The English School as a Roadmap to Societal Stability
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Introduction

Often when countries are faced with wrecked state-structures after times of turmoil, Western state leaders, representatives of NGOs and citizens could be heard promoting the importance of human rights and democracy in processes of post-conflict reconstruction. The leaders of the government involved, however, stress the importance of stability, economic progress and well-protected state borders. Who is right and what should have priority are questions difficult to answer. Participants in this discussion would eventually find themselves in the trenches of some kind of liberalism versus realism debate. Neither of these theories, I believe, is satisfactory. A realist approach would leave me ill equipped to value the role of human rights, or democracy perhaps. And a liberal theory would not do justice to the importance of having well-protected state borders in an anarchic world.

There is another option, the English School. This school of International Relations acknowledges the relations between some states could best be characterized by the absence of an overarching power, by the absence of a Leviathan. In such relations defined by anarchy, realism has most explanatory power. The English School theory recognizes that in other situations states are bound by rules when it comes to interstate relations. In such situations, where states have overcome anarchy, a liberal theory would best be able to explain state behaviour. In a way, the education I received in the bachelor and master International Relations fits neatly with the way the English School sees realism, liberalism, and also constructivism not as metanarratives, but as tools in a toolbox of which the student should know how and when to use.

Besides recognizing the strengths of both realism and liberalism in explaining interstate relations, the English School believes the non-state side of society should be taken into account. However, this non-state society, dubbed ‘world society’, has not been developed in a systematic fashion by the English School scholars. This has undermined the school’s explanatory potential. Barry Buzan came to terms with the ‘world society’ dimension of the English School in his book From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Besides giving the ‘world society’ dimension the badly needed attention, Buzan claims that unlike the classical English School, his version of the theory allows for the interplay between global and sub-global levels; regionalism. In fact, it not only allows for regionalism, Buzan states that his version of the English School could not be understood without regionalism.¹ Such regionalism, as will be shown in this thesis, allows a scholar to take into account the regional as well as the global context in which a society is situated.

So Buzan has delivered a more complete version of the English School that could also be used to analyse processes on a less than global level. What makes Buzans English School even more interesting is its low level of abstraction. Buzan specifies to a considerable extent who are the players and what rules, or institutions, they have to observe. In this way, the theory not only makes general claims about how players act or should act in trans-border situations, but also could be used as a clear roadmap to identify institutional imbalances on a global and sub-global level.

With such a holist approach to both state and non-state societies in hand, do we have a tool to judge post-conflict policies in ways realism or liberalism could not? Or more specifically, and this is the

question I wish to answer in this thesis: In which measure could Buzan’s theory identify strengths and weaknesses in post-conflict reconstruction strategies?

Why exactly is this question relevant? Very often we can see post-conflict strategies being influenced by donors from the Western hemisphere. Institutions like the World Bank and IMF demand more freedom for market forces. Donor states have human rights and democracy high on their agenda. While both the freedom of market forces and principles of human rights have merits on their own, they might not be very well applicable to a specific regional context. In the English School theory, the role of institutions is very important. And with Buzan’s English School as a tool in hand, we can identify the regional institutional context in which a state is situated. This version of the English School allows students of international relations to understand what are the values held in the environment in which a state is to integrate. Such understanding is vital for reconstruction strategies to be successful.

Answering the research question, in my opinion, could not be done without some form of empirical illustration. Therefore, I will use the post civil-war situation in Northern Uganda as the subject of an experiment in which I apply Buzan’s theory to post-conflict strategies. I hesitate to call this experiment a case study, for this would require a level of completeness that lies beyond this thesis. What is more, I believe an in-depth application of Buzan’s theory would need a considerable amount of field-work by researchers with perhaps an anthropological background. Hence, the centre of gravity of this thesis was never meant to be the situation in Northern Uganda. Central in this thesis is the usefulness of Buzan’s theory as a research methodology.

Because Buzan’s interpretation of the English School is not common knowledge, I believe it is important to explain his theory in the first chapter of this thesis; what is Buzan’s theory and what is the relevance of institutions? In the second chapter I will attempt to apply the theory to an actual situation, Northern Uganda. Again, the goal of this thesis is not to show weaknesses, or strengths, of this specific post-conflict reconstruction situation. The goal of this thesis is to show how Buzan’s theory encourages scholars to effectively and systematically analyse the presence or absence of institutions in a certain region, both within a state and a non-state context. It forces scholars to approach post-conflict situations with an open mind. An open mind that often is the first to perish in the cacophony of voices crying for human rights, democracy, strong leaders or strong borders.
Chapter 1: Buzan’s English School explained

This first chapter is written for four purposes. First, to show the relevance and value of the English School (ES) theory within international relations. Second, to explain how Barry Buzan’s three domain approach of the interstate society (the relations between states), transnational society (relations between groups of people who together do not constitute a state) and interhuman society (individuals and the way they are organized) has contributed to the English School. The third goal is to show how every society could be classified on a scale from divided to integrated, but can also be classified as being based on coercion, calculation or belief. The fourth goal of this chapter is explaining the interplay between Buzan’s three domains of interstate society, transnational society and interhuman society. Why are the three domains interdependent and what is the role of institutions in this story? These four goals contribute to create a better understanding of Barry Buzan’s interpretation of the English School and to allow us to answer the question what is the relevance of institutions on a global scale, which is the overarching objective of this chapter. Each part of this chapter is linked to one of the four goal.

In the first paragraph, the conventional English School will be discussed including their basic categories like international system, international society and world society? What is the position of the English School vice other schools of thought, as liberalism and realism? Why is the English School dubbed ‘rational’ and ‘holist’? What are weaknesses of the theory that motivated Barry Buzan to reinterpret the three domains in his book From International System to International society?

Buzan’s book itself will be discussed in the second paragraph. The book should be seen as a fundamental reinterpretation of the conventional English School in that it dismisses the division between the ideas of international system and international society. Buzan merges both notions in one single domain, the interstate domain. Where the conventional school of thought believed one domain for non-state activities (world society) would be enough, Buzan argues this domain should be split up into a domain for groups and a domain for individuals. In the second paragraph I explain why.

In the third part of this chapter it will be shown how actors within the three domains can be integrated or disintegrated on the one hand, and by what means they are integrated on the other hand. Each domain can be placed on a scale from loosely integrated to closely integrated. This integration can be brought about by the mechanism of coercion, calculation and belief. How these mechanism interact with the level integration (from loosely integrated to closely integrated) of the actors will also be discussed.

An important part of this chapter, part four, focusses on the role of institutions. In each domain of society, certain institutions need to be promoted for the society to be stable. When different domains promote conflicting institutions, instability is likely. For instance, Buzan’s theory predicts that when cosmopolitan institutions of human rights are promoted in one domain, and Westphalian institutions of territoriality and sovereignty in the other, a conflict may be the result. 2 In the fourth part of this chapter, the following question will be answered: In what kind of interstate domain do we live at the moment? Do we live in a Westphalian society characterized by coexistence, or has the interstate domain developed past this point, towards a cosmopolitan society?

I will identify the current international society as a society which states interact to coexist. However, as the number of intergovernmental and international organizations increases, cooperation between states now often goes beyond the facilitation of coexistence; the society of

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2 Barry Buzan claims perfect institutional balance might not be achievable, and institutional imbalances might as well be a cause for change. However, Buzan shows he is aware of the interdependent relation between many important institutions. Buzan, From International to World Society?, 250-251.
states becomes somewhat cooperative. Any state seeking stability, both internally and externally, would do good to take the institutions that belong to the coexistence-cooperation model into account.

§ 1: Traditional English School explained
When it comes to describing the current world order, the English School theory is able to improve on both realism and idealism. English School scholars claim there is a “remarkably high level of order, and surprisingly little inter-state violence, given the absence of a world-wide monopoly of power.”\(^3\) In other words; the lack of a ‘Leviathan’ to call states to order does not appear to be a source of international anarchy. The current conflicts on the world stage seem to be waged against the state, not between states.\(^4\) Global international relations are far more pacific than a neo-realist would predict. On the account of neo liberalism, English School scholars recognize that an interdependent international order, in which armed conflicts are increasingly becoming absent because actors (people, groups and states) come to economically depend on each other, does not exist. According to Andrew Linklater, professor of International Politics at the University of Aberystwyth, English School scholars “gravitate towards the middle ground, never reconciling themselves to either idealism or realism.”\(^5\) Barry Buzan is somewhat more ambitious, claiming that the English School not just complements, but also transcends the meta-stories of realism and liberalism: “It (English School theory, tvc) is, instead, an opportunity to step outside that game, and cultivate a more holistic, integrated approach to the study of international relations.”\(^6\)

The English School has a holist character. Scholars within the English School believe every society has three components, which reflect the realist, the neo-liberal and cosmopolitan dimensions of that society. The current international relations are made up of an ‘international system’ of states coexisting in a state of anarchy. In this state of anarchy, each state is only interested in its own survival, and never can be sure it will not be invaded by another state. This ‘international system’ represents the realist strand. Besides the ‘international system’ there is an ‘international society’ consisting of states which, “conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”\(^7\) In this international society one would see the presence of a considerable number of intergovernmental organizations. The ‘international society’ represents a Grotius (liberal) way of theorizing international relations. Cosmopolitanism is represented by ‘world society’ (the third component) which takes “individuals, non-state organizations, and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements.”\(^8\) The three domains exist next to each other, hence the holistic character of the English School.

Apart from the holistic character, the English School has also been called rational. The reason

\(^4\) For instance, the state is threatened by religious extremist movements, or by drug cartels.
\(^5\) Linklater, 87.
\(^8\) Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School”, *International Organization* 47, iss. 3 (June 1993): 337.
for this is twofold. The first reason is the constructivist character of the theory. The constructivist character of the theory is induced by the way the English School allows for both social structures in International Relations, and the way these structures have come about historically.⁹ Concretely, this means there is a high level of interplay between the international society (society of states) and the world society (society of non-state actors) in the English School of International Relations.¹⁰ This level of interplay could be contrasted to realism, which says fairly little about the way a state is constituted by its citizenry. For the English School, the actions in one domain, say the strengthening of world society, has consequences for the international society domain.¹¹ Second, The English School, at least in Buzan’s picture, allows for uncivil societies.¹² With such recognition of uncivil societies, the English School differs from both realism and liberalism. In the English School, the term ‘civil’ in ‘civil society’ could have the meaning of being the opposite, of being ‘barbaric’. Liberalism, especially in the early liberal notions of the civil society, lacks the ability to come to terms with the uncivil, barbaric, side of civil society.¹³ ‘Civil’ could be placed in juxtaposition of the state. It are the realists who have problems accommodating concepts of group processes happening outside state structures. In short, the English School increases its explanative value by allowing for uncivil and non-state structures.

The idea that international relations revolve around the three domains of international system, international society and world society at first sight appears to be a sturdy starting point to conduct analyses of certain phenomena within IR. Especially when taking into account there needs to be harmony between the three domains to achieve stability in the society as a whole. However, a big flaw within the theory is the fact that the category of ‘world society’ has little been elaborated.¹⁴

§ 2: Buzan’s interpretation and modification of the English School
In his book *From International to World Society*, influential English School theorist Barry Buzan gave some much-needed attention to the ‘world society’ in the English School. The goal of Buzan’s book was to explain the idea of world society. The most important argument for doing this is that this term is underdeveloped in English School literature. World society is a pillar in much of the English School literature and simply must be reinforced if the theory is to develop any further.¹⁵

Some English School scholars have been using the term ‘world society’ in the same way as ‘globalisation’. Barry Buzan takes another approach and states: “My starting point is that there is not much to be gained, and quite a lot to be lost analytically, from simply using world society as a label for the totality of human interaction in all forms and at all levels. Globalisation has that role already. My initial strategy will be to construct world society as a concept to capture the non-state side of the

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¹⁰ Ibid, 197.
¹¹ Whether a more tightly integrated world society strengthens or weakens the interstate society, is still debated within English School literature. There are those who believe the strengthening of world society will cause a more robust international society, and those who believe in the exact opposite. Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman, “Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School - Scenarios for an encounter”, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 1 (March 2002): 49.
¹² Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 85.
¹⁴ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 1.
¹⁵ Ibid, 11.
international system, and therefore as the complement/opponent to the already well-developed idea of international society.”

Buzan reinterprets the English School’s three domains (international system, international society and world society) and claims they should be named the interstate domain; which is the domain of relations between states, the transnational domain; interaction between firms, NGOs, mafias, and the interhuman domain; interaction between individuals. In any society, there is an interplay between the three domains. In the following it will be explained how Buzan came to this.

2.1 From international system and international society to one interstate domain
For reasons of clarity, it might be useful first to delineate the notion of state. Buzan takes the state to be:

“Any form of post-kinship, territorially-based, politically centralized, self-governing entity capable of generating an inside-outside structure.”

Indeed, and the author is well aware of this, such delineation of the state is rather wide. Arguably, entities such as the EU and the Holy Roman Empire in the past, can be called states in certain periods of time. The territory of the EU is subject to regular changes when new states join, and states arguably still have enough sovereignty to leave the EU. Hence the EU in its current form can be classified as a state only reluctantly. Still, as the day to day processes of lawmaking within the European Union have increasingly come to resemble internal state politics as opposed to interstate politics, the EU could be defined as a federal state, if not in a very loose form.

Buzan keeps the special role the English School has devoted to the state, intact: “I want to preserve the distinctive idea of a society of states in order to acknowledge the special role of the state in the overall picture of human relations, while at the same time acknowledging the significance of other elements (cosmopolitanism, TNAs) in that picture.” Buzan finds the rationale for emphasizing the state in the central role of the state in “processes of law, organised violence, taxation, political legitimacy, territoriality and in some ways social identity.” However, despite the importance of the state, Buzan believes English School theory could be advanced by contributing only one domain to the state, instead of the two state-domains in traditional English School literature.

The reason Buzan deviates from traditional literature is the following. In English School literature, relations between states could be classified as either an international system or an international society. The international system has been defined as a group of states which maintain only physical relations; the actions of one state towards another are not influenced by social relations between those states but only by the distribution of means. States in an international society also relate to each other in social ways, they socialize each other. A situation of two states having only physical relations with each other is, however, hard to imagine. Buzan believes there are but two situations in which only physical relations are manifest. The first is in a war of extermination.

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16 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 2.
17 Ibid, 198.
18 Ibid, 92.
19 Ibid, 195.
20 Ibid, 91.
21 Ibid.
Like, as Buzan illustrates, between the Mongols and the agrarian civilizations of China in the 13th century. Another example of two states relating to each other in a purely physical manner can be found in the trading system between China and classical Rome. Because goods were traded via so many different merchants between Rome and China, relations between the two were not social in any way. The situations of wars of extermination and relay trade occur seldom, if at all, nowadays.

The point Buzan makes is that essentially all interstate interaction is social. Interstate relations characterized by pure physical relations are so rare that it would be curious to place such relations in a special category. Therefore, the distinction between the international system and the international society becomes obsolete and it would be far more logical to place all international relations in one international domain. Or in the words of Buzan: “Physical elements such as the distribution of power, and the nature of interaction remain central to the analysis of all social systems. What changes is that the physical aspect ceases to provide the principal basis for distinguishing one type of international system from another. Instead of thinking in a frame of two basic forms (international systems and international societies), this move pushes one inexorably down the path of seeking a classification scheme for a spectrum of types of international society, an idea already inherent in Wendt’s famous proposition that ‘anarchy is what states make of it.’” What Buzan means is that relations between states are never only defined by power, nor can power ever be left out of the equation. To place relations between states in the two archetypes of international system and international society would have the implication of losing a lot of the nuance that exists between the two extremes.

Buzan’s book could be read as a critique on pluralists, those who believe international relations is a game of fully sovereign states guided by their own interests, driven only by a distribution of power. Buzan claims that influential English School authors like Martin Wight hold an unrealistically pluralist, Westphalian, notion of states. In such a view, in which states have complete sovereignty within their territory, any form of supranationalism would happen outside the state domain. However, Buzan does not define a state as having complete sovereignty within its territory. Therefore, within Buzan’s state domain, other entities than the purely Westphalian states can play a role. On the other hand, Buzan’s book could be read as critique on solidarists, those who believe that in the current state of affairs in international relations, states have become entangled with each other to such an extent it is impossible to see them as fully sovereign entities. According to Buzan, solidarists, as opposed to pluralists, also hold a too narrow definition of the state, namely as “only existing to promote the welfare and security of their citizens.” Such a vision prevailed in times of the mandate system of the League of Nations, where some states believed that ‘failed states’ had no right of existence. Buzan believes it is perfectly possible for states that are unable to promote the welfare and security of its’ citizens to participate in international relations.

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24 Ibid, 102.
25 Ibid, 94.
26 Indeed, entities like the European Union can be actors in Buzan’s interstate domain.
27 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 94.
28 “Society is not necessarily nice in a moral sense, and so is the state.” Ibid.
2.2 The interhuman and transnational domain: Buzan’s interpretation of world society

State actors have been pushed back in one state domain. What is left of the original three domains is the international domain as depicted above, and the domain of non-state units; world society. Buzan argues world society should be split up in an interhuman domain; the domain of individual human beings, and a transnational domain; the domain of groups of individuals.

In traditional English School literature, world society contains both non-state organizations and individuals. Is it right to put two inherently different types of in one domain? Buzan conducts a thought experiment. On the one hand he imagines how individuals can reach society and community levels of interaction on a global scale. On the other hand he imagines how groups of individuals can reach society and community levels of interaction on a global scale. According to Buzan, imagining a global society of individuals, an interhuman society, is problematic. “It is almost impossible to imagine a large-scale interhuman society or community coming into being without first going through many stages of development focused on collective units of one sort or another.” The entities created by individuals along the road to the interhuman global society are either states or non-state collectivities. Buzan does not believe in an interhuman society on a global scale but has more confidence in a global interhuman community based on a we-feeling: “It is much easier to see individuals in community terms of shared identity without encountering this problem.”

So an interhuman society on a large scale is nearly impossible, and an interhuman community on a large scale is, in fact, feasible. Can the same be said about a transnational society or community? No, not according to Buzan. In his view, a global transnational society is easy to imagine. Proof of this point of view he finds in the example of medieval Europe, where “both property rights and political rights were divided across a range of entities from guilds, crusading orders and monasteries; through bishops, barons and princes; to cities, Holy Roman emperors, and popes.” Imagining a transnational community, on the other hand, is much more problematic. Actors within the transnational domain are so diverse, the only thing they have in common is that they are not states. Such diversity makes a community based on shared identity, between groups of individuals within the transnational domain rather impossible.

Can the logics of the interhuman domain and the transnational domain be integrated in one world society domain? Not according to Buzan: “The ontological difference between individuals and transnational actors is profound, and it leads to quite different logics and potentialities in the way in which each of these types of units can or cannot form societies and communities.”

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29 Contractual social relations based on agreement. Buzan, From International to World Society?, 116.
30 Relations based on a we-feeling. Ibid.
31 Ibid, 123.
32 Ibid, 124.
33 With ‘transnational’ Buzan means relations between groups of people on a non-state level.

Found in Buzan, From International to World Society? 125.
36 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 127.
This second paragraph could be summarized in the following way. The state is such an important player in international relations as we know it, that the relations between states deserve a domain of their own, the interstate domain. In Buzan’s state domain also states not promoting the safety and security of civilians and non-Westphalian states find refuge. Maintaining two state domains (a system and a society) is not rational. There is no sensible distinction to be made between an international system and an international society. Both archetypes should be placed on the same spectrum.

Beside the state domain, the other two domains are identified as the interhuman domain and the transnational domain. It makes no sense to put both domains together under the heading world society because of their ontological difference. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the interhuman domain to form a global society, where a global community belongs to the possibilities. For the transnational domain it works the other way around. It is inconceivable for the diversity of actors in the transnational to form a global community. A global transnational society is more likely. Because of this fundamental difference, Buzan believes individuals and collectivities should not be placed in the same domain.

The three domains in Traditional English school

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>International system</th>
<th>International Society</th>
<th>World Society</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>Relations between states in which the way states interrelate is only determined by the distribution of power among states. States in an Hobbesian state of war.</td>
<td>A form of state interaction in which shared interest and identity has been institutionalized, and in which the maintenance of shared norms and rules is placed at the centre.</td>
<td>The way humankind, the totality of individuals, is organized beyond the state. This concepts points to something that could be called cosmopolitanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
<td>Rivalling states in times of war.</td>
<td>The society of Western states.</td>
<td>The way the internet allows people to unite beyond the state concept.</td>
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Buzan’s reinterpretation of the three domains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interstate Domain</th>
<th>Transnational Domain</th>
<th>Interhuman Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>Relations between states, based on the distribution of power on one extreme, integrated to the extend one could speak of confederalism on the other extreme.</td>
<td>Relations between groups of people which do not meet the criteria of constituting a state. These relations can transcend state borders.</td>
<td>The relations between individuals, which defines the way they are organized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
<td>On one end, relations between China and Mongolia in the 13th century could be seen as interstate relations in which only the distribution of power matters. On the other end, states within the EU are so far integrated one can speak of confederalism.</td>
<td>Relations between companies in an economic system. Relations between political parties. Or between ideological and religious movements. Or between mafias.</td>
<td>In some interhuman domains, individuals are divided in tribes, religious fractions or rivalling clans. In other interhuman domains, individuals are integrated to an extend one could speak of large-scale imagined societies; states.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

38 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, xvii.
39 Ibid, 1.
§ 3: The two dimensions of the three domains

An important part of Buzan’s interpretation of the English School concerns institutions. In each domain, certain institutions are important. And institutions present in one domain need support from other institutions in that domain, or in another domain. For instance, the institution of the market in the interstate domain needs economic liberty in the transnational domain. More on which institutions are present in the current global society of the three domains, and how these institutions interrelate and what their relation is with the three domains, could be found in part four of this chapter.

According to Buzan, the motives the actors in each domain have to promote certain institutions can be threefold. First, actors can be coerced to promote certain institutions. This way of socialization is rather weak and when institutions based on coercion have to compete with the second way of socialization, socialization based on calculation (a cost versus benefit way of reason), the institution based on coercion will disappear. The strongest way of socialization is socialization based on belief. In this paragraph I will explain for each of the domains what the different ways of socialization might look like.

Apart from the coercion-calculation-belief dimension, every domain can also be characterised as having a place on a continuum from a disintegrated to a very integrated society. To clarify, in the interstate domain we can see states finding themselves in an anarchical environment based on war (disintegrated). Or we can see states converging around common values up to a point their relations start to resemble internal state politics as opposed to international bargaining (integrated). How this plays out for each domain will also be subject of this part.

3.1 Socialization within the interstate domain

Within an interstate society, there is always some form of socialization taking place. An international society based on coercion is unlikely to survive when the outside enforcer is removed. The weakness of this system is illustrated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequently by the collapse of its associated empire. In a situation of calculation, the institution rests on a rational calculation of self-interest. A trading system, for example, will likely collapse when the costs of the membership outweigh the benefits. Most stable are institutions based on belief, where “actors support the social structure because they accept it as legitimate, and in so doing incorporate it into their own conception of their identity.” When the source of the socialization disappears, internalized norms will prove persistent. An example can be found in the persistence of Christianity when the Roman Empire faded away.

Another way of categorizing different forms of interaction within the interstate domain is through a spectrum from divided to integrated. The stages on this continuum Buzan calls asocial, power political, coexistence, cooperative, convergence, and confederalism. This identification of stages on a continuum is a reinterpretation of the stages ‘independence’, hegemony’, ‘suzerainty’, ‘dominion’, and ‘empire’ by Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: 1992), 13-18.
little socialization takes place, and relations are based on a distribution of power. On the other extreme, in a confederal stage, relations between states have grown to such an elaborate pattern they come to resemble internal state politics. Buzan argues the ways of socialization; coercion, calculation, and belief, can be combined with any stage on the continuum from asocial to confederal. At the confederal end of the spectrum, states within a confederal type of interaction can be socialized by coercion, calculation and belief. And at the asocial end of the spectrum, states can also be socialized by coercion as much as by belief or calculation.

3.2 Socialization within the transnational domain

In the transnational domain too, the actors can be socialized by coercion, calculation or belief. In a totalitarian state, for example, it is easy to imagine transnational agencies (TNAs) supportive to the ruling government coerce TNAs promoting goals of the opposition to seize their activities or to carry them out underground. In a more liberal state we would, for example, see competition and cooperation between TNAs in an economic context. This form of interaction between transnational actors in an economic context is based on calculation. Interaction between TNAs based on belief is somewhat more difficult to imagine. However, political parties, or organizations which have a certain ideological foundation could be marked as organizations socialized by belief, for it is difficult to put an ideology under the scrutiny of a cost versus benefit analysis.

Again we can link the means of socialization to the depth of integration. In a transnational domain based on competing transnational agencies (disintegrated), institutions can be based on coercion, calculation and belief, and the same goes for a transnational domain based on pure medievalism (integrated); a society in which the state is almost absent, and in which the functions of the state have been taken over by agents in the transnational domain, like the church, trade unions, and guilds. In such a situation, any form of state organization is absent and functions we currently call ‘state functions’ are performed by other types of groups of individuals. This performance of state functions does not coincide with the way they do in states we know today, but much more overlap to create a patchwork of sovereignties, functions and territories.

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44 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 195.
3.3 Socialization within the interhuman domain

How the three ways of socialization in the interhuman domain play out is rather straightforward. In a fragmented interhuman domain we can see cross-cutting cleavages caused by a diverse religious landscape in combination with a tribal or ethnic mosaic. In such a fragmented interhuman domain people can be coerced to have a certain identity, or such identity could be internalised, based on belief. People can be coerced to form a large scale imagined community, like a state. Take for example North Korea, a country that coerces people to adhere to the rules defined by the government by punishing those that deviate from these rules or do not want to be North Korean at all. How this way of socialization based on coercion evolves into a thicker way of socialization is also well visible. Again, look at North Korea and at the way North Koreans perceive their leader. The, rather well televised, tears shed over the death of Kim Jong Un were the tears of people visibly touched by the decease of their leader. So here too, we can link any stage on the continuum from, in this case, fragmented to universal identities, to a means of socialization.
§ 4: Identifying societies; the role of institutions
In this paragraph I will first identify the position of the current interstate domain on the continuum from asocial to confederalism, as defined in the previous paragraph. I will do this by focussing on institutions. What are important institutions in the current interstate domain? This question becomes relevant when states try to integrate in the interstate domain. In other words, when entities want to play the game of states, they should know to which rules to adhere. If such understanding is missing, states risk becoming isolated, which will result in the inability to benefit from interstate interaction in processes of international trade, or security regimes. One could argue many of todays’ conflicts are the result of institutional imbalances between certain states on the one hand, and the global interstate domain on the other hand. In order to bring peace and tranquillity back to regions characterized by bloodshed and war, the institutions of the global interstate domain need to be taken into account. For instance, when a certain state does little to accommodate the institution of the global market, individuals and companies are unable to reap the benefits of international trade. And as people are unable to benefit from trade, they are less motivated to protect peace and tranquillity in the region, making war a more likely outcome.

4.1 The position of the current interstate society on the asocial to confederal continuum
In the previous paragraph I have explained how the global interstate domain could be placed somewhere on the continuum from asocial to confederalism, and how institutions in this domain (and in other domains) are dispersed through the mechanisms of coercion, calculation, and belief. In this section, the place of the current interstate domain on the spectrum from asocial to confederalism will be identified.

The first stage is the power political system. According to Buzan, this society should be “defined as based largely on enmity and the possibility of war…..Survival is the main motive for the states and no values are necessarily shared.” Present in this society is the institution of diplomacy, and possibly the institutions of territoriality, trade, and sovereignty. According to influential English School theorists like James and Holsti, the institutions of territoriality and sovereignty together constitute the state. This idea is also held by Barry Buzan. The reason Buzan does not identify territoriality and sovereignty as paramount in this stage on the power-political to confederal continuum is because this stage is defined by a multitude of actors, which can be states indeed, but can also be tribes and nomadic groups. As already established, the most important actors in todays’ society are states. Hence, to say that we have past the stage of the power political system would be pointing out the obvious.

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45 This is especially the case with the importance of the market at the expense of the institution of war in the current interstate domain on a global scale. A conflict of interests is much more likely to be resolved on the market than through violent confrontation.
46 In the illustration of the interstate domain in paragraph three we can see the first stage on the continuum is in fact the asocial stage. However, as defined in paragraph 2, this stage is absent in modern interstate relations as interstate relations inevitably have a social dimension.
47 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 191.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid, 182-183.
The coexistence model of an interstate society is based on a Westphalian system of balance of power. Balance of power is the organizing principle and therefore an important institution in this stage on the asocial to confederal continuum. Other important institutions in this kind of society are sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, war and international law.\textsuperscript{50} The importance of sovereignty and territoriality in the coexistence model points to the importance of the state in this stage on the continuum. The other mentioned institutions are important for the system as a whole to survive. An interesting absentee in the coexistence model is the institution of the market. A reason for this is not given by Buzan. My suggestion would be that in a coexistence model the institution of the market might well face competition by other means of organizing economic processes, like protectionism and autarky, and that for this reason Buzan believes the institution of the market is not a primary institution in this stage of interstate society.

Whether rules or institutions are designed for states to coexist or whether they are designed for states to cooperate is difficult to discern because security maximizing Hobbesian states might well feel the need to cooperate with other such states. Such cooperation can “fall within the logic of coexistence, where the emphasis is on measures necessary to maintain the condition of existence for the members of the society.”\textsuperscript{51} What Buzan means is that states in an interstate domain based on coexistence are not required to agree on anything beyond the basic. Or more clearly put, the only common interest states have is a common interest in survival.\textsuperscript{52} But he dares to go even further. Even some kind of common identity is possible within relations defined by pluralism (pluralism is the asocial side of the continuum): “…pluralism does not exclude the members of interstate society from sharing a degree of common identity. The institution of sovereignty serves as a kind of bottom line for shared identity inasmuch as the states are required to recognize each other as being the same type of entity with the same legal standing.”\textsuperscript{53} Clearly, this category, a society based on coexistence, is a rather broad one. At least in the image depicted by Buzan.

The cooperation model of interstate society is defined by rules that go beyond those facilitating coexistence, but fall short of extensive domestic convergence.\textsuperscript{54} States come to cooperate on matters which go beyond the mere facilitation of coexistence, but have little or no incentive to become internally alike. Such cooperation is enabled by the creation of secondary institutions, like international organizations. Buzan: “…It would be surprising if a cooperative interstate society did not possess a fairly rich collection of secondary institutions. It is not difficult to imagine that sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, diplomacy and international law remain in place, albeit with some elaboration and reinterpretation.”\textsuperscript{55} According to Buzan, in a society of states based on cooperation, allowing states within the society to resort to war as a way to overcome political problems becomes problematic: “War may not be eliminated, but its legitimate use gets squeezed into a relatively narrow range closely centred on the right to self-defence, and not in violation of the right of national self-determination.”\textsuperscript{56} Around which institutions, on top of the five already mentioned, the members of a society based on cooperation may cooperate depends case by case.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, 191.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 145.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Barry Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School”, 145.
\textsuperscript{54} Buzan, From International to World Society?, 193.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid
The way Buzan identifies the use of war as problematic within the cooperation model of interstate society fits well within Bulls’ divide between pluralism (pluralism runs parallel with Buzan’s power-political and coexistence stage on the continuum) and solidarism (Bull’s solidarism is Buzan’s confederal side of the continuum), and offers a way of identifying whether the current global interstate system is based on coexistence or cooperation. In Bull’s solidarist world, force can legitimately be used only to promote the purposes of the international community as a whole. In such a world, force is the instrument of the international community exclusively.57 Now do restrictions on the use of force, as promoted by the United Nations, fall within the scope of Bull’s solidarism? Or do these restrictions facilitate coexistence of states in an anarchic society? Or in other words, does the current presence of the UN point to an emerging cooperative international community because the legitimacy of the use of force is transferred to an interstate level?

Perhaps this last question could be answered positively if the UN system of restricting the use of armed force would be more effective than it is today. But too many times, states commit acts of violence without mandate of the UN Security Council. Influential English School scholar James Mayall sheds some light on the question of whether the UN system of restrictions on the use of force points to the presence of a cooperative international society. According to Mayall, the role of the UN as sole legitimizer of the use of force has not been settled to such an extent that we could in fact speak of an international society with cooperative characteristics.58 The main reason why a cooperative world has not come into existence is the difficulty of holding non-state international actors accountable for their actions. Leaders of a country can be erased from office by democratic processes or mass protests. If one country decides to wage war on another country, it can be punished by an alliance of countries or simply face defeat because the aggressor is the weaker party. It is a hard system, but a system nonetheless. With intergovernmental organizations being immune before international law, It is difficult to see who will be held accountable if an invasion of one country by another, legitimized by the UN, leads to war and aggression.59 Logically one would assume the UN will claim it is immune before any court of law, leaving complaining states with little to no means of demanding compensation from the United Nations. In this way, the failure to secure peace in the world has consequences only for states, and a super-national organization with legal responsibility to protect tranquillity in international relations is absent. This shows, I believe, that the effect of the UN on the place of the interstate domain on the continuum is minimal. Unveiling that despite the presence of an organization like the UN, the global playground is occupied by countries playing the game of states.

However, the fact that many states make efforts to show they comply with the UN charter of armed intervention, and the presence of a multitude of secondary institutions (IGO’s), shows we do live in a world with some cooperative characteristics. According to Buzan, in a society of states which has cooperative characteristics, the institutions of sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, diplomacy and international law are still present. On top of these institutions, there can be found other institutions.60 Which institutions they are and on which mechanism of socialization the institutions are based, we will see in paragraph 4.2. Though not on a global scale, examples of interstate societies

59 Ibid, 151.
60 According to Buzan, the presence of secondary institutions like international organizations, points to a society in which states do not only cooperate to uphold their own existence. Such cooperation falls outside the realm of facilitating coexistence. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 193.
based on convergence and even federalism could also be found. Although identifying such societies has little value added for the purpose of this thesis, I chose to perform the task for reasons of completeness.

One stage beyond cooperation we find the convergence model of interstate society. “A convergence interstate society was defined as based on the development of a substantial enough range of shared values within a set of states to make them adopt similar political, legal and economic forms.” Now precisely what kind of institutions are important in this stage of interstate society depends hugely on what model of political economy its members are converging around. The values shared between the states go beyond those needed for coexistence and states will cooperate to effectuate such values. In short: the convergence model takes all aspects of the cooperation model and adds to that a deliberate institutional convergence for the sake of protecting the identity of the states involved. The only international society that has the characteristics found in the convergence model is formed by the current EU member states.

Federalism is the final stage on the continuum. This stage is the last before the international society becomes an integrated interhuman society, a large scale imagined society, a state. In this federalist stage “…restraints on the use of force would have to be nearly total, diplomacy largely transformed into something more like the process of domestic politics, and international law transformed into something more like domestic law, with institutions of enforcement to back it up.” In the real world, again we can see these processes happening in the European states uniting under the EU flag.

In this section I have identified what are the stages on the continuum between asocial and confederalism, and how these stages appear in the ‘real world’. The current global society of states is one that could be defined as having both coexistence and cooperative characteristics. The institutions belonging to both stages are sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, nationalism, and equality of people. Because the current interstate society also has some characteristics of a cooperative model, the institutions of the market and environmental stewardship are important. Each of these eight institutions will be analysed in the next section.

4.2 Important institutions in the global interstate domain, and their basis of stability
In this section, I aim to do three things. I will elaborate on the institutions identified by Barry Buzan as primary master institutions. These are sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, nationalism, and environmental stewardship. For each of these institutions it will be discussed how they should be interpreted. The second goal of this section is explaining why the institutions identified by Buzan are primary institutions. And third; what is their mechanism of dispersion; coercion, calculation, or belief?

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61 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 194.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid, 147.
64 Decades of EU integration has made member states institutionally alike. Member states have become socialized by the EU in the sense that the EU dictates what is appropriate behaviour. For more on this: Tanja Börzel, How the European Union Interacts with its Member States, IHS Political Science Series 93 (Vienna: 2003).
65 Buzan, From International to World Society, 195.
66 Ibid, 187.
Buzan makes a distinction between primary and secondary institutions. Buzan makes a distinction between primary and secondary institutions. Primary institutions are constitutive of both state and international society and can be contrasted against secondary institutions, which are in fact organizations in the regime theory sense, expressing or promoting a certain institution; in the way the World Trade Organization is a secondary institution promoting the market, which is a primary institution.

Buzan distances himself from his fellow English School scholars. In a general sense, traditional ES scholars make a distinction between institutions that define the actors of the interstate society (constitutive rules) on the one hand, and institutions that define the relations between these actors, the rules of the game (regulatory rules), on the other. According to Buzan, such a definition would be impractical, given that states (the actors) themselves define the rules to which they adhere: “One key element in the difficulty of drawing a boundary between constitutive institutions and regulatory rules is the breakdown of the analogy between games such as chess where the pieces are not the players, and games such as ‘states’ where the pieces and the players are more closely intertwined. In the game of states, the players can reinterpret existing institutions as they go along.” Put plainly, the state makes rules, and some of these rules become so important that they come to define the state.

After having established that there is no distinction to be drawn between rules constituting actors and rules constituting the relations between actors, Buzan defines important institutions, which he calls primary institutions, to be: “...durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles. In some cases these shared practices and values may be extended to, and accepted by, non-state actors. In order to count as a primary institution, such practices must play a constitutive role in relation to both the pieces/players and the rules of the game.” Buzan uses this definition and argues there are eight primary master institutions. Each of these contain a number of other institutions, called derivative institutions. The primary master and derivative institutions are depicted in the following image.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Master</th>
<th>Primary Institutions</th>
<th>Derivative</th>
<th>Examples of Secondary Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
<td>International Law</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territoriality</td>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations Security Council, Most regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Bilateralism</td>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>Embassies, United Nations Conferences, ICJ, ICC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Management</td>
<td>Alliances</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>NATO, United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of People</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Humanitarian Intervention</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Trade Liberalization</td>
<td></td>
<td>GATT/WTO, MFN Agreements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 163-164.
68 Ibid, 180.
69 Ibid, 181.
70 Ibid, 187.
An elaborated analysis of these derivative institutions lies beyond the scope of this thesis, so I will focus on the eight primary master institutions, as shown in the image above, and will use the derivative institution only for purposes of clarification.

To identify the stability of institutions, which depends on the means of socialization\textsuperscript{71}, is of vital importance. If a state seeks an institutional fit with the global order of states, it should take into account, for example, whether an institution is spread by the coercion of a hegemonic state which is losing its grip on the world, or whether an institution achieves global standing because people believe in it, never even questioning its existence. Needless to say, in the latter case the institution will prove much more stable.

The institutions belonging to a society based on coexistence (sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, nationalism, and equality of people) are, according to Buzan, institutions based on belief.\textsuperscript{72} Institutions belonging to stages further on the continuum have a weaker mode of dispersion (calculation or even coercion). Buzan comes to this conclusion not because he analysed each institution on its own merits, but because he believes “common sense will perhaps save this from being too controversial.”\textsuperscript{73} I will not bluntly adopt this generalization.\textsuperscript{74} What I will do instead in the following section is to deliberate on each of the institutions Buzan identified as primary master institutions in the current interstate domain on a global scale. In the following description of the primary master institutions I will attempt to contrast Buzan with other influential English School scholars, for I believe often such contrast could clarify matters greatly.

**Sovereignty**

Though Buzan shies away from identifying a hierarchy between the master primary institutions, the institution of sovereignty is one of the first to come to mind when deliberating on the rules and actors of the interstate society. The claim of Holsti that sovereignty is a ‘bedrock institution’, is a good illustration of sovereignty’s somewhat elevated status.\textsuperscript{75} According to Buzan, the derivatives of sovereignty are non-intervention and international law.

To call the institution of sovereignty a ‘durable and recognized practice’ would not be a very bold move. After a series of religious wars, the international community agreed in 1648 princes had the power to decide which religion their subjects were to adhere to. In the treaty of Westphalia, in

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\textsuperscript{71} Coercion, calculation and belief.

\textsuperscript{72} Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 234.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} Imagine, for instance, institutions manifested in a stage further on the continuum coming into conflict with institutions in the coexistence stage. In such a situation, belief in an institution of the coexistence stage could easily be eroded. For if this would not be possible, it would be difficult to imagine a society moving past the coexistence stage of the continuum.

other words, the leaders of west-European countries were decided to be sovereign in their own state. This sovereignty was not based on belief, it was belief that was the cause of the religious wars in the first place. The treaty of Westphalia, in the words of Barry Weingast, was an “attempt to construct an agreement that would prevent […] bloody, negative sum conflicts.” This might very well mean the institution was based on calculation. Sovereignty as a principle defined international conduct in the years after the Peace of Westphalia, and it continues to do so today. For an institution to be called a primary institution, it needs to have both a regulative and a constitutive character. State sovereignty is, arbitrarily, the most important asset of a state, and perhaps of the interstate society. Together with territoriality, sovereignty constitutes the state. And the idea one state cannot coerce another state into carrying out a certain policy is what defines the boundaries of possible state behaviour on the global interstate political playing field.

As said, the idea of state sovereignty was initially introduced to end the negative sum conflicts of religious wars. One could easily say the institution of state sovereignty was introduced with some calculative motive in mind. According to Buzan, the initial mechanism of calculation has been replaced by the mechanism of belief; sovereignty is not contested as principle. Influential English School scholar Robert Jackson concedes: “If I had to place a bet on the shape of world politics at the start of the twenty-second century, my money would be on the prognosis that our great-great-grandchildren will live in a political world that would still be familiar to us, that would still be shaped politically by state sovereignty.” Whether the same also counts for the derivatives of sovereignty; non-intervention and international law, is left in the open by Buzan.

**Territoriality**

A group of people calling themselves sovereign need a certain territory over which the holders of sovereignty are to be sovereign. According to Buzan, the derivative institution of territoriality is the institution of boundaries. Though both these institutions on first sight appear to be other sides of the same coin, one could easily imagine a territory without strict boundaries.

Territoriality has a durable character in that, apart from some nomadic peoples, a non-territorial society, let alone a non-territorial state, is hard to imagine. The notion of territory is recognized by states globally, in that every state virtually always has sought for ways to justify its actions when breaching another state’s territorial integrity. Such strained search for justifications would not have been necessary when another actor’s territoriality would not have been something

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76 The treaty of Westphalia, in the words of Barry Weingast, was an “attempt to construct an agreement that would prevent […] bloody, negative sum conflicts.” Barry Weingast, “A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation”, *Politics and Society* 23, no. 4 (December 1995): 456.
77 Ibid.
78 “It is not clear that anything of consequence is left if one subtracts territoriality and sovereignty from the state.” Buzan, *From International to World Society*, 175. Interesting to note is that this statement contradicts with Buzan’s definition of the state (see paragraph 2 of this chapter). In Buzan’s definition of the state, the institution of sovereignty, as such, is not mentioned as an important state asset.
79 Ibid, 234. In this section, sovereignty is discussed as principle, not as a quality of an individual state. In the latter case, sovereignty could indeed only be upheld by having a sufficiently strong army. In this discussion, the sovereignty of one country could well be crushed, but this does little for the role of sovereignty in the interstate domain as a whole. For example, when there are 200 sovereign states, and one state annexes another, 200 become 199, and sovereignty still exists as a principle.
81 Historically, there are examples of groups of people forming states without clear boundaries. Boundaries, however, can be differentiated from territory.
to take into account. Territoriality as an institution has been recognized by every political unit claiming to have the status of state; political units declaring statehood without defining its territorial boundaries are hard to imagine. The institution of territoriality constitutes the state in the sense that, as pointed out by Buzan: “It is not clear that anything of consequence is left if one subtracts sovereignty and territoriality from the state.”

Buzan claims territoriality is an institution based on the mechanism of belief, because the institution belongs to the coexistence stage on the spectrum. But as already mentioned, I doubt this generalization holds much value. A more specific investigation into its foundation (coercion, calculation or belief) is necessary. According to Steven Grosby, professor of religion, a states’ territory is much more than the accidental geographical location a group of people finds themselves on. The act of calling the territory one is born on the homeland or fatherland is a proof that a territory is more than a piece of soil:

A territory is not simply an area within which certain physical actions are performed; rather, it refers to a structural, symbolic condition which has significance for those who act within it and towards it.

The idea of the territory as a notion bigger than the mere piece of land containing an accidental group of people is illustrated by the willingness of young men to ride to war for the glory of the homeland. According to Grosby, soldiers who are willing to die for their country must believe their own life depends on the survival of the fatherland. This, perhaps rather primitive, urge to defend a certain piece of territory, I believe, demonstrates the lasting nature of the institution. It encourages me to predict the institution of territoriality will endure even in a world without states as we know them today.

**Diplomacy**

Diplomacy; the realm of the men and women in suits who try to establish a common ground far away from the people they represent. What does this institution encompass, why is it a primary institution and is it based on coercion, calculation or belief? Barry Buzan has a rather wide definition of diplomacy, which he sees a form of ‘authoritative communication.’ This notion is derived from the work of Jack Donelly, who claims authoritative communication is a core function of the state.

According to Buzan, the derivative institutions of diplomacy are bilateralism and multilateralism. The institution of diplomacy constitutes a very durable practice. Defining diplomacy as the function of communication of a state, would leave one with little other conclusion than that the institution of diplomacy predates the institution of sovereignty. Diplomacy could be defined as an institution recognized by virtually any state, or group of people with state ambitions. Illustrative of this point is the way many regions seeking statehood try to achieve an observer status at United Nations institutions. Arguing that the institution of diplomacy influences state to state relations

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82 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 175.
83 Ibid, 234.
85 Ibid.
86 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 191.
88 “At a minimum a power political society will require means of authoritative communication, even if only for alliance making, and therefore some form of diplomacy.” Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 183. See also Ibid, 188:
would not raise that many eyebrows, one only has to take a look at the derivative institutions of bilateralism and multilateralism to see how diplomacy facilitates a complex system of crosscutting alliances in international relations. But in what way could we argue that diplomacy constitutes the state itself? In the same way Charles Tilly argued the state is a product of war, one could argue the state is also, to a certain extent, a product of diplomacy. By the means of negotiating agreements, gathering information of foreign states and minimising friction with foreign states, the diplomat has a positive influence on the states’ survival. And as already mentioned, Buzan argues a world in which states only have physical relations, e.g. relations of power, does not exist. States always have social relations with other states. Being able to communicate authoritatively with other states is therefore a state’s vital function. In this sense, diplomacy is what defines the state.

Could this institution, of which the common man knows so little, ever be stable, based on belief? Or does it depend on the coercive action of one hegemon? In most societies, diplomacy is a hallmark example of an institution based on a cost versus benefit rationality. Diplomacy is the act of promoting the wishes of the constituency on the international stage. And because the mandate of the state leader is doing just that, one would say there is little room for belief.89

Still, and without much explanation, Buzan holds that the institution of diplomacy is based on belief.90 One reason for this might be the idea originally put forward by Jack Donnelly, who posed that diplomacy is the execution of communicating and interacting, which are core functions of the state.91 Another argument for seeing diplomacy as an institution spread by belief is put forward by Hedley Bull: “The remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, persuasions and stages of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that arose in Europe in another age is today one of the few visible indications of universal acceptance of the idea of international society.”92 According to Bull, diplomacy is the sine qua non of an international society, it is the sine qua non even of an international system.93 Much like Buzan, Bull argues that to be in an international society or even a system, means to have social relations between states. According to Bull, “The pristine form of diplomacy is the transmitting of messages between one independent political community and another.” As communicating is vital for any form of social relationship, one could easily say diplomacy is imperative for state to state relations, and will survive when the outside promotor (if such promotor could even be said to exist) of the institution falls away, or when costs versus benefits analysis will judge negatively on the institution.

**Great Power Management**

How do great powers manage international relations? Why is the institution of great power management a primary master institution? And on what mechanism of dispersion is the institution based? Buzan offers very little assistance when it comes to answering these questions. The only information he gives on the subject could be found in the table above, that the derivatives of the institution of great power management are the institutions of alliances, war and balance of power.

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89 Robert Putnam has written an excellent article on why and when state leaders get involved in processes of diplomacy, when success is most likely, or when a treaty is approved by both parties but ratification is unsuccessful. In this article, Putnam established that diplomacy is solely driven by costs versus benefits; calculation. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer, 1988): 427-460.
90 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 234.
91 Buzan, 187.
93 Ibid, 163-164.
In which way could one say the institution of great power management is durable and recognized? The idea that states are able to use alliances and war to achieve or upset balances of power has determined international relations arguably since the wake of the state system. One could claim the ‘Great Change of Partners’ marked the institution’s coming of age in 1756. The management of international relations on a global scale by the great powers is recognized in the sense that, when the stability of the international system is at risk, people expect the great powers represented by the Security Council of the United Nations to restore stability and tranquillity.

It is not so difficult to see how the institution of great power management constitutes both players and rules of the game. The foreign policy options one state has versus another may be significantly altered when both states come to be part of an alliance. Take for instance a world without alliances. In such a world a powerful state, say the US, can do with a powerless state, say Georgia, whatever it wants. Now in reality, with the US and Russia having alliances with other countries, Russia will soon step in when it sees the interests of one of its allies curbed. Great power management also constitutes the players, states. The Polish partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795 are a rather drastic example of this. A more recent example is Israel. To say Israel exists because of its alliances with states in the Western hemisphere would not do justice to reality, but without a doubt the significant amounts of funding Israel has received from donor countries has facilitated to a certain extent its existence surrounded by hostile states.

Buzan states rather clearly that the institution of great power management belongs to an interstate domain with coexistence characteristics. However, Hedley Bull, who wrote much on order in world politics and who has been an inspiration for Buzan, argues: “The idea of a great power presupposes and implies the idea of an international society as opposed to an international system.” In this statement Bull hints that the institution of great power management belongs to an interstate society with cooperative or even convergence characteristics as opposed to a pluralist interstate society.

The reason Bull and Buzan diverge on the subject of great power management is because both authors interpret the institution differently. Where indeed Buzan sees great power management as the container institution of war, alliances and balance of power, and appears to neglect the ‘management’ in ‘great power management’, Bull argues the institution of great power management bestows upon the most powerful states the responsibility and the right to bring peace and order in the global international society. Actions by the United States to uphold democracy in states where it is absent, its interventions during the Arabic Spring, could be seen in the light of Bull’s great power management, but less so in the interpretation of Buzan. Our understanding of the international society could be enhanced by a more systematic analysis of the role of great power management as an institution.

Because the lack of a well-developed understanding of the institution of great power management, it is hard to identify the institution as dispersed by coercion, calculation or belief. The current mayor

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94 In this event, the alliances of England and Austria versus France and Prussia, became France and Austria versus England and Prussia.
95 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 187.
97 Ibid.
98 Both Bull and Buzan appear not to make a distinction between the great powers before the second world war, and the great powers of the period since 1945. The way the US presents itself as the defender of freedom and democracy worldwide since 1945 does not seem to do justice to this uniformity.
global power without a doubt is the United States of America. This state, for instance, invaded Iraq in 2003 dimension. According to Buzan, an institution is based on belief when the institution holds if the outside promoter disappears and states have no calculative incentive to support the institution. Now imagine a world without America, will another country likely step in to fill its place? Buzan would answer this question positively, but only because he associated great power management with alliances and war. I believe Bull would answer the question negatively, for he sees a great power not only as a military leader, but also as a leader when principles and moral are concerned.

**Equality of people**

According to Buzan, the institution of equality of people can be contrasted against the institution of inequality of people so prevalent in colonial times, when western states experienced a “white man’s burden” to develop undeveloped nations, or straightforward can be said to have drained resources from stateless regions without really any compensation. The derivatives of equality of people are human rights and humanitarian intervention.

The international society has long tried to uphold a certain level of civilization. This motivation was present in the mandate system of the League of Nations, and is present nowadays in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The idea of equality of people has been recognized by virtually every state, at least in word. The way in which the institution is represented in most states’ constitutions illustrates this point very well, as does the composition of the United Nations Human Rights Council, now consisting of, amongst others, Mauritania, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia. States that cannot seriously be called promoters of human rights.

In what sense does the institution of equality of people define the rules between states and in what sense does the institution constitute the state itself? The institution defines the valid policy options states have towards other states. It rules out any form of slavery and colonialism and makes sure inequality of people is no longer at the base of state to state relations. The institution also limits state behaviour towards its own peoples. It rules out policies based on ethnic, religious, racial or gender differentiation. Moreover, it defines the possibilities for state organization in the sense that the rise of the institution of equality of people could also be paralleled with the decline of empires. According to Buzan, the way states take into account the institution of equality of people and its derivative human rights, bears on the ‘standard of civilization’, which in its turn determines whether a state is included or excluded from international society.

Although he does not specify why, according to Buzan, the institution of equality of people is based on belief. This means the institution endures even when the promoters of the institution, Western states most importantly, disappear. However, and Buzan appears to be well aware of this, the derivatives of the master institution of equality of people; human rights and humanitarian intervention, cannot be said to be based on belief: “Should the backing for human rights and humanitarian intervention by the West weaken for any reason, it does not seem likely that they

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99 The concept of the “White Man’s Burden” originates from a poem by Rudyard Kipling first published in 1899. In this poem, Kipling saw it as the duty of the developed nations of the time to civilize those “half-devil and half-child.”

100 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 183.

101 Although such policies are still conducted by some states, such states are often referred to as failed states. Hinting that the protection of the institution of equality of people is what defines the state.

102 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 216.

103 Ibid, 188.

104 Ibid, 234.
would retain much standing as global institutions, even though they would retain strong constituencies of interstate support regionally, and more widely in the transnational and interhuman domains.\textsuperscript{105} To claim that humanitarian intervention is an institution based on belief, is problematic too. In any interstate domain in which sovereignty and territoriality are such important institutions, intervening for the sake of human rights, without the permission of the state in question, would mean an automatic breach of a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the latter two institutions being fully supported by the mechanism of belief.

What Buzan calls equality of people, Hedley Bull calls justice: “It has often been contended that justice is especially to do with equality in the enjoyment of rights and privileges, perhaps also to do with fairness or reciprocity; that, whatever the substance of the rights or privileges in question, demands for justices are demands for the equal enjoyment of them as between persons who are different from one another in some respect but should be treated in respect of these rights as if they were the same.”\textsuperscript{106} With this definition of justice, I hold that Bull’s notion of justice and Buzan’s notion of equality of people more or less boil down to the same. However, in contrast to Bull, Buzan does not make the explicit link between equality of people on the one hand, and fairness and justice on the other. Buzan’s story could win in descriptive value if he were to better explain how far the notion of equality of people stretches.\textsuperscript{107}

Although I believe that since colonisation disappeared as an institution, increasingly states have come to believe in the idea of equality of people, we can see this tendency nowadays counteracted by religious movements which have become entangled with state structures in certain regions of the world. When the support to the institution of equality of people by states with a western liberal character falls away, one could imagine the institution will be driven to extinction in regions where religious fundamentalism thrives. On a global scale, however, the institution will likely survive. And that is the reason Buzan thinks equality of people is based on belief.

**Nationalism**

Barry Buzan refuses to introduce a definition of nationalism, but instead he highlights the many aspects nationalism could have.\textsuperscript{108} However, what appears to be a common thread through his book, as far as nationalism is concerned, is that nationalism makes sovereignty popular. With nationalism as a primary institution, to be sovereign means to be supported by the people. This common thread could also be distilled from the derivatives of nationalism, which are self-determination, popular sovereignty and democracy.

Buzan believes nationalism is a primary institution that defines both the state as well as the relations between states. Nationalism is a building block of the state in that it makes sure the interhuman society conforms to its political boundaries.\textsuperscript{109} Hence, to understand the ways in which nationalism constitutes the state might not be so difficult. To come to an understanding as to how nationalism defines the rules between states needs a little more mental gymnastics.

James Mayall’s *Nationalism and International Society* is a book one should not ignore when

\textsuperscript{105} Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 234. I have chosen to adopt Buzan’s logic here, as an in-depth analysis of derivative institutions is beyond the scope of this thesis.


\textsuperscript{107} For instance, equality would mean giving two people a bread. Justice would taking a bread from someone who has too much, and giving it to someone who is hungry.

\textsuperscript{108} Nationalism can strengthen as well as weaken a state, it can be promote equal rights in a democratic sense, or divide people in a religious sense.

\textsuperscript{109} Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 199.
nationalism in an English School context is concerned. The goal of this book is to reveal the ways in which nationalism has changed the international society of states. According to the author, because the international society emerged before the presence of nationalism, the international society did not emerge under the influence of nationalism. It did, however, evolve at the moment the nationalist idea gained momentum.\textsuperscript{110} This evolution runs parallel with the emergence of international law, human rights and diplomacy as primary institutions in the international society.\textsuperscript{111}

The derivatives of nationalism - namely self-determination, democracy, and popular sovereignty - have one thing in common. That is the idea that the state is a tool of the people instead of the other way around. This idea is something inherent in the idea of nationalism and one could easily see how this feeds back into the institutions named above; international law, human rights and diplomacy. International law becomes impossible if the heads of state do not in fact represent the people, or more precisely, the wishes of the people.\textsuperscript{112} And if the state is organized for the sake of the people, it is only reasonable the state should protect the wellbeing of its people. For after all, the state is to serve the people, not some of the people. This is the way nationalism links to equality or people.\textsuperscript{113} Nationalism could be linked to diplomacy in that diplomats of different states should establish a common ground between the common interests of both their constituencies. Professional diplomats honour the common interests of the people, again in line with the idea that the state is there for the people, instead of vice versa. Apart from being both constitutive and regulative, the institution of nationalism is also both durable and recognized. Nationalism as a deliberate policy has been around since the French Revolution, but the idea of the right of choosing your own leader arguably is much older. Nationalism is a recognized principle in that, as already noted, to promote diplomacy, international law, human rights, but also non-colonialism, one has to recognize some form of nationalism.

According to Buzan, the institution of nationalism is based on belief.\textsuperscript{114} This means he believes the institution of nationalism will remain even when its promotors disappear. Exactly who, according to Buzan, are the promotors of nationalism, is a question he does not answer. If we take a bottom-up approach on nationalism, and hold that the supporter of nationalism is the people themselves, it would be logically to conclude the institution is dead as soon as the supporters disappear. Since this would count for every institution here discussed, I do not believe this is in line with Buzan’s thinking. Taking a top-down approach means seeing nationalism as the outcome of state policy. Now imagine the promoter of the institution, the state, disappearing. I believe it would be safe to say the citizens of the now disappeared state will have a quite persistent national identity even when the state-system is no more, confirming that nationalism is an institution indeed based on belief.

\textbf{Market}

The market has entered the list of primary master institutions after the Cold War, since it has triumphed over other means of organizing trade, like the centrally planned economy.\textsuperscript{115} According to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{110} James Mayall, \textit{Nationalism and International Society} (Cambridge: 1990), 149.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} By Mayall dubbed the principles of enlightment. Mayall, 148.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Hence the ‘national’ in ‘international law’.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Although the institutions of nationalism and equality of people appear to be in conflict where minorities are concerned. To avoid a tyranny by a democratic majority, the institution of nationalism inevitably has to be restrained.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Buzan, \textit{From International to World Society?}, 234.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Buzan, \textit{From International to World Society?}, 183.
\end{itemize}
Buzan: “The market means more than just trade. It is a principle of organisation and legitimation that affects both how states define and constitute themselves, what kind of other actors they give standing to, and how they interpret sovereignty and territoriality.”116 With this, Buzan touches on the interplay between sovereignty and territoriality on the one hand, and the market on the other. In an international society in which the market is a primary master institution, the market will be facilitated somewhat at the expense of sovereignty and territoriality.117 Derivatives of the market are trade liberalization, financial liberalization and hegemonic stability.

If Buzan is right in calling the market a primary master institution, the institution should constitute both the state (actor) and international relations (rules). When a state is economically organized around the institution of the market, it should promote and defend a certain amount of freedom in the interhuman and transnational domain in order to let individuals create companies, and to let companies do business. Such a state needs to be strong enough to cope with the tensions that exist, as noticed by Benjamin Barber in his influential article “Jihad vs. McWorld”, between the institutions of sovereignty and territoriality on the one hand, and the market on the other.118

The institution of the market has come to have a huge influence on the relations between states. Richard Rosecrance noted in as early as 1986 that: “Through mechanism of industrial technological development and international trade, nations can transform their positions in international politics, and they can do so while other states also benefit from the enhanced trade and growth that economic cooperation makes possible.”119 Rosecrance contrasts his view of the market with the role played by the institution of war and claims that the rising costs of wars, which can become nuclear wars, has created room for the market in interstate relations.120 This view is much in line with Buzan’s view when he argues the central role of war in international relations appears to be giving way to the market.121

The idea of the market in the context of trade and financial liberalization emerged on the global stage far before the end of the Cold War, but the institution only became a primary institution on a global scale when rivalling ideas of state controlled economies lost their influence.122 As the institution of the market now is the only guidance in terms of economic organization, states have no other option than to recognize the institution, or follow isolationist policies. With virtually every state choosing the former option, the institution could easily be called widely recognized. Claiming the institution is durable, however, would be troublesome. Buzan identified the wake of the institution to be the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union collapsed and China abandoned the principle of central planning.123 Since then, the institution has been seriously tested by economic crises, most notably by the crises starting in 2008. Only time will tell whether the market will survive as a primary master institution.

Especially in many westernized states, belief in the market as an institution is strong. In these cases, even when market forces fail to bring welfare and prosperity, as in economic crises, belief in

116 Ibid, 194.
117 The opposite would happen in an interstate domain in which protectionism is a primary institution. In such environment we would see state adopting autarkic measures.
120 Ibid, x.
121 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 248.
122 Pockets of resistance to the institution of the market could be found in the cases of Cuba, Myanmar, and North Korea.
123 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 234.
the market does not falter much. Exemplary of this case is the way states see the market as a solution for problems which were created by the market in the first place, like environmental degradation and climate change.

As rightly noted by Buzan, few markets nowadays are opened by the force of gunboats.¹²⁴ This, however, does not mean the market everywhere is upheld by belief. In some states, governments support the market in order to receive monetary aid from powerful secondary institutions like the IMF or World Bank, and in some other cases, states support the market to avoid sanctions. For this reason, Buzan concludes the institution of the market is dispersed by the mechanism of belief in Western states, and by a mixture of the mechanisms of calculation and coercion in other states. This means that when the market is no longer promoted by a collection of Western states, its survival is unsure.

Environmental Stewardship

The institution of environmental stewardship has as its goal not just the survival of the state or of the state society. The two derivatives of environmental stewardship are the survival of the human species, and climate stability.¹²⁵ As we are increasingly becoming aware of the influence we have on the capacity of the earth to carry us homo sapiens, we can easily say the institution of environmental stewardship outranks any other institution here discussed in terms of importance. Still, few English School scholars have come to terms with this institution in a systematic fashion, and Buzan is no exception. If one wants to understand Buzan’s position on environmental stewardship, one has to delve deep. It could only be guessed that Buzan is discussing this institution when he claims we should not neglect the material forces at play when focussing on how institutions come into existence.¹²⁶ The institution of environmental stewardship has come into existence when people became aware of the planetary environment being a finite source.

For the institution of environmental stewardship to be a primary institution, it needs to be constitutive of the actors and rules of interstate society. It is not very hard to see how the finite character of the earth’s resources give standing to states as scarcity of resources is arguably what has driven people to organize into competing states. But this has little to do, or even goes against, environmental stewardship. Can we say states protect the earth’s capacity to support the peoples of this generation and next generations to such an extent this protection comes to define the state? There are few, if any, states meeting this criterion currently. When imagining the institution of environmental stewardship as a rule between states, one runs into the same problems. The troublesome realisation of the Kyoto protocol and its successors is a perfect illustration of this, as is the inability of the international society to cope with problems of overfishing and deforestation. It appears that the institution of environmental stewardship plays too small a role both in states’ internal organization and in the relations between states. States simply can get away with environmentally harmful behaviour too easily for the institution to be called a primary institution.

The institution of environmental stewardship hardly appears to constitute both actors and rules. Does it meet the criteria of durability and recognition? As the problem of climate change and environmental degradation won’t likely be solved in the decades to come, the institution is, if anything, prone to survive. Hence it could be called durable, if only in importance. In terms of recognition, the institution of environmental stewardship can hardly be called a primary institution.

¹²⁴ Buzan, From International to World Society?, 235.
¹²⁵ Ibid, 187.
¹²⁶ Ibid, 261-263.
Emission of carbon dioxide, for instance, is still on the rise. Many developing countries do not seem too enthusiastic to slow down their own development in order to be more environment friendly, rationalizing their behaviour with a ‘we have a right to develop’ sentiment.

According to Buzan, however, the institution of environmental stewardship is dispersed through the mechanism of belief.\textsuperscript{127} This, in my opinion, is debatable for two reasons. First, Buzan has not convincingly made clear why institutions belonging to a coexistence model of interstate domain are dispersed through the mechanism of belief by default. Second, even if we take over this generalization, placing the institution of environmental stewardship in the coexistence model is problematic. Robert Jackson, prominent English School scholar and professor at the Boston University, does not share Buzan’s view on the importance of environmental stewardship as an institution. Jackson claims neglecting environmentalism as an institution is unjustifiable from a philosopher’s standpoint. From a statesman standpoint this question might be answered differently.\textsuperscript{128} This view touches on the difficulty of combining environmentalism on a global scale with a state system on a global scale. It implies that the institution of environmental stewardship only finds a fertile soil in post-state global society. I believe it would be fair to claim Robert Jackson believes the institution of environmental stewardship belongs in a cooperative or even convergence society, in which states together fight for the human species’ survival, rather than belonging to a society based on coexistence, in which each state fights for its own survival.

I believe the means of dispersion of the institution of environmental stewardship could be distilled from the inevitability of the problem. When Buzan spoke on how the material forces at play can define which institution will emerge, this could be understood as an argument for seeing environmental stewardship as an institution based on belief. For when certain promotors of the institution fall away, the material forces will not alter. When actors promoting environmental stewardship will disappear, sea levels won’t stop rising. Hence, my guess is that the institution will survive even when the outside promotors disappear, which is what defines the mechanism of belief. However, why the institution of environmental stewardship is a primary master institution in the first place is not made clear by Buzan.

\textbf{Coherence between institutions}

Is there some logic between this set of eight institutions? Is it a coherent set, or did this combination of institutions come to be accidentally? I would opt for the former option. As already mentioned, the institutions of territoriality and sovereignty together compose the state. Diplomacy is necessary in a world in which states inevitably have social relations. In an interstate domain with a liberal character, there is much interaction between the three domains.\textsuperscript{129} Nationalism then, is needed to have an interhuman domain that overlaps with the state.\textsuperscript{130} In an interstate domain with nationalism as an important institution, the state serves the people, instead of the other way around. Subsequently, war becomes a less viable policy outcome and gives way to the institution of the market. This market profits from a certain tranquillity in the interstate domain. This tranquillity is promoted when minorities have equal opportunities and rights as have majorities. Hence, the institution of equality of people becomes important.\textsuperscript{131} Great powers often profit greatly from the presence of certain

\textsuperscript{127} Buzan, \textit{From International to World Society?}, 233.
\textsuperscript{128} Robert Jackson, 177-178.
\textsuperscript{129} Buzan, \textit{From International to World Society?}, 233.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, 199.
\textsuperscript{131} “Human rights represent the most effective response yet devised to a wide range of standard threats to human dignity that market economies and bureaucratic states have made nearly universal across the globe.
institutions, like the market, and have the ability to influence other states into upholding these institutions. This is why the institution of great power management has entered the system. Environmental stewardship has a rationality of its own. This institution is vital if the other seven institutions here discusses are to survive.

According to Buzan, all primary master institutions of the global interstate domain are relatively stable. This means that even when outside promoters fall away, the institution will survive. This is not the complete story, however. English school scholars need to come to terms with the institution of great power management in a systematic fashion if the claim is to be successfully made that the institution is based on belief. In some parts of the world we can see the stability of the institution of equality of people being eroded by religious fundamentalist movements. Lastly, the institution of environmental stewardship could indeed be supported by belief, as current material conditions necessitate, but more systematic research should be conducted claim is to be made that the principle of environmental stewardship dictates states’ policy.

4.3 Relations between the interstate, the transnational, and the interhuman domains
An explanation of the relations between the three domains could help us understand Buzan’s version of the English school. Nowadays, the global international domain can be characterized as falling between the coexistence and cooperative stages on the asocial to confederal continuum. In this society, the important institutions are sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, diplomacy, great power management, equality of people, the market, and environmental stewardship. According to Buzan, we should expect a great deal of interaction between the three domains in this society, which he calls 'moderately cooperative'. First, in the interstate domain, boundaries need to be respected and undisputed, and rules need to be applicable between states in order to solve border transcending issues. Second, in the interhuman domain, people need to be integrated to the extend one could speak of large-scale imagined communities; states. And in this interhuman domain, there need to be certain liberties, such as the liberty to form companies (to increase the costs of war), or the liberty to promote certain minority interests (to reduce the number of reasons to start a war). Third, integration among supporting institutions in the transnational domain is also needed. An efficient network of companies will increase the costs of war by increasing the efficiency of international markets.

Human rights today remain the only proven effective means to assure human dignity in societies dominated by markets and states. Although historically contingent and relative, this functional universality fully merits the label universal - for us today. Virtually everyone on this planet today lives in a world of modern markets and modern states, which need to be tamed by human rights if those powerful institutions are to made compatible with a life of dignity for the average person.” Jack Donelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (London: 2013), 97.

132 Buzan, *From Interstate to World Society?*, 233
133 The actors that have to promote these liberties are created by the institution of the market in the case of companies, and by the institution of equality of people in the case of civil rights movements. Both these institutions in the interstate domain give standing to actors in the transnational domain. Ibid.
Conclusion
According to Barry Buzan, an analysis of any form of society should take into account three domains. Because of the importance of the state and state to state relations, there should be an interstate domain. Other relevant actors beside the state cannot fit all in a second domain. Some of the actors are groups consisting of individuals, and some of the actors are individuals themselves. Because Buzan believes groups of people and individuals differ on such a basic level, groups of individuals are placed in a transnational domain and individuals are placed in the interhuman domain.

The illustration suggests the three domains lie in some kind of continuum. It suggests that moving from ‘confederative’ in the interstate domain in a more solidarist direction will result in ending up in ‘pure medievalism’ in the transnational domain. This, of course, is not true. The domains are separate.

So in which ways do institutions matter? The three domains are interdependent. Institutions in one domain need to be supported by institutions in the other two domains if the society as a whole (all three domains taken together) is to be stable. In the interstate domain we are living in, institutions of territoriality, sovereignty, diplomacy, nationalism, great power management, equality of people, the market, and environmental stewardship are most important.

The global international society is a society based on coexistence and cooperation. States have made institutions to facilitate this. These institutions in the international society need institutional support in the transnational and interhuman domain. The interhuman domain needs to be integrated to such an extent that one could speak of statehood as opposed to tribalism, to name just one alternative. In the transnational domain, one only has to think about the important role NGOs play in today’s society to see why an institution like the freedom of association (also, of course, cross border association) would be supportive to the institution of equality of people in the international domain. In an increasingly complicated world, transnational organizations are needed for states to live together peacefully, to coexist and cooperate.

The theory I highlighted in this chapter does not dictate with which of the big schools of International Relations to achieve stability. By using Buzan’s version of the English School, one is able to analyse which institutions are important in which domain of society. Thereby, the investigator is capable of identifying where there is friction between domains and how best to reduce this friction in order to
achieve a more peaceful society. One situation in which one could imagine this tool could be applied is in analysing how to stabilize a country after a civil war. In the following chapter we will put this tool to the test and see if Buzan’s English School is able to identify the institutional imbalances in a society torn apart by civil war. I have chosen to focus on post civil-war Uganda as a test case.
Chapter 2: Applying Buzan to post-conflict Uganda; a cursory experiment

In the previous chapter I have discussed the rationale behind the English School as interpreted by Barry Buzan. Buzan and other influential English School authors identified sovereignty and territoriality as still the most important institutions in today’s interstate domain. Institutions in the other two domains, the transnational and interhuman domain, need to support sovereignty and territoriality up to a certain level for the sake of societal stability. However, because the current international domain on a global scale has also characteristics which point to cooperation, more institutions than just sovereignty and territoriality are important. These institutions are nationalism, diplomacy, great power management, equality of people, market and environmental stewardship. There appears to be a coherence between these eight institutions, they are a logical set. 

In this chapter, I will attempt to apply Buzan’s theory to post civil war Uganda as a cursory experiment. Buzan would hold that harmony between institutions has some interesting implications for stability in a society.\(^\text{134}\) If a country, in this case Uganda, is to become peaceful and stable, there needs to be a certain measure of institutional balance between the three domains. But also between the three domains on a global scale on the one hand, and the three domains of the Ugandan society there should be a certain balance because the institutions identified in the first chapter of this thesis together make up a coherent set of rules and depend on each other. In the first paragraph of this chapter, I will investigate whether the institutions within the Ugandan society\(^\text{135}\) are mutually supportive or whether there is friction between them. How the post-conflict strategies come to terms with the institutional imbalances found in the first paragraph of this chapter is the question around which the second paragraph revolves.

§ 1: Uganda’s institutional balance in its three domains

In this first paragraph I will attempt to see Uganda through the eyes of Buzan. This means I will investigate in the institutions present in Uganda in each of the three domains, and where friction within and between the domains can arise. I will show how the information I used leads me to conclude that in the interstate domain, the institutions of equality of people and nationalism are not as strong as they are on a global level, and how this influences the other domains.

1.1 Uganda’s interstate domain

To fit the Ugandan interstate domain somewhere on Buzan’s scale ranging from the asocial, power political stage, via coexistence, cooperation, convergence, to confederalism, is difficult. The state as we know it today can be said to have its origin in Europe. Whether the idea of the state has been successfully transported to the African continent could be subject of debate.\(^\text{136}\) Still, as the institutions of territoriality and sovereignty are firmly recognized on the African continent, I propose

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\(^\text{134}\) Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 250.

\(^\text{135}\) The Ugandan Society, here, is composed of three parts: the interstate domain, the transnational domain, and the interhuman domain.

\(^\text{136}\) Some regions in Africa are “home to ‘quasi states’ that prioritize regime security rather than liberal international politics or human security.” Paul D. Williams, “From non-intervention to non-indifference”, *African Affairs* 106, no. 423 (March, 2007): 254.
to identify the African continent as a society of states, largely based on coexistence, but, as we will see, as also having some cooperative characteristics. As discussed in chapter one, in the interstate society on a global scale, Buzan argued to complement the institutions of sovereignty and territoriality with diplomacy, great power management, equality of people, nationalism, the market and environmental stewardship. Are these institutions present in the interstate relations Uganda has with other states? The limited scope of this thesis forces me to sacrifice completeness. Hence I have chosen to focus only on Uganda’s multilateral relations in the context of the African Union, and to highlight the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa only when the institution of the market is concerned.137

Uganda is a member of the African Union. The African Union (AU) was launched in 2001 to replace the Organization for African Unity. The heads of the member states of the AU were “Inspired by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States.”138 This all sounds very promising, but what really is the effect of the AU on the African international domain? In the first chapter I have identified institutions present in the interstate domain on a global scale. In this part I will analyse whether these institutions are present or absent in Uganda’s interstate domain, and in particular in the African Union. I will do this by analysing existing literature from Buzan’s perspective.

**The African Union and sovereignty**

According to Paul Williams, state sovereignty is an important institution on the African continent, and the institution could be said to be more unrivalled within the African continent than outside. This is the case because the African Union often fails to fulfil its promise of intolerance towards unconstitutional changes of government and the responsibility to protect principle.139 On the continent, the African interstate society does fairly little against instances of fraudulent election, which are not seen as unconstitutional changes, or continuations, of government.140 Although the African Union authorizes coalitions of countries to intervene in cases of coups d’état, the organization has a rather poor record when it comes to the responsibility to protect.141 How could we analyse this information of Williams? I believe Buzan would hold that on the African continent, there is a reluctance to breach a state’s sovereignty to uphold other institutions, for instance human rights

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137 Both the EAC and the COMESA appear to be centred around the institution of the market which is upheld by a calculative rationality. For more on the support for the market in the COMESA, please consult:  

For more on the support for the market in the EAC, please consult:  

For more on the lack of support for the institution of equality of people in the EAC, please consult:  

138 Preamble of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

139 Williams, “From non-intervention to non-indifference”, 278.

140 Ibid, 175.

141 Ibid, 278.
and nationalism, with its derivative democracy. This reluctance could be seen as marking the importance of the institution of sovereignty in Africa.

**The African Union and territoriality**

Already in the period of decolonization, the African continent appeared to be aware of the importance of the institution of territory. The Organization of African Unity embraced the borders handed down by the former colonial powers. Roughly, these borders have remained unchanged. The relative tranquillity surrounding the borders of African states could point, however, both to their importance as to their insignificance. According to Christopher Clapham, the sole purpose of borders on the African continent is meeting the criteria of statehood in order to be represented in international organizations like the African Union. Clapham believes these borders are nothing more than lines on a map arbitrarily drawn in a pre-nation state era. The group of people that is able to hold the capital city within those lines is appointed to represent the country as a whole. In this way, the African borders serve to provide the governments of African states with external sovereignty more than internal sovereignty.

Let’s put on Buzan’s glasses and interpret what we just read. In the depiction of Clapham, which I believe has good descriptive value, we could understand the African state as not so much adopting the institution of borders out of habit, or belief. Much more, the African state in Clapham’s story adopts the institution of borders for a specific purpose, namely to be able to claim statehood and demand membership in international organizations. This interpretation of the African border points to a rather functionalistic view on the institution. A border-for-the-sake-of-having-borders-mentality which is also reflected by the relative ease with which premature African states adopted the borders defined by their former colonizers. Buzan would hold that, with the information provided by Clapham in mind, borders on the African continent perhaps are supported by the mechanism of calculation, and not by belief.

Does this also count for the master institution of territory? Is this institution based on a cost-benefit rationality of calculation. Or is the institution of territory durable and based on belief? Although perhaps the institution of borders is based on calculation, sovereign entities without territory are hard to imagine. At a minimum, the African continent could be described as a society of states with governments whose powers perhaps do not reach all the way to the borders, but with governments that do govern over a certain uncontested defined plot of land none-the-less. The thought that this situation will last in the decades to come could not easily be discarded, that is why I believe the institution of territoriality is based on belief on the African continent.

**The African Union and diplomacy**

In the first chapter of this thesis, diplomacy has been described as the function of authoritative communication by one state with another. In this sense, diplomacy defines the social character a state inevitably has. Changes in government on the African continent are often quick, radical and not democratic. This has the potential of undermining the reliability of another state’s government as a negotiation partner and could thus undermine diplomatic relations. Still, with the African Union in place, the African continent has a forum of multilateral diplomacy. In this sense, one could the say the presence of the African Union has a positive influence on the institution of diplomacy on the

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142 Ibid, 260.
144 Ibid.
145 Although, of course, the borders on the African continent may be subject to change.
African continent. However, the African Union is highly dependent on donations from non-member states and organizations. For example, the budget of the African Union for 2016 draws sixty per cent of its income from international partners.  

How would Buzan perceive such information? Arguably, Buzan would hold that, with such an existential part of the budget of the African Union being paid, it is unlikely that the organization survives if the outside promoters, foreign donors and international partners, disappear. Does this mean the institution of diplomacy is based not on belief but on calculation? I do not believe Buzan would answer this question positively. It would be very likely the positive influence the AU has on diplomatic relations between states lasts even beyond the AU’s existence. I imagine even a bankrupt African Union would leave in place a group of people with diplomatic skills and a very good sense of what diplomatic relations could contribute to the continent. This would make the survival of the institution of diplomacy as such highly likely, even when outside promoters disappear.  

The African Union and great power management  
The African continent is marked by an absence of great powers, or by an unwillingness of the great powers to manage. The unwillingness of many African states to restore peace and stability in the region runs parallel with the importance of the institution of sovereignty on the continent. As Paul Williams notes, the Organization of African Unity often had to rely on outside military assistance to intervene in conflicts, and the African Union often depends on outside funding to finance its peace missions. The institution of Great Power Management does not seem to win terrain in more recent times. In the north, Egypt has been hit hard by the Arabic Spring and has lost its status as a strong state with Great Power potentiality. And in the east, Kenya is too occupied with civil unrest and its struggle against Islamic extremism to stage itself as a regional power. The role of Nigeria on the African continent is an interesting one. Nigeria’s first contribution to a peacekeeping mission was in 1960 when it participated in the ONUC mission in the Congo. Since, it has deployed peacekeepers in Lebanon, India/Pakistan, Iran/Iraq, Iraq/Kuwait, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. “Nigeria further deployed police contingents to Namibia, Western Sahara, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Burundi, Bosnia, Haiti, East Timor, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.” Nigeria promotes itself as a regional hegemon in West Africa. It has participated in United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations throughout Africa and beyond. According to Jude Odigbo, Joseph Effiong Udaw, and Adaona Frank Igwe of the Department of Political Science at the Federal University of Wukari in Nigeria, the role of Nigeria is one of a sub-regional power at most, as its chances of becoming a hegemon on the African continent are curbed by its own internal problems of high unemployment and governmental mismanagement.  

147 Clapham, 270.  
149 - “Nigeria serves as headquarters to the ECOWAS brigade, which was mandated by APSA, whereas the Nigerian Army 130th battalion in Calabar, is the standby force for ECOWAS.” W.O. Alli, The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy (Abuja: 2012), 31.  
- The reason for Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operations could be found in its self-image as a regional hegemon. Adebajo, 246.  
Another state that arguably can claim great power status in Africa is South Africa. Despite South Africa being the only African state with G20 membership, and despite its economic and military superiority on the African Continent, researchers Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman believe South Africa’s influence as great power is overrated: “...outside of a small number of states that form part of its ‘near abroad’, South African hegemony is neither complete in its material form, nor has it demonstrated consistent ability to exercise leadership even where it has the means available.” For the time being, the only claim that could be made on the institution of great power management is that it is lacking on the African continent. A vindication of this statement could be found in the continent’s economic and military reliance on western states and the UN.\footnote{Williams, “From non-intervention to non-indifference”, 19.}

According to Buzan, a derivative of great power management is the institution of war. And as we have seen in the previous chapter, in the current interstate domain on a global scale, war increasingly becomes a tool of the interstate society, and less a tool of individual states. Relevant in this sense is article 4h, in the African Union Constitutive Act which gives the AU the right to intervene in a member state, without its consent, in order to restore peace and stability; to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and in response to a serious threat to legitimate order.\footnote{Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union”, African Affairs 103, iss. 411 (April 2004): 250.} This article of the Constitutive Act is “... a world first for international organisations in recognising a right of humanitarian intervention in a sovereign independent state.”\footnote{Gottschalk, 14.} Without a doubt the AU has the ambition to operate as a legitimizer of armed force. Whether these ambitions have become reality remains to be seen.

Paul D. Williams, in his article “The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: evaluating an embryonic international institution”, is positive in very tentative language: “...if the PSC (Peace and Security Council, tvv) didn’t exist, it would be wise to invent it.”\footnote{Paul D. Williams, “The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: evaluating an embryonic international institution”, The Journal of Modern African Studies 47, iss. 4 (December, 2009): 622.} However, Williams points to the many deficiencies of the Peace and Security Council, which acts as an executive organ of article 4h. The council is understaffed and underfunded. In big operations, AU troops merely assist UN personnel. The problem of budgetary constraints is also identified by Kristiana Powell in her working paper for the North South Institute.\footnote{Kristiana Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on The Responsibility to Protect. ISS Monograph Series 119 (Pretoria: 2005), 30 and 40.} While it is understood by both Williams and Powell there is a continent wide demand for an AU intervention force, the organization is faced with a free-riders problem and a considerable part of the PSC’s operations is funded by external actors.\footnote{Powell, 30 and 40, and Williams, “The Peace and Security Council of the African Union”, 618.}

Now let us wear Buzan’s glasses again. How could we perceive this information? The sources I used in this part point to the absence of the institution of great power management on the African continent. The absence of this institution, one could imagine, would make armed conflicts between small countries more likely, for the stakes are lower when neither of the states in conflict have support by a great power. On the African continent, however, there are no signs of this. The absence of the institution might not have much influence \textit{an sich}, but when we appreciate the relations that exist between institutions, as Buzan does, I believe it would be interesting to investigate what the influence of the absence of great power management is on other institutions. When there is no great power having a stake in upholding a certain level of humanity, the absence of great power...
management might well negatively influence the institution of equality of people as well. If this indeed is the case we will see below.

**The African Union and equality of people**

According to Abadir Ibrahim, doctor of juridical science and human rights activist, the member states of the African Union lack the political will to comply to human rights demands of the AU: “A lack of willingness and incentive of Africa’s political elite to protect human rights and democracy in their own territory, not least in other states, is the strongest conditioning factor.”\(^{157}\) It is very striking to see that, according to Ibrahim, the whole African human rights system has very little influence on the compliance of member states. This accusation is supported by more authors.\(^{158}\) Ibrahim takes it even further, arguing many African leaders have an interest in a neglect for human rights. This leads him to conclude a change in AU’s practice is unlikely unless there is a change in the members of the organization.\(^{159}\)

In somewhat more careful language, Paul Williams comes to the same conclusion: “Although the two transnational norms examined here (intolerance of unconstitutional changes of government and the responsibility to protect) have been institutionalized in the AU Charter and endorsed by the UN, they have been internalized unevenly by the AU’s member states.”\(^{160}\) According to Williams, despite the internalization of human rights norms by the African Union, there appears to be little incentive to actually protect them.\(^{161}\) Although the AU’s intentions are to protect human rights on the continent, the organization is lacking the influence to do so in a credible fashion.

Human rights is a derivatives of the primary master institution of equality of people. The idea that all people are equal appears to be well internalized in states around the world. This internalization points to a belief system that is also present in Africa; one would be hard put to find an African state’s constitution which does not mention principles of equality of people in its constitution. However, as we have seen in the first chapter, important institutions define both state and interstate relations and are shared practices rooted in common values. Does the institution of equality of people meet these criteria in Africa? The mere internalizing the institution in constitutions is not enough. There needs to be an actual practice, the institution needs to be lived up to in some measure to be classified as a primary master institution.

According to Buzan, equality of people is an institution well internalized in states throughout the world and based on belief.\(^{162}\) Did Buzan ignore Africa when he made this claim? Would unequal treatment of people be a viable policy option for an African state? Or would such move be condemned by the African society of states? When South African nationals attacked immigrants in March and April 2015, it faced a storm of critique by other African states\(^{163}\) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.\(^{164}\) Such continent-wide critique is missing where it


\(^{159}\) Ibrahim, 67.

\(^{160}\) Williams, “From non-intervention to non-indifference”, 5.

\(^{161}\) Ibid, 17.

\(^{162}\) Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 188.


\(^{164}\) African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights Resolution 304: Resolution Condemning The Xenophobic Attacks In The Republic Of South Africa.
concerns the unequal treatment by law of homosexual persons in many African states. The anti-gay laws of the Museveni government in Uganda, for example, has met little critique of other African states. An important exemption, however, is resolution 275 of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, which “condemns the situation of systematic attacks by State and non-state actors against persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender identity [...]”\textsuperscript{165}

This story appears to run parallel with Buzan’s interpretation of the institution on a global scale. The unequal treatment of people based on ethnicity, as in South Africa in March and April 2015, is renounced actively by the African society of states. When it concerns the unequal treatment of people based on sexual orientation, such repudiation is less present. The derivatives of the institution of Equality of People are Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention. These derivatives, could not be claimed to have any relevance unless they are actively protected. Such protection appears to be absent in Africa.

In Africa there is no state willing to enforce principles of human rights and humanitarian intervention on a continent-wide scale. This causes, as predicted by Buzan, for the institutions of human rights and humanitarian intervention to be less important on the African continent than they are globally. The primary master institution of equality of people is present on the African continent, but within a rather narrow bandwidth of ethnic discrimination. Could we call this a presence of the institutions based on belief? Or do African states have calculative motives and do they condemn unequal treatment of people out of a fear of spreading unrest or mistreatment of fellow countrymen? Because of the narrow bandwidth in which people are believed to be equal in Africa, I suggest the latter option holds most descriptive value and chose to define the institution of equality of people as an institution based on calculation, when the African context is concerned.

\textit{The African Union and nationalism}

To what extent is the institution of nationalism present on the African continent? The lines on the African map which now form the borders between states have been drawn quite impulsively by the African colonizers in the end of the 19th century. Have nations developed within these borders, or do African people hold another than a national identity? On first sight, the image looks bleak. According to Amanda Robinson, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, the already culturally diverse African continent had its diversity aggravated by colonialism.\textsuperscript{166} “the result of such diversity is that the citizens of most African states lack a common indigenous language, shared historical memories, or similar cultural traditions—the classic building blocks of a coherent national identity.”\textsuperscript{167}

However, further in her article, “National Versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of territorial Nationalism”, Amanda Robinson comes to a rather different conclusion. After analysing statistical data of 21.155 interviews with citizens of sixteen sub-Saharan African countries, Robinson found that ethnical diversity has a positive influence on nationalist sentiments of citizens: “It may be that in multicultural states, a supraethnic national

\textsuperscript{165} African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights Resolution 275: Resolution on Protection against Violence and other Human Rights Violations against Persons on the basis of their real or imputed Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity.


Found in Robinson, 716.
identity is most easily fostered in the absence of ethnic dominance; and, in the absence of complete homogeneity, creating a common national identity may be easiest in highly heterogeneous populations.\textsuperscript{168} In the article, the author discovered there is a strong positive link between modernization, defined by levels of urbanization, universal education, access to mass media, and industrialization on the one hand, and nationalist sentiments on the other.\textsuperscript{169}

With Africa urbanizing at a fast pace and with school enrolment numbers on the African continent on the rise\textsuperscript{170}, one would logically predict more future African citizens to hold feelings of nationalism instead of loyalty towards lower-level organization. Of the 22,155 interviewees, Robinson hold that 6,780 (30.6\%) only have a national identity, and that 2,389 (10.8\%) have a stronger national identity than an ethnic identity. Combined, these numbers add up to 41.4\% of total.\textsuperscript{171} This number is low compared to, for instance, Norway and Switzerland, where respectively 94.2\% and 93.3\% of the 2773 interviewees declared to feel close or very close to the countries in question.\textsuperscript{172} However, part of the difference, could be explained by the way of questioning. In the data used by Robinson, a national identity excluded identification with lower levels of organization, in the GESIS data used for Norway and Switzerland this was not the case.

Derivatives of nationalism are self-determination, popular sovereignty and democracy. The African Union appears to support the institution of popular sovereignty and democracy in the sense that the organization speaks out against unconstitutional changes of government.\textsuperscript{173} However, AU’s negligence of condemning the fraudulent 2000, 2002, and 2005 elections in Zimbabwe shows just how far the African Union is willing to go when threats to democracy and popular sovereignty are concerned.\textsuperscript{174} When it comes to promoting the institution of self-determination, the record isn’t much better. AU’s predecessor, the Organization for African Unity, has in the past accepted resolutions condemning secession.\textsuperscript{175} Secession is, I take it, the act of a group of people within state borders declaring it wants to form a government within its own territorial boundaries. Secession runs parallel with nationalism in that both concepts touch on closing the gap between group identity and territorial sovereignty.

According to Williams, “The number of secessionist movements in post-colonial Africa is remarkably small given the diversity of ethnic groups.”\textsuperscript{176} The 2011 secession of South Sudan from Sudan might be a turning point as far as secession on the African continent is concerned. According to Anthony Christopher from the Department of Geosciences of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University of Port Elisabeth, South Africa, the secession of South Sudan is “…the first successful secessionist movement which lacked the legitimacy of regaining pre-existing colonial boundaries, but obtained international recognition as a result of a sustained struggle for self-determination and
independence, based on the ‘just-cause’ case for secession.” ¹⁷⁷ In this way, the Sudanese secession might point to an increasing importance of the institution of nationalism at the expense of the institution of territory.¹⁷⁸

Now how would Buzan evaluate this collection of information? On the African continent, the institutions of territorality and sovereignty appear to preside over nationalism. The state, then, becomes a goal by itself, which is not strange on a continent that has seen states fighting for independence in the recent past. The African Union has failed to condemn fraudulent elections and in the majority of cases has a negative stance towards secession. This shows the institution of nationalism, if present, is based not on belief, but on calculation or even coercion.

**The African Union and environmental stewardship**

A rather new institution in the international global sphere is the institution of environmentalism, or environmental stewardship. As the influence of seven billion people on the earth becomes obvious to us, increasingly people become aware we have a responsibility to develop in a durable way so that our future generations could do the same. Though many environmentalist movements have originated from countries within the western hemisphere, a claim could be made the institution is alive and well on the African continent, and that environmental stewardship might well be an African concept to begin with.

According to the African historian dr. Kimani Nehusi, environmentalism is in essence an African concept: “We may be certain that what we have uncovered is an environmental complex: a set of related values, beliefs and practices that is represented at all levels of African culture, is founded upon the recognition of the earth as so important that it is sacred, the basis of an interrelated environment that must be inherited, protected and passed on in good condition to those who come after. This way of life has been elaborated in African tradition for thousands of years in cosmology and cosmogony, rituals, names and other beliefs and practices which instruct patterned ways of interacting with the environment. Today this complex is termed environmentalism.”¹⁷⁹

It might sound troublesome to argue that the institution of environmental stewardship constitutes a recognized rule among the states of Africa. For would a continent so troubled by inefficient state institutions, droughts and floods and wars, ever be interested in the environment? According to Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai, it is impossible for African countries to develop while neglecting the environment: “The challenges facing agricultural communities throughout Kenya are mirrored throughout Africa and many of the poor countries in underdeveloped regions. In these regions, concern for environmental issues is treated as a luxury. But it is not: protecting and restoring ecosystems, and slowing or reversing global warming, are matters of life and death. The equation is simple: whatever we do, we impact the environment; if we destroy it, we will undermine our own ways of life and ultimately kill ourselves. This is why the environment needs to be at the centre of domestic and international policy and practice. If it is not, we don’t stand a chance of alleviating poverty in any significant way. Nor will we create for the African people a continent where security and progress can be realized.”¹⁸⁰ The primary question is, are the

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¹⁷⁸ Ibid.


governments on the African continent aware of the urgency of protecting the environment?

Yes, says Shingirirai Mutanga, research specialist in the Science and Technology Programme of the Africa Institute of South Africa. According to Mr. Mutanga, a lot of interstate initiatives fighting climate change have developed on the African continent since 2000: “The first half of the decade since 2000 saw the establishment of Africa Energy Commission (AFREC), convening of heads of states in Maputo 2003, followed by the African Ministers Meeting in Nairobi. However, the second half of the decade witnessed some huge milestones which saw the renaissance of Africa-EU Partnership (AEEP) in 2007, and in the 2008 Dakar declaration which provided an in-depth action plan for scaling up renewable energy in Africa. The year 2009 witnessed the endorsement of the Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) by the African Union/NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development, tvv). Lastly the first High Level Meeting between the AU and EU on Energy Partnership was held in Vienna Austria which developed a road map for outlining the AEEP’s 2011-2013 programme of work, and launch of the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP).”

How would Buzan interpret this information? The efforts of African governments to fight climate change are significant. It is a sign of the acceptance of the institution of environmental stewardship on the continent. Although the recent emergence of international climate policies have an origin that could be found in the developed nations, it could be argued environmentalism inherently is an African concept. This might be proof of the durability of the institution on African soil, which points to the institution being based on belief.

The African Union and the market
One of the goals of the African Union is promoting economic integration and development on the continent. This goal is brought about by several Regional Economic Communities (REC’s) which form the cornerstone of the African economic integration process. The plan is to merge the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) together in 2017, and to link them with the other Regional Economic Communities to form a Continental Free Trade Area.

Uganda is a member state of both the COMESA and the EAC. COMESA is based purely on economic integration. This becomes clear by reading the preamble of the Agreement Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. With such a highly economic agenda, it is difficult to see the political motivation of the member states as having a deeper cause than a cost-benefit assessment. The lacking political will to support this common market shows itself in the way COMESA is funded, it draws about half of its funds from external donors. The scope of the preamble of the EAC is much wider, as it hints on social, cultural and political integration beside economic integration.

A common market appears to be a much more reasonable goal. This is what Anton

182 Gottschalk, 23.
184 Ibid, 32.
185 Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are “determined to strengthen their economic, social, cultural, political, technological and other ties for their fast balanced and sustainable development by the establishment of an East African Community, with an East African Customs Union and a Common Market as transitional stages to and integral parts thereof, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation.” Preamble of the Amended Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. 
Dobrogonov and Thomas Farole claim in their article “An Economic Integration Zone for the East African Community”. But, as we have seen in the first chapter of this thesis, even an institution like the market could be based on belief. And this appears to be the case for the countries Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda that make up the EAC. Together, these countries have already established a customs union in 2005, and a common market in 2010. These same countries have made considerable progress in creating an East African Monetary Union - the protocol of which only needs ratification from Uganda to become binding - while the expected revenues from such a monetary union are far from clear. This unclear revenue would, from a Buzan standpoint, indicate that the institution of the market in the EAC context might be based on belief as opposed to calculation or coercion.

Outcome: presence and absence of institutions in the African interstate domain

The institutions of sovereignty, territoriality, and diplomacy are primary institutions well established on the African continent. The institution of Great Power Management is less obviously present in Africa as it is on a global scale. Norms of Equality of People have been internalized in the African Union system as well as within the constitutions of the African states, but only in the context of ethnical equality. States on the African continent could hardly be called loyal to basic principles of human rights. Buzan predicted that in non-western regions the institution of the market could well be upheld by the mechanism of calculation as opposed to belief. This appears not to be the case for the Ugandan interstate domain, where the unclear revenues of the planned monetary union show that EAC states not just support the institution of the market out of calculative motives, but that there appears to be a belief in the institution. The institution of Nationalism is gaining ground in Africa and has the potential to become as important here as it is in the rest of the world, but currently is underdeveloped. The institution of Environmental Stewardship is present in the African region, and is predicted to remain of importance for the years to come.

Most institution that play such an important role in the global interstate domain are present in the interstate domain on the African continent. There is however, one notable difference; the absence of the institution of Great Power Management. One would predict that the absence of this institution, which is inherently an institution of the coexistence stage on the continuum, pushes the continent more towards cooperative and convergence stages on the continuum. But this is not the case. The absence of Great Power Management has consequences for other primary master institutions. There is no powerful state taking the lead in punishing offenders of the institution of Equality of People. There is no regional hegemon ruling out unconstitutional changes of government. I believe the most striking way Africa differs from the global institutional set-up is the lack of Great Power Management on the continent. The absence of this institution has an impact on the other institution present.

1.2: Uganda’s transnational domain

In this section I will analyse whether the institutions held in Uganda’s interstate domain are supported by Uganda’s transnational domain. Buzan would hold that “without such support the

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186 Dobrogonov and Farole, 2.
188 Ibid, 30-31.
pursuit of the interstate project will be impossible beyond a rather basic level.”

The actors in the transnational domain are called transnational agencies (TNAs). In this paragraph I will briefly explore the Ugandan economic transnational domain, the domain of interaction between actors based on economic transactions, from Buzan’s perspective, and then move on to do the same for the societal transnational domain. I take the societal sector to include political parties, advocacy groups, NGOs, human rights organizations, and pressure groups of all kinds.

**The economic sector**

Economically, Uganda could be called a success story. The country has been experiencing an economic growth of seven per cent each year since 1986. This points to a considerable degree of interaction of companies and businesses in the transnational domain. Dr. Evarist Twimukye made some observations concerning the freedom of Ugandan economic TNAs to interact in freedom. On the positive side, he identified an increase in exports as percentage of GDP since 2000. This increase is due to deliberate liberalization policies of the Ugandan Museveni government over the past two decades. One of the reasons dr. Evarist Twimukye is not whole-heartedly positive of the freedom in the Ugandan economic sector is the unfair taxation that sometimes favours sections of the population against others. “The result is the exclusion of some businesses or individuals from the market through predatory pricing.”

Another reason for dr. Evarist Twimukye to take a pessimist stand concerning Uganda’s economic freedom record is because “there are many other barriers to entry that keep people from accessing the market not only as sellers but also as buyers.” An example of such a barrier is the lack of serious credit to businesses. This prevents companies access to market, or prevents it from maintaining market access. Apart from this problem, Ugandan businesses and companies are free to do deal with each other and are free to trade across borders.

The position of the Ugandan government when foreign trade is concerned appears to be cause for optimism. In his article “The Changing Cross-border Trade Dynamics between North-Western Uganda, North-Eastern Congo and Southern Sudan”, Kristof Titeca, researcher at the Institute of Development Policy of the University of Antwerp, identified how state policies of Uganda have positive influences on free trade with its neighbours; the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. The relatively stable infrastructure in Uganda has caused goods to be traded between South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo through Uganda. Another cause for optimism could be found in trade liberalizations by the Ugandan Government in 1994, which have lead Uganda to become an important regional hub for the trade in coffee and precious metals.

How would Buzan interpret the collection of information I displayed above? My guess is that he would hold that the identified economic growth and the increase in export as well as the role of

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189 Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 197.

190 The role played by transnational agencies operating in the cultural sector is not explained by Buzan, thus left out in this brief case study.


192 Ibid, 14.

193 Ibid, 18.

194 Ibid.


197 Ibid, 14.
trade-hub played by Uganda points to an economic transnational domain that is predominantly supportive of the institution of the market in the interstate domain.

**The societal sector**

Apart from the economic sector, the transnational domain consists of groups of individuals with actor quality in the societal sector. TNAs within this sector do not have profit making as ultimate goal. Instead, the TNAs exist to fill gaps left open by the government. Examples of such organizations are pressure groups, political parties and organizations, and NGOs. In the following I will analyse the societal sector of the transnational domain in Uganda.

The societal transnational domain in Uganda is more restricted than its economic counterpart. The ruling National Resistance Movement is actively engaged in placing restrictions on civil society actors.¹⁹⁸ Yasin Olum, who has conducted an in-debt analysis in African and Ugandan civil society and multiparty politics, believes the NRM’s motives to restrict the transnational domain could be found in the party’s hegemonic position: “because the regime does not wish to see power slipping out of its hands in any conceivable way, it is ready to restrict the operations of civil society as much as possible.”¹⁹⁹ One way the Ugandan government does this, is by restricting NGOs. Within civil society, NGOs are important players. The actions of NGOs in Uganda are restricted by the Ugandan Parliament 2006 NGO Registration Act. By this act, NGOs are obliged to register their organization at a government supervised NGO board. This board is powered to de-register an NGO for contravening ‘any law.’²⁰⁰

The result of this government policy is not very clear. While Yasin Olum believes NGOs will behave in an activist manner in the future, researchers analyzing the Ugandan civil society under contract of the Norwegian Embassy in Kampala have a less optimistic image of the role of NGOs in Uganda. They believe government control over NGOs is almost total, that is to say, they believe the NRM government policies has driven NGOs to such an extent they fear to act against the wishes of the Ugandan government.²⁰¹ From this report it also appears the Ugandan government has a much more restrictive stance towards NGOs advocating democracy and human rights than towards NGOs in the domain of service delivery and development.²⁰² Even more hostile is the Ugandan government towards organizations promoting the rights of gays and lesbians. The Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2014 criminalises same-sex relations and criminalises support for gays by individuals or organizations.

Other actors in the transnational domain are opposition parties. They play important roles in any liberal democratic state in terms of making sure everyone feels politically represented. The Ugandan multiparty system is very young - it exists since 2005 - and most of its problems can be attributed to this immaturity. Put very simply, up to 2005 the National Resistance Movement (NRM) was the only political party. The fact that the NRM has been able to win all elections even after 2005 and remain in power should come as no surprise, as the NRM has developed a firm foundation in Ugandan society. Ugandans do not believe any other party than the NRM is able to win elections, which is one of the reasons opposition parties have difficulties to appeal to voters:


¹⁹⁹ Olum, 187.

²⁰⁰ Olum, 173.


²⁰² Ibid, 14.
“In Uganda’s political system, whereby the NRM dominates in all forms (political, military, economic, international relations, civil society etc.) so that they will win the elections no matter what, voters end up thinking that there is no point in casting their vote. Hence, because of the lack of voter appeal of the different opposition parties, they choose to vote the NRM because it is the only party likely to win and to address their problems.”

In Uganda, intimidation and isolations of opposition parties is not uncommon. The NRM party has been so successful in remaining in power that Ugandan people feel they have no other choice than supporting the largest political party. As a consequence, the NRM has little difficulties in maintaining their privileged position. The Ugandan media plays an important role in denying opposition parties a level playing field. Yasin Olum defined the challenges the media faced in the following words:

“... some journalists were not professional in the way they conducted their business because they were biased. For example, in the 2011 general elections, both the New Vision and the Daily Monitor supported the NRM. Some state agents behaved repressively through indiscriminate arrests and the passage of restrictive laws that bar professional journalists from freely going about their business. This has led to self-censorship among some media houses that are believed to be anti-NRM; and some media houses such as the UBC and Simba FM failed to provide equitable coverage for some candidates and parties during the 2011 general elections, choosing to back the NRM party.”

An important institution in the African interstate domain is the institution of Environmental Stewardship. This institution could be supported by the civil society in the transnational domain, discussed here. The institution of environmental stewardship could, for example, be supported by attempts of actors in the transnational domain to block government policies that damage the environment. In 2007 and 2011, a network of civil society organizations was able to prevent the Ugandan government from cutting large sections of the Mabira Forest: “The SMF (Save the Madira Forest, tvv) campaign soon turned into a mass mobilisation of unprecedented scale, pitting the Ugandan government against a range of CSO’s, international donors, the political opposition, the Buganda kingdom and significant elements of civil society. Museveni eventually shelved his plans for Mabira Forest...”

Now how would Buzan interpret this information on the societal part of the transnational domain? The Ugandan government appears to be unwilling to give a considerable amount of freedom to actors in the societal part of the transnational domain. It actively blocks the effective working of NGOs, and has an antipathetic stance towards organizations promoting gay rights. The relative freedom transnational actors promoting environmentalism enjoy is a striking exemption to the rule of a Ugandan government that tries hard not to share its power. This restrictive stance disables the transnational domain to be supportive of the institution of equality of people. At the same time, the way in which the Ugandan government is not able to provide a level playing field for political opposition parties incapacitates the transnational domain to support the institution of nationalism; the idea that the people decide who rules. Just as there is a parallel between the transnational

203 Olum, 135.
204 ibid, 132.
205 ibid, 185.
domain and the interstate domain where the institution of the market is concerned (the institution of the market being well supported in both domains) there is a parallel between the interstate domain and the transnational domain where the institutions of equality of people and nationalism is concerned; in both domains there is a lack of support for the two institution.

1.3: Uganda’s interhuman domain

The institutions of territoriaility, sovereignty, and diplomacy are well put in place. Also the institutions of the market and environmental stewardship are important institutions on the African continent. Where the African society of states deviates from the interstate domain on a global scale is where it concerns the institutions of great power management, equality of people and nationalism. In the transnational domain, this is reflected by economic freedom for companies to reap the benefits of trade and business. On the societal side, the state government plays a more restricting role, causing for little support of the institution of equality of people and nationalism in the transnational domain. In this section, I will analyse whether Uganda’s interhuman domain is plagued by the same institutional voids present in the interstate and transnational domains.

For the interhuman domain to fit well with the other two, it needs to support the values of sovereignty and territoriality, because an interstate domain defined by coexistence is a domain of sovereign states with strong boundaries. For the interhuman domain to be supportive of the institution of sovereignty, it needs to be integrated up to a point one could speak of an imagined community, a state. At this point, the institution of nationalism becomes important. For it is the institution of nationalism that forms the link between the interstate domain, based for an important part on sovereignty and territory, and the interhuman domain. In this section I will investigate whether the institution of nationalism, so weakly supported in the interstate domain, is supported in the interhuman domain, and hence whether the interhuman domain is able to fill the institutional gap of the interstate domain. I will do this by zooming in on the Acholi case, for this case has descriptive value when analysing the measure of integration in the Ugandan interhuman domain.

The first words of the Ugandan constitution are: “We the people of Uganda.” However, does this mean there is a Ugandan peoples? Or is Uganda perhaps too divided to be able to speak of a Ugandan people? The Ugandan society is divided into 56 legally recognized ethnic groups. Each of these groups has its own indigenous language or dialect. So it is fair to say Ugandan society is highly fragmented in ethnic terms. This does not have to be harmful to the unity of Ugandan society as a whole when each tribe or ethnicity feels equally represented on the national level.

The rights of minorities are protected by article 36 of the Ugandan constitution: “Minorities have a right to participate in decision-making process and their views and interests shall be taken

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207 Buzan, From Interstate to World Society?, 133.
208 Ibid, 197.
209 The underdevelopment of the Acholi region was a mayor cause for the civil war that was waged in Uganda between 1986 and 2006. This makes the Acholi case interesting when analysing the integration within the Uganda interhuman domain.
212 Robinson, 739.
into account in the making of national plans and programs.” And by article 37: “Every person has a right as applicable, to belong to, enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, cultural institution, language, tradition, creed or religion in community with others.” In addition, there are demands from international society and civil society to protect the rights of minorities. Some of these demands have been embedded in treaties and conventions.

The rights of minorities in Uganda are protected, at least on paper. In practice, things turn out less positive: “Uganda has not put in place a framework to implement the provisions in these instruments. This hampers harmonisation of constitutional rights and makes enforcement and monitoring of pacts more difficult therefore increasing the vulnerability of minority and hence lack or poor participation of minority groups in development process and poverty reduction.”

The consequences of the lack of political will to incorporate ethnic minorities in government structures can be far-reaching. The civil war which has turned the country into turmoil between 1986 and 2006 has been the consequence of the Ugandan societal segmentation. Ugandan leaders have often surrounded themselves with national armies loyal to them, and organized around ethnic lines. When Milton Obote became president after Idi Amin was overthrown in 1979, the national army he created, the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), consisted mainly of soldiers from the northern Acholi region. When Obote was overthrown by the National Resistance Army in 1985, the UNLA was dismantled and its soldiers retreated to the Acholi region. The returning soldiers had no skills but waging war, were restless and feared retaliation for their committed crimes under the Obote presidency. These circumstances were the root causes for civil war and made for fertile recruiting grounds for the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group lead by Joseph Kony, operating in north Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Besides a lack of unity in the Ugandan military sphere, there also seem to be economic causes for the lack of unity in Uganda’s interhuman domain. The Acholi region has always been predominantly agricultural. When in the years 1986 and 1987, due to the civil war, there was an exodus of cattle, this had a catastrophic effect on the economic position of the Acholi people. The already poor Acholi region saw its proportion of households living below the poverty line increase between 1997 and 2000. Which is quite dramatic considering gross domestic product of Uganda as a whole has risen in these three years with an average of 5.8 per cent. The Ugandan civil war was especially disastrous in the Acholi region, causing for a destruction of infrastructure and massive flows of refugees. The result was that after the war, the Acholi region was lagging behind in access to education, health services, sanitation, water and nutrition.

The interhuman domain of Uganda appears to be fragmented in an economic and military sense. The underlying problem is bigger, as there are signs the Acholi people have a strong group identity and form a society, if not community, within Uganda. Acholi identity can be traced back to

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213 Uganda constitution.
215 Ibid.
218 Ibid, 17.
219 Van Acker, 337.
the beginning of colonial times. Up to 1860, what is now known as the Acholi region has been occupied by peoples related to Southern Sudan and East Nilotic linguistic groups. These people were not integrated into some tribal society but were fragmented into different chiefdoms, consisting of 2000 to 4000 people. Some lineages, existing below the chiefdom level, were coerced to join the chiefdom by force. The idea offered benefits in times of drought and hardship. Being part of a group meant being able to spread risks. In the period after 1860, an Egypt supported Jadiya administration settled in the Acholi region, demanding burdensome taxes. In 1888, the Acholi defeated the Jadiya and forced their withdrawal. The people in what is now the Acholi region continued to trade with the Jadiya, and soon intensified the trade to be able to reap more benefits of it.221

Although the political organization of people in the Acholi region was still one of chiefdoms in the first half of the nineteenth century, outsiders started to call these people Shuuli, a word which became corrupted by the people into Acholi.222 The branding of Acholi by outsiders was continued after the arrival of the British colonial expedition. The north, so it was decided, was to be a reservoir of cheap labour and a recruiting ground for soldiers.223 Because of this policy, the Northern Acholi region was at the same time underdeveloped economically and overdeveloped militarily. One of the underlying causes of the last civil war was this economic and military discrepancy. The peoples of the Acholi region began to stage themselves as Acholi to use their military means to fight their economic marginalization.224

The Acholi ethnicity is based partly on coercion, the people of the north of Uganda were forced into the Ugandan army. But the Acholi identity is also partly based on calculation. To fight the Jadiya was a decision based on ratio. To fight against economic marginalization, as the Acholi did in the Ugandan civil war, also is a decision based on calculation. But as I have noted in the theoretical first chapter, the depth of integration of institutions, like those belonging to a tribal society, may evolve from coercion, to calculation and to belief. Such evolution is, I believe, what has happened to the Acholi. Today, the Acholi people have established an Acholi identity, or at least some form of it. Evidence of this could be found in the Kacoke Madit organization of Acholi people abroad. This organization is an initiative of the Acholi community in the diaspora. Expressions of Acholi identity by this organization are not hard to find:

“Acholi would still be ill-prepared for the resolution of its sufferings, if indeed it did not also assert a sense of Acholi selfhood in the minds, feelings, thoughts, dreams, and ambitions of its children. Our love and passion for Acholi must transcend artificial cleavages of party politics, religious sects, and administrative boundaries, as well as the un-natural realities of the Ugandan multi-nationality state.”225

An Acholi identity appears to be a reality. This identity has not been determined by some endogenous sense of Acholiness. Much more it has been created by exogenous influences which have led to war and violence in Uganda and specifically in the north of Uganda. The pitiable situation the Acholi, whether rightfully or not, believed they found themselves in has strengthened their ethnic identity:

222 Ibid.
223 Van Acker, 341.
224 Ibid, 339.
225 Lucima Okello, “The crisis of Identity Acholi and Journey into the next Century” (Presentations to Kacoke Madit).
“The ongoing violence has therefore created a militarized class that faced great challenges in returning to civil life. The militarization of society combined with the strong ethnic identity boundaries formed a very fertile base for mobilization for violent action. These factors combined lead to the creation of strong historically and politically enhanced ethnic identity boundaries.”

In this section I have chosen to highlight the Acholi region and show how external influences have created the ethnicity now known as Acholi. But how would Buzan interpret this collection of information on the interhuman domain in Uganda, and in specific the Acholi case? And how could the idea of coercion, calculation and belief be brought in to this story? I believe Buzan would identify the measure of division in the Ugandan interhuman domain as standing in the way of a nation state. The strong Acholi group identity was brought about first by coercion, but this mechanism of dispersion has evolved to calculation and arguably to belief. If this is so, this points to a feeling of we-ness that is relatively stable. This, combined with the feelings of marginalization the Acholi experience, would make the Acholi region susceptible for anti-Ugandan sentiments and can do harm to the tranquillity of the Uganda’s northern borders. In this way, the lack of integration in the interhuman domain of Uganda harms the institutions of territoriality and nationalism in the interstate domain.

§ 2 Uganda’s Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan
In the previous paragraph, I have identified the institutional imbalances Uganda has versus the global interstate domain. I have identified the institutions of nationalism and equality of people are not as strong in Uganda’s three domains as they are in the three domains on a global level. This makes the goal of a reconstruction strategy, through the eyes of Buzan, rather straightforward; strengthening the institutions of equality of people and nationalism in Uganda’s three domains. That is, it should incorporate policies to increase the freedom of groups operating in the societal sector of the transnational domain; NGOs, political opposition, and advocacy groups. Second, it should incorporate measures to overcome societal segmentation and feelings of being disadvantaged in the interhuman domain. In this chapter, I will investigate whether such policies are in place. I will do this by focussing on a recovery strategy document drawn by the Ugandan Government; the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for North Uganda. As this does not cover foreign policy, I have chosen not to deliberate on necessary policies to strengthen institutions in Uganda’s interstate domain. Hence I will only focus here on the transnational domain and the interhuman domain.

227 Arguably, the absence of the institution of great power management in the interstate domain has a negative effect on nationalism and equality of people.
228 Another important post-conflict plan is the National Development Plan. This plan aims to reduce poverty nation-wide. Because this thesis focusses on Acholi region, the National Development Plan will not be discussed.
229 Promoting equality of people or nationalism in its near abroad does not appear to be a priority for Uganda’s ministry of foreign affairs. Uganda’s ministry of Foreign Affairs has nine thematic areas for foreign policy:
1: promotion of Regional and International Peace and Security;
2: Promotion of Commercial and Economic Diplomacy;
3: Promotion of National Image abroad through Public Diplomacy;
4: Effective participation in Multilateral Diplomacy
5: Promotion of Regional and Economic Integration
The PRDP has been formulated by the government of Uganda to cover the years 2007 - 2010. The plan has been designed as a “strategy to eradicate poverty and improve welfare of the populace of Northern Uganda.” In the foreword, president Museveni declares the plan must be read as a commitment to “stabilize and recover the North.” Many of the post-conflict development efforts by third parties are based on this plan. In this section I will analyse in which measure the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) attempts to strengthen the institutions of equality of people and nationalism in the transnational and interhuman domain.

2.1 The PRDP and the societal sector of the transnational domain

The PRDP states it aims to strengthen the demand side of local government to enable the civil society to demand more accountability, responsibility and transparency of local authority. This points to a recognition by the PRDP of the importance of transnational actors in the societal sector. However, how exactly the PRDP will effectuate this enhanced accountability, responsibility and transparency, the document does not mention. The civil society is mentioned but always as civil society organizations being partners in the execution of the PRDP, on the supply side. Never as agents demanding attention, on the demand side of development policies.

The position of the Ugandan government when it comes to civil society organizations also becomes clear by the lack of influence the civil society organizations had on the PRDP. Researcher Clara Kansiime of the International Institute of Social Studies has investigated the influence of civil society organizations in drafting the PRDP. In a very well written essay, “Civil Society Participation in the Peace Recovery and Development Plan in Gulu District of Northern Uganda: A Prospective study to analyse the Contribution of Civil Society Organisations,” the author reports some interesting findings.

“…CS participation in PRDP according to the government is largely limited to big formal and professional NGOs that are operating at national and international levels in Uganda. In my view, such a focus is not only narrow but disempowering to the local communities that have suffered and emerged from conflict situations with the greatest desire to return to peace and to rebuild their communities….”

Civil Society participation in the PRDP is limited. What is more, nowhere in the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan are the adverse consequences of the Ugandan NGOs law mentioned. How

would Buzan interpret this information? It is safe to say the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan does not exactly meet the criteria of enhancing the institutions of nationalism and equality of people in the transnational domain. The plan appears to be designed and implemented in a top-down manner. The way the civil society is overlooked in the PRDP does little to enable actors in the transnational domain to promote the institutions of equality of people or nationalism in a more convincing fashion.

2.2 The PRDP and the feeling of marginalization of the Acholi
In a national state, everybody feels supported by the state in more or less an equal measure. This is a precondition for statehood; the absence of this principle erodes the institutions of sovereignty and borders. The feeling of marginalization the Acholi held in the past—besides being the poorest region of Uganda they were underrepresented in the government and the army—was one of the causes of the conflict. To reduce the chances of conflict hitting Acholi again, a reduction in the feeling of marginalization of the Acholi is vital. The moment the people in the North and East of Uganda support the Ugandan government is also the moment rebellious groups will lose power.

When talking about reducing the feelings of marginalization of the Ugandans, the PRDP is the sole most important instrument of the Ugandan Government. However, and this is the crux of the PRDP, the plan was designed and is implemented by the Ugandan Government. There was very little input by the war affected communities in the North. This has made the plan vulnerable to criticism of the Acholi people. According to Rosie Pinnington of International Alert, allegations are that the PRDP was designed for the sole purpose of attaining donor money:

“Why don’t they bring us the money and trust us to monitor and implement what the community suggests ... but now they come up with good plans which the prime minister controls from afar ... these people building come and do sub-standard work and there is theft of resources ... I was chairman of the health centre and the buildings were incomplete and when I followed up I found that the money had been diverted ... or should I call it embezzled on the way ... as a result the health centre never got all the buildings ... this government is full of lies ... they use our problems ... to attract funds [from development partners] they need and divert to other things ... my request is let this programme be implemented at the sub-county or we be informed and given the mandate formally so we have authority to go and monitor the work and make sure it is done properly ... this would make the builders respect the people from the sub-county. It is better than monitoring from a distance by the other organs ... We are on remote control ...”

Such allegations can be rather deadly for any plan designed with good intentions. And it cannot be said the government of Uganda did their utmost to prevent such accusations. The PRDP focuses on four objectives; the consolidation of state authority, rebuilding and empowering communities, the Ugandan NGO Law are mentioned: ““Despite the important role that civil society has and can play in the development process, a number of factors directly and indirectly work against their full effectiveness. The NDP has identified a weakness in the lack of a comprehensive and consistent framework to institutionalize the interface between NGOs and various Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) at national and district level. The current NGO law also constrains the engagement between NGOs and Government, thus fuelling mutual suspicion and sometimes hostility, rather than cooperation and partnership.” National Development Plan, 27.

revitalizing the economy, and peace building and reconciliation. However, how the drafters of the PRDP, the government of Uganda, came to this list of priorities is unclear. On the one hand, the PRDP mentions the influence of president Museveni and his fourteen point list as being the basis of the PRDP. On the other hand, the PRDP states it came into being after consultations with ministries, local governments, political leaders, districts, North Ugandan members of parliament and international stakeholders. However, what were the outcomes of these consultations the plan does not convey. This makes it very difficult to discern what is the influence on the PRDP of the Ugandan government and what is the influence of the Acholi community and international stakeholders. The government of Uganda acknowledges the top-down structure of the Peace Recovery and Development plan and clarifies the lack of Acholi community involvement in the following way: “local government personnel are inadequate; capacity is generally low and there is lack of a clear framework for interventions in the North.” The government of Uganda seems to lack the political will to involve community based civil society organizations. This absence of political will stems from the high level of donor dependency; the GoU highly depends on international donors to fund PRDP related projects. Such dependency on foreign donors might well result in a neglect for the wishes of the Acholi people themselves, out of a fear too many voices need to be reflected in the PRDP.

The PRDP was supposed to be the most important instrument to develop de Acholi region in an economic and societal sense. But the plan was designed without much consultation with the Acholi peoples themselves. The plan promised considerable amounts of money to flow to the underdeveloped North of Uganda but the execution of the PRDP by the government of Uganda (GoU) has been hampered by budgetary problems. It is widely held that the funding of the PRDP by the GoU has been less than initially promised. A 2008 report of the Makere University shows only 30 per cent of the promised GoU funding for the first year of the PRDP has been delivered, about the same amount as was spend on a new presidential airplane. This weak performance has allegedly been the result of the Medium Term Expentiture Framework, which restricts the government funding to promote macroeconomic stability of the country. The GoU is reluctant to redirect money from other projects to the PRDP for this would mean moving money away from non-PRDP districts, hence away from the non-Acholi electorate, which would be irresponsible politically.

Let’s again try to interpret the above the way Buzan would do. Is the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan capable of overcoming the institutional void in the interhuman domain? Is it able to forge the people within the Ugandan borders into one community? With the development of the PRDP, the drafters had an enormous opportunity of reaching out to the Acholi people and listen. The drafters, however, missed this opportunity by developing the plan top down. Hence, the Acholi do not feel more represented with the plan in place. At the same time, the meagre funding of the plan does little to reduce the feelings of economic marginalization by the Acholi. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the Acholi people hold a rather strong identity that is based on belief. This identity could be corroded for the sake of a national identity, but then it has to be balanced by some

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237 PRDP, 18-19.
238 Ibid, 105.
239 “…even the highest reported figure of UGX 97 billion still amounts to less than 30% of the initially promised first year budget of UGX 337.5 billion. This suggests that the GoU’s plan to have donor funds account for only 14% of total PRDP funding will have to be revised.” Jonathan Marino, Is the PRDP Politics as Usual? Beyond Juba briefing note no.2 (Makere: 2008), 4.
241 Marino, 4.
kind of coercion, or better, by calculation, or even better, by belief. With the PRDP, the Ugandan government had a tool in hand to balance Acholi-ness with Uganda-ness, but failed to use it.

**Conclusion**

Uganda’s interstate domain diverges from the global interstate domain in three ways. It could be set apart most notably by the absence of the institution of great power management. Second, the institution of nationalism is not as deeply internalized as it is in other regions of the world. Third, though states in Uganda’s interstate domain recognize the institution of equality of people in words, not much is done to actively defend this institution.

From a Buzan point of view, the transnational domain of Uganda fits well with the interstate domain. Where organizations are free to trade and do business, organizations with a political or societal function are much more restricted. The relative lack of importance of the institutions of nationalism and equality of people in the interstate domain is visible in the transnational domain. In this domain there is an absence of actors successfully influencing government policy concerning equality of people. This absence puts even more pressure on the institution of nationalism, as it deprives citizens of the opportunity to influence policy.

The institutions of nationalism and equality of people are underdeveloped in the interstate and transnational domains. This is also felt in the interhuman domain of Uganda, where the Acholi people form a community within a society. The weak state of nationalism and equality of well have aggravated segregation in the interhuman domain, where people feel unheard and turn towards their own group for solutions. That such developments can have dangerous repercussions was shown in the Ugandan civil war of 1986-2006.

Uganda’s three domains run parallel in that the institution of equality of people and the institution of nationalism are not well developed. This does, as we have seen, not mean there is stability in the Ugandan society per sé, for the institutions identified in the first chapter of this thesis are mutually enforcing. The underdeveloped institutions are vital in a society in which the territorial state is to be the most important actor. A state in which every sub-state group feels it has equal rights, duties, and possibilities (equality of people), and in which each group feels it is represented by the government and can influence the government (nationalism), has stronger borders, and is better able to seek economic gain on the market. Hence, though the three Ugandan domains run parallel, the weak presence of equality of people and nationalism in all three domains are sources of imbalance.

A strategy to overcome this imbalance should, from a Buzan perspective, be sensitive to this. The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan of the Ugandan government arguably has as its goal filling the institutional void found in the first paragraph of this chapter. By developing the Acholi region, feelings of marginalization in the region can be reduced and the economic gap between the north and the rest of Uganda can be filled. However, the PRDP did not reach these goals. The Ugandan government failed to facilitate the input of the Acholi people themselves, resulting in a plan made for the Acholi, not with the Acholi. The incapacity of the Ugandan government to find proper funding for the plan further decreased the status of the PRDP. As far as the transnational domain is

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242 Precisely how the mechanism works between the interstate and the transnational domain is difficult to tell. One could imagine that the lack of critique by the interstate domain when unconstitutional changes of government occur, or when the institution of equality of people is violated, encourages Uganda to continue its aggressive stance towards TNAs in the societal sector.
concerned, the image isn’t much better. In Buzan’s perspective, the domain needs more freedom for NGOs, minority organizations and pressure groups to be able to promote equality of people and making sure everybody in Uganda feels equally capacitated to influence government policy. In the PRDP, any measure to promote freedom for Ugandan civil society is absent. Is the PRDP effective from a Buzan perspective? The PRDP could have been, the intentions may have been there. Unfortunately, the development and execution of the plan stand in the way of these good intentions.
Findings
According to Buzan, in the current interstate domain on a global scale, sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, equality of people, nationalism, the market, and environmental stewardship are the most important institutions. These institutions constitute the state and define the rules between them. The institutions need support in the transnational domain, the domain of non-state collectives; there needs to be freedom for companies to trade and do business, opposition parties, pressure groups and NGOs need to be able to stage their demands. And also in the interhuman, the domain of relations between individuals, there needs to be support; the interhuman domain should be integrated to such an extent one could speak of a large scale imagined society, as opposed to a fragmented society.

In the second chapter of this thesis I did a cursory review of literature on Uganda’s three domains from a Buzan angle. This review let me to conclude that in Uganda, the three domains of interstate, transnational and interhuman do not run parallel with the three domains on a global level. In all three of Uganda’s domains there is a lacking support for the institutions of equality of people and nationalism. What is more, in Uganda’s interstate domain, the institution of great power management is a notable absentee, one that well may be the cause of the absence of equality of people and nationalism.

The African state is reluctant to lose control on issues like nationalism, with its corollaries self-determination, popular sovereignty and democracy, and equality of people, with corollaries human rights and humanitarian intervention. This tendency is well visible in the Ugandan transnational domain. While transnational agencies in the economic domain are relatively free to do their business, the transnational agencies in the societal domain are much more restricted. The lack of freedom in the societal transnational domain comes at a price when combined with a lack of integration in the interhuman domain. The Ugandan interhuman domain is highly fragmented. When, as is the case in Uganda, there is little freedom in the transnational domain to promote goals of opposition and minority groups, there will be a considerable proportion of people in society feeling unrepresented. Such sentiments are pejorative for the peace within a nation, and have the potential of harming peace between nation nations as well.

From a Buzan point of view, for reconstruction strategies to be effective, they need to overcome institutional imbalances in the Ugandan society. In the transnational domain, civil society organizations need be given more freedom to stage the wishes of minorities, or of people who do not feel represented by their government. In the interhuman domain, a closer integration should be brought about by reducing the feelings of marginalization the Acholi people have.

The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan acknowledges the Acholi region is underdeveloped. This recognition helps the Acholi people feeling represented by the Ugandan government, thus promotes the institution of nationalism in the Ugandan society. In this respect, the PRDP is a step in the right direction from a Buzan point of view. However, the PRDP is flawed in that the Acholi people have not been involved in the process of drafting the plan. Another weakness is the budgetary problem of the PRDP. Just when the Acholi people feel the government has a serious desire to develop the north of Uganda, this initial optimism is crushed by the absence of proper funding. When it comes to supporting the societal sector of the transnational domain, the PRDP does

243 A link that has yet to be researched.
not appreciate the idea that civil society organizations need protection from the government, a freedom to be able to stage minority interests, and the ability to put pressure on government.

The centre of gravity of this thesis was never meant to be the empirical chapter two. Central in this thesis is the usefulness of Buzan’s theory as approach for analysing a society. Buzan’s interpretation of the English School invites students of international relations to identify the institutional set-up of both state and non-state society in a systematic manner. It allows researchers to begin investigating institutional imbalances from the ground up; beginning with the foundations and slowly zooming in on the subject. That, at least, is what I have attempted to do in this thesis. By using this technique, one is bound to find institutional discrepancies that may or may not be relevant. With such an approach, and this I take is the biggest advantage of Buzan’s theory, one is able to take into account the distinctiveness of certain regions without losing sight of the bigger picture; the three domains on a global scale.

Buzan’s version of the English School theory encourages scholars to analyse links within and between domains. The results I found by applying Buzan’s theory, namely that the institutions of equality of people and nationalism are underdeveloped in the three domains of Ugandan society, might not be novel observations. The idea that the institutions of nationalism and equality of people are weak on the African continent is not new. But this thesis never was about the outcome of the brief case study, this thesis was about showing if Buzan’s theory could be useful in situations of societal unrest. In that sense, I believe Buzan’s theory holds value.
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