The Nuclear Triangle: Tehran, Washington and Brussels

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INTRODUCTION

“There will be no peace in the world, if the international community falters in the face of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Iran is entitled the power for civilian purposes, but if we allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons we incur an unacceptable risk to the stability of the region and the stability of the world”\(^1\) stated the French President, Nicholas Sarkozy in his UN General Assembly speech in 2007. However, on the same occasion, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad who took the podium after Sarkozy, defended his country’s nuclear program and claimed that it was intended for peaceful purposes. Consequently, in a world where many countries such as Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea reject being party to the NPT and many more possess nuclear weapons, thereby creating a nuclear competition arena, this “peaceful purposes” answer could neither satisfy nor persuade anybody. By saying this, Ahmedinejad clearly indicated Iran’s insistence on advancing its nuclear program and challenged world opinion. What is more, besides nuclear armament, the country also focused on uranium enrichment activities and undertook efforts to produce plutonium and thus violated the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IEAE) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Throughout the 1990’s, blocking Russian assistance to Iran’s nuclear activities was the main target of the U.S. However, this issue was not a high priority for Europeans until the locations of two secret nuclear facilities including a large, underground uranium-enrichment plant near the town of Natanz\(^2\) were disclosed by an Iranian opposition group. In order to justify its action, Iran claimed that under the terms of the IAEA it was not required to declare facilities until six months before a nuclear weapon was introduced and that the facilities at Natanz were buried underground both because of the fear of an attack as well as for commercial and military security reasons. The fact that in 2003 the IAEA found out that Iran was engaged in activities involving Centrifuge and polonium, which is a material used in nuclear explosions, has made the Iranian threat more visible to Europeans too.\(^3\)

Consequently, both the U.S. and the EU, especially the EU3; Great Britain, France and Germany agree that Iran must be deterred. Due to security concerns, it is in the best interest of the EU and the U.S. to have stability in the Middle East. Furthermore, because of the posture of the EU and the U.S. as great powers on the world stage, their policies towards Iran have great significance in solving this conflict. Accordingly, the stance taken in the American National Security Strategy of March 2006 “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran”⁴ clearly reinforces this. Also, it was declared in the European Security Strategy Paper (ESS) of December 2003 that the EU considers WMD “…as the greatest threat to its security”⁵. Thus, Iran constitutes one of the biggest challenges to both the EU and the U.S.

The parties involved have tried to deal with this international problem in many ways. However, the aim should be to solve this conflict permanently, because Iran’s nuclear armament has many other drawbacks. First of all, the majority of experts claim that Iran wants to acquire these weapons for national prestige and regional leadership. This idea has also been supported by Jeffrey S. Lantis, as he says “Iran seeks a nuclear capability as a symbol of national pride, as well as a way to deter the United States, gain influence in the Middle East region and achieve status and power internationally”⁶. However, there is always the possibility of Iran using these weapons for reasons other than stated above. Primarily, Fitzpatrick claims that “any expansion of nuclear weapons increases the danger of use, even through accident or unintentional escalation”⁷. Secondly, as it has been stated in the U.S. 2002 State Department Report on international terrorism, “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2002”⁸. Also, many politicians both in the U.S. and in the EU draw attention to Iran’s close relations with terrorist organizations. For instance, in March 2006, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, “Iran has been the country that has in many ways been a kind of central banker for terrorism in important regions like Lebanon through Hezbollah, in the Middle East, in the Palestinian Territories, and we have deep concerns about what Iran is doing in the south of Iraq”⁹. Parallel to these, a worst-case scenario might be as such: terrorists may acquire those weapons. Thirdly,

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⁵ European Security Strategy Paper, P:3
⁷ Fitzpatrick 17.
there is always the risk of other countries in the neighborhood feeling threatened and hence, themselves acquiring nuclear weapons. Thus, according to Delpech, threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb can provoke an arms race and this can induce countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to seek nuclear weapons.\footnote{Delpech Teresa, Iran and the Bomb: The Abdication of International Responsibility, London: C. Hurst & Company 2007, p.148.} The Middle East is a bleeding wound in the heart of the world and any chaotic situation taking place in the area can easily spread to other parts of the world. If Iran cannot be stopped, it would be disastrous for the stability of the Middle East and for the future of the non-proliferation program. Therefore, any plan and policy concerning Iran necessitates great attention and well-calculated steps. However, as Shahram Chubin, nonresident senior associate of the non-proliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, points out “Attempts since 2002 to roll back or at least slow Iran’s nuclear ambitions have proven fruitless…”\footnote{Chubin Shahram, “The Iranian Nuclear Riddle after June 12”, The Washington Quarterly, 31:3, January 2010, p.163.} Neither threats of punishment nor sanctions by the UN or the U.S. have been able to dissuade Iran and thus, the need for a strong consensus to force Iran to choose either the international community or nuclear weapons has emerged.

Under these circumstances, one would expect the U.S. and the EU to develop a common strategy and cooperate to take necessary actions against Iran. However, there has been much debate recently regarding the effectiveness of their policies because of diverging methods. Despite exposure to the same threat, their styles of dealing with this problem have not been compatible. After the Cold War, the long-standing western solidarity diminished. While the EU started developing a common foreign policy under the umbrella of the European Union, the U.S. went its own traditional way and consequently at the present there seems to be a clash of methods and ideas between these powers when dealing with international problems. Thus, this paper will investigate the differences in negotiating styles and foreign policies between the EU and the U.S. regarding the subject of Iran’s WMD and ask the question: \textit{To what extent do the diverging strategic cultures of Europeans and the U.S. account for the different foreign and security policies regarding Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction between the years 2002 and 2008?} This is of great importance, since the EU and the U.S. have critical roles in framing the choice for Iran whether to be “...a pariah with nuclear weapons or a respected, fully integrated member of the international community without them”\footnote{Einhorn 28.}
Although a WMD threat requires the cooperation of both parties, the EU and the U.S. provide different answers to the same problem. “They agree on little and understand one another less and less.”\textsuperscript{13} It is commonly believed that Europeans favor international law, cosmopolitanism and liberal-democratic order and prefer carrots to sticks policy as opposed to the U.S., which prefers a coercive foreign policy. Likewise, Einhorn claims “European sticks have usually taken the form of deterred carrots, such as the EU’s postponement of further talks with Iran on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement until the nuclear issue is resolved...”\textsuperscript{14} whereas, “…the U.S. threat of more sticks includes a military option”\textsuperscript{15}. This situation is also stressed by Robert Kagan in his famous article, “Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus”, in which he highlights the EU’s position as a soft power and that of the U.S. as a hard power. Joseph Nye defines soft power as “getting others to want the outcomes you want through cooperation rather than coercion.”\textsuperscript{16} Its legitimacy lies in the ability to attract through culture, values and ideas and persuade through peaceful means such as diplomacy. Correspondingly, in the EU’s case, the success of persuasion and attraction rests on the EU’s ability to apply its norms in the majority of its agreements with other countries. On the other hand, the U.S. which is claimed to be a hard power prefers sanctions and coercion. Considering its massive defense budget, military muscle and tendency to support unilateralism, Kagan, describes the U.S. as a country which “...remains mired in history exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where the security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and the use of military might.”\textsuperscript{17} Accordingly, owing to their sensitivity about insecurity, being a hard power seems to be inevitable for the US.

These different reputations or identities of the EU and the U.S. do not exist in a vacuum. They have their roots in different cultures, geography, unique experiences and capabilities. Consequently, as a first step this paper will identify and elaborate on these differences with the help of Jack Snyder’s theory of “strategic culture” and apply them to the Iran case. The term was coined by Jack Snyder in his article “Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations”, dated 1977. The term will be helpful in explaining the disagreement between the

\textsuperscript{13} Kagan Robert, “Power and Weakness,” Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus, Policy Review, No. 113, June 2002, p:1
\textsuperscript{14} Einhorn 29.
\textsuperscript{15}Einhorn 29.
\textsuperscript{16} Kagan
\textsuperscript{17} Kagan,1
U.S. and the EU over nuclear armament. Strategic Culture, he defines, “…is the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other”\(^\text{18}\). Accordingly, as Snyder states, norms, history, capabilities, geopolitics and values play vital roles in shaping strategic culture. Therefore, it seems to correspond to the Iran problem well because in this case we again see clashing cultures.

Einhorn states that due to unique experiences, differences have emerged between the U.S. and Europe and unless they close the gaps and forge a common strategy, prospects for satisfactorily resolving the Iran issue will be dim.\(^\text{19}\) The fact remains that no state is culture-free and thus, it is culture that forms their perceptions and influences their behaviors. Their doctrines “…have developed in different organizational, historical and political contexts and in response to different situational and technological constraints”\(^\text{20}\). Therefore, through strategic culture, it can be possible to develop an explanation for the opposing policies of the EU and the U.S.

The differences between the U.S. and the EU seem to be causing deep divisions over Iran. Einhorn explicitly distinguishes their roles regarding Iran, as good cop and bad cop. The U.S., also known as the bad cop, besides having had tense relations with Iran since the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979, tries to deter Iran through sanctions and repression such as blocking WTO’s funds to Iran, imposing bans on U.S. trade and investment in Iran or sanctions on foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector.\(^\text{21}\) Economic sanctions, in particular, have become a major part of U.S. policy towards Iran. Consequently, they have never experienced normalized relations. On the other hand, the EU, known as the good cop, has recently established strong trade relations with Iran and it tries to dissuade Iran usually by postponement of further trade talks and cooperation agreements or by giving signals of taking away future gains.\(^\text{22}\) Moreover, the EU-3 which refers to Britain, France and Germany, has represented the EU in talks with Iran since 2004 and it functions as a major interlocutor in negotiations with Iran regarding the issue of peaceful nuclear-research activities. The EU-3 tries to persuade Iran to accept nuclear

\(^{19}\) Einhorn 21.
\(^{20}\) Snyder. 3.
\(^{22}\) Einhorn 21.
material from abroad and thus, give up its fuel-cycle infrastructure.23 As Anna Lagenbach states “…the EU-3 strategy is to offer Iran economic incentives in turn for “objective assurances” of the peaceful nature of the Iranian Nuclear Program”24. Thus, although the EU-U.S. puzzle has been taken up, there are still many questions which remain unanswered in this nexus and this paper aims to analyze them. In this regard, it is of paramount importance to understand the EU and U.S. policies which lie at the root of their course of action.

In addition, the period between the years 2002-2008, has especially been chosen because both the U.S. and the EU experienced historical turning points at the time. In the U.S. case, not only the Bush administration’s relatively aggressive stance but also events such as 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq had significant impacts on shaping U.S. relations with other countries. Apart from deteriorating relations with Iran, during this time period, the U.S. experienced tense relations with Europeans as well. In the meanwhile, the U.S. earned its reputation as being a hard power. On the other hand, during the same period, the EU not only started to accelerate its enlargement process, but also undertook significant efforts for the improvement of a common foreign policy. By extending its borders, the EU widened its scope of leverage. Thus, this process also referred to as European integration, became one of the most important priorities of the Union because by integrating countries and consolidating the Union’s values, the EU was able to influence member states without the use of coercive measures. This is often cited as the clearest illustration of soft power. Especially, the accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 enabled the Union to enlarge its security zone and in a way the EU was compelled to strengthen its foreign and security policy. As a result, they put a lot of effort into the establishment of the European Security and Defense policy and furthermore, the European Security Strategy document was drawn up to identify and address threats to the security of the Union and clarify the objectives in dealing with them. Thus, “the ESS is a milestone in the way to strategically defining the role and the tasks of the EU in a radically changed security environment and in the face of globalization”25.

To sum up, this paper will assess the effects of diverging strategic cultures on shaping cooperation and conflict between the EU and the U.S.. Accordingly, it will focus on the relationship between them as regards Iran. In order to reach an accurate conclusion, this paper has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter will elaborate on and discuss the methodology and the theoretical framework of Jack Snyder. Also, this chapter will examine the significance of strategic culture in shaping states’ behaviors. In the second chapter, an overview of Iran and its nuclear activities will be given. Chapter three will develop an analysis of the U.S.’s strategic culture and discuss the nature of the strategic culture of the EU. Chapter Four will evaluate the attitudes of the US and the EU toward nuclear enriched Iran. This chapter will specifically examine the role of the EU-3 and Javier Solana as regards WMD and provide an explanation of how the U.S.’s strategic culture affected its coercive policy towards Iran especially in the second Bush period. Finally in Chapter Five, the U.S. and the EU will be compared in the light of the factors defined by Snyder and to what extent their differences have affected common principles and shaped relations with Iran since 2002 will be analyzed. Finally, at the end of the paper, the conclusions of each chapter will be summarized and an answer will be provided for the main question.

**CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY**

Jack L. Snyder\(^{26}\) developed a theory to explain the influence of identities and culture in forming countries’ foreign and security policies and named it strategic culture. The term was coined in 1977 by Snyder and as it has been stated earlier, he defines it as “... the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy”\(^{27}\). Today, strategic culture has become a wide-spread foreign policy term because of the fact that it has clarified major conflicts in history; namely during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. and developed a better explanation for their cause. Thus, success of “strategic culture” in solving conflicts with the help of states’ identities, has inspired many writers and guided many other projects on conflict studies.

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\(^{26}\)Jack L. Snyder is a Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department at Columbia University.

\(^{27}\)Snyder 8.
The concept of “strategic culture” refers to the antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In order to diminish the possibility of uncontrolled escalation, the U.S. came up with a new flexibility plan which included “...limited nuclear options as a supplement to the comparatively massive options that had previously existed”\(^{28}\). However, the fact that the Soviet Union did not agree with this plan, forced Snyder to examine the reasons why it was rejected. Whereas, the U.S. proposed this plan as a way of easing the tension, the Soviet Union perceived it as another source of conflict. As Snyder rightly commented, “...differences between Soviet and American statements on deterrence, escalation and limited war reflect real differences in strategic thinking and bespeak the development of separate and distinct strategic cultures in the two countries”\(^{29}\). Briefly, their nuclear doctrines were outcomes of different organizational, historical and political context. Hence, the U.S. failed to take these differences into account and could not predict the Soviet Union’s reaction.

Accordingly, there is an increasing recognition among writers that understanding strategic culture is vital for nations to implement and safeguard security policies. As Lantis claims, “Strategic culture is characterized as a discrete force that shapes the security policy decision-making environment.”\(^{30}\) Thus, strategic culture not only enables countries to assess their enemies and address the threats but also to combat proliferation of WMD by exposing the underlying causes of acquiring them. Kerry Kartchner, a U.S. State Department official, supports this and states “...strategic culture offers the promise of providing insight into motivations and intentions that are not readily explained by other frameworks, and that may help make sense of forces we might otherwise overlook, misunderstand, or misinterpret”\(^{31}\). Furthermore, given the fact that Snyder is the inventor of the term and seeks to clarify the connection between strategic culture and strategic behavior, it will be interesting to test his theory. In addition, “…Snyder’s innovative work on Soviet Nuclear Strategy drew analytical attention to the link between political and military culture”\(^{32}\) and inspired many other writers by setting a precedent for further progress in the area. Thus, academic researches on strategic culture have made substantial progress.\(^{33}\)

\(^{28}\) Snyder, 1.
\(^{29}\) Snyder 22.
\(^{30}\) Lantis 469
\(^{32}\) Lantis 468.
\(^{33}\) Lantis 468.
However, given the fact that there are three generations of writers working on strategic culture, there seems to be disagreement on the literal meaning of the term. As the inventor of the term, Jack Snyder is a prominent writer of the first generation and as Gray portrays, for these writers, “...strategic culture matters deeply for modern strategy, because the culture of the strategic players and organizations influences strategic behavior”\textsuperscript{34}. Influenced by Snyder’s work, writers such as Colin Gray and David Jones followed his line of thought and reached similar conclusions. Thus, the main differences between the first generation and the other two, are that firstly they “…sought to expose the dangers of thinking about strategy only in technical and rational approaches and urged a greater acceptance of the importance of cultural and strategic relativism”\textsuperscript{35} and secondly and more importantly, they linked culture with behavior. As Stuart Poore notes, previously culture was viewed as a secondary explanation for strategic behavior but “… the first generation of research sought to include it as a primary explanation for differences in national nuclear strategy.”\textsuperscript{36}

Second generation literature, as opposed to the first generation “…begins from the premise that there is potentially a vast difference between what leaders think their rhetorical pronouncements say and mean and the deeper motives for doing what they in fact do.”\textsuperscript{37} For instance, Bradley Klein, one of the second generation writers influenced by the Gramscian concept of hegemony, applied the concept of hegemony in the context of international relations and came to the conclusion that “… the focus of attention ought not to be limited to the study of a state’s military capabilities and foreign policy bureaucracy but should be expanded to include social struggles within states.”\textsuperscript{38} As for the third generation writers, they took the podium in the mid 1990’s. The third generation writers tend to “…attack realist theories and focus on cases where structural definitions of interests cannot explain particular strategic decisions.”\textsuperscript{39} Thus, they exclude behavior as an element of strategic culture and “…tend to look at recent practice

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{34} Gray S. Colin; Strategic Culture as context: the First Generation of the Theory Strikes Back, Review of International Studies,1999, p: 56.
\item\textsuperscript{35} Uz Zaman Rashed “Strategic culture: A “Cultural” Understanding of War, Comparative Strategy, 28:1, 2009, p.76.
\item\textsuperscript{37} Uz Zaman, 77.
\item\textsuperscript{38} Ibid 134-135.
\item\textsuperscript{39} Uz Zaman, 79.
\end{itemize}
and experience as sources of cultural values.” In sum, each generation has a different focus and thus, tries to correct each other.

As mentioned above, there are authors who do not necessarily agree with Snyder. In this regard, it is especially useful to look at their claims. Gray notes the different points of view between the first and third generation writers as “… what comprises the proper domain of culture possibly, though less certainly, over how culture may shape impulses to act.” Correspondingly, a third generation writer, Alastair Iain Johnston, defends the idea that there is “…an exceedingly difficult causal connection to show empirically” between behaviors and culture. Furthermore, in his book “Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History” Johnston insists on the separation of ideas from behavior.

However, Snyder has especially been chosen in this paper, because as the founder of the theory, his analysis of strategic culture carries great importance for academic research. What is striking about Snyder is that, contrary to neorealism, he does not see states as black boxes but accepts the key determining role of culture and argues that culture specific attributes are important factors in the formation of a state’s strategy. He also gives considerable importance to causality while evaluating disagreements. Thus, culture is a broad term as we will shortly see and the fact that in causal relations he takes culture as a basis, strengthens his analysis. Thus, what he does in his article is to analyze disagreements among countries with the help of causal relationships he creates among the states’ behaviors and strategic cultures. Straightforwardly, through culture, identities and their reverberation on states’ behaviors, he makes it possible to understand the causes of conflicts. Thus, by doing so, he is supported by constructivism and behaviorism and this makes his argument more understandable in the eyes of readers.

So, based on the above argument, because strategic culture also deals with norms, culture and identity, it can be claimed it is related to constructivism. Correspondingly, it is of paramount importance to consider that constructivism acknowledges the importance of “inter-subjective structures that give the material world meaning” including norms, culture, identity and ideas on state behavior or on international relations more generally.” It is seen that they also support Snyder’s assumption by indicating the link between identity and behavior. Since

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40 Johnston, 19.
41 Gray 50.
42 Johnston Iain Alastair, preface.
“...constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures”\textsuperscript{44}, having strong ties with constructivism enables strategic culture to put emphasis on the historical, social and normative dimension of the debate. Therefore, what Snyder does can be described as forcing material elements such as war, weapons and deterrence into a constructivist framework and providing them with explanations derived from values, beliefs, norms and history. On the other hand, it can be understood that Snyder is not interested so much in the constitutive dimension of constructivism because he mainly focuses on causality. Specifically, he looks for the relationship between the cause and the effect, which shows that he is an implicit constructivist.

This cause and effect relationship also reveals the differentiated characteristics of states and their reverberation on states’ behaviors. Accordingly, every nation has typical characteristics that affect their policy formations and relations with other countries. Thus, collective identity shapes the content of states’ interests and, in turn, actions of states and formation of these identities are directly related to strategic culture.\textsuperscript{45} At the core of every state or community lies a range of shared values and beliefs relating to the use of force, which is derived from collective culture. However, the strategic culture basis of conflict among countries has always been very complicated, because states’ strategic cultures do not emerge suddenly in a vacuum. Within this context, as Snyder states, the importance of four factors; history, geography, values and capabilities in determining strategic culture cannot be overlooked. According to many writers such as Gray and Zaman, these preliminary factors form the basis of being a state and are believed to be “... what bind people together”\textsuperscript{46}. In this regard, it is especially useful to have a closer look at these factors.

First of all, Snyder claims that history is one of the most important factors that motivated the U.S. to make this flexibility plan. Historical experiences, defeats, sufferings and success stories all played a significant role in shaping the plan. On the one hand, Snyder’s views that “American thinking has been conditioned by historically unique circumstances; namely, two past factors- the Korean and Vietnamese wars and NATO’s “first-use” dilemma”\textsuperscript{47}, but on the other

\textsuperscript{44} Smit Reus Christian, Constructivism, Theories of International Relations, p:212.
\textsuperscript{45} Smit 221.
\textsuperscript{46} Banchoff 268.
\textsuperscript{47} Snyder 7.
hand, the rude experience of Russian history; their “…distrust of cooperative strategies of intra-war deterrence and their preference for strategic self-reliance”\textsuperscript{48} can be accepted as effective historical factors that shaped the Cold War strategies of the two countries. In sum, these examples help to explain why history matters. In addition, Snyder highlights the constraining and permissive effects of history. Historical experiences and shared circumstances are not only very important tools for the identity construction of nations, but also quite effective guides for policy formation. While indirectly educating politicians and charting a course for states, history acts as a mentor. Therefore, traces of the past also form states’ futures and perceptions of states’ leaders. Robert G. Herman, who did research on the Russian New thinking ideology to analyze the policy change in the country during the Gorbachev period, states” how a political leadership will respond to the strategic environment is indeterminate; it depends in part on how decision makers interpret the frequently ambiguous lessons of history”.\textsuperscript{49} Therefore, it can be deduced that “Historical lessons thus have to be seen as establishing a latent propensity in the majority of observers, a propensity that may or may not achieve fruition depending on other factors that influence the observer’s judgement”\textsuperscript{50}.

The second important determinant of strategic culture is geography whose function Gray describes as “the physical characteristic of each distinctive geographical environment, notwithstanding technological change, yields noticeable distinctive strategic cultural attitudes and beliefs”\textsuperscript{51}. The scope of geography is much broader than it is actually known due to the fact that it is not only about natural resources, landscape, climate and territory. History, economy, neighbors and population are all geographical considerations. Also, as it is indicated by Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, in their article, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security”, environment affects both the behavior of actors and their contingent properties; namely identities, interests and capabilities\textsuperscript{52}.

As it is clearly seen, Snyder gives considerable importance to geography, because understanding geography is one of the first steps in developing a national security strategy because a country’s geographic situation defines its culture, traditions and the characteristics of

\textsuperscript{48} Snyder 28.
\textsuperscript{50} Snyder 29.
\textsuperscript{51} Gray
\textsuperscript{52} Jepperson L. Ronald, Katzenstein J. Peter, Wendt Alexander, Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security.
its people, friends and enemies. In addition, Hansen describes geography “...as a discipline that can clarify strategic issues and increase the chances of success in any political, economic, or military endeavor”\textsuperscript{53}. Based on this, it can be stated that politics and geography are inter-twined because geopolitics directly influences politics. Moreover, “A knowledge of environmental geography can help one to understand the potential for conflict”\textsuperscript{54}. Also, Solana touches upon the significance of geography in shaping policies and in his paper “A New Dynamism for the Barcelona Process”; he explicitly states that their target is to be constantly aware of the importance of geography.\textsuperscript{55} In sum, geography is an important component of strategic culture and therefore it should be taken into consideration while analyzing conflicts.

The third component of strategic culture is values which “act as a distinct national lens to shape perceptions of events and even channel possible societal responses”\textsuperscript{56}. They attract attention in many disciplines from psychology and sociology to political sciences and this helps to explain their impact on civilian and military preferences. Because of the fact that values include a wide range of norms such as beliefs, laws, habits and customs, their scope and intensity are very broad and thus, they have a significant role in creating national identities. Moreover, while trying to explain their effects on a nation, Kowert and Legro first focus on the influence of values on interests, then the ways values shape instrumental awareness of the relationship between interests and behavior and finally, the effects of values on identities.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, Arab, European, American and Russian identities all seem to have a great impact on strategic behavior in international politics. For instance, Francis Stewart, creator of the horizontal inequalities theory, says that people are motivated by their identity and thus, identities are major sources of action in international relations.\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, the sustained we-ness through time determines public opinion, the type of regime, institutional character, organizational strength, military capacity and even friends and foes, which proves to show values play an extensive role in world politics, shaping both cooperation and conflict\textsuperscript{59} and at the same time giving meaning to strategic behavior.

\textsuperscript{53} Hansen G. David, “The Immutable importance of Geography”, From Parameters, Spring 1997, p.57.
\textsuperscript{54} Hansen 62.
\textsuperscript{56} Lantis 472.
\textsuperscript{57} Kowert, Legro 461.
\textsuperscript{58} Stewart Frances, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: An Introduction and some Hypotheses” p.7
\textsuperscript{59} Kowert Paul and Legro Jeffery,” Norms Identities and Their Limits “, The Culture of National Security, p. 455.
The last factor of strategic culture is the significance of capabilities in determining both countries’ domestic policies and their status in the international arena. Military efficiency, a sufficient budget, and natural resources are major elements of capabilities and they are significant in enabling a country to assess its capacity. It is the trust in their capabilities that strengthen countries’ identity and position in relation to other countries. As Snyder states, “the Soviet strategic culture began to take form during a time when strategic inferiority and the uncertain outcome of internal budgetary politics made the possibility of America achieving a war-winning capability a live issue”\(^{60}\). He goes on to emphasize that “…a fund of strategic concept was developed that focused on war-fighting capability”\(^{61}\). Kagan also supports Snyder’s claim which accepts America’s superiority as a result of its wealth, by saying that America’s strength relative to the rest of the world, its sizable military arsenal and enormous defense budget and developed economy reinforced its status as a hard power.\(^{62}\) In that sense, writers like Kagan, Cornish and Edwards agree on the fact that while abundant military resources encouraged the U.S. to exhibit coercive policies, the relative weakness of the EU compared to the U.S. in terms of capabilities impelled Europe to be a civilian power. This assertion points to the fact that adequacy encourages countries to adopt dynamic politics and to evaluate the best options in their favor whereas inferiority and vulnerability prevent countries from taking necessary steps as in the case of the Kosova crisis. Thus, NATO intervention in the Kosovo crisis, revealed that Europe had paled in its military capability and coordination compared to the United States.\(^{63}\) However, with the establishment of the ESDP, the EU proved that it had become aware of the urgency of strengthening its capability to be able to exert influence on regional security and peacekeeping tasks. With the purpose of providing a context for a better understanding of the importance of capabilities, many official military articles such as the U.S. National Security paper and the ESS will be evaluated and defense budget data will be collected and analyzed in this paper as well.

Interestingly, all the four factors related to strategic culture are interrelated so Snyder does not favor one over the other but rather highlights the significance of each one. Thus, each factor is mutually dependent because together they create the national environment which feeds strategic culture. Accordingly, people who have grown up in such environments are natural

\(^{60}\) Snyder 27.

\(^{61}\) Snyder 27.

\(^{62}\) Kagan5.

guardians of national identities. Similarly, Gray claims that leaders are the keepers of strategic cultures. Leaders’ ideas, preferences and backgrounds form a major part of states’ strategic cultures and thus, policies. A leader’s profile and capacity, as well as the strategy he adopts are so important that they have the power to impact future generations. For instance, in his article “German Identity and European Integration”, Thomas Banchoff cites the importance of Helmut Kohl as a leader for Germany; “...by trying to overcome centuries-old rivalry among Germany and France, he opened the door for a unified Germany as an EU member and now Germany is one of the most developed and prestigious countries in the Union”. This exemplifies the role of leaders in shaping strategic culture.

In the light of the above arguments, the concept of strategic culture offers a better theoretical framework for understanding the U.S.-EU tension over Iran. It provides an explanation for policy differences because it examines the whole picture by taking root factors into account. The issue of tension will be thoroughly examined within the framework of this concept. This framework regarding both the U.S. and the EU will enable the reader to focus more on the core subject and strategic cultures. In this context, their differences will be analyzed in relation to the Iran case. The Iran issue is currently a much debated subject which includes many diverging calculations and policies and it can be said that the strategic culture theory with its detailed assessments ranging from history to sociology and geography to politics offers a coherent and comprehensive perspective so as to provide an alternative explanation to this complicated issue.

As mentioned before, this paper will examine the differences in negotiating styles and foreign policies between the EU and the U.S. as regards the subject of Iran’s WMD and in doing so Jack Snyder’s theory of strategic culture will be used as a theoretical framework especially to highlight the importance of identities in shaping policies towards Iran. To be able to address this question, mainly literature research and behavioral analysis will be carried out. The factors such as geography, history, capabilities and values will be used as independent variables in this study and tested against the U.S. and the EU’s attitudes towards Iran. In order to justify their effect, newspaper articles, books and scholarly journals will be used. Primary sources such as State of the Union addresses, interviews, and briefing papers will be evaluated as well. Furthermore, since

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64 Gray 473.
65 Banchoff Thomas, “German Identity and European Integration” European Journal of International Relations 1999; 5; 259, p.273.
this paper involves a comparative study, economic and military data will be compiled from the reports of the United Nations, the U.S. Department of State and the World Fact Book. Additionally, because a comparison will take place, surveys and opinion polls will be examined and their results justified. However, before all these evaluations, priority will be given to analyzing Iran since the degree of the threat it possess on the U.S. and the EU, is a matter of the utmost importance for this paper. Therefore, in the next chapter Iran will briefly be described and the root causes of the problem will be presented.

CHAPTER 2: IRAN

Iran is considered a challenge to the U.S. and the EU and this paper will analyze the diverging policies of the two actors regarding Iran. In this sense, it is important to evaluate the degree of threat Iran poses. To reach a concrete answer this chapter asks the question “to what extent is Iran an existential threat to the U.S. and the EU?” In this chapter, the factors which motivate Iran to acquire nuclear weapons will also be evaluated. The significance of history, religion, geographic location and leader profile in shaping Iran’s choice of nuclear program will be examined as well.

Many politicians and writers agree that with its nuclear ambitions and aggressive president Iran has become a key concern for the world today. As President Bush warned the world public and stressed:

“Iran would be a dangerous threat to world peace... we got a leader in Iran who has announced that he wants to destroy Israel. So I’ve told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make nuclear weapon.”

Considering Iran’s domestic capabilities to produce enriched uranium and plutonium, former President Bush’s reaction was indeed appropriate. In 2002, a dissident group in the country disclosed Iran’s secret nuclear program to the world. The revelations showed that “…the regime had developed two top-secret nuclear sites, one in Natanz, where a huge uranium enrichment plant was being built under the guise of a desert eradication project, and the other in Arak where a

heavy-water project was hidden behind a front company, Mesbah Energy67. Since then, the possibility of a nuclear armed Iran, has put the world on alert.

Iran has been a party to the NPT since 1970 and signed an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreements in 2003. Moreover, Iran has been participating in conferences, technical committee meetings, general meetings, advisory group meetings, and training and fellowship programs under the sponsorship of the IAEA. However, Iran resumed its program regardless of the rules of the IAEA and denied its progress until there was evidence to the contrary. Even though the country defends its right to have nuclear capabilities to fuel nuclear reactors for electricity generation, it has become a pressing matter in the international arena. Eventually, many writers, such as Perry, call Iran a rogue state which sponsors terrorism and acquires WMD and WMD technologies.68

Bearing in mind Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the aggressive stance of its President who threatened the west to deploy a storm of retaliation in one of his anti-Israel rhetoric in October 200669, it is hard to believe that Iran will not pose a nuclear challenge to the world in the future. However, there is a great difference between how Iranians and the West approach this issue. Contrary to common thought, a 2007 survey conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington based organization, cited that more than 90 percent of Iranians supported the country’s right to develop nuclear weapons70. Also Kasra Naji claims that because Ahmedinejad sees the nuclear program as a national target in a fractured society, many people, even members of the opposition party agree on the country’s right to nuclear energy.71 Accordingly, this chapter will first analyze the underlying motives for this nuclear ambition. What actually drove Iran to acquire WMD? What motivated a whole nation to believe that it was their right? In this regard, sources of Iran’s motivation are a vital starting point for understanding the decisions and ambitions of the state. Thus, the critical geographic location of the country; right in the heart of the Middle East in a problematic neighborhood, ancient history full of bloody wars and revolutions, values shaped by Shia Islam and a controversial leader profile like Ahmedinejad have had a profound impact on Iran’s nuclear decision.

67 Jafarzadeh Alireza, The Iran Threat President Ahmedinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis,
69 “Move Israel to Europe, Iran leader suggests,” Reuters, Dec. 9, 2005.
History is very crucial in understanding the dynamics of Iranian politics. When one looks at Iranian history, it is impossible not to see the effects of colonialism, long wars and bloody revolutions. Struggle for independence, exploitation and western intervention form the important parts of its history and thus, are at the root of its strong nationalism and inclination toward militarism today. The country’s victimized status in the eyes of the Iranian people and politicians, has pushed it further to pursue militarism and the belief that only this ideology can protect the country has led to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Thus, “... Iran is a nationalistic state married to a sense of insecurity...” and this derived from persistent invasions and foreign interventions.

Because of their geographical proximity, Iranians faced the conquest of Arab and Mongol hordes from the seventh through the thirteenth centuries and then they experienced extensive English and Russian interference before World War I. Another foreign intervention can be traced back to 1953, when the popular Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq nationalized the country’s oil industry. Afterwards, an American led coup ousted Mossadeq and a pro-western Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was chosen as new prime minister. According to Hassan Abassi, a theoretician of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, after the coup Iranians increasingly believed that U.S. was a malevolent power and wanted to control Iran’s destiny and prevent it from achieving its prosperity. When this frustration combined with the harsh policies of Reza Pahlavi, the country experienced another bloody coup in 1979 during which independence was the consensus among the public. They wanted to follow their own path to freedom. As Elling says, “when the Islamists entered the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979 to protest U.S. support for the disposed Shah, Iran not only crossed boundaries of political conduct but also, in many senses, withdrew or was expelled from the world community.” The Khomeini led revolution established today’s Islamic Republic of Iran based upon Shia principals and replaced the secular government with a clerical regime. Because of the general belief among Iranians including Khomeini, that “everything wrong in Iran stemmed from foreign machinations and the U.S. represented an existential threat which stood in opposition to Islam”, the revolution eventually united the

72 Knepper, 455.
73 Knepper, 455.
75 Quoted in Knepper, 455.
77 Pollack Kenneth, The Persian Puzzle, p.128.
Iranians. Meanwhile, resentment against the West grew and the country adopted a non-aligned, controversial foreign policy.

Furthermore, it was the Iran-Iraq war that intensified Iran’s skepticism of insecurity and vulnerability. The unprovoked attacks by Saddam Hussein’s army on the Iranian population with chemical weapons killed an estimated 500,000 Iranians and caused such military, political, and psychological damage that it dominates not only the way Iran currently views its security, but has also shifted Iran’s war doctrine away from conventional war to pursuing similar nuclear weapons.

Another point is that, as a Persian state Iran is surrounded by non-Persian neighbors, some of whom have nuclear weapons. It has neither good relations nor any shared ties with its neighbors, which leaves the country in a “...constant state of strategic loneliness.” Furthermore, three of these countries; Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and pose potential threats to Iran’s security. As one of the leading Iranian reformists, Mastafa Tajzadeh, describes it became “...a matter of equilibrium; if I don’t have a nuclear bomb, I don’t have security.” Besides, being surrounded mostly by non-Persian Sunni powers, the country feels even more threatened because of the U.S. presence in Iraq. The presence of the U.S. in the Middle East has a profound effect on Iranian policies. Chubin states that Iran’s increased militarization is partly the result of the entry of the U.S. forces in the region and it poses a big obstacle to Iranian ambitions of regional leadership. As a matter of fact, the U.S. has recently won important victories in Iraq, has the military support of Israel and security pacts with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.”

Not to mention its overwhelming superiority of weapons and capabilities compared to those of Iran’s. As a result, as Jahangir Amuzegar states “…Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, surrounded by nuclear powers on all sides and hearing repeated threats from high-ranking American and Israeli politicians, a nuclear capability is therefore a credible deterrent and a valuable insurance policy against external threats.” To sum up, in that geographical area Iran feels squeezed on several fronts and looks for security alternatives.

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78 Perry, 10.
79 Knepper 455.
81 Quoted in Takeyh, 155.
83 Knepper, 455.
On the other hand, the most unique aspect of Iran is its adherence to Shi’ism. Knepper defines Shi’ism as “...a millenarian and minority sect of Islam that believes in the political and religious leadership of Muhammad’s bloodline and upholds the tradition of martyrdom and sacrifice.” Since the 1979 Khomeini led revolution, “...Shi’ism has provided the constitutional justification for the regime’s political decisions, religious structures, and military doctrine” and ensures the survival of Islam in the country. It arranges daily life, sets goals and defines the behavior of people and policy makers. Iranians are so deeply attached to it that Ahmedinejad affirmed his loyalty to Shia Islam by saying “Instead of implementing the ideology of development that is based on materialism and liberalism, we should pay attention to the ideology of entezar (expectation), and from this perspective we can define our domestic and foreign relations...” Thus, Shi’ism not only isolates Iran from other Arab countries because of different doctrines but also determines its relations with western countries through the lens of Koranic law. Masoud Kazemzadeh identifies the Iranian regime as “an oligarchy of Shi-ite fundamentalist clerics and fundamentalist laypersons that operate within a complex system”. While democracies privilege individuals and their rights, Sharia laws privilege the community and duties of the individuals towards it. Like in the case of Iran, “...genuinely believed worldviews and analogies become lenses through which individuals and groups perceive reality and frame problems, and regard which actions are appropriate or inappropriate”. In this regard, it can be said that the strong nationalism of Iran has its roots in Sharia laws and therefore security is a top priority concern.

In addition, as Iran’s nuclear program advances, all eyes are on Ahmedinejad, who by many writers and politicians, is believed to trigger controversy. For example, the American politician Sarah Palin states,

“The world must awake to the threat this man poses to all of us. Ahmadinejad denies that the Holocaust ever took place. He has called Israel a "stinking corpse" that is "on its way to annihilation." Such talk cannot be dismissed as the ravings of a madman — not when Iran just this summer tested long-range Shahab-3 missiles capable of striking Tel Aviv, not when the Iranian nuclear program is nearing

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85 Knepper, 452.
86 Knepper, 452.
87 Quoted in Kazemzadeh, 442.
89 Kazemzadeh, 440.
90 Kazemzadeh, 441.
completion, and not when Iran sponsors terrorists that threaten and kill innocent people around the world”91.

If his motives are to be better understood, Ahmedinejad’s background needs to be examined. Ahmedinejad was attracted to the Islamist milieu while he was an engineering student at Tehran University and it is contended by Elling that he had an active role in the U.S. embassy hostage taking in 1979.92 However, it was not until 2005 when he was elected as President that his controversial past drew attention in the global media. As Elling claims “his stirring speeches in defense of the nuclear program have since 2005 added much fuel to the already burning issue”93. Moreover, his call for relocating the Jewish people to Europe, his denial of the holocaust and his description of the U.S as the Great Satan together with his long standing support of Hezbollah and Hamas are condemned by the world and have made him a controversial president in the eyes of the western world.

Concerns that Iran is becoming more aggressive have begun to emerge after Ahmedinejad came to power. In addition, the factors described above have had a profound effect on shaping Iran’s choice of a nuclear program. As long as security issues are at stake, Iran attaches more importance to its nuclear development and so it can be said that while trying to protect itself, it poses a great challenge to the Middle East, to international politics and to world security. If this is the case, then Iran can be perceived as an existential threat to the EU and the U.S. and hence, their policies are of vital importance, in the light of their mission of promoting world stability.

CHAPTER 3: THE AMERICAN AND THE EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURES

3.1 The American Strategic Culture

As one of the world’s most powerful nations, the United States’ strategic culture has received considerable attention. Despite being the third largest country in the world, with its large and mixed population of about 309 million people94, developed economy and sizeable armed

92 Elling, 741.
93 Elling, 742.
forces, how the U.S. acts today not only affects its own citizens but also the lives of many others across the globe. Moreover, with recent incidents of the Iraqi war of 2003 and bargaining with Iran over WMD, American policy has become a much debated subject. As the criticisms increase, the importance of understanding the strategic culture of the U.S. has become more apparent. Like Theo Farell says “… Strategic culture is a powerful analytical device for understanding variation in superpower nuclear behavior”\(^95\). Therefore, this chapter will develop an analysis of the U.S.’s strategic culture by giving some typical examples of its characteristics and will specifically focus on the impacts of history, geography, capabilities and culture on U.S. policy making.

The inventor of the term, Synder, as previously mentioned, focuses on the concept of strategic culture in relation to the U.S. and the Soviet Union cases in order to highlight the deterrence problem between them. “In short, whereas the United States has tended to view limited nuclear war in Europe as means of escaping a frightening commitment to provide a strategic umbrella for Western Europe, the Soviets have understandably viewed it as functionally comparable with intercontinental strategic war.”\(^96\) So why is it understandable for the Soviet Union? What are the sources of these differing views? Snyder claims “… the strategic culture approach attempts to explain the origins and continuing vitality of attitudes and behavior that might otherwise seem to”\(^97\) and he looks at the role of identity in giving meaning to their decisions in a broader sense and says that their differences emerge from their unique histories, different geographies, capabilities and values. By identifying these factors, he goes on to say that the strategic culture approach attempts to explain the origins and continuing vitality of attitudes and behavior that might otherwise seem peculiar or adverse to observers of each country. Thus, this chapter will analyze the American identity and its reflection of the state’s behavior and in this way the role of history, geography and leader profile in shaping America’s strategic behaviors will especially be elaborated on.

As it can be understood clearly from above, American strategic culture has strong roots. As Colin Gray states in the article National Style in Strategy: The American Example, “The idea of an American national style is derivative from the idea of American strategic culture, suggesting that there is a distinctively American way in strategic matters”\(^98\). In addition, he continues by adding

\(^{95}\) Farell Theo, Strategic Culture and American Empire, Sais review, vol. XXV, no.2, Summer-Fall 2005, p.3.
\(^{96}\) Snyder 24.
\(^{97}\) Snyder, v.
that American strategic culture provides the ground on which “...strategic ideas and defense policy decisions are debated and decided”\textsuperscript{99}. Thus, its continental insularity, basically isolated position, technologically equipped powerful armed forces, unique historical circumstances such as the Vietnam and Korean wars or 9/11, variety of values such as in Gray’s words “global stability mission or nuclear taboos” and much debated leaders such as Bush, form its strategic culture and explain why the U.S. has made the decisions it has.

Bearing in mind that national cultural lenses are ground by historically unique experiences, one can claim that one of the most significant influences on the development of American strategic culture has been its history. For instance, Kerry Kartchner defends the idea that American strategic culture is based on “…evolving meanings conditioned by historical experience”\textsuperscript{100}. Similarly, Lantis claims that one can easily find the reasons of specific American strategic culture characteristics such as its non-use norm or leadership desire and interventionist policies by looking at its history. It is worth mentioning that U.S. history and values are strongly tied to each other because history is the most powerful explanatory tool to highlight the roots of certain norms and values. Thus, beliefs, fears and ambitions are important aspects of strategic culture and looking at U.S. history we see they comprise the core values that characterize U.S. strategic culture.

Starting from the beginning, the notion that “Americans survived and triumphed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries against the might of intermittently hostile and numerically vastly superior Indian tribes, against the might of France and Great Britain...”\textsuperscript{101} and established their own state, is internalized and glorified by many Americans. Americans’ self-trust, that they “can achieve anything that they set their hands to in earnest”\textsuperscript{102}, probably stems from this belief. Another point of view which supports this assumption is as Gray says” during the nineteenth century it was usually third class enemies such as Mexico, Spain and Indians which America fought against and they did not really necessitate great effort”.\textsuperscript{103} Eventually, this power gap not only gave the U.S. regional authority and established American’s self image of omnipotence but also encouraged American leaders to play a more active role in the world.

\textsuperscript{99} Gray 22.
\textsuperscript{100} Kartchner Kerry, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Crucible of Strategic Culture, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, SAIC, 31 October 2006, p.7.
\textsuperscript{101} Gray, 27.
\textsuperscript{102} Gray, 27.
\textsuperscript{103} Gray 28.
Even though the U.S. adopted a policy of isolationism during the 1920’s and 1930’s, this did not prevent but only slowed down the rise of the U.S. in the international arena. At first, the U.S. was reluctant to become involved in the European alliance system and wars. Because of factors like being a nation of immigrants comprising mainly Europeans who fled wars, poverty and its geographic distance, the U.S. held the view that its position and perspective were different from that of Europe. Moreover, it did not want to sacrifice either money or men and opposed anything that might drag the U.S. into war. They neither ratified the Treaty of Versailles nor became a part of the League of Nations. However, it was apparent that the U.S. would not continue with this policy of isolationism in such an environment. First of all, at the end of the war they had already got involved in European matters because the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had issued the famous Fourteen Points and it was again him who came up with the idea of the League of Nations. Second, Europe was so fragmented that everybody was aware of the fact that a second war was on the horizon and it would be even greater in scale. Thus, with the onset of Second World War, the U.S. entered a new era and moved away from cultural orientation of isolationism in the inter-war period and onto the world stage and the world witnessed the rise of the U.S.

“America rejects the false comfort of isolationism. We are the nation that saved liberty in Europe and liberated death camps and helped rise up democracies and faced down an evil empire.” These are the words of President Bush in his 2005 State of the Union Address and thus highlight both the U.S.’s active role since the end of the First World War and also their pride in this constructive role. The formation of the image of the U.S. as a world leader has its roots in the world wars. For instance, according to Kalu Kalu, the international leadership that Wilson had idealized for the United States can in a way be amenable to the doctrine of great power. Moreover, after World War II, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and DSC-68 were all clear examples of America’s rise in the world. This rise accelerated even more during the Cold War period and the U.S. became the leader of the western alliance against communism and this gave it the mission of global stability. Thus, all these factors not only gave the U.S. a greater say in world affairs but also created its image as a world power and shaped U.S. values and

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104 Farell 363.
105 President George Bush’s State of Union Address, 31 January 2005.
107 Lantis,363.
norms. It is worth noting that some authors like Lantis state that in many ways the transatlantic security agenda has become the U.S. security agenda. Thus, in the absence of a major power, the U.S. became more willing to exert influence and shape global and regional politics, which eventually became a U.S. norm. Especially during the Cold War this willingness led the U.S. to adopt a policy of intervention and this became more overt with the fights against Korea and Vietnam.108 Maybe this is the reason why writers like Kagan blame the U.S. for being stuck in historical success stories and continuing to do what they used to do; intervening whenever and wherever it chose.109 Furthermore, during the World Wars and Cold War era, the U.S. followed a multilateral policy and this can be seen by looking at its close relations with its allies. However, contemporary writers like Kagan, assume that the U.S. pursues a unilateral policy. Thus, one can claim that this change from multilateralism to unilateralism actually coincided with the rise of the U.S. Too much power and the absence of a major power to challenge them, might have pushed the U.S. policy toward unilateralism110. The U.S.’s well-known containment policy as well, has its roots in the Cold War era and it was used so often that it became a major part of the U.S. strategic culture.

In his article Snyder also emphasizes the significance of unique historical experiences of U.S. strategic culture, by which he specifically refers to the membership in NATO and the Korean and Vietnam wars. It can be said that NATO membership largely shaped America’s nuclear might and military history. By constraining the U.S. nuclear power with the introduction of the “first-use” clause, NATO helped the U.S. nuclear deterrence policy development111, and also through NATO, the U.S. legitimized its policies against the Soviets. As Snyder indicates NATO’s dictate has led “…successive generations of American strategists to develop alternative schemes for tactical nuclear interdiction, flexible response, counterforce targeting, and related variations on the theme of limited theater nuclear war”112. As for the Korean and Vietnam wars, they carry great importance because in both of them, even though the US “…had a military capability relied increasingly upon nuclear weapons”113, it avoided using them during the crisis.

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108 Lantis, 364.
109 Kagan.
110 Lantis
111 Snyder, 7.
112 Snyder, 23.
113 Price and Tannenwald, 118.
It is a well known fact that as the architect of NPT, the US has played a key role in international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and this has remained the conclusive proof of American insistence on nuclear taboo. As military historian John Lewis Gaddis notes “taboos are also norms and are directly related to historical circumstance” from which one can infer the strong tie between history and norms. What were the underlying factors that pushed the U.S. to adopt such a taboo? Tannenwald and Price’s assumption “…U.S. restraint with regard to nuclear use was in part a matter of chance, in part a matter of deterrence, but was also shaped in part by emerging American perceptions of nuclear weapons as disproportionate, a view that increasingly clashed with the U.S. leaders’ perceptions of America’s moral identity” may be able to shed light on the U.S. nuclear norm. Furthermore, they avoided doing something that would “…jeopardize the U.S. moral and leadership position in the eyes of friends and allies”. Likewise, ethical concerns like those mentioned above, international law, the uncertain long-term consequences of nuclear use, the horrors of nuclear war and fear of long-term retaliation were among the chief constraining factors regarding the non-use taboo, not to mention the criticisms after the horrific incidents of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in 1945. This taboo has been handed down from generation to generation among American presidents and thus, in a speech on January 27, 2010, President Barrack Obama confirmed this by stating “Even as we prosecute two wars, we are also confronting, perhaps, the greatest danger to the American people— the threat of nuclear weapons. I’ve embraced the vision of John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan through a strategy that reverses the spread of these weapons and seeks a world without them”. In short, it can be said that “…the nuclear taboo arose domestically, principally in the United States and was then diffused transnationally.

In sum, a combination of historical factors such as Europe’s relative weakness compared to that of the U.S., political pressure within the U.S. against the Soviet Union, elite predisposition and inherited self-trust codified the principles of U.S. strategic culture throughout history. For example, Farell viewed norms and policies as deriving from national historical experiences

114 Price and Tannenwald, 121.
116 Tannenwald
117 President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Talk, 27 January 2010.
119 Farell, 3.
Thus, the idea of military involvement in the combined tasks of military and civilian administration in the U.S. is a reflection of the past. Their self-perception has had a great role in forming their image in the eyes of others and thus, history has been the most powerful instrument that influenced their characteristics. History also prepared the psychological and sociological ground for the development of specific American values. The U.S.’s sustained image of a powerful world leader shaped American values because it is values that help to define the means that actors consider acceptable and effective. On the other hand, as claimed by Kagan, the U.S. preference of reliance on military and its interventionist policies is being seen the other way around by the Americans because of the fact that they either consider them as normal humanitarian policies or necessary measures for their security. Thus, in the 2007 State of the Union Address, President Bush confirmed Kagan’s opinion by saying “The great question of our day is whether America will help men and women in the Middle East to build free societies and share in the rights of all humanity. And I say, for the sake of our own security, we must.”

One other important point to consider is the role of geography in forming U.S. policies. According to Gray, U.S. strategic culture of relative nuclear restraint is based on the U.S. experience of the security afforded by its geo-strategic position. Thus, the U.S. has a number of “…strategic culture legacies” deriving from its geographical position. In this regard, “continental insularity and isolation from truly serious security dangers: the conditioning effect of living with weak, non-threatening neighbors” have been very significant geographical advantages for the U.S.

Primarily, the U.S. has an insular political culture and because of this, its belief in safety has become the norm. “Throughout most of its history, North America’s insular position and weak neighbors to the north and south combined to provide the United States free security.” The fact that the U.S. did not exhaust itself by waging wars against its neighbors, while European powers

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120 Mahnken, 6.
121 Kalu, 82.
122 Farell.
123 President George Bush’s State of Union Talk, January 23, 2007, p.3.
124 Snyder.
125 Gray, 24.
126 Gray, 24.
127 Gray, 45.
128 Mahnken G. Thomas, United States Strategic Culture, Comparative Strategic Culture Curriculum, Saic, 13 November 2006, p.4.
were fighting with each other harshly, also strengthened the U.S.’s confidence in its benign
environment. Snyder reinforces this by saying “…Americans have never had the experience of a
devastating war fought on their territory”\(^\text{129}\) and highlights this fact as a major difference between
the Soviet Union and the U.S. “America is a country that has remained relatively isolated from
world affairs because of its geography; surrounded by the great expanse of two oceans and by two
countries; Canada and Mexico that have never posed a serious military threat”.\(^\text{130}\) Moreover,
geographical distance has reduced the risk of contagion of wars to the U.S. and it intervened in
wars such as World War I only when it deemed necessary. This advantage has had two important
consequences for the U.S.; firstly, the United States experience of low casualty wars as Snyder
claims, and secondly while other countries were devastated because of war economies, the U.S.
experienced economic growth. As a result of these, the U.S. strengthened its world status by
aiding countries who were in need and accelerated the country’s rise as a great world power.
Clearly, geography fed the U.S.’s strategic thinking.

Gray notes that strategic culture should also definitely accept the fact that military culture
exists. In line with this, it can be asked what the U.S. military culture consists of? As it is stated
by the U.S. Department of Defense, President Bush’s 2008 budget “…allocates $481.4 billion for
the Department of Defense’s base budget—a 62-percent increase over 2001—to ensure a high
level of military readiness as the Department develops capabilities to meet future threats, defend
the homeland, and support the all-volunteer force and their families and operations in the Global
War on Terror by providing an additional $93.4 billion in supplemental funds for 2007 and
$141.7 billion for 2008”\(^\text{131}\). These facts indicate that one of the most prominent characteristics of
U.S. strategic culture is its military power. Robert Cooper holds the view, “The sum of defense
expenditure is always greater than its parts: economies of scale and the ability to focus resources
mean that the United States possesses military assets that others cannot dream of”\(^\text{132}\).
Accordingly, the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States is a central document to

\(^{129}\) Snyder, 28.
\(^{130}\) Klein S. Bradley, Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defense Politics,
\(^{131}\) Office of Department and Budget, Department of Defense,
\(^{132}\) Cooper Robert, Hard Power, Soft Power and the Goals of Diplomacy, American Power in the 21st Century,
understanding the U.S. aim of having the best equipped army. In the document President Bush explicitly states “the U.S. must maintain a military without peer”\textsuperscript{133}.

In this respect, the superiority of the U.S. can be defined under the terms of economic strength and technological capacity because these two elements are crucial in determining the size and capability of an army. The U.S. has already acknowledged the significance of both and to this end it is the number one country in the world to have spent the most on defense. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2008 top 15 spenders list, the U.S. ranks first\textsuperscript{134}. What is more interesting is the fact that U.S. spending is nine times larger than the military budget of China, which ranks second on the same list. Gray emphasizes the techno-centric nature of U.S. strategic culture by arguing that the U.S. military practices contain technological fetishism and all leaders and technicians are driven by technological fanaticism.\textsuperscript{135} Gray’s observation has also been echoed by Mahnken, who says “Washington’s penchant for advanced technology also fostered the illusion among some that the United States could use force without killing American soldiers and innocent civilians, and among America’s enemies there was the impression that the United State was averse to sustaining casualties”\textsuperscript{136}.

Military capabilities are of paramount importance for the U.S. because they also define U.S. capacity. In this sense, reliance on military seems like a promising option for the U.S. because its self-trust is deeply rooted in its military power. Throughout history, the U.S. has always given considerable importance to its armed forces. Also Mahnken describes U.S. military culture as a distinct one because he considers the U.S. armed forces to be an influential role model to the international military culture. Interestingly enough, in international military lexicon, the term “American way of war” exists and is accepted by many writers. Even, in his book with the same title “American Way of War”, Russel Weigley, especially deals with American military history and their approach towards war. The book is centered on the American ambition to win military victory. According to Weigley, the U.S. military seeks “the complete overthrow of the enemy, the destruction of his military power, as the object of the war”\textsuperscript{137}. He basically focuses on aggressiveness as the main characteristic of the “American way of war”. Eugene Jarecki also

\textsuperscript{133} National Security Strategy of the United States, p.3.
\textsuperscript{134} Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, \url{http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4}, visited on 22 July 2010.
\textsuperscript{135} Gray S. Colin, Weapons Don’t Make War, 1993.
\textsuperscript{136} Mahnken
\textsuperscript{137} Weigley Russel, American Way of War, xxi.
supports Weigley and adds that this aggressiveness plays a central role in the nation’s misguidance today and encourages for more coercive policies.\textsuperscript{138} America’s military ambitions and the military’s favored position in the country regarding international problems have been judged a lot lately by the international media. Following the invasion of Iraq, the image of the U.S. as a coercive power was magnified even more.\textsuperscript{139}

Thus, the leader profile and his policy making capacity are of paramount importance for a country and in the U.S. case it is even a more sensitive issue because by ruling a country like the U.S., the leader not only determines his own country’s future but the rest of the world’s as well. The fact remains that considering the prestige of the U.S. in the international arena, presidents of the U.S. have always attracted much attention and according to Metz, what has recently affected U.S. strategic culture the most are the 9/11 incidents and George Bush’s government. Also Jarecki supports Metz’s claim and adds that none of the previous presidents have been criticized as much as Bush. In addition, many important events which deeply affected the world took place during the Bush presidency such as the 9/11 attacks, “the war on terrorism”, war in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq. As a result, the U.S. underwent massive changes and especially after 9/11 with the introduction of war on terrorism, homeland security became more important and tougher American policies drew attention. Owing to these tougher security measures, the long-standing solidarity with Europe also weakened and unilateralism took the place of U.S. Cold War policy of multilateralism. Thus, this tendency towards unilateralism can also be seen in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. As it is stated in the document, the U.S. “... will not hesitate to act alone if necessary”\textsuperscript{140} Also, besides the impacts of events like 9/11 on U.S. policies, there is an agreement among many writers that in the development of the US image as a coercive power, Bush had an indisputable role. Jeffrey Knopf defends the idea that Bush and his advisors entered the office believing that the Clinton administration’s foreign policy, starting with the withdrawal from Somalia, had left an image of a weak U.S and thus needed to be improved.\textsuperscript{141} It can be inferred from this that they wanted to project a tougher American image. The first thing that came to mind in achieving this was the role military would play.

\textsuperscript{139} Jarecki
\textsuperscript{140} National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p.37.
Bush aimed to keep military strength beyond challenge and deliver this message to terrorist states and rogue governments. During this period, a sharp transition from Cold War policies of deterrence and containment to one of defense was seen. Thus, by stating “Homeland defense and missile defense are part of stronger security, and they’re essential priorities for America. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”

President Bush also supported this viewpoint. While trying to expose the differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Snyder elaborates on the fact that Soviet strategy has been developed in large part by professional military officers whose main motivation is military effectiveness as opposed to U.S. whose strategy has been developed by civilian intellectuals. However, looking at the Bush cabinet, it can be seen that history had repeated itself but this time the other way around. In fact, during the Bush period much of American security policy was shaped by key neo-conservatives including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who led the military through Afghanistan and Iraq, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Moreover, Rumsfeld also sought advice on security matters from the Defense Policy Board led by neo-conservatives “…who revealed themselves to be committed unilateralists- willing and ready to employ American forces to achieve key strategic objectives”. Joseph Nye, in his famous book “Soft Power” also claims that the U.S. became a hard power during this period. By hard power, he means the ability to coerce which grows countries out of country’s military might. Correspondingly, it can be said that this belief formed the core of the Bush administration’s new security strategy. In fact, as mentioned above the approach of the government was set out clearly in its National Security Strategy: the priority is the maintenance of U.S. military superiority.

All the factors mentioned above; history, geography, values, capabilities and leader’s choice have a profound impact on the formation of U.S. strategic culture. Briefly “Americans are what their interpretation of their history and their contemporary roles have made them”. Indeed,
the U.S. definitely has a strategic culture and it is necessary to analyze it in order to understand American policies. Thus, its self-trust as a world leader, its reliance on military power and its self-attributed role of intervening into others’ domestic policies in order to promote stability have their sources in deeply rooted American strategic culture. These factors have become so closely linked to U.S. culture that they shape its policies and relations with other countries because the US behaves in accordance with them. Does the same hold true for the EU? In order to arrive at a conclusion, the EU’s strategic culture determinants need to be elaborated on.

3.2 The Strategic Culture of the EU

Due to the fact that the Union consists of 27 different nations and has recently started to complete its political unity, whether it has a strategic culture or not, is a much debated subject among scholars. However, the sustained we-ness through the time in the Union and their move with breathtaking rapidity towards the creation of ESDP proves that the EU has acquired those essentials necessary for a strategic culture. Thus, given the fact that the EU’s policies reflect common interests and world views of member countries and that it has a supranational feature, in this paper, the EU is accepted to have a strategic culture.

With the largest economy of the world and 27 member countries, the EU is one of the most unusual and widest-ranging actors in the world today. The EU represents more than 492 million\textsuperscript{148} and since the 1950’s the Union has gradually expanded; and as it expanded and developed, it became more active and had more say in world affairs. As Javier Solana said in the 45\textsuperscript{th} Munich Security conference in 2009, “The European Union is a global player, with a role on the world stage that it is keen to play”\textsuperscript{149}. As a result of the political developments in the world, the dimension of the threats it faces has changed and the EU has become more involved in political crises. Thus, regarding Iran, the EU has made a significant leap by forming the EU-3. As opposed to America, it determined its own way of tackling this problem through the EU-3 and has held talks with Iran since 2003. Consequently all these developments and divergences necessitate understanding the strategic culture of the EU as well. Elaborating on the assumption that EU is a

soft power as Nye claims, and thus, does not rely on military option unless there is a direct threat to human security, this chapter will assess the elements of strategic culture in the European case and examine the common European history from world wars to Cold War, effects of geography, basic common values of the Union and their formation and lastly the development of security agenda of the Union through the European Defense and Security Policy (EDSP) and the European Security Strategy paper (ESS). Also the significance of Germany, France, Great Britain and the strategic culture of these countries along with Javier Solana’s role regarding Iran and his contribution to the Union will be elaborated on. Thus, in this chapter, in the light of these assessments, an explanation regarding the nature of the Union’s strategic culture will be provided.

As Gray argues, “Culture compromises the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation, that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience”. Thus, if there is a common European strategic culture, it should be based on four pillars like Snyder has already said. As a matter of fact, the first three, common geography, history and values are among the reasons of the establishment of the Union. Additionally, in order to act and speak as one, they want to strengthen their coherence and lately, they have added the security strategy and capabilities next to the other four. The EU is shown as a soft power by many writers like Kagan and Cooper and this characterizes most of the EU’s policies today; such as multilateralism, strong support for the UN and international law. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to attract and persuade”. Moreover, “an alternative approach to soft power would be to say that it consists of getting people to do what you want by getting them to want what you want” and thus it is also what the EU aims to establish. To see whether these concepts are regarded as European norms, a closer look at the Union is required in the light of history, values, geography and capabilities.

In an interdependent region like Europe, significance of geography is indisputable. It was first the geographical proximity that forced Europeans to consider the establishment of the EU. Thus, because of this interdependency the EU is more exposed to problems related to

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150 Gray Strategic culture as context, 51.
151 Nye
152 Cooper, 172.
globalization. Geography arranges relations among countries and shapes their foreign policies and due to the effects of proximity, beliefs, changes and threats spread rapidly on the continent. The interesting point is that there is no clear agreement among Europeans about where Europe starts and ends. Correspondingly, this ambiguity affects both the Union’s enlargement process and security policies. Firstly, in the Copenhagen Criteria, it is clearly stated that candidate countries must have territory on the European continent without clear reference to where it ends. On the other hand, the more it enlarges the more different problems and threats it faces. If enlargement is the most powerful security policy of the EU, then it can be concluded that security of the Union is directly tied with its geography. In the European Security Strategy paper of 2003, it is explicitly written that “The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas... Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe”153. For instance, the 2004 enlargement of the European Union is the clearest illustration of this. It was the largest single expansion of the Union since its foundation which included the membership of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. With this enlargement the EU expanded its borders and not only became a neighbor to Russia but also became more involved in the Balkan crisis. Correspondingly all these factors clearly explain why during the establishment process of the CFSP, they especially relied heavily on crisis management and conflict prevention mechanisms.154 In sum, it can be said that security concerns are the major motivators of strategic culture and thus, since security is directly related to geography, geography is a key determining factor in characterizing strategic culture of the Union. In addition, the role of geography as a bridge across the Europe transmitting norms and security and thus, ensuring unity and tolerance among people cannot be underestimated.

As an entity consisting of many different countries, common history is the key binding factor of the Europe because it is past experiences what holds them together today. Also, having acknowledged the impact of history on norms, Europe’s history has a critical role in the formation of Unions strategic culture. As Dimitris Chryssochoou stresses “For European demos

to exist its members must recognize their collective existence”\textsuperscript{155}. So if we are to see Europe as a whole, first we need to understand what it means to be European in history. Namely, Christianity, Renaissance, Crusades were all historically unique experiences that bound Europeans to each other and created shared values. Thus, they have the same heritage, same fears and values. Moreover, the European continent witnessed the worst wars in human history. They inflicted millions of casualties and became devastated because of the bloody wars and thus, peace became the most desired goal on the continent. Correspondingly, it was the destructiveness of the wars that helped to create the EU. In order to avoid war, in 1950 they established an organization led by a higher authority whose decisions bound France and Germany because of the Franco-German production of coal and steel and open to all democratic nations and thus, named it European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Therefore, in the establishment process the aim of the Union was to achieve long-lasting peace through strengthening economy among countries. In sum, in the establishment process of the EU, history played a significant role because it was in the light of history that the EU shaped its future.

On the other hand, according to Mark Mazower, writer of the book Dark Continent, after 1945 Europe rediscovered democracy, especially with the significant help of new organizations; the United Nations and the European Economic Community\textsuperscript{156}. Thus, “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the fundamental principles and the rule of law, which are common to the member states”\textsuperscript{157}. They especially highlight the importance of democracy and it became a sine qua non for the Union. It has been sharply highlighted in the Copenhagen Criteria and stated that “Membership requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for, and protection of minorities.”\textsuperscript{158} However, why are they so insistent on democracy? As mentioned above such predispositions are culturally and historically motivated and since 1950, democracy has been a deeply internalized norm among Europeans because they saw it as a way of achieving peace. Thus, Solana especially draws attention to the point that in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Mazower Mark, Dark Continent, Europe’s Twentieth Century, Penguin Books, 1999, p. 290.
\end{itemize}
Western Europe they achieved peace “…due to the existence of a democratic community in Europe”\textsuperscript{159}. In essence, democracy is a very broad term and like Javier Solana claims, “…human rights, good governance and the rule of law go hand-in-hand with democracy and freedom”\textsuperscript{160}. Accordingly, it can be claimed that in such an environment there is no way people can find any reason to make war. Consequently, individuals are socialized into a distinctively European mode of strategic thinking and as a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral patterns with regard to foreign policy has achieved a state of semi permanence that places them on the level of culture.\textsuperscript{161} In sum, the Union’s insistence on democracy contains all the answers as regards the European identities and norms. Thus, the EU’s choices of avoidance of coercive policies, strong ties with the UN, support for international law and multilateralism have their roots in their insistence on democracy because as mentioned above democracy brings together equality, human rights and rule of law and thus rejects disproportionate use of force and uneven policies. Thus, history made Europeans reluctant to use military force. Considering those facts, as Kagan briefly describes, Europeans are interested in “…inhabiting a world where strength does not matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behavior”.

Accordingly, when it comes to using military force, European strategic thinking rests on the principles of attraction and persuasion and direct military force is considered as a last resort. It is also stated by Solana in his address to the European Parliament in 2003 that only “When all other means have been exhausted, measures could include the use of force, in accordance with international law”\textsuperscript{162}. Also, some writers such as Coşkun claim that, the EU believes in just war\textsuperscript{163} and thus, according to the ‘just war’ principle military coercion will take place only when international law and the use of force is constrained. Thus, knowing the considerable attention given to international law, it can be said that military power is seen as last resort by the

\textsuperscript{160} Javier Solana, Europe’s Leading Role in the spread of Democracy, 2
\textsuperscript{161} Snyder v.
Europeans and that is why they use diplomacy namely persuasion and attraction as a first choice. As Andrew Moravscik states “The power of attraction is perhaps the most powerful instrument of democratization that European governments possess, and indeed perhaps, next to trade policy, their most powerful foreign policy instrument overall”\textsuperscript{164}. 

Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards define strategic culture as the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force. Thus, they highlight the importance of capabilities in determining strategic behavior and as Cornish and Edwards add “without military capabilities, all talk of a strategic culture would ring hollow”\textsuperscript{165}. However, the EU became aware of the significance of capabilities quite late. Until the end of the Cold War, they saw the U.S. as a security guarantor and later on, this strengthened the EU’s already existing defensive posture. Thus, the EU gave priority to other concerns such as economy, health and education.\textsuperscript{166} Moreover, the fact that security was a sensitive issue and member countries did not want to pool their sovereignty in defense issues and as Javier Solana said in his Dublin speech in 2000\textsuperscript{167}, ‘the reluctance of the countries to invest in military capabilities and the civilian power image of the Union in the eyes of public’, prevented the EU from taking the necessary steps. 

However, the Yugoslavian civil war and Kosova crisis were an enormous wake-up call and profound embarrassment for the EU.\textsuperscript{168} Their inability to tackle the crisis proved that EU’s success in economy does not match with its success in foreign and security policies. Taking into account those developments, the EU had no choice but to become a security player. In that sense, the EU went through a deep transition process concerning the security policies. The Helsinki meeting of 1999 opened a new way for a new phase in European foreign and security policy. The military side of the ESDP was introduced in Helsinki and resulted in the so called Headline Goal. Under this plan they introduced the Petersberg Task which aims to be able to deploy 60,000

\textsuperscript{166} Dover, 245.
\textsuperscript{168} Dover, 243.
troops in 60 days. Thus, with this plan the EU would be capable of intervening in any crisis that could “...occur in an area where European interests are affected”170. The ESDP has three elements: military crisis management, civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. In that sense the EU has largely regarded the value of military force, preferring a more integrated response that tackles the threat within the EU as much as without.171 But as mentioned above and as it is supported by Dover, the EU does not have enough assets to carry out these tasks. However, with the Berlin Plus agreement, the EU overcame this obstacle as well and gained access to NATO assets. Thus, to date the EU has conducted more than twenty two operations including two operations with the NATO support; Operation Concordia in the Former Republic of Macedonia and EUFOR Atthea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eventually, with this range of capabilities, today the EU is better equipped than ever to extend its political role.

In addition, these institutional changes and various kinds of capabilities have been accompanied by considerable degree of strategic thinking and planning. The clearest example is the 2003 ESS document. According to the Director Foreign Policy and Defense Tomas Valasek from the Centre for European Reform, “...besides giving EU actions more coherence and clarity, it manages to be succinct, highly readable, and prescriptive and thus, a very successful document”.172 Stemming from this assessment it becomes clear that the EU realized the fact that with the globalized world, dimensions of the threats the EU faces have changed and thus, the example of 9/11, the wide spread acknowledgement of the risk of further terrorist attacks and WMD necessitated the EU to have such a document.173 The ESS not only stresses the EU’s strategy against threats, but also provides policy coherence among member states and functions as a guide and identifies threats. Accordingly, terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime are mentioned as major challenges to the Union’s security. More importantly, according to Marco Overhaus, the success of the document rests on the fact that for the first time EU member states agreed on a common threat assessment and considered

169 Dover, 245.
171 Cornish, Edwards 801.
173 Cornish, Edwards, Beyond the EU/ NATO dichotomy, 588.
military force and economic sanctions as instruments. In sum, it is clear that “The ESS is a milestone on the way to strategically defining the role and the tasks of the EU in a radically changed security environment and in the face of globalization.”

Since a part of this paper focuses on the nuclear proliferation in Iran and the strategic culture of the EU is being analyzed it is necessary to take a closer look at the EU’s nuclear policies. However, besides signing the NPT, prior to the issue of the ESS, the EU did not attach too much importance to nuclear proliferation. With the increasing number of countries acquiring these weapons, it finally took its place on the EU agenda. As it is stated in the ESS;

“Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East.”

Thus, concerns about Saddam Hussein’s inherent unreliability, North Korean hostility, and the evident interest of states such as India and Pakistan in nuclear weapons, not to mention Israel, produced a new wave of anxiety about WMD. It is therefore not surprising that the ESS especially indicated that ‘in an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand’, highlighting nuclear risk. On the other hand, the establishment of the EU-3 in dealing with Iran’s WMD is the main indicator of how important non-proliferation is for the EU, which will be assessed in chapter 4 in more detail.

While assessing the strategic culture of an entity like the EU, role of Germany, Britain and France cannot be underestimated. Considering their sizes, population, relatively strong economy and thus, impact on the Union, many writers like Klaus Brummer refer to them as the Big Three. Among them, France and Germany, being the founding members, are mentioned as old Europeans because of their mission of “…uniting European countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace”. As Banchoff indicates European integration is a top foreign policy priority for the Germans and accordingly, all the major parties in the country have moved towards recognition of European integration as a foundation of German policy in Europe. Also,

176 Einhorn, 22.
178 Coşkun, 85.
as far as German strategic culture is concerned, one can claim that there is a sharp avoidance of military power and it is only accepted as a last resort. According to Coşkun, this is because of Germany’s rejection of its militarist past and thus, the fact remains that today the country’s strategic culture is based on this particular tendency. Thomas Banchoff also supports Coşkun by highlighting Germany’s transition from a militarist nation to a civilian one which is in favor of cooperative security institutions. Consequently, these key elements of strategic culture manifested themselves in German policy during the Iraq crisis as well and Germany rejected taking part in the U.S. led military operation.

On the other hand, when it comes to the French strategic culture, Coşkun claims that it is “...based on a search for a proper role for itself in international era and its pretensions to European leadership”. Because of its rich historic roots and the mission as a founding member of the Union, France has always considered itself to be a key player. Gaffney held the view that France had a “...very special attitude towards itself: responsible, vulnerable and the carrier of a super civilization” and thus these self-attributions influenced its policies. Also, Charles de Gaulle clearly exhibited these self attributions as he stated “...to my mind France cannot be France without greatness”. It is a fact that World War II and Charles de Gaulle government played a key role is shaping French strategic culture. The fact that militarily, economically and politically France was not in a powerful condition after the World War II because of war weakened economy and Nazis defeat, led Charles de Gaulle to define France’s policy priorities in order to turn back to old glorious days. Philip H. Gordon defines the characteristics of his policies:

“The distinctive elements of the Gaullist model for French national security are the absolute need for independence in decision-making, a refusal to accept subordination to the United States, the search for grandeur and rang, the primacy of the nation state, and the importance of national defence”.

179 Coşkun, 85. 
180 Banchoff, 271. 
181 Coşkun 85. 
182 Coşkun 85. 
For “de Gaulle, alliances should be flexible and temporary, thus allowing maximum ability to undertake independent action when the interests of France diverged from the common interest of the alliance”\(^{186}\) and this clause clearly explains one of the most important characteristics of French politics; namely, the determination to protect national sovereignty. In this regard, it can be said that, in the past, alliance with the U.S. and the NATO was not favored much by France and at this point France played the Europe card against the U.S and the NATO in order to limit US domination in the continent and prevent it from achieving a leadership position in the continent. Thus, “ever since the return to power of General de Gaulle, all French leaders aimed at instrumentalizing European politics so as to attain, with European partners, national strategic objectives that France would not have had the means to pursue on its own”\(^{187}\). Thus, France wants to turn Europe into an independent actor and thus, while doing this also wants to have the control.\(^{188}\) For instance, in order to diminish American dependence in the continent, it aimed at establishing pan-European military and thus played an active role in the formation processes of the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Defense Community (EDC), even though in 1954 at the National Assembly France rejected to ratify the EDC because of the fear that the EDC would threaten its national sovereignty. Of paramount importance are its great efforts for the European Security and Defense Policy. As opposed to Germany, France gives importance to military power as a result of great concern for national security. It had at its disposal a professional army, observation satellites and an international competitive armament industry.\(^{189}\)

In sum, de Gaulle government and its rich historic roots have significant roles in shaping France strategic culture. Moreover, French desire for the development of a European Defense and Security Policy autonomous from the NATO and the U.S. and its aspiration of strong military power are clear expressions of its characteristics.

Lastly, the third country in the ‘Big Three’, UK is a major diplomatic and military power. It supports multilateralism and has membership in many international organizations including NATO, the EU, G-8 and the OECD and the UN, where its membership is permanent. In addition, it is one of the world’s leading military powers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, after the U.S. and People’s Republic of China, the British armed forces have

\(^{188}\) Stark 14.
\(^{189}\) Stark 16.
the third largest highest declared expenditure in the world.\textsuperscript{190} Thus, they have the largest navy and air force in the European Union, ranked as the second largest in NATO.\textsuperscript{191} Therefore, UK retains its key position in NATO and in Europe where security policies are concerned. Furthermore, the close relationship between the U.S and Britain has been a central pillar of the UK’s strategic culture \textsuperscript{192} and thus, shapes UK’s policies, namely use of force. For Alistar Miskimmon from University of London “The British-American security relationship has had a profound influence on how the use of force is viewed under the Blair government”\textsuperscript{193}. In this regard, considering the British involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, Blair government proved their tendency towards use of force and thus, it became an option for the UK as well. On the other hand, in the case of Iran, Britain differs from France and Germany because Britain has a history with Iran. When, Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized the British owned Anglo-Iranian oil company, the UK also took active role in the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in 1953. Accordingly, resentment remains on the side of Iran and two countries have had tense relations since then.

In conclusion, having acknowledged all the facts; the same historical roots, benefits and drawbacks of geographical proximity, common norms such as giving importance to democracy and shared identity, and most importantly recent efforts on the development of Security Strategy and capabilities, one can claim that the EU strategic culture has already emerged, though as mentioned above, deriving from its supranational entity position, belatedly and somehow in a different way. It cannot be compared to that of the U.S. or any other country but knowing that the attitudes of the EU in policy making are the outcomes of its norms, aims and fears it becomes clear that it can assume the role of being a strategic actor. Accepting the fact that both the EU and the U.S. possess strategic culture, makes the analyses of their bilateral relations with Iran more understandable as strategic culture offers a better explanation of states’ actions by bringing root causes on the table.

\textsuperscript{192} Lief Paul, The Strategic Cultures of Old and New Europe, The international Spectator 2006, p.3.
\textsuperscript{193} Miskimmon Alistar, Continuity in the Face of Upheaval-British Strategic Culture and the impact of Blair Government, in Kerry Longhurst, Marcin Zabarowski, Special Issue, European Security, p.2.
CHAPTER 4: BILATERAL RELATIONS

4.1 The US Attitudes towards the Nuclear Enriched Iran

As it has been mentioned several times before, the fact remains that Iran and the U.S. have never experienced normalized relations after the 1979 revolution. Today, Iran is neither directly represented in the U.S. nor does the U.S. have an embassy in Iran. Iran’s support of terrorist groups, its hatred for Israel, its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, its opposition to the U.S. led Middle East Peace process and abuse of human rights in the country are the main reasons for tense relations. Moreover, especially, Iran’s ambition to acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology has long been a key U.S. concern. The concern has been even heightened when it was declared by an opposition group that Iran built secret facilities in Natanz and Arak to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the outcomes of this situation are reflected in the two-way accusations of the countries. While the U.S president George Bush declared Iran as a part of axis evil together with Iraq and North Korea in his State of Union Address on January 29, 2002, Iran kept calling the U.S. the Great Satan. More importantly the U.S openly blamed Iran for being a nuclear threat to the world. Thus, as President Bush stated, “the Iranian Government is defying the world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons”\(^{194}\). Consequently, the U.S. adopted coercive measures, harsh economic sanctions and interventionist policies against Iran. The U.S. policy toward Iran has been a much criticized issue recently and accordingly, this chapter will analyze the U.S-Iran relations by looking at the impact of U.S strategic culture and sanctions, especially focusing on the period of George Bush. At first the U.S policy towards Iran will be evaluated and then criticisms will be given in the light of strategic culture of the U.S.

According to writers such as Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, after the Cold War two major factors shaped the U.S. policy on Iran. First, Iran’s geopolitical significance because it made it possible for the U.S to contain the Soviet Union on its southern flank and second, Iran having rich oil and gas reserves.\(^ {195}\) Accordingly, controlling Iran and advocating friendly regimes in the country were among the main targets of the U.S. Thus, replacing Mohammad Mossaddeq, who nationalized the country’s oil reserves, with American friendly Shah Reza Pahlavi was a part

\(^{194}\) President Bush’s State of Union Address, 31, January 2006.
of its plans. However, with the Islamic revolution in 1979, this situation totally changed and the U.S. did not only lose its closest ally in the region but also gained a new enemy. Since then the two countries have had only a limited dialogue.

According to the National Security Strategy paper of the U.S., the major security priorities of the U.S. are, firstly providing security for the oil and gas supply, second, eliminating terrorist organizations, third preventing the spread of WMD and fourth ensuring spread of democracy.\textsuperscript{196} Not to mention, the close and supportive relations with Israel. Thus, by looking at these targets, for many Americans the first challenge that comes to mind is Iran. Opinion polls are also confirming this. For instance, according to Pew Research Center, concerns over Iran have sharply risen after 2003. In 2003 only 26% of Americans considered Iran as a threat, however, today nearly half of the Americans (46%) view Iran as a great threat.\textsuperscript{197} Stemming from this, how Americans reflect this dissatisfaction in their policies towards Iran is worth analyzing.

Upon taking office in 1993 the Clinton administration followed a policy of dual containment which aimed at isolating Iraq and Iran. As Amr Sabet claims the aim of dual containment “...was to prohibit each one of regional actors from becoming excessively powerful and thus, potentially threaten perceived US security in the Near East”\textsuperscript{198}. Moreover, he adds that “Containment in its classical formulation involved three main stages. The first aim at establishing a balance of power; the second, at bringing about fragmentation and division; and third, at altering the opponents purposes and behavior with the prospect of eventually pursuing a negotiated settlement of outstanding issues”\textsuperscript{199}

With respect to Iran, these three stages can be analyzed as follows. Firstly, as mentioned before, America is economically and military-wise superior to Iran and has the power to overwhelm it. This fact itself is enough to threaten Iran. Moreover, the presence of America in Iraq has doubled the danger because now the powerful threat is even nearer; not to mention the ally advantage. Also, the good relations with Israel enable the U.S. to maintain balance in the region. In sum, the first goal is pursued because Iran, because of its geography, is surrounded by powers that it does

\textsuperscript{196} US National Security Paper, p.35.
\textsuperscript{198} Sabet G. E. Amr, Dual Containment and Beyond: Reflections on American Strategic Thinking, Mediterranean Politics, 1999, 4:3, 1, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{199} Sabet, 78.
not trust. Secondly, since 2005 with the election of the president Ahmedinejad, the country has witnessed struggles between pro government forces and dissidents and many Iranian officials held the U.S responsible for this. For instance, in an interview with the New York Times, President Ahmedinejad explicitly stated “...the American interventions have caused instability and insecurity in the country”\textsuperscript{200}. Furthermore, President Bush’s statements in the 2003 State of the Union Address confirmed Iranians’ suspicions, as he said that Iranians, like all people, have a right to choose their own Government and determine their own destiny, and the United States supports their aspirations to live in freedom\textsuperscript{201}. Also, as Seymour Hersh from the New Yorker writes, even in 2007 the Congress agreed to request President Bush to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran.\textsuperscript{202} Not to mention their support to the former crown prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi’s speeches\textsuperscript{203} demanding democracy and freedom in Iran. Thirdly and more importantly, sanctions today, especially economic ones form a major part of the U.S policies against Iran which is seriously affected by these and resent them. The U.S either imposes sanctions directly or through the UN by using pressure. Sanctions started during the first period of Clinton administration when he imposed a ban on U.S. trade and investment in Iran in 1995; and a 1996 law imposed sanctions on foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector\textsuperscript{204} which is called Iran-Libya sanctions act (ILSA). As Sullivan claims the intended purpose of this sanction was not only to help cut off outside financial and other help to Iran to redevelop its oil, gas and other industries but also to cut off funding and economic development that Iran could use to export its revolution, and to engage in terrorist activities and develop ballistic missiles\textsuperscript{205}. The ILSA sanctions were planned to be cancelled on August 5, 2001 but they were renewed for another five years.\textsuperscript{206} In addition, the U.S. blocked loans and other assistance from international organizations like the World Bank and the IMF. Also, the fact remained that Iran applied for membership of the WTO in 1996\textsuperscript{207} but as a result of U.S. objections and veto power in the

\textsuperscript{201} President Bush’s State of Union Address, p.6, 28 January 2003.
\textsuperscript{203} Reza Pahlavi, Bibliography, http://www.rezapahlavi.net/bibliography/, visited on June 1, 2010.
\textsuperscript{204} Katzman, summary.
\textsuperscript{205} Sullivan 184.
\textsuperscript{206} Katzman, 12.
\textsuperscript{207} Iran Trade Law, Submission of Application, http://www.irantradelaw.com/?page_id=217, visited on June 1, 2010.
WTO council, it was not until 2005 Iran got only its observer status but not full membership. Moreover, there are sanctions unique to Iran especially as regards to the WMD; for instance the Iran-Iraq Arms Non proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484). It requires denial of license applications for exports to Iran of dual use items, and imposes sanctions on foreign countries that transfer to Iran “destabilizing numbers and types of conventional weapons,” as well as WMD technology. Also, the Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178) authorizes sanctions on foreign entities that assist Iran’s WMD programs and thus, “...during 2001, 2002, and 2003, a number of entities in North Korea, China, India, Armenia, and Moldova were sanctioned under the Iran Non proliferation Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484), and another law, the Chemical and Biological Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, for sales to Iran.” In sum, it can be claimed that strict U.S. sanctions point out the U.S. ambition to hit Iran as a nation and this is where they contradict with the EU. Thus, the U.S. blames the EU for having “...less of an appetite for punitive measure”. Accordingly, the EU prefers targeted sanctions as opposed to the U.S. which have less impact on the Iranian society but the government. These sanctions will be clearly evaluated in the next chapter.

The above mentioned sanctions prove U.S.’s extra sensitiveness as regards the WMD threat. As mentioned in the previous chapters, nuclear taboo is an important part of the U.S. strategic culture and in this regard Iran poses even a larger challenge to the U.S. with its secret plants. Accordingly, as it is declared by the U.S Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation (ISN), the U.S. leads the development of diplomatic responses to specific bilateral and regional WMD proliferation challenges, including today's threats posed by Iran and thus, works closely with the UN, the EU, the G-8, NATO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by WMD.

The U.S. also, exerts considerable pressure on these organizations for ensuring sanctions against Iran.

209 Katzman 11.
210 Katzman 12.
Correspondingly, it can be claimed that the U.S. has also been using its diplomatic and political power to isolate Iran since the crisis began in 2002. It can be seen that these efforts focus on organizations such as the UN, the IAEA and possibly NATO. Above all, the U.S. is a dominant figure in the UN with its important function as a permanent member in the Security Council. In connection with this, they have a large say and power in the council. They have specifically stressed that Council action is necessary to maintain pressure on Iran and the threat of sanctions are seen as important leverage for the Council.\textsuperscript{213} Thus, they tried to maintain a united international front against Iran so as to gain support for their pressure regarding the sanctions by the UN. This was also acknowledged by Ahmedinejad, who, when asked by New York Times about the UN, stated, “The United Nations is completely under the pressure of the U.S. administration”\textsuperscript{214}.

On the other hand, there are many writers like Sabet, Sullivan and Barbara Corny, who claim that this sanction policy is ineffective and instead of improving the existing relations, it creates more problems. While Barbara Corny claims that it is a risky strategy that can endanger further U.S. interest in the region\textsuperscript{215}, Sullivan sees the sanctions as the main source of worsening relations with Iran and claims that they create more resentment in Iran against America. Thus, it can be said that this policy reflects the U.S strategic culture because throughout history, as a result of its self-confidence as a super power, it has always taken what it wants either by using its prestige or through military power.\textsuperscript{216} “The U.S is an imperial power seeking to fulfill its national goals and to the extent that it is historically unique or different pertains mainly to its unprecedented configuration of power, capabilities and technological capacity.”\textsuperscript{217} Moreover, Sabet goes further by adding that whenever there is a challenge to the U.S. interest, they always have the urge to intervene. Similar to the analyses of many writers such as Lantis and Gray mentioned in Chapter 2, it is accepted that America had so long ago adopted this mission of leadership and saving and in the name of this mission, acts as if it has the right to intervene. Furthermore, the U.S. has also adopted the mission of sanctioning a WMD acquiring country so as to achieve peace. However, this does not help matters but even worsens the aggressive image

\textsuperscript{214} New York Times, An Interview with President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, p.4.
of America among the world media. For instance, as Todd Gitlin from World Affair journals wrote, “Unilateral American intervention to other countries has done considerably more harm than good over the past decades.”\textsuperscript{218} Moreover, while famous European newspapers like Der Spiegel weekly and the Guardian criticized the U.S. invasion of Iraq aggressively, Al Huebner from Toward Freedom blamed the U.S. for using tactics during interventions which are outlawed by international law.\textsuperscript{219}

On the other hand, as said earlier in this paper, Snyder gives considerable importance to leader profile while defining strategic culture and in the U.S. case; the impact of presidents on the relations with Iran cannot be underestimated. As mentioned above, at first in 1995 it was Clinton who first introduced the sanction policy against Iran. Then, George Bush took over the presidency during the period of 2002-2008 and kept sanctions going. Thus, they gave shape to the foreign policy against Iran. Accordingly, their attitudes, motivations and decisions carry great importance. It is believed by many writers that during the presidency of Clinton the relations were way better than they were in the period of George Bush. At the beginning, the Clinton administration sanctioned Iran in response to WMD, support for Hamas and Hezbollah and ruining the Israel-Arab peace process. However, with the election of Khatemi in 1997, the U.S. moved toward a policy of engagement and bilateral talks between two sides took place. Moreover, President Clinton sent a positive signal to Iran by attending Khatemi’s speeches in 2000 at the UN’s meeting in connection with the Millennium Summit.\textsuperscript{220} The years between 2000 and 2002 witnessed a period of better relations; the U.S. even gave signals of easing sanctions and especially in 2002 with the cooperation of the two countries in Afghanistan, softer policies towards Iran were favored.\textsuperscript{221}

However, during the late 2002’s the situation totally changed especially following Bush’s State of the Union Address that year.\textsuperscript{222} In his message he said, “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking

\textsuperscript{217} Sabet, 85. \\
\textsuperscript{220} Katzman, 9. \\
\textsuperscript{221} Katzman 9.
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger... In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.”

This damaged the improved relations. From that time on, Iran took its place in all annual threat assessments of the U.S. as one of the major challenges. Against the rising threat, according to Sullivan some members of Congress called for a regime change in Iran and even the President hinted at U.S. support for a regime change. For instance in his State of the Union Address in 2006, President Bush said, “Tonight, let me speak directly to the citizens of Iran: America respects you and we respect your country. We respect your right to choose your own future and win your own freedom. And our nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran”. However, the fact remained that it was unacceptable for many Iranians as well as for many writers like Sabet. It was regarded as an intervention to internal affairs and a serious breach of sovereignty and thus, this was the start of deteriorating relations.

Accordingly, one can claim that the Bush period was more aggressive towards Iran than the Clinton period because while the Clinton administration tried to improve existing relations, events like axis-evil talk or call for a regime change ruined the efforts. In this regard, as Sabet claims Clinton administration, with due respect to Iran's 'ancient civilization', had been very careful in speeches addressed to the Iranian people. Thus, Clinton focused on changing the regime’s behavior rather than its overthrow; and more strangely, wanted to make friends in the Middle East and reflected this desire in his speeches. On the one hand, in an off-the-cuff speech in April 1999, he explicitly revealed his good will towards Iranians and said “Iran has been... a subject of quite a lot of abuse from various Western nations. ... It’s quite important to tell people: Look, you have a right to be angry at something my country or my culture or others that are generally allied with us today did to you 50 or 60 or 100 or 150 years ago... So I think while we speak out against religious intolerance we have to listen for possible ways we can give people the legitimacy of some of their fears, of some of their angers, or some of their historical grievances, and then say... now can we build a common future?”

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223 Sullivan, 196.
224 Sullivan, 198.
225 President Bush’s State of the Union Address, 31 January 2006, p.4.
226 Sabet
227 Quoted in Gerecht Reuel Marc, Regime Change in Iran, http://www.newamericancentury.org/iran-072902.pdf, visited at June 1 2010, p.3.
On the other hand, Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq left question marks in the minds of many. Correspondingly, the U.S. concerns about Iran’s WMD program led to the speculations that the next target was Iran. Even though at G-8 Summit George Bush made it clear that they did not consider military action, many experts like Katzman said “...Administration is considering a number of options, most of which are diplomatic but some of which might include certain military actions such as air strikes, to end or slow Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program”\textsuperscript{228}. Eventually, all these explain clearly why Bush is attacked much more than the Clinton government and why his period is considered to be too harsh as regards Iran.

Moreover, the 9/11 attacks and subsequent shifts in American foreign policy brought another dimension to the U.S.-Iranian relations. As skepticism against Muslims grew, relations with Iran deteriorated. Even though, with all world leaders, Ayatollah Khamenei condemned the attacks of 9/11 and helped the U.S. forces to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the U.S. new approach of war on terrorism also targeted Iran and cooled down the relations. Thus, Bush especially pointed out Iranians as potential terrorism supporters in Iraq in his war on terrorism speech by saying “Many are foreigners who are coming to fight freedom's progress in Iraq. This group includes terrorists from Saudi Arabia and Syria and Iran and Egypt and Sudan and Yemen...”\textsuperscript{229} Also, in State of the Union Addresses of 2005, 2006 and 2007, Bush explicitly claimed that Iran was funding and arming terrorists like Hezbollah and Hamas.

Thus, it is clearly understood that the American-Iranian relations have never been permanently favorable and lately, especially with the declaration of Iran’s covert ballistic missile technology, have worsened. The U.S. does not hesitate to use its unmatched military power and economic superiority and prestige in international organizations when dealing with Iran. Accordingly, these factors strengthen the U.S. hand against Iran and constitute an important policy tool for the U.S. Hence, today severe economic sanctions and mutual threats are a major part of the U.S.-Iranian relations. However, on the one hand, many writers unite on the belief that harsh U.S. sanctions and their intervening policies remain as a big obstacle in trying to solve this international problem; on the other hand, the U.S. is decisive about the effectiveness of their methods. For instance, in the Telegraph newspaper interview with the U.S. Secretary of State,

\textsuperscript{228} Katzman 10.
Condoleezza Rice said that it was necessary to punish Iran for its nuclear activity, missile program, and support for terrorist groups in the Middle East and added that sanctions provide a powerful deterrent.\textsuperscript{230} Thus, having given the brief history of the U.S.-Iranian relations concerning WMD, the EU-Iranian relations regarding WMD will be focused on in the following chapter.

\textbf{4.2 The EU’s Attitudes towards the Nuclear Enriched Iran}

The EU has the goal to become a global power and thus, whatever threatens the world security is also a major concern for the EU. Today with its enhanced capabilities and developed security and political vision, the EU is ready to deal with threats. The Iranian nuclear problem is an issue by which the EU proves its new diplomatic skills and political effectiveness to the rest of the world. In the face of increasing Iran nuclear threat, it takes a central role. Correspondingly, the EU-3 is taking the lead on behalf of the Union in the dialogue with Iran as regards the nuclear problem. Thus, the EU is not only acting as a mediator between the US and Iran but also trying to prevent Iran to become a nuclear power. This chapter will review relations between the EU and Iran, especially by focusing on the efforts of the EU-3 and Javier Solana.

The EU-Iranian relations do not have a long history. However, the fact remains that after the revolution of 1979, relations cooled down even more and Iran grouped the European countries as allies of the U.S. and accordingly, antagonism emerged. Because of Iran’s support of terrorism and rumors about its nuclear enrichment, the EU followed a policy of critical dialogue with Iran. However, the election of reformist Khatami opened a new phase in the EU-Iranian relations. Besides the improved relations, trade ties also deepened.\textsuperscript{231} Especially Khatami’s efforts to improve relations with the West, namely the offer for a “dialogue of civilizations” and his supportive attitudes towards the West for the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan have had a profound impact on shaping positive policies of the EU towards Iran. Thus, the EU replaced its policy of critical dialogue against Iran which occurred as a result of damaged relations because of


\textsuperscript{231} European Union Center of North Carolina EU Briefings, Europe’s Iran Diplomacy, March 2008, p.2.
Mykonos Trial with a new comprehensive dialogue including a host of issues such as non-proliferation, human rights and the Middle East peace process. However, in the course of 2002, bilateral relations between the EU and Iran started to deteriorate when the Iranian reformist movement was increasingly challenged by a resurgent wave of conservatism. Not to mention the discovery of secret nuclear plants

As Einhorn claims, until 2002, the EU did not give Iranian WMD threat a high priority. However, with the declaration of secret plants, the scope of the threat changed and the EU acknowledged the danger Iran poses. Consequently today, the EU has been the main international actor trying to contain the Iranian nuclear program. Especially, the year 2003 had great importance in the Union’s history, because for the first time ever, the EU adopted a coercive diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Iran with the help of EU-3. Sauer says that the success of the coercive diplomacy rests on the facts that in theory it aims to persuade the opponent and prevent war and thus, it is the major reason of the EU’s transition to coercive diplomacy. Mainly, the EU aims to convince Iran for full transparency to resolve the nuclear threat.

However, as it is stated in the EU’s Iran Diplomacy Briefing paper, because of logic, history and result of European strategy, the EU followed a different path under the name of coercive diplomacy. Even though, they again favored a policy of “critical dialogue” that emphasized what Iran had to gain by eschewing nuclear weapons, it can be claimed that the EU views its priorities of multilateralism and respect for international law and diplomatic tools as the main objectives of its coercive diplomacy. Mainly, their approach is based on incentives and sanctions rather than isolation or threat of military force. They prefer having a proper dialogue with Iran and solving problems through direct talks. Moreover, the EU-3 assumes important responsibilities as regards Iran, not only does it try to prevent Iran becoming a nuclear power but also undertakes the role of bridge-building between the U.S. and Iran and tries to balance Iran by convincing China and Russia to confront Iran in IAEA. This great responsibility is also

233 European Union Center of North Carolina, p.2.
235 Sauer, 613.
236 Sauer, 614.
237 European Union Center of North Carolina, p.1.
238 Leonard Mard, Can EU’s diplomacy stop Iran’s Nuclear Program, Centre for European Reform Working Paper, p.3.
highlighted in the Working Paper of Centre for European Reform, as it is stated, with the Iran case, the European approach and success are being put to the test.\textsuperscript{239} Eventually, at this point in order to develop a better understanding of the EU-Iranian relations, it is important to take a closer look at the EU-3 efforts and their effects on relations with Iran.

The first direct EU action took place after the confirmation of Iranian uranium enrichment by the IAEA in 2002. The EU-3, as well as the IAEA board took action and tried to persuade Iran to sign the additional protocol of the IAEA which “... had been introduced in the 1990s on a voluntary basis, and provided the IAEA with more rights to find undeclared materials and possible violations”\textsuperscript{240}. However, as a result of Iran’s rejection, the EU suspended the bilateral negotiations on a trade and association agreement in 2003 and proved its decisiveness to Iran. On 21 October 2003, the EU-3 Ministers of Foreign Affairs; Dominique de Villepin, Jack Straw and Joschka Fisher flew to Tehran to negotiate directly with the regime in Tehran and succeeded in convincing Iran.\textsuperscript{241} Thus, in exchange for further negotiations Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment program and signed the Additional Protocol. This was accepted as a major victory of the EU which proved the efficiency of their policy and unity and it also encouraged the EU-3 to take further steps.

However, Iranian cooperation did not last long and by the beginning of 2004, Iran again began enriching uranium. Nevertheless, the EU continued its diplomatic efforts and in return for European assistance in building a light water reactor and a resumption of trade and investment talks that had faltered in 2003, negotiations started on the basis of the Paris Agreement.\textsuperscript{242} The new deal both opened the way for more rigorous IAEA inspection and spelled out the activities Iran would suspend including uranium enrichment and conversion.\textsuperscript{243} In addition, the Paris Agreement emphasized the incentives that the EU offered in order to convince Tehran; “...it established working groups to negotiate the transfer of technology, increase trade and aid, and deal with security issues in the Gulf”.\textsuperscript{244} Accordingly, this paper accepts that those incentives enable the EU to persuade Iran because the EU prefers targeted sanctions against Iran. They bind Iran to the EU with those incentives and support and then threaten Iran to take them away. Moreover, the

\textsuperscript{239} Leonard, 3.
\textsuperscript{240} Sauer, 618.e
\textsuperscript{241} Sauer, 618.
\textsuperscript{242} European Union Center of North Carolina, p.3.
\textsuperscript{243} Leonard, 5.
\textsuperscript{244} Leonard, 5.
EU favors targeted sanctions because approaching Iran necessitates well-calculated steps and targeted sanctions serve best for this purpose. They neither want to encourage Iran more by being too soft nor want to isolate it and exacerbate the relations by being too hard on them. In that regard, targeted sanctions both improve the effectiveness of the policy and mitigate negative humanitarian impacts. Additionally, previous Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan also pointed out the importance of the EU’s targeted sanctions by saying “...I welcome sanctions which seek to pressure regimes rather than peoples and thus, reduce humanitarian costs...”245. Specifically, in the Iran case, the EU avoids harming civilians and its targets include financial restrictions aimed at pressuring Iran for changes in behavior. As French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner confirms “The general consensus is also to not target the people but to target the economy, banking, insurance and travel permits for some particular people”246. For instance, in April 2008, the EU’s Political and Security Committee placed the largest Iranian bank, Bank Melli, on a list of Iranian institutions and personalities that the EU would boycott247 and also after tense relations between the Commission and Iran since 2003, the Council of the EU has approved actions to enforce UN resolutions that became one of the major threats of the EU.248 Overall, the fact remains that the EU has the capacity to considerably damage the Iranian economy through these targeted sanctions. As a matter of fact, “in 2006, the EU accounted for approximately 33.5% of Iran’s €36.6 billion imports and 24% of Iran’s exports of €53 billion”249. This makes the EU Iran’s main trading partner, holding 27.8% of total market share.250 Therefore, economic sanctions represent powerful diplomatic tools strengthening the hand of the EU in negotiations.

Moreover, even though the election of Ahmedinejad and accordingly tendency towards nationalism in the country put the efforts into a deadlock and complicated negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran, the EU-3 insisted on diplomatic solutions251. For instance, although the IAEA’s inspections showed that Iran continued its enrichment program in 2005, at first the EU avoided using sanctions and thus, they came up with the “framework for a long term

247 Herb Keinon, “EU set to blacklist leading Iranian bank,” The Jerusalem Post, April 29 2008.
248 Leonard 23.
249 European Union Center of North Carolina, 6.
250 European Union Center of North Carolina, 6.
agreement” which offered Iran more economic and political incentives. Also, for the first time, in 2005 the EU-3 secured the backing of the U.S. for this package, which included the lifting of a U.S. sanction on Iranian WTO entry and the sale of spare parts to Iranian civilian airliners. It can also be said that one of the major successes of the EU-3 was its competence in playing the bridge-building role. They assumed the role of bridge-building between the U.S. and Iran and succeeded in convincing the U.S. to negotiate with Iran, something it had always refused to do since 1979. In this regard, like Solana says the European Union can be considered as a “...big mediation and conflict resolution machine, based on law and non-stop negotiations”. Moreover, they also succeeded in convincing the U.S., Russia and China (EU3+3) together to agree on a new common package for Iran, which was offered by Solana to the decision makers in Tehran on June 5, 2006. Thus, all these efforts prove that the EU takes the lead and accommodates the wishes of China, Russia and the U.S. to act in concert towards Iran. Accordingly, this points out the ambition and willingness of the EU to reach a concrete outcome when dealing with Iran and also points out its insistence on diplomacy.

On the contrary, on 11 April 2006 Iran proudly announced that it had succeeded in enriching uranium up to 3.5% thanks to a cascade of 164 centrifuges. The next IAEA report approved this and recommended that the Security Council agree on a formal resolution in order to increase the pressure on the government of Iran. Accordingly, when Iran refused to meet requirements for the suspension of the August 2006 deadline as set by the UN Security Council, the international community began to consider legal steps against Iran and for the first time the EU also supported UN sanctions against Iran. This statement which was also declared in the European Parliament Resolution on Iran said “...in the interests of finding a diplomatic solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, the EU, the United States, China and Russia had proposed that an agreement be reached, under the auspices of the IAEA, to ship Iran's existing low-enriched uranium to Russia and France for processing into fuel rods to keep the Tehran Medical

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252 European Union Center of North Carolina, p.4.
253 Sauer 621.
255 Sauer, 621.
256 Sauer 621.
Research reactor running, and noting that, since Iran rejected this proposal, debates have been ongoing in the Security Council on more stringent sanctions against Iran\textsuperscript{257}.

Nevertheless, the EU-3 did not let these sanctions hinder bilateral relations. Just like Sarkozy claimed, in a meeting with Chancellor Angela Merkel, “even though, sanctions are toughening, the door remains open to Iran”\textsuperscript{258}. Thus, the EU foreign policy Chief Solana started new talks with Larijani and the EU remained open to reengage with Iran throughout 2007. This situation was also supported by leaders across the Europe. Even French President Chirac went as far as saying that formal negotiations could be set up, and that Iran could then take a reciprocal step by suspending its enrichment program\textsuperscript{259}. At the same time, the door remained open to Iran because the general belief in the Union was that isolating Iran from the international community would be too dangerous and that it would mean more tension and might even push Iran more towards nuclear weapons. In that regard, Javier Solana states that the EU will maintain its twin approach of dialogue and pressure\textsuperscript{260} indicating that they are in favor of engagement with Iran through negotiations and targeted sanctions.

In conclusion, it can be claimed that the EU follows a policy of twin approach towards Iran. They neither want to isolate Iran from the international community nor want to encourage it for their unethical covert manner regarding their nuclear program. As mentioned above, specifically, the EU-Iranian relations are based on economic incentives. Given the EU’s leading market position in Iran, the EU trade sanctions have a detrimental impact on the Iranian economy. In this way the EU can both establish dialogue with Iran and pressurize it to comply with the interests of the EU. Therefore, the conditions are so created that the EU plays a great role in shaping Iran’s domestic and international policy. In sum, the Iran case has been a big test for the EU-3 to prove its negotiating skills and international credibility. Thus, these countries not only try to contain Iran but also assume the role of a mediator between Iran and the U.S. Correspondingly, regarding Iran’s ballistic missile, the EU has become the main international actor in negotiating with Iran and has been very successful in slowing down Iran.

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\item European Union Centre of North Carolina, 7.
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However, because of the fact that they differ with the U.S. in many ways the long run effectiveness of the EU’s policies is being speculated on a lot lately. Correspondingly, the answer to the question whether the EU’s policies are effective or not will be given in the next chapter by making a comparison with those of the U.S.

**CHAPTER 5: THE COMPARISON OF THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN ATTITUDES REGARDING IRAN**

Iran’s WMD problem poses critical challenges for both the U.S. and the EU. Today Iran’s evident drive toward nuclear weapons is the major crisis in the international community and given the economic success and political stability of the U.S. and the EU, and each having an important position on the world scene, their policies against Iran carry great importance. There is a common agreement among writers such as Einhorn and Kagan that deep divisions between the U.S. and the EU, as a result of the case of Iraq, have become even more concrete regarding Iran. Even by looking at public opinions about Iran on two sides, the divergence can be clearly understood. According to a survey conducted in 2007 by German Marshall Fund of United States, while 83 percent of Americans consider Iran as a serious nuclear threat, only 54 percent of Europeans think Iran may cause a danger in the future.261 Great attention has been given to this poll in this chapter because this paper acknowledges the fact that public has a great role in policy making. Public opinion matters for political leaders and can cause changes in leaders’ decisions. In this regard, impact of elite position cannot be underestimated and this is also what Snyder emphasizes. Accordingly, these differences in public opinions between two parties concerning Iran are also reflected in policies regarding Iran.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, neither the U.S nor the EU has had close relations with Iran after the 1979 U.S. embassy take over. In addition, increasing tendency towards Sharia, violation of human rights in the country, problems concerning the support for Islamic terrorism, antagonism against Israel and lastly and more importantly nuclear activism, necessitated special attention towards Iran. Therefore, dimensions of the relations have changed and bilateral relations have become prominent. Early on in this paper, bilateral relations of both parties with Iran in the light of the effects of their strategic cultures were discussed and thus, a

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ground was prepared for a comparison. Basically, this chapter will focus on their diverging negotiating styles and policies. Thus, a comparison will be made between the two actors regarding Iran and while doing this, capabilities, diverging policies and threat perceptions will be evaluated. Also, as it is understood from the analyses on strategic culture, the impact of the image of the U.S. as a coercive power that favors military action and the EU as a soft power will be examined.

There is a common agreement among writers such as Dominguez, Kagan and Einhorn that one of the most distinguishing characteristics between the U.S. and the EU is their diverging images. Thus, the U.S. is said to be a coercive power which acts unilaterally whereas the EU is seen as a civilian power which respects international law and institutions. According to Sauer, coercive diplomacy includes threats to use economic sanctions and military actions.\(^{262}\) Consequently, since economic sanctions and threats of the use of military actions constitute an important part of the U.S policy concerning Iran, one can claim that the U.S. follows a coercive policy towards Iran.

First of all, this increasing reliance of the U.S. on military power confirms the American coercive image. Considering the importance of military power in the U.S. strategic culture, reliance on military action is not a new event. Especially, with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, this characteristic of the US became obvious. Also the division between the EU and the US is most stark over whether military force should remain on the table.\(^{263}\) It is clearly understood from the poll given above, the majority of the Americans see Iran as a great threat and accordingly, in the Security Strategy Paper, it is written that the primary threat to U.S. security requires the U.S. to use every tool in its arsenal including military power.\(^{264}\) Correspondingly, after the incident in the Strait of Hormuz,\(^{265}\) President Bush openly threatened Iran to declare war by saying that “We have made it very clear, and they know our position, and that is: There will be serious consequences if they attack our ships, pure and simple... they're going to have to take responsibility for the consequences if they do it again”\(^{266}\) and this confirmed the American highly...

\(^{262}\) Sauer, 614.
\(^{263}\) Martin H. Curtis, Good cop/Bad Cop. As a Model for Nonproliferation Diplomacy toward North Korea and Iran, The Nonproliferation Review, 14:1, p.67.
\(^{265}\) Five Iranian patrol boats had been accused of threatening US warships in the Strait of Hormuz. The Patrol boats were accepted as an act of provocation by the US and tension arose among the US and Iran.
favored militarism image in the eyes of world media. According to Larisa Alexandrovna from the Huntington post, the U.S. navy quite literally almost declared war on Iran.\textsuperscript{267} Moreover, she goes on and says “We have created hysteria over a WMD threat, which fell apart. We later claimed that Iran was behind the insurgency in Iraq (most of the foreign fighters are Saudis by the way), which did not sell all that well either. We then went on to claim that Iran is why we are losing the war in Iraq and that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are the ones providing the IEDs that are being used against our soldiers.”\textsuperscript{268} In sum, she basically calls the U.S. an offensive power, which is ready to fight anytime. What is more interesting is that the 2006 National Security Strategy of the US confirms her claims by implicitly stating that the United States can no longer simply rely on defensive measures. As it is written that “New strategic environment requires new approaches to deterrence and... offense is necessary to deter ” \textsuperscript{269} Moreover, “the U.S. has shown its military card ostentatiously, if only implicitly, in its campaign against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, which resulted in the military encirclement of Iran”\textsuperscript{270} Accordingly, the U.S. proved its aggressiveness and caused fear and resentment in Iran.

Secondly, economic sanctions constitute an important part of this coercive policy. In order to understand this, it would be better to analyze the existing relations. As mentioned above, sanctions form a major part of the U.S. policies against Iran. Following the 1979 U.S. embassy take over in Tehran, the U.S. began to implement the policy of sanctions against Tehran and today still its strongest foreign policy tool against Iran is sanctions. Accordingly, because of sanctions, the U.S.-Iranian relations remain tense. While many writers support the view that harsh American sanctions against Iran are needless, the U.S. government believes in their effectiveness and favors further sanctions. Correspondingly, Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns, an important aide of Bush claimed that sanctions against Iran were meant to prevent war and thus he described this policy as an essential component of American strategy.\textsuperscript{271} Accordingly, those sanctions raise concerns about how serious the U.S. is about stopping Iran from becoming a nuclear power. In order to convince Iran, the U.S. targets main Iranian arteries so that sanctions

\textsuperscript{268} Alexandrovna
\textsuperscript{269} National Security Strategy of the US, 2006, P.22.
\textsuperscript{270} Martin, 70.
would cause suffering and ease Iran’s insistence on ballistic missile. For instance, instead of famous the ILSA sanction which was “...viewed as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law and a convention of U.S. World Trade Organization commitments”\textsuperscript{272}, the bank measures could emerge as the most significant step taken because the financial institutions targeted Bank Melli, Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat, which are among Iran's largest.\textsuperscript{273} However, even though both the U.S. and the EU prefer sanctions against Iran, it is hard to say that they use the same methods. While the EU favors well-planned targeted sanctions which avoid hurting non-state entities and individuals\textsuperscript{274}, the U.S. prefers unilateral sanctions. Thus, the strict U.S. sanctions, instead of hitting the Iranian government, hit civilians. They aim at squeezing Iranian economy so that economically deprived Iranians will pressure the government to alter course on nuclear government and even for a regime change.\textsuperscript{275}

According to Einhorn and Martin, the U.S. played the bad cop in relations with Iran. Also, as Curtis claims states may be bad cops depending on their self-attributed role concepts in world politics, their leadership profile, their strategic culture and the resources available to them.\textsuperscript{276} In this regard, considering the deeply rooted U.S. strategic culture, their self-trust as a world leader and their considerably high military spending, it can be seen that the U.S. has already endorsed this role. Especially, in the Iran case the U.S. has been criticized a lot because of its coercive isolationist attitudes which favor strict sanctions. With respect to military assets, its superiority and unmatched power projection capabilities give the U.S. the ability unilaterally to strike Iran.\textsuperscript{277} Thus far, especially the Bush administration was really harsh on Iran. It was in his period, they branded Iran a member of the “axis evil”, urged the IAEA board to find Iran in compliance with the NPT and to send the matter to the Security Council, opposed all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including Russia’s construction of a power reactor at Bushehr; and broke off even limited bilateral contacts with Iran.\textsuperscript{278} Thus, it can be said that, they adopted a threatening, hostile,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Abramowitz and Wright.
\item Bruno
\item Martin, 64.
\item Martin, 67.
\item Einhorn 29.
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\end{footnotesize}
isolationist and abusive manner, issuing repeated sanctions.\textsuperscript{279} Moreover, isolation of Iran can cause its withdrawal from NPT and enable the country to prioritize nuclear weapons which would in return lead to a “...sustained conflict, regional instability and even nuclear war”\textsuperscript{280}. Thus, considering the drawbacks, the U.S.’s coercive and isolationist manners against Iran are not successful policies at all.

While the U.S. maintained the view that Iran could only be changed through pressure and sanctions, Europe refused to follow this lead and rejected the imposition of harsh sanctions on Iran. As a result, there were frequent transatlantic dissonances over how to behave against Iran. This first shows itself in how both powers approach Iran. Thus, as mentioned above, contrary to U.S., Europe is regarded as a civilian power. They have a tradition and history of being a civilian actor. Looking at the Union’s short history, there are no invasions, no wars or no visible interventions. Even though, they are recently in the process of forming an army, they consider it as a last resort. They rely on law, on negotiations and on multilateral organizations. Javier Solana also approved this at a speech in Dublin, as he said, “Men and women in the street want us to be able to support democratic government, to defend human rights and the rule of law”\textsuperscript{281}. Thus, by establishing military forces they aim at conflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian intervention. Clearly, “...using military force does not go down well with European democratic publics when the issue is not one of existential survival – unless an imminent humanitarian crisis or genocide is unfolding, accompanied by heavy media coverage”\textsuperscript{282}. Consequently, Europe remains a model of soft power and does not constitute a military threat to Iran, as America of hard power. Therefore, the EU-3 employs soft power tools like diplomacy and thus, Iranian relations takes place on the ground of negotiations and proves to be healthier.

Correspondingly, in the Iran case all the roles, as a good cop and soft power, assumed by the EU necessitate a closer examination. According to Sullivan the most important characteristics of soft power are “...getting people to do what you want by getting them to want what you want”\textsuperscript{283}. In this regard, basically in the October 2004 EU-3 proposal, the EU-3 wanted Iran to suspend all his enrichment programs, sign the Additional Protocol and comply with the NPT and

\textsuperscript{279} Martin, 62
\textsuperscript{281} Speech by Javier Solana, 3.
IAEA. In return, they offered Iran a package of incentives. Thus, on nuclear energy they declared that the EU-3 would;

“...reaffirm Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in conformity with Article 2 of the NPT; recognize Iran’s right to a nuclear power program and support Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of nuclear power reactors and fuel supply and management; provide political assurances of Iranian access to the international fuel market, at market prices, consistent with NSG assurances, with spent fuel being returned and reprocessed outside Iran; cooperate with Iran in the field of nuclear safety and physical protection; and support Iranian acquisition of a light water research reactor.”

In this way they wanted to make Iran want what they want and this clearly proves the soft power characteristics of the EU. On the other hand, when it comes to “the good cop” role, it rests on the fact of the EU-3 being the mediator between the U.S. and Iran and thus, its long resistance against U.S. efforts to persuade the UN and the IAEA to declare Iran in noncompliance with the NPT and to punish it and on its strong oppositions to regime change in Iran. In addition, the EU’s 2003 statement of basic nonproliferation principles stressed diplomatic prevention and reserved coercion as a last resort, and then only under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As a result, they gain the target’s trust and they encourage Iran to cooperate in order to dissuade as opposed to the U.S. which tries to achieve its goal by creating fear among the Iranian people.

On the contrary, as mentioned above, the U.S. does not hide its intentions favoring a change of regime in Iran as the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once explicitly stated “We do not have a problem with the Iranian people. We want the Iranian people to be free. Our problem is with the Iranian regime.” Also, in the State of the Union Address in 2006, President Bush concluded that “...if Iran becomes a democratic and free country one day, two countries can be close friends”. Not to mention the Iran Democracy Act of 2003, which was “...be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America” and would “provide democracy in Iran” but this was never actualized. However, Javier Solana, answering questions concerning a regime change in Iran in an interview on ITV’s Jonathan Dimbleby

283 Sullivan, 5.
284 Samore, 7.
285 Martin, 71.
287 President Bush’s State of the Union Address, 31 January 2006, p.4.
program, said “That would be a mistake. That will complicate enormously the situation”\(^\text{290}\). Therefore, as reflected in Javier Solana’s statement, the EU-3’s policy is directed towards a behavior change in the country rather than a regime change.

On the other hand, the EU’s most powerful diplomacy tool against Iran is trade. Therefore, Iran sees its growing commercial ties with Europe as a source of leverage over Europeans and does not want to risk it. The EU-3 identifies the red-lines for Iran as “...failure to implement and maintain a comprehensive suspension of enrichment activities, IAEA detection of clandestine nuclear activities or facilities, and failure to cooperate with IAEA”\(^\text{291}\) and makes it clear that specific consequences will ensue if these red-lines are crossed. The EU-3 follows a carrot and stick approach towards Iran and promises to enhance high-technology and trade while providing assistance in all respects. It can be said that as opposed to the US, European sticks have usually taken the form of deferred carrots, such as the EU’s postponement of further talks with Iran, threat to take away future gains or scaling back existing cooperation.\(^\text{292}\) In doing so the EU does not hurt Iranians but disciplines the government regarding the WMD. In this framework, it can be claimed that the EU-3- Iranian relations are based on well-planned action and thus, each side is aware of the expectations and limits of the other. Therefore, considering the fact that the EU-3 was successful in convincing Iran to sign the Additional Protocol under such circumstances, bilateral relations are said to be more efficient. However, as mentioned earlier in this paper, it is not possible to talk about an official U.S.-Iran dialogue. Because of the fact that two countries do not have direct embassies, diplomatic relations are insufficient and hostile. Thus, besides the U.S. coercive policies, the chaotic, unplanned environment of the U.S.-Iranian relations remains as another big obstacle to their bilateral relations.

In conclusion, it is clear that non-proliferation diplomacy toward Iran has exhibited some characteristics of the U.S. and the EU. Although they both aim to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, they favor different policies, follow different paths. Considering their clashing policies it can be said that the U.S. and Europe are fundamentally different today. Different points of view have naturally produced differing judgments, policies, expectations and calculations. Accordingly, while the EU favors diplomatic tools, negotiations, binding trade

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\(^{289}\) Iran Democracy Act


\(^{291}\) Einhorn 29.

\(^{292}\) Einhorn, 29.
agreements and mild sanctions, the U.S. insists on its coercive policies namely severe sanctions, isolation policies and military threat. Correspondingly, good cop/bad cop roles did not emerge naturally but those attitudes and social influence have had profound role in uncovering them. With respect to those characterizations, the EU has already assumed the role of a friendly, kind partner who deserves to be reciprocated. However, the U.S. draws negative responses especially after declaring its desire of a regime change in Iran. Thus, on the Iran side stimulation and experience of unpleasant conditions and events cause economic and political anxiety and frustration and thus, these feelings shape its perception of the U.S. as well as its actions against the U.S. Basically, coercion is what fuels Iranians aggressiveness. In sum, it is overt that the transatlantic alliance which seemed to be over after the Iraq war became more invisible with Iran and thus, each side decided to follow its own path. While the EU strengthened their image of civilian power, the U.S. remained insistent on its coercive policy.

CONCLUSION

Iran’s covert nuclear program and outright lies about uranium-enrichment capacity was found out and carefully documented by the IAEA and thus, have made all the key players deeply skeptical about Iran’s activities and the future of the global nonproliferation regime. Considering the facts that Middle East is a problematic region and Iran is insistent on the nuclear program, the issue necessitates extra sensitivity and attention. In this regard, policies of the two great powers, the EU and the U.S. are of paramount importance. What is expected from them is to unify their power and work together closely to deter Iran and to alter its calculations of benefit and risk regarding the nuclear program. However, although there is an important consensus between the U.S. and the EU that Iran should be stopped, views and policies differ across the Atlantic on whether mild sanctions or coercive policies should be implemented to Iran. As it can be seen clearly, the U.S. and the EU have not even overcome the division they had over Iraq and today effects of this controversy can be evidently felt even more profoundly in Iran. Thus, while the EU-3 tries to deter Iran through negotiations, mild sanctions and binding trade agreements, the U.S. uses strict sanctions, follows isolationist policies and prefers a threatening manner. As a result, it becomes hard for the two powers to find a common approach and so their relations with Iran are based on different grounds.
Today with its nuclear ambition Iran has become a key concern for the world. Especially, the declaration of the secret plants has put the EU and the U.S. on alert. Thus, the challenge it poses to regional stability and non-proliferation is palpable. Furthermore, Iran’s controversial president, who remains insistent on nuclear activity, imparts a sense of urgency to the problem. For this reason, the international community is looking for possible solutions regarding Iran. The most plausible one seems to be “To compensate Iran for giving up the right to produce reactor fuel. Major nuclear suppliers including Russia, the United States and certain European countries would provide binding guarantee for Iran to receive fuel-cycle-services- the supply of fresh reactor fuel as well as retrieval and storage of spent fuel-on a commercial basis for any nuclear power reactors that it builds as long as it meets its commitments”\textsuperscript{293}. In this regard, the EU-3 favors such a solution whereas the U.S. is reluctant to accept it because this approach “…permits Iran to build nuclear power reactors which is inconsistent with the current U.S. position which opposes all nuclear reactors in Iran, including the 1,000 megawatt reactor the Russians are constructing at Bushehr\textsuperscript{294}. Thus, while the EU accepts this policy as a way of easing tension between the West and Iran, the U.S. sees it as a source of another threat. Correspondingly, this disagreement also reveals the different calculations and threat perceptions of the two powers. To make matters worse, this is not the only point on which the two powers have clashing ideas.

Accordingly, today the transatlantic disagreement, in short is problem of method and clashing methods between the U.S. and the EU over Iran show great resemblance to the theory of strategic culture, found by Jack Snyder. Jack Snyder establishes strong causal relations between state’s cultures and behaviors and thus, in this way he develops better explanations for the policy differences among states. Snyder explicitly accepts history, geography, capabilities and values as determinants of state’s actions and in the Iran case it is possible to see the reflections of these characteristics in the U.S and EU policies. Stemming from this, it can be said that differences between the U.S. and the EU approaches on negotiations, sanctions and deterrents reflect real differences in strategic thinking and “…bespeak the development of separate and distinct strategic cultures”\textsuperscript{295}. Thus, as a result of the deeply rooted U.S. strategic culture, the U.S. has developed some self-attributed roles throughout history and today these roles directly affect its relations with other countries. Accordingly, its self-trust as a world leader, its reliance on military power and its

\textsuperscript{293} Einhorn, 25.
\textsuperscript{294} Einhorn, 26.
\textsuperscript{295} Snyder 22.
self-attributed mission of intervening is also assertive in its relations with Iran. In contrast, the strategic culture of the EU differs greatly because of the fact that it is under the great influence of its deeply rooted soft power characteristics. Even though, with the ESDP and the ESS the EU has proved its strategic culture capability, its long history as a civilian power insistent on democratic values and multilateralism has shaped the strategic culture of the EU differently from that of the U.S. Thus, democratic values are the key determining factors of the EU policies and its rejection of unjust coercive policies and disproportionate use of force have their roots in those values. Accordingly, in relations with Iran, the EU also makes use of these values. The EU enjoys its ability to attract and persuade and prefers mild sanctions. Therefore, methods of the U.S. and the EU are diverging and it is getting harder for them to understand each other. On one side, there is the EU-3 whose policies is designed by tough rhetoric and its willingness to support multilateralism and diplomacy; on the other side there is the U.S. which remains resistant to persuasion and cooperation and rather prefers harsh sanctions and military means. Thus, while the EU-3 enjoys increasing economic ties and their binding power over Iran, specifically tightened sanctions and threatening attitudes are preferred in the U.S.-Iranian relations.

Especially with the Iraq war, aim and essence of the U.S. sanctions and policies had come into question. Later, on the Iran issue, the U.S. with its military forces and facilities encircling Iran and an administration that was in favor of a regime change and harsh sanctions attracted much reaction from the international community. Furthermore, the U.S. did not hesitate to use its economic superiority and prestige in international organizations when dealing with Iran. It has been using diplomacy and politics to isolate Iran since the crisis began in 2002 and pressuring organizations like UN and IAEA to do the same. However, here the major concern is that isolating Iran can have great consequences. This would not only encourage Iran’s nuclear ambition more but also foster regional instability and even lead to a nuclear war. Furthermore, another major concern regarding the sanction regime of the U.S. is that they harm civilians. Considering that even “...international banks and financial institutions are becoming unwilling to take on Iranian transactions for fear of attracting US Treasury Department penalties”

296 Özcan, Özdamar, 126.
297 Gottemoeller, 10.

Also, there are the ILSA sanctions designed to prevent Iran from developing the domestic capability “...to exploit its vast gas and oil reserves by
threatening to sanction foreign firms wishing to invest there. Thus it is explicit that, as well as the Iranian government, the U.S. also targets Iranian people and it is the Iranians who suffer the most from those sanctions.

In sum, it can be said that Iran had long been the focus of unilateral U.S. attempts to isolate or to force a regime change in the county through sanctions. Thus, this stood as the biggest obstacle to the development of the U.S.-Iranian relations and consequently, reduced the effectiveness of the U.S. policies regarding Iran’s nuclear program and WMD. On the contrary, the EU followed a smart policy in Iran. Through negotiations and targeted sanctions, it increased the effectiveness of its policies and thus, established healthier relations with Iran than the U.S. did. It prioritized negotiations and insisted on the continuation of talks even during tense periods. Furthermore, improved relations and strong trade ties under such circumstances strengthened the position of the EU-3. Thus, the EU-3 not only succeeded in convincing Iran to sign the additional protocol but by being a mediator between the U.S. and Iran, proved its decisiveness in solving this conflict. Consequently, this relationship serves in the interest of the EU and eases the tension between the West and Iran to a considerable degree. In sum, even though the fact that Iran’s WMD problem still exists and thus, is impossible to talk about certain outcomes, it turns out that so far Iran has been quite a success story for the EU.

By looking at the efforts the EU-3 and the U.S. have exerted since 2002, it is possible to reach the conclusion that because of the logic and history of their strategy, the U.S. and the EU follow different paths today. Their strategic cultures are shaped under the effects of different historical circumstances, different geographies, diverging values, and incompatible capabilities. Stemming from this, they have developed different policies, expectations and calculations. They have done what they considered as appropriate or correct in order to deal with Iran. As a result, they differ in their approaches: the U.S. remaining insistent on its coercive, unilateral policy whereas the EU strengthening its image of a civilian power and preferring to establish mutually respected relations on the basis of negotiations and trade ties.

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