Migration for development from an EU perspective: a threat or a window of opportunity?

The case of Morocco
DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “Migration for development from an EU perspective: a threat or a window of opportunity? The case of Morocco”, is my own work and by own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name        S.D.C. Nagelkerken

Signature

Date        July, 7, 2016
Preface

‘Caminante no hay camino, se hace camino al andar’

‘Traveler there is no path. A path is made by walking’

Antonio Machado (1875 – 1939)

In my view this philosophy illustrates the way I live and have lived. This path that leads to important things in life is made by walking, through experiences and decisions I had not figured out in advance. In particular the last seven years have marked this tumultuous and unpredictable process that got me to where I am in life right now; at the beginning of a new phase. This thesis is not just the final exercise of my masters but represents the academic and personal developments I have been through in the past years.

My journey, that took me from an individual travel through Latin-America to Amsterdam, where I finished my bachelor Human geography and Urban planning and made friends for life, up to my final destination: Groningen. My experiences, skills and ambitions all come together in the master International Relations and Organization and the ultimate work: a study on migration. An extensively discussed topic, but one that not always gets the (political) attention it deserves. This research provides an alternative to migration, as a valuable and fundamental phenomenon, and gives the reader food for thought and new insights.

I want to thank all the people that crossed my path: friends, family, professors, fellow students and interviewees that pushed me through this fun, and at times, difficult process. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. G.C. Roozendaal for continuous (personal) support and guidance throughout the writing process. Special thanks go to my mother Caroline and my boyfriend Rogier for their constructive criticism and encouragement. I appreciate their love and entire support that walked me through this thesis and give me confidence for my path to follow.

Sannah Danaë Chloë Nagelkerken
Abstract

This explanatory study concentrates on the limited efforts of the EU, as important policy actor, to facilitate the potential and opportunities of migration for development in sending countries. The research has been conducted through studying both quantitative and qualitative sources.

Increasing recognition of the interdependency between migration and development by the public and political field among which the EU, offers a comprehensive and economic approach that addresses the opportunities and threats. Brain drain is one of these negative pressures that could undermine development. Whether the outflow of high-skilled people significantly threatens economic development is to be questioned. The same is true for remittances, return and recruitment, the most widely valued economic stimuli. Particularly remittances turn out to be crucial financial incentives for development at household level, and to some extent at national level. Indeed, the amount of remittances in Morocco has increased and spent in respectively, housing, trade and agriculture. Return migration has yielded higher employment rates and benefited industries, such as construction, services and trade. Sufficient development-outcomes appear to be difficult due to scarce facts and limited research.

Ambitions of Moroccan and European policy towards migration are context-time specific and at times paradoxically. Both actors acknowledge the link between migration and development as can be seen from bilateral agreements as the Mobility Partnership. Nevertheless, EU migration policy runs against its own ambitions by working towards less migration rather than safer migration. Through border restrictions and a selective entry-apparatus the EU serves its own interest and misses the window of opportunity in terms of development and protection of human rights. Migration can work for development if the EU together with sending countries goes beyond its one-sided orientation and respects other migration facets than just security matters.

Key words: migration, development, opportunities, EU policy, Moroccan policy, remittances, return, recruitment, brain drain
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CDMG</td>
<td>Council of Europe within which European Committee for Migration</td>
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<td>DMBS</td>
<td>Direction of Migration and Border Surveillance</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>European Center for Development Policy Management</td>
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<td>EMHRM</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Network</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>GAMM</td>
<td>Global Approach Migration and Mobility</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLD</td>
<td>High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development</td>
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<td>ICDPM</td>
<td>International Center for Migration Policy Development</td>
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<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>MIRAB</td>
<td>Migration, Remittances, Aid and Government-bureaucracy</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Mobility Partnership</td>
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<td>MRN</td>
<td>Migrant Right Network</td>
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<td>NELM</td>
<td>New Economics of Labor Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WW</td>
<td>World War</td>
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Introduction

Migration is anything but a new topic, rather a continuous process in which the number of migrants between- and within regions increases, and a phenomenon that ‘has always been part of human history’ (Castles and Miller, 2014: 70). About three percent of the world’s seven billion people are international migrants, persons living outside their country of origin. Between 1970 and 2005 the stock of international migrants increased from nearly 82 million to just over 190 million (UNDP, 2008). In the era of globalization it is not surprising that increasing migration flows across different countries, regions and continents create a complex challenge for national governments and international political actors. Movement of people is widely influenced by international economic, political and cultural interrelations. ‘International economic disparities, poverty and environmental degradation, combined with the absence of peace and security and human rights violations’ (Kül, w.d.) affect migration patterns and the political agenda. National issues become international matters when people cross borders to seek for better economic prospects or as a safety valve to political unrest and ethnic conflicts. Pull- and push factors (economic, social, political, environmental) are the key factors that drive population movements and explain the different types of migrants that exist (Piesse, 2014). Refugees, asylum seekers, political- economic- or social migrants, transnational migrants, migration for the purpose of family reunification, found in illegal or legal circumstances; all fall under the heading of a migrant. The use of the term migrants is extremely loose and ‘conflicting definitions pose challenges for policy’ (Anderson and Blinder, 2015: 2).

People have been on the move for ages. But migration is subject to changing contexts and times that puts pressure on the interpretation, acceptance and response by policies. International migration that we see today stems from primarily two causes: underdevelopment and insecurity (Muiderman, 2015). The refugee crisis is a living example of how ongoing civil wars and political instability threaten the security of hundred thousands of people. In addition, the influx of (irregular) migrants demonstrates the lack of political will (the Economist, 2016) and limited resources to adequately respond to this huge pressure on e.g. the European Union (EU), as large receiver and preeminent political actor (Carrera, Blockmans, Gros and Guild, 2015). By this means, European policy-makers are being challenged to come up with equitable responses, especially as other national- and citizens’ interest should not be forgotten. Under this heavy pressure there might be a risk for the political field to lose focus on what is inevitable, justified and possible with regard to migration. Sensitive matters as migration, fueled by fear, anger and ignorance, might lead to a one-side orientation and miss the window of opportunity in terms of increasing human capabilities, growth, empowerment and progress (IOM, w.d.). Yet, ‘migration and development are highly interdependent processes’ (IOM, w.d.) and cannot be seen in isolation from one another.

‘The debate about migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum from optimism in the post-war period to pessimism since the 1970s onwards towards neo-optimistic’ (de Haas, 2008: 2). Does the EU as a leading political actor, committed to the arrival of migrants, recognize the importance of these development objectives and from which (optimistic
or pessimistic) perspective? Hence, this thesis concentrates on the stance of the EU towards migration: a threat or an opportunity for development? Particular for developing countries with poor economic conditions, migration, with all the consequences that could entail, might boost household income and at national level create jobs and the proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (UN, 2014). One of these countries that has undergone major (economic) changes and maintains historical ties with Europe under the thumb of migration is Morocco, as it is ‘evolved into one of the world’s leading emigration countries’ (de Haas, 2005). According to the European Commission (EC), Morocco is seen as an ‘indispensable strategic neighbor of Europe’ (Hahn, 2014), connected through a wide array of work fields, including the support of integration policy and fully respect of migrants’ rights. Through which events and from which perspectives has European migration policy been established? And what about the constitution of the migration-development relationship within the implementation of this policy? It is time to take stock of EU migration policy towards migration and all its facets by the example of Morocco. This research will be conducted through the following question:

**To what extent has EU policy facilitated the opportunity of migration for development in sending countries? And has migration, through (bilateral) policies of the EU and the Moroccan government, worked for development in Morocco?**

Migration is not a unilateral motion but embedded in a political interaction and multi-layered contexts (Chaudhary, 2016) of sending- and receiving actors. Next to the EU, the support of the sending side (the Moroccan government) has a great impact on if and how migration works for development. The response (through tools and strategies) of both the EU and Morocco over the course of history will feature in the fourth and fifth chapter of this research.

It has been said that migration is primarily an outcome of uneven development, due to a widening income gap between developed and developing countries. From this point of view it would be simplistic and ingenuous to assume that migration is just a security-matter, while the root causes of migration derive from poor economic conditions (Newland, 2003) and it would be interesting to have economic circumstances as starting point for the research. Therefore, this thesis is conducted through an explanatory, mainly qualitative research that seeks for both threats and opportunities that hamper or stimulate development. Although there is increasingly attention paid to development as an outcome of migration by scholars, politicians and the public, exact numbers and precise findings about the real effect of migration on such potentials are limited. Thus, an extensive research that concentrates on specifically this new insight into migration is recommended.

After the presentation of the social and academic context from which the research will be addressed, an extensive theoretical explanation of how migration went through immense changes in terms of interpretation and understanding, and got into an eminently political debate, will be discussed. This section will zoom in on specific positive and negative aspects of migration for development as at large. In addition, emphasis is put on the heterogenic character of migration as a phenomenon that is inherently linked to specific contexts and events over time. These effects can be put together into one single question:
What has been the impact of remittances, return and recruitment on development in the sending countries that are derived from migration?

The third chapter presents a methodologic framework from which the research will be conducted, and will primarily zoom in on the research strategy, units of analysis, sources used and the three important variables, that can be drawn from the second chapter.

Migration, embedded in different time frames and circumstances, may serve as an explanation for the second section in which the strategies and tools of European external migration policy over the past few decades will be described. The EU as a political actor holds a privileged ability to regulate migration patterns through the constitution of specific rules and procedures (Kicinger and Saczuk, 2004). These regulations have been subject to societal issues and historic events, as warfare and periods of economic recession. Together with critical input from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the citizens’ voice about the tools and strategies, the EU faces a difficult challenge. Even more because the interdependence between migration and development is increasingly recognized by the public and non-governmental actors, and slightly by the political field as can be seen in the EU migration agenda. In this sense, there is no other option for Europe to, at least, put the development potential higher on the agenda. The fourth chapter explores whether the EU has been able to implement this migration ambitions and to what extent the potential of development is considered. This contemplation is guided by the following sub question:

Through which perspectives and strategies has EU migration policy changed over time and how is contemporary policy maintained and implemented? And what are its repercussions today?

Having discussed the two main components within this research, policy and development indicators, that underlie the success or failure of migration for development in sending countries, it is time to measure these against the case of Morocco. Its long-standing migration history, particular with Europe and different (economic and political) circumstances makes Morocco a suitable case-study for the effects of migration on particular development. Already in an early stage, Morocco and Europe developed close (colonial) ties through different partnerships and concrete strategies (de Haas, 2014). Therefore, Morocco serves as a relevant case study to think about the effects of EU policy on migration issues and whether migration, from the post War period onwards, has been more a chance or a threat for development:

To what extent has migration worked for development in Morocco and what has been the response of the EU and Moroccan government to this matter?

After an examination of the previous questions, the conclusion will give a short overview of the research findings, followed by a few policy recommendations. A reflection on the outcomes of the research gives the reader an insight in the topic and food for thought about how policy, underpinned by the EU and the Moroccan government, should be better managed to maximize the potential of migration for development. Or at least the recognition that there might be a chance for migration to foster development.
The aim of this research is not to convince the reader of the success of migration as a unique tool for development. However, through a balanced analysis of migration (affected by threats and opportunities) and an outline of how the EU is subject to a complex and sensitive issue as migration, the reader is challenged to think beyond prevailing interpretations of migration. Secondly, this thesis could serve as a proposal to underline the non-temporary character of migration and remind policy-makers that migration policy should anticipate this fact. Thus, migration – as a potential enabler for development – is too important and inevitable too ignore and deserves adequate research and careful policy-making.
1. Migration and development in a societal and academic context

1.1 MIGRATION: TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT

1.1.1 Introduction

Migration, ‘the movement of people from one place to another for the purpose of taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence, usually across a political boundary’ (National Geographic Society, 2005), is a continuous process that deserves an integral part of the migration-debate. Given the fact that we live in an age of mobility and the public, private and political field has to deal with migration, it makes sense to understand and adjust to the possibilities and threats that migration brings about. Before the research is conducted and presented it is necessary to explain the history, concepts and definitions of migration from a variation in theoretical perspectives that have evolved over the past decades, challenged by globe-spanning trends, such as globalization.

1.1.2 Migration under the thumb of globalization

Globalization, which among other things resulted in mass movements of people, seems to have a great impact on migration and the response by policy-makers. During the late 20th and 21st century migration flows from the traditional migration patterns - South to North – increased, due to the intensified interconnectedness and (economic, political and social) inequality that exists between people and countries. Three main changes can be distinguished that might explain this process of globalization (Page and Plaza, 2005: 3):

- Economic and political instability in a number of countries;
- Reduced transport and communication costs;
- Strong economic conditions in developed countries and a widening income gap between developed and developing countries.

The latter one has for a long time been seen as the main driving force behind migration. Indeed, at first glance it seems logical to assume that economic incentives – at individual level - as jobs, higher wages and loans are the main reasons for migrants to move. Economic opportunities account for a large amount of migration in- and outflows. Traditional economic models that focus on economic conditions neglect the not so obvious processes that drive migration. Pure economic models ‘fail to give insight into social, economic and political processes that have created the wage and opportunity gaps to which migration is supposedly a response and are actually at odds with what is seen in real-life patterns’ (de Haas, 2013). A more refined economic explanation of the appearance of migration will be applied throughout this study and reassess the traditional economic approach.

Defining migration is difficult because it is a long-standing process that is often associated with different events and issues. In particular political- and religious oppression and warfare result in migration flows stemming from ‘fear of being persecuted for reasons of race....political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable .. and unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of the country…..owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’ (Geneva Academy, w.d.). How a migrant can be defined is complicated and highly debated. ‘Migrants are often conflated with ethnic or religious minorities and with asylum seekers’ (Anderson and Blinder, 2015: 5). Next to illegal migrants, asylum seekers, low-skilled and high skilled workers and extended family members can be seen as migrants. These factors and types of migration determine whether migration is (non) forced (when the move is initiated because of external factors), illegal (those who moved without legal permission) or legal. There exists a general thought of the public towards migrants, ‘who want to see immigration reduced’ because people tend to focus on ‘certain types of migrants – especially ‘illegal’ immigrants but also asylum seekers’ (Anderson and Blinder, 2015: 5). The perception of migration, as a threat to national and international security that has heightened in recent years, stems from precisely this phenomenon; the rise in the number of international migrants and especially of ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ migrants’ (Koser, 2011). This research will concentrate on migrants that participate in economic activities (through remittances, return and recruitment) as a result of migration.

Alongside the negative perspective on migration, the utilization of migration for the development potential, among scholars – and gradually – politics, grew. Different ideas underlie this new optimist perspective on the link between migration and development. Particularly economists see migration as a solution to, for example, the aging population that is inherent to the current period of demographic change with all the consequences it has for the national labor markets. As a consequence, it has been said that European economies and jobs grow faster than the population is able to fill them. Migrants could meet this labor shortage. Optimists recognize the potential of migration, even in times of a ‘humanitarian crisis’, as the celebrated author Thomas Piketty states: ‘the crisis represents an ‘opportunity for Europeans to jump-start the continent’s economy’ (Porter, 2015). And at least as notable is the economic contribution that migration offers for sending countries in terms of financial flows (remittances), human capital and investments by return, and policy support of migration through recruitment. Chapter two will zoom in on these economic stimuli that might foster development.

Understanding the political debate allow the reader and policy-makers to think about and illustrate the impact of migration on societal issues like security, development and socio-political conditions. For instance, the interdependency between migration and development has been there for ages, but perspectives on this nexus have radically changed. For a long time, migration has been seen as a result of imbalances in development. Now, increasing attention is paid to migration as an opportunity for development.

So the debate has been associated with different perspectives and context over time. An overview of these varied approaches might be a convenient starting point for this research to discover how the migration debate has swung back and forth, under which circumstances, and how the development potential got involved.

1.1.3 The migration-development nexus

Traditionally, migration is considered as a consequence of uneven development and poor economic conditions between countries. The idea of migration as an outcome of the economic gap between the (poor) South and the (rich) North stems from the neoclassical economic theory.
in which ‘wage differences between regions are the main reasons for migration’ (Porumbescu, 2015: 56). Ever since the end of the 19th century migration has been recognized as an ‘inseparable’ part of development (de Haas, 2008). Migration as a complex heterogenic phenomenon is gradually adapted by policy-makers, as the fundamental origin of migration lies ‘in the history of past and economic and political contact and power asymmetries between sending and receiving nations’ (Portes and Böröcz, 1989: 611). The embedment of migration and development in an international contexts calls for an interdisciplinary exercise that includes ‘context, agents, and processes of multi-spatial environment’ (Wise and Covarrubias, 2009: 93), rather than a one-dimensional and static framework.

With regard to these non-static ever changing variables, one of the processes that the migration experts and policy-makers should look at is the spatial relationship between sending- and receiving countries and address them in the context of different policies. Therefore an appropriate route to a balanced analysis of the migration-development nexus is an economic approach that accepts the labor market and dynamically varying economic circumstances as initial reasons for migration. This chapter will present the discursive shifts in the debate to understand under which different societal and academic contexts the migration-development link has changed.

Perspectives on the relationship between migration and development took off from 1950 onwards and have moved back and forth since. ‘A new surge of interest’ (Newland, 2007) entered the migration debate recently. According to Newland (2007), the revival of the migration and development nexus can be seen as an outcome of different policy concerns that has dominated the migration debate since. It can be said that the migration-development nexus was subject to a more general shift from ‘grand theories towards more pluralist approaches’ (de Haas, 2008: 2) together with a ‘renaissance in optimism…after decades of pessimism’ (de Haas, 2010: 2).

1.1.4 Developmentalist optimism and neoclassical perspective (1950 – 1960)

Theories on migration related to development evolved from the 1950s. The neo-classical scholars could be seen as the first and most traditional migration scholars. Neo-classical theorists tend to see migrants only in the context of factor price equalization and ignore non-economic conditions, such as socio-political pull or push factors. By this means, the ultimate motivation for a migrant is to raise and maximize their wages between sending and receiving countries, as well as on the migrants (Cassarino, 2004). Neoclassic theorists limit themselves to focus on the outcomes and factors of migrants and neglect the impact of migration on those involved (as family members) and side-effects as money transferred to sending countries (de Haas, 2010).

The development economists – a strand within the neoclassical perspective – stick to the idea of migration as an integral part of modernization (de Haas, 2010). From this point of view, migration is inherent to modernization and development may have positive outcomes for migration and vice versa. This developmentalist model respects migration as an opportunity for poor countries to jump on the bandwagon of economic development and industrialization of developed countries. In contrast to the neo-classical scholars, developmentalist optimism
upholds a comprehensive approach that evolved between the 1950s and 1960s. During this time scholars moved away from the neo-classical idea that migrants as individuals are the only study-object and their decisions to migrate are merely based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits to stay at home or move abroad (Castles, 2008).

Notwithstanding, developmentalist optimists to some extent agree with the neo-classical theorists in seeing economic opportunities as the ultimate outcome of migration. Particularly, ‘reduction of labor surpluses and the inflow of capital through migrant remittances’ were seen as crucial determinants that enlarged productivity and incomes (Castles, 2009) and stimulate economic growth.

During the optimist wave specific economic incentives were already recognized as stimuli for development, merged into the MIRAB-model: migration, remittances, aid and government bureaucracy (de Haas, 2010). The optimist view of migration as an impetus for development in the mid twentieth century changed when recruitment and export, for example in the case of Turkey and Morocco, turned out disappointing. In the sense that limited return meant ‘little economic benefit for the country of origin’ (Castles, 2009: 4). These unintended and unpleasant consequences of migration led to a dramatic shift from a predominantly optimist approach towards increasing skepticism that ‘migration undermines the prospects for local development and yields a state of stagnation and dependency’ (Castles, 2008: 3).

1.1.5 A radical shift towards pessimism and skepticism (1970 - 1980)

From 1970 onwards the optimistic approach became increasingly threatened by a more pessimistic interpretation of migration as a ‘negative flight from misery’ (de Haas, 2008: 26), which hampers more than stimulates development. The historical-structuralist scholars refused the developmentalist perspective that migration works for development. On the contrary, they saw migration as a threat to economic growth in the sense that it could aggravate problems of underdevelopment. Once migration takes place, the economic and financial status of migrants and the place that they leave behind diverges and ‘deepens the bipolar pattern characterized by the vicious cycle of poverty in the periphery and the accelerated growth of the core region’ (de Haas, 2010: 7). The pessimist scholars describe this vicious circle as the following logic: migration facilitates underdevelopment and increasing poor conditions push migrants away from their country of origin. This leads to more migration, and so forth. Brain drain from sending countries (the outflow and scarcity of knowledge and migration from country of origin to country of arrival) is a widely used example of these threats that deepens the inequalities between sending and receiving countries. From this perspective, migration undermines regional and local development by depriving qualified and high-skilled workers.

Despite both pessimist and optimist perspectives have been of great value for the debate on migration and development, the traditional developing theories as the neoclassical and the historical-structuralist, largely fail to take into account the driving forces behind migration; the push- and pull factors. A comprehensive approach, and the acceptance of economic circumstances as main driving forces that has been ignored for a long time, gradually gained (political) ground.
Contemporary migration theories seek for ‘factors associated with the area of origin; factors associated with the area of destination; so-called intervening obstacles and personal factors (as economic conditions)’ (de Haas, 2008: 8). The most widely used approach is the ‘push-pull framework’ that takes into account the push-factors of sending- and receiving countries as against the opportunities (pull factors). The push-pull theory sees migration ‘as an outcome of poverty and backwardness in sending areas’ (Portes and Böröcz, 1989: 607). Two explanations underlie this theory. First, ‘the expectation that the most disadvantaged sectors of the poorer societies are most likely to participate in migration’ and second ‘such flows arise spontaneously out of the sheer existence of inequalities on a global scale’ (Portes and Böröcz, 1989: 607).

Unfortunately, due to its dichotomy character, the push-full framework appears to be inconsistent with the more complex migration patterns and ignores the heterogeneity of these patterns and actors that are concerned with migration processes, as the state and politics. According to de Haas, ‘push and pull factors turn out to be two sides of the same coin: together they provide the perception of difference between ‘here’ and ‘there’, and therefore have limited heuristic value’ (de Haas, 2007: 18). Do contemporary migration theories go beyond these clear-cut models and acknowledge the transnational character and the potential of migration in all its aspects?

1.1.6 The recognition of migration as a transnational process

As a consequence of changing awareness of the meaning and influence of migration, since the late 1980s more emphasis has been put on ‘locating migration within transnational processes in terms of global economic connections’ (van Haer and Sorensen, 2002: 16). From this transnational perspective, migration takes place at different levels, constituted through a variety of actors and remains an important source for the country of origin. ‘Migrants facilitate the flow of information back from the place of destination to the origin, which facilitates the passage for later migrants’ (de Haas, 2007: 30). The so-called ‘bridge-heads’ (de Haas, 2007: 30) offer a comfortable climate for coming migrants, reducing the risks and material and psychological costs that new migrants have to deal with. This view of an unfolding network of friends and fellow-migrants that increase the likelihood of migration is called the network theory. These social communities include migrant groups that gather the resources needed to secure and prepare his/her return to the homeland by mobilizing resources stemming from the commonality of interests and available at the level of social and economic cross-border networks (Cassarino, 2004). Besides the creation of networks in their destination countries migrants keep connected with families and friends at home or create networks while moving through, for example, circular migration.

Together with the recognition of migration as a complex and multifaceted process in a broader context, new strands within the migration-development nexus gave room for critical response to old theories and ideas for new perspectives. The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) is one of those perspectives that reject the old theories by shifting the focus from an individualistic level of analysis to ‘placing the behavior of individual migrants in a wider social context and by considering not to the individual migrants in a wider societal context and by considering the family or the household as the most appropriate decision-making unit’ (de Haas, 2007: 51). This revised view on the economic foundation of migration concentrates on
maximizing the incomes of the households in sending countries and minimizing the risks and ‘overcome limitations occurred as a consequence of the failures of national markets’ (Porumbescu, 2015: 55). This theory sees migration as a causal process that appears at different levels of analysis (individual, family, national, international, etc.) and differs from- and challenges the old economic models, which ignored these wider social entities and interactions.

While neo-classical economists uphold a limited approach on the permanent character of migration and the maximization of wages in receiving countries, new economic supporters see migration from a comprehensive perspective in which, for example, migration is not seen as a permanent phenomenon but rather as a temporary or circular process depending on the ‘need of the household’ (Porumbescu, 2015: 60).

Another alternative to the old theories is the *livelihood strategy*, which analyzes the activities surrounding the household. Apart from economic activities, social institutions determine the livelihoods of migrants. In accordance with the migration network theory, the livelihood approach is a strategy that puts emphasis on social networks and conditions and not specifically on the individual circumstances. Diversify, secure, and potentially improve the household through a wide range of assets is seen, from the livelihood strategy, as a durable and long-term solution that creates a safe haven for potential migrants.

The recognition of migration as a process that is subject to a wide array of conditions (economic- network and livelihood dependent) coincided with a transnational turn in the migration debate. ‘There has been increasing recognition of the increased possibilities for migrants and their families to live transnationally and to adopt transnational identities’ (de Haas, 2007: 55). Scholars suggest transnationalism as a convenient framework for analyzing migration because it allows a complete examination of more concepts and ideologies that underlie migration processes. Following Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992), the potential of transnationalism for a well-funded migration analysis can be identified through certain premises: ‘the transnational migrant must be analyzed within the context of a globalizing world, ….transnationalism is grounded in the daily lives, activities, and social relationships of migrants, ..transmigrants deal with and confront a number of hegemonic contexts, both global and national’ (Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992: 5). This definition clearly outlines the hybrid character of contemporary theories that involve actors, causes and impacts in broad terms.

Considering the above, one might question whether there is awareness and concrete action from decision-makers and the degree migration for development has been recognized by policy-makers. How does contemporary policy act upon migration issues and what is it stance? This will be discussed in the course of this chapter. The next section presents the international context, during the after WW period, when Europe faced enormous changes, in particular with regard to its external migration policy. Followed by an examination of the role of receiving- and sending actors towards migration.
1.2 POLICY AND RECEIVING-SENDING ACTORS

1.2.1 The changing EU migration policies

European migration policy has a long history and is therefore difficult to put in a clear time frame. A convenient starting point to analyze the European political approach could be the end of the World War (WW) when mass flows of refugees entered Europe. Chapter four will zoom in on specific policies and instruments that were used since.

A historical-theoretical context demonstrates the multitude of policies and approaches of the EU towards migration. A remarkable time plot for a few (western) European countries has been the transition from an open receiving policy when the reconstruction after the WWII ushered in an economic boom and a huge new demand for workers appeared, towards a restrictive closed border policy until the mid-1980s. It was the recession and the permanent request of workers to stay that Europe decided to close the doors. These remarkable developments had a major impact on how migration has been perceived and controlled since.

Since the end of the 20th century, when the Schengen agreement came into force - which allows for the freedom of people to travel through member states without inconvenient hurdles as border checks - Europe holds an international liberal trade position. It allows free movement of capital, goods and services within the EU-borders. However, the Schengen agreement has been criticized by human rights- and nongovernmental organizations for excluding non-EU citizens and people outside of Europe. The so-called ‘Fort Europe’ exists in a global liberalized market in which international institutions, as the EU, tend to refuse people rather than facilitate opportunities of migrants’ activities. Hence, they provide little space for initiatives and negotiations that might utilize positive outcomes of migration and mobility. How would the migration-development relationship look like if the EU would consider migration as a potential tool for development instead of a barrier? In order to answer this question, the aim of this research is to dismantle the EU policy structures that have determined migration patterns over the last decades and find out how current migration policy affects the migration-development relationship.

Traditionally, the EU has utilized the potential of migration for development to a limited degree, but the purpose of this policy is to be questioned: does this policy accommodate migration for its own ends, or also in the interest of sending countries?

1.2.2 The context of receiving- and sending countries

Having in mind the idea of migration as a transnational process that includes a wide variety of impacts, causes and actors (receiving and sending countries), the research can be best conducted through a modern economic approach. It allows the reader to look at both sides of migration and its link to development: what are the economic consequences for the countries of origin when migrants leave? In order to answer this question, politics and scholars should respond to the receiving-sending relationships case by case and not see this link in isolation from wider issues of global power, wealthy and inequality (Castles, 2008: 14). In particular because migration is well and truly a phenomenon of globalization.
Migration to neighbor countries or within continents happens more often than we might think (Page and Plaza, 2005: 3), as evidenced by the large migrant flows from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. Geographic proximity continues to be a significant determinant of migration patterns. As professor Lucas puts forwards, ‘distance deters migration, and the least-developed countries are generally more remote from the industrialized world’ (Lucas, 2008: 3). People who decide to move for economic reasons might return if their job or satisfaction is fulfilled. In this sense, the country of origin that started as sending country becomes a receiving place. The receiving-and sending link is not exclusively an interaction between two countries. Migrants often circulate in between two or more countries. Globalization has a great impact on the migration patterns resulting in unprecedented intercontinental migration flows rather than within regions. Together with the beginning of globalization, the traditional assumption of ‘international migration seen as a peripheral phenomenon’ (Castles, 2008: 8) during the rise of the nation state disappeared. Crossing borders was no longer the exception. Instead, globalization represents the ‘complementary changes and their complex linkages’ (Castles, 2008: 9). From this moment, political- and non- political actors could no longer ignore the potential of circular migration and its impact on development. Through which factors and circumstances comes migration policy and the willingness to utilize the potential for development about?

The consequences of migration for development depend on the background of both countries/actors and its structure and relation in between. Oftentimes, scholars speak of receiving-and sending countries, but what if we look at an institution or an actor as a whole, such as the EU? It appears that policy plays a crucial role in how migration is related to development. Apart from the social and economic conditions of receiving- and sending actors, one should look at how migration policy is constituted. In addition, receiving countries might pool all migration preferences and strategies into one common policy that has a directive voice (as the EU external migration policy). So if migration takes place in a complex network of different institutions and Member States, policy calls for an appropriate effort on the part of all concerned.

1.2.3 Sending- and receiving actors: the impact of economic factors

Within this thesis great emphasis is put on the labor market and other economic factors of sending countries. In addition, the degree of migration highly depends on the role of different (internal and external) factors, such as (non) state institutions, citizens and informal networks that exert influence on migration flows. Logically, the more (political, economic and social) push- and pull factors are in play (political pressure and employment abroad) the more people will decide to move.

Thanks to scholars and researchers exploring the impacts of migration for development in both sending- and receiving countries, knowledge, evidence and further research gained ground. Interest for the impact on sending countries, particular for developing regions, increased. On the contrary, critical scholars question the extent of economic benefits that migration is said to bring for development and argue that ‘the evidence base for the links between migration and development is still very weak’ (Castles, 2008: 11). Even large institutions as the World Bank
state that the relationship can be ‘unsettled and unresolved’ (Castles, 2008: 11). The so-called ‘development mantra’ supported by the positivist aspects, is criticized by scholars. In order to draw up the balance of the real effects of migration on development and ascertain the idea of a development mantra, chapter two will extensively outline the economic indicators that feature possible potentials and threats. Now, the general conditions of migration as a possible perpetrator of development will be described. First, the possible economic implications of migration for sending countries will be described in the next paragraph.

1.2.4 Migration for sending countries

The exact impact, in economic terms, on sending countries has been neglected until recently. Nonetheless, cautious results show the potential that migration has for development. Migrants can bring back home the same positive spillovers as for host countries. The so-called ‘remittances’ are the ‘largest source of financial inflow after direct foreign investment’ (Lucas, 2008: 7). Together with financial flows from host to home countries, investments as substantial spending on housing and education increase. Yet, investments are often criticized due to their inadequate character (Lucas, 2008), as for the purpose of leisure.

Migration can affect the home labor market directly. Return migration might lead to employment and the growth of the local market through, for example, knowledge-spill over. It is even said that migration leads to a win-win-win situation for both receiving- and sending countries and migrants. Whether this process, called ‘brain circulation’, benefits all actors depends on ‘the willingness of the states concerned to cooperate for development’ (Castles, 2008: 12). For instance, the success of human capital is often challenged by critics who claim that ‘international migration of the highly-skilled from poor to rich countries – the so-called brain drain phenomenon – threatens development’ (OECD, w.d.). Whether migration really works for development through the just mentioned economic conditions will be explored in the upcoming chapters. Even as the extent to which the EU sees and acts upon this potential.

Conclusion

Migration has always been linked to cross-border activities and can be seen as a transnational process that goes beyond borders. From a traditional perspective, either developmentalist or historical-structuralist, considered the migration-development nexus as a one-dimensional trade-off. Perspectives on the migration-development nexus have changed dramatically from grand traditional theories towards modern economic perspectives. Also the political response towards migration moved back and forward between pessimist and optimistic views. A closer look at how policy-makers, particular the EU, act upon migration is important since politics have the exclusive competence to regulate migration.

In order to address the complexity and time-context dependency, migration should not be analyzed in isolation from wider issues of global power (socio-political aspects), but through a comprehensive economic approach that addresses both the opportunities and threats that migration has for development.
Theoretical framework

Migration: a stimulus or threat for development in sending countries?

2.1 THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY ON MIGRATION

Introduction

This research concentrates on the effects of migration for development in sending countries. As an inevitable subject, the characteristics of migration and through which economic variables migration generates positive or threatening outcomes for sending countries will be examined in this chapter. What we have learned from the previous chapter is that migration, built upon economic indicators, includes more than just pure measurable economic facts and numbers. It contains a whole array of economic activities and qualitative data. Although there exist a great amount of data and explanations about the costs and benefits of migration for development, evidence on both sides (negative and positive) is weak and hard to come to any confident conclusions. As Newland puts forward, ‘understanding the causal relationship between rich country immigration policy and poor country development is a frustrating pursuit, hamstrung by the absence of data, frequently inaccurate data, and a lack of comparable data’ (Newland, 2003).

This chapter provides an analysis of three important economic indicators that derived from migration and can be seen as the theoretical starting point of this study. The purpose of exploring the success or failure of these factors is to see if they contribute to financial stability in sending countries and to what extent. This chapter suggests that the impact of these factors are context-specific, based on different national (economic) conditions and (socio-economic and political) circumstances and the importance of policy in sending- and receiving countries to create opportunities for bringing the variables into being, as can be drawn from the previous chapter. The next paragraph will briefly introduce and explain these events and how it affected the ever-changing migration debate.

2.2 MIGRATION AS ENABLER FOR DEVELOPMENT?

During the last decades globalization left its remarks at the world-stage, characterized by a wave of mass migration patterns that coincided with the ‘freer movement of goods (trade) and money (finance)’ (Martin, 2013: 6). A large part of migrants leave their country for economic reasons and seek for places that offer work, better salaries and a higher living standard. ‘About three percent of the world’s population has moved from their countries of origin to live and work elsewhere’ (Page and Plaza, 2005: 2). Simply put, the gap between poor economic conditions in developing countries and prosperous, industrial countries lead to mass flows of migrants. Although it has been said that not the poorest but rather the middle-class represent the major migrant group. Thus, migration does not merely take place between the poorest and richest regions world-wide (often-called: North-South division), but occurs in different contexts and circumstances. So, geographic proximity continues to be a significant determinant of migration also within continents, as can be seen from East to West movements. In addition, sending-
countries, like the African continent, increasingly become hosts for neighbors and find themselves in complex decision-making.

According to policy-makers and voices from NGOs and migration scholars, the most common explanation of migration as a stimulus for development in sending countries is based on the three R’s; *remittances, return* and *recruitment* (Martin, 2013). Supporters believe that these economic stimuli involve mutual benefits (for sending-receiving countries and migrants themselves) by which win-win outcomes are generated. Since globalization has been characterized by huge flows of migrants - facing ‘stringent restrictions’ (Page and Plaza, 2005: 2) - meanwhile free movement of migrants facing ‘stringent restrictions’ (Page and Plaza, 2005: 2) - meanwhile free movement of services and financial activities is a common good, optimistic scholars see ‘liberalizing labor as the last frontier in globalization’ (Martin, 2013: 7). If migration will be relieved from these restrictions and complicated procedures, will, and under which conditions, the opportunities of migration for development increase? The next three paragraphs will provide an analysis of the three – widely used – R’s and utterly the theoretical perspective from which the research will be conducted.

2.3 OPPORTUNITY I: REMITTANCES

Globalization, by which the world gets increasingly connected, creates opportunities for migrants to work abroad while remain connected with their families and belongings at home. For example through financial exchange as remittances; ‘personal transactions from migrants to their friends and families’ (UNDP, 2011: 2). This research concentrates on the economic indicators for migration in which remittances - as dominant financial facilitators - can be divided into two components (Martin, 2013: 7):

- **Worker remittances** (the wages and salaries that are sent home by migrants abroad 12 months or more);
- **Compensation of employees** (the wages and benefits of migrants abroad less than 12 months).

Remittances have developed into the largest financial flows from receiving to home countries and with that, exceed traditional financial inflows, as ‘Official Development Aid’ (ODA) and private financial flows in the last ten years (Page and Plaza, 2005: 9). Also Dr. L. Smith emphasizes that remittances can be the largest share of the economy, even more because ‘remittances have been of greater value than we thought initially’ (Smith, 2016). In many countries the earnings of remittances are even larger than incomes received from the main export products. Therefore it would be interesting to see what the exact amount of money inflow into the concerned country (Morocco) brings about and whether this financial input is invested for either productive or consumptive purposes.

Despite facts and figures about the amount of remittances, reliable data is hard to come by for two reasons. According to Page and Plaza, unrecorded remittances are a consequence of unregistered ‘small’ financial flows. Secondly, money-transfer agents measure official transactions (including cross-border flows captured by central banks as part of international transactions) and do not observe the probably high amount of informal remittances.
The formal agents include (non) bank financial institutions, electronic payment systems, microfinance institutions, money transfer operators and remittance service providers (the World Bank Group, 2011: 12). Although research has indicated that many households ‘show widespread use of informal channels of remittances’ (Page and Plaza, 2005: 11), the amount of unrecorded remittances is significant in Sub-Saharan Africa. This could be explained by the fact that informal channels are very common in many African countries. Moreover, Africa is by far the largest emigration area, within the continent.

The international- and national economic situation determines whether remittances lead to increase of the financial income for three reasons. First, the volume of remittances depends on the economic activities of migrants (what is the number of migrants, what is the volume of the earnings abroad and to what extent are they willing to send money back home). Secondly, national circumstances as economic policies and financial crises determine whether remittances are accepted and if so, how they enter the country (regulated or forced). In addition, costs depend on the channels remittances are transferred (informal or formal) and the extent of competition between money agents. In sub-Saharan African countries competition is limited, due to a low presence of money agents. This increases the costs of money transfer. On average, ‘the cost of sending sums over borders can be 10 per cent of the amount transferred’ (Martin, 2013: 12). Other countries uphold a strict financial policy and only allow a few financial agents to pay out remittances. So, the amount of remittances is often determined by the ‘payment system infrastructure’ (the World Bank Group, 2011: 14).

In short, remittances are seen as a key determinant as to whether migrants decide to use formal or informal channels in transferring money flows. Remittances might have other impacts, for example in times of economic and financial crises, financial input serves as a stable source of financing, when other incomes are scarce. According to Dr. L. Smith, the effectiveness of remittances varies across migrant-sending countries, but ‘can make a difference for sure’ (Smith, 2016). In the Philippines where there exists a ‘structural relation between migrants and the national economy of the Philippines’ (Smith, 2016), the amount of remittances is USD28 billion (The World Bank Group, 2015). The number of remittances received by sending countries depends on a wide array of factors and actors. For example, social circumstances as well as the family structure, the income of migrants, and whether migration is temporary or permanent.

Europe, as a large receiver of economic migrants, gives a good indication of countries that are most reliant on remittances and demonstrate the impact of these financial flows. The figure below includes a list of global financial flows from Europe to sending countries as percentage of annual GDP, including Nigeria, China and Morocco as top three remittances receivers from Europe.
The (non-European) country that receives the highest amount of remittances from Europe is Nigeria. In 2014 the Sub-Saharan country received US$7.31 billion dollar from Europe followed by Morocco (US$6.168). The main areas that receive money from migrants working in Europe are Asia, Africa and Near East, as can be seen from the statistics above. Although the impact of remittances differs per country, depending on the national (economic) conditions.

African countries are a great example of how important remittances can be for the national financial condition in a country. According to IFAD (2009), ‘more than 30 million Africans live outside their countries of origin, sending more than US$40 billion to their families and communities back home each year’. Remittances have become a major financial source of ‘financing for households, communities and governments in Africa’ (the World Bank Group, 2011: 8). Overall, remittances can contribute to the financial stability and development of sending countries. Following Augusto Lopez-Claros, Director of the World’s Bank Global Indicators Group, ‘remittances are an important and fairly stable source of income for millions of families and of foreign exchange to many developing countries’ (the World Bank Group, 2016). How could remittances further contribute to development in sending countries? The fifth chapter will find out to what extent remittances and policy support lead to financial improvement in one of the most important African (e) migration countries, Morocco.

At national level, remittances might be used for government-approved infrastructure projects and generate jobs. Next to remittances, emigrants may stimulate foreign investors to ‘buy products form their country of origin’ (Martin, 2013: 13) and with that contribute to the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). At the household level, remittances are used for investment in housing, health-care and education or for the ‘accumulation of money that leads to investments in countries of origin’ (Smith, 2016). The latter demonstrates the impact of remittances on schooling of children. ‘A recent study in El Salvador shows that the school drop-out rate is lower and the enrollment ratio higher in households that receive remittances’ (Ratha, 2004). In addition to ‘economic’ purposes, remittances are also used for consumption. Research is conducted on whether remittances are used for ‘productive’ investments or for consumption. Another study has indicated that ‘a large part of remittances is consumed instead of invested and thus, not put to productive use in migrant-sending areas’ (Taylor, 2006: 6). Obviously, it depends on the country and household whether remittances are used for consumptive purposes or other investments.
Scholars and policy-makers agree on the idea that if remittances are mainly used for investment, they may foster growth and development economies, receiving the remittances (Bauer, 2009: 4). The use of remittances for consumption and buying goods is criticized and considered as a useless and short-term investment, due to reluctance to work ‘and slowing down the development of the receiving countries’ (Bauer, 2009: 4). Notwithstanding, money for consumption can contribute to leisure activities of families and with that to the well-being and the feel-good-factor, says Smith (2016).

Another phenomenon that migration could create by remittance spending is the so-called multiplier-effect. According to Taylor and Martin, the exit of people to host countries initially has negative consequences, due to the output of labor reduces. But ‘the arrival of remittances can lead to adjustments that maintain or even increase labor output’ (Taylor and Martin, 2001: 457) or through local entrepreneurship and investment projects. Furthermore, diaspora networks could play a crucial role in maintaining and supporting remittances and in ‘promoting trade and investment flows between host- and sending countries since long standing immigrant communities tend to influence trade preferences, facilitate trade intermediation and provide useful information on countries of origin’ (Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani, 2010).

Which factors, besides remittances, could play an important role for development in sending countries and households within?

2.4 OPPORTUNITY II: RETURN

The second ‘R’ within the migration-development framework relates to return migration and the extent to which returnees can take advantage of opportunities to invest the money – earned abroad – at home. Here it will be discussed what the most common form of return is and to what extent it triggers national and household development or the opposite: hampers growth.

Return involves ‘the people and ideas that come back to the country of origin and their impacts on development’ (Martin, 2013: 2). In addition, return is an added value for the creation of new trade and other links of migrants with their home countries. A third option is the circulation of economic migrants between home and abroad. This may ensure a continues process of knowledge-spoolver, employment generation and human capital accumulation, in such a way that ‘win-win solutions for both sending- and receiving countries’ (Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani, 2010: 9) are being pursued as a consequence of ‘back- and forth circulation’ (Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani, 2010: 41).

Return of migrants happens for different reasons. Coming back in the home-country does not automatically mean that returnees put their skills and human capital into practice. A number of migrants returns with the intention to rest and retire. In this sense, the investment of knowledge and money becomes less important. Another reason for the decline of remittances may be the decision of migrants to stay abroad and cut their ties with social networks at home with all consequences this has for knowledge spill-over and return of human capital. However, if migrants return with the intention to work, their come-back might provide ‘energy, ideas, and entrepreneurial vigor to start or expand business at home or go to work and, with the skills and discipline acquired abroad, raise productivity at home’ (Martin, 2013: 13). The return of
manpower that takes advantage of opportunities to invest the money earned abroad at home and ‘set in motion faster development’ (Martin, 2013: 2), is the most widely held outcome of return. Regardless of the household situation, the impact of return migration on national development is also driven by decision-making at national level, or simply-put: whether the government is willing to invest in productive purposes as education, health and infrastructure. For example, ‘migrant-sending governments can maintain links to their citizens abroad by permitting or allowing dual nationality or dual citizenship’ (Martin, 2013: 15). The support of governments for emigration and return predominantly has to do with the development stage of the concerned country. Scholars suggest that the most effective outcome of return would be to complement the stage of development in a particular country with the ‘brain reserves overseas’ (Ratha, 2004). Experience shows that the poorest countries pose the largest challenge to encouraging returns. The outflow of high-skilled migrants, particular in developing countries, has for a long time been seen as the main challenge for these countries to anticipate on migration issues. Wies Maas (2016) reinforces the cry from the poorest countries for help to prevent the depopulation of this group. On the contrary, Maas questions whether brain-drain significantly threatens development, since high-skilled people might have no opportunities in the home-country anyway due to a misfit between their skills and the demand of the short-labor market and underdeveloped educational- health – and social systems. From this point of view, Maas argues that migration, and with that knowledge- and financial spill-over, should be encouraged instead of combatted.

Next to people and money, return also finds expression in sending home the so-called ‘political remittances’. These are ‘ideas that help to speed up development by breaking down gender and other stereotypes that limit the education of girls or restrict women in the workplace’ (Martin, 2013: 15). Through migration from poor to rich countries and with that the new gained work experience- and mentality, the ‘importance of hard work, education, savings and investments will spread to the sending countries’ (Martin, 2013: 15). Compared to remittances, the effectiveness and thus positive impact of return on development in sending countries is hard to measure. Return comes in different forms and with divergent purposes.

2.5 OPPORTUNITY III: RECRUITMENT

The third factor that might influence the development in sending countries has a lot to do with pull factors in destination countries that, on regularly basis, attract young people. This process, called recruitment, encourages (young) people to cross borders in order to find jobs. Both employers, government bodies and recruitment agencies in hosting- and sending countries actively anticipate on the demand of migrants and their own needs for manpower. The mechanisms that facilitate migration through recruitment and the successes and failures involved will be applied to Morocco in the fifth chapter.

A remarkable example of how recruitment and (labor) demand pushes migrants from less developed countries to prosperous welfare states could be the mass wave of guest workers from Morocco to Western Europe during the 1960s. ‘Strong economic growth in Western Europe resulted in great demand for low-skilled labor and got officially committed through a ‘labor recruitment agreement’ (de Haas, 2010). This phenomenon of recruitment and other policy
interference as immigration restrictions already touches upon the issue of unexpected consequences that these institutions had to deal with, such as the unforeseen permanent settlement of migrants in Europe, which will be examined later on.

The required involvement of governments’ migration policies is very clear in the selective entry of migrants that concentrates on ‘the top and bottom of the education ladder, that is, those with college educations and low-skilled migrants’ (Martin, 2013: 8). This does not mean that these groups dominate migration patterns in general. Indeed, the growing middle-class increasingly becomes an important migration group worldwide.

Recruitment does not directly affect development in sending countries as the inflow of money does. Notwithstanding, it can be seen as an indispensable tool to enable (return) migration and remittances. As has been said, migrants may decide to stay abroad and the benefits from return or remittances fail to happen. For this reason, there are countries that demand ‘compensation from countries for their professionals who emigrate’ (Martin, 2013: 10). Depending on the in- and outflow of persons, the condition of health-care, infrastructure, education, and above all, national and international policies and interventions attempt to regulate migration patterns. Africa struggles with the outflow of high-skilled people while it has limited return of knowledge. Therefore the World Health Organization (WHO) arbitrates between African and receiving countries through bilateral or multilateral agreements that encourage governments to ‘subsidize training in African sending countries’ (Martin, 2013: 10).

As goes for remittances, recruitment of migrants every now and then is accompanied by high costs due to the tremendous amounts of money that agents charge, the education of migrants and worker rights. However, there are possibilities for both migrants, agents and other engaged actors that can reduce these costs and facilitate recruitment, such as informing potential migrants’ possible visa, recruitment and work procedure costs. It appears that ‘migrants into many labor importing countries face substantial informational deficits’ (Page and Plaza, 2005: 33).

Institutions as job operators, embassies and local governments can facilitate job-matching. Policies in sending countries could play a crucial role in protecting their citizens from exploitation by, for example, recruitment agencies. This is of great important because it seems that the negative effects of recruitment exceed the benefits, due to ‘large costs to migrants from developing countries are fees paid to recruitment agencies’ (Page and Plaza, 2005: 33).

2.6 THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY IN FACILITATING THE 3 R’S

The previous paragraphs have demonstrated three important economic stimuli that could work for development. It appears that these variables are inextricably linked to internal and external policy, in the sense that the willingness of the state to facilitate remittances and return by active recruitment is decisive. In addition, this policy is subject to national conditions (as financial crises) and other policy priorities. For this research it is of great value to look at the interplay between political interests and the repercussion on the utilization of migration for development.

A majority of scholars agree upon the idea that the extent of ‘migration studies, the topics of investigation, the research questions and even the findings of migration studies’ are driven by
Policy considerations’ (Castles, 2008: 6). Policy is often a derivative from external threats and security matters, such as the mass inflow of undocumented migrants that set the political agenda. It is the duty of politicians to create conditions that tackle these social issues and facilitate appropriate conditions. The priorities of this political agenda highly depend on the degree politicians and society attach value on certain topics.

Despite national concerns, policy is embedded in external relations that pose a challenge for coherent policy and good partnership between sending- and receiving countries (ICDPM and ECDPM, 2013). Even more because a common strategy or bilateral matters are difficult to agree on, since different preferences play a part. The cooperation with its Member States is a perfect example of how the EU struggles to come to an (migration) agreement. Moreover, collaboration between the EU as receiving actor, and the government of the sending side (in this case Morocco) has a great impact on whether migration for development is facilitated. How does current policy respond to the issue of migration?

Political perspectives and policies on migration have changed over the last decades. Although increasing attention is paid to the potential of development, political response tends to be more pessimistic. The current refugee crisis reflects this restrictive policy that the EU pursues, by closing the borders for ‘unwanted’ migrants. This protective behavior derives from ‘problems affecting relations between states, including questions of war and peace’ (Castles, 2004: 857). Terrorist attacks heightened the tensions on the world stage that turned migration into a security-debate. Within the EU conflicting views and policies exists with regard to respond to this crisis. According to Castles, ‘the problems of migration policies arise largely from interactions between political systems’ (Castles, 2004: 865). There have been times that states encouraged the inflow of migrants, as in the late 1950s and 1960s that coincided with an unexpected permanent settlement of Turkish and Moroccan guest-workers. This example is illustrative for the ‘failed policy’ of Europe that time (Castles, 2004).

Besides external (political) actors, sending countries themselves exert a great deal of influence on migration policy. The response of sending countries differs; some governments encourage migration to developed countries while others feel threatened by the outflow of brain drain. Several sending countries have set up special departments to manage recruitment and protect workers (Castles, 2004: 865), with the task to assists, register and protect labor workers abroad. Next to government and interest groups preferences, the involvement of employers, CSOs and the public influence policy-making. For instance, mass media is a channel that the public uses to express themselves.

Conclusion

This study explores the possibilities of migration for development. The success or failure of this relationship can be measured through three economic indicators as can be concluded from this chapter. These development stimuli are just recently adopted and recognized by policymakers. Remittances is assumed as the most influential one, particular at household level. Although its (financial) effectiveness is threatened by high transfer costs. Return could be another impetus for development through human capital accumulation and employment generation. But these results are not significant and hard to come by. First, return could have other purposes than economic activities. Second, the amount of returnees depends on the
willingness of governments to facilitate this. The latter, together with employees and recruitment agencies, has a decisive voice in whether migrants may enter hosting countries or emigration by sending governments is supported through recruitment. This chapter presented a theoretical framework from which the facilitation of policies of migration for development can be examined.

Now the most important facets of migration as potential for economic development have been discussed, the indicators, on which the variables are based, are listed in the figure below. Before the research results – which tools and strategies the EU and the Moroccan government have responded towards the potential of migration – will be discussed, a methodology will demonstrate how the research is conducted in the next chapter.

Q I: Defining migration as a potential or threat through three economic indicators

Q II: Tools and strategies of EU external migration policy

Q III: Migration threats and opportunities for development in Morocco

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q I Opportunities and Treats</td>
<td>- The amount of high-skilled people that leave their home-country</td>
<td>Quantitative + Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The circumstances in which brain drain appears</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brain drain</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>- The amount of remittances towards sending countries</td>
<td>Quantitative + Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Purpose of remittances</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Concrete use/investments remittances</td>
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<td>- Facilities for remittances</td>
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<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td>- The amount of returnees in countries of origin</td>
<td>Quantitative + Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reasons for return</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Effect of return on country of origin; economic activities/investments/shift employment/level of education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- EU and Morocco policy on return</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruitment</td>
<td>- Efforts of agents and governments in sending-hosting countries that support recruitment</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- (bilateral) policies/mechanisms/strategies that facilitate recruitment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Moroccan and European interests in facilitating recruitment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Q II Migration policy priorities</td>
<td>- The amount and content of migration policies;</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The extent to which the EU has been able to implement its ambitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q II Implementation tools</td>
<td>- Tools and (bilateral) agreements used to implement migration ambitions</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q III</td>
<td>Economic opportunities and threats Morocco</td>
<td></td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Return, Remittances, Recruitment, investments knowledge spillover/brain gain, brain drain</td>
<td>See first rows of table</td>
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<tr>
<th>Q III</th>
<th>Policy influence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU policy utilization on migration for development in Morocco</td>
<td>Tools and strategies of the EU that hamper or stimulate the potential of migration for development in Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan policy utilization on migration for development in Morocco</td>
<td>Tools and strategies of the Moroccan government that hamper or stimulate the potential of migration for development in Morocco</td>
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Figure 2: Variables. Source: Sannah Nagelkerken, 2016
3. Methodology

Variables and units of analysis

This research will explore and explain the impact of migration for development in sending countries and how migration policy of the EU responds to this.

Migration and development affect different levels of analysis (local, national, international) and different domains (social, economic, political). In order to ensure the validity of the research, including ‘delivering credible evidence to address the research problem … and to rule out alternative explanations to make inferences about causality’ (Aneshensel, 2013: 85), delimiting the research subject and clearly define its components is a prerequisite. Beforehand, one of the first questions when starting a research is: what is the purpose of the inquiry?

This study aims at exploring the impact of migration on development in sending countries by looking at three determining economic indicators: remittances, return and recruitment. The choice for sending countries as units of analysis within this research has to do with the chance that economic growth particular in these places could have a significant impact and could even reinforce development aid at large. National and international migration management determine the number of migrants that is allowed to enter the hosting countries and whether political institutions give sufficient opportunity for development. National policies might coexist with international political programs, as goes for the EU and its Member States. In order to delimit the research, this thesis will draw upon the EU’s policy and its influence on one specific developing country: Morocco. The sub-questions that will be discussed in the upcoming chapters present the research results and will address the consequences of contemporary EU policy for migration: does it create opportunities for development, and from what interest? In the fifth chapter a case-study presents whether migration, through EU and Moroccan policy, has worked for development in Morocco.

Conceptual framework and operationalization

For the purpose of a clear research the content is built upon a conceptual framework that involves the variables that the study looks at (figure 1). In the figure below both independent variables (individual factors that may have an effect on the dependent variable) and dependent variables (the output variable that is measured within the research) are listed.

![Figure 3: Conceptual framework. Source: Sannah Nagelkerken, 2016.](image-url)
The ‘potential of migration for development’ as given in the framework is the dependent variable that may be influenced by, on the one hand receiving actors (in this case the EU), and on the other hand sending actors (Moroccan government) that determine whether migration is dominated by threats or opportunities. In turn, national and international policies are dependent on other actors that advocate for (different) policies as NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The EU, for example, in cooperation with the Member States, has a hard time to come up with a common strategy in which all interests are satisfied. In order to keep the research strategy clear and feasible these possible external variables (the interests and policies of Member States) will be leave aside.

Depending on the variable, certain indicators can be better measured through statistics, tables and numbers (quantitative sources) while other indicators are better suited for qualitative research. In the next section, this research strategy- and methods will further elaborate on this used sources.

This research will be conducted through an explanatory case-study-design that relates to ‘a single instance or phenomenon’ (Odell, 2001: 3), and seeks for explanations on the impact of migration for development, particularly in Morocco. The research design offers a framework for collecting and analyzing data, including quantitative and qualitative sources.

Research strategy: methods and units of analysis

A research strategy (figure 4) encompasses different components, including the research method and the units of analysis. The pluralist character of migration requires a strategy that is built upon mixed-methods in which quantitative and qualitative research approaches are combined. *Qualitative methods* focusses on ‘detailed, text-based answers that are often historical or include personal reflection from participants in political institutions, events, issues or processes’ (Marsh, 2010: 249). In addition, doing research through a qualitative approach is more theoretically driven than quantitative techniques, and delves deeper into certain themes.

This research is primarily conducted through qualitative methods to understand how and why migration policy is constituted in a certain way. Policy documents, parliamentary letters, literature studies and three interviews will give insight in these political bodies (national and international) and their strategies. Although the results will be mainly based on literature studies, interviews can bear additional information and personal remarks. The research includes three interviews: one from an academic perspective, one from the political field and one from the NGO sector.

Secondly, *quantitative data* (as statistics in number of migrants, trends of migration patterns, and the amount of financial inflows) will complement the qualitative findings. It could undermine or just strengthen these findings.

Finally, as a part of the research strategy, the units of analysis – the major entities that are analyzed during the research – need to be traced. Following from the research question three units of analysis can be distinguished: 1) the EU migration policy 2) Moroccan migration policy 3) development in Morocco.
EXPLANATORY RESEARCH

MIXED METHODS

QUANTITATIVE

Data, tables, statistics

QUALITATIVE

Policy documents, articles/books, reports, parliamentary letters, newsflashes, interviews

SINGLE CASE STUDY

Influence EU policy on migration for development in Morocco

Units of analysis: EU/Moroccan policy and strategies on the opportunities and threats of migration for development

Figure 4: Research strategy. Source: Sannah Nagelkerken, 2016.
4. The EU’s footprint in the migration debate: supportive or opposing?

4.1 HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU’S MIGRATION POLICY

Introduction

As can be concluded from the previous chapters, policy, especially from the EU, has a great impact on how migration is accommodated and controlled. With regard to the main question of this thesis we should look at the constitution of EU migration policy: does it act only from its own interest or is there any attention for consequences and involvement of sending countries? The last section will touch upon the strategies and partnerships that the EU has constituted to actually implement its migration ambitions, in particular to the potential of migration for development. So, does the EU actually responds towards this window of opportunity or does it uphold a restrictive and opposing attitude towards migration?

4.1.1 Assumptions of EU policy towards migration and development

‘People migrate and migration is a right. EU migration policy is too much focused on preventing migration flows’ (Sargentini, 2016)

In the words of Judith Sargentini, Member of the European Parliament, delegate of the GREEN party, the EU holds a strict and direct migration policy that concentrates on preventing (illegal) migration flows. Sargentini stresses that the EU should support legal migration and ensure a ‘generous access to the European labor market’ (Sargentini, 2016) rather than stubborn resistance against migration. Migration-expert Wies Maas (2016) even goes this far by arguing that ‘there is no such a thing as EU external migration policy, because policy is not being made for the benefits of sending countries but for the EU’s own interest’. Moreover she adds, ‘in the end it’s up to states to determine migration policy from national interests and if migrants are welcome or not’ (Maas, 2016).

Voices from across the NGO-sector and the scientific corner underline this restrictive position of the EU and explain that these policies stem from feelings of fear, anger, and the protection of national identity. However, if we believe the increasing events, policy agendas and migration working groups, migration as a growing phenomenon and increasing attention to the potential of development seems to appear firmly on the EU migration agenda. A study on migration and development policies by European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) tells that different events as the United Nations (UN) High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (HLD), the International Conference on Population and Development and the Global Fora on Migration and Development, demonstrate the increasing commitment of different international actors to acknowledge migration and the potential for development. In addition, these events ‘will be called upon to further strengthen a coherent and comprehensive migration and development narrative which can be translated into concrete actions on the ground’ (ICMPD and ECDPM, 2013: 10). This automatically leads to the question whether the EU has been able to translate
this ambitious agenda into practice. The real intention and reasons behind EU policy need to be dismantled in this policy thicket that leaves many questions and uncertainty.

Chapter 2 distinguished particularly these societal issues, norms and values that input and feed (migration) policy. Not just contemporary issues, as the refugee crisis, but developments over the past decades had a tremendous impact on the constitution of migration policy and how it moves these days. Thus, a historical overview and the conditions under which policy is constituted is necessary to explain the developments that migration, related to development, undertook. After a brief introduction, the current EU migration policy will be examined with a particular focus on the position of sending countries. The policy priorities, tools and strategies for implementation will be addressed in the upcoming paragraphs.

4.1.2 Migration perspectives of the EU over the past decades

Before a historical sketch of the EU migration policies and the current stage and impact on sending countries will be given, the term ‘migration policy’ deserves a short explanation since different definitions are used as synonyms in the literature. According to the Central European Forum for Migration Research, ‘migration policy can be best referred to the following description: ‘policy led by a state’, or actor – in this case the EU –, ‘which is aimed at regulating migration in all its possible dimensions’ (Kicinger andSaczk, 2004: 3).

The reason why EU migration policy is the key objective within this research has everything to do with the role of the state in international issues and its ‘exclusive competence’ (Kicinger andSaczk, 2004: 4) to regulate migration and set the rules and procedures that support or prevent population movements. ‘International migration is by its very nature a matter of foreign policies’ (Reslow, 2011: 1). The particular interest of this thesis lies then in the impact of migration on development in sending countries through analyzing the utilization of economic opportunities. The aim of this section is to explain the developments that EU policy - with regard to migration - has undergone and to demonstrate the importance of historical events that had a major impact on the characteristics of migration policy on the longer term.

Migration can be seen as one of the earliest and prolonged continuing phenomena in history, but the after-WW II period gave rise to some new tendencies and led to ‘significant changes in the perception of the position of the state and that of the individual in international population movement’ (Kicinger andSaczk, 2004: 4). This manifestation of the state on migration is influenced by interactions with the public and the citizens’ voice. When looking at the EU as a political institution a third actor, next to citizens, CSOs and NGOs, exerts a great deal of influence on cooperation and policy-making.

The account of Member States and their preferences often conflict with the common strategy of the EU and other international political bodies. Before the role of non-EU actors will be further described, an overview will be given in which the changing policies towards more active anticipation on migration is visible, i.e. through formal agreements during the after WW II period. This era has been marked by very determining international treaties that took off from 1951 onwards, and even today play an important role. As a consequence of worldwide events as wars, technological- and communication developments, extreme poverty and human rights violation, states and governments have to deal with difficult dilemmas. In this era of
globalization, migration is one of these issues that puts a lot of pressure on the agenda of receiving countries. What about EU migration policy? Is it built upon its own interests and hosts migration by selection (cherry-picking)? By doing this, does the EU leave migrants to their own devices and limit protection or facilities as housing, health-care, jobs and education (for what they came for)?

Migration scholars criticize and abhor the policy of European countries and the responsibility of this issue that European countries shift onto others. As economist Milanovic states that ‘every country in Europe is willing, at most, to be the transit point for migrants; none is willing to be the point of settlement’ (Milanovic, 2015). By this means, migration management, border control, and the EU’s self-interest push migrants and refugees’ rights to the sidelines. The norms and values of the EU, including respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality the rule of law and respect for human rights, seem to be contradictory with the implementation of these obligations. CONCORD - the European confederation of relief and development NGOs - sees ‘a policy trend toward less migration rather than safer migration, and toward return migration rather than fair and responsible migration’ (Wirsching and van Dillen, 2016). If we are to believe EU policy, migration should be prevented by taking away the root causes and stop the mass inflow of migrants. This assumption stems from the ‘terribly concerns of the EU, that open borders will lead to a flood of uncontrolled immigration’ (Smith, 2016).

Having in mind all these complex considerations, one might ask whether the EU should prevent or accept migration. The conclusion and policy recommendations will touch upon this debate and respond to the question: how should Europe respond to immigration? First the migration policy of the EU and strategies will be explored, followed by an analysis that considers the extent to which these proposals meet the implementation. This will be done on the basis of a historical overview.

On the next page (figure 5) a short timeframe is listed including the essential migration treaties (refugee agreements are excluded) and initiatives that the EU – sometimes in cooperation with other actors – took. The next section will comment on these important events and zoom in on particularly these agreements, initiatives and dialogues with sending countries that (still) play an important role. The highlighted conventions in the figure below are the most concrete and leading agreements that the EU currently maintains with sending countries. Therefore they serve as the main indicators and strategies through which the effectiveness of EU policy on migration for development in sending countries will be measured.
Historical time-plot EU migration commitments

1975
- Convention Migration in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality and Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers.

1977
- European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers

1990
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families

2000
- Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air

2005
- Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)

2006
- High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development

2007
- Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) Partnerships

2008
- Mobility Partnerships (MP's) of the EU

2009
- Blue Card

2013
- 2nd High Level Dialogue

An approved EU-wide work permit allowing high-skilled non-EU citizens to work and live in any country within the European Union

To protect workers' rights
- Extends the foreign workers rights on such fields as equal with citizens' access to vocational training, higher education or medical and social services

Reaffirms that migration in itself is not a crime, and that migrants may be victims in need of protection

Defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with non-EU

Calls for the respect of human rights and international labor standards, reiterates the commitment to fight human trafficking and strongly condemns manifestations of racism and intolerance.

Enhance dialogue and cooperation on migration more broadly and to identify common priorities between Africa and European governments

Soft law-based bilateral country agreements to share the responsibility and management of circular migration

An approved EU-wide work permit allowing high-skilled non-EU citizens to work and live in any country within the European Union

Gave rise to other partnership initiatives that recognize the importance of migration for development.

To protect workers' rights

Establishes international definitions of the different categories of migrant workers

Reaffirms that migration in itself is not a crime, and that migrants may be victims in need of protection

Defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with non-EU

Calls for the respect of human rights and international labor standards, reiterates the commitment to fight human trafficking and strongly condemns manifestations of racism and intolerance.

Enhance dialogue and cooperation on migration more broadly and to identify common priorities between Africa and European governments

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Gave rise to other partnership initiatives that recognize the importance of migration for development.

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Master Thesis
Together with the constitution of legal migration treaties, the foundation and influence of non-political migration actors and organizations that worked closely with the EU, rapidly grew. The largest and major migration institutions, that are a great source of information for the EU, are the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Council of Europe within which European Committee for Migration (CDMG), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the ICMPD. The proliferation of these institutions and the increased cooperation with political bodies as the EU is a good example of how policy transformed from informal behavior towards formal intergovernmental partnerships and the recognition of the importance of a common migration strategy including the position of sending countries, particular of third countries. ‘A growing international network of institutions handling migration may support the thesis that states have become aware of the fact that managing migration requires cooperation’ (Kicinger and Saczuk, 2004: 7) and the fact that non-political organizations have the know-how and expertise when it comes to all aspects of migration.

NGOs oftentimes uphold a different discourse compared to political institutions, where migration and development are seen from ‘the protection of human rights’ (Maas, 2016). To some extent, political decision-making relies on these valuable sources of information, and cooperation in this sense is crucial. The EU recognizes the added value and the need to work closely with different actors. Addressing migration ‘requires using all policies and tools at our disposal – combining internal and external policies to best effect. All actors, Member States, EU institutions, International Organizations, CSOs, local authorities and third countries need to work together to make a common European migration policy a reality’ (the European Commission, 2015: 2).

Now the context (circumstances and cooperation with other actors) has been described, the constitution of the agreements, the shift towards a more migration-friendly policy on paper and the meaning of these obligations in practice will be examined.

4.2 THE POLICY PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES WITHIN THE EU EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICY

4.2.1 Policy priorities

In its common goals and strategies that address the challenges and consequences of migration - the European Agenda on Migration - the EC recommends the EU as a whole to ‘build up a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration’ (the European Commission, 2015: 2). An immediate respond to thousands of refugees and other migrants that enter Europe should be to protect those in need and ‘Europe should continue to be a safe haven for …. as well as an attractive destination for the talent and entrepreneurship of students, researchers and workers’ (the European Commission, 2015: 2), while addressing and – if necessary – preventing the root causes of migration. The concrete policy agenda of the EU concentrates on tackling the refugee crisis, irregular migration & return, border control and visa policy, developing security management (industry for security, international affairs, police cooperation, organized crime and human trafficking, crisis and terrorism, European agenda on security). An example of how security and efficient border
control are set high on the agenda is the introduction of the ‘Smart Borders’ initiative that allows ‘bona-fide’ migrants to enter Europe, while strengthening the fight against irregular migration ‘by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third countries nationals, fully respecting proportionality’ (the European Commission, 2015: 11). In addition, the EU encourages the development of ‘high-standards’ inside Europe that support third countries to find solutions that better manage crossing-border movements. The question is whether these countries really benefit from this strategy or just being forced to solve their problem without any concrete (financial or mental) support. The feasibility of the above mentioned ‘solutions’ will depend on the willingness of the Member States to cooperate in these proposals.

Another factor that complicates common policy and action is that decision-making may be accompanied by voluntary contribution of Member States or compulsory agreements. This makes it more difficult for the EU to create and implement a common policy. Although Maas criticizes the priorities of the EU, she admits that the EC has presented some good proposals but that the disruptive factors come from Member States that are not willing to implement the mandate’ (Maas, 2016). Stemming from the idea that migration needs to be stopped and the raise of ‘anti-sentiment against migration’ (Maas, 2016), the majority of the Member States support restrictive migration policies.

A brief insight in the migration agenda shows that the EU puts a lot of effort in the security-matter that migration might bring along and less on the migration-development nexus. From which factors and in which contexts have these initiatives, and lack of confident in development potential, been derived?

4.2.2 GAMM

In the context of migration as an urgent phenomenon that, on the one hand pressures the external migration policy of the EU while at the same time opens up opportunities, the need for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and partner countries has been supported in the last years. Migration is increasingly understand as a multilevel phenomenon that requires a strong political agenda at international, national and local level in order to address the challenges and opportunities that migration brings forward.

Labor market shortages that could not be filled with domestic workers, and the long-term ageing in Europe that could be mitigated by foreign non-EU workers have concerned policy-makers. It was during this period that the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) evolved, since it was adopted in 2005 (completed and formerly adopted in 2012). The aim of this overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy is ‘to address all relevant aspects of migration in a balanced and comprehensive way, in partnership with non-EU countries’ (the European Commission, 2011: 3). The GAMM is built on high-level expert meetings, cooperation mechanisms, monitoring instruments and primarily concentrates on the ‘mobility of third country nationals’ (the European Commission, 2011: 4). Besides migration, mobility - including short-term, tourists, students, researchers, and business people – covers the second pillar within the GAMM. Strengthening adaptable workforce and improving the effectiveness of policies aiming at integration of migration into the labor market are concrete examples of how the EU strives towards a vital and competitiveness European market and ‘enrich
European societies’, through ‘education, training, dialogue with the private sector and employers and the portability of social and pension rights’ (the European Commission, 2011: 4).

The GAMM priorities anchor the general strategy of EU migration policy; a selective procedure in which high-skilled migrants are welcomed and irregular migration is prevented through strict border control and effective return policy. The Migrant Rights Network (MRN) argues that ‘stricter border controls do not help address irregular migration or human trafficking but instead reinforce the development of alternative strategies to circumvent the difficulty of entering the EU legally’ (Martin, 2011: 4). Ironically, the GAMM reinforces the potential for development benefits (in sending countries) implemented in a ‘migrant-centered’ manner: it is about people. This approach, from a human rights principle that takes into account the protection of migrants, does not reflect the concrete goals and strategies that the EU enhances. Thus, it seems that the EU through the GAMM pursues its own benefits rather than encourages mutual trust and shared interest. ‘The approach has been much criticized for allowing Member States to use migrants as disposable workers and for further restricting access to the EU’ (Martin, 2012: 1). Others speak of ‘exploitative practices’ since the GAMM ignores the position and wellbeing of low-skilled migrants. In short, the real meaning of supporting integration and respect for human rights is a far cry.

The success and the impact of the GAMM highly depend on Member States and their willingness to cooperate. National sovereignty might play a decisive role for Member States in their consideration to deal with migration issues at EU level. As a result, they may enter bilateral agreements with sending countries by themselves and not under the EU flag. Morocco is such an example, with whom Member States negotiate and sign agreements concerning migration.

In order to monitor and analyze the progress and effectiveness of the dialogues, the GAMM committed to a biannual report based on information from Member States, EU delegations and agencies and partner countries. The most recent report (2012-2013) indicates progress through the establishment of a stronger cooperation between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries. In addition, structured dialogues on migration, mobility and security have been launched with, among others, Morocco. Despite the successes that the EU puts forwards in its report, strengthening cooperation with partner (developing) countries is mainly focused on border management, security issues and regional and local (financial) assistant. Even the link between migration and development is said to be one of the pillars within the GAMM, it seems that the EU gives more priority to other ambitions.

4.2.3 High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development

The decision to organize a HLD on International Migration and Development in 2006 by the UN can be seen as a breakthrough in the migration-debate, in the sense that a more converged discourse within the political field appeared. According to Maas (2016), this platform demonstrates that ‘there exists a common understanding about migration as a choice and not a necessity’, and ‘that migrants’ rights need protection’.

The aim of the HLD is to strengthen coherence and cooperation at all levels, while take into account the consequences for both migrants and countries, and seek the possibilities for
development. The mechanism includes; UN Member States, international organizations, NGOs, academia and the private sector. The second HLD was held in 2013. Earlier, in December 2012, the UN Member States adopted a resolution, which is built upon four overarching themes (UNLD Civil Society, 2013):

- Effects of international migration on sustainable development;
- Strengthening partnerships and cooperation on international migration, mechanisms to effectively integrate migration into development policies and promoting coherence at all levels;
- International and regional labor mobility and its impact on development;
- Measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human right of all migrants.

The latter has been criticized by international migrations organizations as the IOM. They recognize the progress in dialogue and cooperation at global level, but question the adherence of an ‘adequate protection of the human right of all migrants … public perceptions … have not kept pace with the reality of human mobility and remain dangerously negative’ (IOM, 2013). Thus the implementation from global migration policy into national concrete strategies and actions needs to be revised. Notwithstanding, the HLD for Migration and Development has set to work on active migration policies and gave rise to other partnership initiatives that increasingly recognize the importance of migration for development, including non-western alliances with, among others, African-EU partnerships. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan states, ‘we are only beginning to learn how to make migration work more consistently for development … each of us holds a piece of the migration puzzle, but none has the whole picture. It is time to start putting it together’ (HLD on Migration and Development, 2006).

4.2.4 Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment Partnership

Where the GAMM provides a theoretical framework that includes the pillars and the ambitions of the EU to facilitate migration and mobility at large, the Africa-EU Migration Mobility and Employment Partnership aims at a better-managed migration and employment process. It is about the implementation of migration and employment strategies, with an eye on sustainable development. During the second Africa-EU Summit in 2007 all African States and the EU have declared the partnership. A revised version of the collaboration, the 2nd Action Plan, was launched during a Senior Officials Meeting in 2013. The partnership includes three main priorities that echoes the GAMM pillars (European Commission, 2007):

- **Priority action 1** | Implement the Declaration of the Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development;
- **Priority action 2** | Implement the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of human beings;
- **Priority action 3** | Implement and Follow-up the 2004 Quagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.

The Tripoli and Quagadougou declarations are the executive bodies within the Africa-EU partnership and primarily focus on ‘the respond to the challenges and maximize the benefits of international migration’ (European Commission, 2007) and the facilitation of mobility between the EU and Africa. This could be achieved through intensified networks, dialogue, cooperation
on international protection, joint action on fighting illegal migration, mobilize adequate financial resources and the facilitation of a better match between supply and demand of labor. The partnership is supported by both governments (African States and the EU) as non-political institutions, including civil society actors, research institutions, local authorities and migrant associations. How effective has the EU-Africa partnership been so far?

According to the ECDPM, the success and implementation of the proposed goals is debatable. The current strategy that the Africa-EU MME enhances, through aid and trade diplomacy, fight against irregular migration and strengthening surveillance systems, may not be the best way to tackle the challenges and migration obstacles. Whether better regional mobility, integration and employment opportunities will be implemented remains ambiguous, since ‘the political will and momentum to actually implement them is weak’ (Knoll and Abebe Bekele, 2014). Supporters of migration for development, like ECDPM, are skeptic about the ‘breakthrough’ of the declaration. The migration think- and do thank criticizes the big gap that exist between the grand statements on paper and the weak and limited implementation. Moreover, the joint strategy has not been revolutionary compared to other agreements, and remains limited to high-skilled migrants. At the same time the EU sees great progressions and underlines the ‘significant results’ (European Commission, 2016) that have been made. It recognizes a great improvement in the leverage financial flows and the flows of labor and remittances that became ‘easier, cheaper, safer, and more productive’ (European Commission, 2016). In addition, the relevance of policy dialogues and the embedment of key development objectives are further integrated. The VALETTA Migration Summit between the EU and African countries in 2015 reflected these ambitions to ‘further integrate key development objectives in its external migration cooperation with African countries’ (CONCORD, 2015: 3) and strengthen legal migration and mobility. More recently, within the post-2015 development agenda (the Sustainable Development Goals), the EU committed to ‘full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants, regardless of migration status, of refugees and displaced persons’ (CONCORD, 2015: 4).

What is certain is that the EU-Africa MME has broadened its pillars and has worked towards a more migration-development friendly policy. In the revised action plan more attention is paid to the role of diaspora, regional- and sub-regional fora and social protection. The question is now to what extent this partnership will develop into a real executive structure and put its ambitions into practice.

4.2.5 Mobility Partnerships of the EU

On other major aspects the EU, together with sending countries, is running dialogues and partnerships on migration and mobility. A more concrete bilateral affair is the Mobility Partnership (MP) that was first signed in 2008 and the number of partnerships has increased since.

The MP is the most concrete policy tool of the EU’s external migration policy that works towards a joint and coherent management of migratory flows together with sending countries. EU Member States are allowed to join the MP on a voluntary opt-in basis. The specific targets of the partnerships are a result from the global approach for migration and the GAMM.
Hence, focus on better management, combating illegal migration, border control and return. More specifically, the agreement aims at building capacity to better manage legal migration, reducing the negative effects of brain drain and brain waste and target remittances schemes. The latter one is of great value for the development of poor migration countries. The MPs are not legislated and therefore use ‘soft law-based agreements’ (the Governance Report, 2014) that serve as an interplay between the EU and sending- and transit countries to share experiences, responsibilities and management of circular migration without any further obligations, except for two: the visa facilitation agreement and the readmission agreement (van Stokkum, 2015: 39).

In 2008, the first two MP agreements were signed with the Republic of Moldova and the Republic of Cape Verde, a country with a long emigration tradition. In the following years four other MPs were declared with, respectively, Georgia (2009), Armenia (2011), Morocco (2013), Azerbaijan (2013) and Tunisia (2014). New partnerships are currently under negotiation. The specific objectives of the MPs depend on the national circumstances of the concerned country, the migration flows between the EU and the third country and the willingness of both parties to cooperate. The EC considers MPs to be the ‘most comprehensive instrument for managing migration relations’ (Angenendt, 2014: 4). However, critical reviews question the experiences with the MPs.

To what extent are these instruments successful and what is their (development) impact on, particularly, developing countries? A German report on the experience of MP’s touches upon four areas (Angenendt, 2014: 7) that need a critical review:

- The selection of partner countries;
- The hierarchy of political targets;
- The content of the partnerships;
- Monitoring and evaluation.

Certain factors, on both EU and third country side, intricate the establishment of a fluent and mutually beneficial partnership. National circumstances as economic crises, labor shortage, conflicting policies and the participation of Member States could hamper the collaboration between the two parties. The EU and third countries do not all follow the same view when it comes to strategies, reporting and migration cooperation. For instance, in its MP-proposal, the EU emphasizes that the participating countries should undertake active cooperation with the EU. Practice has well tried that some countries, like Moldova, were not very willing to establish a ‘close cooperation with the EU’ (Angenendt, 2014: 7). It turns out that the ‘accession criteria’, set by the EC, run in a very different direction than the needs and interest of the partner countries and often do not meet the main objective. Other critical comments are based on the MPs as an instrument to fight irregular migration.

At the moment, only three of the proposed activities relate to migration and development (Akesson, 2011). Anthropologist and migration-development expert Akesson stresses that this fact implies self-oriented activities reflecting the ‘dominance of the EU’s migration-control agenda.’ This pessimist and skeptic view is even strengthened by the statement that ‘those who
negotiated (on the non-EU side) have a special – personal – interest’ (Akesson, 2011: 17) and not a direct intention to facilitate migration for development.

Despite the challenges, a majority of the partner countries were positive about the partnership and the outcomes through the improvement of contact, exchanges, extensive knowledge about migration and development, and the fact that the ‘soft’ agreement was more helpful than ‘rigid instruments’ (Angenendt, 2014: 8). It is for sure that the MPs reflect a transition in EU migration policy from the traditional method isolated from other domains, towards an approach that is ‘increasingly being associated with other policy areas’ (Reslow, 2010: 1). But it is doubtful whether the purposed goals are implemented or neglected. This consideration, together with the other implementation tools and strategies of the EU will be part of the final conclusion.

4.2.6 Blue Card

Another concrete instrument that the EU uses for development purposes is the Blue Card, introduced in 2009. This work-permit is exclusively invented for highly qualified non-EU citizens to support and further raise the profile of the EU as a ‘desirable destination for qualified workers to practice professional knowledge and skills as well as allowing free movement within the EU for non-EU citizens’ (EU Blue Card, w.d.). One of the (negative) consequences is the outflow of high-skilled migrants from third countries and skill shortages. Both third countries and NGOs call upon the EC to prevent brain drain by informing the private sector about the consequences of high-skilled people recruitment. If the EU actively attracts this specific group, whose education and skills have been provided by their (poor) home country, than ‘these countries should be compensated for having provided skills’ (Fair Politics, 2015). Maas understands that developing countries that invest in human capital (education as one of the foundation within societies) want to profit from this gained knowledge and skills (Maas, 2016) and their need for a financial compensation is more than justified.

Although there exist guidelines (‘ethical recruitment calls’) which calls upon Member States not to recruit in sectors of developing countries where this can lead to skill shortage, the real implementation receives strong criticism since ‘these recruitment principles are voluntary and not enforced or monitored’ (ICMPD and ECDPM, 2013: 195). Modernization and overhaul – to ‘make the Blue Card more effective in attracting talent to Europe’ (European Commission, 2015: 15) - of the Directive scheme is the main concern at the moment, rather than the way third countries might be disadvantaged. It remains the question whether the EU will commit to its ambitions, to ‘facilitate circular and temporary migration and to turn brain-drain into brain gain’ (Fair Politics, 2015), in the coming Blue Card review.

Conclusion

This chapter has elaborated on the EU as a political actor that has a major impact on how migration is stimulated or discouraged. And thus, if the potential of migration for development has been facilitated. The EU increasingly acknowledges the potential of migration for development. But at the same time its policies are incoherent with the implementation of the migration ambitions set forward in dialogues, agreements and policy documents. The development aspect, and thus the potential for migration seems to be left behind.
Migration has led – through remittances – to the highest flows of financial support, outreaching development aid. This is one example of how migration can be of great value for economic growth. The EU has initiated different partnerships and concrete instruments to facilitate this potential, but with what effects? Bilateral agreements are oftentimes built upon non-binding rules, and the EU, until now, shows no political will to actually implement those plans. Furthermore, if the EU continuous to maintain its restrictive policies it will face inconvenient practices, as large numbers of illegal migrants.

Through an extensive case-study these initiatives, strategies and tools of EU external policy will be analyzed. Also the anticipation of local governments, in this case Morocco, on migration and its threats and opportunities will be described in the upcoming chapter.
5. Migration for development in the case of Morocco

5.1 MOROCCO AS A PREEMINENT EMIGRATION COUNTRY: A PROFILE SKETCH

Introduction
How has EU policy facilitated migration for development in one specific case-study? The final chapter will elaborate on the strategies and ambitions of the EU to stimulate or prevent migration in one specific case. After a brief (historical) introduction of how Morocco developed into a large emigration country, the policy responses of the EU on changing migration patterns from Morocco will be illuminated. What about the Moroccan government: did they actively support emigration – when it comes to development – and how have their strategies and ambitions changed over time? The chapter will conclude with an analysis on the impact of remittances, return and recruitment: have these economic stimuli led to real development and at what scale? In short, this section reflects the efforts made by the EU to utilize the potential of migration for development and the extent to which their policies are coherent with the implementation: is their strategy a success or a failure? Appendix I will respond to this issue through a few policy recommendations.

5.1.1 A historical overview and former migration trends

Historical migration patterns to- and from Morocco have been remarked by a number of determining events that even have significant repercussions in today’s migration processes. The development of Morocco as an immigration- and emigration country can be traced back from the seventh century. This chapter kicks off with a historical time-plot that gives a short overview of the most fundamental factors that have influenced the amount of migrants from and to Morocco, from 600 – 700 onwards. This will be followed by an extensive explanation of how these events have influenced particular patterns and why Morocco has become one of the world’s leading migration countries. Furthermore, the role of Europe and its migration policy will be examined, as the greatest receiver of Moroccan labor workers. Over the course of history Morocco has been described as ‘highly dynamic and mobile’ (de Haas, 2009: 1). The continuously and ongoing process of movements and human settlements from and to Morocco over large distances led to a diverse society and ever-changing culture. Its heterogenetic character is an outcome of a turbulent history of wars, conquests, slavery, colonization and its position of, on the one hand an emigration country and on the other an increasing transition country (although this pattern is still very modest). Morocco’s migration history can be broadly divided into four trends (de Haas, 2009):

- Pre-colonial migration;
- Migration in the colonial era;
- The Moroccan migration boom;
- Diversification of migration in response to restrictive policies.

Nomadic – and Arab tribal groups (a derivative of Arab-Islamic conquests) and monotheistic religion that dominated the pre-colonial period of Morocco are at the roots of its diverse and mobile character. The religious embedment and spillover of the Moroccan cultural area through
(religious) education, students and pilgrimages has been associated with high mobility, contacts and networks over large distances. Cities became hubs in trade networks and symbolized the importance of mobility during that time. Subsequently, the expansion of the capitalist economy and colonization by a new empire, Europe, entered the world stage. The French colonization of Algeria defined the beginning of new migration patterns within the Maghreb region. Morocco experienced an outflow of citizens towards Algeria and later to France and Spain. This trend continued, although driven by three new events: decolonization, rapid-postwar economic growth and the oil crisis in 1973. During the 1970s, the view on migration was predominantly negative. In addition, the permanent settlement, the low return rate and the family reunification that increased Europe’s population was unexpected and has challenged the attitude and policy of host-countries towards migration until today. The next section will zoom in on these specific issues based on the most remarkable events in Morocco’s migration history.
Historical time-plot of Moroccan migrants towards Europe

- **600 – 700**
  - Arab – Islamic conquest to Morocco

- **1492 – 1912**
  - Continuing slavery within Morocco

- **1830**
  - French colonization in Algeria (seasonal and circular labor migration from Morocco)

- **1912**
  - Franco-Spanish colonial protectorate (rural-urban migration)

- **1912 – 1956**
  - Colonial era (migration to France)

- **WW I + II**
  - Urgent lack of manpower led to recruitment Moroccan men

- **1949 – 1962**
  - Mine workers from Morocco to France

- **1962 – 1972**
  - Economic growth in Western Europe led to high demand low-skilled workers, also from Morocco
5.1.2 Country preface

Morocco has undergone major cultural, political and economic changes. Under influence of (pre-) colonization and different regimes, Morocco has merged with other entities, languages and cultures, resulting in a diverse society. Immigration from neighbor countries and the sub-Saharan increased the multicultural character even more.

Morocco faced an enormous population growth. During the twentieth century the population increased even to the eight power. At the moment, almost 34 million people live in Morocco and this number is expected to reach the 43 million in 2050 (Nieuws Marokko, 2015). A relative small number of the total population lives below the poverty line which makes Morocco one of the most prosperous and economically strongest regions within the African continent. Given this fact, it is not surprising that Morocco has become an attractive destination for migrants coming from developing countries all over Africa, if Europe is not an option (de Haas, 2005).

The country holds a strong liberal economic-trade position, with its most important partners French and Spain (earlier colonizers). The government committed to ‘continue making Morocco a regional hub to take advantage of free-trade that boost its trade with Sub-Saharan’ (African Economic Outlook, 2015) and strengthens its cooperation with other (potential) partners. A free-trade agreement between the EU and the Mediterranean region is under negotiation. With regard to the social conditions, the government has produced significant results in terms of access to education and health care, and poverty shrank. Despite these developments and socio-economic improvement, a significant part of Moroccans leaves the country. Since the 20th century Morocco has faced several problems in political, economic and social domains and at times is ‘considered as a developing country that is still undergoing reforms in many fields’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 8). Why so, and how does this relate to the EU’s migration policy? Therefore the different historical events will be examined first, including the growing connection with Europe.

600 – 700 | the Arab-Islamic conquest and slavery period

The Kingdom of Morocco has a long history, dating back to the seventh century when the country was conquered by the Arab-Islamic. Since then Morocco has been ruled by Moorish dynasties. Different than other Maghreb countries, Morocco was never conquered by the Ottoman Empire and got very early attention from European states, in particular French (and later Spain) (de Haas, 2014). The Arab dominance brought mostly Arabic-speaking populations to Morocco, and later – when Spain gained power - Jews and Muslims. The mixed population is a result from forced migration in the form of slavery – within and to Morocco - that started in 1492 and lasted until the colonization period.

1830 | colonization by France

In the midst of the 19th century French colonization from neighboring Algeria began and heralded a new era of economic and political restructuring. These remarkable changes led to mass outflows of Moroccan workers to Algeria, primarily as seasonal or circular migrants (de Haas, 2014). What is most notable is the fact that these movements predominantly took place from the rural Moroccan periphery to Algerian urban cities (like Algiers and Oran) as a
consequence of attractive economic, infrastructure and political development - concentrated within these coastal dense cities. Besides these rural-urban movements, rural-rural patterns appeared during that time, since there was a high demand of workers for farms owned by French colonizers.

1912 | colonization by Spain

Early in the 20th century the Franco-Spanish colonial ‘protectorate’ over Morocco was formally established. This period of conquest had a great impact on the internal economic and political conditions of Morocco, and not so much on external factors (emigration, neighbor countries). While France gained control over the heartland of Morocco, Spain conquered the Southwestern Sahara and the Northern Rif Mountain zone. As in Algeria, the arrival of Spanish conquerors led to ‘road construction, other infrastructure projects, and the rapid growth of cities along the Atlantic coast’ (de Haas, 2014). These urban centers with a high-labor demand gave rise to rural-urban migration within Morocco.

1912 – 1956 | recruitment in France and WW I + II

French colonization meant not just recruitment of workers in Morocco but expanded to France. WW I and II led to active recruitment of Moroccan man to work in mines, the army and fabrics. Specifically during WW II, Moroccan man were attracted to France to ‘offset labor shortages’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 13), and in subsequent wars as in Korea and French Indochina (Vietnam). The number of Moroccan workers, recruited during WW, augmented. From 40,000 in the first and 126,000 during the second war (de Haas, 2014). Also Spain became a breeding ground for Moroccan workers, during the Spanish civil war in Spanish Morocco. However, the amount of labor migrants from Morocco to Spain remained limited (de Haas, 2005).

1962 onwards | economic growth in Europe and guest workers

The after WW II period has been characterized by economic growth in Europe and increasing unskilled labor shortages in sectors such as industry, mining, housing construction and agriculture. Meanwhile Morocco became independent in 1956, followed by Algerian independence from France, tensions between the two countries reinforced. These two events shifted the focus from migration between Morocco and Algeria to more and more movements towards Europe. Prosperous economic conditions created a huge demand for unskilled labor and supported the recruitment of the so-called ‘guest-workers’ from the Mediterranean region towards Western Europe: West Germany (1963), France (1963), Belgium (1964) and the Netherlands (1969) which marked a process of a ‘spatial diversification of Moroccan migration distributed around Europe’ (Bommes, Fassmann and Sievers, 2014: 39). ‘Between 1965 and 1972 the estimated number of registered Moroccans living in the main European destination countries increased tenfold, from 30,000 to 300,000, further increasing to 700,000 in 198, 1.6 million in 1998, and 3.1 million in 2012’ (de Haas, 2014) (see figure 5 below). Leaving aside the growing numbers of illegal migrants.
Formal migration, through specialized agencies and agreements between sending- and hosting countries, just happened between 1960 and 1970 when ‘channeled migration was setting the stage for subsequent chain migration’ (Bommes, Fassmann and Sievers, 2014: 39). Spontaneous and informal migration started as early as in the 1960s through migrant networks. The illusion that the status of these migrant workers was just temporary dominated in Morocco and European countries. It was thought that the ‘guest workers would return and that their skills, knowledge and money would help to modernize the economy and trigger economic growth’ (Bommes, Fassmann and Sievers, 2014: 40). Effects derived from migration, as the counterflow of remittances, were expected to reduce poverty and aggravate knowledge- and skills improvements. However, the 1973 oil crisis radically changed the Euro-Mediterranean migration landscape.

1973 | economic stagnation

The oil crisis in Europe limited the need for low-skilled labor as a consequence of economic stagnation and restructuring, resulting in structural unemployment. Quite to the contrary, the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the US and a number of its Western allies led to massive recruitment for ambitious development programs within the Arab oil countries. Not Europe this time, but particularly rich oil states became the destination for thousands of (legal and illegal) migrants. Although the prosperous economic conditions in the Arabic region attracted many Moroccan workers, (western) Europe remained the most popular country. In addition, contrary to expectations, after a first wave of return, the permanent settlement of ‘second wave’ Turkish, Moroccan and other Mediterranean migrants was an unpleasant surprise for European governments. The continuing high number of migrants to Europe had also to do with the rapid population growth.
5.2 MIGRATION BETWEEN MOROCCO AND EUROPE: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY?

5.2.1 Policy responses in Europe and Morocco on changing migration patterns

Policies responded with very restrictive immigration policies that encouraged, rather than prevented, settlement - particular by the introduction of visa restrictions. Migration of primarily Moroccan man workers – already settled in Europe – turned into extensive family reunification. Political instability and repression between 1971 and 1972 in Morocco increased the decision to stay on the safe side (Europe) even more. Significant return migration failed to happen. Only a limited number of migrants returned to Morocco: about one-quarter between 1981 and 2009 (de Haas, 2014).

While Moroccan migrants initially were allowed to travel free between European countries, this process of circular migration became more difficult when Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements in 1990 and 1991. It led not necessarily to less migration but increased illegal practices across the Strait of Gibraltar. Irregular migration continued, due to ongoing labor demand in certain European countries. In recent times, France is the largest receiver of Moroccan migrants (more than 1.1) in 2010, followed by Spain and Italy (see figure below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Moroccan Citizens Living Abroad 2012</th>
<th>Moroccan Emigrants Born in Morocco Around 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,146,682</td>
<td>871,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>671,669</td>
<td>766,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>486,538</td>
<td>356,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>237,919</td>
<td>179,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>264,909 (362,954*)</td>
<td>168,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>126,954</td>
<td>63,000†††</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>26,191</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The response of the EU on the inflow of Mediterranean migrants has been very restrictive associated with strong measures. How strict or supportive has the Moroccan government been on migrant outflows during the post-colonization period?

Migration policy of the national Moroccan government has encouraged emigration to Europe, from the perspective that migration would bring political and economic opportunities. First, governments saw the opportunity of economic growth, and with that poverty reduction, when remittances would increase the livelihoods, incomes and employment of particularly peripheral regions. Second, the government recognized the importance of maintaining strong ties with migrants living in Europe. Therefore, they encouraged smooth integration within these receiving societies. At the same time, teachers and Imams were sent abroad to spread (religious) ideas to migrants’ children with the purpose to ‘remind them of their roots and to prevent integration and assimilation’ (de Haas, 2014), and maybe in the hope that they, at one day, would return to Morocco.
Morocco has for a long time been ruled by a strongly centralized monarchy. Although the King still maintains for a large part absolute power, control of the Parliament gained importance in the last decades and today ‘most of the government and the Parliament are elected by democratic means’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 8). Also in economic terms the Moroccan government made progress since the early 1980s. Reform programs and collaboration with financial international institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank brought macroeconomic stability. Although economic conditions at national- and household level have significantly improved – through diversifying the economy - ‘Morocco still confronts formidable challenges’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 10), as high unemployment rates and economic challenges. Yet, managing these problems will be difficult. To what extent has migration been beneficial for development - in economic terms – and how do the EU and Morocco view cooperation, in terms of facilitating migration?

5.2.2 Moroccan and European relations towards migration

‘Migration has been one of the most defining a thorny issues in relations between Morocco and the European Union’ (de Haas, 2014).

As presented in the previous paragraphs, EU migration policy became increasingly restrictive with regard to the inflow of (Moroccan) migrants, while the Moroccan government has been highly supportive of the recruitment of migrants and in facilitating mobility for its own citizens. This contradictory view on migration and its policies hampers effective partnership, complicated by concerns and conflicting interests and the absence of peaceful cooperation and consensus. Moroccan responses to EU external migration policy is openly debated in the media, and citizens, politicians, NGO-delegates and scholars, including criticisms about the European dominance (Jaulin, 2010).

Geographic proximity is another determining factor that forces both the EU and Morocco to deal with and negotiate about disturbing issues. Partly to their physical closeness the debate is mainly concentrated on issues like ‘border control, security and irregular migration’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 43), that occurs at particularly these places. Besides the legal possibility to cross the border (with Spain as main gateway), there exist a high number of undocumented migrants crossing the European borders. Europe blames Morocco for their negligent attitude when it comes to the prevention of illegal and undocumented migrants (Biligili and Weyel, 2009). Despite the continuing discussion and accusations on both sides, converging interests and a high level of bilateral cooperation is gradually gaining ground. On which goals and interests put the EU and Morocco great emphasis and which specific tools and strategies between the EU and Morocco have been accomplished yet?

5.2.3 The EU’s ambitions towards Moroccan migration

The EU presents the main outlet for migrants from the Maghreb countries and these patterns have changed dramatically in the past decades along with restrictive policies, management and criticized bi- and multilateral agreements. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, established in 2004, was one of these agreements between the EU and MED-MENA countries that works towards ‘a common area of peace and stability within a free market zone’ (Jaulin, 2010: 4). In
line with this, the EU has - in an early stage - strengthened its ties with European coastlines, as Morocco, to work primarily on security issues. Furthermore, Europe’s ambitions towards Morocco’s future concern: boosting Morocco’s development, developing the private sector and promoting good governance. The EU aims at reaching these goals and other common fields through good trade partnership with Morocco (EU, 2013: 21). Since 1995 the EC has negotiated and concluded Association Agreements (AA) with third countries, among them Morocco.

2000 | Association Agreement

The AA between the EU and Morocco, signed in 1996 and entered into force on March 2000, includes a very broad array of economic, social and political principles, as human rights, political stability and development. In addition, the EU encourages a high dialogue with Morocco, through strengthening contact between the European Parliament and the Moroccan Parliamentary Institutions and co-operation at different themes and levels, such as economic and social affairs.

According to the bilateral agreement, ‘the EU is developing a coherent and comprehensive immigration policy which incorporates areas such as legal migration, integration of Moroccans legally living in the European Union, equal treatment, family reunification and harmonization of social security schemes’ (European Union External Action, 2016). Although the EU is able to clearly reflect the importance of coherence between migration and development policies (as embedded in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty), it ‘continuously prevails the security approach that focuses on strengthening border control, fighting smugglers, and irregular migration, and facilitating return and readmission’ (CONCORD, 2015: 3). Whether the EU understands the concerns and interests of third countries is to be questioned.

2013 | Mobility Partnership

The most concrete example of migration agreements between the EU and partner countries is the MP that sets out different fields of cooperation. Morocco was the first Mediterranean country that signed a MP with the EU on June 7, 2013. A strong cooperation that ‘ensures better management of migration based on comprehensive and balanced approach, to the mutual benefit of parties – a triple-win situation for migrants, origin and destination countries - concerned’ (Council of the European Union, 2013: 1) is anchored in the bilateral agreement. The potential of migration for development, through strengthening cooperation and the exploitation of these opportunities for both the EU and Morocco, is one of the key objectives. The EU puts forward concrete examples (Council of the European Union, 2013) that should ensure that migration works for development. The ambitions that are economically relevant for development in Morocco and thus for this research (also listed as indicators in Methodological Framework) are the following:

- Implement targeted policies and encourage investment, including by Moroccans resident abroad, in order to generate employment;
- Help migrants in the EU acquire vocational or academic skills which will enable them to develop viable economic activities and improve their employability on their return to Morocco;
Enhance the establishment of measures in the EU and Morocco to reduce the cost of remittances;
Encourage migrants to invest productively in Morocco, in particular by promoting the financial education of the migrants and recipient families;
Implement policies to prevent and deal with the ‘brain-drain’, including the promotion of circular migration and the mobilization of skills.

The transfer of money that is facilitated by the MP, by facilitating official channels for remittances transfer, is often mentioned as key driver behind migration for development and above all, easy to measure and to discover its impact. Within the MP-preamble the prevention of brain drain and brain waste are high on the agenda, although their outcomes are hard to quantify. As goes for the other pillars in which the real contribution – as a consequence of EU policy – to development is difficult to verify.

An analysis of the EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership demonstrates the soft implementation of the set goals and ambitions in terms of the protection of migrants. It turns out that commitments of the Europeans to protect migrants are not strong enough and ‘prioritized and implemented at the expense of other themes included in the partnership, and more worryingly, at the expense of the rights of migrants’ (Euro-Mediterranean Network, 2014: 2). According to the Euro-Mediterranean Network (EMHRN), it seems that the MP proposal mainly reflects EU interests and that real action on the needs and request from the Mediterranean side fall apart. Indeed, a closer look on the implementation of the goals within the MP demonstrates a strong focus on border control and migration management and less on regular migration and development aspects. From this perspective, it looks like the MP resembles a European instrument to fight migration. By this means, MPs leave aside the other goals: maximize the potential of development, management of mobility and legal migration and maximize capacity in the field of asylum and increase the international protection (European Commission, w.d.).

With regard to Moroccan migration policy, the privileges of Moroccan authorities should be better regulated and in a more ‘human’ way. In the process of tracking illegal migrants, the ‘discretionary power’ (Euro-Mediterranean Network, 2014: 7) of local authorities threatens the safety and a ‘humane migration policy’. The EMHRN recommends an increasing role of CSOs and recalls that ‘respect for human rights and migrants should be a prerequisite for cooperation on migration between the EU, its Member States and Morocco’ (Euro-Mediterranean Network, 2014: 7).

The question if MPs can be a possible future instrument in handling the current migration situation and solution (Euro-Mediterranean Network, 2014: 7) is difficult to answer due to its broad array of ambitions and the amount of factors that is engaged. Moreover, the recent establishment of the Morocco MP, makes it difficult to – in this very short interval of time – come with reliable results. At least, the ambitions of the EU regarding migration give a useful overview. Alongside traditional migration flows, transit migration adds a significant (complex) dimension to the EU-Morocco relationship. This is important to think about because ‘migration in the Moroccan context goes from bilateral affair to be dealt with in agreements to becoming part of a regional migratory system’ (Seeber, 2014: 3). To apply MPs as facilitator in legal migration and attracting migrants to meet the labor-shortages in Europe gets more complex.
when other types of migration are involved. So, from the European side, migration is seen as a phenomenon that includes both positive and negative dimensions.

In the third paragraph of this chapter quantitative results will demonstrate whether the above-mentioned factors significantly contribute to the economic conditions of Morocco or not. Now we will continue with the input and experiences of Moroccan policy-makers regarding migration.

5.2.4 Morocco’s ambitions towards emigration

The Moroccan government has acted upon migration and development with mixed feelings and from different perspectives. Since the 1960s, migration has been considered by the Moroccan state as a phenomenon that could positively contribute to development in terms of ‘national development and for the prevention of political tensions in – specifically - the Berber area’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 41). From this perspective, the central authorities encouraged emigration mainly from these ‘problematic’ regions. In addition, Morocco signed bilateral agreements with European countries to facilitate migration through cheap labor force, informal recruitment and spontaneous settlement. These Moroccan pioneers on European territory were followed by family reunification and chain migration.

However, Morocco has also been less supportive towards emigration, although settlement of Moroccans abroad has been gradually considered as a ‘safety valve’ and as a tool for national development (de Haas, 2009). For a long time Morocco has prevented full integration in receiving countries through tight control fueled by the fear that Moroccan citizens would never return. Since the 1990s, the tide has turned pressured by destination policies that saw these tight and strict policy running against their integration policies. In line with a progressive and liberal economic policy, Morocco’s attitude towards migration changed radically against the background of changing patterns of migration. There is a shift from alienation of migrants to the country of origin to an open and encouraging course in the early 1990s. This more positive attitude has been promoted through the admission of naturalization and dual citizenship (de Haas, 2014) and even the creation of a foreign Morocco ministry in 1990, for migrants abroad. It is even argued that the main reasons for policy change in Morocco were ‘the longstanding demands by the European Union’ (Kreienbrink, 2005: 1) and pressure from Southern neighbors that often use Morocco as a transit route or permanent residence. Regarding its cooperation with the EU, Morocco wants to uphold a partnership that fulfills commitments and participation in the EU’s common market and the world-economy. At the same time, good partnership with their neighbors is necessary for a strong Southern alliance.

Contemporary political interest from Moroccan policy makers stems from the idea that emigration contributes to the national development strategy, as a ‘fruitful source of remittances, reduce the pressure of unemployment and to improve the education of Moroccans’ (Kreienbrink, 2005: 199). To some extent Morocco was for a long time dependent on the extradition of manpower, since they lacked (natural) resources for export. With regard to the potential of migration for development, Morocco has ‘traditionally considered migration as a possible factor for economic growth and development’ (Kreienbrink, 2005: 199).
Quite the opposite, the EU fears unwanted migration, threats to stability, security and national identity as a consequence of international migration. This perception is more and more powered by, and associated with dangers of terrorism coming from Muslim countries. To this end, the EU has tightened the cooperation with North-African countries to reduce migration pressure and Morocco has no legal rights to evade the actions from the European side. Therefore they are forced to take restrictive measures on its own ‘against irregular migrations of its citizens and the citizens of other African countries’ (Kreienbrink, 2005: 208).

Morocco has taken into account different legal policies and programs ‘aiming also at satisfying the security needs of its European partners’ (Arrach, 2014: 5). In 2003 a migration act by Morocco came into force, obviously in response to the demand of the EU. This ‘law 02-03’ does not include the organization of legal migration, rather it concentrates on the sanctioning of illegal emigration and immigration (Kreienbrink, 2005). For instance the law created the Direction of Migrations and Border Surveillance (DMBS) that concentrates on controlling borders and fighting migrant-trafficking through; 1) the regulations on entry and stay 2) sanctions 3) transitory regulations. More recently, the engagement and participation of migrants in bilateral agreements gained ground, since migrants are increasingly seen as ‘collective actors who can contribute to their home country’s development from a distance’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 44). Besides, the EU and Morocco as political actors, migrants and cooperation with NGOs and local governments gets more important in migration policy. This new policy field pays more attention to the link between migration and development.

How is this link utilized concretely? In other words, what is the impact of the three R’s in Morocco?

5.3 MIGRATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

5.3.1 Threats: brain drain

As has been put forward in the previous chapters one of the concerns that sending- and hosting countries struggle with is the issue of brain drain. The loss of high-skilled people – specifically in poor countries – could impoverish the labor market, knowledge and entrepreneurship within these countries. Meanwhile sending countries are not always compensated for their ‘supply’ of knowledge and skilled manpower. Different researches have indicated these negative effects on the economy and prosperity of such an emigration country; Morocco. Based on what circumstances suffers Morocco from brain drain? And what is the exact amount of this outflow?

Globalization

Globalization is one of the most ongoing and widespread causes of brain drain. As a consequence of technological advances, reduced distances, open borders and communication developments, the world gets more connected and so does the (global) labor market. People have more opportunities and migration can be a solution when there exist a (national) gap between the supply and demand sides. On the demand-side opportunities increase, since ‘several industrialized countries have clearly opted for a policy of ‘selective migration’ (Bouoiyour, Miftah and Selmi, 2014: 2) and already introduced instruments to facilitate the
arrival of these high-skilled group. The EU does this by offering them a Blue Card (see chapter four).

International and national push- and pull factors

The case of Morocco shows that ‘the young Moroccan population exceeds the real capacity of Morocco to accommodate it’ (Hanae, 2013). This could lead to brain drain since the ‘lack of appeal of the production systems in developing countries’ (Hanae, 2013) and the fact that Western countries offer attractive and strategic specialties that foreigners can benefit from. Such as high salaries, beneficial compensations, advanced technologies and expertise in certain work fields.

Specific conditions highlight the difficulties of Morocco to keep their citizens at home and the loss of confidence in the country and labor market. First, poor working conditions discourage workers to stay and keep motivated and the fact that employers are not able to embrace and encourage the capacities and skills of their workers. More specifically, the absence of continuous training and ‘the non-response of working conditions in the field of communication and technology to the expectations of the youth’ (Hanae, 2013) is suppressing. A second (push) factor that hampers a balanced labor-market is the political and economic crisis that destabilizes the national economic conditions and opportunities. This could be a reason for Moroccans – whether or not temporary – to leave their country.

Who decides to move in the hope to find better work elsewhere, that suffer from brain drain? Excellent graduated students and manpower from specific work fields form the main outgoing group. In Morocco, technology experts and computer-science graduates are attracted to the European market in search of all their country cannot offer them. According to academics and economists, the wave of emigration is engendered by ‘poverty and the inability of the government to offer proper salaries’ (Mena Report, 2000). In addition, the changing global arena increases the need ‘of developed countries of experts in the new strategic disciplines, such as communication technologies and biotechnology’ (Hanae, 2013), which explains the fact that particularly this group of migrants is attracted to Europe. As a result of the need of skilled workers, ‘migration may lead to a more productive pairing of people’s skills and jobs’ (the Economist, 2011).

On top of that, adds Wies Maas, sending countries are not being compensated for investing and extraditing human capital in countries abroad. Although she reassures that within countries as Morocco brain drain is already a big issue, since patterns from less developed rural regions to urban areas – with a high degree of economic activities – is a constant phenomenon (Maas, 2016)

If we take the migration numbers of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC), the number of Moroccan emigrants to Europe has increased from 1.275.567 in 1993 to 3.051.109 in 2012, as 9.3% of the total population. Surprisingly, in contrast to the previous conclusions, the research by the MPC further indicates that this emigration group is more likely to have a low level of education (59.3%) (Migration Policy Centre, 2013), and that the level of high-educated remains relatively low. It is doubtful whether the exodus of high-skilled Moroccans has a decisive
impact or not. This can be explained by the fact that reliable and adequate numbers of migrants that extract knowledge and investment and damage the national economy are hard to measure.

5.3.2 Opportunities I: remittances

Obviously, as can be concluded from the previous chapters, remittances are by a large number of political and non-political bodies recognized as a very important source that contribute to the development of sending countries. It has been said that the amount of remittances exceeds the ODA and other sources of financial flows. Although there exist no exact facts of the amount of development aid compared to the inflow of remittances, it is likely that Morocco receives a relatively high amount of remittances in relation to ODA, since the country is one of the largest receivers worldwide and is not in such a poor development stage that it is heavily dependent on external financial aid.

Although migration from Morocco to other parts in the world goes back ages, the recognition and importance of migration, specifically to Europe, became significant during the 1960s. It was during this time that the settlement of the so-called ‘guest-workers’ began to bear fruit by sending money back home and that the Moroccan government ‘tended to view migration as a contribution to development’ (Sorensen, 2004: 3). From this perspective the opportunity of migration became apparent through three mechanisms: (Sorensen, 2004: 1) as a solution to growing unemployment problems 2) a means to solve balance of payment problems in the country and 3) providing a cheap and convenient mechanism for upgrading the skills of the population (based on the beliefs that the migrants would return). Although the government attempted to control migration flows equally, the largest emigration flows came from less-developed rural areas. International migration from Morocco to Europe has been accompanied by a growing number of remittances that generates important repercussions on the national economy. Together with tourism, ‘remittances represents the major source of foreign currency receipts’ (Sorensen, 2004: 4) nowadays.

In 2003 the Global Development Finance Annual Report was one of the first analysis that took formal notice of remittances as vital financial source and listed Morocco as the 4th largest remittances receiver among developing countries (Sorensen, 2004). Studies by the World Bank and the Foreign Exchange Office have indicated that remittances to Morocco from Europe, since 2003, have gradually increased. From **US$3,614** million in 2003, to **US$6,447** million in 2010 (see figure below). Although it must be noticed that the trend was also subject to occasional slumps.
In 2007 remittances amounted to 9% of the GDP, while only around 7% between 2008 – 2012 (Hamdouch, 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US$ millions</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010e</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inward remittance flows*</td>
<td>3,614</td>
<td>4,221</td>
<td>4,590</td>
<td>5,451</td>
<td>6,730</td>
<td>6,895</td>
<td>6,271</td>
<td>6,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ remittances</td>
<td>3,614</td>
<td>4,221</td>
<td>4,589</td>
<td>5,451</td>
<td>6,730</td>
<td>6,894</td>
<td>6,271</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation of employees</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants’ transfers</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outward remittance flows</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>of which</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ remittances</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation of employees</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants’ transfers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Remittance trend Morocco 2003 – 2010. Source: Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank, 2011.

By way of comparison, in 2013 the World Bank has indicated that Morocco received US$6,168 million remittances from Europe (IFAD, 2015), with citizens in Spain, Italy and France as ‘leading donors’. Again, there is a slight fall of remittances noticeable in the last years. Which factors affect the purposes, use and amount of remittances?

Remittance studies by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) emphasize the role of remittances as facilitator of financial inclusion that encompasses ‘access to and use of appropriate, affordable and accessible financial services that contribute to poverty and inequality reduction and supports inclusive growth’ (IFAD, 2015: 26). However, the transfer and use of remittances face persistent challenges upon the effective use and high transfer costs. To illustrate this, a recent study by the World Bank on Migration and Remittances shows that the costs of remittances sending home, particular to the MENA-region (including Morocco), exceeds 10 percent (The World Bank, 2015).

Where do remittances go? A survey by Moroccan University students, that has analyzed the use of remittances, indicates that remittances were allocated towards ‘long term investments, including investments and real estate, small business and banks’ (Lochery, 2008: 7). Another study concludes the opposite; financial inflows are often used for day-to-day purpose’, to leisure, but to a larger extent for housing (see figure 7). It is clear that remittances flows are very large and their financial impact can be significant. However it is to be questioned if the remittances are primarily used for ‘economic’ purposes and thus, how they foster development.

As has been explained earlier, the amount of remittances may correlate with economic downturn or growth. For example, in Morocco ‘workers increase remittances during periods of higher economic activity at home and cut them down during downturns and crises’ (World Bank, 2011: 44) and accumulate during summer months when migrants return home for holidays.

Despite the view and evidence that migrants’ remittances can be powerful tools to finance development, different migration-experts have noticed that remittances might decrease or remain at the same level, due to ‘gradual weakening family ties with countries of origin’ (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015). Moreover, the impact of remittances is context- and place (urban/rural) specific and relates to the presence of local networks; whether they support infrastructure developments, the creation of small – and medium size businesses or consumption. The latter one has been criticized by scholars and policy-makers who argue that remittances should be invested in ‘economic’ projects that lead to real development. Other scholars see money, used for consumption, as an alternative tool for (human) development that could positively affect the well-being of individuals and the livelihood. In this sense, investments in ‘frivolous spending’ (Lochery, 2008: 7), is not necessarily ineffective (Smith, 2016). So, the success of remittances depends on how development is perceived.

Either way, the recognition of remittances as a powerful instrument has been associated with a growing number of migration organizations within or outside Morocco that focus on ‘a wider range of migration issues’ (Lochery, 2008: 11). Indeed, cooperation with Spain (a top three immigration country) has been intensified, in terms of business interests and development opportunities, through non-governmental initiatives. Also in the political field migrants’ benefits are encouraged. As goes for the EU, the Moroccan government supports migration research to increase benefits for migrants abroad and facilitate other opportunities. Lastly, cooperation between the EU and Morocco has increased as well as partnerships between Morocco and Member States separately (in particular with Spain, Italy and France).

By which means has return, a second indicator, stimulated or threatened development in Morocco through migration?
5.3.3 Opportunities II: return

When looking at the migration history between the EU and Morocco, one of the most distinctive issues that marked this period has been the expectation of the Moroccan government, and migrants themselves that the guest-workers after a limited period would return, bringing back ‘new’ knowledge and experiences. However, this did not happen. At least not in the number that Morocco hoped for. Due to the Oil Crises and a period of increasing political instability and repressions, a major part of the migrants decided to stay on the safe side: Europe.

Compared to other immigrant groups in Europe, ‘return migration has been low among Moroccans’ (de Haas, 2009: 3). This inconvenient truth challenges the ambitions of the government on return that ‘contributes to the country’s socioeconomic development’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 28). To what extent has return migration, through the creation of new trade, knowledge spillover, employment generation and human capital accumulation, been an integral part of migration for development in Morocco?

Return trends

The 1970s were a time of circular migration, characterized by re-emigration over 9 years. This period led to the division of migrants who migrated once (12,3%), twice (5,2%) and three times or more (7,5%). The main reason for migration, on the first hand, were (better) job prospects. Subsequently, the number of return migrants can be explained by work obligations or other activities at home (46%) or the end of a work contract (39%). These motivations have been subject to changes due to international events (as the oil crises), from the mid-seventies onwards. Migration duration became longer to an average of 18 – 22 years. Besides better job prospects, family reunification became the second reason for emigration (11%). In the last years return became more common under influence of retirement (41%), familial problems (17%) and health problems (10%) (Hamdouch, 2013). In addition, external factors, as the financial downturn in Europe, could be other reasons for migrants to return.

Impact and characteristics of returnees in Morocco

A study, commissioned by the World Bank (2013), presents a research – including 330 respondents - about the effects of return migration on (enterprise) development in the Maghreb region. It demonstrates interesting results including whether return had a significant effect on economic activity in, among others, Morocco. As goes for the actual effects of remittances on development, facts of return are scarce and do not provide a comprehensive and precise reflection on the impact of returnees. Nevertheless, the study by the World Bank came up with an interesting analysis of returnees’ entrepreneurial behavior. Return takes place under different circumstances and therefore deserves a clear definition: ‘any person returning to his/her country of origin, after having been an international migration (whether short-term or long-term) in another country. Return may be permanent or temporary. It may be independently decided by the migrant or forced by unexpected circumstances’ (Gubert and Nordman, 2008: 5).

The successes of the returnees’ impact on the country of origin can be measured through different indicators. Different patterns can be drawn from return migration over the past few decades as the status and shift in employment and the amount of university graduates that
increased between the pre- and post-migration periods, from Europe to Morocco. In the figure below (Gubert and Nordman, 2008), the educational development and employment status of returnees are listed. Different assumptions can be drawn from the percentages of employment and educational background. With regard to education there is no significant increase in the amount of educated returnees, rather there is a small decline. Although there is a large difference between the amount of high education before (2.7%) and after (13.9%) migration, it could be said that this group (high-skilled migrants) has the greatest potential to end up in more advanced and higher industries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual characteristics</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
<th>Today</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in rural areas (%)</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age (in years)</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary I</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary II</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher I (Diploma)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher II (Master's degree)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waged</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal worker</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family worker</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When looking at employment, the status of refugees is undoubtedly varied. The percentage of respondents that became ‘employers’ increased enormously, meanwhile the number of unemployed returnees has not been reduced. The percentage of ‘waged’ and ‘self-employed’ has increased slightly. Return migration has benefited certain industries. The activity within the sectors ‘construction’, ‘services’, ‘trade’ and ‘transport’ has increased after return migration to Morocco. Judging from a report, the majority of Moroccan returnees originated from the agricultural sector. After their return, 41% entered ‘commerce’, ‘services’ or ‘transportation’. The percentage of owners and independent operators increased significantly from 12% before return to 39% afterwards (Sorensen, 2004). It could be said that return demonstrates a shift from job occupations in the primary sectors before migration, to the secondary and tertiary sectors after return (Cassarino, 2008).
Also at livelihood level return migration affected the financial situation of returnees who ‘declared that their situation improved’ (Gubert and Nordman, 2008: 10). It turns out that both Moroccans with a high financial status and those with lower incomes improved their financial situation after returning. To illustrate, 7.3% of the peer group (330 respondents) had a ‘very bad’ financial status. When returning, 54.2% of this number improved their situation. So, return migration can generate beneficial outcomes for development at household level. Whether this had significant impact on the improvement of economic conditions at national level is difficult to say.

The raise in employment, education and ‘small entrepreneurship’ can be explained through two possible factors (Gubert and Nordman, 2008):

- Accumulated savings abroad contributes to alleviating domestic capital imperfections;
- Overseas work experience generates new skills and new ideas.

These two conditions may have contributed to the degree of entrepreneurship and investment projects, two indicators that are very convenient to explore the impact of return migration on development. ‘Self-employed returnees’ with primary education, and ‘Employers’ that acquired secondary and higher education, are the most common backgrounds of migrants after return.

Another research that analyses return migration as a success or failure, affirms that the chance of return is likely when migrants have completed preschool or primary education and highest educated migrants, ‘while unqualified migrants are the least likely to express a return intention’ (de Haas, Fokkema and Fassi Fihri, 2015: 424). This status of returnees highly depends on their (last) migration country. France and Italy rank high when it comes to the educational conditions and skills improvement, whereas Spain and Germany score low.

With regard to investment projects of returnees the number and investment behavior strongly differs between countries. Morocco, compared to other MENA countries, scores high in terms of the percentage of investors among returnees (42.9%). In Morocco more than 42% returnees invested in at least one project (Gubert and Nordman, 2008: 4). The distribution of investment projects differs per industry, which anchors the outcomes of industry activities that have been presented earlier. Again, ‘agriculture’, ‘construction’, ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail trade’, and the ‘real estate’ sector cover the biggest investment projects. The same research also indicated the main reasons among returnees not to invest, including the lack of capital (69.5%), the lack of experience and training (37%) and administrative and institutional constraints (27.9%) when returning in their home country.

Moroccan policy on return

Although the World Wars and after war period led to the recruitment of Moroccans to Europe, the Moroccan government expected that migration would be temporary. And that, after a while, the employed returnees would bring money and knowledge back home, ‘to buy some land, construct a house, or start their own enterprise’ (de Haas, 2009: 3). Indeed, a small number did (during the seventies), but immigration became a permanent phenomenon. How did the Moroccan government respond to this disappointing finding? The government held a strong control apparatus in order to discourage permanent settlement and integration in the immigration country, and supported return to Morocco. Through embassies, consulates and
sending teachers and imams abroad migrants were ‘discouraged to establish independent organizations, joining trade unions or political parties’ (de Haas, 2009: 6). The government did this partly because of permanent migration that was seen as a threat to the vital remittances and knowledge transfer and alienation from their home country. Today, the Moroccan government recognizes the integration of Moroccan migrants in the countries they immigrated to as a political instrument to promote the ideologies and contribute to a more positive image in the destination countries, and to maintain the cultural ties, norms and values with the home country.

EU policy on return

Successive governments within Europe have for a long time actively facilitated the mobility of migrants across Europe, including Moroccan emigrants. In order to fill the gap between the demand- and supply side that threatened the economic conditions during that time. However, form 1973 onwards, these governments gradually closed their doors for immigrants. ‘This is particularly true for Morocco where emigration has always been considered as an export that should be promoted for the benefit of the country’ (Gubert and Nordman, 2008: 3).

To what extent is recruitment, the third R, considered as a vital instrument for development?

5.3.4 Opportunities III: recruitment

(Return) migration from and to Europe of Moroccan workers during the twentieth century has been determined by the degree of recruitment; ‘efforts of employers and recruiters in destination countries, recruiting agents and governments in sending areas and networks that link them’ (Martin, 2013: 8). Recruitment of Moroccan migrants to Europe, and vice versa, has been experiencing various periods that determine the extent and support for recruitment. In addition, recruitment comes in different forms, through formal procedures and agencies as well as informal accomplishments. Formal recruitment by specialized agencies was common for a short period, during the ‘initial years of migration’ (Martin, 2013: 8).

Recruitment trends

The colonial era marked the beginning of migration from Morocco to, primarily, France. This trend was accompanied by active recruitment of Moroccan men by the France army as a consequence of a lack of manpower during the WW I and II. The second recruitment period arose from strong economic growth in Western Europe, during the 1960s, that resulted in great demand for workers, which was formally established through recruitment agreements with Western Europe countries. Due to specialized recruitment, the post war period was marked ‘by intensification of migration and the diversification of countries of destination’ (Ennaji, 2010). Followed by a recruitment-stop in 1973-4 during the economic down-turn. Due to cooperation and the bilateral agreements, labor recruitment became ‘the progressive transformation of labor into a structural component of the political economy of the region’ (Kreienbrink, 2005: 196). Formal recruitment was gradually replaced by informal agreements, maintained by network migration, contact with family and friends and informal companies. This convenient way of attracting migrants became far more important than formal procedures because ‘administrative obstacles, long waiting lists, and necessary bribery could be avoided’ (Biligili and Weyel, 2009: 14).
Moroccan and European strategies towards recruitment

Also within Morocco, recruitment was supported by the government through strongly planned policies, particularly relocation from rural areas to developing urban regions, dependent on the gap that existed between natural resources and population needs. The recruitment behavior of the Morocco government stems from the need to prevent poverty as well as political interest (Biligili and Weyel, 2009). At the moment, Morocco struggles with two internal issues that stimulate more emigration to Europe: demographic transition and employment opportunities. Population growth and the demographic difference between Morocco and Europe is one of these push factors. The Moroccan government tries, ever since the 1960s, to compel this rapid growth. At the same time, unemployment (both in urban and rural areas) is a central issue and poverty remains a problem. Together with other (non-economic) factors the socio-economic and political conditions in Morocco are threatened. Therefore Morocco undertakes great efforts to create jobs (Kreienbrink, 2005), counter unemployment and reduce the migration potential.

From the European side, the surge for circular and temporary migrants through recruitment has augmented as a consequence of EU enlargement that led to a changing labor market and greater mobility of labor. With an eye on the coming decades, it still remains to be seen to what extent Europe will be in need and dependent on manpower from outside. It is argued that enlargement of the EU could increase workforce but may be challenged at the same time by an ageing and shrinking population. Recruitment, in this sense, is essential to maintain a vital European labor market. Yet, one of these recruitment tools that the EC and Member States have initiated, is the Blue Card that should encourage a ‘triple-win’ situation (European Migration Network, 2011), that includes beneficial outcomes for the host and sending countries and migrants. The question is whether this initiative equally benefits the needs of all involved actors or just serves the ambitions of the EU. In addition: to what extent is the EU proceeding recruitment or just focused on other (restrictive) migration strategies?

A second way through which Europe has facilitated recruitment is by the creation of immigration recruitment offices in big Moroccan cities like Casablanca, Rabat, Fes and Marrakesh to ‘recruit Moroccans chiefly from rural areas’. Although, this strategy was part of the recruiting policies that marked 1960s, by Belgium, France and the Netherlands, current policies of the EU are concentrated on restrictive measures and migration-support seems to be left off the agenda. Formal procedures and tools disappear and recruitment mainly happens through informal networks, family reunification and diaspora initiatives. The recruitment support that takes place under the guidance of the EU is concentrated on the top- and bottom of the education ladder and leaves out the middle-class migrants.

In the last years different interventions were constituted, in cooperation of Member States and developing countries as Morocco, to prevent brain-drain in sending countries, exacerbated by recruitment. In addition, the EC proposed a common framework that should enhance convergence within European migration policies. ‘The so-called ‘open coordination method’ aimed to set common guidelines and targets on migration policy, covering such areas as recruitment criteria and procedures and treatment of labor migrants’ (Boswell, 2005: 20). The revised version of this initiative (the proposed legislation had reached deadlock) is more
tentative in its proposals and in admitting migrants. Thus, it is doubtful whether this tool is effective and to what extent.

Conclusion

Migration has the potential to stimulate development in Morocco through three main instruments. Remittances are seen as the most important tool that developed into the largest external financial source for development. Return, through for example recruitment can deliver knowledge-spillover and local entrepreneurship, while at the same time recruitment has a downside since brain drain can be an undesirable effect for sending countries. For both the EU and Morocco these factors could negatively or just positively contribute to national development and thus responded from different perspectives and interests.

With regard to the EU, migration strategies and ambitions have been determined by changing contexts. There have been times that the demand for manpower in Europe was really high and migration from Morocco was supported. However, restrictive policies, caused by security matters, changed the migration landscape. Although EU policy documents put forward development aspects in relation to migration, in practice the EU fails to implement these ambitions. In the past decades, Moroccan policy towards migration radically changed from a strong control apparatus, to prevent permanent settlement, towards a more open and soft policy attitude. Nowadays, migration is encouraged through, amongst others, partnerships with the EU, from the perspective that migration brings development. Although the Moroccan government wants to protect its cultural values.

Colonization of French and Spain left its marks in Morocco that even today maintains a long-standing migration affair. Over time, the Moroccan government has invested a great deal of effort in strengthening the internal labor-market to keep (high-skilled) Moroccans at home. At the same time, migration to Europe is seen as an investment through financial flows and return of knowledge and experiences. From the perspective of Morocco, migration is considered, at times as a threat but also as an opportunity for development.
Conclusion

Introduction

In the past decades, a more positive view of migration has slightly gained support and migration is increasingly seen as a potential facilitator to foster growth. It is even said that migration can be perceived as the ‘new development mantra’. In particular for developing countries with poor socio-economic and political conditions, the effect of financial flows, return of knowledge and investments could be meaningful. At the same time the optimistic strand receives criticism and skepticism, primarily from the political field. What these perspectives mean for the utilization of migration as potential is up to national and international political actors that have exclusive competence to regulate migration processes. Therefore this thesis has concentrated on the extent the EU as a preeminent political institution, accepts and facilitates the potential of migration for development. Or has EU migration policy missed a window of opportunity?

Migration has been subject to changing contexts and worldwide events, associated with contradictory policy strategies, which puts European policy-makers in a difficult position. As can be concluded from the previous chapters, the major causes of migration are economic. In addition, economic asymmetries between countries and security and human rights violations are significant causes of increasing migration patterns worldwide. The move towards restrictive external migration policies stems from precisely the political instability and growing threats. Today, migration within the political field is highly associated with insecurity, while counterarguments from the non-political area point to the opportunities and development aspects of migration.

This thesis has analyzed the conditions for the case of Morocco (international and national circumstances) under which migration appears, and how the EU has responded to migration for development and to what extent their policy facilitated the needs for sending countries (in the case: Morocco) or just for its own ends.

Morocco lends itself very well for a case study on how mass outflows of migrants affect the national and economic conditions at household level and how comprehensive the consequences of return, recruitment and remittances have been. Furthermore, partnerships between the EU and Morocco have demonstrated the effect on the implementation of development objectives. Has the EU acted in a good manner, through equal partnerships, or has its dominant position had a negative impact, maybe even at the expense of migrants’ rights? What about Morocco; to what extent has the government uphold a strict or supportive migration policy and ties with its citizens abroad, and for what purpose?

This section pools the answers and suggestions on these questions and gives a brief overview of how EU policy related to migration has evolved over the past few decades. The question raises then if the EU’s migration instruments and strategies have been successful and if not, how these policies can be improved. Policy recommendations will respond to the outcomes of this study in Appendix I.
Research results

Since economic indicators are widely seen as the primary causes of migration (unemployment, financial instability, low incomes) this research is conducted through a modern economic approach. Emphasis is put on the improvement of jobs, investments, education and so forth, on national and household level, under influence of migration. Remittances, return and recruitment, the most defining economic factors, are considered as mutually beneficial and stimuli for a win-win-win situation. Remittances have become a major financial source of financing for households and the Moroccan government. Remittances facilitate a fairly stable source of income invested in, amongst other things, infrastructure projects at larger scale. For households remittances have been of greater value than was originally thought. Primarily consumption, housing, agriculture, small businesses and education have increased under influence of remittances. High transfer costs of remittances are the other side of the coin and too often these fees outreach the profits of remittances. Reducing these costs is acknowledged, by scholars and policy-makers, as one of the solutions to support financial contribution.

Although the amount of remittances is more convenient to measure, it has been complicated by the presence of unregistered informal transactions – the influence and real impact of return migration is hard to verify. The potential of return, as added value for the creation of new trade, knowledge-spillover, circular migration and capital accumulation is there, but the number of returnees is not evidential. Due to different worldwide events and national circumstances, a major part of migrants have better job prospects elsewhere and settle permanently with all the consequences for development at home. Brain drain is the most mentioned threat of migration and the low rate of returnees.

In turn, policy interference through recruitment stimulates or discourages migrants to leave or stay at home and the chance that migrants return. Practice has demonstrated that recruitment policy is often employed as strategic tool by policy-makers to benefit their own interests and needs. Labor-shortage during the 1960s in Europe is an illustrative example of how Europe actively anticipated on this issue. Nowadays, recruitment is facilitated by a selective entry instrument, the Blue Card, which allows just high-skilled non-European citizens to enter the labor market. This ‘cherry-picking’ is very peculiar to the migration policy pursued by the EU. How self-centered has European migration policy been in the past decades? Moreover, is this behavior justified and effective?

Voices from across the NGO sector as well as the political field see migration suffer from very weak and restrictive European policy. Scholars even go this far by arguing that there is no such thing as migration policy. If we believe the migration ambitions and implementation tools of the European Commission we are given the impression that the potential for development and all its aspects are high up on the agenda. Specific emphasis is put on the idea of Europe as a safe haven for migrants and an attractive destination for talent and entrepreneurship. However, practice proves that this is not the case. As yet, the EU runs against its own ambitious migration policy by working towards less migration rather than safer migration and return migration in a fair and responsible manner. The ‘Smart Border’ initiative by the EU perfectly reflects this incoherency. It allows only ‘bona-fide’ migrants while strengthening border control, visa policy
and developing security management. These concrete policy tools reveal the discrepancy of European migration policy. Why is this the case and which concerns and interests lie at the roots of this policy incoherency?

Contemporary migration policy has to deal with external issues as a widening income gap between developed and less developed regions worldwide, human rights violations and political instability. The latter one has led to massive inflows of migrants, particularly from the Middle East to Europe. It concerns the EU that open borders might lead to a flood of uncontrolled migration. For this reason, every Member State is willing to be the transit country for migrants while permanent settlement is feared and prevented. But if the EU does not recognize the reality of the situation, namely a continuing process of migration, maintaining a restrictive and protective policy will probably lead to more of the inconvenient situation that already face: thousands of refugees stranded due to border restrictions, overcrowded camps and dire circumstances which already ended up in a humanitarian crisis. Moreover, if the EU would change its policy into a more migration-friendly program, with a strong focus on the development aspect, it may increase the likelihood for migrants to actually contribute to economic growth in the country of arrival or to be encouraged by attractive recruitment to return to their home country.

Taking into account the previous struggles, constituting coherent and fair policy is hampered by the fact that the EU is in a very difficult position that it upholds two voices: one of a political union and one as broker between the different Member States. This makes it hard to come up with good policy that satisfies all actors involved. Nevertheless, a number of concrete actions have been taken by the EU in terms of bilateral agreements between Member States, the EU as a whole and sending countries that include development objectives. The High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development is such an example that includes a whole array of development ambitions, such as mechanisms to effectively integrate migration into development policies and promoting coherence at all levels. In addition, there is a clear effort at involving NGOs and CSOs in policy-making, as actors that have the know-how and experience with migration topics.

Cooperation with Morocco perfectly reflects the paradoxical approaches of the EU towards migration and development. Morocco is one of these countries that has undergone serious challenges under the thumb of globalization with that, increasing complex migration issues.

Due to their physical closeness and colonial ties, the EU and Morocco uphold an intensive - and at times conflicting – relationship. EU policy-implementation towards Moroccan migration is very much seen in terms of cooperation on security issues and border control. Indeed, concrete strategies and partnerships of migration ambitions concentrate on fighting smugglers, irregular migration and facilitating return and admission. Meanwhile EU external migration policy creates an impression that boosting Morocco’s development is of the utmost importance as, for example, the EU’s strategy paper 2007 – 2013 presents. To some extent, through the Mobility Partnership and the Association Agreement, the EU engages in motions to strengthen development as financial education of the migrants and recipient families, the promotion of circular migration and develop viable economic activities. The main difficulty here is that all
these nice ambitions are constituted in soft-law agreements. Without any legislations, the EU cannot ensure that migration works for development.

Over the past decades Morocco’s attitude changed towards a more supportive migration policy through recruitment, while promoting the Moroccan norms and religious values in the hosting countries. Migration has been increasingly seen as a safety valve and a tool for national development, such as the fruitful source of remittances. How successful have these and other economic policies been in Morocco?

The number of Moroccan migrants towards Europe significantly increased from the 1990s onwards, together with the inflow of money. Morocco is ranked four on the top remittances receiving (developing) countries. The amount of remittances and human capital has accumulated in the last seven years. To some extent one can conclude that these financial activities and investments have contributed to development, primarily in terms of housing, trade, tourism and agriculture. At the same time Morocco has suffered from brain drain due to poor work conditions and rapid technology- and communication evolution world-wide. This push-pull mechanism has impeded unemployment in Morocco rather than served the high-skilled Moroccan population that even exceeds the real capacity of available jobs. The expectation that these young well-educated group would return and invest their knowledge and money in the local economy turned out to be disappointing. Today a large part of migrants has permanently settled in Europe.

Now it is time to take stock of European migration policy in Morocco: has the EU utilized the opportunity of migration for development? The answer is: not sufficient. The EU has made an ambitious attempt to include development objectives through an impressing amount of partnerships. Unfortunately the EU has not been able to act beyond borders, both literally and figuratively speaking. It has responded through a restrictive policy by closing borders and possibilities while migration could open a unique window of opportunity.

Discussion

Doing research on a broad and complex theme as migration that is subject to different contexts, actors and factors requires a comprehensive approach. During the writing process I faced some difficulties with regard to the interpretation and use of definitions, research sources and results, which I already touched upon in the Theoretical Framework and the Methodology. This discussion will give a brief and critical review of the research limitations and reflections.

First, migration is a very broad definition that includes many types of migrants. Therefore it was hard to distinguish the migrants that particularly contribute to development. The same goes for the meaning of development. What exactly is development and what are its concrete outcomes and on what scale? This study has concentrated on household and national development in the sense of economic improvement, but had some difficulties with dividing the appropriate and feasible economic components since there are a lot of actors involved. In addition, the concrete outcome and difference of development between the household and national level is hard to verify. This brings me to the second point of the scarce availability of (quantitative) results. Two problems underlie this issue. Informal, and thus non-registered data complicate the real amount of, for example, remittances and return. Second, research on
migration for development is limited and just appeared recently. I would recommend researchers and policy-makers to encourage studies on this topic, so that migration that could work for development firmly appears on the political agenda and that we can draw substantiated conclusions.
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Appendix I policy recommendations

The policy recommendations will be presented in the following way. First the criticized migration policies will be described. Subsequently, recommendations that include why and how the strategies and tools should be improved will be discussed. These recommendations are all based on the previous research results. This appendix serves as an opening to a new debate and gives food for thought and hopefully a new insight in the migration topic, particular in relation to development.

- **EU external migration policy is incoherent and the implementation does not reflect the ambitions on paper.**

Throughout its entire policy the ambitions of the EU, building up a coherent and comprehensive approach towards migration, runs counter to the implementation of policy. With regard to this study, the potential and respect for migration as enabler for development is recognized on paper, but in practice these ambitions make no reference to development at all. Thus, a general recommendation would be to ensure that (migration) policy is coherent in all its aspects.

- **The security aspect continues to prevail in the EU external migration policy.**

Migration policy is too restrictive and too much focused on preventing (illegal) migration and return. This stems from fear and security issues, particular in the main emigration regions as the Horn of Africa and the Middle-East. Therefore the EU should strengthen external cooperation with these concerned countries and fight these push factors, as bad governance, corruption and political instability. Take away the root causes and continue the migration profits (of for example the GAMM) by supporting legal migration and ensure access to the European labor market, with respect for human rights works better for development and encourages safe cooperation. The latter one is of particular importance because the EU upholds norms and values in their migration policy that include human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality the rule of law and respect for human rights. Therefore the EU should implement these standards in its migration policy.

- **The EU maintains a selective approach that favors high-skilled over low-skilled migrants.**

The EU should prevent a selective migration approach. This so-called ‘cherry-picking’ of high-skilled migrants, through for example the Blue Card, is a threat to a health labor-market and all the consequences it has for (under) development, such as brain drain. By doing this, the EU considers migrants as labor resources: whether or not migrants are welcome in the EU depends on whether they can fill gaps in human resources (CONCORD spotlight paper 2015). Moreover, the EU should anticipate the mass inflow of primarily middle- and low educated migrants and recognize their fruitful contribution to the European labor market. This should lead to more honest and effective policy that serves both ends.
The partnerships between the EU and sending countries that have been established include non-binding agreements.

The EU should support, in cooperation with sending countries as Morocco, legal frameworks that encourage or even force actors to actually implement the ambitions. The Mobility Partnership is an example of a bilateral agreement that has the potential to encourage the development potential if the non-legal nature of the MP would be replaced by a legal approach that includes strict rules to which both the EU and Morocco are committed.

Finally, strong cooperation is recommended with CSOs, NGOs and other actors that have the know-how and expertise when it comes to migration and implementation.
Appendix II Interview outline

Besides the literature analysis and quantitative data the research results of this thesis are built on three interviews: one person from the NGO sector, one from the academia field and one (European) politician. In order to have as broad a picture as possible and to prevent a too subjective perspective. Below the interview questions are listed. Although sometimes the interview was shortened or just extended depending on the respondents answers. The answers can be found in the thesis.

The following respondents have been interviewed:

Dr. Lothar Smith
Professor Geography Spatial Planning and Environmental Department
Interview by phone: 14 April, 16.30

Judith Sargentini
Member European Parliament for the Greens
Interview by phone: 20 April, 12.00

Wies Maas
Previous work fields: Ministry of Foreign Affairs on migration and development, The International Catholic Migration Commission
Interview: 21 April, 11.00, Rotterdam

Content of interview

Introduction

1. Please introduce yourself shortly: who are you, how did you get involved in the migration and development theme, and how do your current activities relate to this topic?

History migration-development nexus

2. From your perspective, how has the relation between migration and development changed (since you have been involved in this topic)?
3. How could migration contribute to economic development, in the widest sense of the term?
4. How could migration, particularly in sending countries, contribute to economic development?
5. How could migration be a threat for economic development in sending countries, in the widest sense of the term?

(European) migration policy with regard to economic development

6. From your perspective, on which topics puts current European migration policy great emphasis and what about the effects for sending countries?
7. On which themes, tools and strategies should European migration policy pay more attention in order to utilize the development potential?
8. How should/could local governments (in sending countries) better respond to the opportunities/threats of migration for economic development?

Concluding questions

9. Do you have any further questions or comments that might be important for this research?
10. May I ask you some question about this topic in the future, by email or phone?