accessible and omni-available source of identification. In daily life, the youth has to deal with negations when claiming a British identity, being stereotyped and a large cultural gap between public and domestic spaces. In this confusion, the Islamic signifier is able to provide safety and continuity. Furthermore, it is significant that the Muslim identity is able to guide their daily behavior in whichever specific space they move. (Valentine and Sporton 744-748)

This article makes clear that non-rational approaches to personal identification such as religion can, due to a particular context such as culture or upbringing, be the most logical option for an individual to establish her identity. This implies that, due to context, purely rational identification is not always a possibility. In my opinion, it seems as if the ideological cosmopolitan identity as defined earlier in this thesis, will be found in a very different discourse than the environment the young Somali refugees inhabit. In order to relate cosmopolitanism to their context, I think two options are available. In the first place, it could be concluded that the concept of cosmopolitanism as established in the first chapter is too Eurocentric. Through the study of case studies like this, other approaches to cosmopolitanism, such as the *Umma* for many Muslims could be found and a theory
of cosmopolitanism could then be made broader. However, this is problematic since various streams of Islamism strictly distinguish between the *Umma*, or the house of Islam, and the outside world when it comes to identity and belonging. (Buruma and Margalit 125) A second option could be that the notion of the cosmopolitan as such is a very Western concept and therefore only available to individuals with awareness of Western thought. This then would restrict a cosmopolitan identity to individuals who are raised or made familiar with Western values such as rationality, equality and personal freedom. But if this is true, in my view the concept of cosmopolitanism would contradict itself. It would be a universal concept with exclusive significance. On the other hand, this contradiction does not need to have much influence on the development of a personal identity.

This concern about Sen’s under appreciation of the situation in which people construct their identity, automatically leads to another problem, about the large extent of *Eurocentrism* inherent to his rationality-approach, according to me. A high valuation of rationality is extremely European. In many non-European cultures human qualities such as physical strength, faith, or inner will, are valued much more than rationality. In some scholarship, such as the work of the Russian philosopher Kireyevsky and in various separations of Islamism, rationalism is even viewed as an arrogant sin. Kireyevsky makes this argument because he thinks that rationality is only one aspect of the mind. Other aspects are for example emotion, memory, perception and language, and just as important according to him. He also views it as European arrogance to think that all societies could be ruled by common rational principles, as Western governments perform in their own countries, but sometimes also try to impose on non-Western cultures. (Buruma and Margalit 92-95, 102) These arguments imply that relating – and perhaps even equaling – cosmopolitanism to rationality is very Eurocentric. In my opinion cosmopolitanism is supposed to potentially encapsulate the *entire world* and should therefore take diverse possible contexts into account, as far as this is feasible.

In my search for the conditions of a cosmopolitan identity, I would like to take Sen’s theory of a plural as well as layered identity into account, but leave out his philosophical ideological cosmopolitanism and extreme stress on rationality. Instead, I would be eager to add Szerszynski and Urry’s openness as well as Beck’s reflexive element and stress on coherency of layers, to Sen’s description of identity. Since it is hard to determine what aspect makes a plural identity cosmopolitan, I think it is essential for somebody to have a conscious realization of ‘her’ cosmopolitanism. (Beck 94)

In the following chapters, I will use Sen’s modified theory of identity and apply it to a variety of case studies on cosmopolitanism and identity. However, before concluding this chapter, I will shortly look at the potential ethical implications which could be attached to a cosmopolitan identity on the individual level. In section 1.3.3 I quoted Bauman on the global elite, who according to Isin
and Wood is cosmopolitan, but lives a privileged life, separated from the rest of humanity. In contrast, people who deliberately join normative political communities seem to encompass a much more ‘just’ cosmopolitan identity. Subsequently, I wonder if both groups could have members with an actual cosmopolitan identity. In order to see if there is a relation between normativity and cosmopolitanism, Bauman’s work will now shortly be examined a bit closer.

1.5.3 A cosmopolitan identity and the relevance of ideological cosmopolitanism

In his sociological work Bauman makes clear how economic globalization causes a polarization amongst humanity. It has already been explained who, in Bauman’s view, is in charge of globalization: the new professional, self-governing and multinational elite, which is similar to the urban cosmopolitan citizens Isin and Wood describe. However, Bauman writes more about this elite in his other work.

In his book Liquid Times. Living in an Age of Uncertainty, Bauman describes how economic globalization as well as the status of the global elite cause various negative side effects. First of all, because the rich, global elite lives excluded from the local poor, the professional and social opportunities of the latter are very restricted compared to those of the elite. Furthermore, the solid boundaries related to nation, community and religion are fading, which has a profound influence on social and cultural life too. Due to the fragmented status of the nation state, its previous monopolies on justice and security cannot be guaranteed. This causes a fear of the global to arise, especially amongst local and less educated people. This fear sometimes results in very defensive action, for instance in the appearance of terrorism, religious fundamentalism or nationalism. In Bauman’s words, these defensive actions are the ‘side effects’ of economic globalization and the endless possibilities of the global elite existence. (4-8) In Globalization – the Human Consequences, the scholar goes even further and argues that the backward and deprived situation of the poor is a condition for the global elite to exist. This condition is first of all material, by performing labor for a low wage and second conceptual, as a symbolic local ‘other’ to the global elite. (94-102)

It is interesting that Bauman only describes negative side effects of globalization, with the result of a stratified society. He also points at the individuals who deliberately control globalization and take personal advantage from this, but do it at the expense of local poor people. According to Isin and Wood these are cosmopolitan citizens. But this connection would mean that cosmopolitan citizens can create negative effects on local people through their lifestyle, which would not fulfill Beck’s coherence requirement for a cosmopolitan identity.

Bauman’s work contradicts most of the other works examined in this chapter. Beck argued that the cosmopolitan outlook should be the future norm since the cosmopolitan space is real,
regardless of one’s feelings about it. He sees it in the first place as a ‘neutral occurrence’ which ‘just happens’ to communities. When making his argument, he states that because the cosmopolitan space influences people, individuals should generate an inclusive, coherent cosmopolitan outlook. In this argument Beck then moves from an empirical description of large-scale developments to a plead for individual ideological cosmopolitanism. Also Kennedy and Roudometof, in their analysis of cosmopolitan communities, seem to switch between communities generated by the forces of globalization, like cultural diaspora’s or professional networks, and communities of like minded individuals who deliberately set up normative political networks. Isin and Wood also exchange the notion of the cosmopolitan between both approaches; whereas the urban citizen uses global trade flows for convenient business, the ecological citizen identifies with the earth’s ecology and feels obligated to join others in a mission to protect natural balance. Szerszynski and Urry apparently stick with the ideological individual notion, by emphasizing openness.

In my opinion, when searching for a theory on cosmopolitan identity, it is important for clarity to distinguish between descriptive and ideological cosmopolitanism. Descriptive cosmopolitanism is then to be defined as a range of social, economic and political processes which overcome people on the collective level. On the contrary, ideological cosmopolitanism becomes relevant when deliberate choices concerning cosmopolitanism on the individual level are analyzed. Isin and Wood’s urban citizens and Bauman’s global elite seem to participate in the global space for personal gain and perhaps leisure. Therefore, in my opinion, in that sense they are global citizens and not necessarily also cosmopolitan. Obviously, the global elite most probably deliberately engaged in the cosmopolitan space. But this was to use it as an instrument for secondary goals such as personal development, profit or convenience, which perhaps explains the negative side effects of their behavior Bauman pointed out. Therefore, in my opinion a cosmopolitan citizen should act upon ideological cosmopolitanism as an end in itself, instead of only using the cosmopolitan space as a means to gain for example wealth, power, pleasure or company. Somebody with a cosmopolitan identity hence fosters an all-encompassing positive attitude towards human, animal or natural life in general, which can however be manifested and specified in an enormous variety of ways. It is though crucial that one’s benevolence is not by definition restricted to the borders of one’s province, nation or continent. Examples could be international charity work, volunteering for an NGO, caring for stray animals in developing countries or taking action for political prisoners under a faraway dictatorial regime. Obviously, the difference between an idealistic cosmopolitan citizen and a citizen with a global identity, could sometimes be hard to see. Beck’s emphasis on coherence could perhaps explain that cosmopolitan citizens can also be driven by self interest, and that they can also use the cosmopolitan space as a means, but that their identity should always form a coherent whole which fits ideological cosmopolitanism. Therefore, the stress on positivity is significant because actions
motivated by a negative attitude could work destructive towards humans, ecology or institutions situated in the cosmopolitan space, which would be incoherent.

This means that an individual could for example emphasize her cosmopolitan identity by engaging in fair trade commerce, even if she is motivated to do this by a global business lifestyle. Or travel across the world because of a genuine openness as well as personal fascination for other cultures. Another possibility is to demonstrate against global warming because of identification with global ecology, but also to safeguard the current condition of the mountains which she loves to climb. It can be seen as an extra as well as overarching cosmopolitan addition to one’s identity. Finally, this individual should have a reflexive consciousness of her actions being cosmopolitan. This for instance becomes effective when somebody operating in the cosmopolitan space, perceives the need for a cosmopolitan identity through a conscious confrontation with Beck’s risk society.

This cosmopolitan addition resembles ideological cosmopolitanism, but can currently easily be derived from descriptive cosmopolitanism. Before globalization, ideological cosmopolitanism was perhaps a philosophical concept which was only of concern for idealists, politicians or academics. However, since descriptive cosmopolitanism is real, it is more reasonable and pragmatic to define oneself as an ideological cosmopolitan. A lifestyle in the descriptive cosmopolitan space, for example as an exchange student or businesswoman, could motivate somebody to foster ideological cosmopolitan sentiments. Therefore, even though there is a clear difference between the approaches, they could both have an influence on the formation of a cosmopolitan identity. However, ideological cosmopolitanism is in my opinion a necessary condition for a cosmopolitan identity, whereas knowledge of the cosmopolitan space through descriptive cosmopolitanism can only work as a possible influence in cooperation with the former.

Because the manifestations of ideological cosmopolitanism can be so diverse, there is clearly not one single cosmopolitan identity to be defined. Now the question which people actually possess a cosmopolitan addition to their identity becomes relevant, and if these individuals are only from Western culture, as some of the works examined implied. Would the global elite generally be more cosmopolitan oriented than the ‘common’ people? Could local poor also have this addition? To find some answers to these questions, in the next chapter various case studies will be analyzed. The goal then is to find out what the different conditions for a cosmopolitan identity could be, discussing various classes and groups.
Chapter 2

Cosmopolitanism and Identity: A Few Case Studies

In section 1.5.2 I looked at the case of identity construction of young Somali refugees in Great Britain. Most significant was how their situatedness influenced their personal identity formation. Another noteworthy conclusion was that a profound identification as a Muslim was a very suitable way for them of dealing with contextual difficulties and changing environments.

In this chapter a variety of case studies will be analyzed to find out what kind of people have a cosmopolitan identity, if people operating in the cosmopolitan space would be more likely to have such an identity and if there are also individuals encompassing a global identity with a more economically oriented nature, as an alternative to the cosmopolitan identity. Though the cases have a very diverse character, all of them carry implications for the concept of identity in relation to cosmopolitanism. The empirical findings in this chapter will further be analyzed in the final chapter of this thesis. Eventually, the diverse conditions for the cosmopolitan identity will be described.

In order to find general information concerning a cosmopolitan identity, this second chapter starts with some broad statistical findings on attitudes towards cosmopolitanism, in different cultures and classes. Two articles are used for analysis. These are Global Citizenship, Anyone? Cosmopolitanism, Privilege and Public Opinion by the social scientist Peter A. Furia, and Stratification and Global Elite Theory: A Cross-Cultural and Longitudinal Analysis of Public Opinion by Roei Davidson, Nathaniel Poor and Ann Williams, who all research in the area of communication.

2.1 General findings

2.1.1 Cosmopolitan philosophers, individuals, societies and statistics

In the first chapter of this thesis, the claim that cosmopolitanism is elitist came forward in some of the works examined. At last, it was concluded that people with a cosmopolitan identity need not necessarily coincide with the global elite, but that it might be likely for cosmopolitans to possess a certain social and perhaps financial capital. On the basis of various ambiguous historical, cultural and religious arguments, by the authors cited in the introduction it was suggested that only people raised in Western culture can have a cosmopolitan identity. However, the question who these individuals then are is still unanswered. In my opinion, a satisfactory way out of these conceptual difficulties could be stimulated by empirical findings, such as Furia’s article. In Global Citizenship, Anyone?
Cosmopolitanism, Privilege and Public Opinion, Furia attempts to find out whether cosmopolitanism is elitist. For the sake of clarity, he formulates three varieties of this statement. The first is that cosmopolitanism only appeals to rationalist philosophers articulating it, such as Immanuel Kant or Amartya Sen, whose cosmopolitanism I criticized in the first chapter. The second variant is that cosmopolitanism only appeals to individuals from the upper class of any society, such as the global elite discussed by Bauman and Isin and Wood. Finally, the third variant states that cosmopolitan sentiments are restricted to the borders of privileged societies as a whole, which very much relates to the Eurocentric character of various theories on cosmopolitanism I discussed in the previous chapter. However, when testing these hypotheses by looking at the fourth World Values Survey\(^4\) (WVS), Furia comes to a very different view of cosmopolitanism. (331-335)

When it comes to the first variant of his statement to be tested, Furia examines a question of ‘belonging’ asked in the WVS. The focus of the question is geographical groups, which ascend from one’s town, province, country, and continent to the whole world. When Furia analyzes the results, it turns out that most people feel they belong to their town (41%) or country (36%). The response to the other three categories is much lower, but 12% replied to belong to their province, 8% to the world as a whole and finally 3% to their continent. This implies that people with cosmopolitan affiliations are a minority, but not the smallest group. Furthermore, it makes clear that people who feel as if they belong to a territory beyond their nation state, often do not ‘stop’ at the borders of their continent.

Furthermore, the survey examined political cosmopolitanism. Political cosmopolitanism stands for the level of confidence people have in global political institutions such as the United Nations. People were allowed to agree with as much statements as they liked. The result was noteworthy: 52.4% of the ones that replied expressed to have much confidence in the United Nations, 46.1% articulated to have much confidence in regional institutions such as the European Union and just 41.8% was found to have this level of confidence in their national parliament. Furia admits that this outcome may not be as cosmopolitan as it seems, since people generally have higher expectations and more knowledge of their national parliaments than global institutions. However, the results do make clear that most people are at least not hostile to the idea of global institutions influencing them.

Hence, Furia attempts to find out which kind of individuals ‘fit’ in cosmopolitanism as a social and political category, to see if they are solely persons with some intellectual or economic privilege. When participating in the survey, the respondents had to fill out information on their ethnicity, the

\(^4\) The World Values Survey is a social sciences worldwide project which attempts to find out through interviews what the basic social, ethical, religious and political values of different cultures are. (World Values Survey – Organization) In the survey used in Furia’s article, 80% of the world’s population is covered. (Furia 342)
highest level of education they attained and their income level. Through an income analysis of the respondent’s country, a scale of national income variation was made, and hence the indicator of economic privilege was determined. By creating a statistical regression on the basis of education, income, ethnicity and the replies to the questions, social status could be compared with someone’s degree of cosmopolitan belonging. When this was examined, the effect of wealth as well as education on cosmopolitan sentiments however generally proved to be quite weak. Furia nevertheless found slight support that materially privileged individuals are less likely to foster cosmopolitan sentiments than poorer ones. Moreover a weak relation between a significant amount of education and cosmopolitan identifications was discovered in the replies to the WVS’s questions. Furia therefore indicates that cosmopolitanism applies more to ‘educated poor’ than to ‘educated rich’. Especially to questions concerning material cosmopolitan statements, such as the promotion of global equality or a multinational army force, poor people agreed more often than more wealthy individuals. This statement is backed by the finding that underprivileged ethnic groups generally have more cosmopolitan feelings than privileged groups. For example, in data derived from the United States it was found that Caucasians, which are a privileged group in that country, had less cosmopolitan sentiments than the country’s disadvantaged people. In the end, the African American minority proved to have the most cosmopolitan attitudes of the nation’s groups. Though, it should always be realized that people with a cosmopolitan identity are a minority in any case according to the survey. (339-353) These cosmopolitan attitudes furthermore vary on a regional basis, which Furia explores when he later in the article tests the third variant of his hypothesis; the question if cosmopolitanism only applies to privileged societies.

However, before he comes to the third variant, Furia discovered that the representation of ethnically privileged groups in the WVS was marked by many anti-cosmopolitan sentiments such as protectionism, distrust in global political organizations or favor of a solely national policy of defense. If some of these privileged individuals are involved in global business or anything similar, but simultaneously cultivate anti-cosmopolitan sentiments or no cosmopolitan ideas at all, their identity would in my opinion be global instead of cosmopolitan. These people could then fall into the category of Bauman’s and Isin and Wood’s urban or global elite, which I discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, this global elite group most probably encompasses only a very small percentage of all the materially and ethnically privileged individuals in the WVS. According to David Rothkopf, author of the book Superclass. The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making, there are no more than 6000 individuals who possess considerable power and abilities on the global level. (39-41) Therefore, I think that the top global elite is only a small part of the privileged members of a society, and even a smaller fraction of a survey which covers 80% of the world’s population. Rothkopf’s illustration of the global elite will therefore be explored further in one of the case studies.
After studying the first part of Furia’s research, it seems that the statement that cosmopolitanism only applies to rationalist philosophers, is not supported. People with cosmopolitan affiliations are indeed a minority, but this group is obviously not restricted to philosophers. The second variant of the hypothesis, which stated that cosmopolitanism only appeals to privileged individuals, might be very slightly supported since there is a small relation between education and cosmopolitan ideals. However, according to the proof Furia found in the WVS, materially less privileged individuals are generally more eager to identify with cosmopolitan sentiments than their richer fellow citizens.

Finally, Furia attempts to find out if the third variant of his hypothesis, namely that cosmopolitanism solely appeals to privileged societies, could be proven. When looking at the WVS data, he finds out that citizens of Western countries are in general less likely to cultivate cosmopolitan sentiments than those of non-Western countries. It turns out that neither national prosperity nor being a member of the ‘Western world’ has an effect on the expression of cosmopolitan sentiments. Citizens who felt they belonged to the entire world are according to the survey mostly located in the United States, Jordan, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Mexico. Also, the countries with the most confidence in global political organizations such as the United Nations are Bangladesh, Uganda, Albania, Tanzania and the Philippines.

Furia also found regional variations of cosmopolitanism. For example, in the Middle East a relatively high percentage of people identifies with the world as a whole, but a much smaller percentage has faith in global institutions. Furthermore, Asian societies score low in political cosmopolitan sentiments, but do have a large amount of citizens which foster moral cosmopolitan sentiments, such as a fair distribution of wealth on the global level. African societies encompass by far the largest levels of confidence in the United Nations. Finally, it is interesting that Latin American societies have the highest amount of cosmopolitan sentiments in general.

Hence, Furia concludes that the claim that cosmopolitanism is elitist, is not verified by the empirical data. Even though it is indeed a minority ideology in all nations, this definitely not refers to an elite minority. (353-359)

Furia’s research insinuates that the possession of a cosmopolitan identity is not restricted to a Western society as such, or elite members of any society in general. Interestingly, according to his research the opposite seems true. This demonstrates that material privilege is probably not a condition for an individual cosmopolitan identity. His conclusions even seem to point at the assumption that material privilege, or membership of a privileged society, works against the fostering of cosmopolitan sentiments. When attempting to find out why the results turned out this way, Furia speculates that the educated poor might see the “the world as a place in which many
things ‘need doing’”. (Furia 350) This implies that cosmopolitan affiliations are not reserved for the Western world, as some accounts in the introduction implied. However, I do not think that this affiliation necessarily leads to the educated poor embodying a cosmopolitan identity. A different interpretation of the results could indicate that the poor cosmopolitan minority in this article is fed up with being poor or receiving unequal treatment, and hence looks for solidarity beyond their nation state. Therefore, these cosmopolitan sentiments might not necessarily represent a cosmopolitan identity, but instead signify a longing for justice as well as equality.

Furthermore, in my opinion this article does not contain enough data on a possible cosmopolitan identity as the concept was defined in the first chapter. Throughout the WVS’ questions, there is no clear demarcation between a cosmopolitan affiliation and a cosmopolitan identity. A cosmopolitan connection is indeed expressed among this group, but not necessarily the desire to act upon this. There are for example no questions about one’s aspiration to act or make a difference through cosmopolitanism, and most of the questions seem to evolve around passive sentiments of trust and belonging. In order to achieve a more nuanced view or support of Furia’s statements, it would therefore be wise to look at another general research project on this subject, before moving on to more specific case studies.

2.1.2 **The global elite versus the cosmopolitan elite empirically revisited**

In the article *Stratification and Global Elite Theory: A Cross Cultural and Longitudinal Analysis of Public Opinion*, the authors Davidson, Poor and Williams first of all state the importance of distinguishing between a hypothetical global capitalist elite and a hypothetical cosmopolitan elite. Their article is similar to that of Furia but they make an additional contribution concerning the actual identity and location of the global elite in contrast to cosmopolitans. Since a large part of the literature discussed in the first chapter concerns a possible global elite, it would in my opinion be useful to empirically research the actual presence and influence of this potential group as well.

Firstly, the authors distinguish between the global elite and cosmopolitans in a way similar to my distinction earlier. They identify cosmopolitans as people with a tendency of feeling attached to large geographical units and to hold global egalitarian attitudes. In contrast, the global elite is viewed by the authors as globally active individuals who support global capitalist economic institutions and policies, as opposed to the cosmopolitan’s perceived emphasis on economic regulation. (165-166) It seems as if the authors go a step further with their definition of cosmopolitanism than my definition in the first chapter, since they add the economic moral element of egalitarianism to the identity of a cosmopolitan, while my description stayed in a more neutral space of openness and reflexivity. Also in Furia’s text a cosmopolitan was identified as a person who supports equal global economic
arrangements such as a fair distribution of wealth. In the first chapter, my definition of a cosmopolitan identity accumulated into a person who operated for the sake of ideological cosmopolitanism, with a reflexive awareness and an openness towards human as well as natural life beyond the borders of her nation state or continent. This necessarily required a positive attitude towards the cosmopolitan space. This positive attitude could indeed well be represented by economic egalitarianism. Therefore, the definition of Furia, Davidson, Poor and Williams could potentially serve as a complementary cosmopolitan identification. However, since cosmopolitans could also strive for other than economic issues such as global ecology, I personally think that global egalitarian feelings should not be a necessary condition for a cosmopolitan identity because that might work restricting. Furthermore, the more fundamental conditions of openness and affinity which were established in the first chapter, could themselves lead to egalitarianism as well.

Davidson, Poor and William’s hypothesis to be researched is if there is a “relationship between social stratification and attitudes towards and identification with globalization?” (166) When for example, looking at means of access to global media, they conclude that wealthy people have more abilities to participate in the global space than others. Furthermore, they claim that national elite cultures, taking place in the global space, could eventually accumulate into a homogenous world culture. However, other opinions in this debate state that globalization will indeed lead to economic interdependence but not to any cultural homogenization.

The hypotheses they test concerning globalization and homogenization is firstly if “over time individuals with higher levels of income have become attached to global geographical identities while those with lower income have not,” (170) and second if “the upper strata value neoliberal policies to a greater extent than do the lower strata, and over time the difference between the two groups widened, as the upper strata value such neoliberal policies increasingly more.” (170)

On cosmopolitanism they specifically formulate two different hypotheses, the first being if “over time, the value systems of those with higher economic capital have increasingly valued certain global institutions, while the values of those possessing less capital have not,” (170) and second if “over time, the more affluent have grown more supportive of environmental coexistence and gender and ethnic equality compared to others.” (170)

Davidson, Poor and Williams limit their research to economically developed countries, but with different cultures. The selected nations are the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Japan and South Korea. They also use the WVS as a leading thread in their research, but approach it from different angles than Furia. When examining their data, the researchers found out that there is no support for their hypotheses.
They firstly looked at cosmopolitanism. Questions concerning **cosmopolitan values** in the WVS, such as belonging and support for global political institutions, did not find notably more support by the elite than by the common people in the countries they examined, just as Furia concluded. Significantly, these authors found indications that the differences *within* particular societies concerning such values were narrowing, instead of widening into an elite versus common culture. They related this to the revival of the national, ethnic and local as a reaction to globalization. This revival also manifests itself in terrorism, extreme rightwing parties and general fear. From the data, the authors then conclude that the elites identify themselves more similar to their countrymen than to elites of different nationalities. Hence, they state that cosmopolitan identifications can apply to any group, regardless of social status. However, it will always be a minority.

When secondly looking at **global attitudes**, the authors did find class variations. In the responses to WVS questions concerning economic globalization, it became clear that members of the elite were generally more supportive of global free market policies than the common people. Because of economic globalization, the mobility of factories and capital greatly increased and the bargaining power of labor unions in all nations has decreased, since companies have more options and are not very much tied to any particular soil. This means that production is increasingly moving to lower income countries. Therefore, factory workers are obviously less in favor of global economic freedom than the upper class, such as the owners of private capital. As a result, one can conclude that globalization increased the power of the economic elite, whereas it decreased the laborers’ power. This demonstrates that elite members will consequently be more likely to have a **global identity** than common workers.

Davidson, Poor and Williams argue that with a cosmopolitan identity it should be the other way around. Since economic challenges are now global instead of national or local, many workers could according to them **benefit** from regulative policies on the global level. These policies then could be classified under a ‘cosmopolitan label’ since they deal with egalitarianism and aim at the entire cosmopolitan space. But the need for cosmopolitan egalitarian policies is not expressed by most workers, due to the revival of the national in the countries they researched. In the final paragraph of their article, the authors express their concerns of the national orientation of the working class, since workers could profit from cosmopolitan policies. Therefore they conclude that an overall **global awareness** is needed in order to establish **cosmopolitan policies**. (171-182) This follows Zygmunt Bauman when he gives an account of the ‘victims’ of globalization in his book *Globalization. The Human Consequences*. He describes how factory workers are dependent on the global elite for jobs. These elite investors can then easily determine to move the factory if necessary, regardless of the situation of the workers and their family, who are tied to their locality. (1-11) Since many economic developments are now on the global level, I agree that it might not hurt to look for economic policies
beyond the national. However, in my opinion it is questionable if factory workers are in the position to regulate economic matters on the global level themselves, even if they would possess a global outlook.

The empirical findings of Davidson, Poor and Williams do not all match those of Furia, since Furia seems to have found more cosmopolitan sentiments amongst common people. Even though they used the same source, their conclusions are very dissimilar. This is most probably due to their different use of the WVS. Whereas Furia’s research covered 80% of the world’s population, the other authors only selected various developed countries. This points towards a selective use of sources; the conclusions Davidson, Poor and Williams drew, might have looked wholly different if other countries were included in their research. Therefore, I am careful with assuming their conclusions on national and global affiliations. However, various other authors which I studied in this thesis also point towards a revival of nationalism and even xenophobic attitudes in many Western countries, such as Bauman (“LT” 4-8) and Beck (54-57, 117-119). This slightly supports the claim of Davidson, Poor and Williams, but only for the Western nations they examined.

Nevertheless, from both articles it can now be derived that in many countries the economic elite has a positive attitude towards economic globalization, whereas most common people are not so much in favor of it. Furthermore, people with a cosmopolitan identity are proven to be a minority in any case. From Furia’s research it turned out that educated common or poor people in non-Western nations are most likely to have a positive attitude towards cosmopolitanism, whereas Davidson, Poor and Williams, along with Bauman and Beck, demonstrated that most common people in Western countries do not foster this. However, in my opinion it is generally very unclear to determine if these WVS results give information about the cosmopolitan identity. Many poor people do not have the financial as well as social means to participate in the global space. Egalitarian sentiments could also just represent someone’s wish for equal treatment or a better life. But of course this could hypothetically go on a par with a cosmopolitan identity, which will be explored in the case studies following.

Finally, WVS questions about faith in global institutions or belonging to a large geographical entity obviously concern cosmopolitanism, but there could also be different situations with other conditions. In some contexts identification with cosmopolitanism might be very unlikely. In for example the study on young Somali refugees in Great Britain cited in the previous chapter, it was discovered that identifying as a Muslim was a very coherent option for them. The idea that a cosmopolitan identity is not possible for everybody due to context has in my opinion direct implications on the concept. It could for instance demonstrate the potential Western ‘monopoly’
view on the cosmopolitan identity, which was put forward in the introduction as well as the first chapter. In order to research this role of context more thorough, I will now look at some more detailed and particular case studies. The concept of a possible global identity will be studied as well.

2.2 Case studies: culture, class and cosmopolitanism

On the basis of the conclusions from the previous section, more specific cases are analyzed. These are about the mobility of low paid immigrant workers in a cosmopolitan city, the perceived global upper class and the manifestation of global environmentalism in different cultures. The case studies are selected because of their diverse manifestations of simultaneous global, regional, national, religious and ethnic influences on the individual level. In each case, these cosmopolitan influences and their implications on the identity of the people studied, are attempted to be located and structured. Furthermore, I will look for potential ideological cosmopolitan elements in people’s identity. Therefore, the leading thread throughout these case studies is the potential effect of cosmopolitanism on identity.

2.2.1 Global mobility as a component of a local narrative

The second case study to be examined is around the themes of mobility, low paid immigrant laborers in London, and their sources of identification. The title of the article I will use is Men on the Move: Narratives of Migration and Work among Low-Paid Migrant Men in London, and it is written by Kavita Datta, Cathy McIllwaine, Joanna Herbert, Yara Evans, Jon May and Jane Wills from the Department of Geography at the University of London. The main research question in their article is to what extent migration impacts the gender identity of these immigrant workers. Another item to be explored is the negotiation of class, race and ethnicity when establishing their identity in the cosmopolitan city of London. Many of these workers are from developing or undeveloped countries. The concepts researched in the article revolve around the workers’ motives for moving to London and their experiences of low-paid work in London’s labor market. (853-854) In my view, it could be likely that the workers feel solidarity with one another and hence create a sense of togetherness, since they all have to work hard for little wage and are away from home. Another possibility could be that the cultural relocation and hard labor would make them cling on to old traditions and habits for reasons of safety and familiarity, and therefore more culturally conservative. In the article, these possible reactions are explored as well.
The migrants interviewed for this article come from a very diverse range of class, ethnic, racial and national backgrounds. Most of the people questioned come from Latin America or Africa. The authors start their article with a critique on earlier research. They feel as if women’s subjective identity construction in relation to economic migration has been very much researched, but that it has too often been assumed that male migrants act rationally in response towards economic factors. Hence, the goal of their paper is to establish that men’s motives for migration are also influenced by various discourses and therefore not solely rational. Also, they argue that the identity of these men is reconstructed as they move and work in a different cultural context.

In many cultures mobility is equated with masculinity and being a suiting prospective husband. A way to fulfill this ideal is working abroad in one’s twenties, which has become easier over the last decennia since humans became more mobile. (Datta et al 854-856) This information makes clear that the migrants studied often make use of global opportunities for migration in order to fulfill an ideal of a local discourse. Perhaps surprisingly, the researchers discovered that many of the migrants belong to the middle- or upper-class in their country. Therefore, the workers will often experience a downward social mobility in London, but their status at home will go up as a result of their time abroad. Besides the link between migration and masculinity, financial success in a foreign country is also greatly valued in many migrants’ local cultures. Even when the workers will not earn as much as expected or when they feel lonely and displaced, when returned home, most of them will do everything to keep up the appearance of a successful economic migrant.

The authors moreover find out that in the bottom sector of London’s immigrant labor market, symbols of masculinity are very important. Many migrant men end up in typical ‘female labor sectors’ such as cleaning or serving in a restaurant. In order to compensate for the feminine image of these sectors, they often attempt to emphasize different, masculine qualities of the job. Examples are stressing the importance of learning new skills such as vacuuming, the extreme physical challenge in washing dishes, the payment received after completing the work, or the social importance of the job. (Ibid. 857-868)

Next to that, when presenting themselves as successful migrants, while returning home, many migrants emphasize their personal development during the time abroad. For example, when interviewed, Kofi, who comes from an African country, told how much he is learning about others in London. Migration allowed him to:

“meet a whole lot of people from different countries and I’ve learned a lot from such people ... You see Indians, their lifestyle is quite different, you see Chinese, their lifestyle is quite different, you see somebody from Russia, you know what I mean? So with this experience, I’ve learned a lot from such different, different, different people in this country.” (Kofi quoted by Datta et al 868)
Also, the workers Adalberto and Nivaldo, who are both middle class Brazilian, state that having done hard labor in London taught them how to be more responsible, stand hardships and “value things and grow as a person” (Datta et al 868). It also was a chance for their family members to be proud of them. A lot of the men interviewed stated that they now knew what it was like to have endured hardships but be independent. In many cases, their lives in countries such as Brazil or Congo were much more comfortable than their stay in London, where they suffered hunger and cold. For those middle class migrants, this experience was about being a ‘winner’ and becoming wise. For migrants with a greater economic motivation of working in London, the time abroad made them feel independent and masculine as well, since they could now support their children or aging parents. (Datta et al 854-869)

In Kofi’s quote above, it can be seen that some of these men realize the cultural diversity and variation of humanity which comes together in London. However, he seems to portray this diversity as something which he, as an individual, can learn and benefit from. Also in the other accounts it becomes clear that the male workers either go through this experience to earn wage for themselves and their family, or to become a wiser, experienced and more powerful person. Therefore, both of the assumptions made in the beginning of this case study do not seem to apply to this situation: the men interviewed became neither cosmopolitan nor culturally conservative as a reaction to their stay in London. Since they had to go through many hardships and sometimes were in serious trouble, they most probably did not have the time or energy to contemplate about cosmopolitanism. They were too busy with surviving and personal enrichment to sit back and reflect. Therefore, in my view it seems as if these workers have neither a cosmopolitan nor global identity but use the cosmopolitan space of London as well as the global infrastructure and possibilities, for personal gain such as wealth, wisdom or a high status in their local or national culture.

2.2.2 The identity of the ones shaping our history: Rothkopf’s superclass

In his book Superclass – The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making, David Rothkopf describes the lifestyle, identity and interests of an elite almost exclusively functioning on the global level. According to him, the global elite encompasses about 6000 individuals who all have global power and abilities. Among them are for example the top officials of governments with much global impact, leaders of powerful militaries, executives of large investment corporations and heads of the world’s largest NGO’s. Furthermore, important spiritual leaders, thinkers and artists belong to this community. The final component exists of leaders of ‘shadow elites’ such as high up criminals or terrorists.
Rothkopf states that the common characteristics of this group are their global impact and engagement with others in the superclass who can offer them certain returns, such as information, wealth or status. To achieve their global goals, members however need to network with others in the superclass. Therefore, Rothkopf explains that the members usually reside in cosmopolitan cities such as London, Hong Kong, Dubai, Shanghai, Moscow or Tokyo, which are all very well connected to other ends of the globe.

It is noteworthy that the various segments of the superclass, such as finance or fashion, seem very concentrated on the global level. The reasons for this are first of all that target consumer groups are getting more global, and companies are not tied to territory as much as they used to be. Second to this, due to new communication technologies, enhanced mobility, the dominance of the English language, a standardized business culture and common sources of information such as the internet, geography is no longer a limiting factor. Furthermore, many members of the elite manage to enhance their domains of power, and hence the sectors they work in, through networking. Therefore, it is usually only a very small group responsible for a specific sector. (39-49)

It seems as if such global leaders, operating in diverse segments, interconnect several power clusters and hence form a superclass community. According to Rothkopf, these leaders all have a comparable background. Most of them for example start off at elite universities such as Yale or Harvard and some are automatically linked up in the superclass networks by birth. Even though they reside scattered over the globe, Rothkopf thinks they form their own global community,

“In fact, spread around the world as they are, rare as they may be among the teeming billions on the planet, it is easy to see them as a community and to see the geography of that community take shape at least in the mind’s eye – a geography that stretches from South Kensington to the Upper East Side of Manhattan; from St. Tropez to Dubai; from the breeding grounds at Harvard, Yale, Cambridge, and Tokyo University to meeting places on the boards of cultural institutions, banks and political bodies. Linked together by common interests, a common culture and private aircraft, these islands become a glittering, superpowered archipelago amid oceans of aspirants and of the disenfranchised – oceans of people who work for them, are buffeted by their market decisions, are swept along by their political impulses, are profoundly influenced by their views.” (Rothkopf 48-49)

It might also seem as if it is now easier to become a member of the superclass, since the internet is also accessible for many ‘common’ people and top universities are not as exclusive as they have once been. However, even though there are now more possibilities to take part in the superclass than by birth, Rothkopf argues that people can still only receive access to these networks if they are situated in the right context. This can be through proper family ties, an old school network such as an elite student organization, membership of an exclusive organization or tight work relations with others from the superclass. (87-89; 143-144)
Finally, Rothkopf describes how the culture of the superclass community is changing through globalization. Nations like China, India and Russia are gaining much influence on the world market and hence influential leaders from such countries will network their way into the superclass. This means that “the culture of those who influences changes” (Rothkopf 313). Asian leaders for example have very different approaches to business. European and American powers often wanted to ideologically influence their partners, for example by imposing ethical values on the nations they deal with. Asian powers seem to care less about the domestic issues in the countries they do business with, even if these are contested, such as cases of corruption, destructive environmental policy or violation of human rights. (311-314) This last point is significant because it are again just European and American powers with a history of attempting to impose religious, civil or ethical values upon other cultures they deal with, which seems to go along with the notion that cosmopolitanism is Eurocentric.

In my opinion, the superclass is a global community. Its members are connected through an international network and ever since economic globalization, it is becoming more worldwide. Obviously, the superclass cannot be approached as one unified community because of the varied nature of its members. However, due to many linkages, the various segments often overlap and hence form the network of the superclass.

The identity of the members of the superclass is likely to be global also, due to their international daily life. However, their personal network and lifestyle seem to mostly be undertaken for the sake of business dealings. Therefore, their motivation for operating globally could very likely be individual gain of financial means, status, pleasure or influence. But this could potentially go on a par with a cosmopolitan attitude, for example by engaging in fair trade business. A cosmopolitan consciousness might even easily awaken in somebody living in a worldwide context. Since the superclass is such as small group, it is however not very likely that they are well represented in any of the surveys from section 2.1. Therefore, it is hard to judge the potential presence of a cosmopolitan identity in this super privileged group. However, Rothkopf’s article does imply that cultural contextual narratives matter more to the superclass than the global space as such. This is for example manifested by the fact that whereas members of the superclass from Western culture are eager to impose values upon their business partners, non-Western members seem to only influence their business partners as far as their business goals need them to. In conclusion, I think that being a member of the superclass does not necessarily lead to a cosmopolitan identity, but that it could potentially go on a par with it.
2.2.3 Environmental activism in context: a global concern or local interests?

Since ecosystems, natural reserves and waters often stretch beyond national borders, in the first chapter it was assumed by Isin and Wood, that environmental activists could very likely possess a cosmopolitan identity. Activists with positive feelings towards conservation of endangered species of the earth, or clean oceans then could unite in global communities and organizations which aim to protect the atmosphere. In this case study it will be researched to what extent cosmopolitanism is present in environmental organizations, in terms of space as well as identity. Firstly, there will be looked at a general statistical article on transnational cooperation between environmental organizations as such. Secondly, environmental organizations in Lithuania and Turkey and their members will be studied more detailed.

In the article A Global Network? Transnational Cooperation among Environmental Groups, the political researchers Robert Rohrschneider and Russel J. Dalton attempt to find out whether environmental groups in general constitute a global civil society. (abstract) This research on the communal level is in my opinion very relevant for a potential environmental cosmopolitan identity, since a global environmental structure will greatly enhance the possibility for individual cosmopolitan environmental action and affinity. Therefore, the outcomes of this research will be very relevant to gain an idea of possible contexts which could either foster or hinder the development of a cosmopolitan identity in relation to environmental consciousness.

In their article Rohrschneider and Dalton examine groups from all over the world. They however distinguish between six regions: North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Pacific Rim (Australia, Japan, New Zealand) and Asia (Turkey, India, South Korea, China). Groups in Africa and the Middle East have not been included in the survey, due to the absence of effective democracies in the largest part of these regions. (517-519) Since autonomous environmental groups in Africa and the Middle East are hard to establish due to state pressure, in my opinion it must consequently be harder to develop a cosmopolitan identity when living in such a country. This brings me back to the importance of situatedness of identity: if somebody is socially conditioned according to the norms and values of an exclusive national identity, the wide scope of cosmopolitanism will probably feel very unfamiliar. For someone brought up in an ‘open’ country which is for instance engaged in international and supranational agreements, supports student exchanges and participates in international sports events, it will be much easier to establish an environmental organization, as well as a cosmopolitan identity in my view.

Rohrschneider and Dalton examine environmental organizations in all six identified regions. They pay attention to for example the groups’ frequency of international activities and the
organizations’ global orientation. When looking at the first point, the scholars find out that the frequency of international activities of almost all groups is extremely high. Many groups exchange information, go to conferences in different countries or support organizations outside of their region. However, when it comes to the last point, it turns out that the method of support is very asymmetric: the groups from Western Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim seem to constantly support their colleagues in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. This concerns resources, but also ideas and plans of action. The latter is problematic, since the members of environmental organizations in the global North seem to value very different goals than those in the global South. For example, environmental organizations from Latin America and Asia usually emphasize basic environmental issues such as clean drinking water and quality of air in their surroundings. Groups from Western Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim generally focus on broader issues such as clean oceans or actions against global warming. Due to this difference in priorities, the exchange of resources between Northern and Southern environmental groups could be problematic. (518-520; 529)

The researchers furthermore found out that there is a huge difference in international orientation. Almost all of the groups in Northern America, along with half of those in Europe and a quarter of the organizations in Latin America focus on global issues such as global warming or the hole in the ozone layer. This applies to only a very small percentage or even none of the groups in the Pacific Rim, Eastern Europe and Asia, who primarily concentrate on national issues. (522) However, most of the groups are still very familiar with operating internationally. This means that even though many of the groups in the latter four regions focus on domestic issues, they still use the global space to tackle their local problems, for example by cooperating with other organizations.

The authors conclude from this data that environmental organizations which originated from nations who are familiar with acting in the international environment, such as engagement with foreign aid, large-scale sport events or international organizations, also tend to deal with global environmental issues more often. Finally, they conclude that there does not exist a single environmental global civil society with unified targets. All groups clearly have different goals and ideals, which are, according to the survey, very much determined by the regional, national or local context in which they originated. (Rohrschneider and Dalton 523-530) In my opinion, on the individual level this does not work beneficiary for the independent development of an environmental cosmopolitan identity. It mostly seems to depend on one’s culture if environmental involvement could lead to a cosmopolitan identity, which again insinuates a Western relation with the cosmopolitan outlook as such.

In order to research how the combination of local ideals and global means works in practice, a more detailed case study on environmental organizations in Lithuania and Turkey will be examined shortly.
In the article *Transnational Environmentalism at Europe’s Boundaries: Identity Movements in Lithuania and Turkey*, the sociologist Gabriel Ignatow makes an argument against the claim that globalization is unifying, through his study of environmental groups and their members.

Ignatow first of all states that environmental organizations are often composed of members with a traditional outlook. He furthermore explains how current environmental issues and cultural heritage are often intertwined. There are for example many religious environmental groups such as evangelical Christians in the United States, orthodox Jewish groups in Israel and Islamists in Turkey. These groups usually link action in favor of the environment to being discriminated or ignored in their nation’s policy. Significantly, the only region which is excluded from this trend is Western Europe. According to Ignatow this is because of its secularity and wealth. (845-848) In my opinion this is a contradictory argument. It is widely known that Western Europe is a quite secular area, whereas many other parts of the world, such as indeed the United States, Israel or Turkey, have a more religious character. (Delanty and Rumford 73) Therefore, Ignatow seems to be begging the question when he characterizes the environmental organizations in these regions as typically religious. This statement may, as a result, give more information about Western European versus American, Israeli and Turkish culture in general than the environmental organizations in particular. However, in that case Ignatow’s argument about the religious as well as traditional character of environmental groups could complement Rohrschneider and Dalton’s argument about the importance of national context for the goals of an environmental organization.

Ignatow firstly describes environmentalism in Lithuania and focuses on two organizations, which are the *Romuva* and the *Aukuras*. They both dedicate themselves to protection of the environment and conservation of cultural traditions, which in this context are mainly Lithuanian folk traditions and pagan rituals. The group members are interconnected through a global network which partly coincides with the Lithuanian diaspora. Most members live in Lithuania or the United States and they contact each other on the internet. The network organizes conferences, language classes and summer camps. When the groups perform cultural activities, this is almost always done as a way to support environmental activities according to Ignatow. Both are seen as a priority by the group. Much is for example done to clean sacred hills, campaign for clean drinking water, demonstrate against state industrial projects and strive for clean lakes. This all goes on a par with singing and dancing to folk songs or engaging in religious sermons. When a member of Aukuras is interviewed, he declares that, “Whenever an environmental issue arises, we work to combine environmental concerns with heritage concerns” (Darus Ramancionus, 2005, quoted by Ignatow 853). In my view this account displays an interesting synthesis of traditional and environmental identifications, as well as the aspiration to act upon this specific cultural self image. The organizations usually try to include people
from Latvia and Estonia as well. From this, it can be concluded that they emphasize regional issues instead of choosing to focus on national or global concerns. (852-855)

Ignatow secondly portrays environmentalism in the Tunceli region of Turkey, which is situated in the South-Eastern part of Anatolia. First of all, the region is mainly inhabited by Alevi and Kurdish people, which are both very large minorities in Turkey. Second, the Tunceli region is known for its natural beauty, citizens’ aversion of the Turkish government and wide-felt socialist principles. In the 1980’s the Özal government held power in Turkey and promoted an Islamic identity and integration of Turkey in the global economy. In order to achieve this, political and ethnic minorities were very much suppressed by the state, among other measures. This caused the Alevi as well as Kurdish minority to reactionary engage in identity politics and establish youth, environmental, regional and ethnic organizations. A few years ago, the Turkish government moreover decided to build eight dams in the Tunceli region. This would however mean that water levels would soar, cities would flood, and roads to small villages would be cut off. It would also greatly limit as well as damage the ecological beauty and variety in the valley. This plan caused many of the Alevi and Kurdish people to take action. In this action, they linked their ethnic and religious identity to environmental interests. This manifested itself in for example taking action for a sacred river in the valley. Many Alevi groups also have connections to Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. However, I believe that these environmental concerns account for a lot more than a means of resistance against the government, when manifested on the individual level. An Alevi elder or dede, summarizes the relation between Alevi culture and environmentalism in an interview as:

“We give primary importance to the environment all the time for our and our children’s future. Our ancestors planted a tree wherever they saw water. The importance of trees has come down to us. When we were young our elders used to say ‘Plant trees as long as you live. Even if you yourself cannot benefit, other living things such as birds and wolves can benefit’, and they planted a love of nature in us. But over time, the slaughter of nature increased. I am telling you as an Alevi, as a dede, we should give environmental consciousness to our children.” (Celal Arslan, 2004, quoted by Ignatow 858)

In my view, this quote accounts for an inextricable synthesis of culture, religion, environmentalism and locality. This synthesis apparently facilitates the particular environmental identity Alevi people encompass. Furthermore, there is a large global diasporic presence of Alevi and Kurdish people from the Tunceli region. This diaspora is located in the area itself, urbanized regions in Turkey and various European cities. The diaspora cooperated in order to oppose to the dam project and promote ecotourism to the region. (856-859)

Finally, Ignatow concludes that he sees a general trend of minorities who do not get support from their state but are acknowledged by their diasporic communities, the EU, or international
institutions. This means that they receive the recognition their nation state will not allow them from the cosmopolitan space. Furthermore, he states that the theory that globalization produces uniformity is very wrong. Instead of uniformity, Ignatow attaches importance to religion, pseudo-science and local traditions influencing environmentalism in the global space, and thereby creating difference instead of uniformity. Therefore, environmentalism cannot be considered universal according to him. (856, 860) However, in my opinion, environmentalism can be considered cosmopolitan, since these case studies exhibit a mix of global, regional, national, religious and local elements. An interesting illustration of this process is illustrated in Ignatow's conclusion. He first of all states that both the Lithuanian and Turkish groups are shaped by global forces. They all operate in favor of regional, local and religious traditions and identities, but use the global 'infrastructure' such as international institutions and diasporic communities for this end.

In my opinion, both articles demonstrate various cosmopolitan tendencies, such as local organizations using the global space to fulfill their goals, or the transnational network of various organizations. However, many of the organizations, such as the Lithuanian and Turkish environmental groups, operate with their local culture or religion as an end in mind. This makes clear that operating in an environmental cosmopolitan space does not necessarily lead to the creation of a cosmopolitan identity. Members of North American and Western European environmental organizations, will in my view be the most likely to encompass a cosmopolitan identity when striving for causes, since they deliberately focus on ends in the global space. Ignatow made the strong statement that environmental organizations in Western Europe are the only ones not unifying tradition and environmentalism. He proclaimed this on the basis of the secularity and wealth present in Western Europe. As I implied earlier this argument seems ambiguous, but does indeed support Rohrschneider and Dalton’s emphasis on context. Western European nations often have an ‘open character’ through for example engaging in international agreements or supporting exchanges. Second to this, these nations also coincide with the cultures where ideological cosmopolitanism is articulated as such. This however brings me back to the perceived Eurocentric character of cosmopolitanism and universalism, as articulated in the introduction and first chapter by various authors. It could even be that only citizens from Western societies can encompass a cosmopolitan identity as defined in the first chapter, since they are the ones growing up in a cultural context where ideological cosmopolitanism is often articulated and valued as such. This possibility will be explored further in the next chapter.

In conclusion, after looking at general statistics on environmental organizations and two cases in Lithuania and Turkey, it becomes clear that situatedness and context very much count when formulating environmental goals, as well as when fostering a particular development of individual
identity. The locality, religion, ethnicity, nation and region of origin seem to play a large role in environmental goals. The member of the Lithuanian Akuras organization for example displayed an interesting fusion of environmental and traditional welfare.

2.3 Summary of findings

After studying some general statistical articles and more detailed case studies, it appears that the role of context is crucial when establishing one’s identity. The first general article by Furia covered 80% of the world’s population and gave much information on cosmopolitan sentiments, but was not very clear about a cosmopolitan identity as such. It turned out that educated poor people in developing or undeveloped countries were the most likely to exhibit cosmopolitan attachment. However, due to the imprecise focus of the WVS questions as well as the dissimilar outcomes of the case studies, it could in my opinion be more likely that only a cosmopolitan affiliation was expressed by them, instead of a drive to act in an ideological cosmopolitan way.

The second general article, by Davidson, Poor and Williams, which covered several developed nations, demonstrated a tendency of national orientation among poor citizens in those countries. However, since they used their source quite selectively, this outcome should perhaps not be taken for granted. In contrast to cosmopolitan sentiments, they derived the existence of a global identity among the economic upper class from their data. All things considered, in both of the articles it became clear that people with cosmopolitan sentiments are in any case a minority.

The first case study was yet written in the second last section of the previous chapter, and had young Somali refugees as its subject. The conclusion of this study was that a person’s particular situation has a very large influence on how she constructs her identity. In some positions others put a large pressure of a specific identification on the Somali refugees. Furthermore, because they had to deal with many cultural contextual difficulties and changing environments, an overarching identification as a Muslim seemed a very logical way of identifying for them. This implies that a rational way of identification is very unlikely in this context.

Secondly, low paid immigrant workers in London were studied. They are actually one of the cultural and economic factors in creating the cosmopolitan space of London. However, it turned out that the workers themselves mainly operated on the basis of local or national narratives of masculinity, mobility and success. To achieve these cultural goals, they used global infrastructure and the cosmopolitan space of London, even though the city was still a ‘different’ space to them.
The third case study revolved around the superclass, a group of 6000 individuals with global impact and a high class lifestyle. It turned out that, in order to be a successful member of the superclass, moving in the right context is of key importance. In the first place it seemed as if the superclass used the global space for personal gain, but living a global lifestyle could possibly go on a par with a cosmopolitan identity. Furthermore, it turned out that only global leaders with a Western cultural background attempt to influence other cultures they deal with, whereas Asian members of the superclass care less about domestic affairs in the nation they do business with. Western leaders for example attempt to impose ethical values on different cultures, which is an indication of the Western orientation to cosmopolitanism.

Moreover, the final case study considered the theme of the environmental citizen. In two articles on the theme, it turned out that regional, national and local cultural context has a large influence on the particular goals of an environmental organization. For example, nations with an open international policy usually have environmental organizations with a global focus. Therefore, the question if environmental engagement leads to a cosmopolitan identity, in my view depends very much on the culture this occurs in. A different conclusion from the studies is that almost only Western environmental organizations seem to focus on global goals such as global warming. When combining both conclusions, it again seems as if the global focus of Western environmental groups is, amongst other factors, caused by the cosmopolitan traditions of the region.

When looking at all studies, it seems to me as if cultural context is crucial when establishing one’s individual identity. The specific influence of the varied cosmopolitan space on identity is for example largely determined by the culture one resides in. Due to this relevance of situatedness, it becomes clear that the sole use of pure rationality for identity formation is not an option. Therefore, besides the autonomous decision of somebody with a cosmopolitan identity to operate with ideological cosmopolitanism as an end in mind, it appears that this person has to be familiar with cosmopolitan tradition and that her environment should not work against her cosmopolitan associations. Therefore, at present, it seems as if the cosmopolitan space is globally gaining ground, but that a cosmopolitan identity is reserved for people located in a cosmopolitan context. However, I wonder if this context would be exclusively Western, as various authors studied in the first chapter and introduction implied. How the role of context towards the development of a cosmopolitan identity could work in theory and practice will be established in the third, and last, chapter by the use of a theory of social constructivism.
Chapter 3

Analysis: A Social Constructivist Perspective on the Cosmopolitan Identity

In the previous chapter it was concluded that one’s identity very much depends on the context one is raised in, or is surrounded with at a certain time. Apart from a conscious choice to act motivated by ideological cosmopolitanism, it might hence work beneficiary to be in an environment which stimulates development towards cosmopolitanism, in order to encompass a cosmopolitan identity. Therefore it seems more likely for people who are familiar with Western culture to develop a cosmopolitan identity than for individuals who are not. However, this statement seems to be begging the question if the assumptions about the cosmopolitan character of Western culture, as well as its implications towards identity, are not researched more thoroughly. Therefore, one of the goals of this final chapter is to give a detailed account of the potential Western character of cosmopolitanism. In this exploration, I will partly make use of a theory of social constructivism. Furthermore, the difference between a cosmopolitan identity and other forms of engagement with cosmopolitanism will be explored.

3.1 Cosmopolitanism in a European environment

3.1.1 A European cosmopolitan outlook in the past and present

In section 1.2 of the first chapter, historical cosmopolitanism in Europe has been outlined briefly. In their book Rethinking Europe. Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization, the social scientists Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford state that contemporary cosmopolitanism also has a recognizable European nature. Even though a cosmopolitan outlook used to be reserved for the European elite, such as in the time of the Republic of Letters, in their book they demonstrate indications of a more common cosmopolitan identity for all European people, which I already explained shortly in the introduction. The evidence they give to support this statement is firstly the protests in major European cities in 2003 against the war in Iraq, along with other human rights demonstrations. Furthermore, there is no clear common ground for a particular European identity since Europeans are not explicitly united on the basis of traditional loyalties, according to the authors. They are also not united against one ‘Other’ religion, ethnicity or identity. Delanty and Rumford then cite various studies which imply that a European identity can be found in a pragmatic outlook instead of prejudices and stereotypes about ‘Others’. A possible European identity is
according to them not unified, essential or to be found in a common myth. European people are too different from each other for that. As a consequence, the authors conclude that the European outlook lies in respect for global differences between equal individuals, and is therefore specifically cosmopolitan. When they discuss the future of the European Union, Delanty and Rumford even hint towards a cosmopolitan European identity based on social standards such as solidarity and egalitarianism, on the basis of loyalty towards other people. (75-82) At the end of this chapter I will come back to this account of contemporary cosmopolitanism.

3.1.2 The European character of the meta-conditions for descriptive cosmopolitanism

When once again looking at the conditions for descriptive cosmopolitanism in the first chapter, combined with the insight from the second chapter that context matters, it becomes clear that many of these conditions originated on the basis of Western social, economic and political developments. Many of the conditions are therefore more present in Western culture than in other parts of the world.

Among for example the universal conditions individuality was named. It is noteworthy that individuality has always been very valued in European culture. Yet in the 14th century in Mediterranean urban regions, a view of man as a unique, rational and creative individual who should take his personal development as a fundamental objective in life, was developed. However, this individual was still seen as subordinate to God. This was the start of the principle of humanism. This development was amplified in the Renaissance period where man was now considered autonomous and secular. Not only did he have unique powers, it was also thought that man was able to create anything he invented, and discover the scientific truth behind all secrets. When the Renaissance gained more ground, sciences, arts and other scholarship flourished in Europe. Examples of important Renaissance man are all-round successful human beings such as Leonardo da Vinci, or famous artists like Michelangelo. An effect of the central role of the individual was the rise of the literary genre of the autobiography, which is a perfect symbol of the importance of personal character. Key elements in this genre were individualism, realism and secularity. Eventually, humanism decayed because of developments in the Mediterranean region, such as less trans-Mediterranean trade, fewer navigation over the Mediterranean Sea and political fights over the area of Italy. However, the Renaissance image of man continued to influence the people of Europe until today and thereby greatly lessened the dominance of religious authorities over European citizens. (Rietbergen 188-204) Further on, in the Enlightenment period, the importance of the individual was stated anew on a par with a new notion of universal morality. This is for example reflected in Kant’s cosmopolitan philosophy and his Categorical Imperative. It is also represented in a first turn towards
the European cosmopolitan as a distinctive identification, with European loyalties. In for instance Hegel’s philosophy, he stressed the moral importance of the cosmopolitan individual for Europe. This person then views humanity as a whole, in contrast to the national oriented person, who categorizes people in particular terms of their state or religion. (Delanty and Rumford 75)

Another universal condition named in the first chapter was the accessible global space, which is in my opinion also a very European element. However, the moral implications of this element are very contested. The European skills of shipbuilding and being able to use inventions such as cartography, gunpowder or the compass in very lucrative ways, combined with the drive to engage in business and make economic progress led to the creation of an almost global European maritime network. As they traveled and gained more wealth through trade, many European people developed a mindset to value and ‘master’ the unknown. Due to this spirit, international commercial capitalism soared in the late 15th and 16th century.

Apart from this entrepreneurial spirit, many European traders, travelers and monks attempted to impose religious and ethical values upon other cultures. Besides these endeavors, other influences were the change of ecosystems in the environments Europeans engaged in business, because they attempted to grow alien plants in the areas. Other consequences were even more horrific such as slave trade or forced labor on plantations. The justifications for these destructive deeds, but also for the imposition of values on other cultures, were given through the use of biblical and historical arguments which stressed the religious significance of the European territory and the superiority of the Christian religion, the fact that Europe ‘discovered’ and conquered many parts of the globe, the so-called supreme European political structures of the nation, the power of Europe’s militaries, and finally Europe’s scientific, scholarly, artistic and technological advancement. (Rietbergen 239-271) This mindset is strikingly summarized in a poem by Philip Frenau, entitled The Rising Glory of America where he describes native Americans,

“How much obscur’d is human nature here! 
Shut from the light of science and of truth.” (Frenau, quoted by Rietbergen 171)

Fortunately, European nations and other countries with Western culture generally do not engage in slave trade or forced conversions to Christianity anymore. However, they still attempt to influence other cultures in very diverse ways. Stephen Howe, a tutor in politics, gives various examples in his book Empire. A Very Short Introduction. He for instance argues that when the war in Iraq is viewed from a certain viewpoint, it seems as if the United States attempt to restore peace in the area. However, from a different perspective one could argue that the real American motivation is to maintain United States’ owned multinational companies’ control over the regions oil reserves. Howe
classifies universal human rights in this category as well. According to him universal rights are actually very specific and local, since these rights clearly originated from Western cultural tradition. First of all, the idea and concept of ‘international rights’ has been created in the colonial epoch by European powers. Second, the rights are based on a mixture between Napoleonic, Anglo-Saxon and Roman legal concepts. Therefore, Howe argues that the implementation of these rights on non-European countries as well as calling them ‘universal’ is illegitimate. (1-4) Even though this specific example of universal rights might be debatable since it entails matters of personal freedom amongst others, it is indeed an imposition of Western thinking on other cultures.

When explaining the concept of the superclass in section 2.2.2, it was noted that only European and American influential individuals attempted to impose social, political and economic values on the non-Western cultures they engage in business with. In the case study on environmental organizations in section 2.2.3, it turned out that almost only Western environmental groups focus on global goals. Furthermore, the aid of Western groups to non-Western environmental organizations was contested because of difference in priorities. This is another manifestation of the Western drive to impose values and ideas on other cultures, even though the intention behind these moves is most probably altruistic and awarding. In my opinion, this manifests that the general universal outlook is just very Western. Other people, such as the Latin American workers in Furia’s analysis, clearly express cosmopolitan sentiments, but the drive to actively engage in a cosmopolitan space through global means, seems exclusively Western. Even currently, often with the best intentions, Western organizations still attempt to guide other cultures towards Western ways of dealing with issues and problems. This can be through religious conversion, but also by for instance humanitarian assistance or financial aid.

When one furthermore looks at the historical conditions for cosmopolitanism, it turns out that several are exclusively Western as well. The condition of ideological cosmopolitanism concerns mainly people in the Western academic tradition such as the Cynic Diogenes and the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Furthermore, despite their global significance, the historical developments of the aftermath of the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall had most impact on Europe itself, since they directly took place on European territory.

It is significant that I defined both these universal and historical conditions as meta-conditions in section 1.4. This means that they function as the backbone of all the other conditions which are necessary for descriptive cosmopolitanism. Obviously, people in other cultures than Western will also be influenced by unfamiliar local, national and global elements as their countries join in globalization. They could for example be touched by economic globalization, banal globalism or global communities. Their participation in these movements will however not be a guarantee for
the development of a cosmopolitan identity. The inner circle of family and community where they originated might not hinder them at all to make use of the cosmopolitan space, but will always have an influence on their deepest individual sentiments. Therefore, the potential development of a cosmopolitan identity might highly depend on one’s earliest impressions. How this works, will be explained in the next section.

3.2 The social construction of individual identity

In his monograph *Social Identity*, the Professor of Sociology Richard Jenkins explains the relevance of other people in a person’s identity formation. According to him, identification begins as soon as a child is born. It for example greatly matters if the baby is a girl or a boy, and how it will be named. Furthermore, there might be rituals to initiate the newborn in a particular community, such as baptism or circumcision. Also, most contemporary nations oblige various bureaucratic registrations of the child, for example the country of origin from its parents. This might have implications for the baby’s legal status and citizenship. All these identification procedures eventually establish the child within certain groups such as religion, citizenship or gender.

Furthermore, Jenkins states that young children are ‘programmed’ to learn and imitate. But they can only learn from the people close to them. Therefore, people in his closest surroundings will more or less determine a child’s first identifications and teach him language, which plays an important role in classification. Simultaneously with learning a language, the child will learn to categorize and name other people and objects around him. This will lead him to develop a certain understanding of the world. When he is in the phase of early childhood, the understanding of his own identity and categorization of others will be done on the basis of a sense of community.

Jenkins then states that the learning process of a child is a process of ‘others’, since children literally are the *creation* of their parents and the people nearest to them. Before they find their own way in a larger community, children even *depend* on others to value things and give meaning to their life. Furthermore, Jenkins explains the importance of *primary identifications*. These are the identifications a child acquires during the first years of his life and they account for the way ‘the world is’ in the eyes of the child. As derived from research, these seem to have more importance in a child’s life, and be less flexible for change, than later obtained identifications. Examples of primary identifications are the routines and habits a child acquires in early years, his place in the world, the role of relationships with others and in some situations even his ethnicity. (74-101)

Furthermore, identities are not the expression of a stable ‘essential inner self’ or anything as such. The process of identification is never finished, since individuals continuously have to deal with
certain sensory input, relations with others and appropriate functioning in a society throughout their life. One’s personal identity is created through reflection on this input. Because these developments usually change as time goes by, an individual’s identity keeps changing as well. Hence, identities are always created in the course of action. (Delanty and Rumford 51; Jenkins 48)

Since other people have so much influence, one’s identification obviously very much depends on the specific context one is raised in. In various cultures, the collective or community is more important than the individual. In this mode of thinking, one’s goals should always benefit the community, which is seen as a single organism, made up of separate entities, and tied together by certain obligations and freedoms. Central ideas to such a way of thinking are inner strength and in some extreme cases even the passion to die for one’s community, if necessary. This communal way of thinking can potentially be facilitated by the illusion of destiny method of identification. (Buruma and Margalit 89-91; 145)

The members of cultures which emphasize the importance of a particular community, religion or culture, will in my opinion have less chances of encompassing an individual cosmopolitan identity. If very specific and overarching religious or gender-oriented identifications are imposed upon an infant, this person will have strong exclusive primary identifications. Obviously, there will be possibilities for such an individual to encompass a cosmopolitan identity, for instance through education, studying the concept of cosmopolitanism through scholarship or media, or traveling around the world, in combination with a reflexive attitude. But it is likely that the majority of people in such a culture will stick to their strongest primary identifications.

In my view this implies that children who are brought up and educated in a culture which stresses values such as individual freedom, global opportunities or solidarity with all other humans, will be the most likely to encompass a cosmopolitan identity, since they think that a cosmopolitan outlook ought to be the case, and that the cosmopolitan situation is real. But children brought up in a community-oriented or religious culture might think that religious behavior or actions in favor of the community ought to be the case. According to them God and the community are most important. As a consequence, both identities seem to potentially matter as such. In my opinion, it is therefore not ethical to approach the cosmopolitan outlook beforehand as a superior worldview. However, this dilemma arouses ontological issues – how could one possibly recognize what is real and what matters?
3.3 The social construction of reality through community characteristics

3.3.1 Social constructivism

Since their book *Rethinking Europe* is almost entirely based on the social constructivist approach, in their first chapter Delanty and Rumford give a concise outline of this theory. Before they begin to explain the approach, they however state the important presumption that social science is always connected to society itself in a subjective way, even though it attempts to look at the social order from a distance. In the article *The Discursive Construction of National Identities* by Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, who all work for the Sub-department of Applied Linguistics at the University of Vienna, another clear explanation of the theory is given. I will later also give an example about the relation between language and social construction from this article. However, initially, in order to give a complete and nuanced account of the theory, I will use both works to explain social constructivism.

What all social constructivist theories have in common, is that they view persons as situated in social structures. These structures are however, at the same time, also created by people’s actions. Or, in other words, the process of constructing ideas, theories, values and knowledge takes place through a socially negotiated context in a dialectic way. The dialectic relationship is then between the social context and individual behavior. For example politician’s speeches, newspaper articles, posters, political and commercial slogans, advertisements and discussions can all influence social structures through shaping opinions. However, they are directed by such structures as well, when demonstrating power or engaging in resistance towards the social context. These actions are experienced in special situations like elections, but also in daily interaction.

Another central assumption to social constructivism is that persons are situated in particular cultural contexts. This strong assumption about context may seem a repudiation of the idea of an autonomous rational agent. However, according to Delanty and Rumford, both assumptions have influence in social constructivism, because of the reciprocal relationship between context and individual. Construction therefore always takes place in a situation, but by individuals who themselves reflect on their actions. Their specific reflection will however be directed by the way they are situated in society, such as the continent and country they are from, if they belong to an ethnic minority and their economic as well as social position.

A third supposition of social constructivism is the view that social reality is never absolute or essential. Reality is always open to be changed by new ideas and postulations, which are negotiated between members of society. The construction of reality will, according to De Cillia, Reisigl and
Wodak, often happen in discourse. This implies that for example group identities are constructed, transformed and destructed by means of language. This for instance occurs in the formulation of a national historical narrative. A narrative is a specific construction of discourse, which in this case determines how history is told, which occurrences are highlighted and what selective connection is drawn between various episodes. In this way discourse influences social as well as political reality. It can potentially produce social conditions, construct national identities, justify certain social situations such as attitudes towards immigrants or national language, or arouse a perceived need for change in society. An example of a current Eurocentric narrative is the so-called ‘fault line’ between Europe and Turkey I described in the introduction and section 1.2.2. The line is often manifested as a symbol of the perceived incompatibility of Turkish and European culture in general. However, in a detailed account of history in section 1.2.2, it turned out that the line was more characterized by alliances and interlinks than violence.

Finally, the outlook which is formulated by a dominant discourse builds up to a ‘cultural resource’ which is manifested in interpretation of the world, identity, codes of behavior and other social paradigms which are not directly negotiable in social structures, but belong to a deeper cultural context. Once a cultural resource is realized, it determines how the majority of a society looks at the past, present and future and it might modify the way members of society see their own culture. Such cultural resources encompass a very rooted way of looking at the world. Therefore, they lie beyond other, more straightforward social items such as banal nationalism (or banal globalism), or institutional rules. According to Delanty and Rumford, Europe itself contains a context of such cultural resources, which is enclosed in a wider framework of cosmopolitanism. (De Cillia et al 149-161, 169-170; Delanty and Rumford 12-18) They even affirm that, “To be European is simply to recognize that one lives in a world that does not belong to a specific people” (Delanty and Rumford 77). This statement is in my opinion quite contested. In the beginning of this chapter, the general but contested European global outlook was characterized. However, this does not always go on a par with openness as well as respect for difference, as Delanty and Rumford seem to suggest. Therefore, according to me the cosmopolitan outlook of many Europeans might have more to do with feelings of moral, economic and political superiority together with the desire to influence others in general, than with a specific recognition of difference.

Finally, it may seem as if the construction of communities is similar to that of individual identities, according to the theory of social constructivism. Both are continuous social processes and encompass deep as well as more superficial reserves. However, according to Jenkins, only individuals are real entities. Groups and categories are not, since they cannot act in a certain way, and neither have an autonomous existence, limited through space and time. However, many people do experience a sense of community and attempt to influence this by participating in the community’s
They might feel as if they belong to a group and categorize other people either in the same or in different groups. Therefore, even though groups cannot be granted an actual ontological status, they are real to some extent, since people realize them. By their behavior, such as categorizing, people behave in ways as if groups are real and hence construct a piece of reality. (10-14)

3.3.2 An example: the social construction of boundaries and national identities in Europe

According to the above outline of social constructivism groups, categories and other collective entities are socially constructed by persons through discourse. Hence, this also applies to Europe, to the continent as well as its nation states. To illustrate the causes and implications of social constructivism, I will render two explaining articles. The first is *Europe’s Borders: The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe*, by Klaus Eder who is a Professor of Comparative Sociology at the Humboldt University in Berlin. The second case is the article *The Discursive Construction of National Identities* by De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak, which gives further information on the role of language in discourse.\(^5\)

In *Europe’s Borders: The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe*, Eder explains how particular narratives, motivated by historical events and constructed through discourse, can create symbolic European boundaries, such as the case with the ancient Greeks. On the basis of these boundaries, actual borders of for instance the European Union are positioned. However, the other way around is also possible, when for example political developments influence narratives. Narratives can have far reaching implications, such as defining European identity. They are created on the basis of historical images, heroes, symbols and occurrences. These are categorized on the basis of a temporal arrangement in order to achieve a unified image of ‘Europeanness’ over time. (255-257) An interesting illustration of this is the perceived as unique ‘European link’ between ancient Greeks and contemporary Europe along the theme of democracy, as well as seeing ancient Greeks as the ‘first Europeans’. With this statement, the intellectual links between ancient Greeks and ancient Iranians, Indians and Egyptians are however overlooked, as Amartya Sen describes in his *Identity and Violence*. Moreover, there exists no clear proof that the Greek political system had a profound influence on the areas which are now referred to as Europe, except for the Roman system of governance. On the other hand, there is tangible proof of ancient Iranian as well as Indian cities directly incorporating elements of the Greek democratic structure in their system of control. Finally,

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\(^5\) Due to limited time and space, the focus of this chapter and its case studies is again Europe.
whereas ‘European democracy’ is usually associated with elections and polls, in Greece democracy had more to do with public discussion. In many other ancient civilizations, such as Indian Buddhist councils, this was also the case. However, in Western European identity narratives the ancient Greeks are often seen as the ‘cradle’ of European civilization. To support this argument, a selective account of history is made. In this selection, the Greek civilization is for instance linked directly to the Goths and Visigoths who then resided in other parts of the area of Europe, even though the Greeks had much less contact with them than with the communities to their Southeast. (Sen 51-57)

Consequently, this narrative about the ancient Greeks as the cradle of European civilization is in my view more an account of how Europeans would prefer to see themselves, which people they like to see as Europeans and how they value the idea of democracy, instead of a truthful description of the past.

During the time of the Roman Empire, the European identity was based on the unifying power of Christendom, which overcame differences in culture, politics and ethnicity in Europe. When religious differences however occurred, Christendom lost its including function and there was no more clear common European characteristic to be named. A secular idea of Europe was found in the concept of the ‘Occident’ and stressed the importance of difference and political as well as economic progress. This ‘European way of life’ was exported in the colonial era I discussed in the first section of this chapter. Eder though states that during that epoch the national became more important than the European. However, the memory of a Europe united in difference with a global outlook, is then still very present in the network of high culture in Europe as well as in the way of life in many European cities. After both World Wars, the focus on the national was obsolete and morally inappropriate. The impulse for the European Union was established and a search for an including European identity started. However, with this Europe just Western Europe was meant, which was politically separated from communist Central as well as Eastern Europe until 1989. A very large part which before the war always belonged to Europe, and was often even seen as its center, was downright excluded. In my opinion, this makes clear that economic, political and social interests have a profound influence on the social construction of identity.

Another interesting point according to Eder is the socially constructed divide between Northern and Southern Europe. In Greek as well as Roman times, Southern Europe was seen as the ‘civil’ part of Europe, which gave the region its identity. For example through Greek science or Roman culture, the rich and scholarly advanced South very much distinguished itself from the ‘Barbarians’ living in Northern Europe. The Mediterranean Sea was the center of this sophisticated region. However, Eder states that since the establishment of the European Union, Europe is defined according to its wealth instead of civility. The North is then seen as advanced and wealthy, whereas the South is, in stereotypical terms, characterized by a ‘slow, dirty and ineffective Mediterranean
culture’. In European Union discourse, the problems of Southern Europe are even summarized in the term ‘Mediterranean syndrome’. The role of the Mediterranean Sea hence shifted from being a central inner sea to a border region, separating the European Union from Islamic Turkey and Arabic Northern Africa – the Muslim world. Eder states that both divides stand for a common theme, which is the attempt to establish a unique European identity in a particular way, perhaps in opposition to a world outside Europe. As long as the narratives which accompany these motivations can be told in a plausible way, both approaches are theoretically able to define Europe in a way that ‘makes sense’ according to Eder. (260-264) Hence, in my view both approaches strive to define the entire continent of Europe in their particular way. The motives for doing this can be economic, political, social and status-oriented.

In their article The Discursive Construction of National Identities De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak describe, besides their general outline of social constructivism and the central role of discourse, how the Austrian national identity is discursively constructed by a specific use of language. First of all, a specific Austrian identity can be recognized by finding out in which terms people’s general emotional connection to Austria lies, identifying so-called Austrian characteristics and traits, a look at how national media portrays a typical Austrian and finding out how Austrians represent themselves when they are abroad.

When the authors examine various focus-group discussions and interviews with a mixed group of people from various places in Austria, they find out that almost all participants often use the word ‘we’ to appoint Austrians as such. In the process, stereotypical qualities are attached to Austrians in general and the speaker using the word ‘we’ seems to expect homogeneity as well as sameness in the nation, for example in the quote:

“that we are in the mentality – umm really umm – very broad on the one hand: that I think we are quite hard-working: but then on the other hand that we also umm know how to relax and to enjoy holidays in Austria.” (quoted by De Cillia et al 161)

The emphasis on national sameness and unity versus other nations, cultures and immigrants is expressed in the following responses:

“well I think: that the Austrian is somehow different: from anyone else otherwise we wouldn’t be an own / otherwise we wouldn’t be Austrians, would we? we just wouldn’t all be one people, would we?” (quoted by De Cillia et al 162)

“there are really bas.. / these basic – umm mentalities and because of the different ways of life I mean this is because – umm simply because probably the southerner – because of the heat down there is used to during the day – umm taking a siesta and lying around and he really only livens up in the evening. right? of course those are differences that: -- automatically lead to conflict in our country.” (quoted by De Cillia et al 162)
These accounts of ‘the Austrian character’ seem an attempt to create a unique Austrian identity through certain statements. Through a selective account of historical occurrences, on a par with linguistic strategies such as the use of the words ‘we’ and ‘our’, specific connotations of possession, identity and difference are raised. The authors even notice that there is also a historically expanded version of ‘we’, for example when one of the interviewed describes “the wars ‘we’ have lost” (quoted by De Cillia et al 164). ‘We’ then refers to an interest group, which is in this case the Austrians. When in one of the discussions the authors pinpointed some frictions between the local and the national, one participant from Carinthia, who belonged to an ethnic minority in Austria, even managed to evoke a feeling of unity by distinguishing Austria as a whole from the larger entity of Germany. Finally, the authors conclude that the construction of concepts like nation, national or unity is very dependent on the context the discussion takes place in. The context obviously encompasses the political territory or community as such under discussion, but also includes potential economic, political and social interests of the community, which can be furthered in discourse. (De Cillia et al 158-168)

3.4 Classifying cosmopolitanism as a social construction, reality and individual principle

The example of the social construction of identity in the previous section illustrates how language influences discourse, how categories and identities are often a selective social construction and how various individuals and groups in Austria as well as other European nations attempt to construct a national identity on the basis of the illusion of destiny. As I explained in the first chapter, this approach to identity is based on a non-rational idea of specifically selected history and an essentialized image of a unique people. In Amartya Sen’s theory of cosmopolitanism, which I described in section 1.5.2, he implied that this approach to identity is impossible to unite with a cosmopolitan identification. (3-6) However, earlier in this chapter I demonstrated various cosmopolitan elements in European culture. The possible problematic combination of the illusion of destiny with cosmopolitanism will, along with various approaches to cosmopolitanism, be explored further in this chapter.

According to many authors discussed in this thesis, the establishment of a nationalistic or even xenophobic identity in European nations is often a reaction to developments concerning globalization and the rise of the cosmopolitan space (for instance Bauman “LT” 4-8; Beck 54-57, 117-119; Davidson et al 171-182). Moreover, some of these authors emphasize the need for a
cosmopolitan identity for this group of people, for various reasons. Beck argues that the cosmopolitan identity should be real because the cosmopolitan space, which accounts for the overlapping and intermingling of local, national and global elements, is a fact. The cosmopolitan identity will hence enable people to understand the world as it is and therefore better deal with current affairs as well as daily life. (86) Davidson, Poor and Williams state in their article *Stratification and Global Elite Theory: A Cross-Cultural and Longitudinal Analysis of Public Opinion* that people working on the bottom of the labor market, such as industrial workers, *should* encompass a cosmopolitan identity to have the ‘right’ worldview. (171-182) Finally, Sen makes an ideological cosmopolitan argument for a peaceful world with humans who respect each other’s equality because of their cosmopolitan identity and rationality. (16-17)

However, all of these authors either come from, or are profoundly influenced by, Western academic tradition. Even though they attempt to reflect on society, they are always connected with it, as Delanty and Rumford stated in their outline of social constructivism. In my view, their arguments in favor of the cosmopolitan outlook seem sound, but not neutral. From their Western as well as academic perspective the deliberate possession of a cosmopolitan identity makes sense. They are either raised or influenced by a tradition of cosmopolitan philosophy, a global outlook and perhaps universal principles. However, for a very large amount of the world’s population this is not the case, which was demonstrated in the case studies. Environmental organizations in Asia, Eastern Europe or Latin America generally choose to focus on regional, national or local ecological concerns. Immigrant workers operating on the bottom of London’s labor market act on the basis of nationally and locally constructed narratives. Their motivations are personal enrichment, growth and development. For young Somali refugees living in Great Britain, being a Muslim might be the most logical as well as accessible identification available.

The reason why these people do not choose to encompass a cosmopolitan identity, is in my opinion because the context they are situated in does not direct them towards a cosmopolitan identity at all. Moreover, I do not support the authors’ claim that the majority of the world’s population would be better off encompassing a cosmopolitan identity. The non-cosmopolitan identity from London’s immigrant workers as well as Somali refugees, amongst many others, is in my view much more *suiting* in relation to the *circumstances* they inhabit. Therefore, in many cases, it might not make much sense for them to encompass a cosmopolitan identity. Through contact with cosmopolitan discourse and self reflection, encompassing a cosmopolitan identity could potentially be an option for them, but the chances that they will are small. Since many Western people are raised in a discourse which is partly composed of cosmopolitan elements, the academic tradition they are educated in is cosmopolitan, and the area of Europe is a space where the cosmopolitan
space is generally quite present, it might be easier as well as more suitable for them to encompass such an identity.

Moreover, various authors I studied imply that identity construction through the illusion of destiny does not work well towards a potential cosmopolitan identity. However, in my opinion, it does not necessarily neglect the possibility of having a cosmopolitan point of view. In The Cosmopolitan Outlook, Beck distinguished between emancipatory and despotic cosmopolitanism. Emancipatory cosmopolitanism is then characterized as ideological cosmopolitanism, with a stress on norm formation and freedom. This can be done by for example foreign aid or religious organizations. In contrast, despotic cosmopolitanism is an ideal which can potentially, at its worst, have racist or fascist implications. Despotic cosmopolitanism is regularly motivated by the illusion of destiny, perhaps as a counter reaction to globalization. It is often practiced by right wing political groups. (45) Also the Nazi regime is a very extreme example of despotic cosmopolitanism with its emphasis on purity, domination and inner will. (Buruma and Margalit 92)

In my opinion, the line between emancipatory cosmopolitanism and despotic cosmopolitanism can however be very thin. Obviously, there is a big difference between foreign aid and Holocaust crimes, where the latter is rightly signified as one of the most horrible occurrences in history, but these are both extremes. For example the idea of universal human rights, which Howe criticized earlier in this chapter, is in my opinion a lot harder to classify. Because, would it be ethical to give humans more freedom on a par with changing their cultural and religious beliefs, such as action against headscarves? Would they even value it as freedom? It is hard to judge such cultural practices. But when the same debate is raised on more harsh cultural habits, such as women’s circumcision, reactions to the idea of universal rights on that matter will perhaps differ as well. Most probably the NGO and governmental workers engaged in this matter act on the basis of goodwill and altruism. It is very hard, if not impossible to judge such quandaries. Therefore, I do not think I should even make an attempt judging the morality of people’s culturally, and perhaps passively, acquired cosmopolitan outlook. However, I would like to argue that the cosmopolitan outlook is distinctively Western since the social construction of European culture is partly done through cosmopolitanism. Beck strikingly illustrates this point by stating that,

“Cosmopolitan Europe expresses a genuinely European self-contradiction in a moral, legal and political sense. If the traditions from which colonialist, nationalist and genocidal horror originate are European, then so are the evaluative standards and legal categories in terms of which these acts are proclaimed as crimes against humanity before a global public.” (Beck 170)

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6 Which ought not to be confused with the cosmopolitan identity.
This quote greatly exemplifies my assumption that the general cosmopolitan outlook is an ambiguous European narrative, created on the basis of various interests. The cosmopolitan outlook is firstly relevant in periods of colonialism, global religious influence such as crusades or the imposition of trade arrangements. Or, in other words, to legitimate, justify, alter or further certain political, economic or social situations, as is the case with many narratives. Secondly, the cosmopolitan outlook is a way of establishing unity amongst European people. Because Europe, and also the European Union, is composed of such an enormous variety of nations, people and cultures, the creation of a cosmopolitan identity seems a very suitable means of constructing harmony.

Apparently, through the ages, the concept of cosmopolitanism served very well to further particular interests in Europe, as well as to build an overarching identification. Even though Delanty and Rumford in section 3.1.1 diplomatically argued that contemporary Europe is cosmopolitan through its respect for difference, in my view European identity might more likely be based on the construction of a more contested as well as culturally rooted version of cosmopolitanism. Obviously, this attitude can be represented through the elements of respect and difference in the example of human rights demonstrations the authors gave, but the foundation of this mindset is then still a contradictory social construction. A feeling of religious as well as moral superiority and racism unfortunately is a representation of the exact same outlook. Therefore, it seems as if Delanty and Rumford gave a selective outline of European cosmopolitanism.

Nevertheless, people raised in a Western environment often seem to have a cosmopolitan outlook. But this does not need to be deliberately. It can also be mediated through for example religious, social, economic or political motives. However, there is a relation between the outlook and a cosmopolitan identity. In section 3.2 it was demonstrated how much influence the social context has on a person’s primary identifications. Many people who live in Europe, are raised in the cosmopolitan tradition and hence might be directed towards encompassing an actual cosmopolitan identity. Yet, of course not everybody in the West will have the same amount of cosmopolitanism in her earliest ‘context’.

People in societies which are not close to Western culture may have no advantage at all encompassing a cosmopolitan identity. But what would then be the value of a cosmopolitan identity if it is exclusive and local? Does it even matter? In my opinion it does, to people who are situated and supposed to function in a cosmopolitan context. Consequently, they can engage in the discourse of cosmopolitanism and make use of the cosmopolitan space. To others, moving in different contexts, it probably matters less, or not at all. Even though various authors in the beginning of this section suggested that people in general are in need of a cosmopolitan point of view, I believe that the cosmopolitan worldview does not show the ‘appropriate world’ to everybody. People in different circumstances probably require an other construction of reality and perhaps a different approach to
identity than the Western view. Because, why would immigrant workers in London need a cosmopolitan identity when they are looking for a way to make their local family proud? Or how could a Somali refugee benefit from a cosmopolitan identity if other people keep telling her how ‘different’ she is from the autochthonous population?

This statement solves the ontological difficulties about cosmopolitanism versus the community, raised in the end of section 3.2. It also makes clear that Western culture is just one particular context. This greatly contrasts the idea of Western nations forming one advanced civilization together, as was implied by various authors earlier. However, in my opinion, the realization that Western thought is not the ‘right’ worldview or ‘higher’ than other cultures, as well as recognition of the existence of other cultural contexts with different values and beliefs, is what ideological cosmopolitanism is about.

Furthermore, even though I acknowledge different worldviews, I do not wish to fully restrict myself to contextual relativism. Through their reflexive nature, I believe that humans are generally able to make autonomous decisions, which is where the cosmopolitan identity becomes relevant again. Though, in some cultural contexts decisions will be carried out more likely towards ideological cosmopolitanism than in others. As defined in the first chapter, in order to encompass an actual cosmopolitan identity one needs an extra, autonomous element. To encompass this is a deliberate personal decision to act in an ideological cosmopolitan way, besides only thinking in terms of the cosmopolitan. Or, in other words, it might involve a general cosmopolitan outlook, but should necessarily entail a deliberate positive attitude towards cosmopolitanism. This means that a person with a cosmopolitan identity values ‘others’ for them being part of humanity or ecology as a whole, instead of restricting her scope of affinity to the borders of her nation state. The true cosmopolitan identity can, in my opinion, be found in the activities of somebody working for a human rights organization in a developing country, in Amartya Sen’s philosophy, in a Greenpeace activist’s desire to stop global warming or in an exchange student’s intense will to travel and explore what the earth has to offer. Even if that person’s other activities are oriented towards the local or revolve around personal interests, as long as they do not work against elements in the cosmopolitan space, she still has a cosmopolitan identity. For clarity, I follow Beck in his emphasis on a coherent identity (4-5).

This means that one’s cosmopolitan identity ought to be inclusive, and that the non-cosmopolitan elements should not interfere with the cosmopolitan ideal. It could finally be that ideological cosmopolitan motives are influenced by cultural narratives, but not necessarily.

Hence, growing up in a cosmopolitan personal as well as academic context, such as many parts of Europe, along with making a deliberate decision to act motivated by ideological cosmopolitanism, establishes a cosmopolitan identity. However, not everybody growing up in a context inspired by cosmopolitanism encompasses a cosmopolitan identity. Also, not everybody who
embodies a cosmopolitan identity, grew up in a Western context. For example, Amartya Sen demonstrates that in historical India in the third century B.C., there used to be an emperor called Ashoka, who was famous for his religious as well as general appreciation of tolerance. Furthermore, while another past Indian emperor, the Great Mughal Akbar, stated that anyone should be allowed to practice the religion of his choice in his territory, the Inquisitions in Europe, distinguished for their intolerance as well as exclusion, were still in full swing. (49-50) These short examples hint towards deliberate cosmopolitanism without a socially constructed Western cosmopolitan outlook. They also seem to partly diminish the Western exclusivity of ideological cosmopolitanism in history, which was assumed through the first chapter of this thesis. Furthermore, the arbitrary connection between the ancient Greeks and Europe, which was signaled as an example of social constructivism, makes the ‘European monopoly’ on ideological cosmopolitanism, starting with the Cynic Diogenes, even less credible. Therefore, I would like to conclude this chapter with the statement that the Western cosmopolitan outlook is a specific as well as local variation of cosmopolitanism. Even though there is a clear link between the cosmopolitan outlook and identity, they must not be confused, and the particular cosmopolitan outlook should in my opinion not be equated to an inclusive cosmopolitan identity as such.
Conclusion

In the introduction of this thesis I displayed a view on the cosmopolitan identity which I find characteristic of the current debate on general European culture as well as the perceived identity of individual Europeans. By the Dutch member of parliament Geert Wilders, the political scientist Samuel Huntington and a journalist of the newspaper NRC Handelsblad, the notion of cosmopolitanism was seen as an important element of European culture. However, they established this concept at the expense of Islamic culture, portrayed European culture as unique as well as singular, and stressed the incompatibility of cosmopolitan culture and Islam. In my opinion, these authors did not give a true account of cosmopolitanism, but selectively highlighted a cultural myth through a specific construction of discourse. With this account, the cosmopolitan identity as such is however not manifested in my opinion. Instead, it seems as if a particular account of cosmopolitanism is ‘used’ by the authors to make a social and political argument.

The main goal of this thesis was to establish the conditions for an individual cosmopolitan identity. It is however hard to list these without identifying the diverse manifestations of cosmopolitanism. After researching the concept, it turned out that there is cosmopolitanism on the realist, collective and individual level, which all could have a potential influence on identity. In this conclusion, the various levels and their significance for individual identity are structured.

First of all, there is the cosmopolitan space, which is proven to be real in the work on descriptive cosmopolitanism of for example Bauman, Beck and Isin and Wood. In the theoretical part of this thesis as well as in various case studies, it turned out that through globalization global, national, ethnic, religious and local spheres often intermingle as well as overlap. This leads to an inclusive cosmopolitan space where various components are integrated in a selective way. However, in some contexts the cosmopolitan space will be more existent than in others. In cities such as London, New York or Shanghai which are well connected by a fast network of infrastructure, inhabited by people from a wide variety of nationalities, where food from the whole planet is served and people contact each other through digital media, the cosmopolitan as such is very present. The rise and influence of the varied cosmopolitan space, through for instance globalization and the risk society, makes it more likely for pragmatic individuals to encompass a cosmopolitan identity, as Beck argued. For example global businessmen, students going on exchanges and world travelers are very engaged with the cosmopolitan space. A reflexive consciousness of the cosmopolitan space could hence foster the development of their potential cosmopolitan identity. However, the cosmopolitan space is not a necessary condition for encompassing a cosmopolitan identity. Some people embodied a
cosmopolitan identity much earlier than the cosmopolitan space as such existed, or perhaps have an ideological cosmopolitan view on life while they live in an area far from the pressure of globalization. For example Diogenes or Kant, who identified with the whole of humanity in their own specific way, can be said to have a cosmopolitan identity even though the contemporary cosmopolitan space had no role in their lives.

Apart from the cosmopolitan space, in Western discourse the cosmopolitan point of view has been socially constructed. This outlook does not have much to do with individual choices but more with context, upbringing, education and traditions. Characteristic for the cosmopolitan viewpoint, is that people from Western society often perceive it as suiting to act on behalf of other cultures. Moreover, it is a cultural construction of portraying Western society as unique, culturally advanced, politically dominant and morally superior. To a greater or lesser degree, the cosmopolitan point of view is a cultural characteristic of many people residing in a nation with so-called ‘Western’ cultural identity. However, this will obviously greatly vary by region, nation, locality, religion and ethnicity, amongst other factors. This socially constructed cosmopolitan element also does not necessarily lead to a deliberate cosmopolitan identity. Because of its intolerant as well as authoritarian nature towards non-Western cultures, it potentially could even lead to the opposite, in my view.

The final – and, in my opinion only necessary as well as sufficient – condition for a cosmopolitan identity is a person’s deliberate drive to act upon ideological cosmopolitanism. Or, in other words, with humanity and ecology in general as an end in mind. As a consequence, in my view the true cosmopolitan will have no prejudice towards others or entail feelings of cultural superiority. Ideological cosmopolitanism is instead about appreciation of difference. This necessary condition can however be broken down in various fundamental motivations or sub-conditions. Amongst one’s motivations for action should be openness for other cultures or forms of life as well as affinity with ideological cosmopolitan actions. Therefore, it is necessary that actions are not solely carried out on the basis of motives other than ideological cosmopolitanism, such as religion or personal financial gain. Furthermore, the subject of one’s goodwill should never be restricted to the borders of one’s nation state or cultural space. All this should go on a par with a reflexive perception of one’s deeds. One’s cosmopolitan identity can be manifested in an innumerable amount of ways, such as working for an NGO, taking action to save threatened animal species or engaging in fair trade business. Moreover, even though one’s motives could possibly be influenced by a cultural or class-oriented narrative, a person’s cosmopolitan layered identity should in any case be coherent as well as inclusive.

At last, I can now conclude that a cosmopolitan identity by itself is not a particular Western or elite mode of thinking, but a universal concept which signifies a respect for differences and humanity as a whole. If the cosmopolitan identity as such is however used to distinguish Europeans
from people with non-Western culture, it automatically contradicts itself, according to me. Since the cosmopolitan identity is in almost any account associated with values such as freedom and respect for differences, it is not a concept one could possibly use to indicate the superiority or exclusivity of European culture. In using Europe's cosmopolitan identity as a special characteristic, Huntington, the NRC Handelsblad journalist and Wilders hence confused the socially constructed Western cosmopolitan outlook with the cosmopolitan identity as such. In my view this is dangerous, since such accounts amplify the perceived Western feeling of cultural, social and political superiority. Therefore, if the cosmopolitan identity were to be used as an integrating identification for the European Union, as Delanty and Rumford suggested, it is in my view important to stress the genuine open, respectful, coherent and reflexive cosmopolitan identity and thereby attempt to weaken the current emphasis on nationalism and xenophobia in relation to European culture, which is unfortunately widespread in contemporary Europe.

Finally, since they are brought up and educated in a cosmopolitan context and often are familiar with the cosmopolitan space, individuals from a Western background might be more likely to encompass a cosmopolitan identity. However, one could also see the Western cosmopolitan point of view and the cosmopolitan identity as two singular entities. Even though both elements interact, they are also easy to distinguish. On the basis of other than Western values, ideas or principles, people from different cultures could very likely deliberately encompass a cosmopolitan identity as well. I hinted towards this possibility in the end of the final chapter, but due to the limited scope of this thesis, these indications of cosmopolitanism could not be explored further. However, knowledge about non-Western cosmopolitanism could possibly give great insights about different kinds of cosmopolitanism as well as the relation between cosmopolitanism and concepts such as rationality, religion and personal interest. It could also shed light on the potential local element of cosmopolitanism as developed in this thesis. Therefore, my suggestion for further research would be the manifestation of cosmopolitanism in non-Western cultures.
Bibliography


